World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/626761468046801353/pdf/multi... · Report No. 15129 IMIPLEMENTATION ... Kamunge (education ... Bank could have more seriously

Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No. 15129

IMIPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

KENYA

SIXTH EDUCATION PROJECT(CREDIT 1673-KE)

DECEMBER 1, 1995

Population and Human Resources DivisionEastern Africa DepartmentAfrica Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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KENYASIXTH EDUCATION PROJECT

CURRENCY EOUIVALENTS

At the time of appraisalKSh 16 = US$ 1.00KSh 1 = US$ 0.0625

Annual average of the time of project completion (December 1994)KSh 56 = US$ 1.00KSh 1 = US$ 0.0178

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

Metric System

FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER

July 1 - June 30

ACADEMIC YEAR

Primary, Secondary and Polytechnic: January - DecemberTeachers Training: May - March

University: October - June

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AZS - Arid Zone Primary SchoolCAS - Country Assistance StrategyCTB - Central Tender BoardDCA - Development Credit AgreementEDSAC - Education Sector Adjustment CreditEMS - Educational Media ServiceIT - Institute of TechnologyJP - Junior Polytechnic (formerly Village Polytechnic)KIE - Kenya Institute of EducationMEST - Ministry of Education and Science and Technology (former MOE)MOE - Ministry of EducationMOPW - Ministry of Public WorksMOW - Ministry of Works (former MOPW)NTC - National Teacher's CollegePCR - Project Completion ReportPIU - Project Implementation UnitPU - Planning Unit, MOEPTTC -Primary Teacher Training CollegeSAR - Staff Appraisal ReportSDR - Special Drawing RightsStandard - Grade of Primary SchoolTSC - Teachers Service CommissionTTI - Technical Training InstituteVP - Village Polytechnic (currently JP)YP - Youth Polytechnic

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Table of Contents

Preface

Evaluation Summary

Introduction. iProject Objectives and Description ................................................ iImplementation Experience and Results ................................................ iSummary of Future Operations, Findings and Key Lessons Learned ......... ..... iii

Part I: Project Implementation Assessment

Project Objectives ............................................... IAchievement of Project Objectives ................... ............................. 2Implementation Record ............................................... 3Major Factors Affecting the Project ...................... .......................... 4Civil Works and Equipment ............................................... 4Efficiency, Effectiveness and Sustaimability ................................................ 6Bank Performance ........ 8.......................................8Bo rrower Performance ................................................ 9Assessment of Outcome ............................................... 9Completion and Future Operation: Options ............................................... 10Key Lessons Learned ............................................... 10

Part II: Statistical Annexes

Table 1 Summary of AssessmentsTable 2 Related Bank CreditsTable 3 Project TimetableTable 4 Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and ActualTable 5 Key Indicators for Project ImplementationTable 6 Key Indicators for Project Operation OptionsTable 7 Studies Included in ProjectTable 8A Project CostsTable 8B Project FinancingTable 8C Project Financing (continued)Table 9 Costs of Major Project ComponentsTable 10 Status of Legal CovenantsTable 11 Compliance with Operational Manual StatementsTable 12 Bank Resources: Staff InputsTable 13 Bank Resources: Missions

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of theirofficial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed wiLhout World Bank authorization.

Appendices

Appendix A Mission Aide-MemoireAppendix B Borrower Contribution to the ICRAppendix C Cofinancier Contribution (not applicable)Appendix D Quality of Design and ConstructionAppendix 1 Costs of Construction Works (Ksh)Appendix 2 Costs of Construction Works (US$)Appendix 3 Comparison of Planned and Actual Floor AreasAppendix 4 Equipment for KIE, PU and TSCAppendix E Map of Kenya Sixth Education Project

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

KENYA

SIXTH EDUCATION PROJECT (CR. 1673-KE)

Preface

This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Sixth Education Project inKenya, for which Cr. 1673-KE in the amount of SDR 35.0 million (US$ 37.5 million at theprevailing exchange rate) was approved on March 27, 1986 and made effective on February 24,1987.

The credit was closed on December 31, 1994. The original closing date was June 30,1992. The credit was fully disbursed and the last disbursement took place on May 11, 1995.(The actual amount of disbursement increased by US$ 11.0 million to US$ 48.5 million because offavorable exchange fluctuation between SDR and US Dollars.)

The ICR was prepared by Yang-Ro Yoon, from the Population and Human ResourcesDivision (Eastern Africa Department) of the Africa Region and reviewed by Messrs. Jacob vanLutsenburg Maas (Division Chief), Surendra Agarwal (Projects Advisor) and James W. Adams(Director). The borrower contributed to preparation of this ICR by rendering professionalassistance to the ICR mission. The borrower prepared its own ICR, the Executive Summary ofwhich is included as Appendix B. Borrower comments of August 11, 1995 on the draft ICR havebeen incorporated into this final report.

Preparation of this ICR was begun in February 1995 during the Bank's final supervisionmission and the ICR mission which took place from May 17 to June 2, 1995. The ICR missioncomprised Yang-Ro Yoon (task manager), Messrs. Nguyen X. Nguyen (economist), JamesKamunge (education specialist, Resident Mission/Nairobi), Harry Potts (implementationspecialist/quantity surveyor, consultant) and Professor S. 0. Kwasa (economist, consultant). Themission visited the construction sites of seven Primary Teachers Training Colleges (PTTCs) andthree Arid Zone Schools (AZSs) under this Project, and Kericho PTTC which was supported bythe Fifth Education Project. This report is based on the mission's observations from the field trip,discussions in the field with most of the contractors, consultants for the civil works, teachers,students, parents and local officials including education administrators, review of projectdocuments and correspondence in project files, and discussions with various institutions includingthe Project Implementation Unit (PIU), Kenya Institute of Education (KIE), Teachers ServiceCommission (TSC), and Planning Unit (PU) and other departments of the Ministry of Education(MOE).

Evaluation Summary page i of iv

Evaluation Summary

Introduction

1. The Bank has been involved in the development of education and training in Kenya since1966. Bank projects have mainly focused on supply-side financing of education -- construction ofbuildings, provision of equipment, technical assistance and training. To date the Bank has fundedseven education projects (including this project) and one Education Sectoral Adjustment Loan.

Project Objectives and Description

2. The specific project objectives were to improve the equity and quality of Kenya's educationsystem and to promote institutional development through strengthening the Government's capabilityto effectively plan and manage educational expansion at all levels. To achieve these objectives, theproject was to: (a) construct seven new primary teacher training colleges (PTFCs); (b) constructthree new arid zone primary schools (AZSs) in remote locations; (c) provide the Kenya Institute ofEducation (KIE) with equipment, specialist services and training to support the development ofeducational materials delivered by the Educational Media Services (EMS); (d) assist KIE inpreparing and testing new curricular materials for secondary and technical education; (e)strengthen the capacity of the Planning Unit (PU) of MOE and the Teachers Service Comnnission(TSC).

3. While the project objectives were clear and generally consistent with various aspects of theGovernment's education policy in the Fifth Development Plan and with the Bank's countryassistance strategy (CAS) for Kenya, the process of developing project objectives did notvigorously question the central assumption of the Development Plan (vocationalization of basiceducation): nor did it emphasize cost-sharing by students and communities in post-primaryeducation or teacher training.

Implementation Experience and Results

4. Overall, the project objectives were partially achieved and the general outcome was notsatisfactory. The project did not sufficiently enhance quality and equity of the education system.Cost and time control was inadequate, and quality control was seriously flawed. The AZSs andPTTCs were over-designed, over-specified and over-supplied with furniture and equipment.Insufficient attention was paid to sustainability or beneficiaries' needs when specifyingrequirements for physical works: these have inherited problems of maintenance and sustainability.The AZSs are under-enrolled and the facilities of both the PTTCs and the AZSs are underused.The institutions are not sustainable: poor children's access to schooling in the arid zones remainslow because of learning-related costs such as boarding fees; and the PTTCs are not financiallysustainable with limited cost-sharing. Taken together these points demonstrate little result-orientation, low cost effectiveness, lack of efficiency and little relevance to the needs of students.

5. Implementation experience The credit was extended three times by a total of 2.5years. The AZSs had been practically completed and operational since 1992. Two PTTCs -Garissa and Taita Taveta - are far from being fully completed; as for the other five, many otheritems including water works, landscaping and playing fields have yet to be completed or be turnedover by the contractors. The project was initially expected to cost US$ 56.06 million, of which

Evaluation Summary page ii of iv

IDA was to finance US$ 37.5 million. The depreciation of US dollars against the SDR in1992 increased the proceeds of the credit to US$ 48.5 million. Although the IDA fund hadbeen completely disbursed in May 1995, a further amount is needed to meet a shortfall ofabout US$ 15.3 million (KES 700 million) to settle the Government's existing debt of US$11.3 million to contractors and consultants. It will also be necessary to provide an additionalUS$ 4 million to complete the civil works. Although the problem of cost-overrun had beenrecognized, the PIU mistakenly informed the Bank of a US$ 3.4 million obligation: the ICRmission later established the actual much larger over-run total. The MOE requested theTreasury to provide about US$ 3.4 million (KES 150 million) for FY 96 in addition to about US$1.8 million (KES 80 million) in FY 95 budget to complete the civil works: this request was notcomplied with.

6. Major factors affecting the project The project was delayed by: (a) late payments; (b)cumbersome official procedures; inadequate budgetary provisions and by cash liquidity shortages;(c) external imbalances delaying counterpart funding (these imbalances are a consequence of the1990-91 Gulf War, the deteriorating terms of trade, and the withholding of balance of paymentssupport to Kenya by international agencies); and (d) unusually heavy rain in Garissa whichnecessitated a site change.

7. The civil works are the major focus of escalated project costs. These were caused by: (a)specification of larger and more elaborate buildings than in the original plan (and instances of over-equipment); (b) reinstatement of major contracts; (c) late changes in selection of sites; and despitethis, selection of difficult sites; and (d) late payments.

8. Bank performance While being effective in project identification assistance, the Bankdid not perform satisfactorily in preparation, appraisal or supervision. During preparation theBank could have more seriously addressed the pressing policy issues and implications of puresupply-side financing and should have thoroughly evaluated previous projects with similarfeatures. During the appraisal, the Bank was inconsistent in some aspects of project design:insisting on 100% boarding at AZSs with no measures to alleviate the costs of boarding for poorchildren: transferring water works to local authorities despite their weak capacity: failing to takeaccount of the Government's inability to provide counterpart funds; and ignoring systematic andobjective site selection process based on technical feasibility. Supervision was regularly conductedat least twice a year but there were serious weaknesses: mismatching the expertise of staff and theneeds of different stages of supervision; making a limited number of site visits and so over-relianceon progress reports from PIU; overlooking the cost implications of project modifications led todelay and cost overrun; lacking insistence on project document provision.

9. Borrower performance was not satisfactory. Preparation was effective with clearly-defined objectives. Implementation was deficient in some significant respects; Treasury bud3etaryprocedures led to delays and directly attributable costs. MOE failed to complete measures to plan,implement and monitor the increased cost-effectiveness of education. PIU did not develop adequatetechnical managerial capacity despite technical assistance, fellowship awards and trainingsubstantially greater than originally planned: PIU did not identify and rectify fundamental flaws inarchitectural design. Non-compliance of the DCA provisions for qualified technical managementprevented the day-to-day direction required by the nature of the project; PIU had no cost controlsystem in place and was weak in financial management. PIU did not take measures to arTest oralleviate the cost overrun at critical stages and misinformed the Bank and the Government of the

Evaluation Summary page iii of iv

financial status of the project: and PIU allowed consistent delays in preparing and submitting auditreports.

Summary of Future Operations, Findings and Key Lessons Learned

10. Completion andfuture operations: options First, the Government should complete theremaining civil works in Garissa and Taita Taveta and prepare a financial and prioritization planfor the completion. To this end, the Government may consider the following options: convert themto some other purpose and get development funds for that purpose; complete them throughmobilizing the community fund (or harambee); give them to the local districts or communities torun with the local districts or communities paying the cost of final completion, after Governmentgives as much as it can; or sell them to the private sector. If the MOE decides to supervise theremaining civil works, MOE may wish to hire a consulting architect firm instead of the PIU.Second, the AZSs and PTTCs should make every effort to improve the efficient use of facilitiesand incorporate sustainability. For AZSs, measures to finance recurrent costs through demand-driven financing will be explored. The Government has just formalized a fee system under whichPTTC students will pay the full cost of boarding and food: further cost-recovery measures will beconsidered. The Government plans to introduce loans and bursaries particularly for students fromdisadvantaged areas to ensure their access to teacher training. This is encouraging but given thepoor record of university loans, special care should be taken for targeting and maintainingrepayment rate of the loans. Third, follow-up projects focusing on demand-side financing anddiversification of funding sources could do much to improve efficiency, cost effectiveness andmarket relevance of the education provided.

11. Key findings and lessons learned First, this project shows that financing physicalfacilities exclusively without accordingly equal emphasis to demand-side needs leads to lack ofefficiency and effectiveness and entails little beneficiary involvement. The effect on the project isworsened by restricting financial and managerial autonomy. The distorted incentives structure andlack of competition for the use of IDA funds allowed indifference to economy and effectiveness topersist unchecked. To establish a productive incentive structure a two-pronged solution seemsindicated: (a) the demand-driven approach which may empower students and parents to makeschools more responsive to students' needs and to market demand: and (b) the diversification offunding sources for educational institutions to help finance expansion and modernization ofphysical infrastructure.

12. Second, a feasible financing scheme is needed to provide quality education in a sustainablemanner. Cost-recovery measures should be established for post-primary education with studentloans or bursary schemes awarded through means-testing to ensure opportunities for the poor.

13. Future education projects in Kenya should:

* contribute to the Government's development of a coherent sector policy frameworkthrough a congruent specified action plan during project preparation;

* operate with a participatory approach - throughout the whole project cycle, beneficiariesshould be actively involved and consulted;

* decentralize school management to strengthen decision-making at the local level;

Evaluation Summary page iv of iv

* properly evaluate the ability of both the Government and the direct beneficiaries to providecounterpart funds for operation and maintenance of new institutions given prevailingeconomic conditions;

* devise mechanisms to ensure correct and timely payments to consultants, contractors andsuppliers, and install these checks as part of Bank supervision procedures;

* establish a system to monitor implementation and evaluate performance against projectobjectives;

* develop a fully integrated reporting system to cover financial management using pre-accepted criteria and maintaining adherence to design intent. This should embody a "failsafe" warning system.

14. From a Bank perspective, a lasting lesson has been the re-appearance of the familiarproblems described in this report: future projects should deploy firm, consistent measures toprevent these chronic problems. Exclusive attention to financing the "supply-side" should bebalanced with more attention to ensuring that the "demand-side" is also adequately financed.Moving to demand-side financing (which will reflect the wider demand-driven approach to theproject) will empower beneficiaries to express their needs and will facilitate market response to thisdemand through competition. Instead of funding a few politically-selected institutions with no localownership, the Governent and the Bank could together create new arrangements to leverage co-financing from domestic financial institutions to fund physical infrastructure of schools andcolleges, public and private, using land and perhaps other equity as collateral. Placing collateralat risk ensures that the school owner has the incentive to choose the most cost-effective investmentsand maintain close and constant supervision of implementation. Such an approach will structurallyand systematically prevent (or safely limit) many of the risks and consequences presented in thisReport.

Part I: Implementation Assessment pare I of 11

Part 1: Project Implementation Assessment

1. Over the two decades following independence, Kenya experienced dramatic quantitativegrowth in school enrollment: this expansion was gained, to some degree, at the expense ofacademic quality, particularly at the primary and secondary levels. To counter this trend, theGovernment prepared an ambitious scheme for education policy expressed in the FifthDevelopment Plan (1983/84-1987/88) and consisting of: establishment of a 8-4-4 structure;universalization of primary schooling free of charge; orientation of education toward job creationand employment; increased cost-sharing by communities and students at the secondary and highereducation levels; and revision of curricula towards practical subjects and preparation foremployment. Primary school and university time for students was increased by one yearrespectively: the total number of years of schooling remained the same for those who completeduniversity education. As a result, more primary school teachers were required. The 844structure was already in place at the time the project was appraised.

Project Objectives

2. The general main project objectives were first to assist the Government to increase theeffectiveness, relevance to socio-economic requirements and efficiency of the education systemwithin the new 8-4-4 structure. The project also aimed to adjust the system to financial constraintsm an environment of increasing social demand created by the high rate of demographic growth andthe high value placed on education by Kenyans.

3. The specifc project objectives were to improve the equity and quality of Kenya'seducation system and to promote institutional development through strengthening the Government'scapability to effectively plan and manage educational expansion at all levels. To achieve theseobjectives, the project was to: (a) construct seven new primary teacher training colleges (PTTCs)with a total capacity of 4,080 trainees: construct three 720-enrollment PTTCs and four 480-enrollment PTTCs; (b) construct three new arid zone primary schools (AZSs) in remote locationswith a total capacity of 1,080 pupils: each with 360-enrollment; (c) provide the Kenya Institute ofEducation (KIE) with equipment, specialist services and training to support the development ofeducational materials delivered by the Educational Media Services (EMS); (d) assist KIE inpreparing and testing new curricular materials for secondary and technical education; (e)strengthen the capacity of the Planning Unit (PU) of MOE and the Teachers Service Commission(TSC).

4. The project objectives were clear and generally consistent with the Governnent'seducation policy in the Fifth Development Plan and with the Bank's country assistance strategy(CAS) for Kenya. However the process of developing project objectives did not vigorouslyquestion the central assumption of the Development Plan (vocationalization of basic education):nor did it ensure that sufficient attention was paid to cost-sharing by students and communities inpost-primary education or teacher training. Project components which were focused on full publicfinancing and public provision of education could not in themselves be instrumental to achievingthe main objectives. The project objectives did not address financing, recurrent costs andsustainability for PTTCs and AZSs, while the civil work component predominated. That theconstruction sites were scattered all over the country made implementation complex and undulydemanding for the Project Implementation Unit (PIU). The civil works were implemented all at

Part I: Implementation Assessment pare 2 of 11

once: phased imnplementation could have allowed more flexible and productive responses tochanging circumstances.

Achievement of Project Objectives

5. Overall the project objectives were partially achieved.

Physical objectives were not fully achieved. Construction of the seven PTTCs and threeAZSs, the core part of the project, is not yet complete despite three separate credit extensions fortwo and a half years (see paras. 6-10). The AZSs had been practically completed and operationalsince 1992. Two PTTCs - Garissa and Taita Taveta - are far from being fully completed; as forthe other five, many other items including water works, landscaping and playing fields have yet tobe completed or be tumed over by the contractors (Table 5, Part II).

Sector policy objectives were partially achieved. The increase of trained teachers throughboth pre-service and in-service training in new PTTCs has gradually replaced untrained teacherswith trained teachers. However this was not achieved in the most cost-effective way (see paras.23-26). The Government's teacher employment policy undermines efficient market-basedoperation. The Govemment guarantees the placement of PTTC graduates once they have passedthe examination; demand for teachers is determined by the supply (existing capacity of PTTCs)instead of by the need of primary schools. This policy, combined with the higher number ofteachers produced by the additional new PTTCs, has contributed to a large increase in primaryteachers salaries as an item of Govemment recurrent expenditure. To contain this expenditureincrease, EDSAC conditionality was applied. New AZSs have enhanced educational opportunitiesin remote disadvantaged areas. However student enrollment is very low in these AZSs and doesnot fully contribute to enhancing educational equity. The facilities are severely underused in bothPTTCs and AZSs, undermining efficiency (see paras. 18-19 and 23-24).

Poverty reduction objectives were partially achieved. This project's great potential toreduce poverty through the development of human resources has not been fully realized because oflow enrollment in AZSs and under-use of facilities in both AZSs and PTTCs. The AZSs andPTTCs have not fully served as community centers, as planned. To ensure fair distribution ofqualified teachers, the Government recruits teacher trainees on a geographically equitable basis andgenerally assigns trained teachers to their districts of origin. This policy supports povertyreduction through providing quality education in economically deprived areas: teachers from thesame area or tribe became role models and encourage student enrollment in AZSs.

Financial objectives were not achieved. The current education share in recurrentexpenditures is about 36 percent, far above the 30 percent cap agreed at the time of appraisal. Tolimit the effect of the additional teachers trained by new PTTCs on recurrent expenditure, theGovernment initially decided to recruit 30 percent of all pre-service teacher trainees at the P3 level.But none of the new PTTCs will admit P3 level trainees from 1995: they insist on a PI level. Thiswill increase the share of salaries in the recurrent education expenditures. Recruitment of the P3level was a single-issue decision intended to restrain the project's adverse impact on the recurrentexpenditure. Perhaps other options to lessen the pressure on recurrent expenditure should havebeen explored. The PTTCs lack financial sustainability because of minimal cost recoverycombined with declining Government grants (see paras. 25-26). The study on the cost-effectiveness of teacher education including cost recovery measures which the project demanded

Part I: Implementation Assessment paee 3 of 11

was not done. Three years later, EDSAC required a study covering similar issues and this wasdone (see Tables 7 and 13, Part II).

Institutional development objectives were partially achieved. The provision of equipment,specialist services and training was intended to strengthen the planning and implementing capacityof the PU, TSC and KIE. The issue of ensuring adequate maintenance and full use of thisequipment remains. The KIE has developed educational materials delivered through EducationalMedia Service (EMS) and new curricular materials for craft training and secondary education. (seeTable 5, Part II). Judged by these results noted in sector policy and financial objectives, PU'sperformance in policy-making for PTTCs remains ineffective. The achievement of public sedormanagement was minimal because the PIU performed poorly in project implementation (see paras.30-31). Private sector development objectives were not achieved, mainly because of seriousdelays in payments to private contractors and consultants.

Implementation Record

6. The credit was extended three times by a total of 2.5 years. The Governmentrequested a fourth extension which the Bank did not accede to. (In fact, credit funds wereexhausted before the end of the third extension.) The civil works are only 88 percent completemeasured by payments made to date out of projected final accounts, despite an early start indesign financed under the Fifth Education Credit. The construction of PTTCs in Garissa andTaita Taveta started late: in Garissa because exceptional rains in 1989 destroyed thefoundation, causing transfer to a new site restarting in 1990; in Taita Taveta the proposedlocation was held unacceptable. Although five PTTCs and three AZSs have been practicallycomplete for a number of years, no final accounts have been settled and minor works remainunfinished. The contractors for the two remaining PTTCs claim that they could finish in 4 and7 months for Garissa and Taita Taveta respectively given sufficient cash flow. This is arguable:the civil works of the PTTC in Kericho (undertaken under the Fifth Education Project which closedm 1992) are not yet completed because of lack of Government funds (the kitchen equipment wasfinally provided this year by the Sixth Education Project).

7. The project was initially expected to cost US$ 56.06 million, of which IDA was tofinance US$ 37.5 million. The depreciation of US dollars against the SDR increased theproceeds of the credit to US$ 48.5 million. To use this windfall, playing fields andlandscaping were added to the initial civil works design: this became a direct cause of costoverrun. Although the IDA fund had been completely disbursed in May 1995, a furtheramount is needed to meet a shortfall of about US$ 15.3 million (KES 700 million) to settle theGovernment's existing debt of US$ 11.3 million due to contractors and consultants. It willalso be necessary to provide an additional US$ 4 million to complete the civil works.According to the Development Credit Agreement (DCA), financing the funding shortfall aftercredit closing is the Government's responsibility. Although the problem of cost-overrun has beenrecognized, the PIU mistakenly informed the Bank of a US$ 3.4 million overrun: the ICRmission later established the actual much larger over-run total. At the Bank's suggestion, theMOE has requested the Treasury to provide about US$ 3.4 rmillion (KES 150 million) for the FY96 in addition to about US$ 1.8 million (KES 80 million) in the FY 95 budget to complete the civilworks. Lack of funds will pose a serious problem in completing the two remaining PTTCs.

8. The project went through the following modifications. Water works, playing fields andlandscaping not in the original design of the institutions were included. While water works were in

Part I: Imnlementation Assessment Dare 4 of II

fact essential, the appraisal mission relied on the Government's assurance that local authoritiesprovided water. However the project had to install water works at considerable cost in money andtime. Minor additional civil works and procurement amounting to US$ 0.8 million were also added(see Table 9, Part II).

9. Contractors and consultants were unanimous im their opinion that delays were mostly dueto late payments. These were caused occasionally by inconsistency in the payment process butmore generally by cumbersome official procedures, failure to provide adequate budgetaryprovisions and by shortages of cash liquidity. Even after the establishment of the Special Account,it usually took six months from the time the PIU received bills from contractors to the timepayments were disbursed from the Central Bank. Toward the end of the project, many contractorsand suppliers received no payments for months (in one instance for three years.)

10. The civil works are the major focus of escalated project costs. While the SAR estimate forcivil works was US$ 25.4 million, the projected completion cost would be US$ 53.9 million (seeTables 8A and 8B, Part I). The cost increases were caused by: (a) specification of larger and moreelaborate buildings than in the original plan (and instances of over-equipment); (b) reinstatement ofmajor contracts removed from the original plan; (c) late changes in selection of sites; and despitethis, selection of difficult sites; and (d) late payments causing delayed works and associated extracosts such as for lengthened contracts, interest on late payments and extra fluctuations in materialcost.

Major Factors Affecting the Project

11. Factors not subject to Government control First, heavy rains forced abandonment of theoriginal Garissa PTTC site. Second, external imbalances delayed domestic contribution to foreignexpenditures. These imbalances were the consequence of the 1990-91 Gulf War, the deterioratingterms of trade, and the withholding of balance of payments support to Kenya by internationalagencies (the withholding was a direct consequence of the Government's failure to implement itseconomic reform agenda). In combination, these factors accounted for some proportion of costincrease and delay.

12. Factors subject to Government control First, the Government could have chosen sitessuitable for the purposes, so avoiding the increased costs and time for the civil works. Second, theGovernment could have restrained inflation with better macroeconomic discipline: higher budgetdeficits coupled with monetary expansion fueled inflation which rose from 19.6 percent in 1991, to29.5 percent in 1992 to 45.8 percent in 1993. Inflation accounted for about 20 percent of theincrease in the price of civil works from appraisal to tender. But inflation alone is not entirely thecause - for example, the timely provision of counterpart funds and simplified administrativeprocedures could have streamlined project implementation. The Government's inconsistencycombined with the PIU's ineffective management gravely weakened project implementation (seeparas. 30-3 1).

Civil Works and Equipment

13. Selection of location and site Politics influenced location selection (in what general areato build) and local political pressures determined the location eventually chosen. The scope andscale of construction changed over time from an original Government request of 9 P1TCs to 5 to 6and eventually 7. This, too, reflected the intrusion of politics into civil works. Failure to apply

Part I: Imnlementation Assessment nare 5 of 11

objective selection criteria allowed excessive distance from amenities (water, power, transport)caused additional development cost and will cause continuing recurrent expenses. Three PTTCs(Taita Taveta, Baringo and Tambach) are on steeply-sloping sites. This has incurred millions ofdollars in extra foundation work (particularly site-leveling for playing fields). Selection, de-selection and re-selection of sites has incurred extra design fee costs - in only one case (Garissa)was there an evident technical reason for the change in location. There is no evidence that theBank made efforts to ensure systematic and objective site selection. Some remote sites have indeedacted as local catalysts for development but it is not clear that the benefit exceeds the costs.

14. Design and quality of construction Most of the buildings designed were clearly beyondthe SAR's requirement that buildings be functional, austere, appropriate and economical.Overall, the design for AZSs was more modest than for PTTCs. The designed areas exceeded theagreed areas by 23% (see Appendix 3). From appraisal to contract, the increase in costs averaged86% for PTTCs and 24% for AZSs (see Appendix 1). Appendix 1 further shows the increase incosts from contract to final account, averaging 77% for PPTCs and 43% for AZSs. These were amajor cause of cost overruns. PIU and the associated consultants were seriously remiss in failingto arrest and correct these unacceptable cost increases.

15. The design of buildings did not consider regional climate characteristics. For example,only two designs were adopted for all PTTCs, regardless of climate. This led to inappropriatenessof buildings, wastage and high maintenance costs as found in Garissa, Taita Taveta and Bondo(see Appendix D). Beneficiaries were not adequately consulted in the planning, design orconstruction of the buildings. Although the principals were appointed and placed on the sitebefore the opening of the PTTC, they claim that their concerns were often ignored by contractorswho wanted to be accountable to the PIU not to the principals or beneficiaries. Awarding toomany contracts to one contractor may have had negative effects on quality of construction. Delayswould tend to be capitalized to the limit by the contractor to mask inability to properly resource allfive projects simultaneously.

16. Furniture, equipment and vehicles The estimated actual amount for these twocategories was over twice the total SAR estimate: US$ 13.67 million versus US$ 5.55 million.The increase of 146% compares with the SAR contingency of 38%. This level of over-expenditure is immediately apparent when visiting the sites. Under-used teaching rooms havebecome effectively stores for unwanted or broken beds, chairs, desks, cupboards and filingcabinets. Store rooms have become depositories for sofa sets, mattresses, blankets, bed sheets andcovers. sports equipment, cookers, refrigerators and library shelving systems.Headmasters/mistresses of the AZSs wanted more storage space for these items. Barsaloi AZSwas provided with a 15-year reserve equipment for dormitory and 960 mattresses for 400-enrollment capacity (the AZS has only 59 current boarders). The situation is similar everywhere.All staff houses for PTTCs and AZSs were provided even with minor goods such as kettles, eggbeaters and pressure cookers. Shortages are apparent only for library books and laboratoryequipment.

17. Sustainability of equipment and fumiture has not received adequate attention. Muchequipment cannot be maintained or repaired since the technicians are available only at aconsiderable distance (see Appendix D). Beneficiaries complain of having not been involved inbook, fumiture or equipment selection, nor of being informed of their allocations. This lack of localinvolvement in selecting inputs undemined the ownership and relevance of the goods procured.For example, TVs incompatible with solar lighting were provided for AZSs. Agricultural tractors

Part I: Implementation Assessment paee 6 of 11

and trailers supplied have no distributors with workshop and maintenance facilities available inKenya. Fragmented, overlapping and duplicated activities are indicated in the tendering of furiitureand vehicles. Foi example, the first buses for PTTCs were procured and delivered a few yearsago: second buses were recently procured and are reportedly on the way to &Iivery. This appearsto be a split contract.

Efficiency, Effectiveness and Sustainability

18. AZSs All three AZSs are severely underused. While each was built to teach and board400 students, none is being used to full capacity. (The capacity increased from the appraisedfigure of 360 and the reason is not evident.) Current enrollment is 139 (52 girls and 87 boys) inMokowe, 164 (97 boys and 67 girls) in Barsaloi and 227 (134 boys and 93 girls) in Konyao. Theratio of boarding facilities is even lower since Mokowe and Barsaloi admit day students: Konyaoadmits boarders only. In Mokowe there are very few day students because of local insistence on aboarders-only policy. In Barsaloi, only 59 students are boarders, equal to 14 percent of capacity.

19. The low enrollment occurred because of wrongly-chosen school sites and deficient schoolfacilities. The site of Barsaloi AZS was chosen to serve three counties as a district-center schoolnot as a county school. Unfortunately this location is notorious for malaria, and parents areunderstandably reluctant to send their children. (The rumor that a few students had died proveduntrue on visiting the school.) After the initial enthusiasm dissipated, enrollment dropped fromover 300 to 75 students in the first year, then enrollment increased: 75 in 1993, 105 in 1994 and139 in 1995. Mokowe AZS was chosen for the Bony tribe but there were not enough beneficiarieseven under normal conditions and this low level was further reduced after the outbreak of theSomalia War. Konyao AZS had full enrollment at the start with the chiefs' strong support but lackof water (caused by delayed civil works) made the school unattractive to students and parents.

20. Other causes of low enrollment for all three AZSs were: additional costs for learningmaterials and uniform, about KES 1,000 per year (in addition to tuition of KES 200-500 per year);opportunity costs; and lack of a school lunch program. Solid buildings were already used as dayschools before this project (these are currently used as storage in Barsaloi and remain empty inMokowe). Although boarding can be crucial for nomadic student enrollment, as seen in Konyao, itmay have unexpected adverse effects. Because parents are reluctant to send young children toboarding school, Mokowe offers only four classes, grade 5 to 8. This best-equipped school isunderused while other day schools are overcrowded with day students. The parents of Barsaloiusually enroll young children as day students. For the poor, the annual boarding fees of KES 400to 600 at Barsaloi and Konyao, and KES 3,000 at Mokowe are an insuperable deterrent.

21. Had this project renovated and used the old Barsaloi day school building, it could havefully financed tuition and paid the additional costs incurred for learning for all 400 students. Infact this project could have provided free schooling for 400 students for about 100 years. It isregrettable that this promising opportunity was not recognized.

22. The major financial source for these AZSs is Government grants: student fees and income-generating activities contribute a small portion. In Mokowe, where cost-sharing is highest, theGovernment grant covers about two-thirds of school expenses. About 60 percent of governmentgrants go to salaries and boarding. Because of the general and serious shortage of funds,maintenance is given low priority. Only KES 29,999 (about US$ 600) was allocated formaintenance for a whole year in Mokowe AZS: this is not enough even to repair the tires of the

Part I: Implementation Assessment page 7 of 11

vehicles and tractor provided under this project. Given the poor workmanship of construction andthe inappropriate design of facilities, maintenance will be troublesome in the future. (As evidence,Kakuma AZS, built under the Fifth Education Project had to be rehabilitated by a contractor forKonyao AZS as part of his contract.)

23. PTTCs Enrollments in the five PTTCs are consistent with or above planned capacity:completion rate is almost 100 percent; most students pass examinations and are placed as teachersthrough the Government's employment assurance policy for teacher trainees. However, the currentpolicy sets a level of enrollment that exceeds the verifiable demand for newly-trained teachers. Yeteven with this arbitrarily heightened student population some PTTC facilities are seriouslyunderused. The Schedules of Accommodation (which guided construction designs) showed overallRoom Use Factors of 89% and 84% for the 720- and 480-enrollment colleges respectively: thesefigures were based on a class size of 30 students. Because this number is now 40, the overallRoom Use Factors are now reduced to 60% and 57% respectively. The number of teaching roomsm PTTCs and the building configuration xeflect the original plan that students would movebetween classrooms in the course of a day to learn a different subject (rotation). But by increasingclass size, each class now occupies its own permanent classroom and does not have to rotate exceptoccasionally when work in a special room such as a laboratory is required. The lack of consequentdesign adjustment accounts for the inadequate or under-use of rooms, particularly special purposerooms (intended to train teachers in vocational subjects such as agriculture, sewing, cooking andscience'. This is strikingly evident when touring the PTTCs.

24. The implications of this change in class size are startling: the Credit could have provided25% fewer college places - a saving of 1,020 spaces or more than two of the smaller PTTCs orequivalent to about US$ 16 million in IDA Credit borrowings. This implies that on completion,Taita Taveta and Garissa PTTCs can be converted to a different use such as secondary schools.Even if real demand for teachers increases in the long-run, there is no reason to build new PTTCsfor some time to come. The teaching areas and staff housing are adequate for a one-third increasein enrollment. Simple dormitory expansion (and a change to dining arrangements in shifts) willallow an extra enrollment of 1,360 - or equal to almost two of the larger PTTCs.

25. Like the AZSs, the financial sources of the PTTCs are Government grants, student feesand income-generating activities. Under the current situation, the PTTCs are not financiallysustainable and maintenance is given low priority. PT[Cs have been running on deficits and theirdebts are accumulating every year. Since cost-sharing for PTTCs was introduced two years ago,students have paid about KES 15,000 for a two-year education: this is only one-third of a P1teacher's starting wage (KES 44,400 per year). Their contribution of about KES 6,000 toboarding covers only 50-60 percent of food costs. Overall PTTC students' share of the costs ismuch lower than those of private PTTCs, Technical Training Institutes (TTIs) and Institutes ofTechnology (ITs). Students of private PTTCs pay over KES 30,000 but take the same jobs ongraduation. Those in TTIs and ITs with similar background pay KES 30,000 to 36,000 for two-year training, while their starting wages as civil servants are similar: graduates of TTIs and of ITsare not guaranteed employment and most of them go to the Jua Kali sector. Cost-recoverymeasures are urgently needed. Recognizing these problems, the MOE formed a committee to lookinto financing of the PTTCs including the cost-recovery issue: following its recommendations, amore comprehensive fee system has just been formall..,ed which will recover the full cost ofboarding and food.

Part 1: Implementation Assessment oape 8 of 11

26. It seems clear that PTTCs and AZSs could benefit from an official commitment to explorenew modes of school management and financing. Both PTTCs and AZSs exhibit a dependencysyndrome which is caused partly by MOE's control and partly by public expectations. In most ofthe institutions visited, limited initiative had been shown in simple matters (although this variedreflecting the leadership of principals and headmasters/mistresses). These institutions expectedeverything to be done by contractors since no buildings were officially handed over: for exarnple,the institutions mistook defects liability corrections for new or additional work. PIU hadapparently not given guidance on this important distinction.

Bank Performance

27. Project identification was consistent with the Government's education policy as well asthe Bank's CAS. But preparation was unsatisfactory: more comprehensive preparation couldhave explored alternatives other than total emphasis on civil works to meet the objectives. TheBank could have more seriously addressed the pressing policy and institutional issues which havebeen discussed (paras. 4-5) and analyzed the implications of fully public financing. Seriousconcern about increased recurrent expenditure is justified - particularly in view of the 30% cap.However, the Bank remained passive in addressing this issue and its implication for the project.The Bank did not evaluate the impact of five primary boarding schools (under the FourthEducation Project) on the primary education in semi-arid regions but nevertheless picked up theunfulfilled commitment under that project. The costly construction of semi-arid boarding schoolsin the Fourth Education Project had already started to emerge as an issue in the projectpreparation meetings. The existing day school buildings were not capitalized on for AZSs (para.20).

28. Bank performance in project appraisal was highly unsatisfactory. Although cooperatingclosely with the Government, the Bank failed to address sustainability issues by omitting thefinancing aspects of the schools to be built. The Bank was inconsistent in the following aspects ofproject design. First, the Bank recommended boarding at AZSs, but the requirement for 100%boarding was not justified and no measures were taken to alleviate the costs of boarding for poorchildren. The option of smaller PTTCs for day-time students living close to the community couldhave been explored. Second, water works were transferred to local authorities. This was notrealistic or fair to these authorities considering their weak management capacity. Third, the Bankfailed to take into account Government's inability to provide counterpart funds, although beingaware of the weak government financial position at the time of appraisal and the weak performanceof the economy during the 1980s. Specific DCA conditions to ensure counterpart funding wereremoved at Government request during negotiations; no effective substitutes were put in place.Fourth, despite the importance and sensitivity of site acquisition and land use in Kenya, the Bankdid not use the systematic and objective site selection process based on technical feasibility whichwas available.

29. Supervision was regularly conducted at least twice a year but from a technical viewpointthere were serious weaknesses. First, the expertise of staff did not match the needs of differentstages of supervision. This led to inappropriate civil works design initially and little concern forachievement of project objectives later. Second, the aides-mamoire of supervision missions recordan unduly limited number of site visits. The consequence was over-reliance on the PIU reports.Third, evaluation of the project ohbjectives was not taken seriously since the project was consideredan essentially civil works initiative. Fourth, weakness of project supervision overlooked the costimplications of project modifications. The Bank was misinformed by the PIU and in turn,

Part I: ImDlementation Assessment Da2e 9 of 11

inadvertently misinformed the Government conceming the cost overrun. The Bank over-issued no-objections beyond the credit fund. Fifth the Bank failed to insist on the agreed project documentprovisions in case of violation. This is shown by: failure to insist on DCA provisions forappropriately qualified technical management; long delay of studies (a timely report on the supplyof and demand for primary school teachers could have shown that the seventh PTTC was notneeded before the seventh Taita Taveta PTTC construction began): even after a Bank missionarchitect identified over-design and expansion of space in 1987, no effectual follow-up ensued.

Borrower Performance

30. Preparation was effective with clearly-defined objectives. Implementation was deficient insome significant respects. Treasury budgetary procedures and the Government's cumbersomeprocedures resulted in delays and directly attributable costs. MOE failed to complete measures toplan, implement or monitor the increased cost-effectiveness of education.

31. Although receiving substantially greater technical assistance, fellowship awards andtraining than originally planned, PIU did not develop adequate technical managerial capacity: itused all the allocated resources for consultants but used 150 percent more technical assistance, and117 person-months of fellowship time and training not allocated for in the SAR (Table 5). Eist,PIU did not exhibit the technical competence to identify and rectify fundamental flaws inarchitectural design. The DCA stipulated that an architect or civil engineer be recruited as theDeputy Director of PIU to run complex construction projects. Non-compliance of this provisionprevented the day-to-day direction required by the nature of the project. Second, there was no costcontrol system in place. While PIU should have acted to bring costs back under control at crucialstages of the construction process, there are no indications that measures were taken to arrest oralleviate the situation. Third, PIU was weak in financial management. For example, PIUrequested the Bank's October 1994 mission to support a fourth extension of the project (this wasdeclined). However, the credit fund was exhausted before closing date and many claims from thePIU were retumed to the Treasury. Fourth, covenant compliance was only partially satisfactory,the most significant weakness being the consistent delays in presenting audit reports and the cost-effectiveness of education study .

Assessment of Outcome

32. Overall, the project outcome was not satisfactory. The project shows various symptomsshared by education projects focused exclusively on public provision of services where theGovernment is also facing severe financial constraints: concentrating on inputs rather than results,lacking efficiency, cost effectiveness, acceptability to parents and relevance to students' needs.The project cannot be said to have sufficiently enhanced the quality and equity of the educationsystem. Cost and time control was inadequate, and quality control was seriously flawed. The AZSsand PTTCs were over-designed, over-specified and over-supplied with fumiture and equipment.For both civil works and equipment, sufficient attention was not paid to sustainability orbeneficiaries' needs when specifying requirements. Recently completed physical works alreadyshow problems of maintenance and sustainability. The AZSs are under-enrolled and the facilitiesof both the PTTCs and the AZSs are underused. The financing problem for poor children'sschooling in the arid zones is serious. The PTTCs are not financially sustainable with still limitedcost-sharing. The Govenmment's employment assurance policy combined with the expandedcapacity of PTTCs imposes a serious burden on the recurrent expenditure and undermines theefficiency of the labor market.

Part I: Imnlementation Assessment Da2e 10 of 11

Completion and Future Operation: Options

33. First, the Government should complete the remaining civil works in Garissa and TaitaTaveta. This requires about KES 700 million to settle all incurred claims and future commitmentsfor contractors, professional services and suppliers. The MOE, in consultation with localauthorities, institutional managers and beneficiaries, will prepare a financial and prioritization planfor completing the project in the most cost-effective manner. The first priority will be given to thecompletion of the tuition block and dormitories in Garissa and Taita Taveta. The Government maythen consider the following options: convert these two PTTCs to some other purpose and getdevelopment funds for that purpose; complete the PTTCs through mobilizing the community fund(or harambee); give the PTTCs to the local districts or communities to run as they see fit whilethey pay the cost of final completion, after Government gives as much as it can; or sell thePTTCs to the private sector. If the MOE decides to supervise the remaining civil works, MOEmay wish to hire a consulting architect firm instead of the PIU. Second, the AZSs and PTTCsshould make every effort to improve the efficient use of facilities and incorporate sustainability.The MOE will explore measures: to devolve financial and managerial responsibilities to theinstitutions to enhance ownership; to foster the management capacity of the administrators andeducational managers; to involve the parents and community in school activities and governance;and to develop monitoring and evaluation systems for the greater efficiency, effectiveness andsustainability of these institutions. For AZSs, the measures to finance recurrent costs throughdemand-driven financing will be explored. The Government has just formalized a fee system underwhich PTTC students will pay the full cost of boarding and food: further cost-recovery measureswill be considered. The Government plans to introduce loans and bursaries particularly forstudents from disadvantaged areas to ensure their access to teacher training. This is encouragingbut given the poor record of university loans, special care should be taken for targeting andmaintaining the repayment rate. (See Table 6, Part II.) Third, follow-up projects should focusempowering beneficiaries through open competition and on diversifying new funding sources forsocial infrastructure with the private sector's active involvement. These approaches could do muchto improve efficiency, cost effectiveness and market relevance of education. An OED evaluationshould be conducted in 3 years.

Key Lessons Learned

34. First, this project clearly illustrates that full public financing and p-bli" provision ofeducation services, coupled with restriction of financial and managerial autonomy, inhibitsefficiency and effectiveness and generates little beneficiary involvement. The project's inceiitivesstrucrure allowed indifference to economy and effectiveness to persist unchecked. The PIU wasgrantd exclusive access to the IDA funds for construction, but was not made accountable for thedaily operation and maintenance of the schools and colleges after completion. This gap inresponsibilities appears to have led to over-design and implementation delays (see paras. 13-17).Proper incentives and effective sanctions would help to ensure monitored access, responsibleownership and prudent management. To this end, a two-pronged solution is needed: (a) thedemand-driven approach to empower students and parents to make schools more responsive tostudents' needs and to local market demand. To improve primary school enrollment, the poorshould be targeted by providing demand-side financing vehicles such as vouchers and scholarshipsto finance both leaming and some of the opportunity costs of time spent studying which is takenaway from contributing to survival: and (b) instead of funding a few politically-selected institutionswith limited local ownership, a new approach may be developed to finance expansion and

Part I: Implementation Assessment Dare 11 of 11

modernization of physical infrastructure. This approach could leverage co-financing fromdomestic financial institutions to fund physical infrastructure of schools and colleges, public andprivate, using land and perhaps other equity as collateral. Placing collateral at risk ensures thatthe school owner has the incentive to choose the most cost-effective investments and maintain closeand constant supervision of construction and installation.

35. Second. a feasible financing scheme should provide quality education in a sustainablemanner. Increased cost-recovery measures are particularly needed for post-primary education. Toensure that poor students are not deprived of education, student loans and bursary schemes throughmeans-testing should be established.

36. Third, future education projects in Kenya should focus tightly on the following specificrequirements:

* contribute to the Government's development of a coherent sector policy framework with aspecified action plan during project preparation;

* operate with a participatory approach - throughout the whole project cycle, ultimatebeneficiaries (parents and students) should be actively involved and consulted;

* decentralize school management. This will encourage ownership and lead to efficient andeffective management at the local level;

* properly evaluate the ability of both the Government and the direct beneficiaries to providecounterpart funds for operation and maintenance of new institutions; this is especiallyimportant given prevailing economic conditions;

* devise mechanisms to ensure correct and timely payments to consultants, contractors andsuppliers, and install these checks as part of Bank supervision procedures;

* establish a system to monitor the implementation and evaluate performance against projectobjectives; and

* develop a fully integrated reporting system to cover financial management, using pre-accepted criteria and maintaining adherence to design intent. This system should embodya reliable "fail safe" warning system.

37. From a Bank perspective, a lasting lesson has been the re-appearance of the familiarproblems described in this report: future projects should deploy firm, consistent measures toprevent these chronic problems. Moving to a new model for financing physical plant at schoolsand colleges will facilitate the expansion of economically viable educational institutions: demand-side financing (which will reflect the wider demand-driven approach to the project) will empowerbeneficiaries to make informed choices about education and facilitate market response to thisdemand through competition. These approaches will structurally and systematically prevent (orsafely limit) many of the risks and consequences presented in this Report. They will also helpensure that the institutions just created will acquire the financing needed to meet the closelycontrolled costs of operations and maintenance.

Part 11Table 1

KenyaSixth Education Project

Table 1: Summary of Assessments

.. '.'. '.:-' 'N ''... . .... ... ... .. ....... S',........BUb.'st'n3w'.01 'ata M giI t 1ot511.0bI

A. Achievement of objectivesmacro-economic policies Xsectoral policies X Xfinancial objectives Xinstitutional development Xphysical objectives Xpoverty reduction Xgender issues Xother social objectives Xenvironmental objectives Xpublic sector management Xprivate sector developmenta_

o p e r ati o n~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ X =

E. Assjecsusmet ofail oucm B________ ________________

..... S .. ,.,:' .'.:- ,.-.'.'.,'."'''-""""

__ . . ........ ..... ...... ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~........ . :::.'.:.. ' .'': .:':: -': .. ..... ':

B. pprojctsstiabl t Xsupervision~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~........... .....

D........ B o r o w e ..............preparation ...X . ....

c.oBankn perormplanceXidentfiation X

implsesmentaootiome X

Part 11Table 2


Table 2: Related Bank Credits

Past Operations

First Education Project The project financed a major expansion program which 1966 Closed(C 93-KE) involved construction and equipping of 42 general on time,US$7 million secondary schools, 9 technical secondary schools, and 1970

11 PTTCs. The project was completed on time, at acost 8% above appraisal. The project was judged tohave met Kenya's requirements for high-levelmanpower to support economic and social growth toreplace expatriates.

Second Education The project was to expand and improve the agricultural 1970 Closed 2Project education and training system at the professional, sub- years(C 1 85-KE) professional, and skilled labor levels. Specifically, the late,US$6.1 million project expanded training for agricultural staff and 1977

farmers, secondary and technical education, theconstruction of a new technical secondary school, andthe establishment of a unit within the Ministry ofEducation for education planning. The project wasjudged to have been successful at meeting allquantitative targets, but not so on the qualitative front:concerns were raised on the lack of cooperation betweenthe PIU and the MoW education team.

Table 2: page 1 of 4

Table 2: Related Bank Credits (continued)

IPast Operations____

lThird Education The project was to improve the quality of basic 1975 ClosedlProjcect education and to establish a framework for long-term 18|(L 1 184-KE) development of the education and training sector. It monthslUS$10 million focussed on expanding and improving primary teacher late, onl

training, on the distribution and storage of school 12/31/83equipment, and on assistance to the development of

l ~~~~~~curricula and education media, and assistance to thel ~~~~~~National Committee on Educational Objectives andl ~~~~~~Policies (NCEOP) which issued a report in Januaryl ~~~~~~1977. The project encountered delays for variousl ~~~~~reasons: lack of manpower from MoW, weakl ~~~~~~administrative capability of the PIU, difficulties metl ~~~~~~during procurement of specialized equipment, andl ~~~~~~reluctance of the Government to utilize technicall ~~~~~~assistance funds under the loan. Overall, the major

physical objectives of the project were met.

lFourth Education The project was to further expand agricultural training 1978 Closed 2lProject capacity at the degree and certificate levels, develop yearsl(C 797-KE) project management training, assist primary education late,US$23 million in arid zones and village polytechnics (now junior 1984

polytechnics), and support curriculum development andexamination research and planning. At termination,over US$3.8 million equivalent was undisbursed andtherefore cancelled. This was due partly to devaluation,failure to use technical assistance and failure to procureessential equipment for the project institution. Despitea substantial cancellation of funds, the project achievedconsiderable success in curriculum reform, improvedproject development and management capability,

l ~~~~~~increased capacity in agricultural education andl ~~~~~~training, and expanded access to primary education in

nomadic areas. Delays arose because of insufficientl ~~~~~~staff in the PIU who had to implement the Third,l ~~~~~~Fourth, and Fifth Education Projects concurrently; thel ~~~~~~government's difficulties in budgeting the counterpartl ~~~~~~funds; and, the spread of the project over manyl ~~~~~~Ministries which made it difficult to coordinate.



Past 0perations __

Fifth Education Project The project included constructing, furnishing, equipping 1981 Closed 5(C 1107-KE) and providing technical assistance to KESI, faculty of yearsUS$35 mnillion agriculture, Coast Agricultural Institute, and Industrial late,

Training Centers. 1991

The project was to assist in training manpower at themanagerial levels, specifically, training of: primary andsecondary school management staff; high and middlelevel technicians in agriculture; high and middle leveltechnicians in water supply development; and skilledworkers for the industrial sector. At the government'srequest, the Kenya Water Resources Training Institute(appraised at US$10.3 M.) was replaced by severalsmaller components to support a study in manpowerand training requirements, examinations development,education system planning, curriculum development,and media preparation.

Education Sector The project sought to achieve the following: reduce the 1991 Closed,Adjustment Credit growth of the education recurrent budget; expand access to 03/10/95(EDSAC) education and increase retention at primary and secondary(C 2295-KE) levels; enhance and improve the quality and relevance ofUS$ 100 rrillion education at all levels; and strengthen sector management,

planning, budgeting and information systems.

The list of actions included: limit the growth of theprimary and secondary teaching forces, limit newadmissions to the public universities, introduce a directcharge on all public university students, reform thestudent loan scheme, reintroduce public financing oftextbooks to pfimary schools, strengthen the MoE'sPlanning Unit, and strengthen the Commnission forHigher Education to oversee the development andfinancing of public universities.



On-going Operations ___ __ _

University Investrnent The project supports the Government's program to 1992 To close,Project consolidate and develop the Universities by: (a) 12/31/96(C 2309-KE) rationalizing and strengthening the institutional frameworkUS$ 55 million for higher education in the public and private sectors; (b)

limiting the growth of budgetary resources devoted to thepublic universities by promoting cost sharing and improvedinvestment planning; and (c) improving the quality ofteaching and research delivered at public universities.

The project is directly complementary to the EDSAC,building on the higher education adjustment policiessupported by EDSAC which was approved by theBoard in September 1991 (C 2295-KE) and closedMarch 1995. UIP is being suspended with itsachievements being almost nil.


Part IITable 3


Table 3 Project Timetable

Identification June 1984Preparation March 1985 April 1985

Appraisal April 1985 ApriUMay 1985Negotiations November 1985 November 1985Board Presentation March 1986 March 1986Signing 1986 July 1986Effectiveness July 1986 February 1987Mid-term Review June 30, 1989 not doneEstablishment of a Special Account May 1990Changes to the Development Credit Agreement:

reallocation of funds December 1991reallocation of funds March 1993 (GOK July 1993

requested)reallocaLtion of funds February 1994 (GOK October 1994

requested)

Project Completion December 31, 1991 June 30, 1994Closing June 30, 1992 Decemnber 31, 1994

Part IITable 4

Kenya

Sixtli Education Project

Table 4: Credit Disbursements, Estimated and Actual

<,,',,,,', ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~............ . ........ ........ ':.'.'" ,'" '.'f' ........ ................. .... .... . .. ....................... ''','''

FY87 Ql 09/86 0.40 0.40 Q%

Q2 12/86 0.90 1.30 0%Q3 03/87 1.30 2.60 0%Q4 06/87 1.50 4.10 0%

FY88 Ql 09/87 1.80 5.90 0.03 0.03 0%Q2 12/87 2.00 7.90 0.76 0.79 2%Q3 03/88 2.00 9.90 0.02 0.80 2%Q4 06/88 2.20 12.10 0.02 0.82 2%

FY89 Ql 09/88 2.20 14.30 0.22 1.04 2%Q2 12/88 2.20 16.50 0.00 1.04 2%Q3 03/89 2.00 18.50 0.34 1.38 3%Q4 06/89 2.00 20.50 1.64 3.02 6%

FY90 Ql 09/89 2.00 22.50 1.47 4.49 9%Q2 12/89 1.80 24.30 0.76 5.25 11%Q3 03/90 1.80 26.10 4.39 9.64 20%Q4 06/90 1.80 27.90 4.90 14.54 30%

.FY91 Ql 09/90 1.80 29.70 0.58 15.12 31%.Q2 12/90 1.60 31.30 -0.00 15.12 31%Q3 03/91 1.60 32.90 2.53 17.65 36%Q4 06/91 1.30 34.20 2.41 20.06 41%

FY92 Ql 09/91 1.30 35.50 0.24 20.30 42%Q2 12/91 1.00 36.50 2.46 22.76 47%Q3 03/92 0.70 37.20 0.39 23.15 48%Q4 06/92 0.30 37.50 1.92 25.06 52%

FY93 Ql1 09/92 2.79 27.85 57%Q2 12/92 1.32 29.17 60%Q3 03/93 2.78 31.95 66%Q4 06/93 1.03 32.98 68%

FY94 Ql 09/93 2.22 35.20 72%Q2 12/93 0.08 35.29 73%Q3 03/94 1.18 36.47 75%Q4 06/94 2.20 38.66 80%

FY95 Ql 09/94 2.91 41.58 86%Q2 12/94 3.05 44.63 92%Q3 03/95 0.81 45.43 94%Q4 06/95 3.13 48.57 100%


SAR Estimates and Actual Disbursements

45.00

40.00

- 35.00

30.00 -

25.00

4 e 20.00

15.00

o10.00

5.00

0.00

Quarters

U SAR Estimates U Actual

Source: LOAAF


Kenya Part IISixth Education Project Table 5

Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Nme i,fVatg. 4X*tbt S=Oo<iIe

. Key implementation indicators in SAR

Primary Teacher Training Colleges IPTTCs)number of completed PTTCs 7 5

at Bondo 720 11/90 720 04/95 practically completeat Muranga 720 11/90 720 04/95 practically complete (playing fields to

be completed by 09/95)at Tambach 720 11/90 720 06/95 practically complete (landscaping to

be completed by 1 1/951at Garissa 480 06/92 N/A 09/95 civil works 95% complete;

landscaping and water works to becompleted by 11/95

at Narok 480 11/90 480 03/95 practically completeat Taita Taveta (Voi) 480 07/94 N/A 09/95 civil works about 83% complete,

landscaping to be completedat Baringo 480 11/90 480 06/95 practically complete (landscaping to

be completed by 09/95)

total capacity (number of students) 4,080 06/92 3,120 06/95 expect to enroll 3600 by August,1995

Arid Zone Primary Schools (AZSs)number of completed AZSs 3 3

at Konyao 400 10/90 227 12/91 complete and operationalat Barsaloi 400 10/90 164 12/91 complete and operationalat Mokowe 400 10/90 139 12/91 complete and operational

total capacity (number of students) 1,200 as of 530 as of06/92 05/95


Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation (continued)

Number Dat Nuber bt

Curriculum Developmentcourses for which new materials are prepared N/P /2 149 05/95 Subjects developed/revised for

primary (10), secondary (31), TEPcourses for which new materials are in use N/P 05/95 and post-secondary training (87)students using the new materials 500,000 06/92 N.A 05/95

Education Media Equipmentequipment delivered and installed Please refer to appendix 2 All equipment allocated in the SAR

equipment in use Please refer to appendix 2 Supplied, received, verified, and

installed: 55,719 cassettes of radio

program and 216 video tapes of

training progra, developedstudents using the new materials N/P installed

Education Planning and Statisticsequipment delivered and installed (Planning Please refer to appendix 2 All equipment allocated in the SARUnit)equipment in use (Planning Unit) Please refer to appendix 2 Supplied, received, verified, andequipment delivered and installed (TSC) Please refer to appendix 2 installedequipment in use ITSC) Please refer to appendix 2


Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation (continued)

Project Administrationcontracted employees and consultants on post 6 02/87 6 02/87 The PIU staff of specialists wasand functioning effectively to maintained throughout the

05/95 implementation of the projectnew organizational structure functioning effectively N/A 02/87 02/87 The reorganization took place before

credit effectiveness

II. Modified Indicators (if applicable)

Technical AssistanceSpecialist services

. assistance to EMS (pers-yrs) 5 06/92 0 05/95 Technical assistance was replaced bytraining

. assistance for the Planning Unit (pers-yrs) 3 06/92 0 05/95 Technical assistance was replaced bytraining

. assistance for the PIU (pers-yrs) 30 06/92 45 06/94

Fellowships and Training. educational media (pers-yrs) 10 06/92 1 6 06/94 The actual training provided. curriculum development (pers-yrs) 10 06/92 1 6 06/94 by the project far exceeds. for the Planning Unit (person-month) 30 06/92 112 12/93 the estimated value. for the TSC (person-month) 0 06/92 40 06/94 Resources for technical. for the PIU (person-month) 0 06/92 117 06/95

Equipment for the KIE, TSC, and the PU of MEST (please refer to appendix 2)

Ill. Modified indicators for future operation (if applicable)

Notes:/1 N.A. = not available/2 N/A = not applicable

N/P = Estimate not provided in the SARTable 5: page 3 of 3

Part IfKenya Table 6Sixth Educatic 'roject

Table 6: Key Indicators for Future Project Operation Options

Complete the civil works -in The funding shortfall after Credit closing was * A decision by the Government to finance the funding shortfall is urgently needed to avoidparticular, Garissa and Taita assessed at around 700 million Kenya shillings. disruption to the work under process and to complete the remaining part of the project.Taveta. This was required to complete the civil works The MOE has requested the Treasury to make available additional funding to complete the

contracts at Garissa and Taita Taveta and other project.water supply and landscaping subcontracts, and * The Ministry, in consultation with local authorities, institutional managers andto settle all incurred claims and any future beneficiaries, will prepare a financial and prioritization plan for completing the project in acommitments for contractors, professional most cost-effective manner. This includes, for example, finishing the buildings -services, and suppliers to complete the project. classrooms and dormitories- before the playing fields.

* The Government may consider the following options: convert them to some other purposeand get development funds for that purpose; complete them through mobilizing thecommunity fund (or harambee); give them to the local districts or communities to run asthey see fit, and pay for final completion, after Government gives as much as it can; or sellthem to the private sector. If the MOE decides to supervise the remaining civil works,MOE may wish to hire a consulting architect firm instead of the PIU.

The AZSs need to be both * All the schools remain underused. These schools * Every attempt should be made to ensure maximum enrollment from the nomadic populationefficiently utilized and financially were built to provide training and boarding for for which these schools were intended. This includes measures to provide incentives to thesustainable. 400 students, yet, none are being used to full schools to increase boarding enrollment. In the case of insufficient enrollment efforts to

capacity. Added efforts to increase use are admit day students should be encouraged.needed. * In some schools incorporating secondary level classes or even converting the school into a

* The limnited ability of students of nomadic secondary school would maximize social benefits.populations to pay boarding fees and the lack of * Measures to finance recurrent costs through demand-side financing (such as vouchers,feeding programs prevent school enrollment. scholarships, and other household empowerment measures) should be explored.

* Elaborate and expansive design coupled with the * The poor should be targeted by providing such incentives as food programs and support ofneed for appropriate maintenance increase the opportunity costspressure on sustainability and recurrent * Machinery and equipment provided to the schools through the project can also be rentedexpenditures. out for community use. In Barsaloi, the school tractor has been rented to the community.

* Income-generating activities by the schools have * The AZSs should be given more flexibility in conducting enrollment and financingbeen limited. policies.

* There has been limited use of the school facilities * Consultants should be engaged to prepare maintenance manuals for the physicalfor community activities, such as using the infrastructure of the schools.schools as community centers. * The use of the school facilities should be encouraged for community activities such as

village meetings, ceremonies, and other special events.* The schools can also be used for adult education, in particular, basic literacy tutoring or

agricultural training.* Develop monitoring and evaluation system for efficiency, cost effecliveness and

sustainability of AZSs.

Table 6: page I of 2

Table 6: Key Indicators for Future Project Operations (continued)

... .... ... .' :'' '"'"'," " '''-"'"''""""""'""i""'"'''"'"'' '"'"""'''~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. . ..... ... ...

. ; ';' .S'. '''. ''. .' '.f.':^ ..... e e ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. .. .. .. .. .. .

The PTTCs need to be efficiently * The facilities are severely underused. The * Measures are needed to increase use of the facilities.utilized and financially Schedules of Accommodation show overall room * Use of the colleges for in-service training (the 3-year in-service training and the training ofsustainable. use factors of 60% and 57% for 720- and 480- pre-school teachers taken during the breaks or holidays) and for pre-school teachers

enrollment colleges respectively. These facilities training).are idle during school breaks. * Cost recovery should be increased: but ensure that poor students are not left out of theCurrently the colleges are not financially system, financial aid and other demand-side support should be made available throughsustainable. The colleges have been running on means-testing. Cost recovery measures and steps to ensure equity and access to the poordeficits and their debts are accumulating every would be explored under the studies sponsored by the Cost and Financing of Educationyear. Although cost recovery measures have been Project.introduced in the last two years, students still pay * The PTTCs should have more fIT.-icial and managerial responsibilities and the flexibilitytoo little compared to what they would have paid to charge fees to recover the cos'L of z.aining and boarding for both pre-service and in-in secondary schools TTCs. service training. The colleges should have the flexibility and be given the incentives to

* On average, students at the PTTCs only pay compete for students, particularly the in-service trainees.about 50-60% of their food costs. Further cost * The management capacity of the administrators and educational managers should berecovery measures are urgently needed. strengthened, especially, in financial management. The facilities of these colleges can be

* Most colleges are too dependent on Government used for such purposes.grants to take any income-generating initiatives. * The colleges should be encouraged (and given the incentives) to generate extra income forThis is due to their limited financial and programs they administer during the breaks such early childhood development, and adultmanagerial control as well as their high literacy programs. Colleges should be encouraged to undertake other activities to generateexpectations for financial support from the income such as renting out facilities and equipment.Government. * Consultants should be engaged to prepare maintenance manuals for the physical

* The need for adequate maintenance coupled with infrastructure of the colleges.elaborate and expansive (23% larger than * Develop monitoring and evaluation system for efficiency, cost effectiveness andappraised area) design increases the pressure on sustainability of PTFCs.sustainability on recurrent expenditures.


Part if.Kenya Table 7

Sixth Education Project

Table 7: Studies Included in the Project

Studies Carried Out Under Education VI

1. MOE Computerization Study Computer The study was to make a reconunendation on The study was too late for its recommendations to beConsultants installing an MIS in the Ministry of Education and feasibly financed under the project. There were twoLtd. Technology. This MIS is an addition to the reasons for the delay. First, the study was stalled at

computers and equipment already provided under the CTB where the involvement of the Govermmentproject. The installation of this new system was Computer Manager was required for CTB to finalizeestimated to be very costly. its evaluation on the proposed consultant firm. CTB's

concern was that the Govermnent Computer Managerwas not involved in the initial evaluations undertakenby PIU and MTB. Second, even after the involvementof the Manager, the appointment of consultants toundertake the study was delayed until 04/94.

Although the MOE had requested funds in theUniversities Investment Project (UIP) to finance theinstallation of the MIS, the WB maintained that thisoption was not feasible because the transfer of fundsfrom UIP would require a major amendment to theCredit Agreement and could require further Boardapproval (since the UTIP was designed specifically forinvestments in Universities, not capacity-building ofthe Ministry).

Table 7: page I of 2

Table 7: Studies Included in the Project (continued)

2 Cost-effectiveness of education Government of The borrower, according to section 3.04 of the DCA, The study has never been completed. Around MarchKenya, was to provide to the IDA, by December 31, 1987, 1990, some work had been initiated but, shortly afterMinistry of for its review and comment: (a) a detailed plan of that, the undertaking was crowded-out by otherEducation action to increase the cost-effectiveness of education, priorities within the Ministry, notably the preparation

including, cost recovery measures; and (b) concrete for the EDSAC.and monitorable measures to be taken in theimplementation of such plan. As part of the preparation for EDSAC, an equivalent

study was completed. In May 1991, the IDA agreed toconsider the GOK's education sector adjustmentprogram (in particular, its letter of education sectorpolicy) as constituting the action plan. The covenanthas been complied with but after more han 3 yearsdelay.

3. Development of a technical education Govermnent of The study was to provide KIE information that would The study was completed early by the mid 1 980s butcurriculum taking into account the Manpower Kenya, help it develop a technical education curriculum the impact was negligible because the mainand Training Requirements Study (the Ministry of more attuned to the manpower requirement of the beneficiary, the KIE, did not receive the final draft.Manpower study was commissioned under the Education economy.Fifth Credit Cl 107-KE).

4. Report on the Supply of and Demand for Government of The study was to help education planners gauge The study was to assess the need for Taita Taveta andPrimary School Teachers Kenya, resources efficiently for the training of primary was long-delayed. The earlier draft of the study was

Ministry of school teachers according to PTTCs' capacity and based on 1979 census data so undermining theEducation the demand for primary teachers projected over in timeliness of its recommendation. The final version

the next 10 years. The study was not a part of the was revised using 1989 data but was not transmitted toproject's agreement. It only came about when the the Bank until February 1994. At that time, theMinistry requested an extension of the Credit to construction of Taita Taveta has already started.finish Taita Taveta PTTC. At the time, the Bankasked the Ministry to undertake the study to confirmthe need to build another PTTC.


Kenya Part nSixth Education Project Table SA

Table 8A: Project Costs (US$ millions)

Appraisal Estimates /a ActualProject Components Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total

Costs Costs Costs Costs Costs Costs

1. Primary School Improvement(a) Primary teacher training 17.53 9.56 27.09 39.67 16.81 56.48(b) Arid zone schools 1.54 1.00 2.54 0.45 2.58 3.04(c) Education media support 0.32 1.05 1.37 0.00 3.43 3.43

2. Secondary and Technical Education

(a) Curriculum development 1.99 2.41 4.40 0.68 2.12 2.80

. Institutional Development(a) Ministry Planning Unit 0.12 0.24 0.36 0.05 0.39 0.44

(b) Teachers Service Commission 0.02 0.09 0.11 0.01 0.16 0.17

Professional Services 1.36 1.05 2.41 1.45 4.08 5.52S. Project Administration 1.29 1.05 2.34 1.62 1.10 2.736. Total Baseline Cost 24.17 16.45 40.62 43.93 30.68 74.61

Physical contingencies 1.93 1.00 2.93Price contingencies 7.95 4.56 12.51

otal Prject Costs /a 34.05 22.01 56.06 43.93 30.68 74.61

a/ including taxes and duties of US$ 6.30 million equivalent.

SAR Estimates Actual

554 4

3

3

2

4.,.,,.,,' ' .'. .:: g ...~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. .. . .. .. .. 'R

1

~1

Legend1. primary teacher training 4. institutional development2. arid zone schools (PM, TSC and professional services)3. education quality improvement 5. project administration

(EMS support and curriculum development)

Source: Staff Appraisa' Report, LOAAF, and PIU.

Part IITebie 8B

KenynSixth Educatlon Projeot

Table 8B ProJect FlnoncingSAR Estimatos and Actual

(US mililons). . . . . .. , . . , _ . . . .

, W SAR E tirn Actual|Expendituro CgrJry :: : - ;

: : ; :: G"t IDA ToXl y ;Gov't IDA Toed

(1 M (2) {3) (4) (5)1 Civil works 8 88 16 48 26 3e 10 60 16 80 20 80 33 08 49 88 53 882 Furniturs 0 38 1 53 1 91 0 76 1 26 1 26 3 13 4 39 4 393 Equipment and vehicles 0 36 3 28 3 64 0 14 1 16 1 16 8 13 9 28 9 284 Specialistservices 098 098 1 96 012 012 012 018 031 0315 Fellowships 0 07 0 62 0 e9 0 04 0 33 0 33 0 88 1 21 1 216 Educational operations 1 72 2 11 3 83 0 62 0 62 0 62 0 92 1 54 1 57 Administrative operations 0 30 0 46 0 7S 1 60 2 30 2 30 0 12 2 42 2 428 Professional services 0 60 1 81 2 41 0 94 3 46 3 46 2 06 6 52 6 529 In-country training 0 03 0 04 0 07 0 02 0 02 0 02 0 03 0 06 0 0610 Unallocated 6 24 10 20 16 44 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 0O

Zof which taxes) {{6 301) - 1{6 3011

Notes (11 This Npresents what the Government has dre dy paidAs of May 27, 1996, tha Government has only disbursed an equivalent amount of USS 14 74million Therefore, the pending amount of USt11 33 million r preaents incurred debt tobe settled Moreover, at the presem, local contribution is only 19% of total costs whichwell below the floor of 26% agreed with IDA

(21 This represents the total amount that wouW be paid to settb ell ciims alreedy incurredIn this case, local contribution would be 34 S%

13) This represents the amount to be pald to complete the proJectIn this case, local contrlbution would be 38 9%

(4} This represents total costs already incurred(51 This represents total expenditures to complete the project

Part UKenya Table 9


Table 9: Costs of curriculum development, construction, and administration

.:: :. - -g ~~~~~~~~~. . . :- :- : . :-:-.: :. : ::.. .. ... ........: . -. -- -. ::- : :..::

Costs of PTTCs (3)Construction unit costs (US$/meter squared)

Lower bound unit cost 227.00 246.00 8.37Upper bound unit cost 285.00 742.00 160.35

Furniture (million) 2.04 3.67 80.11Equipment (million) 1.34 3.76 179.96Vehicles (million) 1.21 1.20 -0.49

Costs of AZSs (4)Construction unit costs (US$/meter squared)

Lower bound unit cost 168.00 163.00 -2.98Upper bound unit cost 252.00 255.00 1.19

Furniture (million) 0.00 0.53 76.09Equipment (million) 0.00 0.74 157.78Vehicles (million) 0.11 0.18 58.81

Curriculum development (million) 7.46 5.23 -29.93

Project AdministrationOperational costs (million) 0.91 1.13 24.24Vehicles (million) 0.16 0.19 16.05

Extra contribudons by the project (US$)Office renovations and alterations for the PU 25847 These items wereAccommodations to the PIU and the PPTG of the CHE 102568 not appraised.Provision of books to arid zone secondary schools 600000Provision of kitchen equipment for two Fifth IDA PTTCs 70000

(Kericho and Kaimosi)

Notes:(1) In 1985 dollars updated to 95 using an average import unit values multiplier of 1.244 for Africa for imported goods.

These figures did not take into account the costs of water works and landscaping that arebuilt in the actual figures. The exchange rate was 16 Ksh to the dollar.

(2) The actual figures were in total Ksh converted to dollars using a disbursement weighted average exchange rateof US$ 41 Ksh.

(3) The average unit cost of construction (phase 1 only) of a 720-capacity college is US$304-352/m2.The average unit cost of construction (phase I only) of a 480-capacity college is US$635-736/m2.

(4) The average unit cost of construction (phase 1 only) of an AZS is US$223-259/m2.

Sources: SAR, Working Papers, and PIU

Part IITable SC

Table SC. Project Financing (Continued)SAR Estimates and Actual

(US$ millions)

SAR Eatirnates 11) ActualSoure:

Local Forebn Tota Local Forean Totl

1. IDA 15.49 22.01 37.50 18.41 30.13 48.542. Domestic contribution (2) 18.56 0.00 18.56 14.19 0.54 14.73

Domestic contribution 13) 25.52 0.54 26.06Domestic contribution (4) 30.06

Total Proiect Costs 45) 34.05 22.01 56.06 43.93 30.67 74.60Total ProWactosst 46) 78.60

Notes:(1) Local and total figures include taxes and duties of US$6.30 million equivalent(2) Represents the total amount already paid.(3) Represents the total amount paid that would clear all pending debts already incurred.(4) Represents the total amount paid that would complete the project (this includes an additional

amount of about US$4 million in civil works).15) Represents the total costs already incurred.(6) Represents the total expenditures to complete the project.

Source: Staff Appraisal Report, LOAAF, and PIU


Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants

& f r e . ... ........ ....... .................. da. ......

W ... S... ..**..*.. ... .............

Article 3, The borrower was to furnish to the IDA for its review and Sectoral or Delay December May, The study on cost-effectiveness of education has never been completed.section 3.04 comment: (a) a detailed plan of action to increase the cost- cross-sectoral 31, 87 1991 Consequently, the plan of action to increase cost-effectiveness which was to have

effectiveness of education, including. cost recovery measures; budgetary or been based on this study has not been developed.and (b) concrete and monitorable measures to be taken in the other resourceimplementation of such plan. allocation However, three years later, as part of the preparation for EDSAC, an equivalent

study was completed. In May 1991, the IDA agreed to consider the GOK'seducation sedor adjustment program (in particular, its letter of education sectorpolicy) as constituting the action plan.

Ardcle 3, The borrower was to take all measures required to ensure Management Complied N/A N/A The facilities are in operation.section 3.05 adequate operation, maintenance, repair and renewal of facilities aspects of the with

and equipment provided under the project project or ofits executingagency

Article 4, The borrower shall cause PlUto flurnishto IDA no later than 6 Accounts and Delay N/A N/A Submission of audit reports are usually late. The reports for 1990/91, 1991/92,section 4.01 months after the end of each year a certified copy of the audit audit and 1992/93 including the special account and statements of expenditure were(b) report prepared by independent auditors acceptable to IDA. long overdue. As of 03/08/95, the Bank has neither received the audit report for

1993/94 nor an opinion on statements of expenditure for 1992/93 and 1993/94.

Article 4, For all expenditures with resped to which withdrawals from the Accounts and Complied N/A N/A The PIU maintains copies of all SOEs as well as opinions of the auditors on thesection 4.01 Credit Account are made on the basis of the SOE, the borrower audit with SOEs.(c) shall cause PIU to maintain separate records and accounts

reflecting such expendihure, retain them at least one year afterthe completion of the audit for the frcsa year, and include in theaudit reports opinion by the auditors as to whether the proceedsof the credit were used for the purposes for which they wereprovided.


Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants (continued)

1CA Dee Cmwrntt ?zt OtI~a1 At

Article 7, A staffing plan for PTTCs satisfactory to IDA was to be Management Complied Not 05/95 Compliance fullfilled.section 7.01 provided, aspects ofthe with provided(a) project or of

its executingagency

Article 7, Techinical curricula developed under the project would take into Management Complied Not Not Compliance fullfilled.section 7.01 account results ofthe manpower and training requirements aspects ofthe with provided provided(b) study. project or of

its executingagency

Article 7, To undertake TORs for specialists to be hired and produce a Management Complied Not Not Compliance fullfilled. The implementation plan for fellowships and training wassection 7.01 plan for fellowships and training. aspects ofthe with provided provided relatively flexible, since the project provided substantially more fellowships and(C) project or of training than were originally designed.

its executingagency

Article 7, Presentation by December 31, 1987 of detailed plans to Sectoral or Delay 12/1987 05/1991 The plan ofaction to increase cost-effectiveness of education including costsection 7.01 increase the cost-effectiveness of education including cost cross-sedoral recovery measures based on this study has not been developed. However, three(d) recovery measures. budgetary or years later, as part ofthe preparation for EDSAC, an equivalent study was

other resource completed. In May 1991, the IDA agreed to consider the GOK's educationallocation sector adjustment program (in particular, its letter of education sector policy) as

constituting the action plan. The covenant has been complied with but aftermore than 3 years delay (refer to Article 3, section 3.04).

Article 7, Detailed action plan for reorganization of the PIU. Management Complied 02/1987 02/1987 Compliance fullfilled. The new organization chart and functions of the officerssection 7.01 aspects of the with were submitted to the IDA before February 1987 when the project took effect.(e) project or of

its executingagency

Schedule 4, The responsibility for the execution of the project shall be the Management Complied N/A N/A Compliance fullfilled.pars. 1 PIU. The Borrower shall, until completion, maintain the PIU aspects of the with

and keep it adequately staffed. project or ofits executingagency


Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants (continued)

Shedule 4, To ensure the PIU is more responsive to technical and Management Complied 02/1987 02/1987 Compliance fullfilled. The Director has access directly to both the Deputypar 2 administrative duties, the Borrower shall take the following aspects of the with Secretary as well as the Permanent Secretary of the MOE. However, the

measures: project or of its Director was not always available to supervision missions from IDA(a) The PIU is to be headed by a Director who would report executingdiredly to the Deputy Secretary ofthe MOE. agency

Shedule 4, (b) Establish within the PIU, a technical section, composed of 2 Management Complied N/A 10/1986 Compliance partially fullfilled. The Unit acquired I architect, I civil engineer,pra' 2, (b) architects and a civil engineer. The section shall be headed by a aspects of the with I quantity surveyor (in 1988), 2 site supervisors, and a Clerk of Works at each

Deputy Director who shall be a qualified architect or civil project or of its construction site. The Deputy Director is neither an architect nor a civilengineer. executing engineer. As project educator with the PIU since 1982, he has carried out the

agency day-to-day management of the PRI effectively.

Shedide 4, (c) TORs and experience of the Director and Deputy Director Managernent Complied N/A N/A Compliance fullfilled with substantial delay, especially in forwarding thepa. 2, (c) shall be satisfactory to IDA. aspects of the with delay Director's CV to the Association about 6 months after he assumed the

project or of its assignment. The Deputy Director, who assumed the day-to-day management ofexecuting the PIU, is neither an architect nor a civil engineer as specified in the DCAagency The construction delay and cost overrun (especially in civil works) may be

attributed to this technical noncompliance.

Shedule 4, Strengthen the accounting and procurement sections of the PIR. ImpIementation Complied N/A N/A Compliance fullfilled. The Unit hired a procurement officer as a specialist andpr 2, (d) with was provided 2 supply officers by the MOE. For its accounting group, the Unit

acquired a finance officer; the asistant project accountant was provided by theMOE.

Shedule 4, The PIU shall, in consulation with relevant ministries including Implementation Complied N/A 11/1985 Compliance fullfilled. The construction contractors were selected and thepara. 3 the MOW, select and nominate all consulting firns, draft TORs with architectural designs for their works were provided to the IDA before Credit

and contracts, monitor and approve their work, assist in the negotiation. Throughout the implementation, the PIU kept regular contact withpreparation oftender documents in the opening of tenders, in the construction works either directly through field visits or (mainly) indirectlytender analysis, in contrad awards, in supervision during through the Clerks of Works at the sites.construction, and in approving certificates for payment


Part IITable 11


Table II: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements

OD 10.60 Paras. 26-27 of OD 10.60 state that as a minimum, financial reports should normallyAccounting, comprise a statement of receipts and payments, as well as total project costs and sources ofFinancial financing, and that the supporting schedules of statements should disclose annual andReporting, and supplemental budget allotments, actual expenditures under each budget category forAuditing which Bank financing is furnished, and the actual expenditures and amounts of Bank

disbursements claimed. In short, financial reporting should cover all accounts pertainingOD 13.10 to project expenditures, irrespective of sources of financing.BorrowerCompliance with For Education VI, all audited financial statements should have covered the SpecialAudit Covenants Account, IDA funds, the Government Counterpart funds, and the opinions on Statement

of Expenditures by the auditors in support of withdrawal applications. Yet neither auditreports for the Special Account nor the Government Counterpart Account have been filed,and only occasionally were the auditors' opinions on the Statement of Expendituresprovided. Compliance with OD 10.60 and OD 13.10 has been only partiaL

OD 6.30 The Bank initially expected the Borrower to contribute 33 percent minimum (net of taxesLocal Cost and duties) to the project to demonstrate its commitment. In exceptional cases, however,Financing and Cost such as strained government finances, the Bank allows lower borrower contribution.Sharing During the course of implementing the project, this percentage was lowered to 25 percent.

Current borrower's contribution of 19 percent of total incurred project cost fallssubstantially below the level anticipated at appraisal. (When the Government will havepaid the additional 700 million Ksh to complete the project, its contribution rate wouldbecome 43 percent, and the compliance will then be fully met.) SAR's expectations were,however, optimistic, given the weak government financial position at the time of appraisaland the weak performance of the economy during the 1980s. The shortfaU in theBorrower contribution is to be considered only as a partial non-compliance with OD6.30.


Table II: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements (continued)

OD 11.00 In a memorandum dated March 5, 1993 the Bank mandated the use of standard biddingStandard Bidding documents (SBDs) for all international competitive bidding (ICB) procurement initiatedComponents under Bank's Loan and Credit Agreements negotiated after May 1, 1993. Since the loan

was negotiated before this date, this OD was not applicable.

OD 13.25 The Bank allows, on an exceptional basis, some or all of the project savings to be used toUse of Project Cost finance additional project activities not included in the original project description,Savings provided that implementation of the project is satisfactory (including substantial

compliance with the Agreements), the activities proposed have high priority and areconsistent with project objectives, and that they have been fully appraised by Bank staff,and financing these activities does not violate country limits on cost sharing.

This project, although it did not realize any savings did benefit substantially from theappreciation of the SDR (estimated at about US$ 11 million). These "savings" have beenused to cover completely the costs of playing fields omitted from the original design of theproject. The playing fields have proved to be too costly and not worth the value. Inaddition, the project provided books to secondary schools, provided office renovation forthe PIU and the PU, and financed the costs of pipelines and landscaping. The projectclosed, with a funding shortfall of US$15 million. OD 13.25, if applicable, has beenonly_parlayfullflkd.


Part IITable 12


Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..S""'.-." ".'.........sg Seq. it _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ... _ _...._ ...........

PruccC.e W. .. 'OO W.k V ...... t# WP

Preparation to Appraisal N/P N/P N/P N/P 94.8 284.4

Appraisal N/P N/P N/P N/P 41.6 124.8

Negotiations through BoardApproval N/P N/P N/P N/P 6.6 19.8

Supervision 69.0 207.0 96.9 290.7 116.5 349.5

Completion N/P N/P 11.0 33.0 15.0 * 45.0

.......................... ...........

Source: TRS run on 06/10/95 and and BRWPRSTF as of 07/94.Memo:

Assumes average cost of US$3,000 per staff weekN/P stands for not provided

estimated

Part 11Table 13


Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions

|.appraisal .. ... . ...... 94.8 .___ .__ lt Appraisal to 41 .6n.a.appraisal 94.8 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~n.a.

Board __ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Board to 6.6Effectiveness

Supervision _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _educator, Supervisin the project is expected to become effective 02/27/87 once the

Oct, 86 3 14 6.0 educator, architect, 1 1 PIU has been strengthened in accordance with the DCA.

(1) the PIU will prepare detailed plans for specialist servicesand fellowships: (2) the CV of the Director is to be sent to theIDA as well as a list of the PIU professional staff.

(1) reorganization and strengthening of the PIU still in process;(2) list of PIU professional staff to be sent to IDA; (3) changeMay- 3 14 6.0 educators, architect 3 1 in the site for Voi and Garissa; (4) estimated costs well above

Jun. 87 appraisal estimate -no explanation could be given.

reluctance of the PIU to seek help regarding the processing ofSep, 87 1 7 1.0 educator fellowships from an external contracting institution.

(1) issues relating to the timeliness of counterpart funds; (2)Nov, 87 1 10 2.0 educator 2 1 poor performance of the PIU in reviewing architectural designs.

project implementation is behind schedule becuase of (11Apr, 88 1 11 2.0 educator 2 2 delayed counterpart funding, and (2) inadequate staffing of the

Sep. 88 8


Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions (continued)

Supervision (continued) _(1) site survey inaccuracies were reported at Tambach andMokowe; (2) bad soil conditions at Barsaloi and Mokowe

Jan, 89 1 1 1.0 educator necessitated redesign; (3) problems with water supply to somesites; (4) Treasury has yet to agree on the special account.

(1) lack of provision in the DCA for payment under a specialaccount caused delay; (2) fellowship training delayed; (3i PIU

Jul, 89 1 10 2.0 educator 2 1 staff have not been paid for months; (4) re-siting of Voi andGarissa; (5) estimates for PTTC buses and AZS furniture too

.__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ lo w .(1) delay in fellowship training and salary payment; (2) serious

Feb, 90 1 1 1 2.0 educator 2 1 delay in transmitting audit reports for 88 and 89; (3)monitoring of educational elements of the project is weak.

(1) delay of over two years with recruitment of experts andfellowrhip training; (2) delay in recruiting a computer expert inJul. 90 1 10 2.0 educator 2 2 the MOE; (3) weak monitoring of educational elements; (4)audit reports overdue.

Oct, 90 1 7 1.0 educatorNov- The GOK will make an official request to IDA for an extensionDec, 1 7 1.0 architect of the Credit to complete Voi and Garissa.1991 _ .

(1) the computerization study was stalled at CTB; (2) TaitaTaveta has yet to begin; (3) appointments of consultants to doApr, 92 1 7 1 .0 architect 1 1 topographical surveys of the sport fields delayed; (4)submission of audit reports delayed.(1) delay in the appointment of consultants to undertake theMOE computerization study; (2) slow payments to contractors

Nov, 92 2 10 4.0 architect, educator and suppliers; (3) slow action by KIE in settling some of thetraining programs; (4) late submission of audit reports.

(1) appointment of consultants to undertake the MOEcomputerization study; (2) KIE/PIU to process all remainingMar, 93 1 1 1.0 architect 1 2 training programs; (3) MOE to request a one-year extension to

l______ _______ _______________ the project to June 30, 1994.


Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions (continued)

I I F~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~s .l ... .......... P*~~~~uet C~~~~~ei. ~~~~~ shmwww k~~~~~~~~hM was*. ~~~~~~~~~dlts Aq~~~~~~~e.~~~wt.~~~~ tmioe~~~~~~it,do# oo~~~~~~~~~m.. .. .. I4..n.. .

Supervision (continued)the GOK was to look into the question of excess capacity of

Apr, 93 1 1 1.0 architect the teacher training system given the limitations on primaryApr. 93 1 1 1.0 architect teacher numbers agreed under EDSAC.

(1) appointment to undertake the MOE computerization study;(2) PIU to take up the problem relating to requests by suppliers

Jun, 93 2 18 6.0 architect, educator for increases in prices to compensate for the Ksh devaluation;(3) provide forecast number of teachers in the next 10 years.

(1) non receipt by the IDA of the 1991/2 audit report; (2) listof all 22 PTTCs, their occupancy, and forecast of teacher

Oct, 93 2 14 4.0 architect, educator requirements in the next decade; (3) PIU to supply list all its,personnel to the Bank's disbursement division.

(1) slow disbursement from Treasury; (2) Most contractorsFeb, 94 3 1 1 6.0 economist, 2 1 and suppliers not paid for some time; (2) audited accounts for

architect, educator 2 1 1992/3 still to be finalized; (3) Garissa and Taita Taveta farfrom being completed.(1) project partially extended for the third time; (2) Taita

Oct, 94 2 15 4.0 architect, educator u s Taveta and Garissa to be completed; (3) playing fields andwater supply subcontracts to be completed; (4) audit reportsfor 93/94 to be transmitted.(1) financing the funding shortfall by the GOK; (2) submissionof audit reports and an opinion on the SOE for 1992/93 andJan-Feb 4 15 8.0 architect, 1993/94; (3) Taita Taveta and Garissa yet to be completed;

95 economist, educator (4) water supply work incomplete at Baringo, Tambach, andGarissa.

Compltion May- 4 1 15.0 architect,Completion u4,2151 economist, educatorTabJn. 95 | 3 o 3


Appendix A


(Cr. 1673-KE)

Implementation Completion Review MissionI)raft Aide-Memoire

(June 2, 1995)

Introduction

1. An IDA mission was in Kenya between May 17 to June 2, 1995 to prepare theImplementation Completion Report (ICR) of the Sixth Education Project. The mission comprisedYang-Ro Yoon (task manager), Messrs. Nguyen X. Nguyen (economist), James Kamunge(education specialist, Resident Mission/Nairobi) and Harry Potts (ImplementationSpecialist/quantity surveyor, consultant) and Professor S. 0. Kwasa (economist, consultant). Itreviewed project documents, discussed with various institutions including the ProjectImplementation Unit (PIU) and Ministry of Education (MOE), and met with most of thecontractors, consultants for the civil works. It also visited all the construction sites of sevenPrimary Teachers Training Colleges (PTTC's) and three Arid Zone Schools (AZS's) under thisProject. The draft aide-memoire summarizes the mission's findings and the agreements made withthe Project Implementation Unit (PIU) and the Ministry of Education (MOE). This is subject tothe endorsement by the Bank Management. We gratefully acknowledge cooperation andprofessional assistance rendered during the mission, in particular, by the PIU, MOE, consultants,contractors, AZS's and PTTC's visited.

Achievement of Project Objectives

2. The main ob%ctives of the project were to improve the equity and quality of Kenya'seducation system an,' to promote institutional development through strengthening the Government'scapability to effecti .ly plan and manage educational expansion at all levels. To achieve theseobjectives, the proje' was to: (a) construct seven new PTT C's -- Bondo, Muranga, Tambach,Garissa, Narok, Taita Taveta and Baringo; (b) construct three new AZS's -- Konyao, Barsaloi andMokowe; (c) assist development of educational materials delivered by the Educational MediaServices; (d) assist curriculum development for secondary and technical education; (e) strengthenthe capacity of the Planning Unit (PU) of MOE and the Teachers Service Commission (TSC). Theproject was complex due to geographic dispersion of civil works sites.

3. Overall the project objectives were partially achieved and the specifics are the following:

Physical objectives were not fully achieved. Two PTTC's in Ga:issa and Taita Taveta arenot complete although three AZS's and five PTTC's have been practically completed andoperational.

Sector policy objectives were partially achieved. The increase of trained teachers throughboth pre-service and in-service training in new PTTC's has contributed to the quality ofeducation. New AZS's have enhanced educational opportunities in remote disadvantagedareas. However, student enrollment is very low in AZS's and facilities are underutilizedin both PTTC's and AZS's.

Financial objectives were not achieved. The current education share in recurrentexpenditures is about 41 percent, far above 30 percent cap at the time of appraisal. Tolimit the impact of the additional trained teachers by new PTTC's on recurrentexpenditure, without sacrificing the quality of instruction, the Government had initiallydecided to recruit 30 percent of all pre-service teacher trainees at the P3 level.

None of the new PTTC's will admit P3 level trainees from 1995 but at P1 level. This willincrease the share of salaries in the recurrent education expenditures. The PTTC's alsolack financial sustainability due to minimal cost recovery combined with decliningGovermnent grants.

Although this project demanded a study which would prepare detailed action plan toincrease cost-effectiveness of teacher education including cost recovery measures, the studywas not done and the IDA did not insist on it.

Institutional development objectives were partially achieved. The provision ofequipment, specialist services and training helped strengthen the capacity of the PU, TSCand KIE to plan and implement eda.cation policy effectively.

Poverty reduction objectives were partially achieved. To ensure equitable distribution ofqualified teachers, the Government recruits teacher trainees on a geographically equitablebasis and assign trained teachers to their district of origin. This policy certainly haspositive impact on poverty reduction through the provision of quality education ineconomically deprived areas. However, this project's great potential to reduce povertythrough the development of human resources has not been fully realized due to under-utilization of facilities and low enrollment in AZS's as mentioned above. The AZS's andPTTC's have not also served as community centers contrary to original plan.

Implementation Record

4. The project was initially expected to cost US$ 56.06 million, of which IDA was to financeUS$ 37.5 million. The appreciation of US dollars against the SDR in 1992 increased the proceedsof the credit to US$ 48.5 million. To utilize this windfall, playing fields and landscaping wereadded to initial civil works design. While the IDA fund has been completely disbursed before theclosing date, April 30, 1995, there is enormous cost over-run. The GOK should settle the incurreddebt of US$ 11.3 million to contractors and consultants apart from US$ 14.7 million it hasdisbursed so far. The GOK requires additional four million US dollars to complete civil works.The GOK should prepare action plan to meet this financial demand.

5. The civil works costs have been escalated for the following reasons: inclusion of additionalworks such as water, playing fields and landscaping; .pecification of larger and more elaboratebuildings than the original plan; site changes in Garissa caused by heavy rain (the cost of phase 1more than quadrupled the appraised price); selection of some of the sites; and delay in paymentleading to extra costs for contract, interest on the late payment and extra fluctuation in materialcost; high inflation; and sharp increase in imported goods and services to Africa caused by GulfWar and other world economic conditions.

6. Overall the credit was extended three times by a total of 2.5 years. Civil works' delayscontribute a large part to the overall delay, despite an early kickstart in design financed under theFifth Education Credit. Five PTTC's and three AZS's have been practically complete for a

number of years although minor works remain (usually making good defects, water supply andlandscaping) which could probably be completed within a few months. The contractors for the tworemaining PTTC's (Garissa and Taita Taveta) claim that they could finish in 4 and 7 monthsrespectively. However all these forecasts are dependent on sufficient cash flow.

7. The delay in civil works in Garissa was mainly caused by the shift of the original sitewhile Taita Taveta was due to unmet conditionalities in the selection of the site. In addition,contractors and consultants were unanimous in their opinion that the delays were mostly due to latepayments. Late payments were caused occasionally by inconsistency of the payment process butmore generally by official procedures, in particular failure to provide adequate budgetaryprovisions and cash liquidity shortages. For example, even after the establishment of the SpecialAccount, it usually took on average six months from the time the PIU received the bills fromcontractors to the time the payments were disbursed from the Central Bank. Toward the end of theproject, many contractors and suppliers did not receive payments for months (even for three yearsin one instance.)

Efficiency, Effectiveness and Sustainability

8. AZS's. All of the three AZS's are severely underutilized. While they were built to teachand board 400 students, none are being used to full capacity: current enrollment is 139 (52 girlsand 87 boys) in Mokowe, 164 (97 boys and 67 girls) in Barsaloi and 227 (134 boys and 93 girls)in Konyao. The utilization ratio of boarding facilities are even lower since Mokowe and Barsaloiadmit day students although Konyao admits boarders only. In Barsaloi, only 59 students areboarders, meaning that about 14 percent of facilities have been used. In Mokowe, very few daystudents are allowed due to local insistence on boarders only policy.

9. Although boarding can be crucial for nomadic students's enrollment as seen in Konyao, itmay have unexpected adverse impact, when the selection of the site is not properly done. Due toparents' reluctance to send young children to boarding school and local intervention, Mokoweoffers only four classes, grade 5 to 8. This best equipped school is underutilized while other dayschools are overcrowded with 70 to 80 students. Parents of Barsaloi share the same sentiments andmost of them enroll young children as day students. For the poor, boarding fees of Ksh 400 to600 p.a. at Barsaloi and Konyao, and Ksh 3,000 at Mokowe play as a deterrent to student'senrollment.

10. The financial resources for these AZS's come from government grants, student fees,community contributions and income generating activities using facilities and equipment such as atractor. They all go through serious shortage of funds and therefore maintenance is given lowpriority. Given the poor workmanship of construction and inappropriate design of facilities suchas solar lighting, maintenance may be troublesome in the future. Overall, active measures shouldbe explored to increase enrollment though recurrent cost financing (see Future Project Operationsfor detailed discussion).

11. PTTC's. The enrollments in the five PTTC's are consistent with the planned capacity.There is little wastage: completion rate is almost 100 percent; most of them pass examinations andare placed as teachers. However, some facilities are severely underutilized. The Schedules ofAccommodation showed overall Room Use Factors of 89% and 84% for the 720- and 480-enrolment colleges respectively. However these were based on class size of 30 students. Thisnumber is now 40, and the overall Use Factors are now reduced to 60% and 57% respectively.This factor accounts for the wrong or under utilization of rooms, especially special purpose rooms,which is self evident when touring the PTTC's.

12. The ramifications of this change in class size are immense. It means that the credit couldhave provided 25% less college places - a saving of 1020 spaces for two of the smaller PTTC's.Alternatively, for the future it should be remembered that teaching areas and staff housing areadequate for a one third increase in enrolment. Simple dormitory expansion (and a change todining arrangements in shifts) will allow an extra enrolment of 1360 - more for two of the largerPTTC's.

13. Site selection has lacked objectivity in a number of cases. Distance from amenities (water,power, transport) has caused additional expense and will be a continuing inconvenience. ThreePTTC's (Taita Taveta, Baringo and Tambach) are on steeply sloping sites incurring millions ofdollars in extra foundation work and particularly site levelling for playing fields. Selection, de-selection and re-selection of sites has incurred extra design fee costs. Little attention has been paidto the SAR consideration of convenient demonstration schools for practice teaching, and changes inlocation of sites has meant that the SAR objective "to maintain reasonable unit costs" has been lostin some cases.

14. Similarly to the AZS's, the PTTC's financial sources are government grants, student fees,community contributions and income generating activities. Under the current situations, thePTTC's are not financially sustainable and maintenance is given low priority. In fact, they havebeen running on the deficits and their debts are accumulating every year. While Students payabout Ksh 15,000 for two year education, their contribution of about Ksh 6,000 to boarding coversonly 50-60 percent of their food costs. Cost recovery measures are urgently needed. Forcomparison, students in Technical Training Institutes (TTI's) and Institutes of Technology (IT's)with similar background pay about Ksh 30,000 to 36,000 for two year training, while their startingwages as civil servants are similar (although most of them go to the Jua Kali sector). PTTC'sshould move away from dependency syndrome, have ownership of institutions and be given moreresponsibility to make decisions in finance and management (see Future Project Operations fordetailed discussion).

Borrower Performance

15. Preparation was effective with clearly defined objectives esptcially in respect of needscreated by introduction of the 8-4-4 system. hIplementation was deficient in some significantrespects.

While the PIU received more technical assistance, fellowship and training than originallyplanned, PIU did not develop technical managerial capacity as appraised, resulting in costoverruns, time delays and the accumulation of multi-million dollar commitments which willstrain the resources of GOK.

Treasury budgetary procedures and occasi^nal inccr istency resulted in dela)y -d ini!ctlyattribuzb!c costs such as extensions of oven,zad co. s, interest on late payments and higherfluctuations costs.

MOE failed to complete measures to plan, implement and monitor increased cost-effectiveness of education.

Covenant compliance, was only partially satisfactory, the most significant weakness beingthe consistent pattem of delays in audit reports.

Operation will continue to pose problems, not necessarily specific to the credit, but in thegeneral context of continuing recurrent expenditure problems and the failure to addressthem as provided in the Credit.

Bank Performance

16. Identification and preparation assistance were effective, but appraisal was inconsistent inseveral respects.

There was recommendation for boarding at AZS's, but the requirement for 100%boardingwas not justified and no measures were taken to alleviate the costs of boarding.

Budget overruns were resolved by the transfer of water and landscaping out of the credit,but no realistic alternative measures were appraised.

Specific DCA conditions to ensure counterpart funding were removed by GOK duringnegotiations, with no effective substitutes other than loose generalities.

The Bank's overly optimistic view failed to take into account GOK's inability to providecounterpart funds.

Mid-term review was not undertaken. It would have assisted in more coherentrestructuring of the project.

Inadequate time was provided for supervision, as evidenced by civil works design, cost andtime overruns, lack of counterpart funds, late payments and in particular measures to plan,implement and monitor increased cost-effectiveness of education.

Key Lessons Learned

17. Equity for disadvantaged children in arid zones requires more than construction ofboarding schools. The problem needs to be addressed in very specific ways including findingsolutiolns to funding issues. Quality can be improved by provision of more trained teachers, but:

the provision of the physical infrastructure should be better managed in order to achieveappraised targets, and;

failure to achieve quality targets will continue until policies controlling recurrent costs atall levels of education are established and carried out.


Key Indicators for Future Project Operations

. .......... ... . ... ,.'...,,~~ . . '.... ..........-.....- .........,........,............................ .........

...................... . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~... .....

Complete the project; this involves The funding shortfall after Credit closing has been * A decision by the Government to finance the funding shortfall is urgently needed to avoidfinishing all civil works -in assessed at around 700 million Kenya shillings. This disruption to the work under process and to complete the remaining part of the project.particular, Garissa and Taita amount was required to complete the civil works The MOE has requested the Treasury to make available additional funding to complete theTaveta- and settling all claims for contracts at Garissa and Taita Taveta and other water project. The Ministry, however, with consultation with beneficiaries, will prioritize thecontractors, professional services, supply and landscaping subcontracts, and to settle all additional works in order to minimnize the risk of cost over-run. This includes, for instance,and suppliers for the project. debts returned by the Bank after the depletion of the finishing the buildings before the playing fields.

Credit. * The Government will prepare a financial and prioritization plan for completing the project.The plan will include monitoring measures.

The AZS's need to be both * All of the schools remain underutilized. These * Explore measures to provide incentives to the schools to increase boarding enrollment forfinancially sustainable and schools were built to provide training and the nomadic population. In addition, the schools should also make evry effort to increaseefficiently utilized. This involves boarding for 320400 students, yet, none are enrollment of day students.appropriate maintenance, some being used to full capacity. Added efforts to * Explore measures to sustain the operation of the AZS's through recurrent cost financing.cost recovery measures, and increase utilization is needed. * Target the poor by providing such incentives as food programs, etc.increased enrollment and * Every attempt should be made to ensure * Increase the use of the school facilities for community activities such as village meetings,utilization. maximum enrollment from the nomadic ceremonies, and other special events.

population for which these schools were intended * The schools can also be used for adult education, in particular, basic literacy tutoring orfor. In addition, efforts to admit day students in agricultural training.the case of insufficient enrollment should also be * Machineries and equipments provided to the schools through the project can also be rentedencouraged. out for community used. In Barsaloi, the school tractor has been rented to the community.

* The limited ability of students of nomadic * A certain number of schools can also be put into such use that would bring about the mostpopulation to pay boarding fees and the lack of social benefits such as incorporating secondary level classes or even converting the schoolfeeding programs prevent school enrollment. into a secondary school.

* The use of the schools as community centers has * The AZSs should be given more flexibility in terms of conducting enrollment andbeen limited. financing policies.

* Elaborate and expansive design increases the * Consultants be engaged to prepare maintenance manuals for the physical infrastructure ofpressure on sustainability and recurrent the schools.expenditures.

Key Indicators for Future Project Operations (continued)

The PTC's need to be both * Under the cunrent situation, the colleges are not * The PTcS should have the flexibility to charge fees to recover the costs of training andfintancially sustainable and financially sustainable. In fact, the colleges have boarding for both pre-service and in-service training.efficiently utilized. This includes been rnmning on deficits and their debts are * To ensure that poor students are not left out of the system, financial aid should be madeappropriate maintenance, cost accumulating every year. Government grants and available through means-testing.recovery capability, and increased student fees, set by the Government are * Cost recovery measures and accompanying steps to ensure equity and access to the poorenrollment and utilization. insufficient. would be explored under the studies sponsored by the Cost and Financing of Education

Cost recovery measures are urgently needed. Project.Students pay too little even as compared to what * The colleges should also be given the incentives to generate extra incomes for programsthey would have paid in secondary schools. On they administer during the breaks such early chilhood development, adult literacyaverage, students at the PTTCs only pay about programs, etc.50-60% of their food costs. * The colleges should have the flexibility and incentives to compete for in-service trainees.

* Most colleges are too dependent on Government * The colleges should also be encouraged to undertake other activities to generate incomegrants to take any income generating initiatives. such as renting out facilities and equipments, etc.This is partly due to their lack of flexibility in * Consultants be engaged to prepare maintenance manuals for the physical infrastructure ofdetemining how much they can charge for the colleges.various services such as teacher training, early * The management capacity of the administrators and educational managers should bechildhood development programs, adult literacy strengthened, especially, in terms of financial management. The facilities of these collegesprograms, etc. can be used for such purposes.

* Utilization of the colleges for in-service training(the 3-year in-service training and the training ofpre-school teachers taken during the breaks orholidays) is low. The Govenment set thenumber of in-service trainees at about 3,000 UTsper batch, and only a few colleges are being usedfor pre-school teachers training.

* Elaborate and expansive (23% larger thanappraised area) design increases pressure onsustainability and recurrent expenditures.

20-JUN.'95(TUE) 08:05 WORLD BANK (F.O) FAX:254 2 720652 AppendixB P. 002

Borrower's Project Completion Report

SIXTH WORLD EahI ZDucALTION PROJECT - csNDZv 1673 ]M-

The Development Credit Agreement for the Six Education

Project was signed between the World Bank and the Government of

Kenya in July 1986, and became effective in february 1987. Its

major objectives were to improve upon the quality and equity in

education, by providing additional training facilities for

primary school teachers, curriculum development for

Secondary/Technical Education and to increase the capacity to

deliver Educational Media and Institutional development through

strengthening the Government capacity to plan and manage the

Education sector.

In primary Teacher Training and the Arid Zone Primary

Schools, all the originally appraised physical facilities were

realised within the original Credit period (i.e prior to 30th

June, 1992). Only two PTTCu were delayed.

A total cf 1560 new teachers have been graduated annually

in the years 1993, 1994 and the third graduation due by July,

1995. With the completion of the two outstanding colleges, the

overall turnover will increase to 2040 new teachers from the

colleges developed under this Project.

Towards the improvement of equity in Education, three Arid

Zone Primary Schools with a capacity of 960 were built and

equipped. However the recorded enrolment capacity by June 1995,

in all the three schools was 530 pupils. The Government is

making efforts to sensitise the local communities to allow their

children to join the schools.

ii

It is expected that the targeted capacity pf the schools will be

realised within the next 2 to 4 years.

Under the secondary and Technical Education Programme

(SEP/TEP), curriculum programmes were prepared as a follow up to

the introduction of the 8:4:4 System of Education in the country.

These were fully implemented within the Credit period.

In addition to the above, 162 secondary schools in ASAL

areas were supplied with text books for key subjects.

Due to the Governments inability to provide funds for

auxiliary facilities like electricity, water and sports fields,

in the new PTTCs/AZPS, a review of the DCA was made in August

1991 followed by re-allocation of funds in December 1991 to meet

the cost of these facilities.

Work on the same, commenced in February 1993, but the

following are yet to be completed; water supply in 1 of 7 PTTCS,

landscaping in 5 of 7, and main civil works in 2 of 7 PTTC5. All

additional facilities for AZPS were completed within the Credit

Period. In order to ease the Government's burden in raising

counterpart funds from local resources, a review of disbursement

percentages waB made in 1992.

At the time of closing the DCA, on 31st December 1994, the

Credit funds had been utilimed to procure more facilities than

originally appraised in 1985. This was inspite of the general

depreciation of the Xenya Shilling against the SDR and other hard

currencies, major devaluation of the same, and-the effects of the

liberalization of our economy within the last two years, which

resulted into increased costs of the Project components.

iii

By the last date of disbursement, commitments worth

Us $15.3m (equivalent to KSho.706.Om.) were left unsettled

following the depletion of Credit funds.

While these commitments have become the responsibility of

the borrower (Kenya Government) to be funded from the local

resources, the same is unlikely to be realised within the current

contract period due to prevailing budgetary constraints.

It is equally important to note that lack of use of the

facilities by the institutions if their completion is delayed

further, will result in very high rate of depreciation,

notwithstanding the consequential claims which may be accrued due

to delayed payment of the contractors.

In order to achieve the full realisation of the Project

objectives (in terms of physical facilities) we recommend that

the World Bank should avail a quick disbursement facility to the

Government, and particularly under Credit 2309 - xE (Universities

Investment Project), in order to settle these outstanding

commitments.

We are positive that overall completion of the outstanding

works would be realised within seven months from the date the

funds become available.

* Exchange rate used XShs.41.00 to . US $

iv

Appendix C


Appendix CCorinancier Contribution to ICR

Not Applicable - there were no cofinanciers for the Project

ADpendix D


Comments on Quality of Design and Construction

General Comments

1. Double or multi-story buildings require more expensive reinforced concrete frames, staircases andfoundation work than single-story buildings. There may also be maintenance implications bearing onfuture costs. The construction skills needed are rare, relative to the general level of skills available.

2. For PTTC dormitories, Garissa and Taita Taveta are examples of appropriate design for the end-use in keeping with local environment and climatic conditions. Other PTTCs did not show the same closematch.

3. The condition of the ablution facilities was generally poor because of damage or careless use.Separate ablution blocks designed for robust use with little water and easy cleaning and maintenance wouldbe more appropriate for PTTCs and AZSs. In fact some AZS facilities have never been used as originallydesigned. Water supply is the critical restraint.

4. Given that the kitchens as designed could not be used as intended (equipment delivered late, partsmissing, delivered but not connected, no money for buying gas) it would have been more effective toconstruct separate, fuel-efficient firewood kitchens from the beginning or at least as soon as it becameevident that the planned kitchens were impracticable.

5. The lockers provided for PTTCs and AZSs have not proved useful. Most remain unused; manyare damaged or broken. Over-provision (and the administrative change to the home room system) haverendered the lockers redundant.

6. The need for elaborate and large-scale assembly halls for PTTCs is far from demonstrated. Formost purposes the dining halls would serve just as well. The rare public ceremonial functions (such as thecommencement of a PTTC or AZS) could be held in the open air. In rainy weather the dining halls couldbe used.

Specific Comments

Muran'ga and Narok P1TCs- Triad Architects

7. The entrances designed by this group were courtyards with administration, assembly and libraryarranged around. The library was elaborate. There was a natural progression to clusters of teaching areasleading to dormitory areas. In operation, classrooms were used as stores and laboratories were under-used.The sports pavilions at Muran'ga and Narok did not meet the requirements of modesty and economy. Thedetails were well executed and there were no apparent construction failures. To protect sensitivestores/libraries, the college authorities had felt it necessary to strengthen security by means of burglar bars.

Garissa and Taita Taveta PTTCs - NPotho Architects

8. This group largely adopted the same principles of arrangement as Triad. Their design, however,lacked provision for the semi-arid environment. There was no sun protection for windows, the designcalled for three-story dormitories (in the midst of millions of acres of semi-desert) provided a stiflingcentral courtyard, gave the assembly hall only average cross-ventilation (supplemented by electric fans),and gave the dining hall windows on one side only. The groups of buildings are far apart linked byhundreds of meters of covered walkways. The steep site at Taita Taveta produced some unusual details.Construction was nearly finished at Garissa and on-going at Taita Taveta. Construction details at bothcolleges were good; the quality of workmanship at Taita was good. There were serious cracking problemsat Garissa: this is believed to be caused by inadequate foundations which go down to sand.

Baringo, Tambach and Bondo PTTCs- Harbans Singh and Associates

9. Room layout and structure seem to have been designed separately. Fenestration was carriedvertically over a floor and an up-standing wall, leaving a gap which gradually filled with rubbish and wasimpossible to clean or paint. Buildings were arranged at odd angles leading to expensive structures ordifficult roof junctions. At one point the ceiling was only 1 .5m (5 ft.) above the floor. Window frameswere placed inside instead of over wall plaster - raim penetrates the wall and causes efflorescence. Roofflashings were in cement instead of sheet zinc - the result was more rain penetration. Dormitory top floorshad windows arranged so that beds were next to opening casements. At Bondo, the contractor placed rooftiles so badly that leaking was prevalent rather than occasional. The designer's response to the site atTambach was to stick with his plan and adjust the elevation - resulting in 5-story dormitories with theirattendant maintenance problems. In Bondo, bat proofing details have failed and the college is infested withbats to a nauseous degree

Arid Zone Schools - Plan Systems Services

10. Apart from failure to meet floor area requirements, these designs were generally satisfactory. Steelwindows and roof sheets are corroding at Mokowe (at the coast), but this is a maintenance rather than adesign problem. Considering the remoteness of sites (especially Barsaloi and Konyao) the build quality isgood. Some external details (footpaths, building surrounds) are beginning to fail but maintenance is theproblem. The supply of solar lighting, outside this architect's brief, has created problems, of maintenancerelated to batteries. Paraffin lamps may, after all, be more appropriate and sustainable.

Part 11Appendix 1


Appendix 1: Costs of Construction Works (QVI 'b'sh,

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~oa pr X-ieerN

... ..*.*. .:.:. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .. . . ...... ... ...

Primary Teachers Training Colleges (PTTCs)

Baringo (Moi) 480 43611 65014 98405 10 49 51 201790 18121 +L+WBondo 720 59544 85326 138500 34 43 62 175200 11835 +LGarissa 480 51958 66447 234595 249 28 253 338897 30433 +L+WMuranga 720 59544 86178 106655 10 45 24 149615 10106 +LNarok 480 38666 66864 86707 10 73 30 298458 26801 +L+WTambach 720 62911 85706 140172 54 36 64 228983 15468 +L+WTaita Taveta 480 44141 189293 289421 48 329 53 321983 28914 +WAverage 583 51482 92118 156351 59 86 77 244989 20240

Arid Zone Schools (AZSs)

Barsaloi 400 9152 15095 26089 5 65 73 26089 10292Konyao 400 10130 14073 14244 5 39 1 26590 10489 +WMokowe 400 11254 10971 16974 5 -3 55 16974 6696Average 400 10179 13380 19102 5 34 43 23218 9159

Notes:(1) The total price is likely to be underestimated because it uses 1993 estimates for landscaping and water works(2) L = landscaping; W = waterworks


Part IIAppendix 2


Appendix 2: Costs of Construction Works (000 US$)

* . ........ *........... *...~> :.~.:.:.~.:.:.AppraIuid Co~tti~t E$na *w~o~u) C~taet/ E......0.0..$. pe.....w.r....

Primnary Teachers Training Colleges (PITTCs)

Baringo(Moi) 480 2726 3663 4068 10 34 11 5704 512 +L+W

Bondo 720 3722 4807 5726 34 29 19 4952 335 +LGarissa 480 3247 3743 9698 249 15 159 9579 860 +L+WMuranga 720 3722 4855 4409 10 30 -9 4229 286 +LNarok 480 2417 3767 3584 10 56 -5 8436 758 +L+WTambach 720 3932 4829 5795 54 23 20 6472 437 +L+WTaita Taveta 480 2759 10664 11964 48 287 12 9101 817 +WAverage 583 3218 5190 6463 59 68 30 6925 572

Arid Zone Schools (AZSs) (3)

Barsaloi 400 572 850 1079 5 49 27 1079 425Konyao 400 633 793 589 5 25 -26 1099 434 +WMokowe 400 703 618 702 5 -12 14 702 277

Average 400 636 754 790 5 21 5 960 379

Notes:(1) The total price is likely to be underestimated because it uses 1993 estimates for landscaping and water works

(2) L = landscaping; W = waterworks(3) Average exchange rate 1986-91, US$ 1 = KES 24.19 is used since all the payment is made during this period.


Part IIAppendix 3

Appendix 3: Comparison of Planned and Actual Floor Areas.

Item Area m2 Increase %

Planned for 720 PTTC 14,645

Planned for 480 PTTC 10,091

Planned for Arid Zone School 2,535

Ngotho Architects

Garissa (480) 18,057 79%

Taita Taveta (480) 14,809 47%

Triad Architects

Muran'ga (720) 16,143 10%

Narok (480) 11,250 11%

Harbans Singh Associates

Baringo (480) 10,800 7%

Tanbach (720) 15,367 5%

Bondo (720) 15,552 6%

Planning Systems

Each AZS @ 3,779 49%

Total planned gross area 91,904

Total built area 113,315

Increase in total area 23%

Part IIKenya Appendix 4


Annex 4: Equipment for KIE, MEST PU, and TSC

Education Media Support'Education Media ServiceFilm dubbing and Library equipment 235116 1783760 659Video editing 81171 606202 6471 inch format VTR 139950 151010 8Data processing equipment 6033 57917 860Video dubbing equipment 113080 353917 213Printing equipment 0 400237Subtotal 575350 3353043 483

Learning Resource CentersMeasuring equipment 105740 188579 78Additional video equipment 143060 226820 59Subtotal 248800 415398 67

Curriculum DevelopmentVehicles3 long-wheel base, 4-wheel drives 111960 83833 -25 2 vehicles for KIE3 mini vans 70908 7560 -89 1 vanI micro bus 43540 18565 -57 1 busPickup truck 0 6230 1 I pickup truck

Subtotal 226408 116188 -49

Office Eouiyment1 12 stage collator 1866 08 stencil duplicators 44784 010 electric typewriters 22392 010 drafting boards 7464 02 stencil cutters 1866 0Subtotal 78372 0

MEST Planning3 passenger vehicles 93300 101925 9Office equipment 6220 23918 285 2 computersSubtotal 99520 125843 26 & 10ype writers

Teachers Service CormissionComputers, equipment, and installation 90344 57528 -36 5 PCs, I laser andMicrofilm camera, reader and equipment 34832 0 -100 4 dot matrix printersSubtotal 125176 57528 -54

Total 1353626 4068000 201

Notes: /1 the appraised value in 1985 prices was updated to 1995 by an average imported unit values.multiplier of 1.244 for Africa.

/2 the disbursement weighted average exchange rate used is 41 KSH per USS. Vehicles werepurchased in 12/1990 when the exchange rate was 23.4 Ksh per dollar.

Sources: SAR, Working Papers, K7E, MEST, and PI

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Documents

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