Document ofThe World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No. 23354

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT(IDA-25370)

ON AN

IDA CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$24.5 MILLION

T'O

THE REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

FOR AN

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR MANAGEMENT PROJECT - ASMIP(CREDIT NO. 2537-TA)

DECEMBER 31, 2001

Rural Development OperationsEastern & Southern Africa

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the peiformance of theirofficial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchalnge Rate Effective )

Currency Unit = Tanzania Shilling ( Tsh.)At Appraisal: Tsh. 350 = US$ 1.00

At Completioni: Tsh. 880 = US$ 1.00

FISCAL YEARJuly 1 - June 30

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ASDS Agricultural Sector Development StudyASIP Agricultural Sector Investment ProgramASMP Agricultural Sector Management ProjectCAS Country Assistance StrategyDCA Development Credit AgreementGOT Government of TanzaniaIDOS Institutional Development Objectives and StrategyISC Inter-ministerial Steering CommitteeMAC Ministry of Agriculture and CooperativesMOA Ministry of AgricultureOJT On-the-job trainingPC Project CoordinatorPPF Project Preparation FacilityPSC Personal Service ContractPSRC Parastatal Sector Reform CommissionQAG Quality Assurance GroupRTF Rationalization Task ForceSAPDEP Strategic Agricultural Partnership Development ProjectSEC Project SecretariatSOFRAIP Soil Fertility Recapitalization and Agricultural Intensification ProjectSTA Special Training AssignmentTTG Technical Task Groups

Vice President Callisto E. MadavoCountry Manager/Director James Adams

Sector Manager/Director Karen BrooksTask Team Leader/Task Manager Tekola Dejene

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TANZANIAAGRICULTURAL SECTOR MANAGEMENT PROJECT

(Credit No. 2537-TA)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

1. Project Data I2. Principal Performance Ratings 13. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 34. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 45. Major Factors Affecting tmplementation and Outcome 76. Sustainabilitv 87. Bank and Borrower Performance 98. Lessons Learned 119. Partner Comments 1210. Additional Information 12Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Framne Matrix 13-15Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 16-18Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 1 8Annex 4. Bank Inputs 19Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 20Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 20Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 21-71

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in theperformance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed withoutWorld Bank authorization.

Project ID: P002801 t Project Name: ASMPTeam Leader: Tekola Dejene TL Unit: AFTRI

ICR Tvpe: Cor7e ICR Report Date: October 25, 2001

1. Project Data

Name: ASMP JCTF_ Number: LDA-25370Country/Department: TANZANIA Region: Africa Regional

OfficeSector/subsector: AG - Agency Reform

KEY DATESOri!inal Revised/Actual

PCD: 0915/1992 Effective: 10/01/1993 01/10/1994Appraisal: 02/20/1993 AITR: 06/30/1996 10/06/1996A pproval: 07/20/1993 Closing: 06/30/1999 06/30/2001

Borrower/lImplementing Agency: GOT/GOVOther Partners:

STAFF CURRENT AT APPRAISALVice President: Callisto E. Madavo E. JaycoxCountry Manager: Janmes W. Adams F. ColacoSector Manager: Karen Brooks Sushma GangulyTeam Leader at ICR: Tekola Dejene F. ByamugishaICR Primarv Author: Pietros Kidane (TL - FAO/CP) and

Ephrem Asebe, Consultant

2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN-Unlikely,HlUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)

Outcome: SSustainability L

InCstitutional Developrnent Imnpact: SUSBanlc Performance: S

BorrowXer PerJormnance: S

QAG (if available) ICRQuality at WEntr: S

Prqject at Risk atAny Time: No

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

3.1 Original Objective:The rationale for ASMP was the need for an institutional framework in Tanzania's agricultural

sector to manage the transition toward a market-oriented economy. The MOA was overloaded with tasks forwhich it was ill suited or, for which it did not have adequate resources and expertise. There was, therefore, aniobvious need for reformning and strengthening the agricultural institutioins to deal with policy formulation andimplementation and to support the process of developing and implementing a strategy in wlich state institutionsmanage less but better. In addition, there was a need for developing an institutional capacity to prepare andimplement the next phase of sector reforms. ASMP was forMLulated, therefore, to meet these needs.

The main objective of the ASMP was to strengthen institutional capacity to formulate and implementthe Government's agricultural development policies, strategies and programs. Specific objectives includedfostering institutional capacity to support: (i) the rationalization and strengthening of Government functions inthe agricultural sector; (ii) the fornulation and implementation of agricultural policies; and (iii) the improvementof the agricultural information systems and services. These interventions were expected to facilitate an effectivefunctioning of Government and the private sector in a market-based economy. In the context of Tanzania of theearly nineties, the main project objective was sensible and timely, as the country was then gearing up totransform its public-dominated economy into a market-oriented one. Hence, strengthening the Ministry ofAgriculture (MOA)l to enable it to take lead in reorganizing itself and initiating a reform process to modernizethe agricultural sector was relevant indeed.

3.2 Revised Objective.Project objectives were not modified throughout the implementation period. However, more emphasis

was placed in the latter years of project execution on activities related to private sector development (e.g.reviewing the regulatory framework, enhancing diologtie between public and private sector, supporting thefonration and strengthening of commodity associations, etc.) and preparation of feasibility studies for furtlieragricultural development. Although these activities are conisidered a logical corollary to the successfulimplementation of the main project components, the feasibility studies were not foreseen at appraisal. As such,they became added objectives, to the original ones, and this was reflected in the Development Credit Agreement(DCA). which was accordingly amended.

3.3 Original Components:The project comprised three components: (i) rationalization and strengtlhening of Government functions

in the agricultural sector; (ii) formulation and implemeentation of agricultural policies; and (iii) improvement ofthe agricultural information systems and services required to facilitate an effective functioniing of theGovernment and the private sector in a market-oriented economy. These components should be regarded aslogical choices, if looked at from their potential in achieving project objectives rapidly. T hey were alsoconsistent with the Institutional Development Objectives and Strategy (IDOS) for agriculture, elaborated by theGovemment of Tanzania (GOT) in 1992/93, which was endorsed by the World Bank. Major elements of theGovernment strategy covered areas such as: the transfer of commercial type of MOA activities to the privatesector; privatization of agricultural parastatal organizations; revising laws and regulations to encourage privatesector investment in agriculture; developing maniagement systems required to improve the efficiency of MOA,

: In 1998, the name of the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) was changed to Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MAC).

In November 2000, it is again changed to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MAFS). The acronym MOA has been used in thisreport to refer to these three ministerial names. In November 2000, when the Ministry became MAFS, GOT decided to transfer twodepartments away from it, i.e. the Department of Livestock to the Ministry of Water, and the Department of Cooperatives and Marketing toform a new ministry of its own. Therefore, public responsibility for the agricultural sector is now vested within three ministries.

2

including its reorganization; and strengthening the agricultural infonrmation systems and services to support theemergence of a market-based economy.

3.4 Revised Components:No revision was made of project design or components. However, as implementation of the key

components was completed, the project endeavored to assist the counitry by undertaking additional task-s. Amongother things, the project facilitated three feasibility studies: i) the Strategic Agricultural Partnership DevelopmentProject (SAPDEP), which the GoT proposed a follow-on project to ASMP. ii) the Soil Fertility Recapitalizationand Agricultural Intensification Project (SOFRAIP) and, (iii) River Basin Management and SmallholderIrrigation Improvement Project (RBMSIIP). The project also provided support to the Ministry of Lands for theimplementation of the 1999 Land Act.

3.5 Quality at Entry:The project was not subjected to performance rating by the Quality Assurance Group (QAG) of the

World Bank. At project completion, the quality at entiy is regarded as satisfactory for the following reasons.First, the design of ASMP was anchored in the World Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), whichemphasized the need to accelerate implementation of policy reforms as part of the overall effort to move tohigher rates of economic growth. Second, ASMP was designed and implemented under a relatively favorablemacroeconomic environment that was established by two earlier economic adjustment programs: EconomicRecovery Program (ERP) that was launched in 1986 anid succeeded by the Economic and Social Action Program(ESAP) in 1989, which were aimed at reversing the decline and reducing the extreme instabilities in theTanzanian economy. Third, ASMP design and implementation took place at a time when the role of the publicsector in the economy was gradually declining and being r eplaced by an increasing role of the private sector,concurrently with the implementation of public sector adjustment reforms that were intended to transfolrn therole of Government to one that facilitates private sector's development and provides public goods effectively andefficiently. IDA-funded Public and Parastatal Sector Reform Project (PPSRP) and the Public Sector AdjustmentCredit (PSAC) supported these public sector adjustment reforms. Fourth, ASMP design also benefited from thelessons learned during the implementation of the previous technical assistance projects in the agricultural sector(Cr. 1206-TA and Cr. 1524-TA). The lessons that guided the design of ASMP and its implementation planincluded: (a) institutional building and personnel development require long-term assistance and continuity ofimplementationi; (b) the success of capacity building projects is enhaniced if assistance is targeted at the strategicfunctions of the relevant institutions; (c) the need for a clearly thought-out institutional development strategy;(d) the need to take the borrower's limited absorptive capacity into account; and (e) the need for adequatesupervision, especially from World Bank Resident Missions. Fifth, the design of ASMP was grounded on amajor analytic work, Tanzania: Agricultural Sector Review, 1992.

Tak-ing advantage of the reform processes and taking into account lessons learned from theimplementation of IDA-funded projects. ASMP designi was deliberately kept simple to increase the chance forits successful implementation. For instance, it had only three components and they were all to be implementedby MOA, within its existing setup, but under the overall direction of an Inter-ministerial Steering Committee(ISC) chaired by the Principal Secretary of MOA. Since reforming the agricultural sector had implications thatgo beyond agriculture, the appraisal mission aptly involved other concerned institutions in the ISC, inter alia,the Ministry of Finanice, the Civil Service Department (implementing), the Planning Commission, the NationalBureau of Statistics and the Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC - Implementing) by making them fullmembers of the ISC. Moreover, an Advisory Technical Committee (ATC) was established within the MOA toprovide technical guidanice on project activities. These arrangements have proven to work well duringimplementation by involving key institutions in decisions regarding institutional and policy reforms, asagreements were sought a priori within the ISC, thus clearing up any potential obstacle. The project provided forthe establishment of a Project Secretariat (SEC), to be headed by a full-time Project Coordinator (PC), supportedby five professional staff specialized in different disciplines. The SEC proved to be an adequate vehicle for the

I

coordination, planning and timely implementation of project activities.

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs

4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:The project has successfully achieved its main objective, and its outcome is rated as satisfactory. At

completion, Govemnment function in the agricultural sector has been better defined and orientated. The exercisehas enabled the Ministry to adopt three major tasks -policy formulation and planning, development andprovision of services in partnership with the private sector, and regulation and inspection - and to restructureitself around these responsibilities. This entailed the divestLre of many agricultural parastatal, spinning-off ofservices of a commercial nature to the private sector and staff reduction witlhin MOA. The Ministry has startedto strengthen its capacity to formulate and implement agricultural policies, as staff skills have been up-gradedthrough on-the-job training and higher education overseas. More than 18 major studies were completed, whichmade major contributions to the current sector policy. The project has enabled MOA to prepare sector policy,strategy and feasibility studies and to establish a mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the price andmarket reform. Importanit achievements have also been made in improving the agricultural information systemsand services, conflicting information on production were reconciled; sources of agricultural informationstreamlined, an agricultural data base developed, and, a cost-effective production on developed, and, a cost-effective production data collection system is in place. MOA is now carrying out annual agricultural surveysand disseminates results on a timely basis. See Annex I and 7b for details

4.2 Outputs by components:(a) Rationalization and strengthening of Government functions in the agricultural sector.

The major outputs associated with the rationalization of MOA functions include the following. First,priority core functions and mnission of MOA were defined and the non-core functions slotted for privatization andjoint undertakings. The core functions were primarily aimed at creating an enabling environment for privatesector participation in agricuiltural production, trade and processing. Second, based on the new priority corefunctions, a new organizational structure was derived and approved in January 1998 by the Civil ServiceDepartment. Third, following the definition of core functions and the preparation of the organizational structure,a staff inventory was completed and a staffing plan (scheme of service) for all new departments and work units,including the zones, regions, and districts was developed. Based on the staffing plan, 7800 staff were retrenchedand 7,906 staff redeployed to the Regional Administration and Local Government. Fourth, the spinning off ofabout 85% of the original 48 non-core functions that were identified for privatization or joint venture duringproject preparation was completed. Fifth, developed and implemented guidelines to facilitate the formation ofjoint ventures and cost sharing mechanisms for some of the activities that were identified for joint venture atappraisal. Agreement was reached with the respective commodity boards on the cost sharingr mechanisms forresearch of most of the main export crops (coffee, cotton, and tobacco). Some research activities for major exportcrops have actually been privatized or, are in the process of privatization (tea, tobacco). Sixth, the designing andimplementation of improved internal operating systems and MIS was completed. Electronic connectivity withinthe MOA is established through a Local Area Network (LAN) after installing the computers and softvare thatwere procured under the project. Seventh, assisted PSRC in determining the most suitable divestiture strategiesand by preparing 177 profiles for agricultural parastatals for divestiture.

(b) Strengthening Institutional Capacity to Formulate and Implement Policies.

Staff training and policy analysis/formnulation were the two key elemnents of this component. Substantialtraining input, comprising in-service training, short- and long-term overseas training and study tours wereprovided under the project (Annex 7b). The in-service training programs were of innovative niature and consistedof: on-the-job training (OJT) and the Personal Service Contract (PSC) later changed to Special Training

4

Assignment (STA). The OJTs were of two kinds: (i) a less intensive module carried out under the ratioualizationcomponent, which covered mainly tasks related to project activity planning; and (ii) intensive OJTs undertakenwithin the policy formulation component in whiclh the assignments entailed rigorous analysis and research, andclearance/approval of reports by the management, after a formal qualitv review. Staff engaged in intensive OJTswere provided with training mentors - usually from the University of Dar es Salaam - to see that the traineeswere supervised adequately. Under the STA, staff carry out major analytic work and are attached to the project'stechnical assistance personlel so that they could be mentored.

Parallel to the OJTs and STAs, the project also undertook a vigorous training program in the form of theshort- and long-term individual training, study tours, workshops and seminars, which were important tools forcapacity building of MOA. Twenty-three staff members were sent overseas for various degree course traininjg inthe fields of agricultural development and information technology. About 50 staff members were given short-termn training abroad mainly in agricultural development and management. The various workshops and tailor-made courses that were organized by the project covered a wide-range of topics, including researchmethodology, techniques of report writing, commodity price review, development planning, macro-economicpolicies and computer data processing and application. Tailor-made local courses were given to 191 staff.

The overall project outputs concerning staff training and the impacts of this on raising MOA capacitieswas impressive as witnessed by the project accomplishments. Besides fostering staff skills, the training programsunder the project were instrumental in reorienting the staff thinking towards the new role of the Government inthe agriculture sector. Few of the trained staff has left MOA to work in other parts of the Government or theprivate sector during project implementation. Although the present level of turnover has not affected theMinistry's efficiency, the situation calls for a system of continuous training within MOA in order to maintain theexperience gained and the competence attained under the project.

Supported by the training program and guided by a policy and regulatorv reform agenda, the projectcarried out numerous analytic works that made maajor contributionis towards the current sector policy andregulatory framework. At completion, 18 major studies2 were prepared by staff working within OJT/STA, andthese were crucial inputs to the preparation of 15 agricultur-al policy and strategy related studies includingAgricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS), Agricultural Input Supply, Agricultural Taxationl, Agri-business Development, Livestock Sub-sector Development, Cooperatives Development Policy, Rationalizationof Regulatory Function of MOA, etc., to mention a few (Anmex 7b - table 1). The preparation of special reports,like the export crop and food crop reviews, made considerable contribution to the restructuring of theCommodity Boards. The revision of some current legislation (e.g.. Acts for pyrethrum, sisal and tea to improveprivate sector participation in the association) was facilitated by the crop studies done under the project. Thereports on parastatal profiles and strategies provided key inputs in the privatization of parastatals. TheAgribusiness Development Study was instrumental in initiating and deepening the interface betweenGovernment and the private agribusiness sector in the country. This led to the intensification of tlle private/publicsector dialogue through consultative workshops and the Minister ofAgriculture s Round Table Con ferences.These have provided useful for a for private sector's contribution to major policy formulation, including mlajoragricultural tax reforms in 1999 and 2000. Resulting from these interactions with the private sector, ASMPassisted in setting up an industry-based organization called the Tanzania Chamber ofAgriculture and Livestock(TCA1L) in 2001 as an apex organization of industry-based agricultural associations, suclh as cotton, caslhew,tobacco, sisal and coffee growers associations.

However, the adoptioin of the recommendations and findings of the studies or implementation is notwithout difficulty. In some instances, the Government failed to carry out the recommenidations (e.g. food crop

2These studies do not include the over 240 OJT reports covering policy reviews, annual commodity market reviews, export crop reviews,livestock and agricultural input reviews and profile preparation on parastatals.

S5

marketing study), thereby, reducing impact of the studies. This kind of situation required a strategy that involveworking with Bank teams who work in other areas such as public sector reform, adjustment credit and privatesector development to implement the finding in part or in full.

(c) Agriculture Information Systems and Services.

As planned, the project enabled MOA to establish a working system of agricultural data collection.processing, and dissemination to end-users in the public and private sectors. A national sample survey thatserves as the base-year data for aimual surveys was completed in 1994/95. The Expanded Agricultural Survey, anationwide post census agricultural survey, was implemented in 1995/96 and 1996/97 to collect and compilecurrent agricultural statistics. In 1997/98, an Integrated Agricultural Survey was carried out and was followed bya District Agricultural Survey in 1998/99. The District Agricultural Survey, for the first time, provideddisaggregated information by district. In 1999/2000, a Rapid Appraisal Survey was conducted. Ihis surveymethod was aimed at introducing a cost-effective and sustainable data collection method and was a resounding;success. For instance, the 1999/2000 Rapid Appraisal Survey was carried out at a cost of Tsh.56 million,compared to Tsh.400 million for the previous agricultural survey. ASMP has also carried out surveys of large-scale farms, urban agriculture, and of coffee, the major export crop.

The Agricultural Statistical Unit of MOA has implemented this component in collaboration with theNational Bureau of Statistics by pooling staff and financial resources, and this has led to a stable cooperation,which is continuing even after the project is closed. This is "best Practice" in institutional collaboration andcoordination of an activity that fall within the purview of two institutions. This UJnit has developed andimplemented an agricultural database system. The market information and crop monitoring activities have alsobeen strengthiened. Information on food commodities and prices are collected and released regularly, and thedata collection capacity of the Early Waming System under MOA has been improved under the project.

4.3 Net Present Value/Economnic rate of return:As an institutional building project, no quantitative economic analysis was carried out for the project at

appraisal or completion. The project benefits that were identified at appraisal and expected to accrue during andafter project implementation have materialized, largely, and will continue to do so in the coming years. 'Fhereare, however, several economic benefits directly associated with the interventions implemiiented under ASMP.First, ASMP provided the institutional framework in Tanzania's agricultural sector to manage the transitiontoward a market-oriented economy. Second, the role of Government in the agriculture sector is now focused onthe provision of public goods and priority core functions. The policy and regulatory framework necessary tofacilitate private sector is in place and evolving. Third, the project's rationalization component is now serving asa model for the ongoing public service reform program that is directed at rationalizing public functions at thenational level, enhancing core management principles, and performance management systems. Fourth, theGovemment's capacity for policy formulation and implementation has been strengthened to the extent ofinitiating and implementing key agricultural policy and legal reforms (the ASDS), programs and projects (e.g.,SAPDEP, SOFRAIP). Fifth, the agricultural information base, data systems and services hiave become morereliable and frequently sought after by both the public and private sectors. Sixth, although the agriculturalparastatal divestiture process has not yet been brought to an end, it has had profound impact on agriculture'stransition toward becoming a market-based production system. The monopolistic marketing boards andcooperative unions, which were the backbone of the single-channel marketing system in Tanzania, have beenrestructured, or have become moribund. The private sector's response to the opportunities created is strong. Thisis evident in the increasing shares of the private sector in the various commodity markets. Trade in miajor grains(maize, rice, and wheat), which were previously the sole domain of the giant parastatal, the National MillingCorporation, and government-controlled cooperative unions, are now entirely private. Private small and medium-scale mills now do about 98% of the milling of grains. The marketing and processing of the major exportcommodities (coffee, cotton, tea, tobacco, sisal, cashews and pyrethrum) is now virtually in the hands of private

6

operators, with a few cooperative unions competing. Similarly, there has been spontaneous private investment inmarketing and primary processing facilities in several sub-sectors, especially in tobacco, cotton and grainmilling.

It should be realized, however, that these benefits are not solely due to ASMP, since the project wasimplemented in a policy and institutional framework that was facilitated bv other Bank-supported opcrations.ASMP implementation concunrent with other macroeconomic adjustment and structural reformi programiis exertedpositive externalities (linkages) on its development objectives.

4.4 Financial rate of return:The project was not subject to quantitative financial analysis at appraisal and completion. However, the

project has contributed significanitly to budgetary savings, privatization revenue, and removal of parastatalsubsidies. There are two major sources of budgetary savings for the Government, arising from theimsplementationi of ASMP. First, because of the retrenching of more than 7,800 staff, Government reduced itsfiscal burden associated with staff salaries and benefits, and the provision of ineffective public services. Second,during the period of central economic management, Goverm-ienit used to incur substantial costs of supportingthese parastatals. For instance, support to parastatals accounted for 70% of the development budget allocated toMOA in the late 1980s. During 1993/94 and 1994/95, when ASMP started implementation, Governmentprovided Tsh.50.3 billion and Tsh.2 1 .8 billion, respectively, as direct support to the operating parastatals. Since1995/96 Govemment no longer provides operational support to parastatals that are earmarked for privatization orto the restructured Commodity Boards. The latter are financed through industry cess. Accordingly, the divestitureof agricultural parastatals has removed the fiscal burden from the shoulders of the Govemment. On the otlherhand, the privatization of 80 agricultural parastatals, subsidiary companies and operating units has generatedrevenue to the national treasury and helped to offset btudget deficits. In addition, the privatization of theparastatals has broadened the tax base since private firms are liable to a variety of taxes. It is believed that someof these have already been instrumental in increased tax revenue. Data has yet to be collected to verifyv theaccrued financial benefits of liberalization in the agricultural sector. Again, these benefits are not solelv due toASMP. Other programs and projects contributed to the positive performance of the project.

4.5 Institutional development impact:At completion, the project's institutional impact has been substantial. First, MOA has been streamlined

through a well reasoned out process of rationalizing its functions in line with the newly introduced market-basedeconomic policy. This entailed the shedding of many MOA functions, hence enabling it to concentrate on thefew core ones related to policy planning, provision of technical services and nionitoring and regulating theagricultural sector. This has induced the Ministry to devote itself to fewer tasks, and in the process to focus itsactivities and to specialize. The strong training program, both in-service and other type training, as it up-gradedthe Ministry's planning and the implementation capacity of policies and programs facilitated the process. MOA' sinstitutional enhancement has also benefited from the reorganization that ensued fiom the rationalization of theMinistry's functions, as this has enabled the identification of posts and their terms of reference. The provision ofvehicles and office equipment has also contributed to better performance. A noteworthy capacity boost has beengiven by ASMP to the Ministry's agricultural data collection, processing and dissemination. At completioni, theAgricultural Statistics Unit of MOA is able to carry out annual agricultural surveys and produce reports for allinterested users, and has established the foundation for building a useful agricultural database.

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome

5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing aigency:The only factor that can be cited here is the drought of 1993/94 that obliged the project to repeat the

sample survey.

7

5.2 Factors generally subject to government control.Two factors that marginally affected the project were: (i) the shortage of counterpart funds as a result of

Government stringent budget policy during the implementation period; and (ii) the delay in the approval of the1991 organizational structure of MOA as this created some anxiety within the MOA staff. Nevertheless, it shouldalso be recognized that the strong GOT support accorded to the project were instrumlenital in paving the way forthe smooth execution of the project.

5.3 Factors gen7erally subject to implementing agency control:The dedication of the project secretariat, its success in coordinating the implementation units within

MOA and its ability to cooperate with agencies such as the National Bureau of Statistics, enabled the project toachieve its objectives and make efficient use of resources. The same ability to cooperate with the Civil ServiceDepartment and the Ministry of Finance should also be noted, as these institLtions remained good supporters ofthe project.

5.4 Costs andfinancing:At appraisal, total project costs were estimated at US$ 27.2 million. About 90% of these costs or US$

24.5 million was planned to be financed by IDA and the remainder by GOT. IDA financing was to include a PPFof US$ 0.75 million. At completion, total project costs amounted to US$ 21.04 million of which IDA financedUS$ 20.41 million (97%) and GOT US$ 0.63 million (3%). About US$ 2.86 million have been cancelled andUS$ 0.85 million was undisbursed. The reasons for the savings of costs are the strong exchange rate of the SDRvis-a-vis the US$ during the implementation period, and the lower than anticipated expenditure on training,workshops and seminars and operating costs. The increased level of in-country and in-service training, asopposed to overseas training, has also led to substantial savings. Variation betweeni appraisal and latest estimatecomponent costs are due to reallocations, as new activities were funded and government contribution wasreduced due to pressure from macroeconomic imbalance.

6. Sustainability

6. 1 Rationale for sustainabiliiv rating.Overall, sustainability of the project is likely. TIhis is because the institutionial changes introduced by the

project will be long lasting since they are in line with the country's long-term plans. For instance, because of therationalization exercise, the core functions of MOA are defined and new structures consistent with the new roleand functions are implemented leaving no room for major deviations. The retrenchment and redeployment hasleft the Ministry lean and focused in its core functionis. The Ministry's effort to decentralize its activities to thedistricts has been reinforced by the recent government decentralization policy and its implementation is fullyassured. The current GOT policy to improve civil service salaries, whose implementation started in 1999, hlaseased the concern that the capacity created during the project life would be eroded. This policy, whicli focuseson raising significantly salaries and benefits, has improved the prospect of retaining MOA trained staff andattracting qualified new staff.

A scrutiny of the division of MOA's activities in three ministries also suggests that it will have littleeffect on the sustainability of project activities. It is assumed that current performance levels will be maintainedbecause the departments moved to the new ministries with their entire staff and related functionis. However, thereis a clear disadvantage to the newly created ministry, i.e. the Ministry of Cooperatives and Marketing, in that itwill have to secure the additional overhead costs in its new headquarters in Dodoma. Certainly, the division ofthe original MOA tasks into three ministries will call for serious efforts of coordination of activities among theministries.

Well thought-out initiatives that ensure continuity and sustainability of the activities supported bythe project are in place. First, the preparation of ASDS, through a broad consultative process was completed andapproved by Government. The actions and interventions envisaged in the strategy paper are partly aimed at

X

ensuring the implementation of policy and institutional refomns in a sustainable way. Second, the preparation ofa follow-on project that translates the strategy into a program of action is ready for appraisal and implementation.Thlis proposed project, SAPDEP, builds on the work of ASMP and is aimed at advancing the achievements in theareas of expanding production and export of traditional and non-traditional commodities; development of privateagribusiness sector; building governiment capacity at the district and the center to carry out its core functionis andproduction and dissemination of agricultural information. Multi-donor funding is expected ftor implementinig thisproject. Third, preparation of another project. SOFRAIP, that addresses major constraints in smallholderproduction system, such as sustainable productive technology, service delivery and access to inputs. iscompleted. Fourth, an effort was mnade to introduce a cost-effective agricultural data collection anddissemination methodology so that it can be supported by GOT in the absence of donor support. The project hassucceeded in identifying and piloting a methodology whiich can be financed under the GO'I' recurrent anddevelopment budget. In addition, arrangements are being made with the National Bureau of Statistics to obtainfinance from district'local administrations, as they are the main users and have shown a keen interest in theactivity.

6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations.Mainstreaming the project activities into the normal finctions of the MOA has been the main goal of the

project since the Mid-term review. All along, the SEC was lean with a maximLum of five key staff, including'Technical Assistance. 'The activities were carried out by various units of MOA and, when necessary, by outsideconsultants. Therefore, the task of mainstreaming was not difficult. The remaining staff of the SEC were fullyabsorbed into the normal functions of the Ministry at project completioni.

In order to maintain a reasonable level of activity after project completioni, the GOT has allocated abtudget for FY01/02 and MOA plans to tap into the resources of ongoing projects siuch as the Agricultural SectorSupport Program financed by DANIDA and new projects such as the recently appraised IFAD project -Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Program until the government proposed SAPDEP is implemented.

7. Bank and Borrower Performance

Bank7.1 Lendinig:

The Bank was actively involved in the conceptualization of the project as it has jointly identified ASMPwith the Government in 1992 within the framework of a major study. This is an analytic work jointly carriedwith the Government with the aim to understand the status of the sector and propose key actions for the short andmedium-termn. The Bank also provided crucial support to project preparation by making funds available under aProject Preparation Facility (PPF). Project design, whlich was jointly developed by the Bank and GOT, wassimple and clearly defined and concentrated on essential activities. The management of the pioject was also wellorganized. Assigning the implementation responsibility solely to \4OA, but the overall direction to an inter-ministerial steering committee has worked very well. With hindsight, it can be said that project preparationshould have paid niiore attention to private sector (agri-business) development from the start.

7.2 Supervision:The Bank calTied out 12 supervision missions and 6 PSR updates (Annex 4a), including one before the

project became effective. There was no clear pattern in the frequency of the missions. Some years more than twomissions were carried out and in others only one. The variability in frequency of missions is explained by thepresence of Operations Officer in the Country Office who was following tup project implementation in the fieldand sending updates regularly. From the outset, a strong relationship was established between the projectmanagement and the Bank's Country Office, and many issues and routine matters were discussed and dealt within situ.

Qualitatively, the supervision missions were skillfully and professionally executed. In general, the skill

9

mix of the missions was appropriate. Bank staff were particularly helpful in resolving problems that emergedduring implementation. For instance, they endeavored to accelerate the approval of the new structure of MOA byGOT in 1998. Based on the outcome of the analytic work, the supervision missions carried out dialogue withconcerned Government ministries and agencies regarding the recommended policy and institutional reforms, andfacilitated their adoption and implementation. The supervision missions recommended raising the share of IDAfinancing, thereby, obviating the implementation difficulties that were encountered due to shortage ofcounterpart funds. The missions also recommended twice the extension of project closing date to ensure full

implementation of project activities. The supervision missions were also supportive of new ideas. In this context,they approved the inclusion of activities aimed at supporting the private sector; three feasibility studies foragricultural development projects; support to the Ministry of Lands and, agreed to the implementation of aninnovative training scheme. As demonstrated in the financial management, audit, procurement, etc., records ofthe project the follow up on fiduciary responsibility is exemplary. External Bank procurement auditors (SGS)reported procurement under the project as best practice and audit reports were always submitted before the duedates during the life of the project. These audit reports were always unqualified except in 1999/00, whichi wasminor and remedied immediately.

7.3 Overall Batnkperformance:Overall Bank performance was satisfactory. The rating would have been highly satisfactoiy had the

Bank paid attention to the agri-business development aspect from the start.

Borrower7.4 Preparation.

Given the importance of the project in reforming the agricultural sector, project preparation was dealtwith in a systematic manner giving it a broad-based participation of institutions. The overall project formulationtask was entrusted to a team made up from MOA and the National Planning Commission, which was supportedby a local consultancy firm. In order to ensure the participationi of other institutions, the responsibility foroverseeing the preparation work was given to an ad hoc inter-ministerial task force. The task force providedpolicy guidance and finally cleared the project preparation document, after thorough discussions in workshopsorganized for discussing initial project design and review of the final report. These arrangements have resulted inproducing quality preparation document endorsed by several GOT institutions, hence attracting strongcommitment from such institutions. This is one of the reasons for the smooth project appraisal andimplementation.

7. 5 Government implemzentation performance:GOT provided adequate political support to the project, signaling its strong commitment to the project

throughout the entire project implementation period and has been found satisfactory. One of the shortcomingswas the less than anticipated GOT budget allocation to the project resulting in shortage of counterpart funds. Theother is the recent division of MOA responsibilities into three ministries, diluting project organizationalachievements. Although MOA management point out that the project's objectives and outputs have remainedintact and the new arrangement will provide greater focus to the sector, it is a fact that such a decision hasentailed the search for a suitable framework for coordinating the work of the three ministries. The otherweakness is the delay experienced in some key policy and institutional refonn decisions.

7.6 Implenmenting AgencY:The performance of MOA, through SEC, was highly satisfactory. All the tasks that pertained to project

management were carried out diligently and on a timely basis. Progress reports were prepared on time with allthe necessary information. Procurement of goods and services were carried out so competently, that the projectwas singled out as best performer among sampled Bank projects in Tanzania. Project accounts were kept inorder, and the preparation of accounts and submission of audit reports were made consistently ahead of the setdeadline. Savings on project operating costs has been achieved, illustrating efficient project management. Tl he

10

ratings of supervision missions on project implementation and development objectives were, without fail,satisfactory and above. The ISC met regularly and played a useful role in providing the project the necessarysupport and guidance.

7. 7 Overall Borrower performance:The overall performance of the Borrower was satisfactory. GOT's elaborate preparation of the project

and the support given during implementation would have suggested a rating that is higher than satisfactory.However, due to the delay experienced in the approval of the organizational structure of the MOA and in fillingmanagement positions associated with the new structure, a higher rating has not been accorded.

8. Lessons Learned

The following are the main lessons learned from the project:

a. Successful economic adjustment programs are critical for the implementation of institutional reformsand capacity building initiatives such as ASMP. The successful implementation of macro-economic reformprograms in the first half of 90's significantly contributed to the success of ASMP and the achievement of itsdevelopment objectives.

b. Overarching National Reforms Fundamental to Sector Reforms. The implenientation of broadreform measures are also critical for implementation of a project. For instance, delay in the implementationi of anational Civil Service Reform delayed the implementation of reforms that were formulated under the ASMP.The Government's adoption of the Decentralization Program significantly helped ASMP's decentralizationobjectives and interventions. On the other hand, hiving-off of some of the MOA entities was delayed because theMinistry of Finance, which is the repository of all govermment assets, did not have well developed guidelines thatallow public agencies to dispose off properties. These three cases demlonstrate that the presence, and lackthereof, of certain overarching institutional reforms and guidelines affect progress in the implementation ofproject activities. In the absence of key institutional reforms such as civil service reform or public sector refonnand decentralization, the project had to struggle to convince senior officials in cenitral ministries to approve oragree with proposed sectoral refonn and, in some cases, failed to achieve the goals. It would have been easier toimplement ASMP had there been an overall framework in place before embarking on implementation of sectorreform.

c. Create Incentive to Undertake Reform. Although the project succeeded in curtailing MOA's coststhrough staff retrenchment, hiving-off certain fuLtctions and disposing of unutilized/underutilized assets, resultingfrom the strea.mlining of its functions, the savings made were never ploughed back to the Ministry in the form ofeither increased staff salaries or increased operating cost. This was contrary to management and staffexpectations and must have dampened the enthusiasm to inove aggressively with the reform process and thewillingness to engage in cost reduction mechanisms.

d. Sustained Long-term Assistance to Realize the Full Benefit of Institutional Reform. A five-yearproject like ASMP can help introduce key reforrns in a sector. However, most reforms are complex and taketime before they are fully absorbed and the desired cultural change and institutional reform are achieved. Thecompletion of a project can at times be the beginning of a major transformation process and, subsequently, otherinterventions phases are required to realize the full benefit of the initial intervention. The ASMP experienceclearly shows this need and it is hoped that follow on projects will carry forward what has been initiated underthis project.

1 1

e. Implementing Findings and Recommendations. Analytic work carTied out through projects shouldaddress felt needs of the Government or the agency concerned. The work should address important problemswith a reasonable prospect for action. The analysis should be of good quality and lead to substantiveconclusions. At times, inspite of the good quality and strategic relevance of the work, there will be no interest tofollow-up on the recommendations and, take action on the part of the Government and project impact canreduced. Therefore, other instruments within the Bank's country program should be explored and used toimplement recommendations and introduce the needed changes.

f Keeping Project Design Simple. A simple project design with well-focused objectives, relatively fewcomponents and with implementation arrangement that defines the role of each participant is likely to enjoysmooth implenmentation experience and satisfactory performance.

g. Flexibility and Innovation in Project Implementation. As a project is implemenited, there is a need tobe flexible and innovative. The design should allow this to take place as the environment in whichimplementation takes place is dynamic. The training schemes, such as OJTs and STAs, the support to theMinistry of Land to help implementation of the Land Act of 1999, and initerventions in the private sector aregood examples of minovation and flexibility.

9. Partner Comments

(a) Borrower/implementing agency:GOT has produced a completion report on the project, the summary of which is attached. The overall

findings of the Borrower are generally positive as they consider the project to have been implemented smoothlyand to have succeeded in meeting its main objectives.

(b) Cofinaniciers

not applicable:

(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector)

not applicable:

10. Additional Information

Detailed information on project achievements is given in Annex 7b of this report.

12

Annex 1Key Performance Indicators

Key Performance Indicator Projected in SAR Actual/Latest EstimatesOutcome/Impact Indicators1. Refocused MOA to the provision Efficient provision of public Substantive progress has been made inof public goods and enabling goods; and conducive each area. For details see Annex 7c.environment to private sector environment to private sector

2. MOA as a pioneer participant in the Enhanced: pay, morale, MOA reform has served as an examnpleplanned Civil Service Reforms which performance, and productivity for refonning other institutions. Butare geared to enhancing expected incentives to employees haveGovermnment's employees yet to materialize.3. MOA's policy formulation and Accelerated implementation of Accelerated implementation of

implementation capacity agricultural reforms Agricultural reforms have beenstrengthened undertaken. See for details in Annex 7c.

4. Agricultural information base, Facilitate improved public sector Significant progress in each of the threesystems and services strengthened management, planning and areas has been achieved. Quality of

management of the private statistics has significantly improved.sector and cost savings insurveys

5. Overall improvement in economic Agricultural sector growth; food Foundation for agricultural growth hasmanagement security improved; foreign been established,

exchange earnings increasedOutput IndicatorsA. Rationalization of MOA Functions1. Prepare reorganization proposal of Prepare an organizational Completed in 1995 with participation ofMOA, get approval and implement structure stakeholders.1.1 Determnine MOA core and non-

core functions Determiination in line with the Completed in 1998.identified functions at appraisal

1.2 Complete the process ofrestructuring based on core Reduce functions to eight corefunction ones Completed, January 1998.

1.3 Secure GOT approval Within two yearsCompleted in 1996.

1.4 Establish staffing/manning level To be established following thefor new structure identification of posts A total of 7,200 staff were retrenched

between 1996 and 1998.1.5 Retrench redundant staff Establish the nurnber of

redundant staff and propose A total of 7,800 staff were transferred toretrenchment local Government Authorities during

1999/2000.

1.6 Re-deploy staff to districts and Not foreseen at appraisal 31 of 48 function (65%) now fully hivedtransfer to Local Government off; 9 out of 48 functions no longer

require hiving-off; 8 functions arePhasing-out of non-core functions Phase-out 31 of 48 identified gradually evolving for hiving-off.

non-core functions

13

Annex 1

e~~~2. Assist PSRC in the divestiture Prepare as many profiles as 177 profiles and position papers wereof Agricultural required 148 enterprises preparedparastatals/enterprises

2.1 Prepare enterprise profiles 78 enterprises (divested by PSRC); growth ininvestment, employment and productivity yetto be surveyed.

2.2 Divest/liquidate enterprises21 enterprises (under process)29 enterprises under government ownership.These are enterprises mainly associated withthe land issue.

B. Sector Policy Formulation, Plinning 'and Monitoring Componcit

1. Policy analysis/skills Train a total of 70 staff A total of 45 staff, 12 female and 33 male,development participated in workshops on research

1.1 InMOA methodology and techniques of report writingThrough preparation of for a total of 132 staff weeks. Some 40 staff, 5Policy and Strategic studies; female and 35 male, participated in workshopsOJT/STA studies; Pricing and for commodity policy review for a total of 88Marketing Studies; General staff weeks; 19 staff, all male, participated inStudies; Workshops and regional agriculture policy planning for a totalLocal Short Courses of 30 staff weeks; and 51 staff, 13 female and

28 male, participated in macro policies issuesfor a total of 150 staff weeks.

A total of 23 staff, 21 male and 2 female, havereceived long-term overseas training. Atcompletion, 18 of these were still with MOA.

1.2 Long-term Universities orhigher institutions of learningoverseas A total of 53 staff, 40 male and 13 female,

have received a short-term overseas training.Of these, 14 have left MOA, most of them towork with the private sector.

1.3 Short-term overseas training

2. Sector policy and strategy Cabinet paper prepared and Completedprepared approved3. Prepared sector performance Sector performnance review 16 policy and strategic studies were prepared.analysis Public investment review 18 OJT/STA studies were completed which

Commodity review provide input to the policy and strategicstudies. Also pricing and marketing studieswere completed.

14

Annex I

Key Performance pu -: RtP- Achieved/RemarksIndicatorC. Agricultural Information Sy items and Services1. Agricultural Census 1993/94 Completed by December, 1995 Census repeated in 1994/95 because of

drought

2. Agricultural Census 1994/95 Completed by December, 1995 Report produced in April, 1996 and hasbecome a base year for the following annualsurveys

3. National Annual Surveys Produce an annual report Annual reports are produced every year until1999/2000 and preparations are on the way for2000/2001. The reports have become usefuldocuments for planning by both the public andthe private sectors.

4. Coffee Pilot Survey 1995/96 Completed in January, 1997 Report produced in May 1997, and hasintroduced new methodologies for datacollection of perennial crops.

5. Urban Agricultural Survey Completed in April, 2001 Report produced in May, 2001. This is1997/98 expected to provide significant improvement

to planning for urban agriculturaldevelopment.

6. Integrated District Survey Completed in January, 2001 Report produced in February 2001. District1998/99 officials are now enabled to have a clear

picture of the situation of their agriculture, andthis is expected to help their exercise indevelopment planning.

7. Rapid Appraisal Survey Completed in June 2001 Report produced in August 20018. Reconcile Agri. G.D.P. Completed in 2000 Agricultural Production data going back toStatistics 1990 was adjusted and new Agri. GDP

estimate generated.

Project Costs and FinancineAnnex 2a

Proiect Costs by ComRonent (in US$ ; 000' eguivalent)

A. MOA Rationalization1. Parastatal Divestiture 401 55 142. Functions Rationalizations 3,271 1,784 553. New Mission & MGT System 337 546 1624. Reg .Dist. Rationalization 333 76 235. Strengthening Management System 3,438 279 8

Sub- total 7,780 2,740 35

B. Policy1. Policy Agenda 2,551 7,525 2952. Institutional Strengthening 4,591 6,970 152

Sub- total 7,142 14,495 203

C Agricultural Information System1. Agricultural Census 4,093 2,886 712. Agricultural Survey 5,931 610 103. Early Warning -Crop Data 379 148 394. Early Warning- Rain Data 378 159 42

Sub- total 10,781 3,803 35

Total Baseline Costs 25,703 21,039 82Price Contingencies 1,539

Total Project Costs 27,242 21,039 77

16

Annex 2b

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million e uivalent)Procuremet Metho .

Expenditure Category ICB NCI3 .NB.F-

1. Works 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

2. Goods 4522.00 411.00 300.00 0.00(4522.00) (411.00) (300.00) (0.00)

3. Services 0.00 0.00 9451.00 0.00(0.00) (0.00) (9451.00) (0.00)

4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

5. Miscellaneous/I 0.00 0.00 3657.00 0.00(0,00) (0.00) (3657.00) (0.00)

6. Miscellaneous/2 0.00 0.00 8920.00 0.00(0.00) (0.00) (8920.00) (0.00)

Total 4522.00 411.00 22328.00 0.00(4522.00) (411.00) (22328.00) (0.00)

1/ Worskhops, Seminars and MOA rationalization2/ Incremental Operating Costs

Annex 2c

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (ActuallLatest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)Procurement Metiod.

Ex'pediture Category ICR NCB oih-er2 Tota rCost

1. Works 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

2. Goods 3899.45 41.27 279.25 0.00 4219.97(3899.45) (41.27) (279.25) (0.00) (4219.97)

3. Services 0.00 0.00 9305.40 0.00 9305.40(0.00) (0.00) (9305.40) (0.00) (9305.40)

4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 1395.31 0.00 1395.31(0.00) (0.00) (1395.31) (0.00) (1395.31)

5. Miscellaneous/1 0.00 0.00 1865.78 0.00 1865.78(0.00) (0.00) (1865.78) (0.00) (1865.78)

6. Miscellaneous/2 0.00 0.00 4253.39 0.00 4253.39(0.00) (0.00) (4253.39) (0.00) (4253.39)

Total 3899.45 41.27 17099.13 0.00 21039.85(3899.45) (41.27) (17099.13) (0.00) (21039.85)

1/ Workshops, Seminars and MOA Rationalization2/ Incremental operating Costs

1/ Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies.2/ Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted

staff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs relatedto (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-leniding project funds to local government Lnits.

17

Annex 2d

Project Financin b Expenditure Cate o (in US$ million equivalent)

4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~f, RN0('2i

1. Vehicle & Equipment 4.00 1.23 0.00 3.90 0.32 97.5 26.0 0.02. Workshops & Seminars 1.40 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.00 40.7 0.0 0.03. Techinical Assistance & 4.70 0.00 0.00 7.62 0.00 0.00 162 1 0.0 0.0Studies4. T1raining 3.40 0.00 0.00 1.69 0.00 0.00 49.7 0.0 0.0

5. MOA Rationalizaiton 2.00 0.00 0.00 1.30 O.00 0.00 65.0 0.0 0.0

6. Incremental Operating 6.00 1.57 0.00 3.95 0.31 0.00 65.8 19.7 0.0Costs7. Refund of PPF Advance 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0

8. Unallocated 2.30 0.00 0.00 1.40 0.00 0.00 60.9 0.0 0.0

Annex 3Economic Costs and Benefits

A X! " 04 MR '

~ Qualitative assessment presented in paragraph 4.3 and 4.4I

~~~~~~ I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

1X

Bank Inputs: MissionsAnnex 4a

Stgeff . -J Ot ;~oe 4 *.

Identifiiatioi*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4 i n

11/1992 4 A, Ee F IAppra!=Wegoi,o, ,

03/1993 7 A, E, E, T, F, I, PR

Su ervision,Supervision 1 (10/93) 3 F, PR, 1N S HSSupervision 2 (03/94) 3 E, E, I S HSSupervisi6n 3 (07/94) UD 2 E, 0 S SSupervisi6n 4 (11-12/94) 5 E, F, EX, V, S S HSSupervision 5 (04/95) 5 E, EX, F, I, P S SSupervision 6 (02-03/96) 5 E, E, EX, I, S S SSupervision 7 (10/96) 7 E, EX, F, I, PR, 0, S S SSupervision 8 (10/96) 5 E, E, EX, F, 0 S SSupervision 9 (06/97) 2 E, 0 S SUDSupervision 10 (07/97) 4 E, 0, F, P S SSupervision 11 (03/98) 6 E, EX, F, F, PS S SSupervision 12 (11/98) 5 E, EX, F, I, P S SSupervision 13 (03/99) 3 E, EX, P S SSupervision 14 (06/99) 2 E, 0 S SUDSupervision 15 (11/99) 5 E, EX, F, t, O S SSupervision 16 (06/00) 2 E, 0 S SUDSupervision 17 (12/00) 2 E, 0 S SUDSupervision 18 (03/01) 4 E, F, T, 0 S SA = Agriculturist; E = Economnist; EX = Extension Specialist; F = Financial Analyst; I = Institutions Specialist; INAgricultural Informnation Specialist; P = Privatisation Specialist; T = Training Specialist; 0 = Operations Officer; PR =Procurement Specialist; S Statistician; V = Veterinarian; UD = PSR Update

Annex 4bBank Inputs: Staff

Stage of Project Cycle:tl.*afWucIdentificotiort/PparaUon- -22.6 68,6

.ppraial/NenoUan } = =40.5 121.6Supe,vison-- 249.0 1025.6ICR' 8.0 40.0Total 319.1 1255.8

*Includes a large FAO/CP fund used in the reconciliation of production statistics.

19

RatinLis for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs b-y Components

Annex 5

Z E E i| Xn

.,~~~~ "I I mS-

F Mg, M g,S

X KlES r g~~~~~~~i i i B E E~~~~

Ratin2s of Bank and Borrower PerformanceAnnex 6

-~~~~0MOM 1 IBank Performance:I

IBorrower Performance:

PM -I x III

20

TANZANIA

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR MANAGEMENT PROJECT

(Credit no. 2537-TA)

ANNEX 7A

ICR PREPARED BY GOVERNMENT

21

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

OF

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR MANAGEMENT PROJECT(ASMP)

TECHNICAL REPORT

VOLUME II

Final DraftJune 30, 2001

22

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIAMINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITYAGRICULTURAL SECTOR MANAGEMENT PROJECTIMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF ASMP IMPLEMENTATATIONII. ASMP Project Context

Policy Environment for ASMPInstitutional Framework for ASMPLessons Underlying ASMP Design

III. ASMP OBJECTIVES AND COMPONENTSIV. ASMP Objectives

ASMP ComponentsRationalization ComponentPolicy and Institutional Strengthening ComponentAgricultural Information Systems and Services Component

III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RATIONALIZATION COMPONENTIntroductionRationalization of the Functions of MOA

Implementation of Rationalization of MOA FunctionsRationalization Outputs

Impact of the Rationalization ComponentImproved Legal and Regulatory FrameworkMAC Functional and Structural ChangesReduction in Public Fiscal BurdenImproved Public-Private Sector Interface

Issues Limiting the Impact of Rationalization of MOA's FunctionsInadequate Support to the Emerging Private SectorLimited Culture Change in MACInadequate Incentives for MACGovernment Red Tape

Agricultural Parastatal DivestitureMOA's Role in DivestitureImplementation of DivestitureDivestiture PerformanceImpact of Divestiture

IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENINGCOMPONENTPolicy AnalysisInstitutional StrengtheningTraining OutputsImpact of Policy and Institutional Strengthening Component

V. IMPLEMENTATION OF AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION SYSTEMSA-ND SERVICES COMPONENTImplementation of AISSAISS OutputsImpact of AISS Component

VI. PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND WORLD BANK PERFORMANCEIntroductionProject Costs and FinancingDisbursements, Accounts and AuditsProcurementTechnical AssistanceProject BenefitsProject Management PerformanceWorld Bank Performance

24

Agricultural Sector Management ProjectFact Sheet

Activity Date

Project Preparation Completion March, 1993Project Appraisal March, 1993Board Approval July, 1993Credit Agreement Signing July 26, 1993Credit Effectiveness January, 1994Initial Disbursement April, 1994First Credit Agreement Amendment May 5, 1995Second Credit Agreement Amendment 1999Third Credit Agreement Amendment 2000Original Credit Closing June 30, 1999First Credit Extension July 1, 1999Second Credit Extension July 1, 2000Extended Credit Closing June 30, 2001

25

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ASMP Agricultural Sector Management ProjectATC Advisory Technical CommitteeASU Agricultural Statistics UnitCMEWU Crop Monitoring and Early Warning UnitCSD Civil Service DepartmentDAFCO Dairy Farm CompanyDANIDA Danish International Development AgencyDTF Divestiture Task ForceERP Economic Recovery ProgramESAP Economic and Social Action ProgramFAO United Nations Food and Agriculture OrganizationIDA International Development AssociationLAPSO Inter-Agency Procurement Services OrganizationICB International Competitive BiddingIDOS Institutional Development Objectives and StrategyISC Inter-ministerial Steering CommitteeLAN Local Area NetworkLC Letter of CreditLGA Local Government AuthorityMAC Ministry of Agriculture and CooperativesMDB Marketing Development BureauMIS Management Information SystemMOA Ministry of AgricultureMRALG Ministry of Regional Administration and Local GovernmentNAFCO National Agriculture and Food CorporationNARCO National Ranch CompanyNBS National Bureau of StatisticsNMC National Milling CorporationNSCA National Sample Census of AgricultureOJT On-the-job TrainingPCC Policy Coordinating CommitteePMD Policy and Marketing DepartmentPPMB Project Preparation and Monitoring BureauPPSRP Public and Parastatal Sector Reform ProgramPO-RALG President's Office- Regional Administration and Local GovernmentPSAC Pubic Sector Adjustment CreditPSC Personal Service ContractPSRC Parastatal Sector Reform CommissionRTF Rationalization Task ForceSAR Staff Appraisal ReportSDR Special Drawing RightsSOE Statement of ExpenditureSTA Special Training AssignmentSUA Sokoine University of AgricultureTA Technical AssistanceTCAL Tanzania Chamber of Agriculture and LivestockTTG Technical Task Group

26

TSA Tanzania Sisal Authority

I. STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF ASMP IMPLEMENTATION

ASMP Project Context

1.1 The Agricultural Sector Management Project (Cr. 2537-TA) was a third IDA-funded technical assistance intervention in the agricultural sector in Tanzania. Its design andimplementation benefited from the lessons learned from the implementation of two previous technicalassistance projects: Technical Assistance Project (Cr. 1206-TA) and Technical Assistance Project (Cr.1524-TA). The first project supported the Ministry of Agriculture's capacity to implement agriculturalpolicies and to increase exports of eight agricultural parastatals. The second project was a response tothe poor performance of the agricultural project portfolio. It was, therefore, focused at strengtheningthe capacity of the relevant Departments of the Ministry of Agriculture to coordinate and monitorproject and parastatal performance. Under the two projects, the major recipients of institutionalstrengthening were: the Sectoral Planning Section, the Project Preparation and Monitoring Bureau(that monitored public investments and parastatal operations), and the Marketing Development Bureau(that provided pricing and marketing information and advice to stakeholders).

1.2 The two projects improved the Ministry's stock of trained personnel in policy analysis, project and parastatalmonitoring. However, as pointed out in the ASMP's appraisal, utilization of these personnel was limitedbecause the majority was deployed in general planning functions, controlling and directing the economy.Sustainability of the Ministry's capacity was still dependent on technical assistance and was consideredvery fragile. Continued external assistance was, therefore, considered necessary to support theformulation and implementation of the pending sector reforms for transforming agriculture into amarket-oriented economy. Consequently, ASMP was primarily designed as a technical assistanceproject to support the formulation and implementation of reforms to facilitate the agriculture's transitiontoward a market-based production system.

1.3 The rationale for ASMP was the need for an institutional framework in Tanzania's agricultural sector tomanage the transition toward a market-oriented economy. At ASMP appraisal time, MOAs' roles,structures and functions were based on the interventionist approach to development. Under thisapproach, the public sector was overloaded with tasks for which it was ill suited or for which it did nothave adequate resources and expertise. There was, therefore, an obvious need for reforming andstrengthening the agricultural institutions to deal with policy formulation and implementation and tosupport the process of developing and implementing a strategy in which state institutions manage lessbut better. . In addition, while the technical assistance financed under Agriculture SectorAdjustment program had done a credible job in implementing sector reforms, there was a needfor developing an institutional capacity to prepare and implement the next phase of reforms.This required yet another project: ASMP.

Policy Environment for ASMP

1.4 The policy environment under which ASMP was designed and implemented had important bearing on theproject's implementation performance and impact. ASMP was designed and implemented under arelatively favorable MOAroeconomic environment that was established by two earlier economicadjustment programs. These programs included the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) that waslaunched in 1986 and succeeded by the Economic and Social Action Program (ESAP) in 1989. These

27

programs contained reforms that helped reverse the decline and reduce the extreme instabilities in theTanzanian economy. The policy reforms consisted of MOAroeconomic stabilization, exchange rate andtrade liberalization, and financial and structural reforms (including agricultural marketing reforms). As aresult of these reforms and external assistance, the Tanzanian economy registered a real economicgrowth of about 4.9 % per year during 1986-1991. However, this growth recovery was consideredunsatisfactory, given Tanzania's potential and high population growth.

1.5 The design of ASMP was also anchored in the World Bank's assistance strategy. This strategy emphasizedthe need to accelerate implementation of policy reforms as part of the overall effort to move to higherrates of economic growth. Given the importance of agriculture in the economy, it was considerednecessary to accord top priority to policy and institutional reforms and improved sectoral management inagriculture. In this context, ASMP was considered and designed as an important complement to theMOAroeconomic adjustment and structural reforms in the economy. In this sense, the implementationperformance and impact of ASMP were highly influenced by the implementation of previous andconcurrent MOAroeconomic adjustment and structural reforms.

Institutional Framework for ASMP

1.6 ASMP implementation took place at a time when the role of the public sector in the economy was graduallydeclining and being replaced by an increasing role of the private sector. The role of the public sector ineconomic production and marketing declined as a consequence of the increased participation of theprivate sector following the implementation of the ERP. Since then, private agribusinesses haveexpanded their roles in agricultural production, trade, transportation, and processing. The role of theparastatal sector and government-controlled cooperative unions in these activities has virtuallydisappeared as a result of privatization and divestiture of state enterprises. At the same time, Governmentrole has been shifted from central planning to creating a policy and legal environment for vibrant privatesector participation and investment in agriculture. ASMP was implemented concurrently with theimplementation of public sector adjustment reforms that were intended to transform the role ofGovernment to one that facilitates private sector's development and provides public goods effectivelyand efficiently. IDA-funded Public and Parastatal Sector Reform Project (PPSRP) and the Public SectorAdjustment Credit (PSAC) supported these public sector adjustment reforms.

1.7 Prior to and during the implementation of ASMP, several other projects were implemented to strengthen theinstitutional and technical capacity of MOA. These projects included the National Agricultural andLivestock Research Rehabilitation Projects (NALRP I&fl) and the National Agricultural and LivestockExtension Rehabilitation Projects (NALERP I&II). The former rehabilitated and strengthenedagricultural research services in terms of research planning, program management and financing. Thelatter project established a streamlined organization and management structure for extension serviceswithin MOA on a single chain of command at all levels and introduced the famous Training and Visitextension methodology.

Lessons Underlying ASMP Design

1.8 ASMP design benefited from the lessons learned during the implementation of the previoustechnical assistance projects in the agricultural sector (Cr. 1206-TA and Cr. 1524-TA). Thelessons that guided the design of ASMP and its implementation plan included: (a) institutionalbuilding and personnel development require long-term assistance and continuity ofimplementation; (b) the success of capacity building projects is enhanced if assistance istargeted at the strategic functions of the relevant institutions; (c) the need for a clearly thought-out institutional development strategy; (d) the need to take the borrower's limited absorptive

2R

capacity into account; and (e) the need for adequate supervision, especially from World BankResident Missions.

1.9 On the basis of these "best practices" ASMP was designed to focus on implementing key elements of a long-term institutional development strategy. This strategy envisaged: (i) phasing out the involvement ofGovemment in activities that were suited for the private sector; (ii) enabling Government to undertakemore effectively and efficiently the remaining critical public sector functions; and (iii) buildinggovernment capacity to provide an appropriate policy framework and to manage the process offunctional rationalization.

1.10 In addition, ASMP was made simple in design, as it was limited to supporting only three projectcomponents, all in one ministry. Also, the Resident Mission staffs were expected to do most of ASMPsupervision.

ASMP OBJECTIVES AND COMPONENTS

ASMP Objectives

2.1 The primary objective of ASMP was to strengthen institutional capacity for formulating andimplementing the Government's agricultural development policies, strategies and programs.Specific objectives included promoting institutional capacity to support: (a) rationalization andstrengthening of government functions in the agricultural sector; (b) formulation andimplementation of agricultural policies; and (c) improvement of the agricultural informationsystem and services required to facilitate an effective functioning of Government and privatesector in a market-oriented economy.

2.2 These objectives were to be achieved through the Government's institutional development objectives andstrategy (IDOS) for agriculture. The key elements of this strategy were included in a letter of IDOS toIDA. During negotiations, Government made assurances to IDA to implement the program contained inthe IDOS.

ASMP Components

2.3 ASMP contained the following three components: rationalization component, policy and institutionalstrengthening component, and agricultural information systems and services component.

(a) Rationalization Component. This component consisted of the following three sub-components andactivities:

(i) ASMP financed the implementation of activities related to supporting a process to:* Phase out about 48 already identified MOA non-core functions.* Implement joint operation by MOA and private sector of about 20 identified activities.* Assist PSRC in the restructuring and privatization of about 80 agricultural parastatals.* Strengthen MOA's capacity to manage the transition and to better perform the remaining

activities, including the planning and budgeting process, personnel management, managementinformation systems, management training, procurement and accounting.

(ii) Carrying out of seminars and workshops, study tours and short-term training to support the aboveactivities.

(iii) Procurement of office equipment and vehicles for the above activities.

(b) Policy Formulation and Implementation Component. This component had the following five sub-

29

components and activities:(i) Preparation of sector policies, including short and medium-term policies, programs and projects,

including the following activities:* Implementation of improved policy coordination and feedback through strengthening the Policy

Analysis and Policy Coordination Committee.* Implementation of improved regulations and incentives to create an enabling environment for

private sector development in agriculture.* Development of a food security policy.

(ii) Preparation of a comprehensive staff-training program and improving the work environment andfacilities.

(iii) Improving feedback on policy implementation, strengthening data collection and improvingdissemination of new policies.

(iv) Provision of seminars, workshops and training for staff(v) Carrying out of studies and procurement of vehicles and office equipment to support the above

activities.

(c) Agricultural Information Systems and Services Component. This component comprised the followingthree sub-components and activities:

(i) Strengthening, rationalizing and expanding the agricultural sector information base through:* Carrying out a national sample census of agriculture.* Expanding subsequent surveys so as to provide adequate data for planning on an annual basis.

* Carrying out a pilot survey in one of the main crops, using a different and more cost effectivemethodology, once the census is completed.

* Providing the Crop Monitoring Early Warning System with adequate equipment for rainfall datacollection.

* Improving communication equipment for better collection and dissemination of marketing andtrade information by MDB.

(ii) Procurement of vehicles, motorcycles, bicycles, equipment, reference books, and professionaljournals.

(iii) Provision of training for MOA staff to support the above activities.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RATIONALIZATION COMPONENT

Introduction

3.1 The primary objective of the Rationalization Component was to rationalize MOA functions, getting out offunctions better served by the private sector and strengthening the remaining core functions. Theremaining core functions of MOA were intended to create an enabling environment for private sectorinvestment in agricultural production, marketing and processing. In other words, supporting thetransition process from a command economy to a market-based agriculture was the linchpin of ASMP. Itshould be noted, however, that the actual strengthening of the management and financing of some corefunctions relating to agricultural research, extension and irrigation services was implemented underseparate projects as noted in paragraph 1.7. The rationalization component was targeted at strengtheningMOA's management systems that supported its core functions and at improving MOA's implementationcapacity for all its programs. The areas of specific actions were well defined and included: (a) definingMOA's core functions, new mission and organizational structure; (b) spinning off about 48 functionsidentified in the ASMP Preparation Report; (c) crafting MOA rationalization strategy and actions in lightof the general civil service reform; (d) proposing specific strategies for public/private cooperation in

30

about 20 functions previously identified; and (e) support for MOA's role in parastatal divestiture;

Rationalization of the Functions of MOA

3.2 ASMP supported the implementation of activities related to the process of: (i) phasing out about 48 alreadyidentified non-core functions of MOA; (ii) implementing joint operation by MOA and private sector ofabout 20 identified activities; (iii) strengthening MOA's capacity to manage the sector's transition and tobetter perform its core functions; and (iv) carrying out seminars and workshops, study tours and short-term training. The last activity is discussed under the training section in the report.

(a) Implementation of Rationalization of MOA Functions

3.3 During the appraisal of ASMP there was evident support and consensus that a number of MOA servicesshould be phased out and passed on to the private sector. The objective of ASMP support in therationalization of MOA functions was to provide a systematic framework for defining MOA's corefunctions and spinning off the non-core functions. Although the non-core functions were identifiedduring the preparation of ASMP and were contained in the Preparation Report, MOA adopted asystematic and sequential approach to implement the rationalization component. This approach involvedanalysis of MOA functions, determining MOA structure, determining staffing levels, preparing jobdescription for each position, and appointments for established positions. The analysis of functions ledto defining and/or confirming the core and non-core functions identified during preparation. Thedefinition/confirmation of MOA core functions was used to determine the organizational structure andstaffing plan for the ministry, regions and districts. This was followed by job description for eachposition contained in the staffing plan. Appointments, mainly through promotions, were then made foreach staff position. In the midst of implementing the staffing plan and appointments, Governmentdecided to implement its Decentralization Program. Under this program, local government authoritieswere re-established and designated as the institutions responsible for planning and implementing all localdevelopment initiatives, including agricultural development activities. As a result, the staffing positionsat regional and district level were designated as decentralized and were transferred to the Ministry ofRegional Administration and Local Government (MRALG), now known as the President's Office -Regional Administration and Local Government (PO - RALG). The transfers were, however,administrative rather than physical. Physical transfers were limited to MOA-to-MOA transfers involvingspecialists from hived-off activities to remaining programs. As a result of this decentralization, the recentsplit up of MOA into three separate ministries has not affected the set-up of agricultural services atregional and district levels, where the services remain unified under the local government authorities. Toensure close cooperation among the decentralized agricultural staff at the district level, operationalguidelines have been jointly developed by the ministries responsible for Agriculture and Food Security,Cooperatives and Marketing, Water and Livestock Development, and President's Office- RegionalAdministration and Local Government.

3.4 It was decided fairly early during the process of rationalization that the process had to be participatory andinclusive. Consequently, the rationalization strategy required the implementation of the rationalizationactivities to be undertaken by the relevant organizational units within MOA. However, coordination ofimplementation was the responsibility of the Project Coordination Office through the RationalizationTask Manager. A Rationalization Task Force, under the chair of the Principal Secretary of MOA andassisted by numerous Technical Task Groups (TTGs), managed the rationalization process.

31

3.5 The Rationalization Task Force (RTF) was established to set priorities, develop action plans, assign roles andresponsibilities, and monitor implementation progress. The make up of the RTF was broad enough toensure that activities were fully integrated into other components of the project. The RTF adopted aparticipatory process similar to that used during project preparation. The process was initiated through animplementation start-up workshop in which rationalization objectives were reviewed, roles andresponsibilities were established, and a draft overall action plan was developed and agreed.

3.6 Eight TTGs were established for (i) livestock services, (ii) crop services, (iii) cooperative developmentservices, (iv) irrigation services, (v) administration and personnel, (vi) extension services, (vii) researchand training, and (viii) planning and policy formulation. The TTGs were the vehicles for providing aparticipatory process for rationalizing the ministry. The TTGs were instrumental in preparing detailedanalyses of functions, staffing plans, and job descriptions. They essentially identified the tasks forphasing out or joint operation (with cost recovery arrangements) of individual services within theirtechnical areas. The TTGs received some on-the-job training remuneration.

3.7 Appointment of the Rationalization Task Manager (RTM) was a condition for Credit Effectiveness. A localRTM was hired for the entire project period (up to FY 1998/99) to assist the Project Coordinator insupporting the activities of the RTF and TTGs, and coordinating the activities of short-term consultants.He provided guidance to the RTF and served as the secretary at its meetings.

3.8 The Inter-ministerial Steering Committee (ISC) and Advisory Technical Committee (ATC) played animportant role in the implementation of the Rationalization Component. The ISC, chaired by thePrincipal Secretary of MOA, had the responsibility of overall policy guidance, resource allocation, andreview of project implementation. It drew its membership from MOA Commissioners/Directors,representatives from the Civil Service Department, PSRC, Planning Commission, Central Bureau ofStatistics and Ministry of Finance. The ATC, chaired by the Commissioner/Director for Planning andMarketing, was responsible for providing technical guidance and leadership in guiding the work of thevarious TTGs and task forces under the project.

3.9 An institutional development specialist was hired for nine months to provide external guidance and supportto the RTM and RTF. He reviewed the strategies adopted, analyzed implementation progress and helpedin identifying and resolving implementation problems.

(b) Rationalization Outputs

3.10 The major outputs associated with the rationalization of MOA functions include: definition ofpriority core functions and mission of MOA; a new organizational structure of MOA; development of astaffing plan for all department and work units; spinning off of non-core functions implemented;implementation of staff retrenchment; transfer of staff at regional and district levels to local governmentauthorities and development of operational and coordination modalities; guidelines for joint ventures andcost sharing mechanisms in service delivery; and improved internal operating systems and an integratedMIS.

Core Functions and Mission of MOA

3.11 The rationalization of functions of MOA started with the analysis of functions performed by all Ministrydepartments, sections and units to define the core functions and non-core functions. The latter functionswere slotted for privatization or joint undertaking. The agreed core functions of MOA consisted of (i)policy formulation and review; (ii) review of laws, regulations, procedures and guidelines; (iii) settingstandards and criteria for service delivery; (iv) determination of staffing/manning levels; (iv) staff

32

training in relevant fields; (v) monitoring the implementation of policies, laws, regulations, proceduresand guidelines; and (vi) carrying out research relevant to sectors concerned. These functions wereprimarily aimed at creating an enabling environment for private sector investment in agriculturalproduction, trade and processing. This was also perceived to be the mission of MOA.

A New Organizational Structure fir MOA

3.12 Based on the new priority core functions, a new organizational structure was derived and approved inJanuary 1998 by the Civil Service Department. The new structure3 had four technical Divisions: CropDevelopment, Livestock Development, Cooperative Development, and Research and Development. Italso had Divisions or Sections for the following staff functions: Policy and Planning, Training, FoodSecurity, Finance, Administration and Audit. This structure was somewhat different from the oneenvisaged during ASMP appraisal that grouped technical and extension services for crops and livestockunder the Extension and Technical Services Division. During negotiations of the Credit Agreement, ithad been agreed that Government would consult IDA prior to carrying out any significant changes in thestructure of the MOA. The World Bank was initially concerned about the proposed new structure, butafter consultations the World Bank had no objection to the new structure.

Development of Staffing Plans for All Levels

3.13 Following the definition of core functions and the preparation of the organizational structure, MOAcompleted an initial staff inventory, which revealed staff strength of 19,522. The initial staffing scheduleincluded 13,500 staff and identified some 6,000 staff for retrenchment. The staff inventory exercise ledto confirmation of posts, promotions and establishment of a seniority list. The staff inventory exerciseled to confirmation of posts, promotions and establishment of a seniority list. Improved staff records andmanagement human resources were put in place, including staff assessment, and training of personnelstaff. A staffing plan (scheme of service) for all departments and work units, including the zones,regions, and districts were developed by March 1996. However, implementation of both the new schemeof service and retrenchment were protracted for reasons indicated later in this report.

Spinning off of Non-Core Functions

3.14 MOA completed the spinning off of about 85% of the original 48 non-core functions that were identifiedfor privatization or joint venture during project preparation. Some of the privatized non-core functionsincluded: supply and distribution of farm and veterinary inputs, veterinary services, disposal of irrigationand range development construction equipment, cooperative audit services, cattle dipping services,farmers' training services, etc. Due to lack of clear guidelines on hiving off MOA's assets, the disposalof assets of non-core functions was considerably delayed. The Treasury later issued guidelines thatallowed the unpackaging of MOA assets into three categories: (a) assets that could be disposed by MOAusing set procedures; (b) assets to be disposed by the Treasury; and (c) assets that required developmentof new hiving-off/privatization schemes. Assets falling under the first and second category were largelyhived-off. Those under the third category have proved difficult to hive-off. These include the nine heiferbreeding and four seed farms that are still awaiting privatization.

Retrenchment of Staff

3With the separation of the Livestock Development and Cooperative Development and Marketing into two fully-fledgedministries in 2001, the new structure for MOA is no longer valid.

33I

3.15 In addition to 6,000 staff that were retrenched in the first round, MOA also retrenched 600 staff duringthe second and identified another 1,200 staff for a third round. Earlier retrenchment costs were providedby the British Government and the CSD mobilized funds for the follow up retrenches.

Transfer of Staff to Local Government Authorities

3.16 In 1997, Government, under the auspices of the Local Government Reform Program, decided to transferthe function of providing agricultural services to farmers to the local govemment authorities (LGAs).Following this development, about 7,906 MOA staff were transferred to the Regional Administrationand Local Government. The transfer of the staff to RALG was purely administrative and did not involvephysical movement. MOA completed the redeployment exercise in 1999/200. MAFS, MCM, MWLDand PO-RALG have jointly prepared and issued guidelines that specify the roles and functions of thecentral Ministries vis-a-vis the departments of agriculture of the LGAs, the inter-linkages/coordinationthat need to exist between the two levels, and identify the LGA's roles and functions that require supportfrom the central ministries.

Guidelines for Joint Ventures and Cost Sharing

3.17 MOA prepared guidelines to facilitate the formation of joinves and cost sharing mechanisms forsome of the activities that were identified for joint venture (Appendix the technical report. Theguidelines for agricultural extension and training were completed in 1999 and therefore caused a delay inthe implementation of the targeted services. MOA also reached agreement with the respectivecommodity boards on the cost sharing mechanisms for research of most of the main export crops (coffee,cotton, and tobacco). Some research activities for major export crops have actually been privatized orunder privatization. Tea is under the Tea Research Institute of Tanzania (TRIT), which is a privateorganization. Tobacco and Coffee Research are under final stages of privatization and will be under theTobacco Research Institute of Tanzania (TORITA), and the Tanzania Coffee Research Institute (TACRI)respectively. For other export crops, cost sharing guidelines for research were prepared early enough toattract the establishment of Trust Funds.

Improved Internal Operating Systems and MIS

3.18 The designing and implementation of improved internal operating systems and MIS were intended tostrengthen MOA capacity to implement its core functions. Electronic connectivity within Kilimo HouseI was established through a Local Area Network (LAN) after installing the computers and software thatwere procured under the project. This LAN is being expanded to other offices of the ministry, usingfunding provided under other existing agricultural projects. MOA commissioned a study to streamlineits budget preparation procedures and, as result, an integrated budgeting approach was recommended.Under this approach, the recurrent and development budgets were to be integrated or linked.Government, however, could not adopt this approach for MOA alone, because doing so would haveintroduced a distortion in the entire budgeting system of the Government, since other ministries were notready for its adoption. Recent adoption of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) has,however, began to implement the integrated budgeting approach that was proposed under ASMP.

Impact of the Rationalization Component

3.19 The implementation of the rationalization component was critical to strengthening government capacityto provide public services more efficiently and to provide an enabling environment for private sectordevelopment in agriculture. Overall the project succeeded in several key areas: establishment of animproved legal and regulatory framework, MOA functional and structural changes, reduction in public

34

fiscal burden, and improved public-private interface.

(a) Improved Legal and Regulatory Framework

3.18 ASMP, complemented by concurrent structural reform operations, initiated the process to create asatisfactory legal and regulatory framework. This was done through the restructuring of the commodityboards and the revision of key legislation (e.g., rationalization and amendment of the CommodityBoards) to permit private operators to market, process and export under license. Private operatorsactually started to purchase cotton and coffee in 1994/95 and tobacco in 1995/96, pyrethrum in 1998. Anew Tea Act was approved in 1997 to permit the privatization of TTA estates and factories. The PlantProtection Act, 1997 was approved to underpin government regulatory and control services with respectto disease and pest control, and regulation of farm inputs.

(b) MOA Functional and Structural Changes

3.19 Through a participatory process, involving staff at all levels, MOA succeeded in galvanizingcommitment to an irreversible change that allowed the ministry's functional and structural changes to beimplemented with minimum resistance or detraction. This was achieved through a systematic program ofawareness seminars and workshops for all staff aimed at the need, the rationale and the mechanism forrationalization of functions and activities of the ministry. The participatory TTG process facilitated thebuilding of an unprecedented sense of ownership of the rationalization process among the staff. Giventhat this was the first retrenchment exercise in the public sector and that it was confined to MOA (actingas a pilot for a later civil service reform), the achievement under the rationalization component hadimportant implications for a wider civil service reform, which is currently ongoing.

(c) Reduction in Public Fiscal Burden

3.20 As a result of the retrenching of more than 7,000 staff, Government reduced its fiscal burden associatedwith the provision of public service in agriculture. However, because of severe financial constraints thatGovernment generally faced at the time, the resulting savings were not used to improve the performanceand morale of the remaining staff in MOA.

(d) Improved Public-Private Sector Interface

3.21 Although ASMP was originally designed to support the development of the private sector throughputting in place a favorable legal and policy environment only, the changes made during the Mid-TermReview to provide direct support to the private sector had positive effects. As a result of creating aprivate sector desk in the ASMP Secretariat, the interface between the public and private sectorsconsiderably improved. Several private sector institutions or organizations were identified and targetedto participate in the private-public sector dialogue during the Agriculture Minister's Round TableMeetings. MOA also assisted in facilitating the establishment of Regional Commissioners' roundtablemeetings with private sector stakeholders. MOA also assisted the private sector to set up industry-basedorganization, such as the Tanzania Chamber of Agriculture and Livestock (TCAL) that was establishedin 2001 as the apex organization of industry-based agricultural associations.

3-5

Issues Limiting the Impact of Rationalization of MOA's Functions

3.22 Implementation of the rationalization component in general and the rationalization of the functions ofMOA/MOA in particular, raised and experienced a number of serious issues that impeded the sub-component's implementation and limited its impact on the original objectives. The major issues thatconstrained the sub-component's impact on its original objectives consisted of (a) inadequate support tothe emerging private sector, (b) limited impact on culture change among MOA/MOA staff, (c)inadequate incentives for MOA/MOA to implement the rationalization sub-component, and (d)Government red tape.

(a) Inadequate Support to the Emerging Private Sector

3.25 There was one serious omission during the design of the rationalization component. Direct support to theemerging and fledgling private sector was not included in the design of the project, despite the fact thatpromotion of the private sector development was one of the primary objectives of the rationalizationcomponent. It was, nevertheless, acknowledged by the project designers that there were "two sides to thespinning off coin: getting MOA out and enticing the private sector go in" (SAR, page 32). Both wereperceived as necessary and neither was automatic. And yet, "enticing" or supporting the development ofthe private sector was not considered as one of the core functions of MOA. Instead, creating a conducivepolicy environment for private sector participation in the activities hived off by the Government wasconsidered the best way of promoting private sector's entry and development. In Tanzania, like in manyother African countries, it is evident that policy and institutional reforms alone are not adequateconditions for positive private sector response to new production and market opportunities that areassociated with the improvements in the policy environment. Tanzania's agribusiness sector, whichpurchases raw commodities for processing/trading from and sells or provides inputs and finance tosmallholder and commercial farmers, faces numerous constraints. These have largely accounted for theslow response in the private agribusiness sector. They include: inadequate basic entrepreneurship skills;lack of basic skills in investment planning and evaluation, insufficient skills in basic management skills(accounting, inventory control, marketing and market research); limited knowledge of technical knowhow for reducing costs and increasing operating efficiency; lack of financial intermnediation services oraccess to credit.

3.26 In addition, the new policy environment at the beginning of the transition process was bound to beimperfect and fragile, so that private sector's confidence in the new policy environment was naturallylow. The omission of a private sector supportfunction among MOA's core functions and the laterecognition of its importance and incorporation into project activities, affected ASMP implementation.Private sector's response in input delivery and credit services, for example, proved to be slow. ASMPresponded by launching studies that analyzed the underlying problems, but could not directly intervenefor lack of mandate. It was not until 1998, however, when a private sector development desk wascreated in the Project Coordinator's Office to deal with private sector development issues. This one-person desk was instrumental in initiating and deepening the interface between Government and theprivate sector through encouraging policy dialogues, joint reviews of issues, analysis and fornulation ofpolicies and regulations. An inclusion of the private sector function in MOA's core functions, on atransitory rather than permanent basis, would have helped facilitate the private sector's role in theactivities that were hived off and those retained or jointly operated with the private sector. A sub-component to foster private sector participation in production, trade and investment should have beenformulated to complement ASMP's rationalization of MOA and privatization of parastatals. A proposalto this effect was made during the Mid-Term Review and resulted in the creation of the one-person deskfor private sector development. In retrospect, a fully-fledged private sector section would have beenappropriate for deepening and broadening the interface between the public and private sector.

36

(b) Limited Culture Change in MOA

3.27 The rationalization of MOA functions was intended, among other things, to (i) right-size the ministry toaffordable levels commensurate with its core functions, and (ii) introduce a new culture in terms ofshared core values and core management principles. The core values for the new MOA included thepursuit of excellence in service, diligence on duty, and integrity. The new MOA core managementprinciples consisted of result-oriented performance, mission-driven, client focus, participatory-orientation, value for money concern, innovativeness and decentralization. Both the shared core valuesand core management principles are consistent with those of the ongoing broader Public Service ReformProgram (PSRP). Despite the general acceptance of these values and management practices among MOAstaff, culture change within the Ministry has been limited. Restoration of high morale andprofessionalism as well as instilling total commitment to the new values among MOA staff will not takeplace in the absence of improved incentives. The rationalization process in the ministry was andcontinues to be implemented without the requisite incentives for improved staff performance. Staffsalaries and budgetary resources have deteriorated with high inflation rates in recent years. The savingsgenerated by the retrenchments in MOA and the revenue generated by the sale of agricultural paratstatalscould have been deployed to improve the staff incentives in MOA. Government considered thisunfeasible because MOA, despite being singled out as a pilot for a wider Civil Service Reform Program,could not be treated differently from the rest of the civil service. As a result, an opportunity to learn andgauge the impact of civil service reform at a pilot scale was missed. However, Government has leamtfrom MOA's rationalization process that culture change cannot take place in the absence of improvedstaff incentives. Government has therefore begun to address this issue under the PSRP by introducing avariety of employment and benefits options, such as the Selective Accelerated Salary Enhancement(SASE) annual contracts.

(c) Inadequate Incentives for MOA

3.28 MOA implemented the rationalization program with a high degree of commitment, despite theinadequate incentives that derived from the implementation of the component. As already pointed out,the budgetary savings from the retrenchment of staff did neither directly accrue to MOA nor result inincreased budgetary allocations. Instead, Government used the savings to meet other public financialrequirements in the economy. The resulting deterioration in budgetary resource availability in MOAaggravated staff morale. Staff turnover in MOA remained a chronic problem during the implementationof ASMP. In addition, MOA had no incentive to expedite the hiving-off of non-core functions becausethe Treasury retained the resulting revenue and savings. MOA's request for authorization to retain thesavings could not be granted because money was badly needed elsewhere in the public sector. SinceMOA staff had expected that the savings deriving from rationalization would be allocated to strengthenincentive packages and implementation of core functions in MOA, staff were further demoralized whenthey saw that this was not happening.

(d) Government Red Tape

3.29 Although the CSD and MOF were members of the ISC of project, MOA had a tough time having someof its rationalization proposals go through the Govermment red tape. For example, the approval of thenew organizational structure for MOA was protracted and its implementation, after approval, was slow.Both the approval and implementation of the new structure required CSD vetting. The new structure forMOA was submitted to the CSD in 1997, but was not approved until a year later. After its approval, theheads of the approved positions remained in acting capacity until mid- 1999. The CSD delayed approvalof both on technical grounds. Accordingly, the approval of the structure and appointments were delayedbecause of the need to ensure their consistency with the principles of the decentralization program and

37

the Public Service Management and Employment Policy. The latter was published in January 1999.Also, Government's lengthy vetting process for the designated appointees contributed to the delay in.effecting the appointments. Nevertheless, Government was aware that the delays impeded theimplementation of the project and affected the enthusiasm with which the rationalization program wasinitially accorded by MOA staff. This was, perhaps, a fair price to pay, given the strategic importance ofMOA's rationalization program in the context of the overall PSRP.

3.30 As previously alluded to, the Treasury had good reasons for not releasing the savings made through theimplementation of MOA's rationalization program. While the Treasury, as a member of the ISC,supported the project's thrust and development objectives, it was not capable of providing adequatesupport to facilitate the implementation of the rationalization component. Its retention of the savingsfrom the hived off non-core functions and staff retrenchment as well as its withholding of the saleproceeds of the agricultural parastatals, did not auger well for strengthening MOA's capacity toeffectively implement its core functions. Furthermore, by allocating fewer budgetary resources to MOAand, hence, inadequate counterpart funds, the project's access to the Credit proceeds was somewhatslowed down. Eventually, the adoption of "cash budgets" by the Treasury during the period of projectimplementation, also adversely affected project implementation in general and the implementation of therationalization component in particular. As a result of cash budgeting, the availability of counterpartfunds became both inadequate and unpredictable, leading to slow down in project implementation andlimited achievement of the ultimate objectives of reforming MOA.

Agricultural Parastatal Divestiture

(a) MOA 's Role in Divestiture

A3 .31 Agricultural parastatal divesture was considered a critical part of the process of rationalizing MOA' sfunctions. However, MOA's role in the process of parastatal divesture was restricted to setting priorities,identifying divestiture strategies and preparing parastatal profiles. The overall responsibility forimplementing the actual divestiture belonged to the PSRC. Consequently, the actions relating toimplementing the actual divestiture of the agricultural parastatals were not part of ASMP. Nevertheless,MOA was required to provide continuous support to PSRC to meet its statutory responsibilities forimplementing the divestiture. For example, MOA continued to prepare the agricultural parastatals forprivatization on case-by-case basis as requested by PSRC. MOA was, however, discouraged from micro-managing parastatals as this role was left to the management and Boards of the parastatals themselves.

(b) Implementation of Divestiture

3.32 Prior to March, 1996, the process of parastatal privatization involved the following steps:

* PSRC, in consultation with MOA, formulated a two-year rolling master plan.* For each parastatal in the master plan, PSRC established a Divestiture Task Force (DTF) under

its chair with members from the Treasury, MOA and the relevant parastatal; other relevantministries or government agencies were co-opted on demand basis.

* MOA, through its PPMB, acted as the Secretariat of each DTF in addition to being responsiblefor preparation of parastatal profiles and divestiture strategy for each parastatal.

* The DTF reviewed and approved both the profile and strategy or directed additional reviews, ifdeemed necessary, mainly focusing on financial and corporate structure.

* The DTF recommendations were submitted to the Rationalization Task Force (RTF) of ASMP,under the chair of the Principal Secretary with the Rationalization Task Manager acting as theSecretary, for decision.

* RTF-approved divestiture strategy was sent to Minister of Agriculture for endorsement, afterwhich the strategy was sent back to the PSRC for action, namely to undertake sale orrestructuring procedures.

3.33 The above procedure was streamlined in March, 1996 on the basis of a MOA/PSRC/Treasuryrecommendation to the Cabinet that issued the following general guidelines to the divestiture process:

* Parastatals to remain 100 % owned regulatory bodies for maj or crops.* Parastatals in which Government has to maintain a majority.* Parastatals in which Government will maintain a minority.* Parastatals to be sold outright.* Parastatals to be closed down, liquidated.

(c) Divestiture Performance

3.34 The performance indicators for divestiture of agricultural parastatals, as specified in the ASMPImplementation Manual, included: (a) preparation of clearly specified MOA role and responsibilities vis-a-vis PSRC for preparing for sale; (b) systematic incorporation of MOA data and studies into thedivestiture process; and (c) ultimately, the number of agricultural parastatals divested. These processindicators of performance were achieved as described below.

3.34 ASMP's performance on the basis of the first two indicators was fully satisfactory. MOA, in closecoordination with PRSC, Treasury and parastatal management, had the final responsibility for decidingthe most suitable divestiture strategy for agricultural parastatals.

3.35 Regarding the third performance indicator, PSRC was responsible for divesting 80 agriculturalparastatals, subsidiary companies and operating units that were under the jurisdiction of MOA. As ofJune 30, 2001 (Credit Closing Date), a total of 17 state farms and 12 cashew-processing plants had notbeen sold or their divestiture had not been legally completed. Since the actual privatization of parastatalswas outside the mandate of ASMP, it is not appropriate to pass judgment on its performance in thisregard.

3.36 Progress in divesture of agricultural parastatals was much slower than originally anticipated. The originalfive-year time frame for completion was exceeded. As a result, the entire privatization program inagriculture was and remains behind schedule for several reasons, most of which were land-related:

(i) Most agricultural parastatals had large tracts of land (e.g., DAFCO, NARCO, NAFCO, andTSA) and their divestiture encountered the following land policy and land-related problems: non-availability of land titles in the name of the parastatal; non-surveyed land of NARCO and DAFCO;land titles in possession of creditors (banks) to secure long-term loans; squatters had occupied theland of the parastatal (Kigamboni Poultry); villagers reclaimed lands that were previouslynationalized or those close to them (Hanang Wheat Complex); and population pressure or highdemand for land in certain cases (West Kilimanjaro).

(ii) Most agricultural parastatals had accumulated large amounts of long-term debts with local andforeign lenders and the Treasury; such parastatals were less attractive to private investors.

(iii) The corporate structures of some agricultural parastatals were not appropriate for immediateprivatization. For example, NAFCO's Hanang Wheat Complex had seven wheat farms and centralmaintenance service center that were established as separate companies owned by NAFCO. Theyshared common agricultural infrastructure (on-farm roads) and it was not practical to sell these farmsto different investors due to the problems that would arise in sharing the common facilities.

39

(iv) Non-availability of working capital for parastatals that were still operating during privatizationforced them to cease operation as they could not borrow from banks; and the security of their assetsdeteriorated and the value of the business declined, causing potential investors to lose interest.

(v) Most agricultural parastatals did not have updated audited accounts or draft management accounts,making it difficult to analyze their operations based on audited accounts and causing potentialinvestors to lose interest.

(vi) Rational delays in Government approval for concluded deals caused, in some cases, the purchaser towithdraw his offer, or for the time frame for its validity to expire.

(vii) Underdeveloped financial and capital markets in the country have denied most private entrepreneursand enterprises the opportunity to purchase some of the agricultural parastatals of commercialinterest to them.

(d) Impact of Divestiture

3.37 The impact of the agricultural parastatal divestiture program can best be assessed on the basis of theobjectives of the entire divestiture program. The objectives of divestiture included:

o Increase efficiency, productivity and quality of goods and services through capital injection, newand improved management and technology.

o Reducing the fiscal budget on government.O Providing opportunities for wide share ownership amongst Tanzanians through various

measures, including the Privatization Trust Fund, Tanzania Investment Partnership, and salethrough Employee Share Ownership Plans.

O Providing a source of revenue for Government from the sale proceeds.

3.38 In addition to factors that impeded progress in the process of agricultural parastatals privatization(paragraph 3.36), the inherent trade-offs (contradictions) in the objectives of the divestiture program wasalso a fundamental problem. There were irreconcilable trade-offs, for example, between the objectivesof providing a source of revenue for Government and providing opportunities for wide share ownershipamongst Tanzanians. Similarly, many of the objectives were inconsistent with economic and fiscalefficiency. It was thus virtually impossible for PSRC to pay due attention to all the objectives ofdivestiture and, at the same time, accelerate the divestiture process. Whenever, these trade-offs wereencountered PSRC had to resort to seeking clarification and approval from Government. This, of course,protracted the divestiture process.

3.39 Although the agricultural parastatal divestiture process has not yet been brought to an end, it has hadprofound impact on agriculture's transition toward becoming a market-based production system. Themonopolistic marketing boards and cooperative unions, which were the backbone of the single-channelmarketing system in Tanzania, have been restructured, or have become moribund. The disappearance ofGovernment owned trading monopolies has allowed many new private sector enterprises to enter andplay a key role in the marketing function. In almost all cases, the public monopolies have not beenreplaced by private monopolies, allowing a reasonable degree of competition for most commoditiesproduced in the country. For instance, during the 2000/2001 marketing season, about 26 privatecompanies participated in the purchasing of seed cotton in the Western Zone, which includes the entireLake Victoria Basin regions.

3.40 The private sector's response to the opportunities created by the liberalization (under concurrentadjustment and structural reform programs) and privatization (under ASMP) was strong. This wasevident in the increasing shares of the private sector in the various commodity markets. Trade in major

40

grains (maize, rice, and wheat), which were previously the sole domain of the giant NMC andgovernment-controlled cooperative unions, are now entirely private, except the trading operations of theStrategic Grain Reserve. Private small and medium-scale mills now do about 98% of the milling ofgrains, while the market share of NMC and Cooperative Unions has become negligible because theirmills are largely moribund. The marketing and processing of the major export commodities (coffee,cotton, tea, tobacco, sisal, cashews and pyrethrum) is now virtually in the hands of private operators,with a few cooperative unions competing. Similarly, there has been spontaneous private investment inmarketing and primary processing facilities in several sub-sectors, especially in tobacco, cotton and grainmilling. In the cashew sub-sector, the obsolescence of the technology of the 12 existing publicprocessing plants has greatly contributed to the lack of interest in them by private investors.

3.41 When Government owned and operated the agricultural parastatal portfolio, many of them operatedinefficiently and with substantial operating losses. During the period of central economic management,Government used to incur substantial costs of supporting these parastatals. This cost of supportaccounted for 70% of the development budget allocated to MOA in the early 1980s. During 1993/94 and1994/95 Government provided Tsh.50.3 billion and Tsh.21.8 billion respectively as direct supports to theoperating parastatals. Since 1995/96 Government no longer provides operational support to parastatalsthat are earmarked for privatization or to the restructured Commodity Boards. The latter are financedthrough industry cess. Accordingly, the divestiture of agricultural parastatals has removed the fiscalburden from the shoulders of the Government.

3.42 The savings and revenue generated by the agricultural parastatal divestiture program did not directlybenefit MOA/MOA or the agricultural sector. The substantial savings made by Government as a result ofgetting rid of the fiscal burden of supporting parastatals and the revenue from the sale proceeds were notploughed back into the agriculture sector. Due to severe overall Government budget constraints, MOA' sbudget allocations declined between 1991/92 and 1998/99. The share of MOA in total governmentexpenditure (both recurrent and development) averaged 3.5% during 1991/92 and 1995/96, but declinedto 2.1 % in 1997/98. The declining budgetary allocations prevented MOA from strengthening itsmanagement systems as envisaged under the Rationalization Component of ASMP. Due to limitedbudgetary resources, MOA was not able to improve pay incentives for its remaining staff, making therationalization process of the ministry an end in itself. Finally, non-availability of adequate financialresources adversely affected project implementation. One of the reasons for the poor disbursement underthe project was inadequate counterpart funding, particularly during 1995/96 and 1999/2000 to2000/2001.

3.43 Allowing MOA to make use of part of the savings or revenue associated with the rationalizationcomponent would have helped to provide adequate counterpart funding for ASMP. This did not happen.Instead, MOA requested, and the World Bank agreed, to raise IDA contribution from 90% to 95%. TheWorld Bank did, however, raise the issue of using some of the savings to improve the pay incentives forthe remaining staff. But Government was not financially capable of being responsive to the proposal. Asstated previously, severe financial constraints and government red tape did not permit the Government toaddress these issues in a timely fashion.

3.44 Government realizes that the delays in agricultural parastatal divestiture have substantial costs. Due tomounting staff benefits claims, growing debt burden and increasing deterioration in assets, some of theremaining parastatals may no longer be saleable. Their assets may turn out to be a total loss to theeconomy. The remaining parastatals are still controlling substantial assets of land, buildings, equipmentand expertise that are not available to the productive sectors of the economy until their disposal takesplace. Thus, a substantial amount of capital available to the country is not productive at considerableopportunity costs to the economy. Government, however, is committed to ensure that remaining

41

parastatal portfolio is divested as soon as practical.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION COMPONENT

4.1 The Policy Formulation and Implementation Component had several activities as described in section 2.4(b). The major activities consisted of policy analysis and institutional strengthening. Policy analysiscomprised preparation of sector policies and short and medium term programs and projects, whileinstitutional strengthening involved a comprehensive staff training program and improvement in workenvironment and facilities.

Policy Analysis

4.2 The preparation of sector policies and programs and staff training were implemented to complement eachother. The bulk of the preparation of sector policies and programs was based on an in-service staff-training program. The staff-training program consisted of long-term, short-term, seminars, workshopsand on-the-job assignments. The on-the-job assignments were an integral part of the staff-trainingprogram and the preparation of sector policies and programs. The assignments were of two types: the on-the-job tasks (OJT) and the personal service contract assignments (PSC) that were later changed to stafftraining assignments (STA). These are described further later.

4.3 The project provided for in-service training under which staff of the Planning and Marketing Division(PMD) were given special tasks, as part of their training included in the annual work plan of the PMD, toprepare policy papers or programs focusing on priority issues. The staff were paid allowances forundertaking such assignments. A decision was later made to separate "routine activities" from "specialassignment tasks". Staff were not paid for the former. A norm of 8 staff weeks was established forcompleting the latter tasks.

4.4 The PMD had 3 sections, including Sector Planning, MDB and PPMB. In addition the Early Warning andCrop Monitoring of the Food Security Department was included. The annual work plan of PMDconsisted of policy and program reviews by these sections. Staff assignments in these sections/units weredesignated as OJTs or PSCs. The bulk of the assignments were under the first category. PSCs were morecomplex assignments, both in terms of work involved and time required to complete them. They requiredfull time from the staff, who were generally required to take leave without pay but were paid areasonable allowance. Eventually, PSCs were replaced by special training assignments (STAs) that didnot require MOA staff to resign, but were assigned to work with local or foreign consultants on specialassignments.

4.5 The identification of OJTs and PSCs, as part of PMD's annual work plan was quite lengthy. It required thestaff's initiative that had to be vetted by both a training mentor and the unit head on the basis of itsrelevant to the priorities of the unit. This was followed by the submission of the unit tasks by the unithead to the section head. The section head's evaluation of the proposed tasks was based on the staffcompetence and relevance of the proposed task to the section's issues priority agenda. Finally,discussions were held with the ASMP Secretariat to clarify various issues, including workload of thestaff/section, resource availability for field research and staff allowances. The ASMP Secretariatconsolidated and submitted the proposed tasks to the Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC), ATC, andISC for approval at each stage. The ISC-approved work plan was sent to the World Bank for clearance.The approved OJT/PSC list was returned to the respective sections and units for implementation. Policystaff in collaboration jointly undertook some of the PSC tasks with local or international consultants.

42

4.6 Both OJTs and PSCs that were approved during the implementation of the project dealt with varioustopics or themes relating to sector policies or programs that were considered of high priority at the time.These themes included, among others: marketing and price reviews in relation to private sectordevelopment; public expenditure reviews; monitoring of project/program implementation; projectformulation for smallholder irrigation and export crop development; preparation of parastatal profilesand divestiture strategies to support the privatization program of state enterprises; review of foodsecurity and rural credit.

Institutional Strengthening

4.7 The project aimed to enhance the analytical capacity of Policy and Planning Division to: (a) formulate andmonitor the implementation of policies affecting agricultural and rural development and (b) carry outtimely analysis and dissemination of agricultural information, including agricultural censuses, annualsurveys, pilot surveys and the production of crop monitoring and early waming bulletins.

4.8 FAO, under contract with MOA, managed both local and international training for the policy andinformation components. FAO's responsibility included, in consultation with MOA, administeringfellowships and training and recruitment of a training adviser, national experts, consultants andadministrative support staff for training component. For the rationalization component, FAO handledonly international training and study tours.

4.9 Institutional strengthening comprised of a staff-training program with long- and short-term overseas training,study tours, tailor-made local courses, seminars and workshops using local training institutions. For theagricultural information system, priority was given to supporting the country's capacity to producereliable information on crop and livestock production, marketing and trade.

Training outputs

4.10 The implementation of the training program began in June 1994 and was completed in 1998. By projectClosing Date (June 30, 2001), training outputs included, among others, the following: the production of245 OJT reports covering policy reviews, annual commodity market reviews, program preparation,parastatal profiles and divestiture strategies, monitoring of program implementation, food security,export and food crop reviews, livestock and agricultural inputs; completion of master's degree programsby 20 staff in agricultural development, econometrics, infornation technology and data processing;completion of short-term courses in different fields of agriculture and rural development for 21 staff,short-term practical training abroad for 32 staff, and tailor-made local courses for about 191 staff; and 6staff of ASU were trained at master's degree level and I at diploma level.

Impact of the Policy Formulation and Implementation Component

4.11 The primary objective of the Policy and Institutional Strengthening Component was to strengthenMOA's capacity to formulate and monitor the implementation of policies that affect agriculture and ruraldevelopment in the country. Specifically, this component was to strengthen MOA's capacity to providereliable, high quality analytical position papers on pertinent agricultural issues to facilitate the process ofre-defining government policies in agriculture. This objective was largely met. A number of policy andtechnical reports were prepared as OJT and SPA tasks. The quality of most of the reports wassatisfactory. Some of the reports were used as references in the parastatal privatization process,restructuring of commodity boards, and preparation of key policy and legal documents. Similarly, threeprojects were prepared under the auspices of ASMP: the Strategic Agricultural Partnership DevelopmentProject (SAPDEP) as a follow up project to ASMP; the Soil Fertility Recapitalization and

43

Intensification Project (SOFRAIP); and the River Basin Project for irrigation development.

4.12 A training needs assessment of PMD staff in 1995 revealed that staff had a high level of academicqualifications, but generally lacked practical work skills in quantitative analysis, research skills, policyanalysis skills and tools, computer skills, interdisciplinary work skills and report writing. The trainingprogram's focus was accordingly shifted to meet this need through tailor-made local courses and OJTs.However, an assessment of local training institutions' capacity to meet this need revealed that most ofthese institutions could not adequately provide the needed training to PMD staff, except SUA in policyareas. This placed a major constraint on the development and implementation of tailor-made courses forPMD staff. However, MOA ingenuously made use of FAO, local and international consultants tocomplement the local training institutions and managed to organized local courses that met the needs forpractical skills by the PMD staff. This, however, proved to be extremely management-intensive andadministratively time-consuming. The OJTs played a key role in imparting analytical skills among thestaff and in facilitating the use of the skills acquired by the staff during training.

4.13 The OJTs proved to be effective instruments in imparting analytical and drafting skills for thepreparation of policy documents to the professional staff of the PMD. They also provided theopportunity for staff to make use of the skills they acquired through training, in line with the project'scapacity building objective. A substantial improvement in the presentation of OJT technical reports wasobserved in 1997/98 and thereafter. Special effort was also made to use OJT findings andrecommendations in policy documents, ensuring that OJTs were demand-driven. This was particularlythe case for the preparation of policy and strategies, both of which were OJT assignments. However,OJT reports were plagued by long delays and, at times, the use inaccurate infornation. Thesedeficiencies were caused by inadequate financial incentives for the staff involved.

4.14 The OJT and STA reports as well as the statistical reports provided useful inputs in the preparation ofkey agricultural policy documents and legislation. The Agricultural and Livestock Policy, 1997; theAgricultural Sector Memorandum (February 2000); the report on the Amendment of Acts/Ordinancesregulating the Livestock Sector; and the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (June 2001), havegreatly benefited from the information and data contained in the various reports prepared during theimplementation of the ASMP. Development of a Food Security Policy was originally envisaged as oneof the key activities under the Policy Component. A decision was later made to include this in theoverall agricultural and livestock policy document of 1997 and also a chapter on food security wasincorporated in the Agricultural Sector Memorandum. Future preparation of investmnent or developmentprograms in the agricultural sector would also continue to use OJT reports as references on policy andtechnical issues.

4.15 The preparation of special reports, like the export crop and food crop reviews, made considerablycontribution to the restructuring of the Commodity Boards. The revision of some current legislation(e.g., Acts for pyrethrum, sisal and tea) was facilitated by the crop studies done under the project. TheOJT reports on parastatal profiles and strategies provided key inputs in the privatization of parastatals.The ASMP-funded study on "Facilitating Agribusiness Development in Tanzania" was instrumental ininitiating and deepening the interface between Government and the private agribusiness sector in thecountry. This led to the intensification of the private/public sector dialogue through consultativeworkshops and the Minister of Agriculture's Round Table Conferences. These have provided useful forafor private sector's contribution to major policy formulation, including taxation on agriculture in the2001/02 budget.

4.16 The key indicator for ASMP training program was providing MOA with well-trained and experienced

44

staff to deal with sector reforms, policy analysis and formulation and preparation of sector policies,programs and projects. This objective was largely met. As indicated earlier, a significant number of staffwere trained and these have produced several policy and technical documents that have provided majorinputs in the preparation of key strategic policy and legal reports. However, given the dynamics of thetransition of the agricultural sector in the country, there is need for continued upgrading of staff skills forimproved job performance. It is, however, clear that MOA has been finding it difficult to retain thetrained and skilled staff. Several of such staff have been "poached" by both the private sector and thedonor and NGO agencies that are based in the country.

4.17 The various reports that were prepared during ASMP implementation have clearly helped MOA toarticulate the pertinent issues in the agricultural sector. These issues have included the lack of anagricultural sector development strategy to implement the sectoral policies, inadequate coordination ofagricultural programs at national and district levels, weak supporting services, low investment andinadequate financing in agriculture, inefficient markets for agricultural inputs and outputs, inappropriateadministrative and legal environment, and inadequate environment for agribusiness development in thecountry. MOA completed the preparation of an agricultural sector development strategy that wouldprovide guidelines for public and private interventions to address the identified development issues inthe sector. It is expected that the various policy documents prepared under ASMP would provide usefulreferences in this endeavor.

IMPLEMENTATION OF AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND SERVICESCOMPONENT (AISS)

Implementation of AISS Component

5.1 The objective of this component was to strengthen, rationalize and expand the agricultural sectorinformation base for the benefit of the public and private sectors. The project was expected, under thiscomponent, to put in place an integrated and rationalized framework for collecting, processing, reportingand disseminating data and information that are relevant to policy analysis, planning, marketing,evaluation and monitoring of the performance of the agricultural sector. Priority was accorded toestablishing a capacity to produce reliable information at national, regional and district level coveringproduction of crops and livestock, marketing and trade information.

5.2 The major activities under this component consisted of: national sample census of agriculture; annualagricultural surveys; improving MDB capacity; and improving Crop Monitoring and Early Warning Unit(CMEWU) capacity.

5.3 The implementation of this component required the collaboration of several institutions that dealt withagricultural information systems and services. This included three units of MOA: Statistics Unit,CMEWU, and MDB, and two sections in the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS): Agriculture Sectionand Electronic Data Processing (EDP). These institutions attempted to rationalize their mandatedprograms and pooled both financial and staff resources to provide official statistics on agriculture. Theyestablished mechanisms for coordinating and pooling resources for implementing the Census ofAgriculture and the post-census surveys. These mechanisms comprised the National Census Committee,National Census Technical Committee, Regional Census Committee and Regional Census TechnicalCommittee.

AISS Outputs

5.4 Originally, it was planned to undertake the National Sample Census of Agriculture In 1993/94. However,

45

due to drought conditions and unavailability of field equipment and vehicles, it was decided to repeat thecensus during the 1994/95 season on a more comprehensive basis. Data processing, analysis wascompleted and two reports were prepared, one containing mainly livestock information and the othermainly crops. Also two reports were prepared and published for the 1993/94 NSCA.

5.5 The Expanded Agricultural Survey, a nationwide post census agricultural survey, was started in 1995/96 tocollect and compile current agricultural statistics. It provided estimates at national and regional levelsand is the main source of current data on the agricultural sector. In 1996/97 another ExpandedAgricultural Survey was carried out. In 1997/98 an Integrated Agricultural Survey was carried out andfollowed by a District Agricultural Survey in 1998/99 and a Rapid Appraisal Survey in 1999/2000.Under the leadership of the National Census Technical Committee, a field management system,consisting of trained staff, logistics and field equipment, has been put in place to undertake datacollection and processing for the agricultural sector in the country. The rapid appraisal survey methodhas proved to be cost-effective and sustainable. The 1999/2000 Rapid Appraisal Survey was carried outat Tsh.56 million only, compared to Tsh.400 million for the previous agricultural surveys.

5.6 Other agricultural surveys undertaken under the project include the Large Scale Farms Survey, UrbanAgriculture Survey, and Coffee Pilot Survey. ASU has also developed a framework for an AgriculturalDatabase that is expected to become operational as soon as possible.

5.7 The Crop Monitoring and Early Warning Unit is part of the Tanzania Early Warning System. The primaryobjective of CMEWU, as part of the Food Security Department of the Ministry, is establish a robustsystem with the requisite capacity and infrastructure for providing reliable food security information. Inparticular, CMEWU provides advance information on crop production and food supply to avert hungerand other forms of food crisis

5.8 ASMLP supported the collection and publication of data and information relating to food and livestocksupply and prices by the Marketing Development Bureau of MOA. MDB regularly collects data on foodand livestock prices on a weekly basis from major regional towns in the country and published theinformation through the press and radio on a regular basis. This has greatly helped make the foodmarkets become transparent and the information has become a good basis for decision making by theprivate traders and producers in agriculture. The current MDB's provision of marketing and priceinformation is based on a comprehensive marketing information system (MIS) that was designed byconsultants in 1995/96 season.

Impact of the AISS Component

5.9 Implementation of the AISS component has been good. All planned tasks were carried out, although therewere unforeseen start-up delays. The quality of the products of the censuses and surveys has been alsogenerally good. The National Sample Census of agriculture (NSCA) for 1993/94 was carried outsuccessfully and a report was issued in June 1994. The NCAS for 1994/95 was launched on schedule andreport production was timely. In order to generate adequately comprehensive data on the agriculturalsector, an Expanded Survey (ES) was carried out for the crop seasons 1995/96 and 1996/97. Otheragricultural surveys that were carried out during 1997/98 to 1999/2000 were implemented on scheduleand their publications were timely. The Crop Monitoring and Early Warning Unit and the MarketingDevelopment Bureau implemented their work without major difficulties.

5. 10 Sustainability of the initial methods of agricultural information gathering and processing was an issue. Thecost of carrying out the surveys and censuses was extremely high and Government would have faceddifficulty in sustaining this high-cost agricultural information system. The adoption a rapid appraisal

46

survey in 1999/2000 has proved more cost-effective than the previous methods, paving the way for asustainable agricultural information system. Although staffing in ASU has been a problem, both inquality and numbers, there appears that a sustainable capability to design a survey system, collect data,process it and report in a timely manner has been developed, provided the cooperation between ASU andthe NBS is maintained. Technical leadership and a critical mass of trained personnel exists and the sub-professional cadre at headquarters and in the field have been adequately trained.

5.11 In collaboration with FAO, MOA and NBS carried out a major exercise to reconcile discrepancies andinconsistencies in the agricultural production and national accounts data, which was a major weakness ofthe agricultural information system in the country. Methods of generating more reliable national accountdata were agreed with the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). MOA also developed a framework forintegrated agricultural statistics aimed at improving the flow of consistent, accurate and timelyagricultural data.

VI. PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND WORLD BANK PERFORMANCE

Introduction

6.1 ASMP implementation performance was dependent on the Project Management and the World Bank. TheASMP implementation performance indicators include the Project Management's/World Bank'sperformance in respect of project costs and financing, disbursements, accounts and audits, procurement,technical assistance and project benefits.

Project Costs and Financing

6.2 The project was implemented below the costs estimated at appraisal. The original total project costs wereestimated at USD27.2 million, or Tsh.9.535 billion, excluding taxes. The actual total project costs wereUSD21.429 million, or Tsh. 13.776 billion4. This was about 79 % of the original cost estimates in dollarterms. The rapid depreciation of the Tanzanian Shilling during the period of project implementationaccounted for the reduction of project costs in dollar terms. At the same time, it accounted for increasingthe project costs in the local currency by about 44 %. The IDA Credit financed about 97 % of projectcosts (USD 20.783 million) as opposed to the original 90 % as provided in the Credit Agreement.Government contributed only 3 % (USD0.6 million) as compared to the origin 10 %.

Disbursement, Accounts and Audits

6.3 Out of the original Credit amount of SDR17.300 million, SDR14.582 million, or USD18..52 million wasdisbursed as of Closing Date. The disbursement period was 7.25 years and this was slightly lower thanthe standard disbursement profile of 8 years for all agricultural projects in Tanzania. The annual averagedisbursement was SDR2.01 million, or USD2.55 million. This level of disbursement was slightly higherthan the standard disbursement for agricultural projects in Tanzania. It was, however, slightly lower thanthe SAR annual average disbursement estimate of USD3.02 million. The lower disbursement was,largely, due to the temporary suspension of release of IDA funds to the Government of Tanzania by theWorld Bank for reasons not connected to ASMP that led to delays in the implementation of someactivities planned for 1993/94. Also, delays in the engagement of international consultants accounted forthe low disbursement level. Finally, shortage of counterpart funds, particularly in 1995/96 and after1998/99, led to lower disbursement in Credit funds.

4Based on a project expenditure weighted average exchange rate of US$1 =Tsh.642.88 for the period 1993/94 to 2000/201.The exchange rate at appraisal was US$1 = Tsh.350.

47

6.4 The Credit amount was reduced once by mutual agreement. In 1999, the Credit amount was reduced fromSDR17.300 million to SDR15.167 million. This through cancellation of SDR 2.13 million. Thiscancellation was deemed necessary because there was still a large amount of undisbursed balance afterthe original project Closing Date of June 30, 1999.

6.5 Actual disbursements under the major expenditure categories of the project were considerably different fromthe SRA estimates. Disbursement against 'equipment and vehicles' and 'consultants and studies'exceeded appraisal estimates by 4 and 19 percentage points. The change was, largely, due to increase inprocurement prices and quantities. The disbursements against 'training', 'MOA rationalization' and'incremental operating costs' turned out to be slightly less than those forecast at appraisal. The reductionin disbursement against training reflected the need to re-orient the training program toward local short-term training rather than long-term external training after the training needs assessment in 1995. Thedecrease in actual expenditure for MOA rationalization was due to the effectiveness of the consultativeapproach adopted by the Ministry in selling the need for change. Staff were more able to buy in thechange process than it was originally anticipated. This shortened the change process, so that by March1996 the first 6,000 retrenchees had been identified. The decrease in incremental operating costs was,largely, due to the substantial decrease in the domestic rate of inflation in the second half of 1990s.

6.6 Disbursement of Government counterpart funds was highly satisfactory during early years of projectimplementation, when IDA was disbursing almost 100% of the incremental operating costs. Duringthese fiscal years, all counterpart needed to carry out the work programs were committed and disbursed.Counterpart funding became a serious problem from 1995/96 onwards, due to severe budgetaryconstraints. Tight budgetary situations resulted in reductions in work programs. The counterpart fundingreductions in recent years pose serious sustainability problems of project activities.

6.7 ASMP management information system and accounting were computerized. The overall financialmanagement system of ASMP was sound and books of accounts were well maintained and in goodorder. The system of internal control was also sound, ensuring adequate supporting documentation,verification and authorization. Claims under the SOEs were supported with adequate and appropriatedocuments that were duly approved.

6.8 Audited annual accounts of ASMP were prepared and completed on time. All annual audited accounts,unqualified reports of auditors and replies of Management were submitted to the IDA on time. The draftaccounts of the financial year ending June 30, 2001 are being finalized for submission to the auditors andare expected to be submitted within the time limit agreed with IDA.

4R

Procurement

6.9 The project's original procurement plan was implemented, overall, on schedule with minor delays andamendments, and following World Bank procedures and guidelines. Problems were experienced in theinitial procurement of intemational consultants and slightly delayed the Date of Effectiveness. Theprocurement of international consultants for the agricultural information component and the trainingprogram were managed by FAO, on behalf of the Government, in accordance with World Bankprocedures and guidelines. The supply of computers and software was carried out through the Inter-Agency Procurement Services Office (IAPSO) of the United Nations, instead of the original ICB. Thiswas done to expedite the procurement process to have the equipment in place well in advance ofthe project closing date, to test and train MOA staff in running, maintenance and administrationof the system.

6.10 Technical Assistance

6.11 Long, medium and short-term TA was used under ASMP for the rationalization, policy formulation,and agricultural information systems components. Two international consulting firms, FAO and a localconsulting firm were retained to provide various services. In several cases, the international consultingfirms used local consultants to carry out the assignments. In addition, individual local TA was recruitedfor project management and for financial control and procurement.

6.12 With one exception, the performance of the consulting firms and the individuals used for theassignments have been satisfactory. The performance of the local individual TA has been of the higheststandard. This, perhaps, reflects the objective approach to TA recruitment demonstrated by the ASMPSecretariat. Following the Mid-Term Review mission's recommendation, long-term TA was phased outin 1998 and the project has relied on short-term and, largely, local TA.

Project Benefits

6.13 The project benefits that were identified at appraisal and expected to accrue during and after projectimplementation, have, to a large extent, materialized and will continue to do so in the near future. Itshould be realized, however, that these benefits are not solely due to ASMP. As indicated in chapter 1 ofthis report, ASMP was implemented in a policy and institutional framework that was facilitated by otherBank-supported operations. It was also implemented concurrent with other MOAroeconomic adjustmentand structural reform programs that exerted positive externalities (linkages) on ASMP developmentobjectives. Within this strategic context, the benefits stemming from the implementation of ASMPcannot be assigned to ASMP alone. Notwithstanding this, there are several benefits that are directlyassociated with the interventions implemented under ASMP. First, the role of Government in theagriculture sector is now focused on the provision of public goods and priority core functions. The policyand regulatory framework necessary to facilitate the development of a vibrant private sector is in placeand evolving. Second, the project's rationalization component is now serving as a model for the ongoingpublic service reform program that is directed at rationalizing public functions, enhancing coremanagement principles, and performance management systems. Third, the Ministry's capacity for policyformulation and implementation has been strengthened to the extent of initiating and implementing keyagricultural policy and legal reforms as well as supervising the formulation of an agricultural sectordevelopment strategy. Fourth, the agricultural information base, data systems and services have becomemore reliable and frequently sought after by both the public and private sectors. Fifth, although the actualprivatization of parastatals was outside the ASMP, the project, through the preparation ofparastatal/company profiles and divestiture strategies, play a key role in privatization process of thepublic agricultural portfolio.

49

Project Management Performance

6.14 On the basis of the above major performance indicators, it is evident that the management andadministration of ASMP has been highly effective and satisfactory. The key to this success has been theefficient and effective Project Secretariat, headed by the Project Coordinator and consisting ofRationalization Task Manager, Training Officer and Finance Manager. The ASMP Secretariat ablyprovided leadership in coordinating the various components and activities of the project through theInter-ministerial Steering Committee (ISC) and the Advisory Technical Committee ATC). Both the ISCand ATC provided the policy and technical guidance anticipated at project appraisal. The committeesmet regularly and were involved in all major decisions regarding the project.

World Bank Performance

6.15 The performance of the World Bank is measured by the efficacy of the project design and theefficiency of project review or supervision missions. The overall World Bank's performance in theseregards was highly satisfactory. The project was well designed to take into account the lessons ofprevious projects and the implications of the concurrent policy and institutional reforms supported by theWorld Bank. The only design deficiency was the lack of anticipation, at appraisal, that private sectordevelopment, in the short and medium-term, would need government direct support, in addition to thecreation of a favorable regulatory and policy environment. Recognition of this need would have logicallyled to defining private sector development support as one of the core and priority, albeit transitory,functions of the Ministry of Agriculture. This did not happened until the Mid-Term Review and, eventhen, the World Bank mission's review fell short of defining private sector development support as acore and priority function of the Ministry.

6.16 The World Bank supervised the project in an efficient manner, in terms of providing timely adviceon implementation issues to the ASMP management and the Government. However, for unknownreasons, the World Bank did not strictly adhere to the Project Supervision Plan (Annex G of the SAR).Its supervision input was about 71 % of the total 90 staff-weeks anticipated at appraisal. This inputreduction could have been due to the World Bank's judgment that implementation of the project wasgenerally satisfactory and needed no intensive supervision as anticipated at appraisal. Budgetary reasonsmight have played a role too.

50

TANZANIA

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR MANAGEMENT PROJECT

(Credit no. 2537-TA)

ANNEX 7B

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

51

ASMP ACHIEVEMENTS

LIST OF TABLES

1. List of ASMP Studies and Reviews

2. Status of Agricultural Parastatal Divestiture (As June 30, 2001)

3. Training:Fellowships and Study Tours: Long-Term CoursesFellowships and Study Tours: Short-Term CoursesWorkshops

52

ASMP ACHIEVEMENTSTable 1. List of ASMP Studies and Reviews

I. Policy and Strategic Studies: Impact of the Studies

1. (1995) Proposal for a Medium Term Background document for the preparation ofAgricultural Development Strategy 1996- 1997 Agricultural and Livestock Policy.2000 of the Government of Tanzania(NEI/MAC)

2. (1997) Agricultural and Livestock Policy Is the basic Government document guiding(MAC) sub-sector development.

3. (1998) Agricultural Input Supply For expansion of agricultural database.(NEI/MAC)

4. (1998) Taxation in Agriculture Sector Created public awareness on the nature and(NEI/MAC) magnitude of taxes and levies for agricultural

sector.

5. (1999) Taxation in Agriculture Sector Helped in the reduction and harmonization of(NEI/MAC) taxes and levies in the sector.

6. (1999) Facilitating Agribusiness Helped to improve dialogue and to forgeDevelopment in Tanzania: What Government partnership between public and privateShould Do (NEI/MAC) sectors.

7. (1999) Sub-Sector Studies, Vol. 1-5 Assisted the Government in identifying(NEI/MAC) opportunities and constraints of sub-sector.

This has helped in the preparation ofAgricultural Sector Development Study(ASDS).

8. (1999) Tanzania Livestock Sub-Sector Study Assisted the Government in identifying(NEI/MAC) opportunities and constraints of sub-sector.

This has helped in the preparation of ASDS.

9. (1999) Cooperative Study (NEI/MAC) Has assisted to identify weaknesses of 1991Cooperative Act.

10. (1997) Cooperative Helped to guide development of cooperatives.Development Policy

11. (2000) Strategies for Developing the Input to the approved 2001 AgriculturalAgriculture Sector (MAC) Sector Development Strategy.

Input to the Rural Development Strategyunder preparations.

,53

Table 1. List of ASMP Studies and Reviews

I. Policy and Strategic Studies: Impact of the Studies

12. (2000) Tanzania Agriculture: Performance Input to the preparation of Agricultural Sectorand Strategies for Sustainable Growth Development Strategy.(MAC/World Bank) Reference document for sector performance.

13. (1999) Study on Rationalization of the Helped the Government in the review of theRegulatory Functions of the Ministry of legal framework for the sector.Agriculture and Cooperatives of Tanzania(NEI)

14. (2000) Draft Agricultural Sector Helped the Government in the review of theDevelopment Strategy (MAC) (September, legal framework for the sector.2000)

15. (1996) Food Security in Tanzania Background document for the preparation of(NEI/AGRIS) 1997 Agricultural Policy.

16. 1999/2000 and 2000/2001 Public Helped in resource allocation and preparationExpenditure Reviews for the Agricultural of Medium-Term Expenditure FrameworkSector (MAC) (MTEF).

54

Table 1. List of ASMP Studies and ReviewsII. OJT/STA Studies: Impact of the Studies

1. (1994) Agriculture and Livestock Policy -RevisedEdition (M.M. Ndimbo, et al.)

2. (1993) Private Sector Participation into Agricultural )Inputs Trade (A. Nkwera, et al.) )

3. (1993) Land Tenure Issues Affecting Agricultural and )Livestock Activities in Tanzania (O.O.N. Lemweli, et )al.)

4. (1994) The Impact of Removing Subsidies on )Fertilizer on Small-scale Farmers (O.O.N. Lemweli, )et al.) )

5. (1994) General Policies of the Agricultural Sector and )the Importance of Irrigation in Tanzania (J.K. )Kabyemera, et al.) )

6. (1993) Background to the Design and Management ofthe Agricultural Sector Policies (J.K. Kabyemera) )

7. (1994) The Impact of Implementing Structural )Adjustment Program Reform in Environmental )Quality (F.P. Madembwe) Capacity building of MAC staff on

8. (1995) Sisal Policy Paper (Willy Misanga) policy formulation and analysis.

9. (1995) Tea Policy Paper (E.C. Kimambo) Reference material and input to the

10. (1995) Pyrethrum Policy Paper (K.S. Mbufu) major studies above.

11. (1995) Agriculture Policy on Increased FoodPromotion (N. Nkwera) )

12. (1995) Issues on Environmental Sustainability of )Agriculture (A.R. Kwayu) )

13. (1996) Commodity Policy Review of Cotton inTanzania (E. Mbiaha, et al.) )

14. (1997) The Impact and Consequences of the )Liberalization of Cotton Processing and Marketing inTanzania (J.M. Mdadila) )

15. (1996) Commodity Policy Review for Food Crops inTanzania (N. Mdoe, et al.) )

16. (1995) Production Action Plan to PromoteAgricultural Exports (Agriculture and Livestock (C.Joseph, et. al) )

17. (1993) Livestock and Meat Export Study (A. Nestory) )18. (1994) Availability of Credit to Smallholder Dairy )

Producers in Dar es Salaam: Problems and PolicyImplications (S.S. Mpaki)

.55

Table 1. List of ASMP Studies and Reviews

III. Pricing and Marketing Studies: Impact of the Studies

1. (1994) A Study on the Cross-Border Trade in the )Northern Zone (F. Mashamba, et al.) )

2. (1994) A profile of the Wholesale Price of the Main )Crops in Tanzania (R. Mbelwa, et al.) )

3. (1994) A Study on Wholesale Prices of Maize, Rice, Capacity building of MAC staff onand Beans in Six Major Urban Markets in Tanzania policy formulation and analysis.(S.B. Toke, et al.)

Reference material and input to the4. (1994) Beef Supply to Dar es Salaam (M.J. Munissi, et majores abe.

al.) major studies above.

5. (1994) Livestock Marketing Information Services (J.G.Bokella) )

6. (1995) Coffee Marketing Review (W.S. Mwaikambo)

7. (1995) Industry Review of Horticultural Crops (R. )Mbelwa) )

56

Table 2. Status of Agricultural Parastatal Divestiture(As June 30, 2001)

A. Privatized/Restructured ParastatalsOwnershik 1

TANZANIA SISAL AUTHORITY:1. Chanjura Estate P2. Musuwero Estate P3. Rudewa Estate P4. Mkumbura Estate P5. Mnazi Estate P6. Ndungu Estate P7. Toronto Estate P8. Zetternburg Estate r

9. Mkonge Group of Companies (8 Farm) PTA-NSEED:

1. Rift Valley Seed Conmpany P

DAFCO:1 . Kiwalani Central Workshop Co. Ltd. P2. Moshi Piggery r

TCMB:1 . Tanganyika Coffee Curing Co. Ltd. P2. Mbinga Coffee Curing P3. Mbozi Coffee Curing P

NAPOCO:1 . Majohe P2. Ukonga P3. Arusha GPS P

NAFCO:1. ~~~Bagamoyo Farms Limited-Megani Farm P

MOPROCO:1 . Plant P

1. ~~~Tobacco Processing Factory P

NMC:I1. Mzizima Plot No. 5 - Rice Mill P2. Morogoro P3. Mbeya P4. Gairo godown P5. Pugu Road godown P6. Makambako godown P

p= Private; G =Government

-7

B: Non-Divested Parastatals:

Ownership

TCB:1. Mtwara Cashew Co. G2. Kibaha Cashew Factory G3. Masasi Cashew Factory Leased4. Mtama Cashew Factory G

TSA:1. Rump P2. Godowns, Staff Houses P3. Mkonge Hotel P

NMC:1. Rump, Godowns, Staff Houses P2. Isaka Rice Mill P3. Tabora Rice Mill P4. Shinyanga Rice Mill P5. Mwanza Rice Mill P6. Mwanza Maize Mill P7. Mtwara Harnmer Mill P

,5X

Table 2. Status of Agricultural Parastatal Divestiture(As June 30, 2001)

Ownership

8. Arusha Wheat and Maize Mill P9. Pugu Road Complex P10. Kurasini Complex P11. Iringa Complex P12. Dodoma Complex PNAFCO:1. Rump G2. Mbozi Coffee Farms (9) Partial (3)

Privatised3. Kigamboni Poultry Farm Case in Court4. Bagamoyo Farms Ltd PS. Rotian Seed Co. Ltd P6. Tanzania Seed Co. Ltd To be Liquidated7. Mafia Coconuts Ltd (minority shares) P8. Kwamtili Estate Ltd (minority shares) P9. Ruvu Rice Farms Ltd G10. Dakawa Rice Farms Ltd Leased11. Mbarali Rice Farms Ltd G12. Kapunga Rice Farms Ltd G13. Mbozi Maize Farms Ltd G14. Namtumbo Maize Farm G15. Kahe Estates Ltd P16. Hanang Wheat Complex (8) G (1 Farm Leased)17. West Kilimanjaro Livestock Co. Ltd P18. Tanzania Dairy Farming Co. Ltd P(Rump plus 4 farms)19. National Poultry Co. Ltd (Rump plus 2 P

farms and a hatchery)20. Tanzania Dairies Ltd (Rump plus 3 Pplants)

TLSB:1 . Manawa Ginnery G2. Pamba Engineering Co. Ltd G

TANITA:1. Bukoba P

Mbinga Coffee Curing Co. Ltd (minority shares) PMbozi Coffee Curing Co. Ltd (minority shares) PTanzania Coffee Establishments Ltd PSDC: P1. Rump P2. TPC Ltd P3. Kagera Sugar Ltd Under P advanced

Divestiture

59

Table 2. Status of Agricultural Parastatal Divestiture(As June 30, 2001)

Ownership

COASCO GNational Sugar Institute GRufiji Basin Development Authority P

KOTACO G

NARCO:1. Rump G2. Ranches (12) G

Tanaganyika Packers Ltd GTanzania Tea Blenders Under LiquidationMufindi Tea Co. Ltd PMalangali Tea Estate PMaruku/Katoke Tea Estates and Factory PDabaga Tea Estate PLushoto Tea Estate and Factory PNjombe Tea Estate and Factory PRungwe Tea Estate and Factory PKorogwe Tea Estate PMoproco (25% of shares) PMtibwa Sugar Estates Co. Ltd (25% of shares) PLindi Cashew Factory G (to be Privatized

soon)Newala 1 Cashew Factory G (to be Privatized

soon)Newala 2 Cashew Factory G (to be Privatized

soon)Likombe Cashew Factory G (to be Privatized

soon)

Tunduru Cashew Factory G (to be Privatizedl_________________________________________________________ soon)

Tanita 1 Pugu Road Cashew Factory G (to be Privatizedsoon)

Tanita 2 Mbagal Cashew Factory G (to be Privatizedsoon)

Nachingwea Cashew Factory G (to be Privatizedsoon)

Note: A total of 78 units are privatized, 21 were under process; and 29 were owned by the Government.

60

Table 3. Training

Fellowships and Study Tours: Long-Tern CoursesParticipants Study Place Date Current AssignmentA.J. Ahmend Agricultural Management Reading, the UK 1994/95 Research and DevelopmentJ.G. Bokella Agricultural Development Aberdeen, the UK 1994/96 Resigned-Private SectorP.M. Mafuru Agricultural Development Aberdeen, the UK 1994/95 Irrigation - EconomistS.K. Mwinjaka Agricultural Economnics Aberdeen, the UK 1994/95 Policy Ministry of Water and Livestock

DevelopmentP. Ndeshilio Agricultural Development Aberdeen, the UK 1994/95 Policy Sector ReformsA. Rutihinda Agricultural Development Aberdeen, the UK 1994/95 Resigned - Private SectorG.L. Shange Agricultural Development Aberdeen, the UK 1994/95 Policy - Ministry of Water and Livestock

DevelopmentA.L. Tax Agricultural Economics York, the UK 1994 Resigned - Private SectorC.D. Wallwa Agricultural Development and Rural Bradfod, the UK 1994/95 Policy, Sector Plans and Budgets

FinanceI.G. Komba Economics and Econometrics Bradfod, the UK 1994/95 Sector Reforms and DivestitureT.K. Mangare Information Technology and Management Maastrich School of Management 1994/95 Transferred Planning Commission

the NetherlandsA.O. Ntikha Economic Development Glasgow, the UK 1994/95 Food Security, Crop Monitoring and Early

WamingW.L.A.Missanga Agricultural Economics Reading, the UK 1995/96 DeceasedS.A. Toke Information Technology Silsoe, the UK 1995/96 Management Information SystemL. Lyimo Agricultural Economics East Anglia, the UK 1995/96 Sector PolicyA.S. Baruti Information Technology Maastrich School of 1995/96 Transferred Planning Commission

_ Management, the NetherlandsG.A. Mariki Information Technology Maastrich School of 1995/96 National Bureau of Statistics

Management, the NetherlandsR. Makusi Econometrics & Social Statistics Kent, the UK 1995 Agricultural InformnationE. Mbogoro Data Processing West London, the UK 1996 Agricultural InformationG.M. Mwaijonga Information Technology Maastrich School of 1997/98 National Bureau of Statistics

Management, the NetherlandsT.L. Nshau Computer Science/Data Base Management University of Essex, the UK 1998/99 DeceasedJ.C. Shuma Computer Science/Data Base Management University of Essex, the UK 1998/99 Management Information SystemB.M. Ulaya Computer Science/ Information Technology University of Essex, the UK 1998/99 Management Information System

61

Table 3. TrainingFellowships and Study Tours: Short-Term Courses

Participants Study Place Date Current Assignment GenderE.G. Mbogoro Microcomputer Processing Commerce Bureau of the Census, 26/9/94-16/12/94 Agricultural Information F

System/Agricultural Statistics the USAJ.Y. Mwakatobe Personnel Management RIPA, the UK 3rd Oct. 1994 Regional Administrative Secretary M

9 Dec. 1994D. Biseko Planning and Financial Resources Erasmus Growth Dynamic 5 Sept. 1994- Resigned Private Sector - Consultant M

Management Institute, the Netherlands Wye 30 Nov.1994College, the UK

D. Gembe Microcomputer Application in Agricultural Wye College, the UK 10/10/94 -16/12/94 Retired MDevelopmentMicrocomputer Application in Agricultural Wye College, the UK 10 Oct. 1994- Resigned - Postal Bank. F

B.J. Gogadi Development 16 Dec. 1994P.S. Kamwela Statistics for Development Policy IDS/Sussex, the UK 19/9/94-9/12/994 Retired M

J. Mahundaza Management Information System RIPA, the UK 5/9/94 - 11/11/94 Resigned M

J.S.Mawalla Management of Agriculture and Rural Manchester, the UK 19 Sept. 1994 - Policy, monitoring MDevelopment Program 9 Dec. 1994

P. Minja Development and Project Planning in Agro- Bradford, the UK 19 Sept. 1994 - River Basin Project Mindustrial Project 24 Dec. 1994

M. Munissi Food Security in Africa: IDS/Sussex, the UK 19 Sept. 1994 - Policy, Private Sector Desk Officer MPolicy Planning and Interventions 9 Dec. 1994

J. Mwakisyala Financial Restructuring Arthur D. Little, USA 17 Oct. 1994 Policy, Ministry of Cooperatives and M18 Nov. 1994 Marketing

Ole-Sirikwa Financial Restructuring Arthur D. Little, USA 17/10/94 -18/11/94 Financial Controller, ASMP M

A.M.G. Micro-computer Application in Agricultural Wye College, the UK 10 Oct. 1994- Sector Policy F

Mwakyembe Development 16 Dec.1994Micro-computer Application in Agricultural Wye College, the UK 10/10/94-16/12/94 Sector Policy, gender issues M

T.P. Msaki DevelopmentI.N. Kaduma Project Management Development Bradford, the UK 9 Jan. 1995- Sector Policy, Ministry of Water and M

_______________________________ 31 March 1995 Livestock Development

L.D.Y. Mutani Personnel Management RIPA, the UK 13/3/95 -18/5/95 Retired M

C. Joseph Management Sustainable Project/Program Bradford, the UK 25/4/95 -15/7/95 Sector Plans and Budgets M

62

Table 3. TrainingParticipants Study Place Date Current Assignment GenderD. Nsherenguzi Rural Policy and Project Planning Institute of Social Studies, the 9 Jan. 1995- Resigned - Swiss Aid M

Netherlands 7 July 1995M. Ndimbo Rural Policy and Project Planning Institute of Social Studies, the 9 Jan. 1995- Sector Policy, Ministry of Water and M

Netherlands 7 July 1995 Livestock DevelopmentA.T. Kavishe Data Processing Institute of Social Studies, the 9 Jan. 1995- Crop Monitoring and Early Waming F

Netherlands 7 July 1995A. Kwayu Environmental Economics and Policy Harvard Institute, USA 10 June 1996 Management Information System M

Analysis 12 July-1996E. Massawe Agricultural Sample Surveys and Census Botswana, Malawi and Zimbabwe 3 Dec. 1994 - Agricultural Inforrnation F

Procedures 16 Dec. 1994U. Mtenga Agricultural Sample Surveys and Census Botswana, Malawi and Zimbabwe 3 Dec. 1994 - Retired M

Procedures 16 Dec. 1994N.B. Chukilizo Privatization of Procurement and Quebec (Canada), Paris, Morocco 14 Nov. 1994- Livestock Department M

Distribution of Veterinary Inputs Program and Mali 4 Dec. 1994LS. Mawalla

Y.S. Sembiko Privatization of Procurement and Quebec (Canada), Paris, Morocco 14 Nov. 1994- Resigned - Private Sector MDistribution of Veterinary Inputs Program and Mali 4 Dec. 1994LS. Mawalla

H.R. Mwango Monitoring and Evaluation of Agricultural Bangladesh and Thailand 9/12/994 - 2/12/94 Resigned - Private Sector MExtension Projects

F.S. Katagira Privatization of Procurement and Malaysia 26/6/95 -30/6/95 Plant Protection Section MDistribution of Pesticides

A.L. Lyatuu Distribution of Pesticides Malaysia 26 June 1995 Regional Secretariat F30 June 1995

J. Kimati Policy Management Viet Nam 4 April 1995 Director of Policy, Ministry of M19 April 1995 Cooperatives & Marketing

W. Ngirwa Policy Management Thailand and the UK 4 April 1995 Permanent Secretary, Ministry of M19 April 1994 Agriculture

J. Rugumyamheto Human Resources Development Indonesia 4 April 1995 Permanent Secretary, Civil Service M15 April 1995 Department

J.R. Madata Project Financing Thailand 4/4/95- 15/4/95 Ministry of Finance MJ. Kimati Preparation of ASIP Zambia 11/2/96 - 23/2/96 Director of Policy, Ministry of M

Cooperativcs and MarketingF.P. Medembwe Preparation of ASIP Zambia 11/2/96-23/296 Local Government Reform ME. Ndanshau Preparation of ASIP Zambia 11/2/96 -23/2/96 Seconded to an agricultural NGO M

63

Table 3. TrainingParticipants Study Place Date Current Assignment Gender

H. Chande Preparation of ASIP Zambia 11 Feb. 1996 Resigned - Private Sector F23 Feb. 1996

P. Kirniti Policy Management Malaysia and Indonesia 30 Sept. 1996 - Member of Parliament M

October 1996N. Kasaka Improving Management Thailand 24 Feb. 1997 - Member of Parliament M

_____________________________ 6 M arch 1997

R.O.S. Mollel Managing the Transition to Market Vietnam and China 7 April 1997 - Permanent Secretary, Prime Minister's M

Economy 24 April 1997 Office

E.J. Makoye Managing the Transition to Market Vietnam and China 7 April 1997 - Retired F

Economy 24 April 1997

T.N. Kirway Managing the Transition to Market Vietnam and China 7 April 1997 - Farming Systems M

Economy 24 April 1997

A.Mwenye Managing the Transition to Market Vietnam and China 7 April 1997 - Deceased M

Economy 24 April 1997

E.L.K. Bubelwa Managing the Transition to Market Vietnam and China 7 April 1997 - Retired M

Economy 24 April 1997

P. Mbawala ASIP Preparation Zambia and Mozambique 10 March 1997 - Deputy Minister Agriculture M21 March 1997

T. Mahuwi ASIP Preparation Zambia and Mozambique 10 March 1997 - Retired M21 March 1997

J.F. Bitegeko ASIP Preparation Zambia and Mozambique 10 March 1997 - Director of Policy and Planning F21 March 1997

G.J. Lujuo ASIP Preparation Zambia and Mozambique 10 March 1997 - Retired M21 March 1997

C. Joseph ASIP Preparation Zambia and Mozambique 10 March 1997 - Sector Plans and Budgets F21 March 1997

R.S. Mlay Survey Methodology and Data processing Zambia and Botswana 24 March 1997 - Census Coordinator M11 April 1997

M.P.L. Nsiima Survey Methodology and Data processing Zambia and Botswana 24 March 1997 - Data Base Administrator M11 April 1997

T.L. Nshau Survey Methodology and Data processing Zambia and Botswana 24 March 1997 - Deceased M11 April 1997

W.R. Katunzi Survey Methodology and Data processing Zambia and Botswana 24 March 1997 - Crop Monitoring and Early Warning M

._________ _________ _________ ___ _____ _________ _____ _ 11 A pril 1997 .

E.H. Hezron Survey Methodology and Data processing Zambia and Botswana 24 March 1997 - National Bureau of Statistics M11 April 1997

Table 3. Training - WorkshopsActivities Workshop on Research Methodology and Techniaiues of Report Writing

16-19 February, 25- 28 March and 22-25 April 1996Department/section/ Current Assignment Gender

K.S. Mbufu Marketing Marketing Information ME.C. Kizwalo Policy and Planning Plans and Budgets FF.E. Makongo Policy and Planning Plans and Budgets MF.C.J. Mushi Policy and Planning Resigned MB.K.P. Kalekezi Policy and Planning Agricultural Information (Data Base Unit) MW.E. Swai Policy and Planning Monitoring Unit MP.N. Ndeshilio Policy and Planning Sector Reform and Divestiture MM. Madallali Policy and Planning Retrenched MA. Assey Policy and Planning Monitoring FC.S. Luhindi Policy and Planning Monitoring FE.C. Kimambo Marketing Common Fund for Commodities Project FD.M. Biswalo Policy and Planning Plans and Budget MG. K. Rwiza Policy and Planning Resigned (Agric. Business) FLF. Myvela Policy and Planning Retrenched FA. G. Ngoo Policy and Planning External Assistance Coordination FR.K. Mwinjaka Policy and Planning Ministry of Water and Livestock Development MN.J. Simkanga Policy and Planning Sector Policy FLS. Lugaganya Policy and Planning Ministry of Natural Resources MC.T. Manumbu Marketing Research and Market Information ML. Lyimo Policy and Planning Sector Policy MMbelwa Marketing Research and Market Information F0. Majengo Marketing Regulation and Promotion MD.M. Kinabo Marketing Retired MS.S. Mpaki Policy and Planning Plans and Budget MA.G. Rutihinda Policy and Planning Resigned (Private Sector) MJ.B. Ngwira Policy and Planning Plans and Programmes MM.A. Mwakyembe Policy and Planning Sector Policy MD. Rwezaula Policy and Planning Ministry of Water and Livestock Development ME.N. Ndanshau Policy and Planning Seconded to an Agriculture (NGO) MD.K.S. Gembe Policy and Planning Retired MF. Mhina Crop Department Deceased MP. Hingi Policy and Planning Agricultural Attachee - Tanzania Embassy - Rome FP. Mafuru Irrigation Section Agricultural Economist M

65

Table 3. Training

Workshot on Research Methodolo2v and Techniwues of Report Writing6-19 February, 25-28 March and 22-25 April 1996

._________ Department/Section Current Assignment GenderA. Kajugusi Crop Department Extension MN.E. Ndauka Crop Development Extension MP.J.K. Mziray Livestok Department Resigned - Politics MM. Achayo Policy and Planning Monitoring M0. Sirikwa Policy and Planning Financial Controller - ASMP MH. Chande Livestock Resigned - Private Sector FJ. Mushi Policy and Planning Plans and Budgets MMwakisyala Cooperatives Sector Policy FG.K. Magai Food Security Crop Monitoring and Early WamingM0. Ntikba Food Security Crop Monitoring and Early Warning MA. Ngondo Food Security Head of Department MH. Hongo Food Security Early Warning system M

66

Table 3. Training

First Workshop on Commodity Policy Review1-19 April 1996

__________________Devartment/Section Current Assi2nmentP. Undolle Marketing Research and Market InformationB. Ulaya Policy and Planning Management Information SystemR. Kadigi Marketing Wildlife College MwekaF. Mashamba Marketing Research and Market InformationE. Kimambo Marketing Common Fund for Commodities (CFC)R. Mbelwa Marketing Research and Market InformationK. Mbufu Marketing Regulation and Promotion0. Shuma Policy and Planning Resigned (Private Sector - Consultant)D. Nsherenguzi Policy and Planning Resigned - SWISS - AIDK. Mnenwa Policy and Planning Resigned - Lecturer - University of Sokoine0.0. Lemweli Food Security Food PolicyF.P. Madembwe Policy and Planning Transferred to Local Govermnent Reformn ProgrammeC.D. Bundala Policy and Planning Resigned - NGOF.C. Mushi Policy and Planning Resigned World VisionG. Shange Ministry of Water and Livestock Policy and Planning

DevelopmentM. Mwakyembe Policy and Planning Sector PolicyJ. Shuma Policy and Planning Management Information ServicesJ. Mshana Policy and Planning Sector Reform and DivestitureA. Tax Policy and Planning Resigned - (Private Bank)Mziray Livestock Resigned (Politics)

67

Table 3. Training

Workshop on Re2ional Agricultural Development Planning2-17 May 1996

Department/Section Current Assienment GenderB.G. Njau Marketing Regulation and Promotion MF.B. Machumu Cooperative Development Regional Supervisor (Statistics) MM.E. Mrema Crop Development Regional Supervisor (Agric. Statistics) MM.A. Musa Regional Secretariat Crop Advisor MS.S. Nyoni Crop Development Regional Supervisor (Agric. Statistics) M

Workshop on Regional Agricultural Development Planning2-7 May 1996

Department/Section Current Assienment Gender

R.T.CG. Nkyeganaki Regional Secretariat Crop Advisor MU.A.M. Lyatuu Regional Secretariat Crop Advisor MR.M. Oswald Policy and Planning Census Coordinator MM.S. Nyanda Crop Agric. Stastistics Supervisor MM. Kajimbwa Policy and Planning Crop Advisor MI. Mtabazi Crop Development Deceased MF.M. Tindwa Regional Secretariat Crop Advisor MJ. Maige Crop Development Agric. Stastistics Suspervisor MR. Mfoi Regional Secretariat Deceased MR. Fundi Crop Development Agric. Stastistics Supervisor MD.R. Maruchu Regional Secretariat Crop Advisor ML. S. Nkya Regional Secretariat Crop Advisor MJ.K. Salu Crop Development Extension MG. Masaki Crop Development Extension M

68

Table 3. Training

Second Workshop on Commodity Policy Review, Morogoro24 March-April 1997

Department/Section Current Assignment Gender

J. Mdadila Marketing Department Head of Department MS. Toke Policy and Planning MIS MA. Kiriwagulu Marketing Department Research & Market Information MW. Mwaikambo Policy and Planning External Assistance Coordinator FW. Misanga Policy and Planning Deceased MJ. Kinabo Marketing Department Retired MC. Manumbu Marketing Department Research & Market Information MH. Mwaipyana Marketing Department Retired M0. Majengo Marketing Department Regulation & Promotion ML. Lyimo Policy and Planning Sector Policies ME. Kizwalo Policy and Planning Plans & Budgets MB. Kalekezi Policy and Planning Agric. Information System MN. Ndanshau Policy and Planning NGO (Agric. Advisor) MS.R. Mwinjaka Livestock Department Sector Policy MA. Lamosai Policy and Planning Agric. Sector Programme Suport MC. Wallwa Ministry of Cooperative & Marketing Policy and Planning MK. Kagaruki Ministry of Cooperative & Marketing Policy and Planning M

-W, Swai Policy and Planning Monitoring MP. Ndeshilio Policy and Planning Sector Reform and Divestiture MC. Kalamba Irrigation Irrigation Schemes M

69

Table 3. TrainingWorkshop on Macropolicies

21 July-7 August 1997Department/Section Current Assignment Gender

E. Ndanshau Policy and Planning NGO (Agriculture) MJ. Mawalla Policy and Planning Plans and Budget MN. Simkanga Policy and Planning Sector Policies FC. Tulahi Policy and Planning Sector Policy MK. Mnenwa Policy and Planning Resigned - Lecturer at SUA MJ. Lugaganya Ministry of Natural Resources & Tourism Policy and Planning MJ. Shuma Policy and Planning MIS MM. Ndaba Policy and Planning External Assistance Coordination FD. Nsherenguzi Policy and Planning Resigned - Swiss Aid FL. Lyimo Policy and Planning Sector Policy MI. Kaduma Ministry of Water and Livestock Plans and Budgets M

DevelopmentS. Assey Policy and Planning Monitoring FE. Achayo Policy and Planning Monitoring MF. Madembwe Policy and Planning Local Government Reform Programme MC. Joseph Policy and Planning Plans and Budgets FD. Biswalo Policy and Planning Plans and Budgets MC. Luhindi Policy and Planning Monitoring FJ. Bokella Marketing Department Resigned - Kibo Breweriest Ltd. MS. Toke Policy and Planning MIS M0. Majengo Marketing Department Regulation & Promotion MA.G. Ngoo Policy and Planning External Assistance Coordinationi FLS. Lugaganya Ministry of Natural Resources and 'I'ourism Sector Planning MM.M. Ndimbo Ministry of Water and Livestock Dev. Sector Planning ML.M. Lyimo Policy and Planning Sector Policy MM. J. Ndaba Policy and Planning External Assistance Coordination FJ. Ngwira Policy and Planning Plans and Programmes MM.A.G. Mwakyembe Policy and Planning Sector Policy MLS. Mawalla Policy and Plaining Plans and Budgets M

70

Table 3. Training

Department/Section Current Assi2znment GenderE.C. Kizwalo Policy and Planning Plans and Budgets FMJ. Munisi Policy and Planning Private Sector Development MR.R. Makusi Policy and Planning Agric. Information System MA.H. Simba Crop Development Irrigation MAsurnwisye A.N. Mbwele Crop Development Agric. Inputs and Mechanisation MM.E. Ishumni Ministry of Water & Livestock Sanitary and Phytosanitary Duties M

DevelopmentP.G. Kasuga Cooperatives Cooperatives MH.A. Ulotu Research Departmnent Farming Systems MM. Lyimo Crop Development Mechanisation MW.G. Mgema Crop Development Extension FC.A.A. Sonyi Planning Comrnission Agriculture Sector M

M. Rwenyagira Crop Development Extension MA. Bituro Training Curriculum Development F

S.H. Mangasin Crop Development Extension M

Table 3. TrainingGroup Training in Computer Data Processing and Application

14-26 September 1998

Department/Section Current Assignment Gender

T.L. Nshau Policy and Planning Deceased ME. Mbogoro Policy and Planning Data Base FM.P.L. Nsiima Policy and Planming Data Base MR.S. Mlay Policy and Planning Agric. Census Coordinator MG. Mariki National Bureau of Statistics Agric. Statistics ME. Hezron National Bureau of Statistics Agric. Statistics MG. Gambamala National Bureau of Statistics Agric. Statistics MB. Kalekezi Policy and Planning Agric. Inforrnation System MT. Mwisomba National Bureau of Statistics Agric. Statistics M

71

MAP SECTION

I 30' 32'UG 4'LNQAr-- 33' 38_

L~~~~ ~~~ ~~~~~ La 'S I YN> 'Xak VIIAJR

~Akoba

RWANDA , KAG MSGA KENYA

BU < RUKY NDI

hiny-ngN \tro=

The ooundrJries rolors HINYAy Ma-_ . R. ra KILIMNAR

,k,, 5, of 4 5 0 AOMA "I", 4

NVERS REGION BOUNDARIES )STabora T SNngidA

DIEM~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I

other informationsnINGIDA R

The World Bank Group,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~te r

an 0ugmn o00 the legal-

or nany endoremen h 3

The ondaries. ir,M CAdenomntos'n n

of on, ri10 00, ',

bo.ndories. TANZANIA L~~~~~~~~ZAM inUi

31 AI36 3OAD REIN-AITL