WP09 TZLatt-Politics of Reconciliation-Cover

Technical Advisory Network of Burma B

WORKING PAPERS

Politics of Reconciliation in Burma

Toe Zaw Latt

WP No. 9 — March 2005

WORKING PAPERS are published by Technical Advisory Network of Burma at the The Burma Fund 77 South Washington Street, Suite 308 Rockville, MD 20850 Editor: Zaw Oo e-mail [email protected] First Published March 2005 Printed at the Chulalongkorn University Press. Working Papers Series is supported by the National Endowment for Democ-racy (USA) and the Rights and Democ-racy (CANADA). © The Burma Fund, 2005

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The Technical Advisory Network of Burma con-ducts research studies for the Burma Fund, which is dedicated to promoting and sharing knowledge and building capacity essential to the establishment of durable democracy in Burma. Further information:

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Politics of Reconciliation in Burma This paper is a response to the seeming 'intractability' of civil conflict in Burma, as well as a reflection on the problem of anticipating, achieving and sus-taining a reconciliation process in Burma that lives beyond the life of the first de-mocratic elections in the post-regime period. The author hopes to stimulate thoughtful discussion and debate about matters of reconciliation in Burma. The paper strongly emphasizes the relevance of Buddhism to the politics of reconciliation, which has not yet fully explored by both the leaders and the stakeholders in Burma. The paper also stresses three other key building blocks for a reconciliation process in Burma. Firstly, because Burma is ultimately a vil-lage-based society, a reconciliation processes will necessarily need to occur at the village level. Any State based initiatives must also be accompanied by broad and effective grassroots efforts. Secondly, compensation and/or merit-making has played a crucial role in conflict resolution and justice at various village levels and as such could provide valuable tools in building an appropriate model of conflict resolution at the community levels. Thirdly, the importance of administrative and political decentralization in a democratic mould cannot be over-emphasized more in the case of Burma. By adopting a system of autonomous local governments whereby local communities (ethnically or otherwise defined) are given real power with regard to their present lives and future affairs and aspirations may be the key to a more peaceful, united, diverse Burma, beneficial to all its citizens.

WP No. 9 — March 2005

Toe Zaw Latt 1

“There remains muchwork to be done for agenuine reconcilia-tion process inBurma outside of orbeyond the 'state'.”

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Technical Advisory Network of Burma

Politics of Reconciliation in Burma

I. Introduction*

Many Burma analysts agree that the seeming intractability ofthe political conflict in Burma1 has resulted in the furtherconsolidation of military rule in Burma and the systematizing oflarge-scale human rights abuses. This paper is a response to theseeming 'intractability' of civil conflict in Burma, as well as a reflectionon the problem of anticipating, achieving and sustaining areconciliation process in Burma that lives beyond the life of the firstdemocratic elections in the post-regime period. The author hopesto stimulate thoughtful discussion and debate about matters ofreconciliation in Burma. While I am only able to give a cursoryintroduction to the complex situation of Burma, I have attemptedto canvas a broad range of issues in considering the source, extentand nature of the conflict in Burma as well as the limits of differentapproaches to understanding conflict in Burma. I also broadlyconsider barriers to reconciliation in Burma as well as existing policyand program responses to reconciliation in Burma and their shortfalls.

There remains much work to be done for a genuinereconciliation process in Burma outside of or beyond the 'state'.The tendency to devise new state-centric, democratic models ofnation-building in Burma must be placed within historical critiquesof past nation-building projects in Burma. Secondly, existing policyand program approaches to reconciliation in Burma do not yetrespond to the problem of ethnocentric nationalism, which is theroot of militarism and violence in Burma today. In considering theprospects for reconciliation in Burma, I call into question the ideathat democracy and a federal state system alone will unlock Burmafrom the confines of decades of ethno-religious conflict, militarizedviolence and fear. I argue for an analysis of current nationalreconciliation politics in Burma in light of the legacies and lessonsof the past and a rethinking of ideas of Burmese nationalism andnational unity. Thirdly, without social, cultural and psychologicalreconciliation, political reconciliation in Burma cannot be sustainedin a democratic Burma. A holistic approach to reconciliation isimportant precisely because of Burma's cultural and linguistic diversityand because of the real & significant legacy of military rule. Theextent and impact of militarization on families and communities ofall ethnicities and religions and the state of fear and mistrust thatBurmese people, whether inside Burma or in exile outside of it, areforced to live with must be addressed. A national reconciliationprocess must be a way by which Burma can rid itself of the powerstructures and institutions which have exploited long-running internalconflicts and divisions and perpetuated and strengthened inequalitiesbetween different factions of people. A national reconciliation process

Reconciliation Politics in Burma2

"Burma's ethnic con-flict is a conflict rootedin politics rather than'ethnic difference' it-self”

can also be a process of re-enfranchizing highly fragmented Burmesecommunities into a common political project.

Burma's Diversity

Burma possesses considerable ethnic and religious diversity.2With a population of approximately 50 million people, ethnicBurmans make up 65 percent of the population, while a range ofethnic minority groups make up the remaining 35 percent such asShan, Wa, Karen, Mon, Kachin, Chin, and Arakanese. Further,linguists acknowledge more than 135 languages are spokenthroughout Burma. While more than 80 percent of Burma'spopulation are Buddhist, the remaining 15-20 percent practice variousChristian and animist faiths, in addition to Islam. Aside from theethnic Burmese groups previously mentioned, there are also largeimmigrant Indian (brought to Burma as colonial administrators)and Chinese populations (who have migrated under recent militaryrule) in central and lower Burma, and Mandalay city, Kachin andShan states, respectively. While most ethnic minority peoples residein the frontier areas, central Burma remains quite ethnically diversewhere different ethnic and religious groups from the frontier areaslive side by side in local communities since prior to independence.

While ethnic conflict has been seen by many as the centralroot of Burma's current crisis,3 Yawnghwe (2001) highlights animportant characteristic that Burma's ethnic conflict is a conflictrooted in politics rather than 'ethnic difference' itself, particularlyover issues regarding access to what he terms 'frontier' territory,resources, language, and cultural practice. He writes that,

(t)he conflict is political because it is both about ethnicidentity and rights, about democracy and equal opportunity,and about building nation and state. It involves politicalfundamentals as to how a nation is to be built, defined oridentified, by whom, and in what direction. It has much todo with problems arising from the application of nation-buildingformulae by the state or by a set of power-holders.4

However, in many ways the politicization of ethnic differencein Burma has resulted in ethnicity becoming a source of conflict,particularly in the wake of prolonged civil war and paranoid ethno-nationalisms that have left communities living in a state of mistrustand fear.5 A reconciliation process in Burma will have to developcareful responses to the issue of ethnic conflicts in Burma, whichavoids what Burmese historian Michael Aung Thwin calls the'reification of ethnicity' whereby conflict comes to be seen throughthe lens of ethnicity.

Toe Zaw Latt 3

“This presents a dan-gerous liaison, withtheir [INGOs'] viewsneatly meshing withthe military's own viewof their future role inBurma - central andstrong”

Doest Intractability of Conflict Mean Inevitability of MilitaryRule?

Reconciliation advocates in Burma must also respond toarguments made for supporting the perpetuation of military rule inBurma. Recent scholarship on Burma has outlined the view thatmilitarism in Burma is a way of life and their role of the military intransitional politics is inevitable. For example, the work of suchscholars as Steinberg has been increasingly of the view that themilitarism in Burma is something that cannot be changed. In hisaccount, the international community, as well as the oppositionmovement, need to come to terms with this Burmese 'fact' andredevelop strategies for democratization accordingly. In a recentopinion piece Steinberg writes, "simply to wish or try to force themilitary from power will not work. The military will be important inBurma, as it has been since independence in 1948, under any civilianadministration."7

Such views have resonated with the influential, internationalNGO sector as well, particularly international humanitarianorganizations that encourage engagement with the regime in Burmabecause of the deepening humanitarian crisis, and they believe thepro-democracy movement has achieved little real change over thepast 16 years. This presents a dangerous liaison, with their viewsneatly meshing with the military's own view of their future role inBurma - central and strong. Recently, the regime confirmed thenecessity to continue military rule in Burma:

Therefore now is the time to analyze and give upthe dogmatic view that only with the downfall of anauthoritarian system will democracy be obtained and inaccordance with the people's desire establish a marketeconomy (that is the emergence of a new and developednation) that will pave the way to a peaceful transition ofpower and national unity, which at present is sorely needed…There is no other choice, for this is the only path open for apeaceful transition of power and national reconciliation.8

An understanding of militarism as inevitable and somethingto be 'lived with' can be seen in emerging reconciliation discourseon Burma, particularly in relation to discourses on transitional justicemodels and the question of amnesties for military leaders. Bothapproaches to transitional justice and the question of amnesties arefrom the opposition movement's viewpoint key negotiating tools inthe dialogue process. Sulistiyanto has suggested that as in Indonesia,the military will play a key role in the governance of Burma andmust be figured into the equation when planning for a transitionaljustice and reconciliation process.9

However, Burmese writer Kanbawza Win argues thatamnesties must not be given to the military, whose ultimate


i

“The military wit-tingly or unwittinglyemploys a range ofexploitative andabusive practices”

accountability for human rights abuses will play a pivotal role in thereconciliation process.10 This view has been similarly expressed byBurmese exiles from around the world, in expressing fears that theright to truth, justice and in the long term, the right to reconciliation,will be traded away by political elites in the dialogue process. Onthe other hand, the members of the military, or their families andfriends would refuse to admit that there was indeed a case forreconciliation. In addition, some international NGO's and academicswho are dependent on access to military-run Burma for theirorganizational survival could also forfeit such a need.

Challenges to Reconciliation: Extent of Militarization

After eighteen years of direct military rule, Burma has gaineda notorious status of being one of the world's least developedcountries and one of the world's worst human rights violators.11

The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the currentincarnation of the military regime which has ruled Burma for decades,wages a bloody and brutal war against its own people on a varietyof fronts using all tools of power at its disposal - ideological, cultural,social, political, military, and economic. The military wittingly orunwittingly employs a range of exploitative and abusive practicessuch as forced labor, forced portering, rape and sexual violence,incarceration, torture, and extrajudicial killing, as well as repressionof political opposition and ethnic insurgent groups to maintain itspower and control. The conflict has resulted in the displacement ofhundreds of thousands of people, including political refugees incamps along the border areas, other refugees without access tocamps such as almost two million 'migrant workers' in Thailand,and unknown thousands of internally displaced people, mostly fromethnic nationality groups. In addition, Burma has a large-scaleproblem with illegal drug production as well as trafficking in people,amid an ever worsening economic situation.

It is important to get a sense of the extent of the impact ofmilitarization and repression in Burma today.12 In addition to thealmost 2,000 political prisoners in 38 major prisons around thecountry,13 more than an estimated 800,000 people a year arerequired to provide forced labor.14 In terms of the size of the militaryitself there are an estimated 400,000 plus ground troops - one ofthe largest armies in the world today without a foreign enemy, andthe largest ground force in Southeast Asia - as well as a reasonablysized air force and navy.15 In addition, there are an estimated 11million Burmese16 required to join the militia-like para-statalorganization known as the Union Solidarity & DevelopmentAssociation (USDA).17 It is commonly believed that there is onemilitary informant per ten houses in Burma, although the extent oforganized military intelligence networks cannot be accuratelymeasured.18 It is not known how many people service the prison

Toe Zaw Latt 5

“There are virtuallyno legitimatespaces for inde-pendent civil soci-ety organizations tofunction. ”

and police sector, but the number is likely to be both high andequally complicit in state-sanctioned human rights abuses.

USDA members are often encouraged to engage in publicvilification of Noble Peace Laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and herpro-democracy party the National League for Democracy (NLD),where she is claimed to be an 'axe-handle' or 'neo-colonialist'.Indeed, there have been numerous times when the USDA haveattempted physical attacks on her motorcade.19 The harshest ofthese attacks occurred on May 30, 2003, which resulted in up to 70deaths and hundreds injured, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,who was subsequently put under house arrest where she currentlyremains.20 In addition there have been recent reports of theformation of new state-sponsored militias such as Swan Arr Shin intownships across the country. This group has been particularlyimplicated in the recent unrest which resulted in the incarcerationof Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The challenge posed by the extent ofmilitarization of the Burmese state, as well as the relative complicityof people in military-led human rights abuses, is substantial.Furthermore, the USDA will pose a particular challenge forreconciliation in Burma.

The extent of repression against civil society initiatives inBurma poses an additional challenge to reconciliation in Burma.There are virtually no legitimate spaces for independent civil societyorganizations to function. However, many organizations still makeattempts to organize by resisting the absolute authority of the militaryregime. For example, even though Sangha or Buddhist clergyorganizations must be registered with the military and remain underconstant military surveillance and control, monks and nuns haveplayed an important role in sustaining the democracy movement.However, the silence of Buddhist spiritual leaders in Burma isparticularly severe regarding discussing the topic of the end ofmilitary rule and state-sanctioned human rights abuses committedacross the country. This silence must be broken if Burma is toachieve genuine reconciliation.

The NLD, under the leadership of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, isthe primary non-military controlled organization able to organizeand resist militarism in Burma within public spaces today. Otherpolitical organizations, such as the All Burma Students Federationof Student Unions, political parties, women's groups, unions, andliterary circles, for example, organize and resist militarism in smallbut creative ways often disguised from public view. Further, it hasbeen argued that some ceasefire groups have been able to negotiatea small degree of autonomy from the military in organizing socialdevelopment initiatives.21

Both Fink (2001) and Skidmore (2004) give a useful accountof the impact of military rule on people's lives. Fink draws her


“There was little'ethnic awareness'in the modern politi-cal sense duringthese times, and'ethnic identity' wasnot used or politi-cally mobilized,even forwarfare.....Ethnicitywas politically non-existent and irrel-evant as basis ofidentity. ”

research from the social and psychological perspectives of families,many of whom include both military officers, informants, and pro-democracy supporters and activists.22 Skidmore focuses on thevarious coping strategies that Burmese employ to manage, contain,and understand their fear of the terror inflicted by the state.23 Finkmakes particular note of how families, communities, and professionalgroups "are torn between protecting themselves and standing upfor what they believe." She notes how Burmese people talk and actin contradictory ways - on the one hand exposing their willingnessto complain, in certain circumstances, about the effects of militaryrule, but at other times exposing their silence and complicity withregime politics by arguing that this occurs because of the extent ofmilitarization of the state and the violence inflicted on those suspectedof supporting the opposition movement. By punishing those whosurround activists, from casual acquaintances to close friends andfamily, Fink argues the regime has been able to successfully fosterconformity and passivity among citizens.24

Searching for the Sources of Conflict in Burma

Burma's early history was not characterized by a sense ofshared belonging to an imagined Burmese community. On thecontrary, it has been marked by rivalry and conflict amid repeatedattempts at the expansion of the larger Burman, Mon, Shan, andArakan kingdoms by conquering or making strategic alliances withthe more numerous village-based tribes with the Chin, Kachin, Wa,and Karen ethnic groupings.25 The size of the competing kingdomsvaried greatly depending on the resources they could accumulate,particularly by conquering people over new territories and forgingnew tribal alliances.26 One of the primary concerns for kingdomsthroughout Asia was acquiring more people to work, such as toexpand armies, build temples, palaces, and irrigation. For thisreason, the victors of the many conflicts often returned not onlywith loot of gold and gems, but also thousands of captives whowere forced to join local workforces in and around the kingdomcapitals.27 There was little 'ethnic awareness' in the modern politicalsense during these times, and 'ethnic identity' was not used orpolitically mobilized, even for warfare.28 Kings and kingdoms werepersonal, dynastic, and legitimated not by reference to the peopleas ethnic collectivities. Ethnicity was politically non-existent andirrelevant as basis of identity. Rather, reference was made to mythicalreligious events and figures and cosmology to legitimate and justifyrule.29

Traditional accounts of the conflict in Burma frequently drawattention to the importance of understanding colonialism andnationalism and the symbiotic relationship between them. Thisrelationship is often misunderstood and needs to be re-examined.Blaming colonial powers as the original source of conflict in Burmahas been politically expedient for both the regime and the mainstream

Toe Zaw Latt 7

Burman opposition movement. While it was alongside Britishcolonialism that a sense of Burman nationalism became rooted in aparticular understanding of ethnic identity and/or, it was stronglylinked to a belief in Burman superiority over frontier and Christianizedcultures. Benedict Anderson writes that,

"…the nineteenth century colonial state (and policiesthat its mindset encouraged) dialectically engendered thegrammar of the nationalisms that eventually arose to combatit. Indeed, one might go so far as to say that the stateimagined its local adversaries as in an ominous propheticdream, well before they came into historical existence."30

His observations certainly match the case of modern Burma.For example, Burma's political boundaries, and thus the nature andextent of later border conflicts, were largely a colonial creation. Thecolonial map of Burma even included some areas and peoples thathad never before been claimed by any Burmese court, such as theRawang and Lisu communities near the Himalayan Mountains.31

(see Figure 1) It was true that the British colonial model in Burmawas based, not uncommonly, on the fundamental principle of 'divideand rule'. While British colonial policy recognized racial, ethnic,religious, social, and economic difference, it equally createddistinctions and economic inequalities between different ethnicgroups and had a great impact on the development of ethnocentricnationalisms. In Burma, the British divide and rule strategy set theKaren, Kachin, and the administrative class (a wealthy Indian migrantminority) against a pro-Rangoon based Burman majority ethnicalliance. Thus the seeds of contemporary civil war were duly sown.At the same time, increasing political defiance against the Britishwas always deeply felt in relation to repressed traditional Burmancultural and religious belief systems.

However, blaming colonialism is too easy an answer. Thekind of colonialism practiced by the British in Burma must beunderstood as a one stage in globalization, with the expansion andglobalization of capitalism or the 'free market' system, spearheadedby national capital and facilitated by and dependent on Britain, France,Portugal, and the Netherlands. Colonialists did not consciously'divide-and-rule', owing to the fear of future nationalistic reactionor resistance. The directly ruled areas were more economically viableand exploitable areas, where political, administrative, andinfrastructure investments made logical sense, and often were (orbecame) self-supporting, and in many cases profitable for colonialinvestors and bureaucrats. The indirectly ruled areas - protectorates,frontiers, the outer islands, etc. - were areas where the cost-benefitratio was not favorable. As these areas became, in time, morecommercially viable, colonial powers proceeded to impose moredirect rule, and began to integrate them into the directly ruled areas.The colonial rulers expanded the directly ruled areas and attemptedto unify all the possessions into a single, larger, more integrated

“However, blamingcolonialism is tooeasy an answer.The kind of colonial-ism practiced by theBritish in Burmamust be under-stood as a onestage in globaliza-tion, with the expan-sion and globaliza-tion of capitalism orthe 'free market'system, spear-headed by nationalcapital and facili-tated by and de-pendent on Britain,France, Portugal,and the Nether-lands.”


“construction ofMaha identities inBurmese opposi-tion and regimepolitics is one of thebiggest barriers themovement has toovercome to lay thefoundations of anew inclusive post-regime social iden-tity. ”

entity, in essence proto-modern state formations. This integratingimperative, based on market rationality and considerations of trade,investment, and production, came into play in all colonial possessionsin Southeast Asia, Africa, and South Asia.

Figure 1: Map of Burma in 1850 before the British annexed the wholecountry [Source: Descriptive Atlas of Astronomy and of Physical and PoliticalGeography by the Rev. Thomas Milner, published in London in 1850 by Wm. S. Orrand Co., can be accessed at www.maproom.org]

Beyond Maha Politics: Deconstructing EthnocentricNationalism

Maha is a Pali term used in Burmese meaning 'great'. Theterm is often used as a prefix before the statement of one's ethnicnationality, for example, Maha Bama, Maha Shan, Maha Kayin (Karen),Maha Kayah (Karenni), etc. I suggest that construction of Mahaidentities in Burmese opposition and regime politics is one of thebiggest barriers the movement has to overcome to lay thefoundations of a new inclusive post-regime social identity. Specific

Toe Zaw Latt 9

“Burma has no tra-dition of contract-based credit and,with it, no vibrantprivate sector ableto access financialresources to iden-tify and exploit eco-nomic opportuni-ties”

attention needs be given to the deconstruction of Maha Burmanidentity in Burmese nation formation.

A key strategy in this process may be redefining the importantnationalist Burman-Buddhist principles of a-myo (race), ba-tha(language), tha-thana (religion), and pyin-nyah (education) whichemerged from the Burmese anti-colonial struggle. Instead of fixedand singular ideas of race, language, and religion, a genuine senseof national unity must be given material expression through anideology that recognizes and values the differences in these aspects.If Burma's prospects for transition, improving human rights, andnational reconciliation are to be strong, both state structures,including state-military-civil relations, and the nationalist ideologiesthat give rise to it must be critically evaluated and re-defined.

In terms of a-myo, or race and nation, the dominantperspective (which certain sections of the Burmese oppositionmovement share with the military) is clearly that Burman civilizationis at the center of the Burmese nation-state, and that 'Myanmarese'culture reflect the most civilized and modern ideals of it. Suchconceptions are strongly associated with territory and conflict withthe existing Burman classification of the 'national races'. In terms ofba-tha, or language, the dominant Burman perspective is reflectedin the idea that Burmese is the national language because 82% ofthe population can speak it. This in turn justifies state-imposedrestrictions on the teaching and speaking of indigenous languages,and has resulted in demands by ethnic nationalities for the right tospeak, teach, and publish in their own languages. In terms of tha-thana, or religion, and pyin-nyah, or education, a similar rationaleexists whereby majority practices are justly imposed on the wholepopulace.

Opportunities for Reconciliation: Seeking Legitimacythrough Tradition

Nowadays, many experts suggest that "some communitiesand individuals are extremely good at coping with adversity." Theyalso recommend that in any post-conflict reconciliation process,localized coping mechanisms and traditional methods of healingshould be supported and built upon where possible.32 However, theuse of traditional methods of reconciliation can be problematic inBurma. Firstly, the regime used ample doses of tradition and cultureto legitimatize existing patterns of domination and exclusion incontemporary Burma. The militarisation of aspects of mainstreamBurmese traditions or cultural practises may have reduced the impactand significance of such practices in some communities. For instance,the military leaders have attempted to gain prestige and increasetheir social image and status through sponsoring lavish socialfunctions particularly during religious festivals that unfortunatelypromote traditional values associated with the majority Burmans


than of those from other ethnic nationalities. Second, the militaryregime has exerted great efforts with proving their legitimacy bydeploying both traditional religious and cultural symbols. Forexample, in the recent years the regime publicized the existence ofthree white elephants, which according to Burmese tradition, areonly born in times of good government, of a good king or ruler.33

Houtman (1999) offers a useful insight into theinterconnecting roles of religion and pre-colonial tradition in Burmesepolitics. He argues that there have been two approaches to theinstitutionalization of 'tradition' in Burma: on the one hand, themilitary regime's preoccupation with pagoda reconstruction,museum-building, and other 'myanmafication' projects, and on theother, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD's 'universalist mentalculture' steeped in a Theravada Buddhist tradition.34 He sets outthe ways in which the military regime has attempted to re-definehistory to bring it into line with its own national ideology. Forexample, the regime's preoccupation with history, such as the 'proof'of museum building, pagoda reconstruction, and archaeology, whichmakes sense when seen in the context of the regime's need to showit is a legitimate government based on an ancient culture.35 Thisimportance of traditional religious and cultural practices to themilitary has been a significant site for reconciliation politics,particularly for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who has strategicallydeployed tradition and culture discourses to criticize the behaviorof the military towards the people and military rule itself.

Buddhism is one of the most significant cultural systems inmainstream Burma at a village level and has played a pivotal role inreinforcing notions of nation-state and national unity in Burma.36

Both from a military and a pro-democracy movement perspective,Buddhism is the foundation of the society. Burmese Buddhistcosmology is a holistic model that covers all aspects of humanexistence and a range of both ethical and ontological customs. Assuch, it will need to play a central role in a reconciliation movementinside Burma. There power lies in the Sangha's ability to brokeraccess to religious merit-making activities leading to the accumulationof Karma. The relevance of Buddhism and the role of the Sangha inreconciliation are beginning to be considered by activists outsideBurma, and some scholarship has recently emerged on the relevanceof Buddhism to post-conflict situations. However, much more workneeds to be done on the role of Burmese Buddhist ideas andinstitutions might play in post-conflict transition.

Peace, Development & National Reconciliation: 'Inside'Approaches

'Inside' approaches to reconciliation in Burma fall into threemajor categories: firstly, military approaches; secondly, religiousapproaches sponsored by Buddhist monks or church-based NGOs

“Buddhism is one ofthe most significantcultural systems inmainstream Burmaat a village leveland has played apivotal role in rein-forcing notions ofnation-state andnational unity inBurma both from amilitary and a pro-democracy move-ment perspective.”

Toe Zaw Latt 11

such as the Shalom Foundation and Metta Development Foundationbased in Kachin state; and thirdly, opposition tactics, such as theapproach typified by the NLD. In terms of military approaches it ishard to obtain reliable information but there has been muchdiscussion of 'national reconciliation' on an ideological level in state-sponsored media. For example, all printed magazines, books, etc.are printed with the four political objectives of the state, the secondof which is 'national reconsolidation'. By this the regime refers to aprocess of unifying 'rogue' border states into a strong military state.The following quote typifies the military's response to issues ofreconciliation and peace-building, which sees itself as a central,driving force in this process:

Nowadays, national unity has been rebuilt in the Unionof Myanmar. As 17 armed groups have returned to thelegal fold, peace now prevails across the country. It is onlymore than a dozen years that peace and security (internalpeace as the politicians say) the people have desired formany years, has been restored. It can be said thereconciliation has been brought about between armed groupsand national races and between the groups and theGovernment dispelling suspicions of the past.37

The regime has recently reignited efforts to see this unifyingprocess through the National Convention process, although onlyselected individuals and parties are able to participate with manyrestrictions causing it to be widely considered ineffective.

Despite mounting evidence to the contrary, the military seesitself as engaging in genuine peace-building and nationalreconciliation through legitimate means. Two are worthy of mentionin our current discussion. Firstly, through accepting ethnic insurgentgroups who have returned to the 'legal fold', particularly the twolargest cease-fire ethnic armies - the Kachin and the Mon. Thesereturns are given wide state media coverage and are promotedheavily in Burma's international diplomacy. Secondly, concessionlicenses given by the military to companies owned by ceasefiregroups for infrastructure and resource extraction developmentprojects.38 Lambrecht argues that while 'development' has beenused as a military strategy by successive regimes, it has beenparticularly so under the SPDC since 1997 where the rhetoric of'benevolent development' has been used to disguise the dominationof marginalized ethnic minority communities.39 The current regime's'Master Plan for the Development of the Border Areas and NationalRaces' sets five goals: to develop the economic and social worksand roads and communications of the national races at the borderareas in accordance with the three main national causes;40 to cherishand preserve the culture, literature, and customs of the nationalraces; to strengthen the amity among the national races; to eradicatetotally the cultivation of poppy plants by establishing economicenterprises; and lastly, to preserve and maintain the security,

“Despite mountingevidence to thecontrary, the militarysees itself as en-gaging in genuinepeace-building andnational reconcilia-tion through legiti-mate means.”


“The Sangha,which has a popu-lation of nearly half-a-million monksroughly equivalentin number to thearmed forces....”

prevalence of law and order, and regional peace and tranquillity ofthe border areas.41 Lambrecht notes that while these goals appearin 'noble language' they have in practice provided a vehicle for thefurther oppression of ethnic minorities as the regime deploys thediscourse of development in an attempt to justify the activities theyconduct in the border regions.42 He writes that by "presenting itspolitical agenda in the border regions as a disinterested effort torealize the goal of development, it can appeal for internationalassistance and justify the violent consequences of its developmentpolicies as the necessary cost of progress."43

Beside this military-dominated discourse on reconsolidation,there is a subtle but significant alternative perspective onreconciliation by the country's Sangha order. For example, thepreachings of many prominent Buddhist monks reminded both themilitary junta and the democratic opposition about the need forreconciliation. The Sangha, which has a population of nearly half-a-million monks roughly equivalent in number to the armed forces,plays three important roles in reconciliation process as agitators,pacifiers, and mediators. Historically, Burmese Buddhist monksas social agitators played important roles in anti-colonial period aswell as the subsequent period under parliamentary governmentsuntil the military-socialist regime in 1962 strictly prohibited againstsuch religious activism. Again in 1988, the activism of youngBuddhist monks resurfaced and brought a direct confrontation withthe military regime. At the height of the democratic opposition'svictory over May elections in 1990, the activist monks declared aboycott against military men and their families, refusing to acceptthe donations of alms from them and limiting their ability to earndonor merit in fulfilling future lives, or to participate in weddingsand funerals. Monk activists referred to this practice as "the powerof overturning the begging bowl," or the patta ni kauz za kan.Unfortunately but not surprisingly, the military crushed the protestwith force and detained and disrobed several young monks associatedwith the incident.44 The raid on the Mahagandayone Monastry inMandalay, religious capital of Burma, left several casualties andresulted in the imprisonment of young activist monks. It inflicted adeep sore in the relationship between the military and the Buddhistorder that until now has not been completely reconciled.

Following the incident, the miliary junta implemented acampaign on "purification" of Sangha order in a drive against activistmonks, while promoting traditional pacifiers who endorsed strictnon-engagement in politics to the higher echelon of the State SanghaMaha Nayaka or the country's highest monastic council. In reinforcingstate patronage of Buddhism,45 the SPDC generals often brought inand observed together with senior monks on public merit makingat national monuments and local pagodas as well as on religiouscelebrations during akha-gyi yet-gyi or important religious timesand dates.

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“Buddhist reconcili-ation initiatives in-side Burma are fewand far between.What few do exist,their activities arelimited, small scale,and usually not pro-grams that are inte-grated and sup-ported by the Bud-dhist hierarchy. ”

As a result, the country's Sangha order has become deeplypolarized between senior and junior monks, between younger andolder generations, between top-down and bottom-up practices, andmost importantly, between military and opposition camps. However,a few senior monks did try to promote reconciliation within thesociety in general and between the political foes in particular. Forinstance, the countrys' most revered senior abbot titled ThamanyaSayadaw, whom both SPDC generals and Daw Aung San Suu Kyipaid regular homage, emphasized loving kindness, truth, peaceand development in his teachings.

Although the Tha-ma-nya Sayadaw's approach was subtleand non-public, two highly respected Sayadaws urged openly theruling military council and the NLD to work for national reconciliation.Two senior Buddhist figures, Sayadaw U Zawtipala, abbot ofKyakhatwaing Monastery in Pegu and Ashin Kundalabiwuntha ofMahaghandharon Monastery in Mandalay, appealed both sides tobe flexible to end the suffering of the Burmese people.47 Representinghighly influential Shwe Kyin and Masoeyein Buddhsit sect respectively,the appeals prompted both SPDC and NLD to issued responses.However, judging from these responses, the military regime wasunreceptive to the notion of reconciliation remaining firmly of theopinion that there is nothing wrong with the state of the Union.Thus, the calls for reconciliation sadly faded away.

Buddhist reconciliation initiatives inside Burma are few andfar between. What few do exist, their activities are limited, smallscale, and usually not programs that are integrated and supportedby the Buddhist hierarchy. Buddhist reconciliation initiatives are largelybeing conducted in active lay communities close to the frontierconflict zones. For example, the Kayan Peace Committee, which isbased out of a Buddhist monastery in Pa'an district in Burma, aimsat reconciling Buddhist and Christian Karen communities. Thereremains however, a glaring need for Burmese monks to take amore active role in promoting and sustaining reconciliation at agrassroots level.

Information about church-sponsored ceasefire groupinitiatives is most limited, and what is known about these initiativesis difficult to report because of its sensitive nature. This lack ofinformation combined with the need for secrecy about 'inside'initiatives is a huge barrier to achieving reconciliation in Burma asgroups that withhold such information are viewed by 'outside' groupswith suspicion and mistrust. On the other hand, it is difficult to gaintrust and openly communicate with groups 'inside'.48

The NLD utilizes the language of reconciliation in their politicaldiscourse but in practice shows it has a limited understanding ofreconciliation. The NLD's approach reflects their narrow interpretation


“Burma remains se-riously in need of ajointly owned, inclu-sive national recon-ciliation process.However, all partiesat the leadershiplevel have yet topropose or initiatesuch a process.”

of the term as thin-bone-kyay which translates as 'amnesia' or'forgetting.' Their December 2004 statement clarified the goal ofnational reconciliation is about finding "ways to condone each other."In the same statement, the NLD emphasized:

An atmosphere which encourages mutual consultation,working in unity, and obeying the law, which forms part ofthe seven rules of Apiriha Niya codes of conduct for thegeneral public and which furthers the interests of the nationand the people, needs to be created. Hence, in accordancewith the wishes of the people and looking forward to generalharmony devoid of any retribution, the NLD wishes to suggestthat it is time to start discussing matters that will clean theslate and let bygones relating to all the national forces,including the ethnic nationalities, be bygones.49

On the other hand, the SPDC emphasized the importance ofnational convention in its interpretation of national reconciliation,and the NLD's commitment to the convention is viewed as anecessary step. Such view was also a response to the NLD's decisionin November 1995 to withdraw from the military-run NationalConvention, which the NLD said "[the convention] could notmeaningfully contribute to national reconciliation, multi-partydemocracy or a constitution that will be acceptable to all the peopleof our country."50

The question here is what kind of process do the politicalactors propose for 'national reconciliation'? Obviously, the mode ofclosed-door, 'secret talks', like those sponsored by United Nationsin 2000, is not a sufficient venue to accomplish reconciliation of thenation. The NLD remains in need of a clear policy on "nationalreconciliation" with workable procedures, not only on dealing withthe SPDC, but for its own members as a mass movement. Burmaremains seriously in need of a jointly owned, inclusive nationalreconciliation process. However, all parties at the leadership levelhave yet to propose or initiate such a process.

Dialogue & National Reconciliation: 'Outside' Approaches

The National Reconciliation Program (NRP) was establishedin 1999 to assist the pro-democracy movement to bring about apeaceful transition to democracy and the establishment of a federalUnion of Burma through a 'tripartite dialogue' as set out in theUnited Nations General Assembly resolutions on Burma. It wasinitiated by the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burmato ensure the widest possible participation of ethnic peoples todetermine their own political future. It is managed by the EuropeanOffice for the Development of Democracy (Euro-Burma Office)through its Secretariat based in Thailand. The Secretariat is theclearinghouse/liaison between donors and the NRP FacilitationTeam.51 The program also aims to encourage ethnic peoples toengage in dialogue with their geographical neighbors and to prepare

Toe Zaw Latt 15

“While the estab-lishment and scopeof the committee isa promising devel-opment, the ques-tion is whether theentire non-Burmanethnic nationalitiescan reach commonagreement if andwhen tripartite dia-logue actually oc-curs.”

themselves to achieve the political structures they desire. The NRPdoes not directly implement projects; rather existing politicalorganizations implement their own projects within the NRPframework.52 Program areas include consultations, conflictmanagement training, and resolution and capacity building.

The focus of the NRP on tripartite dialogue is interesting tonote. It sees tripartite dialogue in the Burmese context as a dialogueamong the military, democracy movement (represented singularlyby the NLD), and the ethnic nationalities. Since the NRP is not apolitical organization, this raises the question of who will representthe ethnic nationalities. The term 'tripartite dialogue' arose becausemost external actors thought the problem of Burma can be resolvedby solving the political deadlock among three key players. Althoughsuch deadlock emerged mainly from the military regime's refusal tohandover power to the NLD in 1990 elections, 'tripartite' was usedto indicate that a third party or issue must also be included in thefinal settlement.

The NRP also made another significant argument that theBurmese problem is a constitutional problem, not a minority or anethnic problem that can be resolved at a later date once democracyis established. The questions of democracy, military rule, and theconstitutional arrangement with the non-Burman ethnic nationalitiesare intrinsically intertwined and cannot be separately resolved. Whilethe NRP is a welcomed initiative, there are some worrying absencesof overarching ideology and vision about reconciliation in Burma.Further, because program implementation is fully dependent on thecapacity and approach of the implementing organizations,reconciliation initiatives along the border areas have diverseideological underpinnings and vastly divergent outcomes.

Another 'outside' initiative, born out of the NRP consultations,is the formation of the Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and CooperationCommittee (ENSCC)53 who is empowered by its memberorganization to speak on behalf of the non-Burman ethnicnationalities on matters concerning 'tripartite dialogue' in the processleading up to dialogue.54 While the establishment and scope of thecommittee is a promising development, the question is whether theentire non-Burman ethnic nationalities can reach common agreementif and when tripartite dialogue actually occurs. A particular challengeto this initiative is the firm communication gap - both ideologicaland logistical - between internal ceasefire groups and non-ceasefireethnic insurgent groups based along the border areas of Burma.These divisions can actually work to augment the military's argumentfor 'national unity' maintained through its own 'centralized mediation'and armed intervention. There is a great deal of pressure on non-Burman ethnic nationalities as they work to convince both the militaryregime and the democracy movement on their common positionon constitutional federalism and commitment to the process of


“I don't think thatpeople will reallythirst for vengeanceonce they have be-ing given access totruth.”

democratization. While the 'third party' question remains under theshadow of the military rule, it is still difficult to reach a consensuswithin the third party to bring their agenda on the table. This is anarea where the United Nations should play a more pro-active roleby facilitating the meeting of 'inside' and 'outside' ethnic minoritygroups.55

The challenges that 'inside' and 'outside' reconciliation effortsshare range from the need for compatible ideological frameworksand coordinated models, to a lack of adequate and equitableresourcing amongst all groups. These issues are interlinked andneed to be more particularly addressed by international donors andNGO's, particularly those with access to communities inside Burma.

Towards a Truth and Reconciliation Model for Burma?

Truth and Reconciliation Commissions have providednumerous nations with a means by which to grapple with the legacyof human rights abuses in post-conflict or transitional contexts;however, the success of commissions in dealing with these issueshas been mixed. Furthermore, commissions have largely operatedin Christian societies in African and Latin American countriesmodelled around the central idea of forgiveness. There has yet tobe an example of such a body in a Buddhist society, and the relevanceof Buddhism to the politics of reconciliation in Burma has not beenfully explored. However, in the Burmese context, Daw Aung SanSuu Kyi has stated:

I think in every country which has undergone thekind of traumatic experiences that we have had in Burmathere will be need for truth and reconciliation. I don't thinkthat people will really thirst for vengeance once they havebeing given access to truth. But the fact that they aredenied access to the truth simply stokes the anger andhatred in them. That their suffering has not beenacknowledged makes people angry.56

There is mounting evidence from around the globe that 'truth-seeking' has become a central mechanism for reconciliation processesin many transitional societies. South Africa is a classic examplealong with many Latin American countries such as Chile, Argentina,and El Salvador. In the Asian context, Indonesia is currentlyexperiencing much public and parliamentary debate on the formationof its Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This process is beingmirrored in Cambodia as it comes to terms with the difficulties ofobtaining justice for those harmed under the Khmer Rouge's reignof terror.

Restorative and reconciliatory justice approaches in dealingwith past human rights abuses have became widely accepted asnecessary and legitimate transitional mechanisms. The mostsuccessful transitional strategies in this respect have been large

Toe Zaw Latt 17

“Retributive killingsin the final days ofweak socialist gov-ernment duringSeptember 1988,which took place inthe suburbs ofRangoon andeventually broughtback the army intopower with a justifi-cation of "restoringlaw and order,"57were key lessonsfor the leadership ofthe democracymovement andwork must be doneto avoid any similaroutcomes in the fu-ture transition. ”

citizen-led movements, rather than narrow state-based retributivejustice strategies which focus on punishments with little considerationfor the reintegration of victims and perpetrators back intocommunities. Although ideas of restorative and reconciliatory justicecan be identified in each subset of diverse Burmese cultural context,little work has been done by organizations and groups to exploreand make these ideas into actions. This is an important area forfuture work.

The 1988 nationwide uprising, in which former military-backed Burma Socialist Party Program (BSPP) members wereaccepted by the protesters, can provide a historical reference fromwhich one can think about the twin process of demilitarization andreconciliation in the current context. While there was no formal,centrally-led and organized reconciliation process with either theBSPP as a whole or with local party officials, the reciprocity providedby both student activists and the Sangha to the initial confessionsof the BSPP officers triggered mass exodus of party members andsubsequent collapse of the entire BSPP. It is interesting to note thata key part of this process in 1988 was "truth-telling" on the extentof party corruption and abuse of power and public confessions ofguilt by party members. . However, it is also important to note howfragile reconciliation process can easily end up in violence. Retributivekillings in the final days of weak socialist government duringSeptember 1988, which took place in the suburbs of Rangoon andeventually brought back the army into power with a justification of"restoring law and order,"57 were key lessons for the leadership ofthe democracy movement and work must be done to avoid anysimilar outcomes in the future transition.

In bringing this paper to a close, there are three other keybuilding blocks for a reconciliation process in Burma. Firstly, becauseBurma is ultimately a village-based society, a reconciliation processeswill need to occur at the village level. State based initiatives mustalso be accompanies by broad and effective grassroots efforts.Secondly, compensation and merit-making has played a crucial rolein conflict resolution and justice at the village level and could providevaluable tools in building an appropriate model of conflict resolutionat the community level. Thirdly, the importance of administrativeand political decentralization in a democratic mould cannot be over-emphasized more in the case of Burma. By adopting a system ofautonomous local governments whereby local communities(ethnically or otherwise defined) are given real power with regardto their present lives and future affairs and aspirations may be thekey to a more peaceful, united, diverse Burma, beneficial to all itscitizens.


Endnotes:

* This paper is dedicated to the late Dr. Chao Tzang Yawnghwe for his vision on mattersof reconciliation in Burma, encouragement to the author and helpful advice on earlydrafts of this paper. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the InternationalPerspectives on Peace and Reconciliation Conference at the University of Melbourne inJuly 2003 with Carol Ransley.1 It is customary to acknowledge that the decision to use the term ‘Burma’ or ‘Myanmar’generates some controversy in that Burma’s ruling military junta changed the name of thecountry from the Union of Burma to the Union of Myanmar in 1989. While the UnitedNations recognized this name change, many opposition groups regarded the change asillegitimate and take offence at the use of the term ‘Myanmar’. While ‘Myanmar’ is adirect transliteration of the formal, official Burmese language name for the country Myan-mar Naing-Ngan, in this paper I use the term Burma. I do, however, reproduce the term‘Myanmar’ in quotations where the term has been used in the original text.2 Smith, M. 1994. Ethnic Groups in Burma: Development, Democracy and Human Rights.3 See, for example, Bertil Lintner, Land of Jade: A Journey from India through NorthernBurma to China, White Orchid Press, Bangkok, 1996; Josef Silverstein, Burmese Politics:The Dilemmas of National Unity (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1980; and MartinSmith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. London and New Jersy: ZedBooks, 1991).4 Yawnghwe, Chao-Tzang. 2001. “Burma and National Reconciliation: Ethnic Conflict &State-Society Dysfunction.” Legal Issues on Burma Journal, Vol 10, No. 1.5 See Mikael Gravers 1998. Nationalism as Political Paranoia in Burma.6 Michael Aung Thwin. 1998. Myth and History in the Historiography of Early Burma:Paradigms, Primary Sources and Prejudices.7 Steinberg, D. 2003. “Engage Burma.” Washington Post, July 15.8 Editorial of New Light of Myanmar, July 11, 2003.9 Sulistiyanto, Priyambudi. 2002. “Reconciliation and the Politics of Justice: Indonesiaand Burma in Comparative Perspective.” Paper presented at the 1st International BurmaStudies Conference, Götenberg University, Sweden, September 2002.10 Kanbawza Win. 2002. “Impunity Inconceivable.” Working Paper 1/02, TechnicalAdvisory Network of Burma, April.11 United Nations General Assembly has adopted successive, strongly-worded resolutionson the gravity of the human rights situation in Burma.12 Numbers regarding the size of the army, military intelligence and political prisonerpopulation sizes are not always reliable. For example, the size of the army is oftenexaggerated and the population of political prisoners vastly underestimated due to aninability to access independent information. However, the numbers provided herein areuseful estimates.13 See Assistance Association for Political Prisoners Burma at http://www.aappb.org14 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Forced Labour in Burma. PressRelease 1999.15 Selth, Andrew. 2002. Burma’s Armed Forces: Power without Glory.16 Figure quoted in Economic Intelligence Unit. 1999. Report on Burma. Third Quarter.17 Today, the USDA is the only formal Burma-wide social organization, but remains firmlycontrolled & managed by the Minister for Home Affairs under the tutelage of the SPDCChairman, General Than Shwe. Its prime function is to promote national unity and pride inthe Burmese nation, and is an important strategic space for the circulation of militarypropaganda. The military state returns membership and participation in the USDA withsignificantly subsidised consumer goods and some free education & businessopportunities, as well as special training in SPDC ideology, military parading, tactics andthe use of basic weapons.18 Fink, C. Living Silence: Burma under Military Rule. Zed Books, London, 2001.19 The worst incident was recorded in May 2003 in Depayin in Upper Burma prompting theinternational community to send its strongest messages of support for Daw Aung SuuKyi to Rangoon yet. However, the regime responded that it could not control the growinghatred of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in the Burmese population, despite the obviouspropaganda machine being responsible for the vilification of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.20 Aung Htoo, Preliminary Report of the Ad hoc Commission on Depayin Massacre. Adhoc Commission, Thailand, July 17, 2003.

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21 These groups include the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), New Mon StateParty (NMSP), Kayan New Land Party (KNLP), Karenni Nationals People LiberationFront (KNPLF), Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organizations (SSNPLO),Palaung State Liberation Organization (PSLO) and Shan State Peace Council (SSPC).22 Fink, C, 2001, op cit.23 Skidmore, Monique. 2004. Karaoke Fascism: Burma and the Politics of Fear; seeparticularly Chapter 3, “Darker than Midnight: Fear, Vulnerability and Terror-making.”24 Fink, C., op cit, p.120.25 For an account of the allegiance-building strategy with the Chin chieftains by successivemajority rulers see Vumsom. 1987. Zo History: with an introduction to Zo Culture,economy, religion and their status as an ethnic minority in India, Burma and Bangladesh.See also, Sakhon, Lian. 2002. In search of Chin Identity.26 Fink, above n 16, 15.27 See Liebermann, Victor. 1984. Burmese Administrative Cycles: Anarchy and Conquestc. 1580-1760. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 98 pgs. He presents an account ofthe Burman King Thalun’s resettlement plans for conquered Mon, Shan, Siamese, Lao,Indians and Arakanese in an around his dynastical capital.28 For example, various military regiments such as the Kachin Rifles and the Karen Rifleswere of British creation. Burma itself had never had a tradition of ethnically-labelledarmies but only regional ones such as Shwe Bo Calvary.29 Victor B. Lieberman. “Reinterpreting Burmese History,” Comparative Studies in Societyand History, Vol. 29, No..1. (January 1987), 162-194.30 Anderson, B. 1991..31 Thant Myint-U. 2001. The Making of Modern Burma.32 International IDEA. Reconciliation after Violent Conflict, Policy Summary. Stockholm,2003.33 It is now customary practice for all post-secondary school students to become USDAmembers and at the commencement of their course, participate in ceremonies to payrespect to the recently named white elephants. See All Burma Students Federation ofStudent Unions, Education Report 2002 and 2003.34 Gustaaf Houtman, (1999a) ‘Remaking Myanmar and human origins: an account of therole of pagoda relics and museum fossils in SLORC-SPDC concepts of nation-building’,Anthropology Today, Vol. 15, No. 4, p. 13-19, and (1999b) Mental Culture in BurmeseCrisis Politics: Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (Institute forthe Study of Languages and Cultures of Asian and Africa, Tokyo University of ForeignStudies.35 Interestingly, as Houtman notes, the Burmese term for history, thamaing, literallytranslates as ‘pagoda history’.36 ECV Focar, (1946) They Reigned in Mandalay.37 New Light of Myanmar. June 3, 2003.38 Andrew Selth, op cit, notes that SLORC/SPDC also benefits economically throughPyidaungsu Myanmar Naing-Ngan Si Pwa Yae Corporation (Myanmar EconomicCorporation) which was authorized by the military regime to conduct business “in almostany field of commerce and industry, completed unfettered by the law which control othereconomic activities in Burma.”39 Lambrecht, Curtis. 1999. “Destruction and violation: Burma’s border developmentpolicies.” Watershed, November.40 The three main national clauses are i) non-disintegration of the Union; (ii) non-disintegration of national solidarity; (iii) consolidation and perpetuation of sovereignty.41 Union of Myanmar, Master Plan for the Development of the Border Areas and NationalRaces, State Peace and Development Council, Burma. 1992.42 Lambrecht, C. 1999.43 Lambrecht, C. 1999:.44 Bruce Matthews. “Buddhism under military rule,” Asian Survey. Vol. 33, No. 4, 1993.45 Juliane Schober. “Buddhist Just Rules and Burmese National Culture,” History ofReligions. Vol. 36, No. 3, 1997. Schober skillfully deconstructed the religious rituals andevents in Burma by explaining how the military regime has used various religious symbolsto reinforce hegemony on traditional Buddhist populations.46 Houtman, Gustaaf. 1999b. Houtman devoted the whole chapter (20) “Samatha meditationand the politics of power and control” to the role of Tha-ma-nya Sayardaw.


47 Vol.8 No.2 February - Perspective by Min Zin, the article accessed at http://www.irrawaddy.org/database/2000/vol8.2/perspective.html on 7/13/200548 Ashley South. “Political Transition in Myanmar: A New Model for Democratization,”Contemporary Southeast Asia. Singapore: Aug 2004. Vol. 26, Iss. 2; pg. 233. South madean excellent analysis of the tentative re-emergence of civil society networks within andbetween ethnic nationality/ minority communities over the past decade is one of the mostsignificant - but under-examined - aspects of the social and political situation in thecountry.49 Democratic Voice of Burma. “Burma’s National League for Democracy seeks talks on“forgiveness,”” December 28, 2004. The Democratic Voice of Burma had translated thisterm imprecisely as forgiveness; however, the Burmese term refers to a forgetting andmoving into the future with a clean slate.50 Shenon, P. 1995. “The national convention is not heading towards democracy.” TheNew York Times November 30.51 The National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), the NationalCouncil of the Union of Burma (NCUB), and other political organizations like the KarenniNational Progressive Party (KNPP) and the Shan State Army (SSA), form the ‘FacilitationTeam’ to help manage the program.52 Current target groups are non-Burman ethnic nationalities, women, youth and Burman/non-Burman relations from non-ceasefire groups, ceasefire groups and political networks.Two organizations empowered by the NRP to concentrate on these issues are the Women’sLeague of Burma and the United Nationalities League for Democracy– Liberated Area.53 Members include the National Democratic Front (NDF), United Nationalities League forDemocracy Liberated Area (UNLD_LA), non-ceasefire groups, such as the KarenniNational Progressive Party, and ceasefire groups as of August 2001.54 ENSCC policy is that when actual dialogue takes place only duly appointedrepresentatives of various ethnic nationalities will be empowered to speak on their ownbehalf in the actual process of tripartite dialogue. See Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity andCooperation Committee. 2002. The New Panglong Initiative: Re-Building The Union OfBurma. Policy Papers.55 UN Special Envoy Razali has conducted initial consultations and meetings with allmajor internal and external minority groups but little has been done to facilitate bridgingthe ideological and communication gaps.56 Clements, Alan. 1998. Voice of Hope. Seven Stories Press, Reprint edition.57 The military junta named itself the “State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)upon taking over power on September 18, 1988. It also produced an official documentarydisplaying atrocious acts committed by the mass movement including beheadings, lootingsand killings during summer in 1988 while justifying its killing of three thousand unarmedprotesters as necessary acts to restore law and order.

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The Author:

Toe Zaw Latt is a Research Associate of the Washington-based think-tank, BurmaFund. He holds B.A. from Bradford University and M.A. in Asian Studies fromMonash University. He recently spent six months in South Africa and received adiploma on reconciliation studies from the International Center for TransitionalJustice in Cape Town.

Documents

WP09 TZLatt-Politics of Reconciliation-Cover