Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIL USE ONLY

Repoit No. 5729

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

JORDAN

TOURISM PROJECT (CREDIT 639-JO)

June 21, 1985

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Urban aad Regional Development Projects DivisionEurope, Eiddle East and North Africa Region

I his docut bah a resticted dlstrbuton ad may be used by recipients only in the peformnce oftdir officll dudes Us contents may not othrwise be disdosed without Wodd Bnk authorinaion.

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PROJECT COmPiETioN REPORT

JORDAN TOURISM PROJECT

(Credit No. 639-JO)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Preface .-------------------------------------------------------- i

Basic Data Sheet .................................................Highlights .......................................--............. iL

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. 1

II. PROJECT BACKGROUND AND PREPARATION. 2

Identification, Preparation, and Appraisal. 2

Project Objectives ..- 3

Project Description. 4

III. IMPLEMENTATION .4.........................; 4

Effectiveness ............ ..... 4Project Content and Revisions. 5Implementation Schedules ................................. 5Reporting. 7Procurement. 7Costs. 7Consultants' Performance. 8Contractor Performance. 9IDA Performance. 9

IV. PROJECT PERFORMANCE ........................ 10

Antiquities Sites ........................ 10Hotel and Restaurants ...... .................. 11Bedouin Resettlement ........................ 12Training ........................ 12

V. ECONOMIC RE-EVALUATION ....... ................. 12

VI. CONCLUSIONS ........................ 13

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS .14

ThI doomm b estricte-td disibutson ad may be used by recipients only in the performance of|tber of FO dutim Its contets may not otberw be d idse wout World Bankc autbor=uton.

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Table of Contents

Page

Annexes . .................................... 15

I. Visitor Arrivals to Jordan.. .. 15II. Project Implementation, Actual and Expected .... 16III. Project Costs; Actual and Expected . . . .17IV. Project Disbursemnts, Actual and Expected ... 18

V. Contract Details ........ 19VI. Economic Cost and Benefits... 22VII. Letter of November 15, 1983 .............................. 30

Maps: Jerash IBRD 17943(PPA)Petra IBRD 17944(PPA)

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

TOURISM PROJECT (CREDIT 639-JO)

PREFACE

This Project Completion Report (PCR) presents the results of thereview of the Jordan Tourism Project (Credit 639-JO) which was approvedby the Board on June 8, 1976 and for which the last disbursement was madeon August 7, 1983.

The PCR was prepared by the EMENA Urban Projects Division on thebasis of a review of IDA files, reports prepared by the Borrower and itsConsultant, findings of an IDA mission comprising Messrs. I. T. Christieand F. Mitchell to Jordan in October, 1983, and a mission to Washingtonby the Project Director and Accountant in November/December 1983. Thework of the IDA mission was facilitated and made into a pleasantexperience by the assistance accorded by H. E. Ma'an Abu Nuwar, theMinister of. Tourism and Antiquities, personnel of the Antiquities andTourism Departments of the Ministry, and, above all, by the time andefforts of Mr. Yousef Alami, Director of the Project Unit and his staff.The principal author of this report was Mr. F. Mitchell; Ms. S. Advanihandled the typing.

In accordance with the revised procedures for ProjectPerformance Audit Reporting, this PCR was read by the OperationsEvaluation Department (OED), but not audited by OED staff. The draft PCRwas sent to the Borrower for comments; however, none were received.

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imma iRiSM ERWE: - ERa3K1 COMWLEDN RMOR1r(Credit 639-JO)

BASIC DAA SHEETKEY PROJECT DATA

AP4aisal Ac.kal orTM pecratiens Czruea Estiztes

Thtal project Gst ([$ ; illiem) 12.1 19.4 JaThM nr Ouercm (Z) 60Z

lw tCredit h t (MSt fillie 6.0 6.0Dis ed 6.0 6.0

:wi - -

Owddr to -_

Uwe P*scal cars epar 12/79 /c 1083Proportion CAeced by Aboe Dam (Z) 15Z 95Z /dPIo!mriaa of TimecUdm or OCerf G- 1 IL2 /dFcac Raw of Becurn C) 20.1 -0.6Firial Pefe sarstfory Por

Instiwucala Pefiname sas6crrysafcor

/a using aueWe IS76-8a exda6og rate fior the acn=a c , and 1975 exdzarge rare fa appaisal e ct ./6b his c co 55 in JordaLian Dizs.

/c This is we dare scaed in the 1&. fever, if cbe sdhekles in the SAR are caclared fram the actua date ofsixWu, tde appraisal compLecua date wald be 12/80.

/d Thze ove-cm oc the SAR caiLerion date of 12/80 c co 64Z. All itru finanted e the credit wecazmjeced by 10183. rcomzc of tbe pnject still rain to be =kweraken, costing about USS0.8 million.

OTHER PROJECT DATA

item, Orginal Actual orPLak Revisions Es.imt ed Actual

First .4ktion in Files or Tiamea - 07/24/75Gitinrs Applicaticn

't " ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ ~~0(i26/76B3d Ap4_vaL 06108176C_i t Ag- n.-r t Dte 0/12/76Effectiveness Date 1213/76 03/18/77 05/20/77 07/15177Csis Bare 06/301/80 06/30/82 03/31/83Final Disr 06/30/80 08/07/83

erMWW The Hbeuite Kirgdom of JordanBce=fing Aguiy Minisrry of Tourism and AniquitiesFiscl Year of Bwrwer January 1 - Irceber 31Fojor-on Projet N ha

JOFEr DMRI E1W) - ERWECr YLErTDN REBohT(credic 639-JO)

MISS ION DATA

item tbnth/Year No. of weeks No. of Persons Mbnweks Ite of Report

Identification 01U73 2 4 4 07124/75Pteparaz I 09/75 2 4 8 10/28/75Pbepatioa II 10/75 1 1 1 11/14/75Pre-*pvaisaI 11/75 2 6 12 12/18/75Jpraisal Gbmpletion 02/76 1 3 3 03/08/76

Tbtal 8 28

s&pervisiDm 1 08/76 0.8 2 1.6 09/22/76Sipervisin, II 01/77 0.8 1 .8 01/31/77SupVwvision III 09/77 1.4 2 2.8 11/21/77Supervision IV 04/78 1.6 2 3.2 05/09/78supervision V 10/78 1.2 2 2.4 11/28/786apervision Vl 0/79 1.6 2 3.2 05/14/79Supervision VII 07/79 2 3 6 08/28/79Supervision VuII 02/80 2.2 1 2.2 03/12/0OSRpfvision Ix 07/80 2 1 2 08/01/80Supervision X 09/80 1.8 1 1.8 10/22/80SUpe,'ision Xi 12/80 1 1 1 C1/16/81Svisim XII 06/81 1.4 1 1.4 07/27/81Su,xrvision XIII 11/81 0.8 2 1.6 12/07/81

suprvion XIV 06/82 1 2 2 06/25/82Sabcocal 19.6 32.0

C=pletimn - 05/83 1 1 1.0 06/28/8310/83 1.5 2 3.0 11/11/83

Subcocal 2.5 4.0-and Total 301 64.0

COUNTRY EX0HANG RATE

Loie of Curency (Abbreviation) Joxdanian Linar (JD)Yeer:

Appaisal Year Average (1975) Exdcwge Race: ItU1 - 0.33lnatiniRg Years Average (1976-1982) US$l = 0.32Copletion Year Average /a USSI - 0.36

Ta Jmuary - Mcrdt, L93

ACROHS AMD ABBREVIATID#6

AD - Antiquities Depmrtme NPC - National Planning G uncil1D. - Developmenc Cedit Agreeent PU - Project IhitEH - - Fornn Hotels ID - Tourism Department'$AC - Et,els and Resthouses CoQrpation WS - lhter Supply CorporationJic - Jordan Hsiug rporacion esco - United Notions Educational, ScientificMPA - Mnistry of £ixicipalities and Rural Affairs and Cultural Organization

MKA - Munisry of Tourism and Ant'ui ies USNPS IS National Parks Service

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JORDAN TOURISM PROJECT

(Credit No. 639-JO)

RIGHLIGHTS

The objective of the Jordan Tourism Project was to increase theattractiveness to tourists of two major Jordanian antiquities sites,through construction of tourism facilities (a hotel, two restaurants),and improvement in visitor management (including interpretive services,charging entry fees), as well as to conserve those sites through avariety of monument conservation and restoration works, and resettlementof persons residing in the Petra Basin monuments. The project cost atappraisal was JD 4 million, of which JD 2 million (US$6 million) werefinanced from the IDA Credit.

The main features of the project were:

(a) as the first IDA operation related largely to assisting acountry to increase earnings from antiquities-relatedtourism, the project was highly innovative. Nevertheless,it was processed rapidly (12 months from identification toBoard -presentation) because designs were prepared duringproject execution (paras. 1.02 and 3.16);

(b) the project largely succeeded in implementing the physicalworks foreseen, and in increasing the attractiveness of thesites to tourists. The project will enhance Jordan'sappeal as a tourist destination and increase its foreignexchange earnings from that source (paras- 4.01 through 4.08);

Cc) cost qver-runs (of 55% in nominal terms, 19% in realterms), resulted from; (i) appraisal underestimates (duepartly to the unavailability of designs); and (ii) afailure to review project viability once designs wereavailable (a reevaluation then, or when tenders werereceived, might have stimulated a search for lower costdesigns or restructuring proposals) (para. 3.10);

(d) action has yet to be taken to ensure efficient managementand upkeep of the project sites. The appraisal relied upontechnical assistance in museology and national parksadministration - skills outside IDA's normal experience -to develop institutional proposals. Partly because ofdifficulties encountered with other TA on softwarecomponents, specially on monument restoration works,however, the Government did not actively pursue appointmentof the TA for museology and park management (paras. 4.06

through 4.08);

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(e) EDA project supervision emphasized resolution ofsubstantial physical implementation difficulties; lessattention was paid to institutional and economic viabilityquestions (para. 3.16);

(f) the re-estimated ERR is negative (compared with an SAR ERRof 20.LZ) due to cost overruns, a failure of benefits tomatch appraisal estimates, and delays in benefits due toconstruction delays. Inclusion of some indirect benefits(not considered in the SAR) yields a positive ERR of about4%. The re-estimated economic benefits are lower than SARestimates because the Government plans to introduce entryfees to the monuments of only 33% to 50Z of the SARestimates in real terms, and has fixed hotel prices wellbelow levels the market could bear (para. 5.01);

(g) action by the Government to establish institutionalarrangements for sound management of the sites, introduce(and then rapidly increase) entry fees, and to allowcommercial facilities to charge higher prices would raisethe ERR to a more acceptable and economically attractivelevel. The above measures should be introduced as a matterof urgency, and the project should be re-evaluated in twoyears when there has been time for those measures to havean effect (paras. 7.01 and 7.02).

PRCJECT COMPLETION REPORT

JORDAN TOURISM PROJECT(Credit 639-JO)

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

1.01 Tourism is Jordan's fourth largest source of foreign exchangeafter workers remittances, grant aid, and phosphate exports. Mostvisitors are from other Arab and Middle Eastern countries, many of themvisiting Jordan on business or pilgrimage. The country also containsmany artifacts of ancient civilizations which attract western visitors.Prior to the 1967 War, the Holy Land sites on the West Bank were themajor attractions for western tourists, and over 80% of the country'shotel capacity was located there. Visits to the West Bank continue to bean important element in Jordanian tourism. The country has, however,made prudent efforts to diversify its attractions by upgrading East Bankfacilities, notably hotel capacity in Amman and at Aqaba, and thearchaeological sites at Jerash and Petra.

1.02 The Tourism Project was designed to increase the tourist appeaiof the latter two sites, to conserve threatened monuments, and to ensurean economic return from tourism. The project has largely succeeded inmeeting the first two objectives, alchough initial gains must beconsolidated through introduction of appropriate institutional measuresfor operation and maintenance. Economic returns are more doubtful dueprimarily to more spreadout expenditure than appraisal estimates, highercosts (55% overrun), lower prices of outputs than appraisal estimates,and to some adverse market developments (the international recessi-on, andthe effect of the Middle East security situation on tourist flows). TheGovernment has throughout shown a high degree of commitment to theproject. Financial constraints did not affect execution even though -heGovernment needed to increase its funding from JD 2.0 million toapproximately JD 4.5 million. The IDA contribution was US$6 million, orJD 1.9 million, and was fully disbursed on August 7, 1983.

1.03 The most serious cost problems mignt have been ameliorated hadthe project been appraised on the basis of preliminary designs (instead,appointment of design consultants was an effectiveness condition); thiswas probably not a feasible option at the time, however (para 2.04).Dealing with the difficulties of physical implementation divertedattention from institutional and pricing questions.

1.04 The regional security situation permitting, the world economicrecovery should improve tourism marketing prospects in the medium term.To secure a positive rate of return on the project investment, however,urgent actions are required to (a) create an organization to manage theproject sites, (b) introduce entry fees, and (c) increase prices ofcommercial facilities to profitable levels. Some components, with a costof about JD 0.3 million, are still required to complete the project; theyinclude the additional houses for the Bedouin at Petra and socialfacilities for them. It is recommended that IDA re-evaluate theeconomic, financial and institutional elements of the project in abouttwo years, when there has been time for the above measures to have aneffect.

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II. PROJECT BACKGROUND AND PREPARATION

2.01 Jordan's paucity of natural resources means that the country'seconomic growth is heavily dependent upon development of export-orientedlight industry and services. Tourism provides an important potentialwhich the Government has been concerned to realize from an early date.For Western tourists, the main attractions are the religious sites on theWest Bank of the Jordan River. Following the 1967 War, access to thosesites continued, but on an intermittent basis reflecting the securitysituation and Israeli policies. Hence, the Government paid increasedattention to developing attractions on the East Bank, and especiallyPetra and Jerash.

2.02 At the request of the Jordanian Government, the U.S. NationalParks Service (USNPS), in collaboration with the Department ofAntiquities (DA) of the Jordanian Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities(1TA), prepared masterplans for Petra, Jerash, and Amman in 1968. Petraand Jerash are important not only in a Jordanian context, but in thelarger context of the world's cultural heritage. Petra was, from the 4thcentury BC to 106AD, the capital of che Nabateans, following which itbecame an important Roman provincial town and was remodeled on Romanlines. With its tombs, houses and temples carved into the multi-huedsandstoqe cliffs which encircle and comprise the site, Petra epitomisesthe "lost city" in beautiful, rugged and remote surroundings. Jerash wasan important centre from about 6000 BC Latil a major earthquake in 742AD. It remains one of the best-preserved Roman provincial cities. Themodern city occupies part of the ancient city area.

Identification, Preparation, and Appraisal

2.03 Starting in 1972, several IDA tourism missions visited Jordan;their emphasis was upon laying the groundwork for a comprehensive tourismdevelopment plan, and upon developing beach tourism. With theidentification of cultural components in courism projects elsewhere,however, and strong interest expressed by Unesco's Department of CulturalHeritage in the potential of Petra and Jerash, the Association activelypursued the Petra and Jerash proposals when they were brought to theattention of a mission by the Government in June, 1975.

2.04 Although the government strongly supported the project, it wasunwilling to engage design consultants until there were firm assurancesof IDA support, and their appointment eventually became an effectivenesscondition (see also para 3.01). Preparation therefore took the form ofupdating the USNPS cost estimates, and of discussions between IDA andthe DA on project components and their costs. This procedure enabled theproject to be processed rapidly (12 months from identification untilBoard presentation). This procedure was feasible due to the fact thatthe head of the Planning and Maintenance Division of the DA had been themain counterpart on the USNPS studies, and so was intimately acquaintedwith all aspects of the earlier proposals, with the sites themiselves, andwith local costs. (The same person was project director during the wholeimplementation period, and he provided a critical element of continuity

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and direction to the project.) The DA pre-appraisal cost estimate ofJD 5.9 million was about the same as the final project cost ofJD 6.2 million. It was, however, substantially above the appraisedproject cost of JD 4.0 million; the reduction from JD 5.9 million to JD 4million was largely in the firm of mistakenly lower estimated unit costswith minimal reduction in project components.

2.05 A major recommendation of the USNPS had been to establish aJordanian National Parks Serrice to manage the sites. The DA and theTourism Department (TD) of tie MTA each had partial responsibilities forsite management but there was no comprehensive responsibility. Vi._alfunctions such as site cleansing, visitor control, preparation ofinterpretive materials, and monitoring of the conservation status of themonuments, were not performed. The question of the future management ofthe project sites, which would presuppose significant changes in theresponsibilities and authorities of the DA and TD, was not resolvedduring project preparation and is still outstanding.

2.06 Of more immediate concern during preparation were thearrangements for project implementation. It was agreed that a specialProject Unit (PU), reporting to a committee comprising the Minister ofTourism, and the Directors of the DA and TD, would supervise the project,assisted by design consultants, and experts in archaeology, museology,and park management services. Considerable attention focused prior toBoard presentation on the need for efficient operation of the commercialfacilities and the actions required to assure an economic return on theproject. To this end, it was agreed that the commercial facilities wouldbe managed with the assistance of companies engaged on terms acceptableto the Association, that appropriate fees would be charged for entry toPetra and Jerash, and that hotels and restaurants would charge prices "tomaximize the economic return on tue investment costs under the Project"(Section 4.03 of the Development Credit Agreement (DCA)).

Project Objectives

2.07 The project's objectives as stated in the SAR were to meet theneeds identified by the USNPS reports, i.e.

(a) to preserve and protect the antiquities themselves, whichwere threatened by the natural forces of erosion and thedeterioration resulting from human activity;

(b) to provide physical facilities and amenities for growingnumbers of visitors without jeopardizing the archaeologicalvalue of the sites; and

(c) to improve tne presentation and interpretive services ateach site in order to achieve the highest possible level ofvisitor satisfaction.

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Project Description

2.08 The project comprised the following components:

(a) Petra Entrance; renovation and expansion o_ the entrancehotel; improvements to the visitor centre; development ofcampgrounds; construction of staff quarters for MTA andhotel staff; construction of a snelter for the horses whichcarry visitors into Petra Basin; and associatedinfrastructures (water, sewerage, power, andtelecommunications).

(b) Petra Basin: construction of a -.ew comax.oe restaurant,visitor centre and antiquities department offices (andremoval of the existing Nazal Gueschouse from the Basin);infrastructure including works to protect the monumentrfrom heavy flooding; construction and improvements totrails and to interpretive facilities (e.g. signposts,issue of brochures for walking tours, etc); conservationworks and some restoration; and construction near the townof Wadi Husa of houses for relocation of an estimated 96Bedouin families occupying combs in the Petra Basin.

'c) Jerash; construction of a new restaurant outside thearchaeological area; guides, trails, imoroved interpretivematerials and equipmenc for the visitor centre; -a Sound andLight program; upgrading and relocating the small sitemuseum; restrooms and visitor facilities; associatedlandscaping and infrastructure; archaeological preservationand restoration of several of the major monuments;construction of appropriate offices and maintenancebuildings; and demolition of buildings (including the"Turkish" building and the existing restaurant) and;

(d) Administration, Professional Services, and TechnicalAssistance and Training connected with the above components.

III. IMPLEMENTATION

Effectiveness

3.01 Proiect effectiveness was delayed seven months due to delays inthe appointment of the Project Unit staff and in the appointment of thedesign consultants. The latter process in particular took more time thanexpected due partly to MIA's unfamiliarity with IDA. Firms were invitedto prequalify only after credit negotiations were complete, when MTA wasconvinced that IDA would indeed support the project. The timesubsequently taken to evaluate, negotiate, and secure governmentclearances for the draft contract was also about 4 months longer thananticipated at appraisal.

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Project Content and Revisions

3.02 The implemented project corresponded closely to the appraisedproject, with only a few significant exceptions;

(a) a new hotel of 82 rooms was constructed at Petra Entrance,in place of renovation of the existing 25 room hotel andits expansion to' a total of 100 rooms as assumed atappraisal. The Government independently expanded the oldhotel to 35 rooms in 1976 and 1977 (bringing total rooms onsite to 117 by 1983). This change occurred because the MTAwas uncertain about the Credit, it had a firm budget tomake the expansion in 1976, and the renovation contract wasawarded before the DCA was signed in August;

(b) the surfaces of the Siq and the forecourts of El Deir andthe Treasury at Petra were not stabilized because nosatisfactory and economical solution could be found(anachronistic materials were found to be unacceptable fortechnical and aesthetic reasons, and the originalNiabatean/Roman type of stone paving was too expensive);

(c) the maintenance facilities and the horse shelter at Petrawere not constructed in order to reallocate funds to themain contract;

(d) the facilities which were to be demolished onceproject-provided replacements had been constructed (theNazal Guesthouse at Petra, the old restaurant and theTurkish house at Jerash) remain, and the DA is nowexploring new uses for them, since the current Director ofthe DA does not share the USNPS and appraisal mission viewson aesthetics and on appropriate land uses for antiquitiessites; and

(e) less than planned technical assistance was engaged in themuseological, parks management, and archaeological fieldsdue to a variety of difficulties (paras. 3.13 and 3.14).

Implementation Schedules

3.03 The project was completed about 46 months late. 1/ Thesedelays (more details on specific dates are provided in Annexes II and V)resulted from: (a) an SAR implementation schedule which wasover-optimistic; (b) delays in start of construction due to inadequatepreparation of some components; and (c) a variety of constructionproblems which resulted in delays beyond contract completion dates.

1/ Loan sign.ture was in 8/76, and actual completion was in 10/83,compared with the 12/79 stated in the DCA. However, theimplementation schedule of the SAR impLied ccmpletion in 12/80,implying a "real" over-run of 34 months.

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3.04 The most significant delays in starting construction due topreparation inadequacies concerned the Sound and Light and the Bedouinrelocation components. The main consultants lacked experience of Soundand Light shows; after an initial tender for equipment had been issuedand responded to, it became clear that it would be more efficient t- callfor renders for a package of equipment, script and recorded performancefrom the handful of companies which had relevant experience. This wasthen done, though the need for it could have been foreseen at appraisal.

3.05 The failure to carry out thorough consultations with theconcerned Bedouin families resulted in extensive delays and overruns onthe Bedouin relocation component. The first tenders for this componenchad to be rejected when it was found that the Bedouin did not accept theinitial site. A more acceptable site was then identified which, beingmore remote from the town of Wadi Musa, required heavy investmentsin additional roads and social facilities (the latter are still notconstructed). There were also delays in design of this component, someresulting from IDA efforts to reduce costs of design proposals. Delays_n the component also resulted in increases in the numbers ofbeneficiaries. The definitive administrative census and consultationwith the Bedouin undertaken in October, 1983 to establish criteria forallocating housing units determined that there were 111 eligiblefamilies, that there were 128 wives in the 109 male-headed families, andthat two housing units would be allocated to families which had 2 or morewives and 8 or more family members. This will require the constructionof an additional 20 units, at an estimated cost of JD 172,000.

3.06 The main causes of construction delays were:

(a) failure by the client, consultants, and contractors toappreciate che difficulties of working in-Petra which wasremoce from labor and materials (acceptable aggregate hadto be trucked from Aqaba, there were great difficulties inrecruiting adequate staff to stay there, weak siterepresentatives and poor telecommunications madeconstruction supervision difficult. All too frequently, itproved necessary to demolish and reconstruct works whichwere found to be of unacceptable standard duringintermittent field missions by the senior consultingengineer);

(b) unexpected technical problems: more excavation thananticipated was needed for the Petra hotel; commencement ofthe Jerash restaurant was delayed three months and then hadto be resited because the initial foundation excavationuncovered ancient tombs (in an area which had been chosenas antiquities-free);

(c) design features which went beyond local experience causedtime and cost over-runs; in the case of the Bedouinrelocation, craftsmen skilled in laying red brick (whichwas chosen for aesthetic reasons) were difficult to obtain;in the case of the Petra hotel and the two restaurants, the

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designs required elaborate de.ails and fine toleranceswhich were -not consonant with the capacities of localcraftsmen and the local building industry (for example, itis more efficient in Jordan to fit windows to the holesleft by masons, than to attempt to dimension window holesaccurately enough to install prefabricated building units.In this project, however, imported prefabricated windowunits were used);

(d) the hotel and restaurant designs made use of a large rangeof imported items, for finishes particularly; it wasdifficult even to obtain timely samples for approval by thesupervising engineer; the problems were compounded by thecontractor's tendency to place orders too late; and

(e) the eruption of the Iraq-Iran war placed enormous pressureson the capacity of Aqaba port and of road transport. Thiswas exacerbated for the project by the fact that the(government-fixed) road haulage tariffs for short-hauldestinations such as Petra were less profitable fortruckers than for long-haul destinations such as Amman andBaghdad.

3.07 By contrast with the works carried out by contractors, the forceaccount works proceeded relatively smoothly. Early difficulties inengaging adequate labor in Petra were. gradually overcome, althoughretaining sufficiently qualified high-level supervision staff remained,and remains, a problem (see also para 3.12).

Reporting

3.08 Quarterly and annual reports were sent on an intermittentbasis. These provided sound information on expenditures and expenditurecommitments. For information on project status, major reliance was placedon IDA mission findings, and specific querLes.

Procurement

3.09 Apart from the delays and misunderstandings while the projectagency became accustomed to IDA procedures, there were no significantprocurement problems.

Costs

3.10 The project suffered severe cost over-runs. The accounted-forover-run is estimated at 55% of the appraisal estimate (Annex IIIcontains details of the costs). The true over-run is somewhat higher:completion of all components might occasion an additional JD 0.3 million(7.5% of appraisal cost); more significantly, the measured costs excludecontractors losses. The main sources of the over-runs were:

(a) underestimation of costs at the time of appraisal (see alsopara. 2.04);

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(b) delays in commencement of contracts and hence more years ofprice inflation than assumed at appraisal;

Cc) high cost design standards in the case of the hotel andrestaurants (see also paras. 3.06 (e), 3.11 and 3.17).

Consultants' Performance

3.11 The main consultants were responsible for the design andsupervision of all major non-archaeological components with the exceptionof the Bedouin housing which was designed and supervised by the JordanHousing Corporation (JUC). They performed throughout the project in afully professional fashion. They were responsible for the design ofvery attractive and functional facilities at Petra and Jerash whichshould enhance Jordan's image for tourism. Nevertheless, it is possiblethat costs would have been lowered if the designs more fully reflectedthe availability of local materials and skills, and if the consultantshad been more flexible during implementation (in making modifications tooriginal designs) as they became more acquainted with local realities.

3.12 The experience with the experts appointed to supervise thearchaeological field works was mixed. In Jerash, the project had theservices of an energetic architect/engineer with fifty years ofexperience in conservacion and restoration of similar sites. He not onlyorganized and executed more physical works than planned, but alsoprepared several papers on ancient building techniques and the remarkablepersistence of religious cultural norms from pre-Christian throughIslamic times based upon study of the monuments on which he was working.The first architect-restorer in Petra resigned after one year for healthreasons; his successor was unsatisfactory; thereafter supervision andmanagement of the works was provided on a part-time basis by otherexperts -from Jordan and abroad. IC unfortunately proved impossible tofind a Jordanian with the necessary background and skills who was willingto remain in Petra and to take responsibility for executing the worksthere.

3.13 Given the early and continuing interest of Unesco in theproject, and IDA's lack of antiquities expertise, it was decided thatUnesco should nominate restoration experts who would review plans andprogress of the archaeological works. The costs of these experts weredefrayed largely by Unesco, although the project paid some of their localsubsistence expenses. This component encountered serious problems;expert missions tended to be for extremely brief periods with minimalnotice; field visits were only partly coordinated with local officials;some reports were only received long after mission departure (3 months inone case, 9 months in another); the experts' recommendations weregenerally critical of what was being done, and constructive suggestionswere often uneconomic (e.g. use of epoxy resins for conservation of stonework -at Petra) or excessively general (i.e. the landscaping proposals forJerash); the experts evidently felt their prime audience wasnon-Jordar: an and on one occasion even cabled from the field an alarm tothe Secretary General of Unesco and the President of the Associationwithout first discussing their concerns with the relevant Jordanian

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officials. They often advised doing less work rather than more (someplanned works were not carried out on their advice, however, e.g.conservation and restoration of the Roman Bridge at Jerash). Onecontinuing controversy related to the use of Portland cement atJerash;the consultants maintained this was deleterious (as it undoubtedlyis in northern Europe with its high rainfall and hydroscopic stone); thelocal experts maintained its use was acceptable with Jordan's lowrainfall and less permeable stone. Satisfactory resolution of suchissues requires the application of extensive technical knowledge, ofrelevant local and foreign experience, and a large measure of mutualunderstanding and respect by the parties concerned. In retrospect, theGovernment has suggested that it would have been better to have appointeda single expert with a more local background who would have spent muchmore time in the country, a view with which the mission concurs.

3.14 The failure of the consultancy by restoration experts reducedexpectations about whether positive results could be expected from theappointment of the experts in museology and parks administration, issueswhich also involve a delicate mix of expertise and judgement.

Con tractor Performance

3.15 Notwithstanding the difficulties and weaknesses outlined inpara. 3.06 above, it should be noted that the main contractor wasconcerned to produce outstanding facilities, even although this may haveinvolved it in substantial losses (the contractor's financialreorganization was underway as of late 1983). The supplier of Sound andLight Equipment replaced all-the speakers without additional charges whenit was found that the original equipment did not stand up to the rigoursof the first Jerash winter.

IDA Performance

3.16 With benefit of hindsight, the project design would havebenefitted from closer attention by Association staff to defining thenature of the hotel and restaurant required for the unique Petrasituation, to preparing the design brief, and to reviewing designs in thelight of viability considerations. The consultant received minimalbriefing on the type of hotel facility required. Extensive discussionsamong the Association, client, and consultant were necessary in the fallof 1977 to reduce the consultants' initial proposals on building areas toeconomic levels; unfortunately, there was never a similar review of theappropriateness of structural features and finishes. This would havebeen even more difficult to accomplish, not least because the judgementsrequired would have been more subjective. A re-analysis of financial andeconomic viability at the design stage, or at the tender stage, mightalso have demonstrated that costs were excessive and have stimulatedredesign effort. Such an analysis was not carried out, however, anddiscussions of over-runs were in terms of available finances andreallocations rather than project viability. Following IDA's decision todiscontinue tourism lending, less emphasis was given to institutionalquestions, and the burden of supervision shifted more exclusively toexpediting physical implementation.

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IV. PROJECT PERFORMANCE

Antiquities Sites

4.01 Jordan tourism is currently suffering from the internationalrecession and the security situation in the Middle East, although growthfrom 1975 to 1982 of Western visitors, who form the main target group forthis project, was satisfactory at around 14% p.a (Annex I). No reliableestimates are available of visitors to Petra and Jerash, either Jordanianor non-Jordanian. There were perhaps 100,000 visitors to Petra in 1982;in the case of Jerash, about 165,000 people purchased tickets to theJerash Festival in August, 1983 and there were perhaps 300,000 visitorsduring the year. These compare with the following SAR estimates:

1981 1982 1983

Petra ('000 visitors) 111 132 156

Jerash ('000 visitors) 204 231 262

4.02 Whatever the exact number of visitors, the antiquities siteshave certainly become more attractive as a result of the restorationworks undertaken by the project, and the promotional activities by themanagement of the Petra hotel, particularly. Much still remains to bedone to improve the sites from the tourism point of view, including, mostimportantly, marking trails, installing appropriate signs, issuing guidesand accurate maps, and installing models and interpretive materials inthe visitor reception centres. Institutional arrangements are alsorequired for the efficient management of the sites, including promotion,security, management of visitors and concessionaires, revenue collection,plant maintenance, refuse collection, systematic monitoring- of thephysical status of the antiquities (including measuring wind erosiondamage) and programming and executing conservation and restorationworks. While MTA recognises this need, the role of a new department toperform these functions, and the changes in functions of the existingdepartments, has not yet been thoroughly addressed. Action has beendeferred pending implementation of entry fees, at which pointexpenditures on site management may become more acceptable in a time ofbudgetary stringency.

4.03 A draft decree which would introduce fees to enter the sites (atthe same nominal rates as discussed at appraisal, which are equivalent toabout one half the real rates assumed at appraisal), has been underdiscussion in the cabinet for some months. The discussions have revolvedaround the conflicts between the need for revenues versus concerns thatcharging fees to enter cultural monuments would exclude some citizens andmake foreigners feel unwelcome. This is a familiar public policy dilemmain which economic and financial considerations do not always outweighcultural and political factors.

- 1.1 -

4.04 Although the Sound and Light show has been physically capable ofoperation since May 1982, and has been exhibited on special occasions, ithas not yet started regular operations pending the engagement ofappropriate staff and authority to charge the entry fee (the draft decreementioned in para. 4.03 includes an entry fee to the Sound and Light attwo thirds the nominal rate and one third of the real rate assumed atappraisal). The completion mission found that several lights and somecircuits were not working; regular maintenance will be important duringthe upcoming winter months to avoid system deterioration.

Hotel and Restaurants

4.05 The Petra hotel and Basin restaurant commenced operation inAugust 1983, under the management of Forum Hotels (FH), which wasselected in accordance with procedures agreed with the Association. FHare providing an outstanding standard of service and marketing effort,and the reputation of the Petra facilities should become a significantfactor in upgrading Jordan's image as a tourist destination. The hotelis, however, incurring heavy losses. Although these will decrease asoccupancy rates build up, no operating profit is foreseeable unless thereis very substantial improvement in prices or operating costs or both.The hotel is charging prices about 30% less in real terms than estimatedat appraisal; operating costs are around IO less (Annex VI, Table.3).The hotel management believes it could charge higher prices with noadverse marketing effects, but is constrained by the hotel's four-starclassification and the Government-controlled prices which were lastchanged in 1979. (Group tourists travelling as couples are changed US$20per person per night half board; individual singles are charged US$35half board. In the view of IDA, significantly higher prices, say 50%higher, could be charged with minimal reduction in clientele.) TheMinister of Tourism assured the project completion mission that hotelprices would be reviewed before the end of the year. The Government isalso interested in exploring means to reduce hotel operating costs; whilethis should be investigated, the mission was not sanguine thatsignificant economies could be obtained without prejudicing the standardof service, effectiveness of marketing, and upkeep of facilities.

4.06 The Jerash restaurant is under the management of theGovernment-owned Hotels and Restaurants Corporation (HRC) which managedthe old Jerash resthouse. The HRC has introduced new staff, and so farhas been making operating profits (before interest, depreciation, orreplacements) of about JD 2,OOU per month, compared with annual losses ofJD 5,000 on the old resthouse. The Minister of Tourism and Antiquitiesstated to the completion mission that he felt management of this facilityshould be returned to FH as previously agreed. (HRC manages the facilityat present since FH were unwilling to open the restaurant during theJerash Festival in advance of completion of all physical works andequipment installation.) All government-owned hotels and restaurants areexpected to be purchased by the Social Security Corporation (SSC) in1984. Since financial profitability is an important SSC objective (theHRC placed more emphasis on providing a service), this may augur well forprofitability of the project facilities.

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Bedouin Resettlement

4.07 Cost recovery of the new housing units would be inappropriate asthe Bedouins are being resettled. Families will gain tenure over housingunits and will be responsible for their maintenance. They will paynormal charges for water and electricity. Other facilities will bemanaged by appropriate ministries/departments when they are built(school, health, centre, social centre, mosque).

Training

4.08 Four officials of MTA were trained in various aspects ofmonument conservation and restoration (26 man-months, compared with anSAR estimate of 54 man-months). Three of these officials are working inrelevant units of MTA; the fourth intends to returh to MTA aftercompleting his PhD.

V. ECONOMIC RE-EVALUATION

5.01 Since several project components have just started operations,and others have yet to begin, and because of a lack of basic data, there-evaluation had to be based on estimates more than on actualperformance. It would be better if this re-evaluation were to be carriedout again at a later date, when the operations have started on a properfinancial basis, and when better data is available (PCR para 7.02). Thedetailed assumptions used in the evaluation presented in this report areset out in Annex VI. The principal ones are: the recorded investmentcosts equal economic costs (i.e. contractors' losses are excluded); thedraft decree regarding entry fees will come into effect from January 1,1984 and the Sound and Light show will commence in 1984; and incrementalvisitors attracted to the site due to the project will be identical tothe SAR estimates. These assumptions yield a base ERR of -0.6% whichcompares with the SAR estimate of 20.1%. The main factors accounting forthe difference are:

(a) a more extended construction period of negative net benefitflows (7 years versus 3 years in the SAR);

(b) cost over-runs (19% over appraisal estimates in real terms);

(c) a serious shortfall in hotel prices (31M), entry fees (50Z)and Sound and Light charges (66%) without compensatingdeclines in operating costs; and

(d) exclusion of incremental benefits from the renovation andexpansion of the old entrance hotel (which was incurringlosses at the time of appraisal, but has averaged operatingprofits of JD 40,000 in the last five years sicce itsrenovation was complete on the basis of an investment costof around JD 250,000 carried out independently of theproject).

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If hotel prices were 50% higher, and if entry fees were set at the (real)levels estimated in the SAR, the ERR would be 8.4%.

5.02 With the exception of investment costs, the actual values lieoutside the ranges in the SAR sensitivity tests. The SAR sensitivityanalysis did not analyze the effects on the ERR of combinations ofadverse factors.

5.03 It should, however, be noted that the above analysis does notconsider "indirect" or off-site benefits, nor does it consider the fullconsumer surplus which would accrue to visitors from the Sound and Lightfacilities. Including benefits generated by transport of tourists to andf:rom the sites (which were not counted during the appraisal), andassuming (a) all hotel prices were raised by 50Z from January 1, 1984,(b) entry fees to the sites and sound and light were set at the appraisallevels (in real terms), (c) a higher estimate of benefits on the Jerashrestaurant, (d) 20% more incremental visitors than assumed at appraisal,and (e) inclusion of consumer surplus from the Sound and Light show, theERR would rise to 12.8%.

5.04 As regards other indirect benefits, although the constructionand operation of the project created employment opportunities in Petra,many jobs had to be filled by immigrants from other parts of Jordan andfrom abroad. Tourism-related employment in Petra (excluding the 200-300persons connected with the horses which carry tourists to the Basin),will have risen from around 35 in 1975 to 150 once the site managementstaff is in place. The Petra hotel is making an effort to train peoplefrom Wadi Musa and the Bedouin settlement in service tasks, withconsiderable success. In the case of Jerash, employment may rise fromabout iO to about 40 persons once the organization for site management isinstalled. In addition, there are jobs in both locations connected withexcavations and restoration works.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

6.01 The basic project concept was sound. The project may notachieve the full benefits expected of it, however, due to:

(a) unrealistically low cost estimates,

(b) the failure to reassess the economic viability of the maincomponents when more realistic cost estimates became availableduring the design and tendering process, which might havestimulated redesign efforts to lower costs, and

(c) lower fees for project outputs than expected at the time ofappraisal.

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6.02 This project would have encountered fewer problem. had it been

carried out in the context of an agreed tourism policy framework and hadit been more thoroughly prepared. Substantially more preparation wasprobably not a viable option because of MTA's unwillingness to engagedesign consultants before receiving a commitment from IDA (paras 2.04 and3.01). The decision to proceed obviously carried some risk. Inretrospect, the SAR sensitivity analyses did not test a wide enough rangeof outcomes, and specifically failed to examine adequate combinations ofadverse outcomes.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

7.01 Although the opportunity to earn the initially foreseen rate ofreturn on this project has been lost, the Government can still elevateits financial returns and enhance its economic justification. In theAssociation's letter of November 15, 1983, the Government has been urgedto take the following three actions as soon as possible:

(a) introduce entry fees to the sites and the Sound and Light show(and then raise them over time to at least the levels proposedby the SAR);

(b) allow the project hotel and restaurants to charge prices whichwill enable them to maximise the return on investments in thosefacilities; and

(c) create a department with adequate responsibility, authority,staff and budget to m=z3age the sites.

7.02 In view of the potential returns from the above actions and inorder to encourage follow up action by the Jordanian authorities, theAssociation proposes to re-evaluate the economic, financial andinstitutional aspects of this project in about two years, by which timethe international tourism market may have picked up and the tourismpolicy framework in Jordan may have improved.

JORDAN TOURISM PROJECT

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORTCredit No. 639-JO

Tabl

A. Prolected Visitor Arrivals to Jordan for Businhsg or Vacation(Staff Appraisal Report)

AverageAnnual Growth First 6 Months % Change

Year 1974 1976 1976 1977 1978 L979 12QQ J Z 1976-1982 1982 1993 1982-8

Arabs 77 124 137 147 167 9%(a)

Non Arabs 67 166 199 229 263 19%(a)

Total 144 290 336 376 420 14X(a)

B. Total Visitor Arrivals to Jordan ( 0001 (b)

Arab Countrles 431.1 746.1 781.7 863.8 1075.0 1213.3 1124.4 1675.2 21% 772.4 709.8 -8%

Mid East andAs1an Countries 192.8 196.3 199.2 142.9 60.8 168.7 108.7 100.1 -9% 48.9 55.3 13%

Non-Arab. Middle East ILor Asian:1UK 10.6 16.6 17.4 18.3 19.9 21.7 22.6 21.9 11%France 5.9 8,0 7.6 9.5 9.0 16.6 20.6 13.6 13%Germany 7.3 10.5 11.8 16.6 20.0 26.6 26.1 20.5 16% ) 58.4 ) 61.9 -11%Italy 3.6 4.1 5.2 7.3 6.8 16.3 13.4 8.0 12%Other Europe 16.5 29.7 28.3 33.1 38.3 56.9 69.9 46.4 16%USA 27.4 35.6 38.1 70.2 56.1 66.1 66.9 44.9 7%Other American 4.5 4.7 4.4 8.3 7.2 10.4 11.7 5.2 2% 29.3 36.7 25%Other .6 12.L7 ILI I5 IL3 1LL zl7 21% 21.8" 1L4 -32%

Subtotal 83.3 120.9 124.9 177.6 175.9 242.2 266.8 202.7 14% 109.5 103.5 -6%(Increase/Decrease %) +A45X +3X 4% AI.L .1% 38X +6X -21X _ -5X

Grand total 707.2 1063.3 1105.8 1184.3 1311.7 1624.2 1488.9 1977.9 16% 930.9 B68.5 -7%(Increase/Decrease %) +60% +4% +7% +11% +24% -8% +33% -7%

(a) Growth from 1974 to 1982(b) Data on visitors by purpose of visit are not available 1

- 16 -

AINEX II

JCRDAN- 1DURI4 HRWEXT - PROE COWHfErfDN RE[ORT(Credit ND. 639-JO)

ERDJC DML£ENIC AClUL AND EXFED

Start Completion FxecutionDifference rifference period

SAR /a ACtial 6(wnths) SAR Actual (nxiths) over-nm

DesigW 12/76 7/77 7 12/77 /b 9/78 /b 9 17%min Construction

Contract /c 7/78 9/79 14 9/79 4-9/83 Ic 43-48 242%Sbund and Light 6/78 1/80 19 6/79 5/82 35 141%Petra Telecommuni-

cation /d 9/78 7/77 (14) 9/79 3/82 30 367%Petra Irter Sipply 6/78 1/77 (18) 10/78 12/77 (10) mmPetra Seweage 6/78 6/82 48 3/79 8/83 53 56ZEbdouin Pesettlement 3/77 9/80 42 6/79 10/83 52 37Zkdi.logical &

Foace Accountuorks 3/77 1177 (2) 9/81 12/83 N/A NWA /e

Ccxapletionm A. - - - 12/79 10/83 48 120iB. - - - 12/80 /a 10/83 36 692

/a The 'SWa" dates have been delayed by one year an the assumptions that (a) the maindesipi consultants would be appointed by effecaiveness s estimated at Loansigiarre (ratber than 6 ndaths befxre 3bard appnval as stated in the SARinplezeccation sdhedule), and (b) all other dates would be delayed byamou5ts.

/b delivery of rt dcumentsic Petra staff bousing was delivered 4/83, Petca Basin facilities and Jerasi Restaurant

6/83, infrastructure 7/83 and Petra Hbtel 9/83./d Time savigs occurred becase of (i) the 'S'R" tinetable delay described in /a

above ence a '"aving" of 12 mvndhs), and (ii) action took place on this cOMpi entmore rapidly tha anticipated (saving of 2 mnoths). Cmpletion was delayed becauseit was partly dependent on pwgress of other components.

/e Nbt Applicable, since sae additional wrks we carried out over and above theiniciAl OLans-

- 17 - Ann x Tll

JORDA TURI9S PjWECT COULETmOu meyT

Prnlect Coats' Atual and Fanacted (Jo)

Cost It_ Appraisal Actual Esti1ted Over- Over- xmiks(Nubers refer to Annes I - Est1ste (as of Total (under)-run (underl-run

Table 2 of the SAl) Sept. 30. as t of19131 (4) - (2) ApmpraiSal

ell 62) 121 641 15) (61

0. PETRA 214610e 22ns314 450292531 12531 I=

A. PETRA ENA E 1937000 2691612 1300875 1071711 t5

1. Honel and Related Facilities JJUhlMl 2122151 241.551 1113116 ±4 Overrun is underestimted since the losses suffered byHotel 12430801 ) the contractor are excluded.

2.3 Power supply 3s500) 1S97377) 18407002.6 Landscaping 24000 1

Carpeting - 324U6 3246Furniture 8 Equsipint - 153298 15329

Financed by a JO 300.000 loan from the Housing anx.Operating Equipmet - 100000 10000l interest at 9S and coumssion or 1X. repayable in two

) Pre-Opening Expenses - 100000 100000 years. JO 200.000 were drawn In 2/83. rinder inWorking Capital - se000 100000 10/83. Includes equipment for Basin restaurant.

2. Ifraftrfotutrs -52211 .2ASZ2 .295 121 (11111t47S) LIM2.1 Water supply 86000 3710 3710 (82290) (9g61 Pay>ent by PU to WSC; excludes ISC-financed costs.2.2 Sewerage 87000 69542 75345 (11655) (312)2.4 and k 2.4 TeleComaications 169000 126272 136272 (52728) (28) Excludes TCC-financed excavation costs.2.5 Watershed Protetioin (entrance) 71000 89000 89200 18200 t26S2.7 1aintenance faciltties 23000 - - - - Hot constructed.2.8 Solid Waste Disposal 22400 - - Handled by sunicipaltty of Wadi Musa; prolect will

transfer a dump truck and loader to municipalityfollowing completion or restoration works.

3. Visitor Center TiWavEmLttis 19319 10922 .. 10325 ..... 2 24. CamR D 2.400 51m 164115 40111 5. Staff luarters 7.e3 292.1 214.102 . 721x6. Stahl= 290 - - - Not constructed.

S. PETIl &ASZI 93239 112M222 11413 2A1514 3

1. Visitor Facil- Assor tInf. 151O9 Z1511 2212 132636 Visitor Facilities 107000) 1 1 ) About one half of the building cost is for Antiquities

2.1 Water Supply 30000) 1 l 1 Oepartment offices. stores and classrooms and the2.2 Sewerage 7000) 264615) 277588) 18000) 60s other half for the lasin Restaurant.2.3 Power Supplies 2200o0 I

Furniture 1S490 18490Carpeting 2558 255S

2. Infrastnctr 492000 49755 531132 43s2 jf nH. Planned upgrading of the Siq surface and soil2.5 watershed Protection (Basin) 17S000) ) I stabilization on Treasury and El Deir forecourts

I X we-re not executed.

2.6-a Access IDrovient. Trasil 111000 497507) 535547 1 Of hich salaries: 30 324.10: materials andt;;rkers operating costs - JD 139.530: Equipment -

3. Arcneolonical Preservation 206000) I 1 a 71877.4. Bedouin Resettlement, 2sleD 234552 103333 193303 ±52 Excludes schools and coiunity facilities dch by

Comm1nity FacilIties) zs2500 234552 310000 tender of 9/83 = 10 132.800. Finance for tnese Item Is- Access road )50000 5s00e not yet arranged. Total overun with unrcleted Items

equals JO 241.000 or 96X

C. 111131 A3500330 1 6 1511212 66M212

I. Datau-rant ffl"1aries 139000 12 52253 51427559 ±1531Civil Works 127000) 441300) 470317

2.1 uttilities 12000)t I Furniture 25242 Z5242t Carpeting 2000 2000

2. Infrsrctu S 14165B 141 1632) 312.2-3 Trails, trail aarkers 53000 54921 549212.4 Fencing 16000 14263 142632. 5 Landscaping weed contrOl 30000 32687 326872.6 Hainternace facilities 49800 39817 39817

3. Sound am nle 11t 232 382193 ±912739334. Visitor Center ImTroveents 11403 23415 Z21 9415 ,67Xs. Archeological Preservation 372000 4121 449152 195 Of etcoh Equi5it: JD0 79 157

0. P3JECT AOm3NIST3ATr151 6e 950 395 12ZS Of shch Salaries: JD 120.e00; mterials A OP. cost -Jo 73n.oo equipment - J0 4.950

E. EROEESSZaDNAtSERvlES: 11fi1 3282 32eJ4 126032 ±213Design 87315 87315Supervision 205969 214769

F. TE ICAL ASSSTAICE t AINIG 62 120 1 9 II 3Tecnical Assistance 3468 3468Training 6541 6841

GRAND TOTAL 400830 56947813 6214456 22515 25

- 18 -

JORDAN: URISMr EW - HROJH= CCMREEIIN EORT

1RWBI DAS;! A, ACIUL AND EXED

OxtLative Ls (Ub$rs L 'zu4 ) ActuaL asFiscal Year ict :UaP tavnte Percn ofand Quarter Total A- b Appraisal Estinte B

FY77Septeier 30, 1976 - 0.1Daceber 31 1976 - 0.2Parch 31, l077 - 0.3June 30, 1977 - 0.4

FY78September 30, 1977 - -1.0 -

Der 31 1977 - 2.0 0.1rh 31, 78 - 3.8 0.2

June 30, 1978 - 4.5 0.2

FY79September 30, 1978 0.4 5.2 0.4 10(%Debewber31, 1978 0.6 5.4 1.0 60%March 31,1979 0.7 5.5 2.0 35%June 30, 1979 0.7 5.6 3.8 18Z

FY80Septeuber 30, 1979 0.7 5.7 4.6 15%December 31, 1979 0.8 5.8 5.1 16%4brh 31,J180 1.4 5.9 5.4 26%June 30, 1980 1.5 6.0 5.5 27%

FY81Septembier 30, 1980 1.5 - 5.6 27%Deceuber 3 1980 1.5 - 5.7 26%Mbrch 31, 1981 2.3 - 5.8 40%June 30, 198 2.5 - 5.9 42%

FY82tepeber 30, 1981 3.2 - 6.0 53Z

= = 31 er 1981 3.2 - - 53ZMbrch 31, 182 3.5 - - 58%Jume 30, 1982 3.7 - - 62%

E183September 30, 1982 4.9 - - 822Deceuber 31 1982 5.0 - - 83ZMarch 31, 1983 5.7 - - 95%Jume 30, 1983 5.7 - - 95%

FY84Septesber 30, 1983 6.0 - - 10(%

Closing Dite 3/31/83 06/30/80 09/30/81Delay 33 mnwths 18 months

Estimate A: as stated in SARi WE3: assumg that the appointent of consultants occurred on effectiveness date

expected as of signature.

PROJECT COMPLZTION REPORT

JORDAN TOURISM PROJECTContract etails

Prmesed FinalFiil OIuio S.lnn ahContract Oatibenltly Site Tedor Te,Udersld Advertivowrt pol!vry er camyleln W drld " is Owatien Ceeletion 1livsery e} Set&&tcost in cto4 . nf~~~~ &-_.Wwreltl rw. tam t , !rss :I_": f_ rlr ¢*.e x _r*.U! alZ ' r*e

2. JArduEuMA PIrs 0 snS, WI til 20/ls 'M" 181176 1@tt 4/ag/7i 1s Ios. 11/i/17 Wi/la La -is111 41s 11 lfid Plans & TenderJerashit eificetions

a. Jordan/uSA Per tra u lr,islrn 101206 2-10c9 1 hOWlfin l3 etics 10t. 39/1/1 /III/l 11/1111 11/1/76 AccerdinJeralli h call

Oate

a. JorjiJuR Petr 1.0ply of Cables, LCS Advertised O/6Sf77 WW/I/7 17/1/17 * IbS. "as,/7W W0/W/7I 1t13 *- 116 1 12041Ireg aires Pols, thregoh ICCdiltrilutienbe-.s forwadi Ms.le Petro

0. U. S. A. Petra 0. sotles Circultits LIc Advlrtild 1/071 I2/17 17/0/711 II is. tO/a/l WW/I/ U11190000 26723 6 . abW non Petra 9 tflrOrh TCC= A4 n.

0. as s44ch andW tellx circuit

biut""" patr aC. GM sea and

one totesc FPetre to Aube.

'. Jordan/Wy Potr" ProCurat & Ins. tC Advertied 3/010/76 /flni 7/0/m7 to mos. 7/9/10 t0/i/al 11413000 "4O1i 3 e tsllattie, ef Can- tIvreuetslrnrlasd Telephon I.C.C.

gt"lb l PAIX VWcertoln olthereqalpmnt.

WJrdan Petri S iorbe#el Ill Ow mCI it, 32/9/77 2//7 30/17 to don 15/4/73 W4/1/1 11110 23 21JarAsh Onor ear An 1401/71

4 *w trukis

7. frame Jerash tjvr Crae (for LC I. Is. 31//7W 13/71/a 20/7/if 4 "Os 40/3/70 11/16 FF361322 30001 3 nue.eItortICA t1tarnl 1301/i7

a. Jardsni Petra Loader 713 LCI It. 32. 2//72 3I/2/l6 307/7n 4 Mos. 4/20/70 10/0119 Usg71411 23006 2 141 1SCDutch 1~~~~~~~~~~~4/7/71

9. Jor4un/ Petra I lan cruller mCI 123,2, 22/6/77 3/1/73 53/7/77 1 teith I/2laf 7000 7430 1 7400Juan Jerith 30y7cla3 aMaiclos 124/7/

A Stal y of doeolp a" tSernr eeAvA,. ,a

wsri. ~ aratian as IniA final Olbit6eman~t 1@U14o t Pl~Fg~tContract hfattonlty Sitt Tender TenderitI Adaertil nt Oliver, of C letiwi lrien ledll gUnk1,7

DuatboneCa.4EJs.ery am "Cost in cal'9ee t ofu .r C~~~~~~~e t7UU -- scrILtGLen Um n n a a eeslzJrdr°*a eaLZ dtyuIC. Jordan Pete. I ChwrolOt IC 11i4/7d11 W5ell? V1IM iwlOll/P 8 "Ds. 3011/10 W/MI Me silo I faisPick-up

IL Sruny i Pera [qulppnt 'e'for ice i" "4/7/'7 """/'1 '1/47 WWI" I MII. /9/7 IlI/pIl CgmiOigo st1ll I 99149.11rjSteratIle

it. Joredan Fetre Wter TAm ICE 1hf/7n7 i l77 1ls/7J I/I717/ 1 7 mIS. hllS71 I/1U71 U14 6841 J 8841andJerash

1. Jordan/ Jerash 140el leader icE h/i/77 WlSt/y 1l/1/il l/7l7/ I les. Wi/IWI Wt/W/ll uSSleols 11544 7 1 44ljEpan

14. Jordan/ Jirash Wall e CrAM - Ice Il/i/77 Il//77 I11//77 lO/17i7 1 llec tli/l7il li/I/Il U5tS?@4S 11stil 1 1641JIS it l l rtSulsr

IS. IU Jerash Equipent for res. ICE WWI/1//7/ 5/61/79 4/6/19 4/6 As. 9/879 8/MO/I 15111.40 0948 11111,91raltio works loireJacks I soulowtstS

1, II Jrthl Equipon for Ica 1/IlM 10i/7$ 1/8/79 14/4/79 8 "as, 11/9/79 19/9179 11.4la 1114 * £145.91* tont of 7. soprestressing wiro.

1i. Jordan Petr Constructlen of ICe 84/6/"" 7/Sill. il/Sill 14//719 lslo , l3i/il 5/9/l3 1s111151 IISOI I 1116177Hotel Cav1ea 1/4/79

Is, jordc Petra ClnltruCtion of icC 144/4/7 i6 7/4/17 t8/5i/79 4/4/79 la "Ds. WW/ 1/4/l 81171 314109 1 211184Staff elutrig5

it. Joerdan Ptra Ceontruttion of ICI 14/1/71 7/4/I9 31/5/19 14/6/19 It Has. 30/ t I/1il 17t9l1 11111 1 147t1UInf rlltreoture

7'. Jordan potr Consitruction of IC 24i/17 7/4/19 1/f/il 84/8/79 16 MOs. 30/i/li 5/6/83 811411 110161 1 131111is. Joednd Petra gall~~si facilities

El. Jordan JersNh Censtructlen of ICC 34M8I 1/4/9 W1e/t1 14//7iV 1 Nl. lofllAl V/W/) 411470 47@1l7 1 441341hRstaurant

1t. Netherlands JirAsh SouiW A lilht ICe WWI/I 1i/9/79 bIl/slt 11"11s. 1l7/I/l I"""' /SI "La Uiltl 71141 1 140111,11is, AlutnerlndS Jarish Seund A tight Ecu U J 1J/9 /79 31/11/19 I1/1/So It MON. ).I/I/I Il/Al ilO HU I114 tt/ll I 1''"'114 .

10. .Jar.cn PLra tes uy of iteMs LCI 1l1//S i1/at il//l 1/1/eIl 7 HaS. il/S/l' t19/ll It@e 6173I 1 1 67111for Notel

1b leilderl wore dellvered to pro-qualified *pplicAots on 16/1/79.

Contract UstI elnt MI. J tehnder Tendering AOertlsnt hiIuor 1 e I e tIon A dr.ht w, Ia s Cr 1nC a "a-_*ar- f al e.an, S., I =.S WlA is tr .- tl U l ..

25. Jordan fetr. SIu lHeIg eIC I/I l aS/S 2//a II"i/o 14MS. 14l/i s " ' u ale 145

I* Jord&nj ir.Ir ConAtruCtenI ICM ' /6/8S Il8//S Il/Il/H IS/I/I0 I *. aen 81/ l/a1 CIlE 117141 1 S1IS:parsoS Trocl_nt proved

Iq cqlenl br n1ii. ~~~Jardan/UIh Pattr SlSphn Laucdry Eet. S/a. IlS/S /SC ISE/i/S I ls. Il/il/Cl 8,iif/a/a ChaIdS@ 111114 3 saIn s

Jeorsh lWorks

on beasiof bidsSMllISD 11

55. OIthetIMd JratimA $PDPJ957 C lSn 3CR 3/5/5 118/9/a t#la/l/S l*{/I/S I Item. IS#/I/S I/S/Il 016115651 4a151 1 1u71.Ufor Sound I LIShA56000 lil 174 410

b. Jordan/ Petra a Furniture & fur- ICs Si16/SS li/Ia/SO al/la/al lI/i/al 1 55/a/al I/IS/al uslalaae Ihl 1 1111 4854Italy J#ramih nhhIIn. fer

IelaSl andh$taurMt

"I. Jordwn JeraIh Civil Works IC 1i//SI 3/i/I I/a/l tl/S/vi leOs. S/I/al 4/S/al 81019 1169 I ll9lafor sosnid a

II. JlOrd/ Putre Supply VW IcC 81/4/Cl I a411//l Ia/I/af Wi/SI I/./.. IS/S/al SI4S1 33044 a 114 11455and fnsUIietIon af Ist//eoJerall' .f Cerptlno

Ont@l anDOntIur nL

"I Jordan Jarali SIPI, of lancing Id IS/S/SI 1/1111 Sl/I/SIida ,I//m i//l *.a ease1'" " " " sele a aga

II. Jordan JoraIf iwIly of anlaa ICR iaS/I/a a/I/am IS/I/al -. Idlatel, IS/a/el ia/I/al 1555 zama 3 IHfar Jerash fenels

14 Jordan JeraSIl mnniallmIIon f ICE Ia/I/aS al/i/al la/i/li * 1E.wEIelSl li/a/al Il/a/fl nJ7a Dil I Jan7anelng wIres

wl

10 e S lIcu net fInIshed by tAg conlractr aceorJlln IS OpeelfIcatICnI oIlS he cSoieud hyth Po ru e JHU w

- 22 -

ANNEX VIPage 1 of 8

JORDAN: TOURISM PROJECT - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT(Credit 639-JO)

ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS

1. All benefits and costs were deflated to end 1975 using the GDP deflator.

2. Investment Costs were taken from Annex III. Consultant fees andadministrative costs were distributed to the components identified in Table6. Replacements were estimated from the third full year of operations at 2%of investment cost, except in the case of the Sound and Light where annualreplacements were estimated at 6% due to the greater importance of equipmentin that component than others.

3. No adjustments were made to reflect differences between financialreceipts and expenditures and economic benefits and costs. The main biasintroduced by this procedure is exclusion of contractors' losses, which wouldamount to several times the indirect tax content in civil works (ofapproximately 5% of project cost).

4. Tables 1 to 5 set out the estimates of receipts and operating costs andcompare them with those of the SAR. The base PCR estimates of incrementalvisitors to Petra and Jerash are equal to those in the SAR. This assumptionmay be optimistic.

5. Table 6 sets out the investment costs, Table 7 the operating benefitsflows, and Table 8 shows the net benefit flows. NPVs (at discount rates of 0%and 10%) and - IRRs are shown in Table 9 for the base case and varioussensitivity tests showing the effects of (i) more optimistic assumptions aboutprices, (ii) the effects of incorporating some external benefits which werenot considered in the appraisal, (iii) alternative visitor forecasts, and(iv) alternative estimates of benefits of the Jerash restaurant. The estimatein the text that the ERR would rise by 0.4% if consumer surpluses by Jordanianusers of the Sound and Light are taken into account is based on the assumptionthat one-half of Sound and Light receipts are from Jordanians, and thatconsumers surplus equals the revenues from residents.

- 23 -

ANNEX VIPage 2 of 8

JORDAN: TOURISM PROJECT - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT(Credit No. 639-JO)

Table 1: NON-HOTEL/RESTAURANT RECEIPTS AND COSTS PER VISITOR

- (JD/visitor)Location Petra Jerash Sound & LightEstimate SAR PCR SAR PCR SAR PCRPrice Levels 1975 1983 1975 1975 1983 1975 1975 1983 1975

A. Receipts per Visitor

Entry Fees(a) 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 1.5 1.0 0.5Car/Horse Hire,Local transport 1.25 1.0 0.5 0.1

Tips, Guides, Other 0.25 1.0 0.5 0.2Purchases, Souvenirs 1.0 3.0 1.5 0.7 1.0 0.5Meals, Drink - (b) 2.0 1.0

Subtotal 2.50 6.0 3.1 1.5 3.5 1.8 1.5 1.0 0.5

Off-site Transport - 6.0 3.1 - 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0Crand £otal 2.5 12.0 6.2 1.5 5.5 2.8 1.5 3.0 1.5

B. Costs as 2 of Receipts SAR PCR

Entry Fees lo 0Car, Horse Hire 65% 65%Tips 0%Purchases, Souvenirs 65Z 65%Heals, Drink 65% 65%Sound and Light 50% 47-532 (c)Off-site Transport - 65Z

NB. Not all totals add up due to rounding.

(a) Assumed to be levied from January 1, 1984(b) Included in receipts of restaurant.(c) Depending on year - See Table 5.

- 24 -

ARM VIPage 3 of 8

.XN: MURIS14 ERQ - EPROM CfION REWOR(Credit Nb. 639-Jo)

Table 2: VISIDR PDROCASI5

PEIRA JEASHIctalement

(i.est Niits Foreigi Visitors SDud & Ligt Foreigp Visitors

SAR /a PCR /b SAR PCR SAR PCR SAR PCR

Year

19781979 36.1 5 50 71980 39.4 10 55 7;981 42.7 24 55 151982 46.0 43 60 191983 49.3 9.4 /e 51 60 271984 49.3 28.2 /f 60 60 /f 65 80 /f 30 30 /f1985 49.3 33.3 70 70 65 80 37 371986 49.3 35.8 - 72 65 80 - 40

1987 49.3 38.4 - 74 65 95 - 401988 49.3 38.4 - 76 65 95 - 40

1989 49.3 38.4 - 79 65 95 - 401990 49.3 38.4 81 81 65 95 40 401991 49.3 38.4 - 81 65 95 - 40

1992 49.3 38.4 - 81 65 95 - 401993 49.3 38.4 - 81 65 95 - 40

l994 49.3 38.4 - 81 65 95 - 401995 49.3 38.4 25.0 81 65 95 40 401996-2006 49.3 38.4 0 /c 81 65 95 50 /d 40

"J' - rvot stated.Ia lb allowaarxe dws made for guests who uld have stayed in the renovated facilities even

witwut the pzject./b OQest ni#its in the new Peta IHtel./c 0 in 2000 si8e even 'rikhut the project", the nuxier of visitors have readed the

capcity of the site. lb capacity limit (and hence decline in inczemtal visitrrs) wasasmwd in the PCR.

/d 2000/e EstimtedIf Forecast

- 25 -AM= VI

mini w mz3ecr- emr ~u~Page 4 of 8(Cmdit B.6 639-J)

-M* 3 L AM I. WAh1Z S - MM5

3Asial and O r Ea t CJDM)

S8 ( PM) (d

pk 11 Cbl 1975 1983 1M75 I 1975U) (2) {~~~~~3) /b X4 ' U '0 (6) 577

km kmipCu/~zi,~ 4.0 4.0 6.1 3.2 (21) -Food 5.9-7.7 3.8 6.9 3.6 (39) -a o Rmipca/2t 2.-2.9 1.0 2.1 1 (2)Otbw =MiuMiii &lk C 0.5 0.5 .L6 0.8 -8w _Lb M7c 17-15.1d 9.3 18 87 31) Ie 8a7

3wof tms , 82 a) 2 -

12e GuqWy Ra L8 L71 L7

lbm O=o.. SUMin Yal 55 SSIS /C 55

2 60 60 653 65 65 704 70 70 755 75 75

a.c of Ss,m (paccet) 38 - 37km e 4mx= 22 2

Q -(pectd 50 75

La (D ( w g ni$c) 3.0-3.8 Id 4.2? 2.20 (27)

Faplnym/F.m 1.5 1.13 L13 (25)kywLL S o 301 155 Z10

ll.U pw boiic 3.L-2.6 8.6 4.5 73 IfOdih e per brkitz 4.2-6 5.1 2.63 (43) Iflbtal matJ pw betmt 10*-114 18.0 9-3 tlO) Jc-

valiba ct pw b ci NJL L LJL 3.75Fiud Oatpsw mm aiit aail. Nh. LA. LA. NA. 6.852mal Qmm per beqwat

ai - St W10.3 I& MA. L L. MA. 1.0oR - 751 11.0 17.5 9.03 (13)(d 9.09

_u Iomt Fee ILS. 3D(0.5) 0.26 0.26zrn- fee U.S. 1L of XP ILO of GCP

ifL 0 o iO 0

/I Fic 1 x 1t d by Rn _Hes in JunL983 f firstc ye of apmcias;Cooipc hUM (OR) - 75.91

hb Pcipcs fw Its .at onLy (ancfiy carual,l *alis)Ic Intevie im Mbin 193 with Fe.im m idicatcd occzpmy rates am

v eyacted co scart lewam d. 75.91 fc the firsear acpited in.mw 193. OR in e first dhm mdis b_ or qdi 3M.

Jd Mm f irS mf£t to d ye of ap.2g (0 55S); tde s d flgueto yaw 5 (Q7C) aft -ich o= ie emmin tah .s flu eb i

pw bdmist tue became of dte imcwmaizi weLacbm inpotwee of c me.lLe Qcimn oE 1oui (5) with the fist fiwu in colum (2)/f Camped of cdlma (5) widt die mwd fis; in alam (2) dsew the

fi£u zuws to om n cy rafs of 751 ad so is mo 'lafcw fiwdad ov_d atc uici tde esdmwi of cnlii (4) ad (5) uic* m bmWd onm (of 7S5.

/L Xis uism %diec .o f_ is i-1id- in die S asts.

MA -C s ot sviced .S to

- 26 -

JORDAN: MDRlM ERPWlT - RiT W1MalETN IEOE:r ANNEX VI(Credit lt. 639-Jo) Page 5 of 8

Table 4: GJP OF EE1h MEL AND RESrAUJRATAPEBAIL AND CWRENI ESMAM

1. &iN (1975 JD) 1979 1980 1981 1982 L983 1984 1985

Hocm (kcupancy 55 60 65 70 75 75 75aP (JD 'W0) 84 102 L19 167 203 220 244

2. PCR (1975 JD) 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987

xupazy rate 55% 55% 65% 7CZ 75%GP: Base (24)/a (73) (49) (37) (25)

- Boom Rates + 50Z (24)/b (29) 2 17 31

- All Hotel Prices + 50( (24)/b 41 82 103 123

3. Other Petra anefits (1983 JD) 1984 1985 1986 1987

Campsite /cGP UD000) 5 7 10 10

rg fromproject providedinfrastructure /d 9 10 11 12

BErtal value on staffhousixg; 12 units atJD 50/mo. 6 6 6 6

Rental value of BBouinhousirg at 8Z of buildingcost (JD 22 per unitper unnth) 25 25 25 25

%btotal 45 48 52 53SubCotaL, 1975 prices 23 25 27 27

/a Ibtel opened in Agust, 1983./b Increase in prices assued fxom 1 Jmwary 1984./c Charge of JD 1.5 per nigit for persons in "rotels", 5 rotels of 20 people

eadc per mxith, yields receipts of M 1,800 pa. The hotel intends to set uptents to handle overflows. Oa the assuvptions that it diarges JD 7 per guestnigit, 0P cmes to 5aZ, and an occancy of 15 tents for five mnoths peryear, (XP would ame to JD 7,875 after the initial start up period.

/d Conprises:(i) Hotel: one quarter of telehorne bill (to remove double count

of cost of the telecommmnictions component) JD 4,000 in 1984(ii) Savings of electricity cost to rest house (which are included

in the hotel operating costs); JD 3,000 pa.(iii) Saving by resthouse on disposal of sewage and sludge due to

sewage treatment works; JD 2,0W

- 27 -

.CRU ~IOURIM( EROECr - ERG COMPLYrM RE Page 6 of 8(Ccedit No. 639-JO)

Table 5: GP OF JERASI lwrANI AND SOIAD Tw r&ISAL AM CDEW ESr%M

A. estaurant 1979 M980 1 983 194 1985 1986 1987 1988ff

SAB aP CJD '0ow) 38 -53 64 78 92 109 127 127 127 127

Base estinae of Benefi /a 7 20 22 23 25 25ALtenative Estin3te of efits /b 7 53 57 62 67 67

B. Smd and ligit

si; aP UD '0OO) 38 42 42 45 45 49 49 49 49 49

PCR:

Receipts (JD '000) /c 80 80 80 90 95Opatirg Cbots (JD '000) /d 42 42 42 42 42aP (JD '000) 38 38 38 48 53in 1975 prices 20 20 20 25 27

/a Pzxfit of MD 15,0W pa. and eliminatic of the aual losses of JD 5000 sfed by the Htels and:Bsestaiznts Corporaion over the last 5 years in ruDng the old restauran; GCP rises at 8Z infirst 4 years.

/b An existirg restrant has offered to rent the fcility for JD 4000/1mth. Mhis rental wuld be ani sxzaiextal beefi t to the ec if the opwator were to uuke an additioal pcofit equal to therenta paid on his existig establis r.

Ic Capacity of the Soird and Liit is appwximte1y 95D00 visitors p.a., calculated as foUois:Saso, from 1 April - 31 C0t - 7 ins. x 30 days - 210 daysCapacity cwwd - 300SK4wing per night - 1.5Tnitial visitors are assiume at apoxetely half of visitors to Jerash (eluding Jerashfestival) for first three years, rising to capity in the nect tw years.Enty fee of MD 1 per visitor.

/d Staff salaries = JD 26,000;-other operating costs = JD 16,000 p.a.

-21- sA VPae 7 of a

__ Tumin Ar

PROJECT r=LErN aERT

Table 6: Investment Costs

CJD -68 IN 9l75 PrLcas)

-977 1978 1979 1966 1sl 1962 1963 1984-1985 1986-2as

Poetr' Hotel 21. 1 6.5 21L-2 1l8a5 472 3 338.6 75%13 - 36.6Sther Det'a :.42 69. 165.2 136.7 £1. 93.2 132.0 - 12-Jvrsh Restaueant 3.4 2.7 37.6 66.3 95.6 al 42.7 - 5s7SO-nC arC L: 6nt L I 1.4 1.3 1.3 138.7 asL9 5.7 - 13.-Other jera63 22. 4 5.3 64.6 54.5 69.4 63.8 78.8 - 7-..

TO TAL 61.2 16. 3 479 4 423 891.1 646-5 1I . 2 - 74-6

3ecember 23. :S96 1:-49JORDAN TOURISM PIJECT

PRCJECT COIPLETlON REPORT

T?aIe 7t OCerat,ng BeuerLts (ReceiPts les Operating Costs)

CJD -rP IN 197S Dr,acw%

------- _-- --- ----------- - ---------- _ _ _ _ _

1977-1982 1963 1984 L985 1986 1987 lS98 L989 1990-2ae6_ _ - ----_ _ - - - -- - - - _--- -- - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ __

PErRa fCrEL

Gap: - -24.6 -73.6 -49.8 -376 -26 -a5. -2S.. -25e0GSPZ - -24 6 -29.8 2.8 17.6 31.6 31.8 31.6 31.6GSO3 - -2- e 41.6 82-Sz 163e 123.0 I3.6 123.6 123.8CT0ER - - 23.8 25.8 27.6 27.6 27.0 27.6 27.6

PETRA VISSIOR DENEF I.S

-NTCRNRL - - 15.6 12P25 1266 129.5 133.8 138.2 141.7EXTERNAL - - 64.8 756 77.8 79.9 82.1 653 87.5

JERAS4 RESTaURANT

BASE BENEFIT - 4.6 MS 11.8 12.6 13.6 13.0 13.0 13.6ALTERNATIVE - 4.6 27.8 36.6 32.6 34.0 34.0 34. 6 34.6

SOUNID aIND L E114T

XITE11 - - 19.9 19.9 Z4.6 a I 27.7 27.7 27.7EXTmL - - 28.a 26.8 32.6 32.4 34.2 34.2 34.2

.H804 VISITOR BENEFrTS

INTERNAL - - 3 .2 38.5 41.6 41.6 *i.6 41.6 41.6EXTERNAL - - L168 13.3 14.4 144 14. 4 14.4 14.4

- _-----------_---- --------- - - --- -_--_ --- -- _ _ -_ _ _ _ _ _ _

December 22. 193 11:49JORDAN TSURISM PROJECT

PRDEr-T CaOPLWETION REPORT

Table 6: rat Benefits Flo.

(JlD -ee IN 1975 Prices)

1977 197a 197 1980 1981 198 1983 1984 195 1966 1967 1988 1989 199-26

A. BaSE CASE -61.2 -16Q-3 -479.6 -442.3 -891.1 S648.5 -±631.2 116 1 167.9 119.6 136.6 142.7 148.6 151.5B. a. v DN -8m -61.2 -166.3 -479.6 2.3 -891.1 -64L85 -1631.2 aLs 135.7 66.1 182.4 167.8 112.0 114.8C. A, V Lp 2an -61.2 -168.3 -479.8 -442.3 -891.1 -648.3 -1831.2 143.4 268.1 153.1 178.8 177.6 183.9 18.1ID. R.Rt UP 58% -61.2 -166.3 -479.8 -42. 3 -6911 -648.5 -1031.2 168 1 21899 173.6 1flS 198.7 264-. 267.5E. H. P. UD 56% -61.2 -160.3 -479.8 -442.3 -891.1 -648.3 -1631.2 z36 1 298.9 259.6 284.6 296-7 296.6 29.5F. A - Ext. -61.2 -168.3 -479.8 -442.3 -891.1 -648.5 -1631.2 2265 285 6 243.8 263.3 273.4 281.9 287.5G.E.1t,E.. -61. Z -166.3 -479.8 -442.3 -691.1 -64L.3 -1631.2 351.5 435.6 4e3L. 432.3 442.4 438.9 486. H. C,, 0 O 26S% -61.2 -168.3 -479.6 -442.3 -691.1 -648 . -1631.2 369.2 385.6 351.8 379.3 386.2 395.0 399.5H. 6, ULIP 26% -61.2 -16E83 -479.6 -443 -691.1 -6 4.5 -ie31.2 393.9 485.6 4557 485.4 496 6 5S668 513.6S. SaR -98e.6 -1256.6 -76.6 14L 6 '26.6 56eeS 626 6 76L. 826.6 M6M. 886.6 876.6 968.6 966.8

Decembe- 22, 19e3 11:49

- 29 -

ANNEX VIPage 8 of 8

JORDAN: TOURISM PROJECT - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT(Credit No. 639-JO)

Table 9: ECONOMIC RATES OF RETURN AND NET PRESENT VALUES

ERR Net Present Value (JD'O00) atNet Benefit Flow Z OZ lOZ

A. Base Case -0.6 -309 -1,640B. A, incremental visitors down 20Z -2.5 -1,130 1,798C. A, incremental visitors up 20% 0.9 513 -1,482D. Room rate up 50% 1.7 960 -1,393E. All hotel prices up 50% 4.7 3,036 -991F. Base + External Benefits 4.3 2,742 -1,052G. E, alternative Jerash

restaurant and externalbenefits 8.5 6,564 -311

R. G, incremental visitors down 20% 7.2 5,286 -557R. G, incremental visitors up 20% 9.7 7,841 -65J. Staff Appraisal Report /a 20.3% 19,770 2,958

la To facilitate the calculations and presentation, the SAR stream of net benefitswas extended to 30 years from 25, and an average size of the stream for thelast 18 years was estimated to yield approximately the same ERR as in theappraisal (20.1%).

ANNEX VII-:30- - -F&Page 1 of 2

- November 15, 1963

H.E. MaH'n abu ..uwarA1inibter for TourismBox 54G3.Amman, Jordan

'Your Zxcelleucy:

SUBJECT: Jordan Tourism Project

I am writing to express my cbaoks For the assistance accorded myself and.Ir. Mitchell in connection with this project by you and by members of yourstaff. The mission is now preparing the Project Completioo Report, vwich willprovide our best assessment of tbe success of the project and lessoos to belesrned from it. We expect the report to be readv for review by the Jordaniaoauthorities in early 1984. Ia the meantime, we look forward to- receivionir. Alami in Washington in November to assist with drafting the report.

I would also like to take this opportunity to review with vou some of themajor missio -findincs and to confirm the points discussed duriac your meetingvith Hr. -iitchell on October 26.

Mana%ement of the Sites

We share your concern that appropriate institutional and budtetarvprovision be made for the future operation and manazeueat of Petra and Jerashfires. In addition to cleaoinY and unkeep of these areas, collectine chargesfrom visitors, and contiouing restoration wor'ks, it is important that thepresentJtion of the sites to visitors (-including production of maps,appropriate signposts, trails etc.) be improved. There also still needs to beattencion given to cne stabilization of the surface of the Siq, and of theforecourts or the Treasury and of '1 Deir Temple at Petra. We understand thatyou are exploring means for accomplisbing chere objectives, poseiblv chrouchextennion of the life of the Project Unit beyond the end of 19a3. We hovethat the Government edopts a tinely solution to this important problem.

Securing Economic Returns from the Project Investment

The project has, for a variety of reasons, cost more thoa anticipated atappraisal in 1975, and operating iocome is tow expected to be substantiallyunder appraisal estimates. The Petra and Jerash facilities are of a very highstandard, and qh',uld be iostrumental in dravin2- more tourists to Jordan. I amsure tnat vou share our concern that the substantial investments made by theGovervment in this project secure an ecooonic returot as bi2b as possible, evenif this is less than the returns anticinated at apprsisal. In our view the

OFFICIAL FILE COPY

-31- ANNEX VIIPage 2 of 2

l4ovember 15, 1983

zoiloving measures would hielp increase the economic return as well as reducetne neec for Government suosidies to tourism:

(a) incroductior. of entry fees at Petra and Jerash;

(b) raising subscantially tne prices charged in che Perra hotel and Jerashlestaurant. We were glaa to learn that the Ministry intends to review

.these prices before the end of tne year, and look forward to receivinginformation on the outcome of that review;

(c) razionalizing the management arrangements for the old resthouse atPetra and placing the Jerash rescaurant under the management of thecompany previousiy selectea oy che government and agreed by the Bank;anu

(a) making additional investments in the Petra facilities (upgrading ofthe existing resthouse, provision of indoors lounge/bar area at thenew hotel), to secure mximum returns on that investment.

Comuletion of Resettlement of Bedouin at Petra

Substantial additional investments will be required to complete theresettiement of the Bedouin now occupying caves in the Petra Basin, inclucinginvestments in social facilities (school, mosque, health center and communitycenter), and also in housing to accommodate a larger number of families thaninitially planned for. We hope that appropriate arrangements can be rade forthese matters in the coming year.

it may be appropriate to review once more the project's impact after therehas oeen an opportunity to deaL with the above listed issues. Vc believe thata two year interval should-be appropriate, in order to benefit from moreoperating experience with the project facilities and possibly an increase intourism. We hope to hear your further views on this at the time that thecompletion report is forwarded to you.

In tae meantime, we would be gratetul to be kept informed of cle actionstaken in connection with the above issues, especially as re-ards entry fees,hotel pricing management of the Jerash Restaurant and provision formaintenance and operation of the sites.

'WLth best wishes,

Yours incerely,

lain a IristieDeputy Chief

Urban Projects DivisionEurope. hliddle East. and North Africa Region

cc; Dr. Hanna Oen, President, National Planning Council

Cleared with and cc: I. Erim (E!K2D)cc: ri:-ssrs. Serageldin (oir), AssiMakopoulos (EIPUR)

N.DRIH SITE OF THE CHuL OF~ ~

5~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~TTAF O.TEPOPIS

S~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~A0TI N NYR

I~~~E

0 EAST NATHS~~~~I *-UTH

T .T5PY/1

* t * SITE OP TIlE cHUhCH OP~~~~~~~~O

SOUTH THEATRE -' Is,,

as WATER GATF ag

t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~g .1 w/o

METERS HIPPODRO

r~~19,Uit"114r I ...... Wr.wi .... J O R D A NI" f 4tofc rto Vr &r "w ft 0ri,,it Ir. CM.A " nd

5"ri Y Inre< I Ar NIRAOTOURISM PROJECTLEBANON I fD rn,azu -. -

AYRI ANI JERASH~J}$ s rpAlAS .- I RAOJERASHREFUEL IC .

JERASI_ PllOJECT a 0. OLD CIIY WALLAAMMAt 1 NEW VISITOR CENTER ARCHEOLOOICAL SITE AREA

,- -. \ ; : ta t2 NEW RESTAURANT FACILITIES - EXISTINO TOWNTRIUMPHAL ARCII ADMINISTRATIVE AND MAINTENANCE FACILITIES ----- FOOT TRAIUSAUDI ARABIA CBUICHAI

JO RDA N T * E RIEMOVED WADIStPsIaC| / > ( A~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ EXISTING RE5TAuRIANT s IPEII EJISTING RESTAURANT OCCUPFIED TERRITORIESMAAId 5 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~EXISTING TURKISH BUILDING

- 5 T~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1his FPA map is baied on IBRD 11981R,POAS "I Ma/ _76. 1976_ I under project have been

,,and inset revised In reflec ihe- lvi rel~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~44iUJIon.

11IIf~~~~~~~~~~~~~I

J, > ' ~J ORDANvs yx J r~~~~OUR ISM Pr'

- -\ o PETRA~

- SNAKE MONUMENT PETA BSIN

to ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~PQIOJECT ARIEA

-92 H + | 1 ~~~~~~~~RESAURANT AND QEiARCH CENTER

_ -O -.AZZAL CAMP TO BE REMOVED

/ '1 /iSTORICAL STRUCTURES

/ - HORSE TRAILS

e _A_E_f_ _ FOOT TRAILS

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