Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No. 7042

.

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

RWANDA

BUGESERA EAST, GISAKA/MIGONGO MIXED FARMINGAND RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(CREDIT 668-RW)

December 11, 1987

.

Afeica Regional Office

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Currency Unit Rwandese F (RwF)US$1.00 = RwF 92.84RwF 100 - US$1.08

This exchange rate prevailed throughout the projectimplementation period.

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

Metric System

ABBREVIATIONS

AIDR Association Internationale de Developpement RuralBADEA Banque Arabe pour le Developpement Economique en AfriqueBGM Bugesera East, Gisaka/Migongo ProjectCFZV Centre de Formation Zootechnique et Veterinaire de

RubiliziERR Economic Rate of ReturnFAC Fonds d'Aide et de CooperationIAMSEA Institut africain et malgache de Statistiques

economiques appliqueesIEMVT Institut d'elevage et de medecine veterinaire des Pays

tropicauxISAR Institut des Sciences agronomiques du RwandaOBM Office de Bugesera MayagaOVAPAM Office pour la Valorisation Pastorale et Agricole du

MutaraOED Operations Evaluation DepartmentOPROVIA Office National pour le Developpement et la

Commercialisation des produits vivriers et productionsanimales (Development and Marketing organization)

PAV Poste Agro VeterinairePCC Project Coordination CommitteePCR Project Completion ReportPPAM Project Performance Audit MemorandumPPAR Project Performance Audit ReportSAR Staff Appraisal ReportSSS Service des Semences silectionniee (Selected Seed

Service)UNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeWHO World Health Organization

FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER

Government of Rwanda : January 1 to December 31

FME ONU L L OLYTHE WORLD BANK

Wasetoee. D.C. 20433U.S.A.

MC* dw OWctM4mai~ ~Opeae.m Ivabamiuw

December 11, 1987

MDOR^ANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AMD THM PRMSIDENT

SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Rendas lugeuers E.tIOicuka-Migongo Mixed rarming and Rural Development Project(Credlt 668-RW)

Attached. for Lnformatlon, La a copy of the report entltledOproject Completion Reports Rwanda Buggier. east/Gleaka-Migongo Mlxedfarming and Rural Deielopment Project (Credit 668-RW) I prepared bythe Africa RegLonal OffLce. further evaluation of thli project by theOperation* Evaluation Department ha not been made.

Attachment

This document has a resuitod ditributlo and may be used by eciplents io the pOrfopufmamof their ofimcial dute Its contents may not otherwis be disclod without World l1hk autoutioon.

FOR OF0CIAL US ONLY

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

AWANDA

BUGESERA EAST, GISAKA/MIGONGO MIXED FARMINGAND RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(CREDIT 668-RW)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

Preface ................................... *....*..********* iBasic Data She-t ......... . .............................. **** i4Evaluation S-mary .... .................................. iii

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

I. Background ............ ............................. 1II. Project Identification, Preparation and Appraisal .. 3

III. Project Implemontation ............................. 7IV. Project Impact ..................................... 20V. Project Bonefits ................................ . 28VI. Institutional Performance and Development .......... 29

VII. Bank Performance ......... .......................... 54VIII. Conclusions and Outstanding Issues ................. 60

Annex It Project Cost Data ................................. 37Annex 2: Ts-ts* Eradication in the Gisaka/Migongo Region ... 47Annex 3: Summary of Key Indicators ......................... 51Annex 4: Appraisal Estimates and Actual Disbursements ...... 54Annex 5: Assumptions for Calculations of Prod. Increase .... 57Annez 6: Economic Benefits ................................. 61

Chart lt Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Forestry ... 65Chart 2: Project Organization Chart ........ ................ 66

Maps: IBRD Nos. 164081596119475(PCR)19454(PCR)19474(PCR)

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authozation.

PROJECT CQMPLETION REPORT

RWANDA

BUGESERA EAST, GISAKA/MIGONGO MIXED FARMINGAND RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(CREDIT 668-RW)

PREFACE

This is a Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Bugesera East,Gisaka/Migongo Mixed Farming and Rural Development Project in Rwanda, forwhich Credit 668-RW, for US$14.0 million, was approved in December 1976.The credit was fully disbursed in November 1982; the original closing datewas September 30, 1982.

The PCR was prepared by staff of the Eastern Africa RegionalOffice, now a part of the Africa Regional Office, and a consultant, on thebasis of a review of the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) No. 1222-RW datedNovember 17, 1976, the President's Report, the Credit Agreement andproject files, and interviews with Bank staff associated with the projectand Borrower representatives, and a specific mission to review the projectexperience. It was specifically reviewed in conjunction with appraisal ofthe follow-on project (BGM II, approved in July 1982).

The PCR wao submitted to OED on December 19, 1985. The report wasnot selected for audit by vED. The draft report was sent to the Borrowerfor comments on October 2, 1987; however, no comments were received.

The valuable assistance provided during the preparation of thisreport by Borrower representatives and Bank staff interviewed is gratefullyacknowledged.

=1s A 3S?A G!8&AJIMOO KIM PAMAM IIIL DhVLO T FDJW

(Ctrit 868-Mi)

BASIC DATA 31

ZT PRoJZCT DATA Appraea1 Actal or Actual as I ofXtat_t rAztI Actua rLlm r,tmt

Total project coest (US$ mdllon) a 13 a7.a IoIDA Credit AmOunt (US$ mllio0) 14 0 1/ 14.0 100Date Physical Componente Completod 12/3171i 12/31/82 120Proportion then completed (2) 100 50-60 50-60Econouic Rate of UAturn (2) 32 2/ 5 13-20xastitutional Performance FairTechnical Perfotinte MidNumber of Direct 5"nficierieo (77-82) 150,000 200,000 133Date of Board Approvl 12/14/76Date of Credit Zffectivee 06/30177 11/23/77Closing Date 09/30/82 09/30/82

CUIEI.ATIV DISSWUUSUS FY77 na nT79 n80O FT81 m2 FT83

Appraieal etimteo (US$ mllion) 0.5 2.0 *.0 7.0 11.0 13.5 14.0 (by 09/30/62)Actual (US$ million) - 0.83 3.73 7.24 11.41 13.45 14.0 (by 11/31/82)ACt"al As 2 nf Vtete 41 94 103 104 99.6 100

SIS WAO DATASent Ibth fi. of Speciealtetion san trformancoe Typs of

It_T- Pereone rpratented VeeiS ratios Tr! d Ipbl_

3/ LI 2/ 6Identifieation HQ/RNZA 07/74 4 A, C, L 6.0Preparation HQ/RMEA 0-49/74 1 2A, . L, A 9.0

gm1 04/73 1 A 0.9Appr: val IQ/R(ZA 05/73 3 A, L, b 6.9Post V~praieal HQ 11/75 1 A,9 1.

HQ 05/76 1.0

26.8

Supervlston I ram 03/77 1 A 1 2 - 0

- 2 - 6/77 i A 0.3 - --

* 3 0 10/77 1 A 0.9 - O- 4 Ot0/78 I A 0.7 1 1 0

5 ' 08/78 1 A 1.4 1 2 I P

- 6 - 12/75-06/79 /74 A, n, PA, 3.2 2 2 NV- 0-/7 2 A.1 3.4 2 2 MV

a- 8 ~ 03/60 1 a 1.8 ---

- - ~~~~~~06/SO 2 A.9 1.4 2 2 TN

- 109 11-12/60 2 A,S 2.8 2 2 T 1- 103/1 2 A,a 4.0 2 3 N T

-11 * ~~~~~05/82 1 A 09 2 2 N TTotal A.Compietion mm 01-02/83 2 L. a 5.0TOTAL 53.6

OTHER PROJECT DATA

Borrower Government of RuwndaExecuting Agency Niniotry of Agriculture, LiUvtock d Forestry (through project unit)Follow-on Project Bugesera/Gieaka-NiSono Rural Services - Phaae tX (SQ XI)Credit Number 1283-31Amount (US$ milliOn) US$16.3 million

* Credit Agreement Data Septmber 28, 1982

-~~~~__ *. -~. m. *ep.eImi 4.4 £6.1 8.5 - - - 3.

"10618eIe 14.1 - - - - - - - - U.3

"W e - - 3.8 1.3 1.6 3.0 IS .6 3.8 U. 3.3 R.6 I.I

ew - - 6.2 8. - .

T_I a.4 10.1 21.$ 3. U. u. .S. 1 .s Me u.s 18.8 u.s 2.* Ue.

I/ Cofinetcing tnitially involved Kingdos of Se4gium (U$ million n.9) and SADIA

(US6 million 3.0)2/ Calculated on directly productive elemnt only.P A - agronodit; L - Liv.otock Specialiet; VA - Financial Analyst; C - Agricultural conomsit

*/ 1 - problm free or minor problsm; 2 - mderate problem; 3 * major problaeT I Improving; 2 * stationary; 3 DeterioratingTI * Financial; N W Managerial; T - Technical; 0 - other1 Several icione spread over 6 mthe - evrap.

Oi ne repert c ring twe tee ieeloe.

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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

RWANDA

BUGESERA EAST, GISAKA/HIGONGO MIXED FARMINGAND RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(Credit 668-RW)

EVALUATION SUMMARY

Introduction

The Bugesera East, Gisaka/Migongo Mixed Farming and Rural Develop-ment Project was IDA's third agricultural operation in Rwanda. The projectwas identified in conjunction with discussions of the 1974 economic report,which focused on the need for integrated rural development programs to spureconomic d-velopment. It was prepared jointly by IDA missions and govern-ment staff. A combined preparation/appraisal effort was launched in May1975 and was followed by a series of post-appraisal discussions on projectdasign, and particularly implementation arrangements. The Credit wasapproved in December 1976 and signed in March 1977; a PPF advance wasprovided for start-up work.

Oblectives

The project was designed to support a broad range of developmentactivities in southeastern Rwanda, building on the foundation of priordevelopment schemes in the area. Dual objectives were to develop sparselypopulated areas opened up by tsetse eradication and to build rural servicesand infrastructure in a wider area. Explicit project objectives were towork through existing government institutions, including local governmententities, and to foster training of project staff and farmers. Incrementalcrop production was estimated at about 25,000 tons in year 10, plus signif-icant increases in milk and beef production. The economic rate of returnwas estimated at about 322 on production-related components. There wasspecific recognition that this ws an operation entailing substantialrisks, given institutional weaknesses in the agricultural sector in Rwanda.The project was noteworthy in its focus on a strong annual planning tooland the explicit recognition that the program would be modified in linewith experience gained.

Implementation Experience

The implementation record was mixed. The protracted preparation/appraisal process involved successive discussions of key issues to ensurefull government commitment to the project. The delays were well worthwhileand led to a good dialogue on important policy and institutional issues.It is striking that the project was implemented roughly on schedule, withdisbursements in line with estimates. Project management was smooth inmany respects, down to timely submission of reports and audited accounts.

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There were, however, some fundamental problems. Instead of a small manage-ment apparatus, relying essentially on existing services, closely linked tolocal authorities (as desired and planned by IDA and the Government), alarge, autonomous project unit emerged, and little effort was made toinvolve local authorities and cooperatives in management. Much more wasspent on infrastructure and equipment than planned, with very limited costrecovery. The flexibility built into the project through the annual plan-ning mechanism was indeed essential, as policies and general circumstanceschanged markedly over the implementation period, but neither the Governmentnor IDA used the tools well to ensure that basic objectives and principleswere adhered to along the way. The result was that, at the close of wh.atwas always seen as the first phase of a long-term program, both the Govern-ment and IDA came face to face with serious problems on where to go next,because the level of development and related operating costs was plainlyneither sustainable with Rwanda's financial resources nor replicable else-where in Rwanda on any significant scale. The result was a painful pruningprocess; this can be seen as the practical start of an important policychange in Rwanda, away from area-based, integrated rural development proj-ects, implemented with relative autonomy (like this project), towards amore clearly articulated national framework for developing services andinvestments for agriculture.

Cofinancing arrangements which changed sub)stantially complicatedthe task of implementation. Apart from heightening uncertainties on plansand management arrangements, the need to revamp the financing plan requiredheavy inputs by project, government, and IDA staff during the initialstart-up period, when attention to basic issues of institutional design andplans was most needed. Difficulties in working out clear responsibilitieswithin the project management team heightened tensions between expatriateand local managers and within the technical assistance team. Excessiveadministrative centralization, poor extension-research linkages, and uncer-tain input supply services were other problems. In contrast, substantialtraining efforts were undertaken and will have lasting benefits.

Results

There were important achievements, though well short of appraisalestimates, in terms of agricultural and livestock production, institutionaldevelopment, and economic returns. Infrastructure development was substan-tial and generally impressive, although less than planned, notably forroads. There were, however, the problems with inappropriate design andpoor quality construction. The poor record of project ranches and cattlemarketing helped convince the Government that extensive beef production haspoor prospects in Rwanda. The cow stall-feeding (fermette) system wasadopted slowly, but is picking up now and opens the way for important andvery beneficial changes in farming systems. While crop and livestockextension activities started slowly and not systematically enough, success-ful project activities included erosion control, distribution of forestryand fruit tree seedlings, and rapid development of vegetable production.Agricultural credit, marketing and input efforts were disappointing becauseof management and technical shortcomings and be-ause of insufficient atten-

tlon to cost recovery. Increments in production were too small to justifyproject costs. Many unit costs were higher than expected (materials andequipment, local salaries, and farm inputs). Actual project costs wereUS$25 million or 116S of appraisal estimates and government financing washigher than anticipated. The economic rate of return estimated at projectcompletion is 5Z. This must be qualified, however, as the project was thevital first step in a long-term program whose results are not fully known.The BGM I and II projects viewed together may have a better rate of returrthen the first taken alone.

Sustainabilitv

The project experience leaves numerous issues for the follow-upBGM II project to deal with. Many are addressed in that project's design(lower costs, less staff, more decentralized focus on extension andresearch). Some problems, however, continued into the second-phaseproject, including: (i) over-designed infrastructure relative to theregion's productive capacity, resulting in poorly operated end maintainedstructures; (ii) an unsustainable project management structure, including alarge staff end excessively high operating costaS (iii) a work programwhich relies too much on central project management with very little feed-back from producers; (iv) insufficient analysis and knowledge of localfarming end social constraints; end (v) a lack of agricultural researchbackup. It has become too clear, in the course of implementation of BGM11, that special efforts were needed to simplify design, to tailor agricul-tural se*rices to specific environment end farming needs, and to streamlineorganization and mAnagement. These efforts are presently underway.

Findinzs and Lessons

The project experience suggests several lessons, which are ofparticular interest because many are common to area-based integrated ruraldevelopment projects:

(a) The appraisal V=ocess was protracted and involved a series ofmissions and discussions with the Government. The primary objec-tive of this process, which was deliberately planned, was toensure full government cowuitment to the project and to awaitgovernment decisions on key issues, notably implementationarrangements. The process worked quite well in focusing policymakers' attention on the project (paras. 2.04-2.18) and in over-coming problems from insufficient government involvement earlier(see (h) below);

(b) The project was designed with considerable flexibility; annualmlplementation plans were to be agreed upon by the Government and

IDA, and it was expected that these would reflect experiencegained and depart substantially from appraisal estimates. Thesystem showed great promise, but did not work as well as it shouldhave because of insufficient attention to it from the Governmentand IDA. Special efforts were called for to ensure that key proj-

- vi -

ect objectives remained constantly in view and to test continuallythe sustainability of actions undertaken (paras. 2.24, 6.03 and7.04);

(c) This was one of the Region's first instances of use of the ProiectPreparation Facility. It proved a lightly effective way to speedstart-up and sustain momentum between appraisal and implementation(paras. 2.14, 3.02). A PPF also smoothed the transition betweenthe first and second projects (para. 8.01);

(d) Even though the project was conceived as an integrated developmentproject, it included too many components. Non-agricultural activ-ities should have been postponed or assigned to other institu-tions. This would have allowed project staff, who came under theMinistry of Agriculture, to concentrate on agriculture and live-stock development activities (the project's chief objective)rather than on other areas (paras. 2.18, 7.04);

(e) Co-financing arrangements came unstuck after approval and theresulting uncertainties and changes seriously perturbed projectimplementation. Coordination arrangements for the key work pro-gram exercise were not worked out in sufficient detail. Numerousco-financier meetings during implementation monopolized time andattention of project and supervision staff (paras. 3.03-3.06);

(f) A more thorough and realistic assessment at appraisal of recurrentcosts and mechanisms for cost recovery, including analysis ofprospects for sustainability of activities and services, mighthave brought home the vital importance of these issues earlier.More specific policy agreements should have been negotiated andapplied. Notwithstanding, these issues need to be addressed pri-marily in the context of a broader sector dialogue between theGovernment and the Bank, which had hardly gotten underway whenthis project was designed, but is now far advanced (paras. 3.40,7 06);

(g) Key decisions on the institutional framework for a project mustplainly be made by the Government (as was indeed the case in thisproject), but with special attention to financial sustainabilityissues. Appraisal agreements called for reliance on existinginstitutions and farmers' groups but this objective was largelyforgotten. The project unit became a large autonomous bureaucracyseen as a foreign providential source of finance by localauthorities (paras. 2.07, 2.12, 3.11-3.12, 8.03);

(h) The lack of sustained Rwanlese official involvement in proiectidentification and preparation posed serious problems of govern-ment commitment and placed too much onus on Bank missions to pro-pose specific project ideas. This is an appropriate area for theBank to insist on full government involvement (paras. 2.02, 2.18,7.02);

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(i) The technical data base for this project was weak, and even avail-able documentation (maps, descriptive reports, statistics) werenot fully communicated to project staff. More attention tospecific arrangements for plugging information gaps was needed;

(j) Although supervision time spent was, as anticipated, relativelyhigh, substantial time went to resolving cofinancing problems, andthe conclusion is that more intensive supervision, wvll timed andincluding a wider mix of expertise, would have been beneficial.The experience demonstrates clearly that a flexible project designcalls for greater inputs by IDA and the Government during imple-mentation. Areas where more supervision could have helped were:problems of agricultural extension, training, monitoring and eval-uation, cost recovery, and input supply. Project supervisionexperience could have heen used earlier as a springboard to abroad-based sector dialogue in many areas (paras. 7.05-7.06);

(k) Technical assistance was critical, but arrangements posed impor-tant problems. This experience underscores the difficulties inusing technical assistance well. Expatriate technical assistantsare rarely well accepted in managerial positions and the record oftraining and motivating local staff was disappointing. They wereoften underutilized when assigned as local manager counterparts oradvisors. One conclusion is that frequent short-term consultan-ciaS seem preferable to permanent expatriate positions in manyinstances. Much effort was fruitlessly expended in sorting outresponsibilities within the project management team. Lines ofcommand and terms of reference for staff at all levels need to beclearly defined at the outset and clearly communicated to individ-uals. Vigorous follow-up is also needed (paras. 3.05, 3.08-3.09).An important achievement was that at project completion Rwandesestaff held all project management positions (para. 8.02);

(1) Attention to extension systems and research-extension linkages wasinsufficient. Specific attention to linkages with agriculturalresearch are critical for a project like this whose successdepends on strong extension themes adapted to the area in ques-tion. The preferred solution is to rely on a solid nationalresearch program, but in a case like this (the national researchwas on a rapidly descending slope during implementation), a welldesigned research component is essential (paras. 3.21, 8.03);

(m) The tsetse eradication component was problematic and its outcomegenerally disappointing, pointing to the need for a regional(i.e., international) approach to the problem and special atten-tion to environmental implications (para. 3.17, Annex 2). Incontrast, the experience with soil erosion control and rurala afforestation gives some grounds for optimism that progress can beachieved (paras. 3.30, 4.05, 5.04).

RWANDA

BUGESERA EAST/GISAKA-MIGONGO MIXED FARMINGAND RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(Cr. 668-RW)

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

I, BACKGROUND

1.01 The Bugesera Gisaka/Migongo Project experience was heavily coloredby Rwanda's physical and economic situation. Rwanda's small size (26,000km2 ), dense population (which increased from 160 inhabitants per km2 in1973 to 210 in 1983), heavy preponderence of rural population (95%), andpoverty (per capita income now estimated at US$ 210) posed particularlydifficult development challenges. At the time the project was identifiedand prepared there was deep concern, within the Government and the Bank,about the tight grip of poverty, and gloom about medium and long-termdevelopment prospects. This was a period when Rwanda's physical isolationwas accentuated by enormous transportation difficulties through Uganda.The inexorable pressure of population on scarce land resources had emergedas the number one development problem.

1.02 Agriculture contributed 65% of GDP and 65% of export earnings in1973 (respectively 46% and 79% after 1980). Cultivated land representedabout 38% of the total area with 33% of the land covered with naturalpasture. Some 95% of cultivated land was allocated to food crops and theremainder to marketable crops, mainly for export (coffee, tea andpyrethrum). Although Rwanda produced most of its food requirements innormal years, food imports to satisfy urban demand weighed quite heavilyon the balance of payments (13% of total import volume in 1972).Production and farming systems throughout Rwanda (including the projectarea) have changed little over the life of the project. These were (andstill are) based on small family holdings, averaging about one hectare,often scattered over several small plots, there are virtually no largefarms. Farm size varies according to natural conditions, with thelargest units generally located in the less productive areas. Farm laboris provided almost exclusively by family members. Average rural familyearnings are estimated at less than US$ 70 per year, with about 25% incash. On-farm production is remarkably diversified, with a wide varietyof crops cultivated for family consumption or for sale, either as purecrops or in complex crop associations. Agricultural activities are oftencomplemented with livestock raising, bee-keeping, fishing and other localactivities.

1.03 Performance of the agricultural sector during the yearspreceeding the project was uneven, with an average rate of growth ofagricqltural value added estimated at 3.2% a year during the period196971974. This kept pace with the 3% or more yearly increase inpopulation. Public services such as agricultural extension, ruralinfrastructure, and social services were generally very limited in rural

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areas. Rwanda's second development plan, under preparation in 1974,devoted much attention to rural development. This was supported by theBank which stressed, in its 1974 economic report, that a nationwide ruraldevelopment effort was needed, guided by central Government ministries.The report specifically recommended decentralization of decision-making tolocal levels in order to involve farmers in the development effort.

1.04 The Bugesera East/Gisaka-Migongo Mixed Farming and RuralDevelopment Project (known as the BGM Project) was the third IDA creditfor agriculture and rural development in Rwanda. A USS 3.8 million credit(Cr 439-RW) had been approved in 1973 for livestock development andpopulation settlement in the Mutara area ir. the north-east. This projectfaced difficult implementation problems, which were at their height at thetime the BGM project was being prepared. A Cinchona Development Project(Cr. 656-RW for US$ 1.8 million) was approved in 1976; it had had a longand protracted history, as it was initially designed to support coffee andtea. It was approved immediately prior to the BGM project. At present,total IDA lending for agriculture in Rwanda, since its inception, standsat US$ 91.4 million. Projects approved after the BGM project include: (i)a follow on project in the Mutara area (Credit 937-RW for USS 8.8 millionapproved in 1979), (ii) the second phase Bugesera and Gisaka-Migongoproject (Credit 1283-RW for US$ 16.5 million approved in 1983); (iii) an.ntegrated forestry/livestock project (Credit 1039-RW for US$ 21 millionapproved in 1981); (iv) the Lake Kivu Coffee and Food Crops Project (Cr.'126-RW for US$ 15.0 million, approved in 1981), and (v) a nationalagricultural research project (Cr.1546-RW for USS 11.5 million, signed inearly 1985). The Gitarama/Ministry of Agriculture InstitutionalDevelopment Project is at negotiation stage.

1.05 The BGM project area includes two quite distinct zones: theeastern part of the Bugesera region, about 65,000 ha south of Kigali, andthe Gisaka-Migongo region in Kibungo prefecture in south-easternRwanda, with an area of about 170,000 ha (see map). These two zones arepart of the eastern lowlands of Rwanda (less than 1,500m elevation onaverage) and have relatively low rainfall (less than 1,000 mm) compared toother parts of the country. This partly explains why population densitywas lower than elsewhere in Rwanda, and why agricultural development hadbeen slower than in better favored areas. Services were virtuallynon-existent there. Parts of the region had large expanses of naturalpastures. Project area population, estimated at about 150,000, wasincreasing rapidly, primarily because people were migrating from othermore densely populated regions of Rwanda. The project area as defined atappraisal included two communes (Gashora and Ngenda) and part of a thirdcommune (Kanzenze) in the Bugesera region, and three communes (Birenga,Rukira and Rusumo) in the Gisaka-Migongo region. It was expanded in 1979,at the Government's request, to cover all Kanzenze commune.

'1.06 There had been substantial development efforts in the projectarea. Much of the project area was, in the 1960's, heavily infested bytse-tse flies. These zones lay principally along the Akagera river andother low lying areas. They were barely accessible (hiking was the onlyaccess to some areas at the time of appraisal). A successful tse-tseeradication operation was carried out in 1968/69 in Bugesera, followed byintensive settlement and rural development schemes. Although the

principal project effort, through the OBM (Office de Bugesera Mayaga) hadmany successes to its credit, including several thriving cooperatives,external financing had ceased by the time of appraisal and there was muchuncertainty on its future. A tse-tse control and rural developmentproject in the Rusumo basin (in the Akagera Valley) financed by Belgianbilateral aid had demonstrated that this area also had considerabledevelopment potential, for livestock and agriculture. Despite thecontinuing presence of tse-tse flies in most of Akagera valley and droughtrisks, the intense pressure on land elsewhere in Rwanda had led, from theearly 1970's, to a rapid population influx into the project area. By1975, some parts were already entirely occupied, despite the total absenceof infrastructure and services. The International Association for RuralDevelopment (AIDR), a non-profit Belgian organization, had undertaken alimited rural development project based on "animation" (mobilization andorganization of people for development) around Rusumo at the southeasterntip of Rwanda. Here also, there were many positive signs, includingsuccessful precooperatives and evidence that the population could andwould contribute to development efforts, The major problems were thatdevelopment support was partial and was not institutionalized, andexternal financing was at an end. Despite these past and on-goingprojects, thi whole of the Bugesera-East area, the Akagera Valley, andneighboring highlands remained at a very low level of development, even bythe standards of Rwanda.

II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION. PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL

A. Identification and Preparation

2.01 Possible IDA financing for an agricultural project in southeasternRwanda was first considered formally in 1974, during discussions on thedraft Bank economic report, which stressed integrated rural development(para 1.03). An RMEA agricultural project identification mission visitedRwanda in July 1974. Following field visits and various meetings, twomain project ideas were identified and discussed: () a settlement/mixed-farming project in the south-east; and (ii) development andimprovement of high altitude crops (coffee, cinchona and wheat) andconstruction of a tea factory in the west. The settlement/mixed-farmingproject was designed to support orderly settlement of 4,000 families intse-tse infested areas in Kibungo Province, and of 1,000 families in theBugesera area. Following tse-tse eradication, economic and socialinfrastructure were to be provided for a total of 11,000 families.Agricultural development was to be based on raising livestock for meat andmilk production, within a system of mixed farming. The project was alsoto provide for training of cooperative managers and marketing, storage,aad processing facilities. Total investment costs were estimated at USS5.5 million. Discussions on the second project idea proceeded separatelyand with difficulty, culminating eventually in the Cinchona Project,approved by IDA in 1976.

2.02 Preparation work was essentially carried out by Bank staff(led by the Nairobi regional mission, with support from headquartersstaff). Three consecutive, short missions were the focal point ofpreparatory work, between August 1974 and April 1975. The projectproposal was based on technical studies prepared by technical assistantsworking in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rwanda's Agricultural Research

Institute (ISAR). A soil survey and a water resources inventory were alsocarried out by ISAR and AIDR with IDA financing (under the MutaraProject). The settlement proposals were based on the extensive experiencewith "paysannat" settlements in Rwanda, dating back to the late 1950's,and, as presented to IDA, differed little from the general model. Therewere paysannat schemes on-going in both the Kibongo and Bugesera areas(para 1.06).

2.03 At the time of appraisal, the project concept was relativelycomplex, with ten quite distinct components. The heart of the proposal,however, was settlement schemes in areas along the Akegera River whichwere to be opened up by tse-tse fly eradication. The emphasis was onlivestock development as the technical basis for the settlement schemes.Two small commercial ranches were also to be developed, one building on anexisting livestock station at Rusumo managed by AIDR, another on amilitary reservation in Bugesera. Substantial investments forinfrastructure were proposed, particularly access roads and human watersupply. Project costs were estimated, quite tentatively, at USS10.0million. Institutional aspects had not been worked out in any detail; thetentative Government proposal was to create a special authority to managethe project along the lines of OVAPAM which was implementing theIDA-financed Mutara Project. The only major project issue discussed withthe Government during preparation was the extent of the proposed tse-tseeradication program.

B. Appraisal to Credit Effectiveness

2.04 Because a wide variety of existing surveys and on-going pilotdevelopment efforts had been undertaken in the project area, no formalpreparation report was prepared. IDA decided nonetheless to proceeddirectly to a combined preparation and appraisal mission. This decisionwas partly linked to the parallel experience of preparing and appraisingan export crop pro'ect, which encountered serious difficulties andheightened tensions in IDA/Government relations (IDA had declined toconsider financing of tea, and the Government had raised serious doubtsabout coffee development proposals at a late stage of projectprocessing). There was thus some impetus to move expeditiously from talkand study to action. The preparation/appraisal mission, composed of threeBank staff members, visited Rwanda in May 1975. Bank group financing hadbeen formally requested in a cable from the Minister of Finance andEconomy dated April 29, 1975.

2.05 The mission raised some fundamental issues which called for afundamental redefinition of the project's objectives and scope. This inturn necessitated substantial additional planning of investments andraised issues of basic policy on the role of rural institutions. Theinitial project focus had been settlement in the project area (followingtse-tse control) of families from over-populated parts of Rwanda anddevelopment of basic infrastructure for mixed farming and ruraldevelopment. The mission, however, became convinced that previousassumptions that tse-tse fly infestation had largely precluded settlementin the project area werj incorrect. Most parts of the project area werethus unsuitable for organized settlement programs mainly because they werealready substantially populated and being farmed. Further, agriculturalpotential of the area was better than previously supposed, while

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possibilities for extensive livestock raising were rather restricted. Themission concluded that the focus of development had to be on mixedfarming, promoting integration of livestock with cropping to the greatestextent possible; the project should be viewed as a broadly-based ruraldevelopment program, assisting population already in the area and alimited number of new settlers who would come spontaneously, under anyscenario. The primary emphasis had to be on development of basic ruralinfrastructure (roads, water supply, community centers, schools and healthcenters), development of essential rural services (notably extensionservices for crops and livestock), and on providing agricultural inputs.

2.06 The institutional issue proved even more thorny than anticipated.The Government was clearly not fully convinced of the need for anautonomous project management authority, although they had formallyproposed it. At that time there was a general uncertainty in Rwanda onnational policies for development of rural institutions, and conflictingopinions were expressed by different individuals or agencies. The debateturned around the role of local government institutions (prefecture andcommune levels), autonomous regional development parastatals, andcentral Government services.

2.07 The mission was particularly concerned as to whether there wasclear Government commitment to the project. It became apparent that noRwandese official had participated consistently or completely in detailedproject preparation. Despite meetings and discussions held duringpreparation missions, few Government officials fully appreciated thedetails of project proposals. The problem wias aggravated by the fact thatsubstantial alterations both in project concept and in the design ofindividual project components were proposed a. the appraisal stage. Themission therefore concluded that special efforts were called for to ensurethat Rwandese officials careru iy consiaerea ail aspects or the prolectand made specific decisions as to how outstandi3g issues were to beresolved. The mission's approach was to define options and seekGovernment decisions. On the key issue of project organization andimplementation, five alternatives were outlined:

(a) direct implementation by Government of Rwanda departments,coordinated by a small project unit and coordinationcommittee;

(b) project responsibility assumed by existing regionalparastatal organizations (OVAPAM and OBM), with statutesmodified so they could function in the project area;

(c) establishment of a new national parastatal organization forfood crop and livestock production, marketing andprocessing (this was already under consideration by thePresidency and, during the appraisal period, OPROV,A wasestablished - para 3.13);

(d) implementation by a new parastatal authority to be createdexpressly for the project; or

(e) implementation by one or more decentralized regionaldevelopment authorities.

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2.08 The mission also emphasized the need to clarify policies ondevelopment of agricultural extension services throughout Rwanda, trainingof intermediate level staff, and coordination at field level of extensionprograms for commercial crops, foodcrops and livestock, as there was muchuncertainty in all these areas. In addition, settlement policies, were atthat time in some disarray (for example scope for more paysannat schemesand arrangements for cost recovery). Alternative approaches then underdiscussion included: (a) organizing farmers into formal settlementprograms; (b) development of village organizations and new villages; or(c) provision of infrastructure to existing settlements, witl-out formaldemarcation of settlement plots.

2.09 Livestock proposals for the project proved particularlyproblematic. Tse-tse fly eradication was effectively a precondition formany project proposals. Shortly before the appraisal mission, a financingagreement betweaen the Belgian and Rwandese Governments had been concludedfor a tse-tse eradication campaign in the Akegera Valley. Clearcoordination arrangements with the Belgian tse-tse control project werethus essential. Secondly, a proposal, first advanced during thepreparation/appraisal mission, to establish a cattle ranch near theAkagera Lakes (see map) posed other issues. The objective was to occupyareas temporarily with a ranch, after tse-tse eradication, to detersettlement while studies were undertaken to prepare a development plan forthe area. The mission found this proposal interesting, but details hadnot been worked out and the scheme seemed particularly risky. The secondranch was also tricky as it was to be developed on a military reservation;the mission recommended strict conditions ott management. General issuesof livestock policy clearly needed further government review, as did theorganization of veterinary services. There was still considerableoptimism that Rwanda could export cattle and beef, but new uncertaintieswere emerging on markets including the role of a brand new parastatal,OPROVIA.

2.10 O:her troublesome issues involved immediate and potential linkagesbetween project activities and some proposed developments then takingshape in the context of the UNDP-financed Kagera River Basin DevelopmentStudies (a far-ranging regional study program covering most of Rwanda andBurundi and part of Tanzania.) The appraisal mission was told thatproject proposals would not run counter to any scheme likely to beforthcoming from these regional studies, but two matters plainly meritedcontinued attention. The first was regional control of tse-tse fly (i.e.covering Tanzania and Burundi) which WHO officials considered essential toreduce the risk of reinfestation. The mission concluded that tse-tsecontrol in a circumscribed area was justified since it seemed highlyunlikely that an international cooperative effort would be mounted for along time, and there were reasonably good natural barriers around thearea (surrounding highlands and the Akegera River). Second, it seemedprobable that a hydroelectric power plant proposed for Rusumo Falls wouldcause flooding of parts of the project area. The mission concluded,nonetheless, that it was unlikely, for technical, financial and politicalreasons, that this scheme would materialize.

2.11 The mission's issues paper set out these problems and proposed aprocess to ensure that the Government was given more time to review theproject. The mission recommended that the draft appraisal report

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summarize problems and outline alternative solutions where there wereoutstanding issues and where decisions by the Government were required.After appropriate clearances within the Bank, the report was to be sent tothe Government. IDA would mount an appraisal follow-up mission when theGovernment was ready. The mission also recommended that two guidingprinciples be adhered to: (a) because the project could not be successfulwithout full and explicit Government support, the first criterion indetermining which alternative course of action to pursue should be the

* Government's preferred option; and (b) since the project had to rely on-Government institutions and had to be attune to changes in policy, themission recommended that project design be sufficiently flexitle to permitadaptation to changing circumstances. After considerable internaldiscussion, IDA management supported the mission's recomendations,including those on the post appraisal process.

2.12 The draft appraisal report was transmitted to the Government inearly December 1975. The Government's comments on the yellow-coverappraisal report were received in April 1976 and discussed during a postappraisal mission in early May 1976. This mission also discussed variousco-financing possibilities (BADEA, Belgian aid, and FAC) which had arisenfollowing the preparation/appraisal mission. The Government's commentsfocused on project organization and the financing plan:

, (a) The Government decided that the project should beImplemented through a coordinating committee and amanagement committee, making maximum use of existinginstitutions and staff and of producer cooperatives;

(b) The Government agreed to all other implementationprocedures, including the level of technical assistance (9expatriates) but questionned the recruitment proceduresproposed (one single firm to provide all needs);

(c) the Government informed the mission that the BelgianGovernment had agreed to finance tse-tse eradication andRusumo breeding station. The Government had also approachedthe French Government for possible assistance. Finally,BADEA had agreed to finance US$5 million of project costs;

(d) the Government requested that additional investments for apumped water supply system (estimated at US$1.5 million)for East Bugesera be financed under the project; and

(e) the Government agreed to most proposed credit conditions,-. including that annual disbursements be conditional on.3 A approval of an annual budget and work program.

2.13 BADEA parallel financing for the project was confirmed during thepost appraisal mission: BADEA was to finance the water supply program,pilot irrigation scheme, veterinary laboratory, and revolving fund forfattening ranches. Belgian financing for the tsetse eradication program

4 and extension of the Rusumo breeding station was also confirmed. However,following contacts with the FAC mission in Kigali and the Ministry ofCooperation in Paris, the mission concluded that the French Government wasunlikely to decide definitively on participation soon, and French

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assistance could be counted on for only a relatively small part of thetechnical assistance requirements.

2.14 The mission recommended, following these discussions, that IDAproceed with credit processing. The mission also assisted the Governmentin drawing up a request for a Prolect Preparation Facility advance (thiswas a new instrument at this time) for start-up activities prior to crediteffectiveness (a PPF advance of US$200,000 was approved in August 1976).Finally, the mission reiterated its previous recommendations that theproject would require intensive supervision and that flexibility duringproJect implementation would be essential.

2.15 Negotiations were held in Kigali (largely in response to a BADEArequest) from October 7 - 22, 1976. The Belgian Government wasrepresented at negotiations. A central issue during negotiations was toensure once again full Government commitment to the project. Anotherimportant issue was to work out arrangements for the work plan approach,which was a new mechanism for both IDA and the Government. Creditproceeds were to be allocated on an annual basis according to detailedwork plans prepared by the Government and approved by IDA. Other issues(parallel financing arrangements between IDA and BADEA, number ofexpatriates to be employed, establishment of a revolving fund, interestrates, and procedures for relending IDA credit and BADEA loan proceeds toOPROVIA), were resolved relatively easily.

2.16 A US$14.0 million IDA credit was approved by IDA's ExecutiveDirectors on December 14, 1976. There was a lengthy Board discussionwhich focused on many aspects of project design, including the built-inflexibility in design through work plans (which was commended), prospectsfor sustainability, and technical assistance provisions. The Directorsexpresed concern on the likely difficulty and possible delays in findingsuitably qualified technical assistance personnel, the risk thatinstitutional lnnovations and technical assistance would lapse followingthe investment period, the possible construction of a power dam at RusumoFalls which would entail extensive flooding of project areas,l/ and thedanger of tsetse reinfestation since no coordinated regional effort was animmediate prospect. The IDA Credit Agreement was signed on March 31,1977, and the loan agreement between the Government and BADEA on April 7,1977. The IDA credit effectiveness date was set for June 30, 1977.

2.17 Confinancing arrangements came unstuck after credit signature andresulted in extensive discussions over the next two years. Despiteearlier indications that the 'FAC could not participate in projectfinancing, IDA learned in December 1976 that FAC were prepared to providea part of project technical assistance. FAC indicated a strongpreference for participation on a full cofinancing basis, which would callfor a full revamping of the financing plan. An initial, interim agreementwas reached whereby FAC would recruit and finance three individuals,(Project Director and the two regional directors) and short-term

' consultants for cattle ranches, cattle marketing, and water development.They would help launch project Implementation and prepare a detailedimplementation plan, on the basis of which longer-term FAC involvementwould be determined. IDA staff recognized that the proposed arrangementswere by no means ideal, largely because they called for significant

4 changes in plans at a late stage. Nonetheless, IDA made arrangements to

1/ Rusumo schemes have been under discussion ever since, but a high dam,which would entail major flooding, was long since ruled out.

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integrate French assistance because this was clearly the solution theRwandese Government preferred for financing and recruiting technicalassistance (the Government then and now strongly favors technicalassistance to be financed on grant terms). The new arrangements were notfully worked out until April 1979, but ultimately FAC financed mosttechnical assistance costs (para 3.05).

2.18 Conclusions: Project preparation and appraisal were noteworthyfor a relatively protracted appraisal process, important changes inproject design, and a bumpy and rather confusing path towards working outfinancing arrangements. Project identification and preparatioa werecarried out almost exclusively by Bank staff, with limited effectiveparticipation of Rwandese officials, although regular meetings were heldwith Rwandese Staff at almost every stage. Local institutions (ISAR) andconsultants (AIDR) were involved only In carrying out preliminary studiesto define specific components. In retrospect, it seems clear that moregroundwork at preparation would have been beneficial, and the decision toproceed to preparation/appraisal was premature. No formal preparationreport had been written and the project's essential institutional aspectshad not been fully analyzed. This led the appraisal mission to proposesignificant changes in project objectives and scope and to recommend(wisely) that sufficient time be given to the Rwandese Government toconsider project design further and make up their minds on options forproject organization. These changes and delays were no doubt beneficialin that they permitted better adaptation to constraints on the ground andensured better acceptance by Rwandese officials. However, one missingelement in the process was a much needed simplification in design; theproject remaine very complex and involved far too many components to besuccessfully implemented in the Rwandese environment at the time.

C. Project Design at Appralsal

2.19 Prolect Description and Costs: The project as approved in 1976was defined as a broad-based program of activities to be carried out overa five year period, aimed at boosting crop and livestock activities andgeneral rural development in the East-Bugesera and Gisaka/MigongoRegions. It included specifically:

(a) tsetse eradication in the Akagera valley;

(b) development of extension services for foodcrops andlivestock, including extension infrastructure comprisingcommunal agricultural centers, demonstration units forcattle stall feeding, tree nurseries, dipping tanks, andlivestock breeding centers;

.

A (c) provision of inputs to farmers using credit, particularlyheifers, cattle-sheds, agricultural inputs (seeds, tools,tree seedlings), fishing equipment, bee-hives, andmarketing and processing equipment;

(d) improvement of secondary and feeder roads, topographicsurveys, and mapping;

(e) construction of human and livestock water supply systems;

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(f) construction of schools and health centers;

(g) development of two new cattle ranches, expansion of theRusumo breeding station, and construction of stock routes,holding grounds, and a veterinary diagnostic laboratory;

(h) a pilot irrigation scheme to test potential for irrigatedagriculture development around the Nasho lakes; and

(i) technical assistance for project management and stafftraining, an agricultural training center, future projectpreparation, and monitoring and evaluation.

2.20 The prolect area covered two distinct regions (para 1.05).Although neighboring, they were physically separated by a swampy valleyand administratively isolated from one another, each falling in adifferent prefecture. This situation later proved to be a constraint tothe involvement of local governments in project execution, a problemexacerbated by the project's complexity.

2.21 Project cost details are summarized in Annex 1. At appraisal,costs were estimated at RWF 2,159 million (US$23.3 million equivalent),including 40X in foreign exchange. The financing plan at appraisal was asfollows:

FRW US$(million) (million) %

Rwandese Government 145 1.6 7Farmers 163 1.8 8Government of Belgium 79 0.9 4BADEA 469 5.0 21IDA 1,303 14.0 60TOTAL 23159 2.=3 I5

2.22 Organization and Management. A Project Coordination Committee(PCC), established by presidential decree, was to have overallresponsibility for project lmplementationz Tt wao to include high rankingrepresentatives of all concerned ministries (Finance, Planning, SocialAffairs, and Interior), chaired by the Secretary General of the Ministryof Agriculture and Livestock. The PCC was to have a Permanent Secretariatwithin the Ministry which would liaise between the committee and allagencies involved in project execution. It was to coordinate andsupervise all activities related to project programming, implementation,and monitoring and to delegate part of its authority to a managementcommittee including the Secretary of the Coordination Committee, the

,'Project Director and the two Regional Directors.

2.23 The prolect management team was to comprise the Project Director,the Rwandese managerial staff, and technical assistance staff. It was tobe in charge of project execution and coordination, under the PCC'sauthority and in conjunction with local authorities and producercooperatives. The management team was based in Kigali. It was to prepareand manage annual work plans, procurement, project financing, andtraininge In the field, each Regional Director was to manage project

construction work for his region and organize extension services andagricultural credit mechanisms, assisted by a small team of specialistsand Rwandese technicians. Regional staff were to work in closecollaboration with regional (prefets), communal (bourgmestres) and local(conseillers de communes) authorities, both in planning and implementationof works. Development centers were to complement existing communalinfrastructure. The appraisal report forecast that responsibility formanaging field activities, Including extension, rural Infrastructure andagricultural credit, would be progressively transferred from the projectmanagement team and government services to producer cooperatives. Theproject management team was also to Implement and manage, on behalf ofOPROVIA, the two now fattening ranches, as well as the stock-routes andholding ground. It was responsible for the management of all projectmarketing infrastructure financed by OPROVIA.

2.24 A key instrument of project management and IDA supervision was tobe annual work programs. These were to define the specific scope of workfor most components, Including costs and allocation of credit funds. Itwas expected that appraisal estimates would not be adhered to slavishly,but that each year's program would be worked out taking into accountexperience gained, and working in close collaboration with localauthorities. IDA and other cofinanciers were to approve plans after theywere reviewed and approved b7 the PCC. Because this placed a heavy burdenon project management, special emphasis was placed on systematic reportingon Implementation results and provision was made for monitoring andevaluation.

2.25 The major expected production benefits were Increased foodcropproduction resulting from higher yields. This was to be achieved byintroducing better cropping techniques, opening uncultivated land, andmore Intensive farming of underused areas. Improved livestock handlingtechniques such as feeding of livestock in cowsheds were to generateincreased milk and meat production for family consumption and sale. Useof manure as fertilizer was to make possible crop intensification andbetter yields. Other components were to complement these basicImprovements. The ranches were to fatten young cattle for export, at thesame time relieving overgrazing pressures. The Rusumo station was toproduce better heifers for farm stall-feeding. Reafforestation was toincrease wood production and enhance traditional bee-keeping. By year 10,Incremental crop production was expected to reach 25,000 tons per year,that of milk 3.1 million liters, and meat 2,500 tons. Fish productionwould bring a significant animal protein production complement. Increasedfish production was estimated at about 400 tons a year; honey and woodproduction increase were valued at US$300,000 p.a. at full development.Road Improvements, tsetse eradication and assistance to farmers andfarmers groups were to favor marketing (estimated to increase to about 60Zof incremental production). Human development was to be furthered byprovision of essential social infrastructure (water, roads, education,health). Benefits to the Government were expected from fattening ranchprofits and some additional tax revenues. The economic rate of return ondirectly productive project components was estimated at 32X over a 20 yearperiod; costs and benefits of social infrastructure, water supply, thepilot irrigation scheme, and some technical services were excluded fromthis calculation.

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2.26 The appraisal report noted that the project entailed substantialrisks. Success depended on adoption by many farmers of new techniques,which in turn was dependent on major strengthening of services, includingextension, good coordination within the Government, and full involvementof local communities. The risk that developments might not be sustainedafter the project period v:as underlined. The appraisal report concludednonetheless: "Difficult as they rightly appear, broad-based developmentproject like the proposed project appear to offer the best prospect fordevelopment in Rwanda".

III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

A. Project start-up and Implementation Problems

Effectiveness and Project Start Up

3.01 There were five special conditions of IDA credit effectiveness:(a) signature of the BADEA Credit Agreement; (b) setting up a US$200,000revolving fund; (c) establishment of the PCC (para 2.22); (d) submission

to IDA of the first annual work program; and (e) recruitment of keyproject staff, expatriate and Rwandese. Credit effectiveness, originallyscheduled for June 30, 1977 was delayed by five months (to November 23,1977), mainly because of late official submission to IDA of the first workplan. Other conditions were met essentially on schedule.

3.02 Although a PPF advance was available from August 1976, it tookalmost a year to start using it, mainly because of delays in appointingkey project staff. Planned start-up activities (house and officeconstruction, ordering of vehicles) got off the ground only in April1977. By October 1977, however, foui months after the project directorand regional managers arrived, a joint Bank/FAC mission reported that animpressive start had been made. A project office had been established andhouses rented for staff. The Government had allocated land for theagricultural training center, the veterinary laboratory, and the cattleholding ground near Kigali. Sites had been selected and constructionbegun for the two regional project centers. Topographic surveys werebeing carried out in the two regions, and the boundaries of the Gako Ranchwere being surveyed. Finally, tsetse eradication in Gisaka Migongo wason-going and apparently successful.

Financing Arrangements and Changes in Project Design

3.03 There were substantial changes in financing arrangements duringimplementation which materially affected the outcome of many projectcomponents. There were intensive discussions, and three formalcofinanciers meetings before arrangements were sorted out, two years aftereredit approval. The Belgium Government indicated in late 1977 its'intention to withdraw its financing for the Rusumo Station component;financing had been agreed upon during negotiations, but no specificagreement had been signed between the Belgian and Rwandese Governments.AIDR (para 1.06), cut off from Belgian funding, handed the Rusumo stationover to the project unit early in 1978. Apart from confusion, this hadserious consequences as much of the breeding herd was sold prior to thetransfer to cover operating costs. Belgian-financed tsetse eradicationactivities were carried out by AIDR under ISAR supervision but were poorly

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coordinated with other project activities despite long prior discussionsabout this potential issue. The initial confusion on the Rusumo stationhad an impact which is still apparent today in the station's uncertainrole and failure to implement needed improvement programs.

3.04 The financing agreement between BADEA and the Rwandese Governrmentbecame effective in July 1978. This had been delayed because BADEA soughtassurances that IDA would replace Belgian aid in financing Rusumo. Thesituation was partially sorted out during a Paris Cofinancing meeting inFebruary 1978, when IDA, satisfied that French financing wouldmaterialize, amended its agreement to Include finance for Rusumo. By

; 1979, it was apparent that, due to cost escalation for the Bugesera watersupply system, BADEA funds would be insufficient to cover both the costsassociated with cattle marketing and the %'asho irrigation center pilotdevelopment, It was thus decided that BADEA funds would be reserved tocomplete the Bugesera water supply system and to purchase cattle for thefattening ranches. As a result, no irrigation trials were carried out(this proposal is under active review now). Stock-route development wasalso abandoned. The project management team had serious logistic problemsin communicating with BADEA in the early years, and this had adverseconsequences, notably explaining delayed stocking of the fattening ranches(only one became operational).

3.05 French Government financing had a significant impact on theproJect both because FAC effectively managed technical assistance which inturn largely determined the nature of project management arrangements, andbecause of a protracted period of uncertainty in working out new financingarrangements. FAC posted three technical assistants to Rwanda in June1977 (the Project Director and the two Regional Directors). Over the nextsiX months, FAC also sent three technical consultant missions (on fishing,training and cattle marketing), and two supervision missions. In February1978, during a co-financiers meeting in Paris between the RwandeseGovernment, IDA, BADEA and FAC, FAC proposed to finance 342 of technicalassistance costs and 10% of other project costs for a total amount of FF13million. Assignment of five new technical assistants (one accountant, twotrainers, one livestock specialist and one veterinarian) and a plan forfour more specific studies were also agreed upon. This proposal, however,was not ratified and in January 1979, during another co-financiers meetingin Kigali, FAC committed themselves to finance all project technicalassistance costs., An agreement to this effect was eventually signedbetween the French and Rwandese Governments in April 1979. Meanwhile aFAC financial specialist arrived in Rwanda in March 1978 and a livestockspecialist in May 1978. A training expert arrived In November 1979. Insum, this negotiation process came late and resulted both in delays inrecruitment of key personnel and important changes In the agreed plans forthe technical assistance team. The individuals were, in general, highlyquallfied and motivated. However, partly because of late-course changesand partly because arrangements were administered separately by thefinancing partners, some basic agreements on project objectives and designworked out during appraisal were lost sight of during implementation.

3.06 This complex process of finalizing co-financing agreementsresulted in important changes in project design. Amendments to the IDACredit and BADEA loan agreements were made (July 1979) to accomodatechanges in the financing plan and cost overruns for some components. New

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agreements were:

(a) BADEA would restrict Its financing to water development inBugesera and Gisaka and to cattle purchase for the Nashoand Gako ranches;

(b) IDA would finance cattle marketing activities and theKigali holding ground; and

(c) IDA would finance consultancies to plan the proposed Nashopilot irrigation schemes

The amendment to the IDA credit agreement also confirmed previousagreement by IDA to finance Ruaumo station development and formalizedagreement to enlarge the project area by adding western Kanzenze commune.The project revolving fund was increased from US$200,000 to US$400,000.

3.07 It was apparent by 1981 that several planned investments wouldhave to be delayed to a follow-up project. The 1981 budget made specificprovision to conserve funds to ensure a smooth transition to the secondphase project. Vehicle purchases were reduced and the Nasho pilotirrigation scheme was delayed. Discussions on the 1982 Project workprogram led to further reductions of operating expenses in order to remainwithin the limits of available finance; it was by now clear that the BGMII project would entail reductions in the number of activities undertakenand in the level of recurrent expenses. Vehicle numbers and operatingcost allowances were reduced, as were administrative operating costs andmost technical activities (seed.multiplication, afforestation, bushfirecontrol, poultry, fishing, training, etc.).

Proiect Management

3.08 Problems in defining responsibilities of the various seniorproject managers had an important impact on project implementation. Afirst issue became apparent within weeks of the arrival of the expatriateProject Director: definition of the respective responsibilities of theSecretary, PCC, and the Project Director. The latter had, beginnirg inJuly 1977, unofficially transmitted notes to FAC and IDA expressingconcern about the definition of his position vis-a-vis the RwandesePermanent Secretary; his view was that he must have either full authority,or clear agreement on terms of reference as an advisor to the Government.The issue was considered by all concerned, including IDA, FAC andGovernment. IDA's position was that the Government must clarify the jobs,but that plainly the Rwandese Permanent Secretary must play an active rolein project implementation. By end 1977 an informal agreement was reachedwhereby responsibilities for all major project activities and decisionsr'elated to personnel were to be shared by the Project Director and the"Permanent Secretary, an arrangement signified by their co-signing allcorrespondence and memoranda. Fresh problems arose when a long-awaitedRwandese Co-director was finally appointed in mid 1978. Working relationsbetween the Permanent Secretary and the expatriate Project Directorimproved during the second project year, but relations between the latterand his "co-Director" deteriorated rapidly to the point where fruitfulcollaboration became impossible. It took an inordinate amount of timebefore satisfactory terms of reference for each were finally approved by

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the PCC, which decided to alter the title of the co-Director to deputyDirector and to define his responsibilities accordingly. The PermanentSecretary remained at his post until the second phase project began. The

;4 Rwandese Deputy Director remained until late 1980 when he was appointedproject coordinator for the new, IDA financed, GBK Project. He was neverreplaced.

3.09 Although they remained discreet, tensions also arose within the* project technical assistance team, specifically between the Project

Director who was perceived as centralizing too much responsibility, and.1 regional staff, including some of the regional expatriate directors. It

is noteworthy that the 1981 project work plan was for the first timeprepared with real consultation of local authorities. This was done atthe initiative of regional staff who took advantage of the absence of theProject Director in late 1980. There is some evidence that the ProjectDixector erred in centralizing decision making excessively and failing todelegate sufficient responsibility to local managers.

Agro-Climatic and Social Factors affecting Implementation

3.10 Agro-climatic and social factors affected the project in several! ways. First, the project area consisted of two different regions with

different soils, different topography, and resources. Somewhat differentagricultural interventions were therefore required in the twe regions.The diversity of social settlements in the project area and the high rateof spontaneous immigration made the organization and execution oftechnical services and input supply difficult. Despite ambitious ruralinfrastructure components, no master plan was prepared which would haveallowed for rational location of administrative infrastructure, so errorswere made, like locating a development center away from the Sub-Prefectureseat at Nyamata. During the project period very low rainfall in Gisakacaused abandonment of some existing paysannat settlements near Rusumo:significant numbers of people moved to more favorable areas. In Bugesera,the progressive drying-up after 1980 of Lake Cyohoha, which was to supplywater to the Gako ranch, was a major reason the ianch was not developed.

Institutional Factors affecting Implementation

3.11 A primary concern during appraisal and negotiations was to avoidcreation of new institutions and to assure sustainability throughIntegration with the local administration and farmer organizations. Thecoordination and management committees and the project management teamsoon lost sight of this objective. Project management became centralized,and tended to execute most project activities directly rather than to workwith and through existing local and national lnstitutions. As a result,the project was increasingly perceived by the local authorities asa providential source of finance; the object was to extract from it themaximum. Project staff went so far as to use communal authorities toexercise pressure on farmers to follow extension advice where extensionactivities were not convincing enough.

3.12 The project was prepared and implemented during a time ofuncertainty in Rwanda regarding the institutional framework for ruraldevelopment. Various systems of project management had been tried in thepreceeding period, ranging from independent project units (project

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Agro-Pastoral de Nyabisindu and Project Agricole de Kibuye) to thecreation of special parastatals (OVAPAM). The structure proposed for theproject represented a prudent position designed to avoid the creation of anew institution which would be difficult to dismantle later. This prudentapproach was, however, not maintained by those who implemented the projectand in practice a large project unit and staff, with no independentstatutes yet apart from the normal government services, emerged.

Agricultural Policy

3.13 No clear national policy on input supply or agricultural marketlnghad been defined at the time of appraisal. Improved seeds, for example,were sold at a price below or equal to the consumer market price forthe same commodity, taking no account of eitbar production costs orproduct quality. A parastatal entity, OP%0'JXA, was created in early 1976to intervene in agricultural commodity matkeza ti an attempt to lessenseasonal price variations and to secure food sJiplies for Government staffsuch as the military. However, OPROVIA's role was very uncertain for aprolonged period. Government and project staff uncertainties in this areacontributed to the ultimate failure of the project's marketing component(para 3.26).

3.14 The Government's settlement policy was also unclear at the time ofappraisal. IDA was informed in 1976 that the Government wanted toexperiment with a formula of 'village' settlements in order to reduce t.hecosts of social infrastructure by concentrating population in villages.This was implemented during the project period in che Akagera corridornear Lake Nasho and at Gashora. This strategy proved unacceptable to thefarm population, nor was it compatible with extension recommendations suchas livestock stall-feeding on the farm. Since then, a more pragmaticsettlement policy has emerged, and settlement figures much lessprominently in policy discussions as there remains virtually no vacantland to settle.

Staffing

3.15 Local staff availability proved to be even more problematic thanexpected at appraisal; problems were accentuated by the project'sambitious objectives (particularly in the field of extension and technicalassistance to farmers). Lack of staff, particularly at the intermediateand field levels, greatly affected implementation during most of theproject period. It limited the extent to which extension services couldbe developed (until mid 1981, there was little possibility for carryingout more than scattered extension activities). Staff shortages werepartly responsible for the project's shortfalls in achieving its ambitiousinstitutional objectives, particularly in the area of assistance tofarmers' cooperatives.

B. Project Technical Achievements

Rural infrastructure program

3.16 A substantial rural infrastructure construction program wascarried out .under the project, most using force account. It includedspecifically:

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(a) Construction of infrastructure for extension and otheragricultural services, a project management center inKigali, two regional centers at Gashora and Kibungo, twentyPAVs (Poste agro-veterinaire) and six silos (altogether,332 different buildings representing a total covered areaof some 25,000 m2 - Annex 1). Works were undertakenremarkably quickly, but a serious flaw was the highrecurrent costs of operating arl maintaining thesebuildings. Further, quality of some work was poor, perhapsbecause no civil engineer was assigned to the program.

* (b) The planned roads program was only partially implemented(about 35Z of projections in terms of kilometers). Theprogram was sharply curtailed because funds availableproved to be largely insufficient (cost overruns).

(c) Six schools and three health centers were constructed, butlack of equipment, staff accommodations, and operatingfunds (supposed to be provided by Government) caused delaysin operating them.

(d) A substantial water supply program was carried outincluding a large pipe water supply scheme covering most ofGashora commune and smaller schemes in the Akagera corridor(three water collection and distribution systems), atNasho-West (two) and Musaza-south. Two small pumpingstations were also installed at Nasho and Gako as well asthe Kibungo regional center water supply.

Despite an attempt to initiate beneficiary contributions to operating andmaintenance costs, for water supply, costs were not recovered. A nationalcost recovery system was discussed at length, but a decision on the matterwas taken only in 1984. Meanwhile, the Government had not wished tointroduce new mechanisms at a regional level.

Tse-tse eradication (Annex 2)

3.17 Tse-tse eradication started in 1977 with Belgian Governmentfinancing. It was interrupted in late 1977 following a Presidentialdecision to ban the use of Dieldrex throughout Rwanda on environmentalgrounds (Dieldrex is used for tsetse eradication). The program wasresumed in 1978 when doubts were put, at least provisionally, to rest. In1979, tse-tse reinfestation occurred and a new eradication can ,aign wasundertaken in 1980-1981. A FAO tsetse specialist assessed the situation

'1 1981 but his recommendations could not be implemented because of theirhigh costs. Clearly, project activities did not fully eradicate tsetseflies in the area, and massive tsetse reinfestation occurred in areasallOcated to livestock. However, partial success in some cropped areas

* did facilitate settlement of new farmers there (creation of the Malindiand Rushonga "paysannat" settlements, extension of those around Rusumo).The extension of cropping areas has in turn reduced tsetse concentrationby breaking up the flies' habitat there.

.1

iJ

* 1

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Fattening ranches, Rusumo breeding station and Diagnostic Laboratory

3.18 Two fattening ranches were established and partly stocked withcattle from 1978 to 1982. During this period, some basic questions wereraised by the cofinancing partners and technical assistance staff on thejustification for ranching operations and proposed stock routes andholding ground construction. Decisions were made in 1978 not to open upstock routes (because transport of cattle by truck was judged moreprofitable) and, in 1979, to call off holding ground construction.Because of increasing operating problems at Gako ranch (including waterproblems after Lake Cyohoha disappeared - para 3.10), BADEA stopped cattlepurchases for this ranch in 1980. Finally, the Ministry of Agricultureand Livestock decided, in 1981, to transform the ranches progressivelyinto collective ranches. In retrospect, appraisal technical assumptionsappear to have been somewhat theoretical and unrealistic. This was due topoor data available at the time and the general belief that meat exportswere feasible and profitable. The pasture carrying capacity at Nashoproved far below appraisal expectations (2,000 head of cattle instead of8,000). Also lack of water at Nasho did not permit use of more than 2,300ha of pasture instead of the expected 7,000 ha. For both ranches saleswere disappointing due to the lack of marketing outlets. Nelther ranchever reached full capacity. The Nasho ranch was partly settled in 1982 byRwandese refugees from Uganda.

3.19 The Rusumo breeding station was handed over by AIDR to theProject unit in early 1978 (para 3.03). The station was doing well atappraisal, but by 1978 faced serious problems resulting principally fromthe financing hiatus. Thereafter, station management suffered because offrequent replacement of managers. Complementary investments were made in1980/81 and stock levels were progressively increased thereafter. Stocknumbers reached 3,000 head in 1983, corresponding to Rusumo's estimatedcarrying capacity. This stocking level was supposedly sufficient toensure profitability of the station's operations. The Rusumo breedingstation never became financially viable, however, in part because of thefailure of tsetse eradication operations. Despite several treatmentscarried out within the station and clearing of two successive flybarriers, tsetse flies never completely disappeared and the tryponocidaltreatments of the stock (both preventive and curative) could never bestopped, and proved extremely costly. In sum, the project ranches werenot successful ventures for social, economic and management reasons.

3.20 Design of the veterinary diagnostic center was significantlymodified in 1978 and 1979 by a specialist from IEMVT. Based on aGovernment request, a vaccine production unit, not foreseen at appraisal,was added. With these changes a full National Veterinary Laboratory wasconstructed, which the Dutch Government decided in 1979 to finance.Project financing was limited to site preparation (water supply andsewerage) and electrical supply.

Extension

3.21 Because of delays in infrastructure construction, equipmentprocurement, and lack of qualified personnel, extension activities startedvery slowly, taking off on a significant scale only in 1981. Throughoutthe life of the project these problems were accentuated by the dearth of

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attractive technical packages adapted to the area, a fundamental problemaddressed explicitly only late in the project period. Before 1981, theproject extension service supported only minor activities like small stockraising (rabbits and fowl), fishing, bee-keeping, market-gardening, andpineapple cropping. In 1981 this situation began to change. Extensionstaff began to distribute to farmers, and to plant itself, fruit trees,tea and coffee seedlings (at least one nursery lnstalled per sector).Forage multiplication fields were established (one per sector) and grassstems for forage cropping and planting on contour lines were distributed.Extension staff introduced and distributed soy bean seeds, promoted theimpvovevient of banana plantations through intercropping of beans,developed anti-erosion activities, and promoted agriculture/livestockassociation (stall feeding). Livestock extension did not get underwayuntil 1980 (para 3.32). Construction of breeding centers, which alsobecame operational in 1981, worked poorly, as did distribution ofcrossbred animals for stall feeding; animals distributed were lessresistant than the local breed to ambiant pathology, and showed a highmortality rate which could not be overcome because of insufficientcompetent staff. Pastur4 management improvement work, started in 1978 inBugesera and 1981 in Gis4ka/Migongo, had limited impact due to land tenureconstraints. Investments undertaken in some of these pasture areas werelost because of uncontrolled farmer settlement in areas reserved forpasture. In sum, in spite of some positive steps, the extension programswere not generally successful, primarily because of weaknesses in theextension system itself. Further, the project period coincided with atime of sharp decline in the effectiveness of ISAR, the agriculturalresearch organization, so ISAR support was very limited andextension-research links especially poor.

3.22 For fishing, positive extension actions were undertaken which,although beneitithg a limited number of people, led to improvements infishing methods, monitoring and regulation of production, and the creationof better marketing channels. These achievements have been sustained tothe present.

3.23 Assistance to cooperatives (initially seen as the principalexecuting agents of project activities) suffered from lack of qualifiedstaff to train cooperative leaders. In addition, member control overcooperative management was weak, due above all to the illiteracy of mostcooperative members. Cooperative assistance staff, administrativelyattached to the Ministry of Social Affairs, were not formally integratedinto the project structure. This contributed to coordination problems.Extension efforts to boost the creation of pre-cooperative groups werestopped in 1979 due to poor results. Activities in this area were limitedthereafter to supporting existing farmer groups, particularly throughcredit for construction of storage facilities. Project staff monitoredand so'metimes assisted a few dozen groups. In retrospect the projectlacked the means and the approach required to build new cooperatives, oreven to assist existing cooperatives in more than a marginal manner. Thissituation was exacerbated by the fact that the cooperative specialistforeseen at appraisal was never recruited. The experience demonstratedvividly the difficulty Involved in "outsiders" creating viablecooperatives, and the intensive assistance required If cooperatives are towork. If outsiders are the glue keeping a cooperative together, and notfarmer self-interest, the cooperative tends to collapse when the outsider

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leaves. This conclusion is accentuated in the BGM experience as there hadbeen working cooperatives In the area prior to the project period which

- could not be sustained even though support was available. In retrospectit is regrettable that cooperative issues did not figure more prominentlyin supervision issues raised during implementation.

Credit, Marketing and Input Supply

3.24 The appraisal report had foreseen that agricultural inputs wouldbe supplied to farmers through cooperative structures, and financed oncredit. The cooperative channel proved unworkable (para 3.23), butthrough this project some of the first concerted efforts in Rwanda weremade to initiate the use of agricultural credit. However, a seriousproblem was inherited, as the projects previously operating in the area(OBM, AIDR) had provided subsidies for input use. This made theintroduction of credit more difficult since farmers were not accustomed topaying. Credit was in fact extended only to individuals, both farmers andproject staff. During the period between 1979 and 1982, most creditgranted (70%) was for the purchase of bicycles, motorcycles and loans forthe benefit of project staff. Genuine agricultural credit was limited tothe financing of animal stall-feeding facilities, backyard poultryraising, and fishing equipment. Farm inputs (seeds, insecticides,fungicides) were supplied on cash basis. Three types of creditconditions were used: (a) short term credit (7 to 12 months) with 20%downpayment and a fixed charge of RWF500 per loan for poultry andcorrugated iron sheets; (b) short term credit with no downpayment at 9%interest for farmers groups; and (c) five year credit with 10% insurancedownpayment (to constitute an insurance fund) and 3% interest for thepurchase of cows. Interest rates were plainly too low to cover the costsof credit processing and recovery.

3.25 Total credit distributed during the project period was about RWF6.4 million, compared to appraisal estimates of RWF 96.3 million. Creditmonitoring at the regional level was uneven and funds were misappropriatedon several occasions. A total of 152 cows were purchased on credit,with a recovery rate of about 70%; most borrowers had unpaid balances atthe end of the project period. High cow mortality rates, financed by theproject insurance fund even in cases of recognized deficiencies on theborrower's part, significantly depleted this fund. Poultry sheds (102 intotal) housing an average of 30 hens each were financed on credit (aboutRWF 1 million). Recovery rates for poultry raising were low: 37% inGisaka/Migongo and 64% in Bugesera. This result was particularly poorsince most loans were to project staff. Loans for nets and other fishingequipment were repaid at a rate of about 30% and were stopped in 1981.Credit to farmer groups (RWF 1.3 million) for construction of storagefacilities and stores was recovered at the rate of 88% and 72%,t'espectively in Gisaka/Migongo and Bugesera. These results provided an

; important lesson which was the difficulty of managing a proper creditscheme through the auspices of an autonomous regional project authority.Under the second BGM project, the agricultural credit scheme was changedsignificantly so that an existing national rural banking system (BanquesPopulaires) provided credit in the project area. The project creditscheme was then terminated.

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3.26 Project plans called for development of foodcrop marketing throughcooperatives and informal farmer groups. Credit was to be provided tosuch entities to purchase transportation, storage, and processingequipment. This objective was not achieved and only a few storagefacilities were built. In 1978, the project team began to organizedirectly marketing for agricultural and livestock products (milk, butter,

t pineapples, eggs, and some other crops). These operations proved costly,requiring heavy project management inputs. They were neither sustainablewithout heavy donor finance, nor replicable outside the project area.Part of the problem was that project staff were left to experiment as theypleased, with no policy or operational guidance from the Ministry ofAgriculture.

3.27 Seed was provided to farmers directly through the project because,at least initially, varieties adapted to project areas were not availableand ISAR and the Selected Seed Service (SSS) were unable to satisfy farmerdemand. Project staff experimented with different systems of seedmultiplication (on public land, through seed producing farmers, and onother available fields). None of these systems proved satisfactory.Farmers did not produce high quality seeds because seed prices were fixedofficially and were much too low, taking no account of quality. On publicland, project staff were unable to maintain variety pureness and quality,largely due to management constraints. As a result, few farmers obtainedimproved seed. Seed distribution focused primarily on soya beans (Palmettoand Davis varieties) which were introduced under the project, groundnuts(Fatui and HNG 18 varieties), beans (variety 1/2), maize (Bambu andKatumani varieties), vegetables and, in lesser quantities, sorghum. The

- key lesson was that production and distribution of improved seed is aspecialized business, better done by a national organization with thenecessary expertise. This regional specialized entity clearly haddifficulty in developing the required expertise. In retrospect, much moreeffort should have been focused, early on, on the national Selected SeedService which was and remains very weak.

3.28 Fruit tree seedlings, particularly avocado, guava and papayatrees, banana stems, and pineapple shoots, were distributed tmder theproject. Avocado trees were particularly successful with farmers.Pineapple distribution was active but declined significantly whensubsidies were stopped. Some 6,879,000 forestry seedlings (95%eucalyptus) were produced in 69 nurseries (the number operating 1981-82).1,260 ha were planted in Bugesera and 2,551 ha in Gisaka. These figuresare rough since there was little supervision after seedlings weredistributed; loss rates after planting are unknown. Given technical

. problems observed (poor spacing, termite attacks), probably no more than atotal of 3,200 ha were actually afforested during the project period, andthe status of these plantations, from what can be observed, is poor,partioularly in Gisaka/Migongo.

i 3.29 Multiplication fields for forage grass shoots were established inJ every sector of the project area, at first for Setaria sphacelata, then

Trysacum laxum. Despite management difficulties for some multiplicationfields, the project met some success in distributing forage grasses, whichwere nonexistent before. In both regions, the areas allocated to thesemultiplication fields increased from 59 ha In 1980 to 126 ha in 1982 whichserved to supply farmers with shoots necessary for contour line plantingand forage cropping for cattle.

.3A

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3.30 Various tools, particularly for erosion control works throughUmuganda (communal compulsory work), were distributed by project staff.The main constraint proved to be the incapacity of Umuganda work to keeppace with contour line marking executed by paid laborers (only 20 to 48%of the marked lines were actually installed). Location lines was notalways optimal and maintenance of contour lines, once installed, was oftenpoor. Some 21,280 ha were reportedly protected in the project areabetween 1978 and 1982, representing 9% of crop lands. According to asurvey carried out in Bugesera in 1981, erosion control was undertaken on33% of fields where it was thought necessary, but also on 10% of the areaon which it was judged useless. Erosion control was thus partiallysuccessful.

3.31 Insecticides and fungicides were supplied free of charge toprotect seedlings in nurseries and trees in forestry plantations. Thesechemicals were sold when used for vegetable crops. These products werehighly effective for vegetables and contributed to the development ofvegetable production.

3.32 Substantial efforts were undertaken to increase distribution ofveterinary products and drugs, both preventive drugs (vaccinations againstRinderpest and black quarter, deticking, drugs against internal parasites)and curative (typanocides, antiseptics and antibiotics). Initiallydistributed and applied free of charge, these products benefitted up to40% of the cattle population in Bugesera and 18% in Gisaka/Migongo in1981. There was, however, a dramatic decline in 1982, when a policy ofpartial cost recovery was enforced. Breeding centers were constructed andstocked in every rural center, with a bull, a ram and a buck. Althoughmating was free of charge, these animals remained largely underutilizedduring the project period, perhaps because farmers were aware of thegreater susceptibility to disease of crossbreed animals. Heifers (152)and a few dozen sheep were provided on credit, and about 7,000 hens andchickens were distributed, mainly in Gashora, where the development centeralso produced chicken feed (258 tons sold). In sum, the impact theseactivities was marginal.

Training Activities

3.33 Training was defined at appraisal as a key project element,and several and distinct training activities were undertaken. First, aveterinary training center was established at Rubilizi. This center wasoriginally designed for agricultural and livestock extension, but laterfocused only on livestock (A3 level staff). Built in 1978 and 1979, theCenter began operating in 1980. About 30 out of the first 80 graduateswere assigned to work on the project in late 1981. The center tackled theacute problem of lack of intermediate level livestock staff. The majorproblem remains the center's financial situation, as the Government must

'cover its operating costs. Some further issues emerged on certificationof the center by the Ministry of Education, which remains a problem. Asecond training facility, the medical auxillaries training center, wasbuilt in 1980. It began operation in 1982 but insufficient operating fundallocations by the Ministry of Health considerably slowed its activities.A third type of training was undertaken in the field, for field levelextension and veterinary staff. This began in late 1980 in projecttraining rooms and training centers (one or two week long sessions with

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boarding arrangements). Training of livestock staff was moderatelyeffective, training of medical auxiliaries and in service training ofextension staff less so.

- Technical Assistance. Surveys, and Monitoring

3.34 Less technical assistance than planned was actually mobilized;contrary to appraisal plans technical assistance was provided through aconsultant team financed by FAC (individual recruitment was theGovernment's preference at appraisal). The expatriate Project Director,who was effectively the project manager, remained throughout the projectperiod (1977-82), despite a lengthy absence in 1980/81 following a caraccident; generally, there was substantial continuity in the managementteam. Two expatriate regional Directors, were employed for the fullproject period. The expatriate livestock specialist served from 1978 to1982 but was never supported, as initially planned, by an animal healthspecialist. No cooperative specialist was recruited, but a fishingspecialist visited Rwanda for several months in 1980. Finally, theadministrative and financial director (also an expatriate) served the fromMarch 1978 to 1982. Three volunteers also worked for the project for ayear. It was regrettable that the cooperative specialist was notrecruited given the importance of cooperatives, and their poorperformance. In addition, a civil works specialist could have been usedprofitably during the first three project years, to accelerateconstruction and to allow the Regional Directors to concentrate muchearlier on extension activities rather than on construction. A clear gapin implementation was failure to implement the monitoring and evaluationprogram (para 4.01).

Implementation Schedule

3.35 The project was, quite deliberately, implemented on the basis ofannual work plans, which were to take into account operating experienceand allowed significant changes in project investments and activities ascompared with appraisal plans. Therefore, comparison between theappraisal "indicative" and the actual implementation schedule is notvery meaningful. Roughly speaking, construction of infrastructure

; went according to plans (except for roads, stock routes and holding- ground, and the Nasho irrigation pilot scheme). Services to farmers and

training began on a significant scale about two years late, and extensionefforts remain much smaller than planned.

Reporting, Accounting and Audit

M - 3.36 Project reporting performance was good. Quarterly and annual, implementation reports and yearly financial statements were issued on a

regylar basis, in a satisfactory form. In addition, occasional technical¶ notes were produced describing achievements on specific components.

Finally, a general statement of achievements by December 31, 1981 wasproduced by the expatriate Project Director before his departure and thetwo regional offices prepared a summary completion report.

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Procurement

3.37 No serious difficulties were encountered in folloving Bankguidelines procurement. The only issue raised during projectimplementation concerned the recruitment of expatriate technicalassistants who, until an agreement was finally reached between IDA and FACin 1979, were recruited directly by FAC without consultation with IDA.The project's centralized management style made it difficult for fieldstaff to procure the equipment and goods they needed. Orders had to beestablished at the regional level, and submitted to the central office inKigali for approval; only then were the orders processed, a procedurewhich proved rather cumbersome in case of emergency needs.

Project Costs

3.38 Actual project expenditures totalled RWF 2,500 million (USs27.2million) or roughly 16Z more than anticipated at appraisal. Details aregiven in Annex 1. However, these expenditures went for a substantiallydifferent project than planned, and many unit costs were higher thanexpected. The following table summarizes, by type of expenses, appraisalestimates and actual expenses (RWF'000):

Type of Expense Appraisal estimate Actual costs(including contingencies)

Infrastructure 939,500 1,028,951Materials and equipment 41,800 416,599Local salaries and wages 46,900 534,618Technical assistance 245,300 239,473Other operating costs 504,600 202,518Farm inputs 380.900 78,040

TOTAL 2,159,000 2,500.199

Infrastructure costs were close td appraisal projections, but appraisalprojections included infrastructure which was not constructed (for tsetseeradication, stock routes and holding grounds, veterinary lab, irrigationscheme) or not completed (access and feeder roads). Expenses on materialsand equipment were about ten-fold those projected, as were expendituresfor local salaries and wages, This was in part because actual figuresinclude equipment and material bought to carry out many works on forceaccount, and because a larger number of permanent and teuiporary staff thanplanned were employed by the project unit. Expenses for farm inputs on

-* the other hand (although most were until 1980 distributed free of charge)were barely a fifth of projected amounts, a shortfall which reflectsdelays and difficulties met in agricultural extension.

jDisbursements (Annex 4)

3.39 Disbursements were completed on November 1982, not long after theclosing date (September 30, 1982). After initial delays, mainlyexplained by the six-month delay in effectiveness, actual disbursementsquickly caught up to appraisal estimates and by end 1980 exceeded them.

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Compliance with ma1or covenants

3.40 Most covenants of the Development Credit Agreement were compliedwith. A noteworthy exception was that both the Government and the Bankconcluded that it was unrealistic to seek recovery of most project costs

* from beneficiaries, as planned. Farmer participation in project cost asforeseen in the financing plan was supposed to total 82 of project costs.Some cost recovery efforts were made, notably to sell inputs at marketprices and sell veterinary drugs at cost, but they generally metconsiderable difficulty. The major problem was the lack of clear nationalpolicies in this area which meant that project efforts were piecemeal andhad little Government support. This issue is being addressed now squarely

i at a national level.

IV. PROJECT IMPACT

4.01 Since no systematic effort was made during project implementationto monitor farm developments and collect information on participants'pre-project activities, it is difficult to estimate accurately theproject's impact on agricultural and livestock production. Surveyscarried out in 1980 and 1981 by LAMSEA gathered detailed information onthe project area which has been used in this PCR as a baseline forestimating changes resulting from the project.

4.02 Activities carried out during the project implementation periodwill not have the economic impact expected at appraisal. The preparationand appraisal teams underestimated the difficulty of implementing such acomplex project. However, it is clear that many investments and changesintroduced under the project were necessary for the long term developmentof the areas concerned. These include establishment of two regionaldevelopment centers, development of water supply systems, and thecomprehensive network of PAVs which support agricultural and livestockactivities in a large area where rural services were almost nonexistentbefore. Much needed administrative and technical staff training wasstarted, although late and in a rather disorganized manner; extensionactivities which served farmer needs were initiated, albeit late.

; 4.03 Agricultural production Increases attributable to the project willcome chiefly from improved seeds, grass shoots and seedlings produced anddistributed. Production increases from improved seeds can be indirectlyestimated using improved yields In areas where the seeds, shoots orseedlings were distributed. This estimate indicates an annual productionincrease in 1984 of 38 tons of groundnuts, 196 tons of maize, 23 tons ofsorghum, 22 tons of beaus and 88 tons of cassava. Production increases ofsoy beans (introduced under the project) and of coffee are estimated atrespectively 590 tons and 750 tons. Additional fruit production (mainly

* avocaUos) is estimated at about 7,500 tons, and of pineapples 1,600 tons.Vegetable production increases are estimated at some 1,200 tons p.a. andfuelwood production almost 20,000 tons p.a. Annex 5 gives basicassumptions for these calculations. It is noteworthy that these increasescame despite a dearth of appropriate technical packages. This does notmean that research/extension linkages are not critically important butshows that available knowledge provided at least some basis for technicaladvances with extension advice.

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4.04 Livestock production increases attributable to the project willcome mainly from the development of cattle stall-feeding practices andforage cropping, which both can be considered as having been introducedand developed under the project with some success. Veterinary treatmentsmay have had an impact in 1980 when a significant part of the herd wastreated against ticks and internal parasites, but no benefits are includedbecause the 1980 performance was not sustained thereafter. Stall-feedingpractices supported an increase in the calf weaning rate from 40% to 66X ayear and consumable milk production per cow increased from 200 to 700liters a year. Forage introduced under the project and used as animalfeed produced 1 Kg of meat per 50 Kg of forage. Total additionalproduction per year from these activities is thus estimated at nearly 650calves or heifers per year, 325,000 liters of milk and over 600 tons ofmeat.

4.05 A notable technical innovation was the introduction oflivestock-agriculture integration techniques in the framework of thecattle stall feeding ("Fermettes") extension program. Although a recentsurvey of existing "fermettes" shows that most farmers had adoptedstall-feeding practices because of manure production (used as fertilizer),the use of manure still remains marginal and will probably not lead in theshort term to significant further crop yield increases.

V. PROJECT BENEFITS

Economic benefits (Annex 6)

5.01 At appraisal, the economic rate of return on directly productiveproject components was estimated at 32X (para 2.25). Costs consid;xcad inthe new ERR estimate are given in Annex 1. As at appraisal, costs ofactivities not directly related to production are excluded. It wasassumed that without the project, operating costs would have been thefollowing from year 6:

a) 502 of the "otner operating costs";

b) Year 1 level for consumed materials;

c) Staff financed from local budget at year 1;

d) Same level of inputs as in year 5.

Economic costs were obtained through deduction of 20% on fuel, oil andvehicle spare parts (average tax and duty). The economic rate of returnwas estimated to be 52. It falls to 3% with costs increased by 10% toinclude farm labor.

'5.02 Such estimates have limited significance since the project was thebeginning of a long term development program, and it is hazardous toassign benefits to a single part of that program. However, the limitedproduction increases (Chapter IV) resulted in part from limitedagricultural extension effort, and relatively heavy early expenditures oninfrastructure. The introduction of new seeds, seedlings, and stallfeeding of animals accounted for most increased production. The majorityof farmers simply continued to practice their traditional cultivation

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techniques. Some incremental production resulted from spontaneousmigration, but also from settlements supported and assisted under theproject. However, even these increases bring risks as increasedpopulation in the project area is likely to cause reduced fallow and, intime, declining soil fertility and increased erosion. Some of theinfrastructure developed (particularly the extension and animal healthcenters, roads, water supply, social infrastracture and the trainingcenter) were indispensable for the phase two BGS project. The twoprolects viewed together may have a better economic rate of return. Thepossibility for greater and more sustained longterm beneflts is clearlylinked both to the effectiveness of organizing services and to continuingefforts to identify technical innovations which are attractive to farmersin the area.

Other Benefits

5.03 The project did not generate significant increases in familyincomes. However, the number of people who benefitted from the projectwas higher than expected at appraisal, mainly because of high populationincreases in the area during the project period (population in 1982 wasmore than double that estimated at appraisal in 1975). Socialinfrastructure (health centers, schools, roads and particularly drinkingwater supply) have no doubt benefitted several thousand families., Manymore people have benefitted at least to some extent from the servicesextended by the project which, although irregular, now cover the entireproject area.

5.04 Some input distribution activities carried out under the project(which led to most production benefits, along with immigration) have beeninstitutionalized in sustainable systems. Forestry and fruit treesnurseries which still function were created at the communal and sectorlevel. Seedlings are produced regularly and at relatively low cost;various kinds of seedlings are thus available to most farmers. Atpresent, only seeds and plastic bags still need to be supplied throughofficial channels; all other costs can be financed by the localcommunity. Forage multiplication fields installed under the project canalso be eesily financed at cammunal and sectoral levels* Vegetable seeds,introduced under the project, are now mostly supplied by private dealers.Cows for the creation of 'fermettes' are more easily accessible now, dueto their introduction under the project. Regrettably, the project did notdevelop a successful distribution system for tools and plant treatmentproductse. Distribution of basic veterinary products (acaricides,anti-parasite drugs, vaccines and other curative drugs) was poorlyorganized, and the supply and use of such products has not beensustained. Breeding centers established throughout the project areasproduced disappointing results.

5.05 Project marketing interventions yielded few benefits and were notsustained. Efforts included purchase and sale of agricultural commoditiesto stabilize prices, direct purchases from farmers and grouping of sales,and subsidized transport. A more successful marketing intervention wasroad construction, which facilitated agricultural marketing in someareas. In addition, several market places were developed under theproject, which helped marketing in a visible, but unquantified manner.

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VI. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

6.01 In institutional development, there were marked differencesbetween appraisal intentions and what actually transpired duringimplementation. The appraisal mission worked out implementationarrangements carefully, with active Government participation (paras 2.07,2.12). The main concerns then were to avoid the already well knownproblems associated with creating a new parastatal organization (likeOVAPAM, the troubled Mutara project authority), and to work primarily withexisting Rwandese Institutions and farmer groups, as this was seen as theonly way to ensure sustainability of activities undertaken. The plancalled for Rwandese ministry services and cooperatives to take overdevelopment activities as soon as possible.

6.02 The Proiect Coordination Committee (PCC): was created byPresidential decree in November I9i7, constituted as planned at appraisal(para. 2.22). In practice, it met 13 times or once every 3-4 months.Meeting reports show that much time was spent in initial years inarbritrating conflicts of authority within project management. As aresult, much attention was given to setting up internal projectregulations and discussion of staff working conditions, in order toestablish and consolidate the project entity. This went counter to theinitial objective of avoiding the creation of new institutions.Strikingly, meeting reports do not mention the role of coperatives inproject execution, although the Government, during appraisal, had stronglyfavored a central role for cooperatives; for example the DCA stipulatedthat agricultural credit funds for input supply, marketing and processingpass through cooperatives. In practice, the PCC never considered thecooperatives, or even the communes, as important potential partners. Inretrospect, the PCC's working conditions, notably lack of staff supportand time necessary to understand project objectives or analyse problems insufficient detail, partly explain why the PCC could not prevent thesechanges in the project's implementation principles. During an interviewwith a PCC member he suggested that participants often tended to react toproblems according to their own ideas and interests rather than theirministry's positions.

6.03 The PCC was to delegate part of its responsibilities to amanagement committee, chaired by the PCC Permanent Secretary and includingthe project manager and the two regional directors (para. 2.22). Thiscommittee did not in fact operate as planned and its role soon overlappedwith the management team, partly because of initial confusion ofresponsibilities because the PCC Permanent Secretary was also ProjectCo-Director. The management team itself was deeply influenced by thestrong personality of the expatriate project manager, who tended tooperate more as the manager of a strongly centralized private enterprisethan as the coordinator and moderator of a team whose responsibility wasjte assist national institutions in developing sustainable activities.Internal regulations adopted in May 1980 formalized the allocation ofresponsibilities within the management team, designed primarily to resolvetensions between the large team of expatriates and Rwanda staff, whosestatus and authority were uncertain. This move, in effect, turned theproject structure into a heavily centralized and strongly graded entity,far from the light organization which was intended. In a similar vein,annual work plans were prepared by the management team with no formal

.

- 29 -

participation by either the comunes or cooperativGs and, until 1980, werefinalized by the project manager himself. It is surprising that theseorganizational developments, which were inconsistent with initialinstitutional objectives, and which plainly could not survive thewithdrawal of external financing, met no objection either from the PCC orfrom IDA. The effects were clear and probably inevitable: a significantpart of project resources was directed towards the project's ownstructural development: the small Kigali coordinating office became a huge500 m2 complex, the regional development centers were conceived as if theywere to be managed forever by the project, and a special statute wasadopted for Rwandese project staff.

6.04 Financial management was well handled throughout the projectperiod, under the leadership of the expatriate financial manager. Projectaccounts were regularly audited and never questionned either by the PCC orthe co-financiers. Implemented along the OCAM system, project accountingwas managed so as to ensure significant staff training. From 1978, annualbudgets and progress reports were presented according to type of expensesby activity, in order to facilitate coordination between technical controland financial monitoring and more easily compute unit prices. Althoughcalled analytical accounting, the system was in practice not preciseenough to permit effective financial and technical monitoring of projectsub-components.

6.05 Technical management suffered from the lack of qualified Rwandesestaff during the first half of the project period and from continuingfailure to fill technical assistance positions for some key projectactivities. As no cooperative specialist or civil work specialist wasever recruited, a significant part of the regional directors' time wentorganize and supervise the project's huge infrastructure program, Thanksto the good will and hard work of the incumbents, many activities directlyexecuted by the project were successfully launched but were unfortunatelynever taken over by the beneficiaries. An evident conclusion from theexperience was that the effort required to carry out the project - humanand financial - and to establish a lasting institutional base wasseriously underestimated.

6.06 The project was appraised when the Rwandese Government was optingfor a policy of administrative decentralization which tended to reinforcethe responsibilities and financial means of the communes. Communalparticipation in project activities was thought the more necessary asmanagement and maintenance of most planned infrastructure was a communal

* responsibility (roads, water supply, reafforestation, erosion control,etc.). However, since no formal institutional framework for goodcooperation between the communes and the project was foreseen, relationsdeveloped unevenly according to personalities. They were sometimesexcdellent, sometimes disastrous. The project was often perceived as aforeign entity not belonging to Rwandese structures. This situation was

A partly corrected in 1981, when communal authorities began to participatedirectly in the elaboration of project work programs.

A 6.07 Cooperatives were initially expected to become the main projectA executing institutions. The expectations were founded principally on the

encouraging results of previous AIDR work with cooperatives in KibungoPrefecture. In 1975 the Kibungo experiment had seemed positive enough to

- 30 -

convince the "Banques Populaires' to locate some of their first fieldbranch offices theTe. In 1975, in the three communes concerned by theproject, there were 10 cooperatives, with a total membership of 4,578,active in marketing of agricultural products and consumer goods. The mainproblems they had to face were associated with management. As discussedabove (para 3.23) it is regrettable that the project confined itscooperative suport to limited direct assistance, and that coordinationwith the responsible ministry and local authorities in this area waspoor. On the other hand, an effective program would plainly have requiredspecial resources and will take a long time.

VII. BANK PERFORMANCE

7.01 At the time the project was prepared and appraised, the Bank'sknowledge of Rwanda's agricultural sector was somewhat limited. Only oneagricultural project had been implemented and little formal sector workhad been undertaken. This partly explains the substantial changes inproject definition and objectives between identification and appraisal,reflecting some uncertainties by Bank staff on the main constraints anddevelopment priorities for Rwanda's rural sector. Difficultiesexperienced during Implementation of the Mutara Project, the only on-goingBank financed agricultural project in Rwanda during preparation,demonstrated that local conditions were evolving rapidly, in a contextwhere rural development policies had not yet been clearly defined.

7.02 Despite a serious lack of general data on the project area, aninteresting project proposal was defined and prepared in a relativelytimely and effective manner. The preparation process, however, displayedsome shortcomings: (i) more intensive Bank participation in thepreparation process would have been desirable (the short mission formuladid not allow sufficient interaction with the Government and technical

review); and (ii) insufficient effort to place the project in a nationalcontext and to appreciate fully the impact of unclear and evolving ruraldevelopment policies, notably on prices, settlement control andorganizational systems, and to benefit from other project experiences.The decision not to insist on a full preparation report was probablymistaken. To a significant extent these shortcomings were corrected at theappraisal stage, when all project components and conditions ofimplementation were examined in detail.

7.03 Issues raised at appraisal were appropriate, particularly withregard to project organization and implementation and the shift in

A emphasis from formal settlement schemes to the development of agriculturalservices. The recommendation to leave enough time for the Government tobecome fully involved and agree to all aspects of the project was wise.The recommended flexibility to permit adaptation to changing circumstances(thus recognizing some degree of uncertainty about project design) wasidnovative in 1975. It is interesting that despite the long lapsed timefor appraisal, manpower expenditures were relatively low, at 30 staffweeks. The appraisal process followed had a favorable impact on the finalproject design, as it led to significant Government understanding of andcommitment to the project content and positive decisions on projectorganization. Delays in appraisal were, in restrospect, plainlyworthwhile.

.I

- 31 -

7.04 Implementation experience suggests that the project was too largeand complex given the situation prevailing at the time in Rwanda (lackof appropriate technologies, lack of staff, lack of clear policies) and inthe project area (rapid inmigration and communication difficulties). Theeffort needed to implement the project - human and financial - and toestablish a lasting institutional base was seriously underestimated.However, the system of scheduling investments on the basis of agreedannual work programs and budgets could have kept implementation within thelimits of what was feasible, had the system been properly applied, as eachannual plan was to be based on explicit reconsideration of what wasfeasible in the light of experience gained. Regrettably, it was not fullyapplied. In practice, difficulties in finalizing co-financingarrangements (particularly with FAC) and various management dilemmas(definition of responsibilities) diverted supervision missions fromdealing adequately with two main issues: implementation capacity andinstitutional development. The consequences were serious as: (i) the mainproject technical objective (development of production through extensionservices and availability of inputs) was only partly met; and vii) theproject institutional objective was reversed (instead of handing overproject activities to local institutions, the project structure becameovercentralized and non sustainable).

7.05 It is difficult to judge whether these shortcomings could havebeen avoided. It would have been preferable to settle all co-financingarrangements before project start up, but the Government was keen on FACinvolvement, which presented important comparative advantages. The issueof Government implementation capacity was raised at appraisal and couldhave been resolved by drastically reducing the scope of the annual workplans during the two or three first years of implementation. Thie wouldhave delayed project implementation by two or three years and wouldprobably have created more awareness of the adverse institutionalevolution which was developing. Supervision missions were probably notintensive enough in such circumstances to react adequately to all pressingissues raised, particularly during the first three years ofimplementation. Also notable is that more effective timing and a broadermix of disciplines could have had a material and beneficial impact onproject implementation. The time spent on supervision was, nonethelesssubstantial: a total of 120 staffweeks over some five years. It isstriking that very high inputs were required during the period whencofinancing arrangements were reworked. Intensive supervision during thefinal project years proved particularly beneficial in defining issues fortransition to thd second phase project and working towards solutions.

7.06 An effective dialogue on both project snd sector issues developedbetween the Bank and Government during the life of this project. This canbe attributed to a significant degreee to the vehicle afforded by thisproject and the flexibile approach adopted: learning, at least in part, bydding. This improving operational dialogue stood in marked contrast tothe situation before 1975. The improvement was due in part to the processof project appraisal, where the Government was given the opportunity toreview the project in depth and to define its own policy orientationsamong several alternatives, and to intensive and careful supervisionefforts. From appraisal on, the dialogue with the Government wasconstructive and collaborative even on thorny issues like technicalassistance and cost recovery. The Government observed, however, that

- 32 -

supervision missions were generally too short and tended to limitthemselves too often to criticizing what was being done and imposingchanges which did not always lead to improvements. The project experiencemight have been used earlier and more systematically as a springboard forpractical sector dialogue on key issues like cost recovery andsustainability.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTSTANDING ISSUES

8.01 Although the project was not fully completed, the credit closed inDecember 1982. Credit 1283-RW for the follow-on project became effectivein March 1983, with a PPF advance facilitating a smooth transition betweenthe two phases. Although the project did not have the expected impact onagricultural production, achievements were substantial, mostly in terms ofinfrastructure development, experience acquired by Rwandese staff, andsocial changes. The project laid a solid base for the further developmentof the Bugesera and Gisaka/Nigongo regions.

8.02 Although the two regional centers responsible for extensionactivities were not fully staffed until late 1981, a number of activities,including extension work and distribution of various inputs, were carriedout with some success. This came despite a dearth of power, attractivetechnical packages and research adapted to the area. Plainly, someprogress could be made with existing knowledge but sustained, long termprogress depended on proper research and better research/extensionlinkages. Livestock programs were hampered by an acute shortage ofqualified staff almost throughout. Their Impact on production was,therefore, limited although veterinary products were introduced andcollective pastures, which could be developed in the future, wereidentified. The two commercial fattening ranches proved to be non viablebut the Rusumo station, despite numerous management problems, remains apotentially productive asset. An important program of ruralInfrastructure development was completed, including a center at Kigali,two regional centers, staff housing, and 20 PAVs. However, much of thework program for access and feeder roads was not completed due primarilyto higher than expected costs. Health centers and schools wereconstructed in the two regions. Most of the water supply program was alsocompleted. Two training centers were established and are operating. Theprofessional training program was changed and delayed. The Rubilizitraining center, which was meant to train veterinary extension workers,was eventually transformed into a national veterinary and animalproduction training center. Training in the regional centers began onlyin 1981. By the end of 1982, project infrastructure was considered almostcompleted and extension services had, at length, become a main concern ofproject management. Project planning and execution were theresponsibility of regional directors and Rwandese officials had assumedall project management responsibilities.

A

8.03 Important problems which emerged during project implementation andpreparation of the follow-on project include:

(1) Too many buildings, generally on too large a scale, andoften poorly designed were developed, so the Governmentfaces serious difficulties in financing proper maintenance.Future use of this infrastructure is uncertain now that

- 33 -

activities have been reduced, and not all of itindispensable for Government agricultural services;

(ii) Substantial numbers of staff were hired over the projectperiod for specific activities, but almost none of them wasdismissed when the need ended. Similarly, the projectorganization was built up to the point that it nowrepresents a new institution which the Government is unable.to maintain with its own resources and which is in any eventdisproportionate in size for the project area;

(iii) almost no agricultural research was undertaken duringproject implementation, leaving, at project completion, muchwork to be done to identify, experiment with, and implementrelevant extension themes for the project area;

(iv) no monitoring was undertaken, nor systematic technicalsurveys carried out, so that apart from the IAMSEA surveysthere is no basic technical data on which a program offuture actions can be professionally built up; and

(v) although project staff appears better qualified at projectcompletion than it was when it started, as far as formaltraining is concerned, few acquired a real professionalqualification, or are more motivated to build up and manageefficient extension services.

8.04 During appraisal of the second phase prolect, in May-June 1981,changes were introduced in the concept and organization of plannedactivities taking into account experience of the BGK I project and ofother rural development projects in Rwanda. The project included aresearch component to introduce applied research and farming systemtechniques. This component is being managed by ISAR from the Karamaresearch station located in the project area. Emphasis was placed onextension staff training and on-farm demonstrations to be reinforced bydistribution of inputs. Livestock activities were to be organized aroundassociations of producers. The project placed greater emphasis onimprovement of feeder roads and bridge construction to facilitatetransport and give access to several isolated areas. Finally, projectstaff were to plan, execute, and monitor agricultural and pastoralactivities in the project area in close coordination with localauthorities. Other changes included the introduction of a projectmonitoring and evaluation unit. Funds were provided to help the Rusumostation to become financially autonomous but the Gako and Nasho ranchesreceived no further support. On project structure, the decentralizationof responsibilities from Kigali to the regions is a main feature of thesecond phase project. The project included two components which wereeiplicitly designed as pilot efforts for future national programs:nutrition centers and a family planning program. These activities androad development are managed by the relevant ministries.

8.05 Design of the second phase project thus benefits directly fromexperience acquired: less numerous components managed by the relevantinstitutions, decentralization of responsibilities, elimination of nonviable components, introduction of research activities, direct focus on

34 -

extension, and better coordination with local authorities. Unfortunately,the second phase project also inherited some problems from itspredecessor:

(i) an infrastructure out of proportion to real needs whichthe Government cannot maintain;

(ii) a very numerous staff (an average of 70 agents per commune)whose salaries cannot be supported by the Government budgetand which is disproportionate to real needs;

(iii) working habits poorly adapted to the requiredconcentration of efforts on priority topics; and

(iv) a still poor information base on the project area,which is indispensable for proper planning of extensionactivities.

8.06 These problems are gradually being addressed through a morerigorous administration involving definition of tasks and Implementationof routine work schedules for every staff member, concentration ofactivities on what can effectively be achieved and attempts to develop amore logical and more professional working approach to achieving definedobjectives. Much imagination will, however, be necessary to allow usefulutilization and maintenance of all infrastructure constructed; painfulreductions of staff and means will have to be imposed before reaching thesmall number of qualified staff required for lasting agriculturaldevelopment programs in the area.

8.07 The project experience suggests s*veral lessons, which are ofparticular interest because many are common to area-based integrated ruraldevelopment projects:

(a) The appraisal process was% nrotracted and involved a series ofmissions and discussions with the Governmrnt. The prim_ry objec-tive of this process, which was deliberately planned, was toensure full government commitment to the project and to awaitgovernment decisions on key issues, notably implementationarrangements. The process worked quite well in focusing policymakers' attention on the project (paras. 2.04-2.18) and in over-coming problems from insufficient government involvement earlier(see (h) below);

(b) The project was designed with considerable flexibility; annualimplementation plans were to be agreed upon by the Government andIDA, and it ws expected that these would reflect experiencegained and depart substantially from appraisal estimates. Thesystem showed great promise, but did not work as well as it shouldhave because of insufficient attention to it from the Governmentend IDA. Special efforts were called for to ensure that key proj-

_ 35 _

*ct objectives remained constantly in view and to test continuallythe sustainability of actions undertaken (pares. 2.24, 6.03 and7.04);

(c) This was one of the Region's first instances of use of the ProiectPrevargtion Facility. It proved a lightly effective way to speedstart-up and sustain momentum between appraisal and implementation(paras. 2.14, 3.02). A PPF also smoothed the transition betweenthe first and second projects (para. 8.01);

(d) Even though the project was conceived as an integrated developmentproject, lt included too many components. Non-agricultural activ-ities should have been postponed or assigned to other lnstitu-tions* This would have allowed project staff, who came under theMiniatry of Agriculture, to concentrate ou agriculture and live-stock development activities (the project's chief objective)rather than on other areas (par-s. 2.18, 7.04);

(e) Co-financina arrantements came unstuck after approval and theresulting uncertainties and changes seriously perturbed projectimplementation. Coordination arrangements for the key work pro-gram exercise were not warked out in sufficient detail. Numerousco-financier meetings during implementation monopolized time andattentlon of project and supervision staff (paras. 3.03-3.06);

(f) A more thorough and reallstic assessment at appraisal of recurrentcosts and mechanisms for cost recovery, including analysis ofprospects for sustainability of activities and services, mighthave brought home the vital importance of these issues earlier.Moro specific policy agreements should have been negotiated andapplled. Notwithstanding, these issues need to be addressed pri-marily in the context of a broader sector dialogue between theGovernment and the Bank, whilch had hardly gotten underway whenthis project was designed, but is now far advanced (paras. 3.40,7 06);

(g) Key decisions on the institutional framework for a project mustplainly be made by the Government (as was indeed the case in thisproject), but with special attention to financial sustainabilityissues. Appraisal agreements called for reliance on existinglnstitutions and farmers' groups but this objective was largelyforgotten. The project unit became a large autonomous bureaucracyseen as a foreign providential source of finance by localauthorities (paras. 2.07, 2.12, 3.11-3.12, 8.03);

(h) The lack of sustained Rwandese official involvement in proiectidentification and Preparation posed serious problems of govern-ment commitment and placed too much onus on Bank missions to pro-pose specific project ideas. This is an appropriate area for theBank to insist on full government lnvolvement (paras. 2.02, 2.18,7 02);

4

- 36 -

(i) The technical data base for this project was weak, and even avail-able documentation (maps, descriptive reports, statistics) werenot fully communicated to project staff. More attention tospecific arrangements for plugging information gaps was needed;

(j) Although supervision time spent ws, as anticipated, relativelyhigh, substantial time went to resolving cofinancing problems, andthe conclusion is that more intensive supervision, well timed andincluding a wider mix of expertise, would have been beneficial.The experience demonstrates clearly that a flexible project designcalls for greater inputs by IDA and the Government during imple-mentation. Areas where more supervision could have helped were:problems of agricultural *xtension, training, monitoring and eval-uation, cost recovery, and input supply. Project supervisionaxperience could have been used *arlier as a springboard to abroad-based sector dialogue in many areas (paras. 7.05-7.06);

(k) Technical assistance was critical, but arrangements posed impor-tant problems. This experience underscores the difficulties inusing technical assistance well. Expatriate technical assistantsare rarely well accopted in managerial positions and the record oftraining and motivating local staff was disappointing. They wereoften underutilized when assigned as local manager counterparts oradvisors. One conclusion is that frequent short-term consultan-cies seem preferable to permanent expatriate positions in manyinstances. Much effort was fruitlessly expended in sorting outrasponsibilities within the project management team. Lines ofcommand and term of reforence for staff at all levels need to beclearly defined at the outset and clearly communicated to individ-uals. Vigorous follow-up is also needed (paras. 3.05, 3.08-3.09).An important achievement was tnat at project completion Rwandesestaff held all project management positions (para. 8.02);

(1) Attention to extension systems and research-extension linkages wasinsufficient. Specific attention to linkages with agriculturalresearch are critical for a project like thls whose successdepends on strong extension themes adapted to the area in ques-tion. The preferred solution is to rely on a solid nationalresearch program, but in a case like this (the national researchwas on a rapidly descendlng slope during implementation), a welldesigned research component is essential (pras. 3.21, 8.03);

(m) The tsets- eradication component was problematic and its outcomegenerally disappointing, pointing to the need for a regional(l.e., international) approach to the p-oblem and special atten-tion to environme:t.al implications (par&. 3.17, Annex 2). Incontrast, the experience with soil erosion control and ruralafforestation gives some grounds for optimism that progress can beachieved (paras. 3.30, 4.05, 5.04).

-37-

RUAM

surtSEsA usT. GISAEAIIICOnIo MIXED 1IUII3AND hEAL D3VEWXMT PrOJCT

PRJCT COIPlET1IOM ROIRT

A',rawrel Estibte. of fro1ect Costs

Local ForeIgn Total Local Poreiln Total-f- ' mllion- - W00 -

Proiact Coanonente

Tsetse eradication 23,8 15.0 38.8 256 162 418

Extenslon services and Infrastructure 172,3 100.3 272.6 11856 1,060 2,936

Agricultural Inputs - Farer Credit 191.8 71,9 263.7 2,066 774 2,64q

Access and Fweder Roads 73.6 22.1 95.7 793 235 1,031

Water Developmet 50,4 115.2 165.6 543 1,241 1,784

Social lnfratructure 3.7 18.8 50,5 341 203 544

Livestock Development/excl. extension 139,8 43,1 182 9 1,506 464 1,970

North Glmaka pilot irrigation station 47,4 67,6 11,0 511 728 1,239

Technical Serviceo 157.3 146.8 30 1.694 1.581 3.275

Total 18lJ. 600.8 1,486.9 9.566 6.571 16.037

Contingencles

Physical contingences 107,8 68,7 175,7 1,153 740 18893

Price contlngencies 295.6 198.9 4945 3.184 2.142 S.326

Total contingencies 402.6 267.6 670.2 4.337 2.882 7.219

Project Total Costs 1.290.6 868.5 2.159.1 1.390 9.355 23.256

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- 41 - ANNEX 1

-'I Table 5

Proiecc Accual Costs

Costs per Component

(RWF '000)

I

'1

.,

1M 17 190 till 12

Surveys 1t9 15010 1fi 107? 10191 195

Tsetse Eradication * 0 10041 31 402 13774

Extension 2041 126023 LOm27 19104 112 311992

Access and Feeder roads 13W 1 10196 3742 U 3069 3911

Water Supply 2096 M112 2A IN79 6151 4334

Ranches 4011 961 2703 7 7 4926Social Infrastructure 2145 34195 2130 34..j 0 0wo

Technical assistance SOW 44112 9133 2422 23947n

Equipment 457 735 12M'& 11M4 507 41651?

S/Total 41043 3243 44U5 217217 268995 1U5

Consumed material 1. 9 26849 1316 4' 4154 14417

Other operating costs i~~1 19441 21079 z.... 14476 10375

Staff 3i c0 93022 145015 113467 159 4370Staff 2~~~~~~~~~~S 553 253 is I 33

Financial charges - 1 17612 I69 75I(0Inputs

S/Total 11869 1629I4 209362 2 1106 615175

Total MM 52z67 549 467777 355 2O1

_

-1

3~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

- 42 -

Annex 1Table 6

Pro 4ect ACtual Costs

Costs Per CaCesOries

(RWF '000)

117; 971im m9o 11.1 23 IgTOW

Surveys 1040 15010 1555 10702 101X! S1il"Tsetse eradication I 0 100I 3=31 42 12774Kigali infrastructures 6840 1:U44 1002 152 0 2Regional infrastructures 44465 34171 31095 428 1M7 12i:'Training centre 2433 33105 7443 534 0 UM2PAY IIV 4IS;2 43843 S145 2217 iSioRanches 4071 1411 27403 7745 31: I1:saFarmers settlement 5 2402 7634 22ff Oi4 I"A2Fishing 0 97o 0 390 i 1354Communal fields. 412 .0 1130 078 a MA20Pastures I 0 21 OS3 1215 tErosion control 0 O3512Slaughtor houses I 3770 *10 94 4154Silos o O 13 550 II n9

,4' Social centres ISO 50 1230 2I0 0 1EQSchools 15* 5 31U45 n33o 5 0 471s0Water Supply 2M01 51 12 2U 70071 U15S :. 'Roads and feeder roads 132 10114 C 1412 4f3 ICL9 .iz

0Total infrastructure 39 255332 24H2I 121:41 S453 102lSlWorks on force account 41841 152B37 117130 431710 17C50 459d6Balance 22034 1021. 5111'1 713 77A5U s5l3

4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Mlaterial and equipment 4. 6? 7351 12M 12 12 14 520L 41450Consumed materials 5077 141111 17511 SUM 55I12 StOiSiOther operating costs 21423 3478 43iV 221112 tS!SI 14^233Staff 44441 NS& 16441 117831 11301 :; 4 IS8Technical assistance MU? 44112 41132 53B74 22422 234113Financial charges 1 '5 2 IS I 6I0Inputs 322 2U140 4S5t1 J72 16439 78040

Total with watersupply 41230 53548 54193 427M IrXi 2FI-91Total wichout wateogupply M490 473 262U.5 417413 270314 20122454!

, J

43 -

Aamx I3UCESRA - GCISA/MICONbCO PROJZCT

(Cr.d$t ~~oa-rna Table 7; t~~~~~~~~~~Credft 66"1U) 'bc7

PROJECT COIPLETION REORT

' Ptie Ac.tual Costs

Infrastructure

(meW '000)

1977/78 1979 1960 1961 1982

C nzrsServ±ces() (2) S/T:T (1) (2)S/T T (1) 9) (1) (2) SJ/T, T) (2Central Sria 311314VA U4& W235?2 1433 a()()ST 2 2* Offices .a. ... ,q ,S . W, el 131 I1945Offices ,i .. ma Ow

ubilial. Trm. C.ontrb *I 1 I1 A "' Im mu uW u 3:u-uildings £415 lI4 11415 1 USS 30 7 li UPjI 4l2 9I 27 3 U5 72 .Biause 1723)11 .-1all 4!4 44 w t II$I 1412 4454453.

.,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~m na "i - t , * 'W

RSional Centres 11 1044 1014 I? PM 1 Z 23131lU mlw 19 no4 35 720 1w 34* Offices 1 LI5 T1VA LIVIA. III"0 IFIW; 0144 :10 67 nfi2 MflJ M33 *J 1S.Zll I2t X tbuso~~ ~351 1321 U 21UL 21.. U171N W5Wi. SISO 212 212 4171 U. 4 46 .5311 12 523 1V7tRouses III 361 444 4446 410 '21 lf-r 434~40 M 33 3 32 13 37) 101Field preperatSoli UUS 131M ml 1303 2U12 1014 loJS U M I. 4i

PAV'. M *.34 M1'II, I53P ?i 2 Z5 ImM15 222' 3 122Offices 33 *13** 113 VI VU 4 in 6 S. 6 1xlouses M 1% 4 l Ifield PTperati *4 e4 10. ,e.g Z? m4 0 qrRefugees S

.4 , *. .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- 0. AA suZamo Ste ios n CM 0 1 M.t IoS 1 su * MIUutldliag 6 I33 *26321218OaS 1 32

tauies , 02242? * LI2,field Preparation * * . IOi UU410 13

CAIO *Dt .i m 2M 21 M31 3122112101U22m11 . e

;uisdins .A 0 4 414 * 424 214 13 S 633 0*234Neusee ~~~~~~~~~422 3? 31 414411 41251&in 62544 0143

Field preparation 21 MII I7 t 1 M 1 447 40 17 404 -4N IM 1 22

.AildIigs I a l 141 511 141 437 4 4 13 1 S i *Bounes 'I In it 7m2 363 S4 W40 "Mo as12 119t ?17 * lownield prwepaaeitol0 3 I313 I I210 21031"M 6 4 43 0 4633Feature lprove. ,4 294 M M153 L3 Il 1 1U 1 3isl 1n &10 DU im

Nurseries 13 II '4 lU 211 1344 IXI 74 RuFa*urs s:ttlgme 51 3 74 2412 2I1 7U 0 73 1;04 2295 M221 215 37 13.is e emX u ems am,,<Caslld.s 417 II 41? 42 l 1131 2 u I 10132 in ' 21' .tu5r" . S *I2U 2&1 i2110 lo low31 121M. IM 'MU.rosion Cacrol I ' * 623W mo VW I mM 11 152 7112Si;auter Houses . e 0 * 53 M70 37 17621 2 331 4154

.108' 8* e eonW 4* * 1 M a0 iss2E1*t 11 t;;SaocSal Coutrs I t 1 .. I 3X 15 nn Mo I21"3 r.ss 21I 1? 1ons t MSchools 31 Scho2 1 241121 23 3315 l1 4011 4 1 1 47Vatar Supply - Lid 21;#5 M1 5" 141 5t2 li2117 l 2awl m 0n ts 2gt5,5 WXl70 o.l sM,*s

j t~~~~oads M#2 tom I]Ni 111UM .1__ SJ 11m ,5¢,_ _, , 10it MMi!

b ceiorM o force a.count, 2) Others, S/t Sub.Ttal by Ila, T Tocal

-.s-J

- 44 -Annex 1

Prolect Actual- Cots Table 8

No Lpbs1cal lawueaauu Costs

(3W '000)

1977/78 1979 1980 1981 1982

(1) (2)S/T T (1) (2) S/T T (1) (2) SIT T (1) (2) S/T T (1) (2) S/T T

o . . *sas,2 * s u 31451 e sIL;Vetcriway Lab. i1n 11 SW U t 3 3 3 3 3ubtlil -- IU; lt1 IMJi 4w 4U41a o82O1

*AeraL pbotos & Haps 4537 all au) on ml ell lo ion 1* ?1Feasiblity Stude me al l we 3n m12 11 IS 1E IlMm la Om so U333- Ct Stt | | w w 9 * w § ;s~~~~- 1 s 9CredieServey m?S4? fSP o @147$Url Svey -S*1 U *3*W*23T!sue _ S MM621 1431 .21 U131 4u 12 i3rl:

*~~ t ?r1* *.. 111 .0311 SS lS9 . 2ta 31 *:il !8 5L3451; Swa _ 1111 llls 111t , . * 1nt sn s uw | 155$~~~~~~231 111 IMa 151Ing - , .,- _maWW

Total .. . 59 1fl IMJ6 0 5515 I!i22 Aa4 1*46 I3 l IIi'i033 8513 2M ".42 :f. 7..2

(1) Vo?k cafied out by project(2) Others

S/T Sub Total

t Tocal

si~~~~

- 45 -

Ann9x 1Prolects Actual Costs Table 9

Material and Equipment

(RWF '000)

5123 1979 5119 1931 5962 MAL

Vehicles 349 091 gm5 1 C4 942 4 Mm9Civil works materials 59 o1 954 S 0 ANOfflice equipment 3716 on 93 13 a InaTraining center equipment 3 11 21" 9 5 59 194School equipment 12 15 6 0 Marketing/Processing Equipment 2 2913 132 1 596 19PAY equipment 2 1157 M2m 2un 5Garage equlpment 52 2361 UN 5 UHousing furniture WI mi 712 f 1 lUmAgricultural equipment 3 w n7 145 14 I Health centres equipment M' 35 35

Total 1137 73539 IA !2 IO N . 4150f

a

.'1

- 46 -

Proiect's Actual Costs Annex 1

Oneratina Costs Table 10

(WF 000)

IM I11 111 .1111 191 WiDtMISESConemned aMterials

Construction materials 2NW UU1 m32 22611Ubuliding m*intenance _mt. a 7 21 I4 1146 tIOffice equip mt UU *t me 1 lei421 aMileneved tfurniture I 1 IV 165 33 411Clvil Work spares 4 l 2 14Vehicles spares 2-42 atm a* ,; lao 4"ai,Fuelond oil 642 U 2764 I"M4 13 UawSycicles UD14 1371Agricultural equipesnt l 2C S91 l2 tn26 31N0Agricultural Inputs IM9 MI 2W 41W 2X33 1UU5Veterinaries Inputs a auw 1141 MO 110 lUlTraining materials m m XIu 3b am5 *mMarketing U w "I 41 u s t 3Ni ntennce u* am W Ill75 n 4119

harmacy a a 1 El 25 112KuscellanecuaFishing It, A 214

.- F~~~~B*lbu * M b Health Centres ' 42 a

Total consaud aterials (W. Stock)$t27 loin mm17 no SIR 1111Tr anports LIS 36 437 21 418 1`1

Other Servwlc.

Vehicles maintenance 3S7 a 3ti m 46 nu 26131Offices salntenance 2 1 296 29 2 "IBuilding maintenance 1ll 1 2U II .142 lnCivil Worku equipt. maintenance I6 U III In a aSurveys Ml Ss lm SZ 111 170Rental charges 2 31 m 7 74Other op. expenses ma2 NU I56 26" 211 Wit

Total Other Services 11 2221 23 191m 5r7 ISO17Losses SuNI . s un1 52 m 2 22454

Total pther op. expenses A Looses' 2I 2 3613 OM2 M2U 1Il1 IMStock Celk W 44U 5 513Stock Nsho Ni ItS 2 2M1

Stock Lg iu 1 1 962Other stock * *,

Total Stock UX m us' ~~~~~Staff

Paid by IDA 215 911 11177 I1 U Civil Servants UUU 1OU 1151 l21 1123! R21

>Hingart fixed termo 2K5Ml nm 2322 = 51 1132CaOnee 4 W I 429 7 5311 12112Technical Assistance 13W 167 aim 13 221 239

Total Staff (en1. TA) 4445 IN IU647D IIX5 1311 5UIIFinannciol ctcharges U m 33 a I W

Total.IWU. =0 4ILV 3NN I"LU 14101

ANNEX 2Page 1 of 4

BUGESERA-EAST/GISAKA-MIGONGO MIXED FARMINGAND RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(Cr. 668-RW)

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

Tsetse Eradication in the Gisaka/Migongo Region

1. A component of the project since its Identification, tsetseeradication in the infested areas of the Akagera Valley had been plannedlong ago in the framework of a three-phase national eradication programincluding all infested areas in eastern Rwanda. This program, designed bythe Government with ISAR assistance, started In the late 1960. andIncluded:

(i) tsetse eradication in the Bugesera region. Successfullyimplemented in 1968/69 wLth financial assistance from EDF,some 90,000 ha of land were cleared of tsetse flies.Assesments carried out in 1974 confirmed the remarkablesuccess of this operation and even nowadays, more than 10years later, no serious roinfestation appears to havetaken place;

(11) tsetse eradication in the Kibungo (Rusuo) area. AIDRcarried out from 1970 treatments of about 12,000 ha ofland and established anti-fly barriers covering some 5,000ha. This second phase, although initially successful,eventually failed to avoid progressive reinfestation fromneighboring areas in Tan*anla;

(iii) a survey was planned under the Mutara Projectto design a program of tsetse eradication and protectionmeasures for the Mutara area and the Akagera NationalPark.

2. Because of the failure experienced in the Rusumo basin, ISARcarried out a new survey in February 1973 and prepared an eradicationprogram for the whole fly-belt (from Nasho to Rusumo). This program, towhich was added the area around lakes Rwampanga, Rwehikama and Nasho andthe Southern part of the Kibungo highlands, and including also repetitionof actions already carried out in 1970 In the Rusumo basin, constitutedthe basis of the project tsetse eradication component. Altogether, the

j. project eradication program entailed treatment of some 100,000 ha of landand establishment of 40 Kms of anti-fly barriers for a cost estimated atnegzly RWF 39 million.

3. The principal objective of the tsetse eradication program was topermit development in new areas considered favorable for traditionalcropping or irrigation, and to facilitate livestock development onmarginal areas and in the Rusumo Station. It soon became apparent, during

48 - ~~~~ANNEX 2- 48 - PagPe2 of 4

the course of preparation and then appraisal, that immigration in theseareas was greater, occurring at a quicker pace, than expected. Therefore,it was difficult for the Government to limit or block new settlements, andthere were special demands for coordinated anti-fly treatment activitiesand initiation of project developments. The May 1975 appraisal missionhighlighted these issues and, in the subsequent letter to the Government,recommended that energetic measures be taken to control new settlements.The mission underlined the risks of continued spontaneous settlement inInfested areas, but emphasized that the project should be developed takingInto account the reality that full control of settlement was notfeasible.

4. The Government of Belgium agreed in April/May 1975 to finance thetsetse eradication program; there remained the problem of timelycoordination between the various activities. Technically, the sameprinciples applied in Bugesera some years before were to be retained (withthe exception of a complementary insecticide spraying by plane). Theyconsisted in the delineation of geographical zones to be treated bynatural (mountains, rivers or marshes) or artificial (tree and bushcleared) barriers and systematic spraying of all fly habitats until alldifferent fly species had disappeared (verified by systematic control).This strategy was based on several, perhaps over-optimistic, beliefs withregard to the biological behavior of the various existing fly species(flies not living above a 1,500m elevation, and being unable to move morethan 2 km). However, it was already proven thrt some species(particularly Glossina morsitans) could live up to a 2,000m elevation andthat, carried by wind or fixed on an animal, a fly could move overconsiderable distances.

5. From 1977 to 1981, implementation of the eradication campaignwas seriously disturbed on several occasions, so that its results wereuneven and incomplete. Implementation began as planned, but was abruptlystopped at the end of September, 1977, following the ban imposed by theGovernment Supreme Council upon the use of Dieldrine (basic component ofDieldrex then used for spraying). This ban occurred when 90Z of theprogram had already been executed. It was called off only in mid-January1978, after early rains had permitted reinfestation of already treatedareas. The 1978 treatment campaign was carried out in much betterconditions. An ISAR report concluded that the operation had been asuccess, although detailed comments showed that uncertainties remained inseveral areas as to whether the flies had been completely eliminated orwhether some residual pockets still existed. The report included severalspecific recommendations concerning operation follow-up, particularly:

(i) to proceed quickly with settlement in treated areasin order to break up possible residual pockets ofinfestation and thus slow down or avoid possiblereinfestation;

(ii) to establish a sanitary control post at the Rusumo customspost to prevent flies from being carried into areasalready treated;

(ii) to continue control aetivities and sporadic treatmentswith some funds remaining under Belgian financing;

_49 - ANNEX 2i iPoge73of 4

(iv) to ensure maintenance of anti-fly barriers; and

(v) to avoid uncontrolled Import of cattle which are posslblecarriers of tryponosomiasis from which mechanicaltransmission could occur through other kinds of insects.

These recommendations, althougb justified, were not fully followed up.Checks were undertaken by ISAR until June 1979 but their results appearnot to have been transmitted to the project managing team. What Isapparent, in any case, is that those in charge of project lmplementation,probably overloaded with their various other responsibilities, did not

* follow up closely on progress in implementation, which came under theresponsibility of institutions not directly related to the project. Theirinformation was incomplete since copies of the progress reports to MINAGRIwere not even systematically sent to BGN.

6. Only at the end of 1979 did the BGH managers become worried aboutthe re-emergence of tryponosomiasis outbreaks in Rusumo and Nasho. Theycontacted ISAR who indicated that their continuing Intervention dependedupon decisions from Brussels on use of remaining funds. Only in May 1980did the project Permanent Secretary agree on use of IDA funds to carry outurgent measures which could stop tsetse reinfestation in already treatedareas through maintenance of existing anti-fly barriers. These activitieswere started at the end of 1979 but stopped in early 1981 because ofmismanagement of funds. Meanwhile, assessments proved that reinfestationhad already occurred in the whole area already treated, from Rusumo to thesouthern border of the Akagera National Park.

7. In October 1981, an FAO consultant visited the infested zone atIDA's request. His report confirmed the precariousness of actionsundertaken prior to his visit and recommended a set of interventions(control studies, bush clearing, spraying and use of fly nets) whose costswere estimated to some RWF 37 million. Since such investments could notbe envisaged at that late stage of project implementation and also did notguarantee complete tsetse eradication, only minor activities were pursuedwhich efficiency proved later doubtful (biconical fly nets in particular).

8. Compared to appraisal estimates, expenses under this componentwere the following (in RWF)

ANNEX 2

-50- Page 4 of 4

4Wt 1^ t- 1976 1977 1978 1979.J 1980 1981 Tbtal

Labor (Salaria.) 12,900,000 165,310 709,885 790,580 1,573,532 - 3,239,307

Squlpu nt 3,800,000 46,270 225,030 7,200 - 2,430,338 - 2,708,838

~ lmnapo,t 5,900,000 180,020 587,490 430,750 - 36,500 - 1,294,760

Splm - - 34,596 - - - - 34,596

M - - 26,0D - - - - 26,500

* 1Tbuiuar - - - - - 6,000,000 2,057,031 8,057,031

LGaoullIinm 8,700.0Q0 100 77.410 49 100 - - - 126,510

.

7

i~~~oa 38800031701609112753 00030207011,2,4

q~~~~~~

::~~~~~

';

- 51 -1

DUGESIRA EST GISAA MIGOf0GO;IUD FARMING AND R DZVELOPEN PROJECT

(Credit 668-RW).4

PROJECT COMPION RPORT

.e u rv of Key Indicators

;gaasre *i /alUigellg Tsui

1 A.L(1) Actual A.E.(1 Actual A 1(1) Actu l

A. Technical Services

* ~~~~(Ki9gal1)Main Office 1 Training Cnre School Form I Vetrinary Lob. 1 -(2)

B. btneoe Intrn-structure

;Regloal DevlopmatCentres 1 2 a

Agricultural EatensiecCentre (PAVe) 4 1i 4 2 (a) 6 1,

Vet. Centre (PAVe) 6 is 6 9 (4) 1 10Beekeeping Ceetre 2 8 I 1 (5) 8 4Fisheries Cenre i 1 8 I isNurseries a U U 88 la 65Dipglng Tanks 6 5 F 4 14 6

C. Inputs

H.l'o! rs 7i 74 1,U 1i (6)Stables 6527) 1,17 (s) 1,56 2,16Beehives so (i a (15) I'm 867 (9)Fishing sta and n*.e. n.. 2U u... (21)Gear

Fish Seelng Oven 4 (22) a (12) 4 I (11)

A.4 , F

..

Annex 3-52-Lu.

gagesers Cisaka/ligoinso Total

- 5 - -s 2

.~~~~~~~~~~~~~..2 cul A 1. .2 Acua A. I.( Ata

3. Market.jo and

Coq,eatiwe off Icgsmd stores 12(12)4(25 6lz

Vlorer sllg and_ -- 2 2

Decorticators e----

Ilmaghterhouses -3 1na4

SlJcos 3(t3) t 1 nA 4

It. ,ads

Accessaroada(I=) so) 100) 10)

Pr a (kin) ) ~~~~313 156 ) 6'owei roads (km) m goo ) 1,200

I.Vat*lor §MIvmite .9 10 10

C. Social Infrastructure

Sboleuhchue 2 3 _ 3 3; 6

B ' So ltb Contras 3 2 3 2(16) 6 4(24).~~~~c.i .. . ~ ~~ ; 'al*h*Centre.

(1) 4ppraisal estimate at project completion. All numbers are indicativeas project Is being Implemented on basis annual work plans. taking into

- account operating axpereance and possibly Qntadling substantial changesto project Investments as compared with original appraisal estimates.

(2) Finncing taken over by CGoverment of the tetherlads; constructioncpled In 1983. -

(3) Seven of whlch with both atricultural and livestock facilities, twodith agricultural extenson only.

(4) Sree of which with both agricultural and livestock facilitises two- with livestoek extension only.

O(5) Co mro at Regional Centei HQ, but bot equipped with honey extractor.

- . ...........(6) SVpPlied on credit.

f(7 Of ubich 152 "Siprovea stables" eorered with corrugated iron roofingprovided on credit.

* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~A ;E( 3

Page 3.-53 -

(8) Of which 150 lmproved stsl0es, covered with corrugated iron roofingprovided on credit.

(9) Figures seem uncertain; 128 beekeepers reportedly registered inBugesera, precise number in Gisaka not Known, possibly souwherebetveen 100 and l50.

(10) Reportedly 332 fishermen with 321 pirogues provided with extensionservices in Bugesera, as of end December 1981; no figures availableLi Gisaka.

(11) In Bugesera 2 3ut of 4 Intermittently operated for sometime virtually notoperated in Gisaka; most fish is being sold fresh.

(12) Only stores, no offices.

; (13) One being uspd.

(14) Of which, in Gisaka, one health center and one school for nurses.

i.

.1~~~~~

4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

- 54 -

Annex 4Table I

RWANDABUGESERA - GISAIA/MIGONGO PROJECT

(Credit 668-RW)

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

Comparison of Appraisal estimates and actual disbursesents.

(US$ '000)

c er Appraisal Actual Actual disbursements asand quarter Esdtiate Total X of appraisal Estizates

1977 II 0 0 -III 1) 350 0 0IV 500 0 0

1978 I 1 750 0 0II 2) 1,100 340 34III 1,500 540 36IV 2,000 830 42

1979 I 2,500 1,100 44II 3,000 1,700 57III 39500 2,260 65IV 4,000 3,750 94

1980 I 4,500 4,325 96II 5,000 5,300 106III 6,000 6,230 104IV 7,000 7,240 103

1981 I 8,000 8,750 1091I 9,000 9,640 107III 10,000 10,810 108IV 11,000 11,410 104

1982 I 11,500 11,970 104II 12,000 12,650 105III 12,500 13,300 106IV 13,500 13,450 100

1983 I 14,000 13,850 99a II 14,000 100

Closing date 09/30/82 11/30/82

1i Expected date of effectiveness : March 1, 1977 (at appraisal).2/ Actual date of effectiveness : November 23, 1977

y , - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~55-

Annex 4Table 2

RWANDABUGESERA - GIS-AXA/IGONGO PROJECT

Credit 668-RW)PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

* IDA DISBURSEMENTS-BREAKDONJ BY CATEGoRy

Credit Categories Credit Agreement Revisd Credit ActualAllocations Agreemeat Disbursements

Allocations (1979)

I A 200,000 200,000 4,820,000.. B~~ (1) (1) _

C (1) (1) 249,933!, D 100,000 100,000 275,140

E (2) (1) 59,491II A 100,000 100,000 1,955,639

B 500,000 500,000 173,056C (1) (1) _D (1) (1) 579,691Z (2) (1) 47,652

III (1) (1) 103,823IV A (1) (1) 4,352,094

3 : (1) (l) 192,567V A 300,000 3009000 17,341

3 (1) (1) 530,000VI 300,000 300,000 128,815VII A 180,000 360,000 360,000

s 200*000 200,000 154,758V'III 11,120,000 (3) 9,940,000 (3) -IX 2.000,000 2.000.000

TOTAL 14,000v00, 14,000,00 14,000,000

(15 to be laocI ted on the basis of agreed yearly work plans(2) sub-category added in 1979 amended credit agreement(3) to be allocated to categories I to VI on the basis of work plans

!~~~~~

';

- 56 -

i ~~~~~~~~~~~A"" 41 5Table 3

uuauM-ozaxJiaoa.Io PItwgcT

(Criet "a-RV

IDA DIUUUIZTM PI CATOU MMJICT TMA

l_)

Cat ls. 1977/1576 1979 1960 1981 192 Total

x 68,726,782 180,551,510 174,215.392 53,900,450 19,196,682 4/ 496,591,016

* It 48,825,267 87,00X,406 86,073,913 24,126,123 7,040,066 253,069,795

III 2,652,A65 1,416,218 4,611,572 549,500 - 9,431,755

Iv 29,105,966 90,364,862 137,757.668 130,010,384 30,856,268 418,115,168

V 4,502,636 10,376,649 12,182,730 12,179,291 11,139,868 50,361,374

VI - 1,559,76 6,010,349 4,269,359 - 11,639,434

vIt 30.767,638 16,543,600 - - - 41.314,438

TOTAL 164.760.954 387.839.191 420.851.644 225.035.107 68.233.104 1I 1.2*6.740.000

) Etimat

.i

.;

- !., o~~

_ 57 _ ANNEX 5Page 1 of 2

BUGESERA-EAST/GISAKA-MIGONGO MIXED FARMINGAND RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(cr. 668-RW)

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

Basic assuMptions for the calculaton of production increases

1. It is judged that seed multiplication would not have been carriedout in the project area without the project. Additional production hasbeen estimated from existing data on seeds distributed each project year.Seeds would be used by farmers during four consecutive years and it isestimated that the quantities distributed after the project would be equalto the average quantities distributed during the three last project years.

2. Areas theoretically sowed or planted have been calculated usingsowing density norms recommended by ISAR. applied to the quantitiesactually distributed:

Maize : 40 kg/haSorghum : 30 kg/haBeans : 70 kg/haSoy beans : 35 kg/haCassava : 10,000 shoots/haPineapples: 50,000 shoots/ha

3. Additional production on these areas has been estlmated usingresults of the IAMSEA survey (situation without project) and TSAR yieldnorms from which have been deducted 20X (and 40X for maize and sorghum) totake into account conditions, prevailing in farmers flelds (situation wthproject). Yields used are the folloving:

without project with proiect additional yields

Groundnuts 590 960 370Maize 910 1,500 590Sorghum 820 1,800 980Beans 800 900 100Soy beans - 960 960Cassava - 2,750 2,750

4' Vegetables - 10,000 10,000

4. , Additional production for coffee has been estimated using thefollowing assumptLons:

- 90 additional ha with a productlon of 585 kg/ha rough;

- additlonal yields of 50 kg/ha on 3,800 existing has because of41 the maLntenance of coffee fields and development of mulching

with forage crops;

ANNEX 5-58 - Page 2 of 2

- additional production of fuelwood was calculated on the basisof an average production of 6 c.m./ha/year;

- pineapples are estimated to yield 1 kg/plant with 50,000plants/ha;

- additional fruit production has been estiated using yieldsIncreasing from 10 to 78 kg per tree from the seventh yearafter plantation (ISAR estimates 200 kg/tree).

i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

.1

Annex STable r

RVANDAsuCmS-GIsATI7M-co0C w FROJUCT

(CrediLt 666-t)

PROJECT COtlPLSTION REPORT

Istiated Amricultural production Increase

(tone)

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992

Groundauts 11.5 17.8 25.9 41.8 35.5 38.9 40.3 34 38.5 38.5 36.5 39.5 38.5 38.5 38.5Mais 3 3 52.5 134.5 147.5 196.5 195.9 162.8 195.9 195.9 195.9 195.9 195.9 195.9 195.9 oSorgbi 0 0 0 0 18.6 23.5 29.4 35.,3 23.5 23.5 23.5 23.5 23.5 23.5 23.5sans 2.7 2.7 8.2 13.2 16.2 21.6 21.5 21.9 21.6 21.6 21.6 21.6 21.6 21.6 21.6Soy Beans 17.3 70.1 171.8 353.3 493.4 587.5 632.6 598.1 587.5 587.7 587.5 587.5 587.5 587.5 587.5Cassava 0 0 55 55 66 88 55 77 88 88 88 89 88 88 88Vegetables 0 530 670 910 1620 1070 1200 1300 1198 1230 1240 1220 1230 1230 1230Fults 0 0 0 0 0 150 3050 950 1848 3698 4851 5915 6930 7485 7722Fuel Vood (c.m.) 0 0 0 0 7956 16320 11880 19104 19104 19104 19104 19104 19104 19104 19104Pilneapple 24 49 296 703 1383 2470 3002 1619 1619 1619 1619 1619 1619 1619 1619Coffee 0 0 0 0 200 300 400 500 750 750 750 750 750 750 750

-60-Aneoc 5

Table

IUGESERA-CGSAKA/IGONCO PROJECT(Credit 668W)

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

.Esimated Livestock Production increases

17 1m1 1M 1m flul 1 1I4 15 3l 13P7 139 le:

Cattle stall1nF, ("Fermettem")

Number -9 I 49 92 13 415 245 2495 24;5 2405 24'

Calves s 0 0 0 0 13 5 129 IN 514 14 L4Milk ('0001) I * 0 0 .5 25 64.5 129 258 324.5 LO

____...... ....:

Impact ot forage crops

leeM] tiplicatilti (ha)It 5C 1 114 204 20 204 .W 0' 204 ': *

X,..3 tiplicaticn ~ (h) 9 2!T 315 720 l02 3020 3020 1024.. 302 1v X 1C2I areas plantedforage prnduction (V).7t V; 5 10055 216X 3* N W; 3O0@ X'i.0 : 30o@. 3-..,additional moat prod. (t) 54 17'7 201 432 612 61;12 412 112 i12 112 112 43

i

o''~~~~~

.,~~~~~

.

.-

3971 1979 3966 3963 1962 1963 194 m5 3966 36I"7 i91 1m I3 1991 l92 1993 19194 m995 399 1991 2 3 4 5 I 7 t 9 1 It 12 13 14 Is 11 17 1 1t 26

Ilot iw u.:al tul its 1.517 25.942 35.9 70.566 135.499 151.142 1U3.4U3 207.10 264.39 271.79 295.61 317.19 33.59 2414911 354.65 354.43 354.43356.45 354.43 354.63Fridts lisaits 3 1 19 3.91 73.26 97.62 116.6 13S.6 I4.5 156.44 154.44 154.44 15t. 154.44 150U4431w baslit. .957 25.942 35.97 71.56 135.4 155.12 1736.43 Mi6.d63 227.933 1".4" 19.56" 191.39 191.9m1 199.99m 19.9m m.ne 19m.9m M MM. .m. 9.9nmalllity fruit baefats e.5 0.5 6.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.u L.s 0.5 6.5 0.5 3.5 0.5 6.5 0.5 0.5 6.5 6.5 L.5 6.5ifidifi fruit e.it 0 0 e 0 0 1.5 3.5 9.5 11.4U 36.63 4U.51 59.4 09.3 74.25 77.22 n.22 77.22 77.22 77.22 77.22.t1 fdllihd baoits 6.51.7 25.42 35.9 7 1.5M 135.499 156.642 179.913 197.u6 241.413 235.32 247.14 257.79 269.291 274.243 27.213 277.216 277.231 277.211 271.218 277.233

gsts tabtut fam labw 270.66 47U.2M2 633.363 411.735 266.924 4L.73 6.733 41.70 .33 M .7U UM.7M 4.73 4M 73 3 3 3 4LM .73 .M 1.73 4U.733 47 .7M3

hi mosc its -264.673 *444.35 -512.393 -341.13 -131..45 167.159 131.12 14.05 197.63 l3.345 139.325 209.015 22.55 225.465 223.435 22.435 22.435 223.435 22.435 223.5

i 2 3 4 5 1 7 I 9 30 1 12 13 14 15 36 17 to 1t 2e 23

621.616 317.11" 339.321 23.72224 -11.057 -2U3.64 -332.473 -415.40 -44.11 -542.4 6-591.076 -63.919 -663.3 -69.54 -712.13 -729.211 -742.511 -52.3-75 .35 -7U4.

ucmic an w Kum 397 9n 13 1 INm 391 104 I015 19M I 190 9 1M 399 IM2 3993 I39 Im I99 9917

1 2 3 4 0 I a 9 10 12 it 13 14 17 10 17 1o It 20

1a IM Oli bftdlt$ 0.n 2s.912 3.9 7L.504 135.499 19.1 133.03 201.13 2W4AS 2119 2M5.UH 311.19 335 343.41 354.43 354.433 354.433 754.433 354.433 34.4a3

Fradia htits 3 1 I9 3. 13.24 97.02 111.e 133.0 14.5 154.4 154.44 154.44 154.44 154.44 154.4

War 513t1. LUl Z92L 73.9 7L.M 33.9 155.142 176.403 10.130 22W.93 I"9.43 91.593 499.3 MM 199."ll 19.91 I".91 1.9"9 1.9"9 1."ll 1.9"hmaitOwity ffirt _14it 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 e.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 e.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5bfi sd f,uit _ait 0 * 0 0 0 1.5 3.5 9.5 I3. U .03 43.51 59.4 09.3 74.25 1.22 n7.22 n1.22 77.22 11.22 11.221. .fidfi minf Us 6.3 25Lsu2 3s5. 70.51i. 135.49 I5.4,42 379.93 197.40 240.413 23523 21MAN 25r.," 249.291 214.24 27 7.21 2m.2u 77.213 2n7.211 27.218 2 M.21

cuts .31.t fare lar 210.00 47.292 11.363 411.3 2.924 4L.7U 4U.7U .7U3 473 4U.7 .713 4U.73 U.U .7U 4.U 4U.7U 4.7U3 ".7 4.3 4U.7

Wated cuts loX 2" 517 in 43 2m 54 54 5f 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 so 54 54 54 5f

ltl cNsIC b...hts -291.413 -49.03 -44.03 -332.434 -15.93 102.042 125.903 143.3 I392.433 1.121 193 .10 203.791 215.211 223.24 223.233 223.213 223.213 223.211 223.211 223.211

1 2 3 4 5 0 7 a .9 I0 11 12 13 14 15 20 1 1o 19 20 21

361.410 Mu.3Ms -39.60 -135.517 -32.92 43.972 -525.11II 3-0.51 -444.23 -715.93 -153.5 -7M2.7 -. 44 -2.317 -59.3 1472.224 -11.41 4-7.07 01.278 -92.02

Ic! I!

.c..uc myrn

*MII6L AC.zm.sIMu imiono.r

1971 1976 1919 £900___ 1963 16 8913 196 3965 196 £961 966 18969 1990 1991 1992

Croumdauate NreluctIo 1) 11.5 17.6 25.9 41. 39S.S 21.9 40.3 34.0 3#1.S 3. 39.5 33.S 9 36.5 34.S 38.0ftlc. 2) So S0 S0 So So So S0 So S0 S0 So so S0 S0 50Value 3) .57s .69 1.299 2.06 1.115 1.945 2.01S 1.1 1.925 8.92s 8.92s 8.925 8.9s 1.925

Heaim ?roduetloa S 3 52.5 334.5 147.5 394.5 1.95.9 1U2.6 m9a. 195.9 395.S 195.9 395.9 895.9?rlco a a a a a a a I a S a a 8 0value .024 .024 .42 1.075 1.16 1.5n 1.541 3.302 I .5S1 3.541 I.S41 1.541 8.547 1.567

Sorghm productiou 0 0 0 0 ISA 25.5 29.4 SS.3 23.S 23.S 23.S 23.S 23.5 23.5 23.5Ptice 13 13 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33Val" .035 .035 .271 .439 .535 .713 .78 .123 .733 .713 .713 .713 .718 .183 .133

Soyeans production 17.3 70.1 111.5 3S3.3 13.4 517.S 32.4 5.1 S917.S 5617.S 57.5 567.5 567.5 SS7.5 587.5PrIe 2S 2S 30 9 30 30 s0 30 *0 30 30 10 30 30 30Value .433 1.753 5.154 30.599 14.602 :1 .41S 18.976 17.943 17.62S 17.425 17.425 17.42S 11.42S 17.42S 17.625

Ceaaaw Productlo. 0 0 SS 55 as 55 77 a n 9 n 6 as asItie to 10 l0 0 10 30 80 0 30 10 10 80 80 30 10 80value 0 0 .ss .ss .4 .u.1 .u6 .61 .n6 .as .a6 .u1 .6u .6 .

tVgetable Productioa 0 530 (.70 I0 1320 1070 1200 3300 3390 U 30 1240 8220 1230 12.40 1220ftPe 0O 10 10 10 l0 80 10 t0 l0 10 t0 80 80 10 10value 0 5.3 4.7 9.1 34.2 10.7 12 13 11.9 12.3 12.4 12.2 12.3 12.3 12.:

fraets 8roductioe 0 0 0 0 a ISO 21 950 l6 46" 458 S9IS 4930 7915 1722PrIes 10 10 10 10 80 30 30 10 0e 10 10 10 to Invalue 0 0 0 0 a 1.O 3.5 6.5 16.45 36.96 46.S 5.15 49.30 74.8S 77.22

Fualvood ?roiuctllo 0 0 0 0 7954 80320 860 19304 19104 19104 89804 19804 39104 19104 19104PrIce 2S0 2S0 230 250 221 220 250 221 2S2 250 220 250 250 250 2S0*ola 0 0 0 0 1.963 2.56 .2.97 4.174 4.774 4.171 4.774 4.774 4.776 4.774 4.771

n oppl. Ptoductl00 24 U 29 703 13a 2470 3002 1619 1419 8439 3419 1819 1419 1319 1819Price S S S S s s S s S s 5 S S Svalue .12 .24 I.4 3.MIS 4.915 12.35 35.01 6.066 1.09S 9.096 S .665 .09S 8.099S 8.095 .095

Coffee PraductIce 0 0 0 0 200 300 400 SC 750 750 7S0 750 721 750 7SOPrtce 0 0 0 0 I3O ISO ISO ISO ISO ISO ISO ISO ISO I2 152Value 0 0 0 0 30 4S 40 i5 112.9 382.5 112.S 112.9 114 114

1) to002) 3w3) V1W ullilo

1(60L 1160L 9669 L~~~019 1119o slit 16,19 9319 319 P103 Il.l 9o'1 am619 1.9 r 939 611 £ r. o 0 0 * 1T

1U1319 9151133 199"Ifi 1111 1L9 1 929 13 19£1 £P1 £9 993 L1 96 LPI*6 U 60

911 911 tt 611 S3 9911 13t fl 131 Pl SI c i 09 1 0 0 0 0 0393

9119t 9LL9t 9LV9 9iLL9 9iLP 9L19l 9L9' 9Lil9 Lt'3 363 61361 0 0 0 0 flog3S 33tL 1P9£i 01,69 1P61 i ItIt 16969 *96l SI6 s1 VI 0 0 0 0 0 8Ta

rzri il3 clef rzti V931 P391 6111 Si 3 @ P91 P6t ll 1 r19 1I 0 111161 W. 99 a. W so. 9 W. a.Ia 69St99 St, 11 0 0 301031399£1 139l1t 519£t 13993 139911 Stoltz SO911 tWItl 61661 139£1 309,91 "6P01 991P1 Stll SC,? pro$

at, got, got, .936P 3P got tellP Nz got, M. fee, 0 0 0 0 OqisOgL9IK' L9PI1 L91li 19PI 19913 VIST1.3 l £ AP1 i I", I9. 3L9 lilt 9L0*I it* 9io 930. "1rAIS?1 13611 1361 1Z9 1611 SI SUIT 1361 II Stolz SIG's stil so's %llP go. 1W, *1M

3661 3663 0661 666t 6963 £661 91166 1661 9661 NOT 3M6 I 1663 0966 611o 9161 It6T

WIVA NOU2011OU11 IMIUOI5S

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- 63 -

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BUGESERA-GISAKA/MIGONGO MIXED FARMINGAND RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

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