Document ofThe World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No: 22496

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT(IDA-28390; PPFI-P9440)

ONA

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$35.0 MILLION

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF GUINEA

FOR THE

NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL SERVICES PROJECT

June 29, 2001

Rural Development mCountry Department 11Africa Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of theirofficial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective December 26, 1995)

Currency Unit = Guinean Franc (GNF)GNF 1.00 = US$ 0.001US$ 1.00 = GNF 978

FISCAL YEARJanuary 1 to December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

Al Artificial InseminationBCEPA Agricultural Policy Coordination OfficeCBPP Contagious Bovine Peri-pneumoniaCIRAD Center for International Cooperation in Agronomic Research for DevelopmentDNA National Agriculture DirectorateDNE National Livestock DirectorateDPDRE Prefectoral Directorate for Rural Development and EnvironmentFEW Field Extension WorkersIITA International Institute of Tropical AgricultureIRAEF Regional Inspection for Agriculture, Livestock and ForestryIRAG Agricultural Research Institute of GuineaLPDA II Second Sector Policy LetterLSRP Livestock Sector Rehabilitation Project (Cr. 1752-GN)MAEF Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and ForestryMC French Ministry for CooperationNASP National Agricultural Services ProjectOP Fanners OrganizationSAR Staff Appraisal ReportSNPRV National Rural Development and Agricultural Extension ServiceSOP Farmer Organizations SpecialistTS Subject Matter SpecialistUEP Experimental Farmer GroupsWARDA West African Rice Development Association

Vice President: Callisto E. MadavoCountry Manager/Director: Mamadou Dia

Sector Manager/Director: Jean-Paul ChausseTask Team Leader/Task Manager: Suzanne Piriou-Sall

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GUINEANATIONAL AGRICULTURAL SERVICES PROJECT (Cr. 2839-GN - PPFI-P9440)

CONTENTS

Page No.1. Project Data 12. Principal Performance Ratings I3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 24. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 35. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 156. Sustainability 167. Bank and Borrower Performance 178. Lessons Learned 199. Partner Comments 2010. Additional Information 20Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 21Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 23Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 25Annex 4. Bank Inputs 26Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 28Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 29Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 30

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in theperformance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed withoutWorld Bank authorization.

Project ID. P001081 Project Name: NATIONAL AGRICULTURALSERVICES PROJECT

Team Leader: Suzanne Piriou-Sall TL Unit: AFTR3ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: June 29, 2001

1. Project Data

Name: NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL SERVICES L/C/TF Number: IDA-28390;PROJECT PPFI-P9440

Country/Department: GUINEA Region: Africa Regional OfficeSector/subsector: AE - Agricultural Extension; AG - Agency Reform;

AL - Livestock; AR - Research; VY - OtherEnvironment

KEY DATESOriginal Revised/Actual

PCD: 01/15/1995 Effective: 08/09/1996 10/03/1996Appraisal: 06/28/1995 MTR: 04/12/1999Approval: 04/02/1996 Closing: 12/31/2000

Borrower/lImplementing Agency: GOVERNMENT/MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE;GOVERNMENT/LIVESTOCK; GOVERNMENT/AND FORESTRY

Other Partners: European Union, French Republic (Ministry of Cooperation, Caisse Francaise deDeveloppement)

STAFF Current At AppraisalVice President: Callisto E. Madavo Edward V. K. JaycoxCountry Manager: Mamadou Dia Jean-Louis SarbibSector Manager: Jean-Paul Chausse Randolph HarrisTeam Leader at ICR: Suzanne Piriou-Sall Franz SchoroschICR Primary Author: Dirk Nicolaas Prevoo; Amadou

Oury Diallo

2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=HighlyUnlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)

Outcome: S

Sustainability: L

Institutional Development Impact: SU

Bank Performance: S

Borrower Performance: S

QAG (if available) ICRQuality at Entry: S

Project at Risk at Any Time: No

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

3.1 Original Objective:The objectives and design of the National Agricultural Services Project (NASP) need to beassessed against the situation prevailing in Guinea at the time of project preparation (1994-1996).Agriculture was characterized by smallholdings (averaging less than 2 ha), low productivity due tolimited use of improved agricultural technology, animal traction and commercial inputs.Production increases had been mostly due to area expansion. The public expenditure reviewcarried out jointly by Government and IDA in early 1995, showed that: (i) public sectorinvolvement in agriculture was disproportionately large relative to needs; (ii) the pattern ofrecurrent and investment expenditure funding was almost entirely donor driven, with donorsfimding 85 percent of investment expenditures and 80 percent of recurrent expenditures; (iii)insufficient attention to operating and maintenance, especially for rural infrastructure; and (iv) thehigh cost of public investment in agriculture (including substantial use of technical assistance) withlimited impact. The livestock sector had already benefited from a long policy dialogue betweenthe Government and the donor community, which had been supported by IDA through theLivestock Sector Rehabilitation Project (Cr. 1725-GN; LSRP), which closed in 1995.

To address these issues, Government prepared an Agricultural Sector Policy Note and with thesupport of donors, the NASP. The NASP was to be a first step towards an integrated sectorinvestment program in the agricultural sector. It was co-financed by the European Union, theFrench Ministry of Cooperation (Ministere de la Cooperation Franqaise, MC) and the Caissefran(aise de developpement (CFD). A seperate Livestock Sector Policy Letter had been preparedas part of the LSRP.

The project's development objective was to improve nationwide agricultural productivity andproduction, incomes of fanners and food security. The operation was designed to: (i) reshape thepublic sector role to complement the private sector and support private sector led growth; (ii)develop human capital, i.e., the knowledge and skills of both professionals (researchers, extensionagents and livestock specialists) and farmers; and (iii) improve Ministry of Agriculture, Livestockand Forestry's (MAEF) capacity to provide services that are public goods and to arrestenvironmental degradation.

The NASP was consistent with the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy for Guinea. Its overallobjectives and the goals the operation was designed to achieve were clearly appropriate given thesectoral analysis and the country's own vision as detailed in its Agriculture Sector Policy Note andthe Livestock Sector Policy Letter.

3.2 Revised Objeetive:The mid-term review confirmed the pertinence of the original objectives of the project.

3.3 Original Components:In support of the project's objectives, the project included the following four components:

* institutional capacity building of MAEF (US$6.9 million or 9 percent of base costs)* agricultural extension (US$31.0 million or 39 percent of base costs)* agricultural research (US$20.3 million or 25 percent of base costs)

- 2 -

* livestock and animal health component (US$21.2 million or 26 percent of total base costs)* responsiveness to social, gender and environmental issues (costs included under the other four

components)

The components were well designed and formed a coherent framework in support of the project'sobjectives. Many of the institutional reforms proposed were in line with Bank practice at thetime. The sole exception was the pilot entrepreneur capacity building scheme sub-component ofthe institutional capacity building of MAEF component. The design of this pilot was not yet clearat the time of Board presentation of the project and was to be detailed during the first year ofproject implementation. The sub-component was, however, only added at appraisal and leavingthe details for implementation was not uncommon at the time.

3.4 Revised Components:The components were not substantially revised during project implementation. The pilotoperation was suspended following the 1999 supervision mission because of the relatively highcosts and low impact.

3.5 Quality at Entry:Quality at Entry is rated marginally satisfactory. The project was a follow-on of two earlieroperations (First Agricultural Services Project, Cr. 1636-GN, and the Livestock SectorRehabilitation Project, Cr. 1725-GN). The preparation team appropriately focused on the lessonslearned from these prior operations and addressed these satisfactory in project design. Thedevelopment objective was clearly defined and had appropriate indicators. As mentioned above,the project's components formed a coherent framework in support of the development objectiveand were technically well designed. The analysis presented in the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR)was superficial, but supplementary information was available from the existing Project CompletionReports and project documents in file. In addition, a good project implementation manual hadbeen prepared. As mentioned before, the project was in support of the Bank's and Government ofGuinea's development strategies. The design was not overly complex and did not introduce newconcepts, but was in support of agreed reforms with the Government and in the case of thelivestock sector, ongoing reforms. The timetable for the institutional reforms at the AgriculturalResearch Institute of Guinea (Institut de recherche agronomique de guinee, IRAG) was veryoptimistic given the Bank's experience in other countries, which became apparent during projectimplementation.

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs

4.1 Outcome/achievenment of objective:The project's overall development objective was to improve nationwide agricultural productivityand-production, incomes of farmers and food security. The overall outcome of the project is ratedsatisfactory as the project was successful in increasing agricultural productivity, production andincomes. As the key performance indicators in Annex show, agricultural gross domestic productgrew faster under the project than expected. In addition, the share of agriculture in the nationaldomestic product increased by two percent from 22 in 1996 to 24 percent in 2000 (estimated). Inabsolute terms agricultural GDP increased to 449 billion GF, exceeding appraisal estimates by 2billion GF. This was achieved primarily by increasing productivity through the adoption of newtechnologies and improved plant varieties by the 46 percent of the farm families reached by the

-3 -

project, and improved animal husbandry practices. General food security increased and reach itstarget one year early in 1999. Agricultural exports slightly lagged behind appraisal estimates, butthis was caused by external factors over which the project had no control. Imports of meat anddiary projects declined precipitously as a result of the continued livestock reforms and increasedlivestock productivity. In addition, the strengthening of agricultural research has availed thecountry access to a continuous flow of improved farming technologies. Fertilizer use laggedslightly because of the delayed adoption of the regulatory framework liberalizing trade in chemicalinputs. This had, however, no impact on the project's overall outcome. The details for individualcomponents are provided below.

4.2 Outputs by components:A. Institutional Capacity Building.This component's objectives were to strengthen the field presence and technical capacity ofMAEF in the areas of sectoral policy formulation, project and donor coordination, andagricultural statistics. Despite the achievements of most objectives, the component is ratedmarginally satisfactory, as the pilot project failed to have an impact.

A.]. Agricultural Policy Coordination Office (Bureau central des etudes et de planificationagricole, BCEPA). The specific objective of this component was to improve the capacity ofBCEPA for policy formulation and coordination of donors and projects. In order to achieve this,staff was trained in economic analysis and consulting services were provided. BCEPA alsoassured the coordination of project activities through the technical coordination committee andsupervision. The objective was achieved and the sub-component is rated satisfactory.

BCEPA satisfactoriy carried out several studies. The first study related to the redefinition of therole of MAEF given Government's policy to withdraw from the provision of services that could bemore efficiently provided by the private sector, and redeployment of staff from headquarters tothe field. Government was to refocus on key functions such as policy setting, regulation andcontrol. The document was discussed in the Council of Ministers. A subsequent study focussedon the reorganization of the National Agriculture Directorate (Direction nationale del'agriculture, DNA). This study was completed and the recommendations were still beingimplemented at the time of credit closing, with DNA refocussing on strategy fortnulation,regulation and control. As part of this process, the phyto-sanitary service of DNA has been fullyprivatized. Thirty-three civil servants responsible for phytosanitary treatment of plants, left thecivil service and installed themselves as private service providers. They have been successful atthis because of existing demand and started to hire and train auxiliaries (about 50 in total) to assistthem in their work. As part of a third study, a staff inventory was carried out, and jobdescriptions and a training plan were defined. The training plan formed the basis for trainingactivities under the project. A fourth study focussed on the agricultural input distribution system.At the time, several distortions existed that limited inputs consumption. The study was topropose revised legislation that would address bottlenecks caused by regulations related to thedistribution and taxation of inputs. This applied in particular to Japanese fertilizer aid, which wasdistributed using a system of quotas by region. The Government failed to implement therecommendations of the study until well after the mid-termn review in 1999, despite repeatedrequests by the Bank. Despite the delays, this was an important accomplishment given theoppostion of vested interests that benefitted from the status quo. Several additional studies were

- 4 -

carried out by BCEPA under joint financing of the MC and the Bank. These studies relatedmostly to crop specific issues.

BCEPA carried out the planned review of the agricultural sector investment program. Combinedwith other preparatory work, this review led the way to the Second Sector Policy Letter (Deuxieme lettre de politique de developpement agricole, LPDA II). This policy letter wasadopted in October 1998 by the donors participating in the round table and now forms the basisfor the rural development program. A review of the possibility of collecting user fees (through acess or direct contributions) was to be studied as a result of this review. Pilots were introducedfor cost recovery in research and extension. The results were judged satisfactory and costrecovery will be used in the design of the follow-on project. A tariff review was started late in theproject, but not completed prior to credit closing.

Support was also provided to the Agricultural Statistics Office of MAEF. The goal was toimprove the reliability of data collected. Two surveys were carried out, the agricultural survey (Enquete agricole) in 1997, and the national agricultural census (recensement nationale del'agriculture), which started in 2000. FAO provided technical assistance to these activities. Thishelped ensure the integrity data collection methods and analysis. The study to measure projectimpact was not carried out.

Economic simulation software was installed within MAEF and staff trained in its use. Thesoftware simulates the impact of policy decisions on agriculture in the sub-region. Unfortunately,the software is too sophisticated and insufficient numbers of staff trained in its use to be of value.The installation of a Geographic Information System for the management of rural investmentscould not be completed because of delays in its delivery.

Equipment and training was provided to the all the personnel of the 33 Prefect level Directoratesfor Rural Development and Environment (Direction prefectorale du developpement rural et del'environnement, DPDRE) and the 7 Regional Inspections for Agriculture, Livestock and Forestry(Inspection regional de l'agriculture, de 6levage et desforets, IRAEF)

A.2. Pilot operation. The objective of this sub-component was to encourage MAEF employees(civil servants), especially those who were already engaged in subsidiary economic activities, toleave the public sector and become private entrepreneurs. The sub-component is rated higlyunsatisfactorv. Implementation was carried out by Pride Guinee, which had executed a privatesector development project for USAID. The preparatory studies were completed as planned andthe pilot operation was launched in 1997. An information and sensitization campaign of allMAEF personnel was carried out to explain the objective of the pilot operation. Subsequently,initial training was provided to about five hundred ministry staff. Implementation progress underthis sub-component was slow. By November 1999, only nine staff had received financing (in theform of a credit) to leave the public sector and install themselves as private entrepreneurs. Thesub-component was suspended following the November 1999 supervision mission as results werenegligible and overhead costs were high (US$1.2 million). Lack of clearly defined severanceprocedures for staff eligible for support under the sub-component was a main determinant of itsfailure. Despite the lack of progress made under the pilot, a dialogue was started within the

-5-

Government on how to deal with this issue and the objectives of the proposed redefinition ofGovernment's role is now better understood among potentially affected civil servants. This isespecially important as it has taken away existing insecurities based on misinformation.

B. Agricultural Extension Component.This component's objective was to strengthen agricultural extension to accelerate thedissemination of appropriate and sustainable technologies. Activities were implemented asplanned and the objective was fully achieved with the component rated fully satisfactory.

Strengthening of Agricultural Extension. Management of the National Extension Service (Service national de la promotion rurale et de vulgarisation, SNPRV) was decentralized asplanned. Staff was hired by the regional and provincial departments and financial managementwas decentralized to the regional level. Bank accounts were opened in each region andaccountants hired and trained. Budgets were established at the regional level and reviewed eachtrimester. This decentralization of budgetary execution and personnel management avoided theproblems that negatively affected extension work during key periods in the past as staff workedwith those who hired and evaluated them, and funds were made available in a timely andtransparent manner.

The training program for extension staff was executed as planned. All Field Extension Workers(FEWs) received refresher training, fortnightly training with the content adapted to their workprogram and basic training in carrying out participatory community diagnostics. MonthlyTechnical Review workshops were regularly organized in each region, with participation ofSubject Matter Specialists (Techniciens sp&ialis6s, TS), researchers from IRAG, seniorextension staff and beneficiaries. Additional meetings were organized as needed. All TSparticipated in annual training workshops for TS in Monitoring and Evaluation and surveys, andseveral TS were trained to serve as Farmer Organization Specialists (Specialiste en organisationspaysannes, SOP). Training in management techniques was provided to 80 supervisors, 33coordinators and 8 regional directors. Finally staff benefited from a number of national andinternational study tours.

Implementation of the project has shown the need for SNPRV to evolve. The present setup hasserved the country well in building a basic capacity amongst farmers. The time is now coming toimprove services to farmers that have shown that they are ready to move beyond the support thatcan be provided by FEWs. These farmers need access to higher qualified and demand drivenextension advice. This will need to be addressed during a follow-on phase.

Monitoring and Evaluation and Beneficiary Assessments. The SNPRV's M&E system hadbeen tested and found to be satisfactory. What was lacking was a qualitative feedback from thebeneficiaries on the services provided by the SNPRV. As a result, systematic clientconsultation/beneficiary assessments were introduced to measure the qualitative impact ofextension on beneficiaries. These assessments showed that beneficiaries were satisfied with theservices provided by the SNPRV and confirmed that the oil spill effect of extension did not occur.This formed the rationale for the change from placing emphasis on working with contact groupsto working increasingly with OPs, where they existed.

- 6 -

Support to Contact Groups of Farmers. SNPRV was to work with 200,000 farmers organizedin 20,000 contact groups and covered by 1,300 Field Extension Workers (FEW). In order toachieve this the number of FEWs was to be increased from 800 to 1,300. During implementationthe decision was made to provide the FEWs with mobylettes rather than bicycles to increase theirmobility. In addition farmers increasingly grouped themselves in Farmers Organizations (Organisations professionels, OP). As a result, only 200 additional FEWs needed to be hired and200,000 families organized in 40,000 groups were reached. This represents about 38 percent ofall farmers (the goal for 2000 was 40 percent). Where OPs were present, the SNPRV did notformn groups, but worked with the OPs instead. FEWs were able to establish almost 60,000demonstration plots in 2000, while the goal for that year was 34,000 (almost 50 percent more).The adoption rate increased from 30 percent in 1996 to 46 percent in 2000 or 92,000 farmfamilies versus an objective of 80,000 farm families (50 percent of 160,000 families).

Several new varities and planting/plant maintenance techniques had been adapted/developed byIRAG and were introduced by the SNPRV during the project. Seeds for improved WADRA ricewere provided to 22,000 farmers by test farmers between 1997 and 2000. It is not clear whetherthere was onward distribution by the recipient farmers to other farmers. As only about 62 percentof farmers grow rice, the adoption rate is of the improved seeds achieved around 20 percent inless than three years. Adoption of a wider basket of rice production technologies has beenconsistently over 50 percent during project implementation. On average rice yields increasedfrom 1.46 tons/ha in 1996/97 to 1.92 tons/ha in 1999/00 (about one-third over three years).Where comparison data are available, contact farmers consistently have much higher yields thannon-contact farmers (rainfed areas: 1.98 tons/ha by contact farmers versus 1.60 tons/ha by noncontact farmers). For other crops this information is summarized in the table below

- 7 -

Yield of Yield ofcontact ether farmers

farmers (tons/ha)Crop % of % of 1996/97 1999/00 % 1996/97 1999/00

farmers producing adoptionproducing farmers by contact

in 2000 contacted farmers(2000) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Com 26 35 1.58 2.34 52 1.06 1.54Groundnut 43 43 1.12 1.55 72 0.95 X 1.12Cassave 29 not available 7.81 9.87 50 5.39 6.82Onion 13 not available 17.8 24.8-35.8 49% in not not

Haute available availableGuinee and

14% inMoyenneGuinee

Aubergine not available 40 12.0 14.3 64 9.0 11.5Tomatoes not available 25 15.9 18.7 49 10.3 13.5

(I 8,750 totalfarmers)

Coffee not available 73 1.1 2.0 94 0.8 1.0(49,768 total

farners)Potatoes not available 25 17.8 24,8 98 10.4 13.2

(21,429 totalfarmers) _

Support to OPs. SNPRV provided training to OPs in the areas of commercialization, financialmanagement, collective inputs purchasing, etc. At the end of the project, 8,500 OPs existed, andover 100 unions, four federations and one national council. On a pilot basis, support wasprovided to OPs to plant 6,000 ha with improved coffee tree material.

Support to Women. In 1996, a unit was created within the SNPRV that provided training toextension staff and rural women on social issues and post-harvest technologies (storage andtransformation). As a result the percentage of women touched directly by the SNPRV increasedfrom two percent in 1996 to 48 percent in 2000.

Seeds Multiplication. Under the Agricultural Seeds Project (Cr. 1864-GN), the cost of seedsmultiplication at the seed centers had been a major impediment to widespread dissemination ofimproved seeds. One kilo of rice seeds ranged from GF 500-1,000, corn GF 500 and groundnutsGF 1400. The SNPRV trained interested farmers in seed multiplication on a communal basis.This led to improved access of farmers to improved seeds at lower cost.

Collaboration with Others. During the start-up of the project, emphasis was shifted to theeconomic and financial impact of improved technologies rather than focussing foremost onproduction increases. Contractual relationships were entered into with several NGOs, includingSG2000, I'AFVP, CMC, CLUSA, ACT and numerous development projects. This enabled theSNPRV and the participating NGOs to capitalize on each other's strengths (e.g., SG2000: inputs

- 8 -

promotion; AFVP: lowland development). With the help of SG2000, small storage facilities wereconstructed to help farmers store crop and inputs. Larger storage facilities were constructed atthe union and federation level. Contractual relationships were also developed with rural radiosand communities to spread technical messages on a wider scale in local languages. A surveyshowed that 22 percent of farmers that were contacted by the SNPRV in Moyenne Guinee and 8percent of contact fanners in Haute Guinee received technical advice through these means.

C. Agricultural Research Component.

This component's specific objective was to build a sustainable agricultural research capacityresponsive to farmers' needs by developing appropriate technologies. This was to be achieved byimplementing a number of institutional strengthening measures and improvements in researchorganization and management. The component achieved most of its objectives, however somewith serious delays that affected the outcome of the proposed institutional reforms. In the case ofGovernment's delayed budgetary support, it also affects the institute's ability to functionefficiently. It is therefore rated marginally satisfactory.

The revised statutes for IRAG, which were to strengthen its autonomy and accountability, werenot adopted until February 1999. Almost three years later than planned and despite repeatedthreats by supervision staff that the project would be suspended unless action was taken. IRAG'sBoard could not be appointed until after the adoption of its revised statutes and therefore did notmeet for the first time until 1999. The External Review Board for the research programs wasestablished only in early 2000. This board was considered an important instrument for improvingthe quality of research programming, but did not meet prior to credit closing. IRAG felt that withcredit closing imminent, the review was unlikely to have an impact on the quality of the researchprogram as future IDA funding was uncertain. Cofinanciers of IRAG funded specific researchactivities and had therefore less of an interest in an overall review of research priorities. It isunlikely that this delay impacted on project outcome and research results. In case of a follow-onproject, it would, however, be important to have an evaluation of the research programs early on.

A research master plan was developed to guide the future research priorities, and human andphysical resources needs. Thirty-three priority programs were identified and research programswere refocused on the principal crops in their agro-ecological zone. Following an initialevaluation of its research staff in 1996, IRAG proceeded with the nomination of research programcoordinators, program heads and redeployed research staff to its regional centers. A detailedmedium-term plan was elaborated, which was discussed with farmers and other developmentpartners at the regional level.

Improved human resources management started with a test of all of IRAG's research staff beforethe end of December 1996 and of senior staff before the end of December 1997. The advantageof the evaluation was twofold: (i) it allowed classifying staff on an equal basis with other researchinstitutions in the sub-region on the basis of their training and work experience, which the gradingsystem within MAEF could not accommodate; and (ii) a targeted training program could bedeveloped. The testing of staff was very successful despite initial opposition by staff who fearedthat the tests would lead to lay-offs. The training program started in 1998 and included long-term

-9-

overseas training and shorter courses in Guinea (twenty courses covering such subjects asEnglish, information technology, research project preparation, statistical analysis, andmanagement). The training program was executed as planned.

The new financial management procedures, including the separation of procurement from thefinancial and accounting functions, decentralization of responsibilities to the research centers, andseparation of the commercial activities from the research activities were mostly implemented asplanned, but not until after the adoption of Government of the revised statutes of IRAG in 1999.The financial controller, however, was not hired, which meant that the intemal audit function wasnot carried out as planned.

The SAR foresaw the rationalizing of IRAG's network of stations and laboratories, but did notmake clear what this meant (reduction, size adjustments). Station and laboratory managementwas improved through training of station managers. An inventory was made of the status ofinfrastructure and requirements to carry out the research master plan. Only limited, relative toneeds, rehabilitation of infrastructure was carried out during the project.

To improve the relevance of its research, collaboration with intemational research centers such asthe Center for Intemational Cooperation in Agronomic Research for Development (CIRAD,Centre de coop&ration internationale en recherche agronomique pour le developpement),International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), West African Rice DevelopmentAssociation/Association de developpement du riz en afrique de louest (WARDA/ADRAO), andITC, was strengthened. Seven collaborative livestock research programs were developed withITC. CIRAD made nine technical assistants available to IRAG. WARDA/ADRAO and IITAhelped IRAG to strengthen beneficiary participation and reduce the time needed betweengeneration of a new technology and extension.

Several reforrns were implemented to improve research - extension - farmer linkages in researchprogramming, monitoring and evaluation. Experimental Farmer Groups (Unites experimentalespaysannes, UEP) had been created by the SNPRV under the predecessor project. Researchersand extension staff worked with the UEPs to identify priority research needs of farmers. Thelarge number of UEPs relative to qualified research and extension staff made the system difficultto manage and did not allow for proper diagnostics to be carried out. Tests were executed withindividual farmers, which diminished the impact on group participation, and extension workerswere not adequately trained to properly guide the UEPs. The experiment with UEPs wasdiscontinued in 1998. Instead IRAG refocused on farming systems research in one village in eachof the five agro-climatic zones. This allowed IRAG to better focus its staff and improve thequality of research advice on these sites. In these zones, IRAG would set up Conseils de centre.These are consultative mechanisms that help define IRAG the research agenda for the region andevaluate results in the region with farmers/potential users.

Cost recovery was tested with the execution of research programs under contract with OPs.Examples are the Federation of Fouta Djalon Producers, the Federation of Coffee Growers ofForest Guinea, the Union of Cotton Associations and the Union of Pineapple Growers. Thesetests of working under contract have shown that substantial scope for cost recovery exists.

- 10-

One major issue for IRAG is the replacement of research and technical staff. About 80 percent ofstaff on-board today will retire by 2010 and all staff will have retired by 2013. The SAR foresawthat ten 10 staff would need to be hired each year to prevent a disruption of research work, so faronly 9 have been hired under French funding. IRAG did not want to use IDA funds to hire newstaff, as it was not convinced of the availability of such funds after credit closing.

IRAG was expected to be inscribed in the Government's budget with the adoption of its newstatutes (change from in essence a line department to separate entity). This was done for fiscalyear 2000 (although no funds were made available) and now a proposal for GF 350 million isincluded in the draft finance law for fiscal year 2001. This amount is insufficient to cover IRAG'sfmancing gap, making it difficult for the institute to maintain research activities at its present level.

Even though the SAR did not specify research outputs, IRAG was successful indeveloping/adapting a large number of varieties for each of the climatic zones. Excellent resultswere obtained with improved varieties of rice, corn, fruit trees, coffee trees and manioc. Inaddition, improved guidelines were developed for intensification of production of coffee, rice,potatoes, etc. The research results were made available to the SNPRV for extension (describedabove).

D. Livestock and Animal Health.

This component's specific objective was to improve animal production and veterinary supportservices to herders. All measures were implemented as planned and physical targets were reachedor exceeded, as detailed below. The outcome for this component is therefore rated higblysatisfactorv.

Improved Animal Health. Vaccination coverage is now entirely assured by the private sector.About 11,000 grassroots auxiliaries cover over 70 percent of the 210,000 livestock holdingfamilies. The auxiliaries receive training from private veterinarians contracted by DNE. Asidefrom vaccinations, these auxiliaries provide basic care for animals and act as conduits forextension. Mass compulsory vaccination campaigns are carried out under contract by privateveterinarians (mandat sanitaire). The cost of vaccination has as a result been reduced from GF400 to GF 300 per head. About 92 percent of cattle have been vaccinated against ContagiousBovine Peri-pneumonia (CBPP), Rinderpest and Peste des Petits Ruminants. The number ofoutbreaks was reduced from 125 in 1988 to only 6 in 1998 (and by 43 percent reduction since thestart of the project). Epidemiological surveillance was started with, as its objective thecertification of Guinea as free of foot and mouth disease. Prior to credit closing the country hadbeen 10 months free of foot and mouth disease.

The Salt Lick Production Agency (APILEC, Atelier de pierres de leches) and the VeterinaryProcurement Agency (CAVET, Cabinet d'achat des produits veterinaires) were privatized asplanned by September 30, 1996. Delays in effectiveness changed this condition from a datedcovenant to a condition of effectiveness. The distribution of animal health products is, thusentirely assured by the private sector. At the time of credit closing, there were five wholesalers

- 11 -

(wholesale), 42 private veterinarians (wholesale and retail) and 128 semi-intensive to intensivelivestock farms active in input distribution (retail).

Institutional Support. The process that had started under the predecessor Livestock SectorRehabilitation Project continued under the PNSA. The National Directorate for Livestock (Direction nationale de 16levage, DNE) refocused on its public service mission and completed thetransfer to the private sector of animal health care and inputs distribution. The DNE remainedresponsible for policymaking, support to the development of herder and other professionalorganizations (including research and extension), and epidemiological surveillance and control.Following the redefinition of its functions under the predecessor project, DNE was successful inreducing its staff from 1,600 in 1990 to 986 by credit closing, 92 percent of which presently workoutside of Conakry.

DNE successfully reduced its dependency on technical assistance from 19 man-years during the1993-1997 period to 1.25 man-years in 2000 and national staff is now responsible for donorcoordination and taking a much more important role in project preparation. Training wasprovided to 308 staff and 340 livestock posts were equipped at the Decentralized RuralCommunities level to monitor activities in the field.

Links were strengthened with IRAG and a livestock research program developed. The three mainareas of intervention for research were to increase meat, milk and organic fertilizer production.Given the medium- to longer-term nature of the research, it is still too early to present results.Extension was also strengthened with the training of eight livestock TS. These specialists were toimprove agriculture and livestock integration. However, the planned transfer to the extensionservice did not happen prior to credit closing.

Animal production systems improvement. The goal of this sub component was to promotepoultry and improve the quality of the dairy herd and add value added to the income of livestockholders.

The DNE continued its support to groups of herders started under the predecessor project.About 1,050 groups were provided with support (primarily capacity strengthening). In addition,DNE provided support to 173 departmental, 33 provincial, 4 regional and the nationalcoordination committees. A total of 54 conflict management committees were established intranshuman migratory areas to help resolve conflicts between farmers and herders. As a result,integration of livestock and agriculture is taking place and social friction has been reduced.

Support to meat production was provided through infrastructures and training of meat processors.About 27 percent of cattle were marked at the end of the project and two databases were created:one for marked animals and one for slaughtered animals. Support to village poultry productionwas provided through the grassroots auxiliaries who provided vaccination support to interestedfarmers. Breeding for improved dairy production was supported through artificial insemination.An improved milk processing technology was introduced for the processing of cheese. Inaddition, about GF 220 million (US$120,000 equivalent) was provided as credit to 43entrepreneurs. The credit was used to support the development of model farms (128 in existence

- 12-

at credit closing) started by former civil servants that had to leave following the reorganization ofDNE.

The potential for artificial insemination (Al) was reviewed as part of the elaboration of a NationalGenetic Resource Management Policy. Al has potential in areas close to cities and where milkhas high value added.

Infrastructure and Natural Resources Management Support. In support of transhumanmigration, support was provided by DNE to farmers and herders to jointly develop, manage andmaintain improved access to, tracks, drinking troughs and cattle crushes. Improvements weresupported by the project on a matching grant basis. A study was undertaken to evaluate thecarrying capacity of the different climatic zones. Subsequently, programs were elaborated torestore/improve pastures. In deficit areas, alternative food sources were identified andincorporated in the extension services program. The Regional Pilot Pastoral Program, launched in1997 and for which activities started in Guinea the following year, was instrumental in helping toget these activities off the ground. The goal of this program is to address pastoral development aspart of a wider set of issues affecting the rural population. Initial results relating to pasturemanagement and cooperation between farmers and livestock owners are very encouraging.

E. Cross component.

In addition, the project had as a cross component objective to increase responsiveness to socialand gender issues as well as environmental concerns. As discussed above, a small gender unit atnational level of SNPRV was created and several TS (mostly women) were trained insocio-cultural issues that would enable them to work more easily with women. Work programand research priorities included subjects important to women (transformation and conservation).The main gender related activity that did not get off the ground was support to women for incomegenerating activities. SNPRV increasingly included topics emphasizing water and soilconservation, preserving and improving soil fertility and training of farmers in environmentalmonitoring. Mass communications media were used to raise environmental awareness.

An AIDS/STD awareness raising activities were added to the project in 2000. The SNPRV tookthis up first, followed by DNE. Activities focussed on sensitizing project staff and beneficiaries ofthe risks, means of transmission and ways to protect against HIV/STDs. A pilot was launchedwith th help of the Ministry of Health and the National Program to Fight AIDS. As a result,700,000 people received information from the SNPRV and 110,000 (including 1,000 women)from the DNE on the modes of transmission and means of protecting oneself and family from thedisease. it has become clear as a result of the pilot that frontline field staff of rural developmentagencies are an efficient vehicle to reach large numbers of potential victims that could otherwisenot be easily reached.

The component is rated satisfactorv.

4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:

The SAR did not present an overall rate of return for the project given its composite nature, butpresented an estimate for the livestock component (30 percent) and for the combined research and

- 13 -

extension comnponents (46 percent). The project impact study, which was not originally plannedbut request by the Bank in 1999, was not carried out and estimates are therefore based oninformation obtained from the monitoring and evaluation units of DNE and SNPRV. Given theabsence of detailed price data that an impact study might have provided and the shortimplementation period of the project, the ICR can only provide broad indications and comparethese with the estimates in the SAR

The project has consistently met, and in the case of coffee exceeded, average adoption rates foragricultural crops as defined in Table 2, Annex 4, of the SAR. Average yields for the four maincrops for which data were available (rice, cassava, groundnuts and com), were within 10 percentof appraisal estimates. In addition, overall project costs are expected to be close to appraisalestimates. Using the same parameters as the appraisal estimate, this would mean that theeconomic rate of return for the agricultural extension and research component would be around30-35 percent.

In the case of livestock, census data show that herd growth rates have exceeded appraisalestimates by about 15 percent. No information is available on milk production. It is, however,likely that given the larger than expected herd increases and substantial decreases in milk and milkproduct imports, that the increase in milk Using similar assumptions as those used by the SARmission, the project benefits are expected to be at least as much. This would be in line with other,freestanding, livestock projects.

The fiscal analysis could not be replicated in the absence of information on rural tax collection.

4.4 Financial rate of return:No financial rate of return was presented in the SAR and the collection of such data was notforeseen. The ICR therefore does not present one.

4.S Institutional development impact:The project's institutional development impact was substantial. BCEPA was strengthenedthrough training and new equipment. In addition, it had gained increasing experience in thesatisfactory executiong of studies and supervising consultants. IRAG was also strengthened as aresult of its strengthened autonomy, decentralization, the new research master plan, andstrengthened collaboration with beneficiaries and tests with cost recovery. The end result wasless than planned, as it did not have an opportunity to gain experience with its strengthenedautonomy, the internal audit function and the independent reserach review board. SNPRV wasalso further strengthened under this project through the decentralization of its functions andcontinued staff training, increased mobility of staff and strong collaboration with DNE, IRAG andbeneficiaries. DNE continued the process of strengthening its key responsibilities, improve datacollection and improve collaboration on livestock issues with IRAG and SNPRV. It alsoincreased the use of contractual service providers as a means of reducing costs and reaching morebeneficiaries.

- 14 -

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:

There were no such factors.

5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:

Effectiveness. Credit conditionality was not overly demanding and the credit was declaredeffective about five months after signature.

Political Environment. The project's institutional strengthening, agricultural extension andlivestock components benefited from positive experience gained under predecessor projects andongoing dialogue. The Government had already embarked on a policy ofdecentralizationldeconcentration and a gradual withdrawal by Government from productiveactivities. Much positive experience had already been made in this context under the predecessorLivestock Rehabilitation Project. In the case of the research component, the rationale for makingthe proposed changes was less evident to Government. The proposed changes, which would limitpolitical interference in the day to day management of the institute, with no clear medium-termgains to policy makers, led to serious delays in Government adopting the revised of IRAG.

5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:Procurement. Procurement was poorly managed, leading to unnecessary delays. During the lastsupervision mission, the procurement specialist of the Guinea country office concluded, thatprocurement was lacking in the following areas: (i) establishment and adherence to annualprocurement plans; (ii) proper publication of procurement notices; (iii) availability and updatingof procurement documents; (iv) discrepancies between the procurement procedures utilized andthose defined in the development credit agreement; and (v) inadequately defined procurementresponsibilities.

Financial management and audits. The status of the annual audits improved each year. Theaccounting system at IRAG, which was centralized and followed standard Governmentconventions, was decentralized and brought up to date to international accounting standards. Thebook keeping of the SNPRV and the BCEPA was also satisfactory overall.

Implementation arrangements. The project's implementation arrangements posed no problemsduring project implementation. No new units were created and arrangements were the same asthose used under predecessor projects. A steering committee oversaw project implementationand- overall coordination agency for the overall project was assigned to the BCPA. The projectwas almost exactly carried out as planned, except for the delays in the research component andthe pilot operation sub-component.

5.4 Costs andfinancing:At appraisal project costs were estimated at US$90.5 million. The breakdown over the financiersis shown in Table 2.B. Actual project costs were estimated at US$80-90 million. Insufficientinformation is available on the contributions of other financiers and the Government's

- 15 -

contribution, but given that the project was planned as executed, it is likely that actual costs areclose to appraised costs. The actual contributions are also shown in Table 2.B. The IDA credit inthe amount of SDR23.6 million (US$35.0 million equivalent at the time of negotiations) was fullydisbursed.

6. Sustainability

6.1 Rationalefor sustainability rating:

Sustainability is likely. The project was part of a long-term program and designed to lead to theintegration of all donor funded activities into coherent national programs. Sustainability was notexpected to be achieved by the end of this project. The SAR defined sustainability only from aleast-cost persepctive. Unit cost for service delivery (research, extension and livestock) wasexpected to be reduced to about US$20 or two percent of agricultural GDP per farm family. Thiswas considered an acceptable cost for the country. In addition, user fees and other cost recoverymechanisms were expected to reduce the burden on the state's budget even further. It is not clearhow this number was calculated, which makes it difficult to compare the final cost data with thosepresented in the SAR. Actual project costs are about 5-10 percent lower than the appraisalestimate and implementation indicators were met or exceeded. Unit cost per beneficiciary familyis therefore likely to be no higher than the appraisal estimate. In addition, cost recovery wassuccessfully implemented by IRAG and SNPRV. However, even with the adoption of costrecovery and efficiency measures, the country can ill afford to pay for agricultural serviceswithout continued outside support until cost recovery mechanisms and efficiency measures arefully implemented. This would be the objective of a Bank operation, which is presently underpreparation.

Instutional sustainability is very likely. In the case of the livestock sub-sector, much progress hasbeen made in refocussing the role of Government and in transferring certain responsibilities to theprivate sector. To a lesser extent similar progress has been made with DNA, where the process isstill ongoing. All institutions benefitting from project support have been substantiallystrengthened through decentralization and training. At the DNA, the process of refocusing of itsrole has started and the phytosanitary service has been fully privatized. IRAG did not fullyachieve its institutional objectives because of an overly optimistic timetable, yet substantialprogress was made in ensuring the independence of the institute, strengthening the focus of itsresearch programs through the new master plan and regular consultations with stakeholders, andthrough decentralizing management.

6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:No specific transition arrangements were made as part of the final supervision missions, as thisproject was viewed to be part of a longer-term commitment by the Bank and other donors to thecountry. Preparation of the follow-up IDA operation was delayed and donor funding is makingup some of the present shorfall to ensure that basic activities can be continued until Bank fundingbecomes available again sometime during the 2002 fiscal year.

- 16-

7. Bank and Borrower Performance

Bank7.1 Lending:

Preparation. Performance at this stage was satisfactorv. The project was a follow-on of twoearlier operations (First Agricultural Services Project, Cr. 1636-GN, and the Livestock SectorRehabilitation Project, Cr. 1725-GN). The preparation team did focus on the lessons learnedfrom these prior operations and addressed these appropriately in project design. The main changefor this project was that it supported a program for which broad donor support existed. Thedesign team properly estimated the Government's commitment to most of the proposed changes,except for the research component. In the latter case, the design team seems to haveunderestimated the timeframe needed for implementing the required changes to make the institutefully independent from Ministerial interference. The pilot project (sub-component 1.(a)) was notyet part of project design at this stage.

Appraisal. Performance at this stage was marginally satisfactory. The background analysis aspresented in the SAR was weak. This was in part because this poject was pushed through as afast track operation with limited time between appraisal and Board presentation and the regionwas favoring short reports at the time. It is likely that the appraisal team, like the design team,underestimated the amount of time needed to complete the envisioned institutional changes atIRAG. All other components were adequately appraised. The pilot project was a late addition atthe request of the Government and implementation details were therefore left for the first year ofproject implementation. This was not an uncommon practice at the time. The projectimplementation manual and background documents were well prepared.

7.2 Supervision:Performance at this stage was marginally satisfactory. Missions were adequately staffed and withan appropriate skills mix, although budgetary difficulties reduced the frequency of these missionsbelow the desirable level. Regular supervision and implementation support was provided by oneinternational and one national staff at the resident mission in Conakry. Documentation bysupervision missions was poor outside of the aide-memoire. The limited effectiveness of datedcovenants and the difficulty in enforcing them other than through a general suspension of thecredit, made it difficult to ensure that the agreed upon statutory changes of IRAG and budgetappropriations were adopted in a timely manner. Procurement was regularly supervised from theresident mission in Senegal given the weak performance of the project early on. This did not leadto the expected improvements despite training efforts. The latest PSR noted that: "processesshow various weaknesses: (i) annual procurement plans have not always been elaborated, or, ifelaborated, not followed; (ii) tenders have not been published adequately; and (iii) the variousceilings of the DCA have not always been followed." QAG reviewed the quality of thesupervision of the research component and rated it satisafctory.

7.3 Overall Bankperformance:The overall performance of the Bank is judged marginally satisfactorily.

- 17-

Borrower7.4 Preparation:Its performance at the time of project preparation and appraisal was satisfactory. The Borrowerprovided an updated sectoral policy that served as the basis for the reforms introduced under theproject.

7.5 Government implementation performance:During implementation, Government performance related to IRAG and the pilot project wasunsatisfactory. Regarding IRAG, dated covenants were routinely ignored and no budgetinscription was made for IRAG as agreed, leading to budget problems for the institute towardsthe end of project implementation and delays in recruiting new personnel. Regarding the pilotproject, the Government failed to develop separation procedures and the pilot project activitiestherefore failed to have any impact. In Government's defense, it can also be easily argued that thepilot was started before a supporting framework was in place. The Government adopted andimplemented the updated livestock and agriculture sector policies prepared by DNE and BCEPA.As noted above, procurement performance was weak. The overall judgment is satisfactorybecause of the tremendous progress made in implementing the updated agriculture and livestocksector policies.

7.6 Implementing Agency:The project was implemented by three agencies (IRAG, SNPRV and DNE) and one technicaldepartment (BCEPA) and supervised by a steering committee. In addition, coordination wasensured by a technical committee constituted of representatives of the implementing agencies.Implementation by the implementing agencies was satisfactory overall. In the case of DNE andSNPRV, implementation was highly satisfactory. DNE is now considered one of the strongest, ifnot the strongest, livestock departments in West Africa. Its technical capacity has been markedlystrengthened over the past ten years and technical assistance to the department has been sharplyreduced. SNPRV adapted itself to a changing environment and increasingly emphasized workingwith producer organizations. It also choose to improve the mobility of existing staff - and therebyincrease the number of beneficiaries that could be served by each field worker - over a furtherincrease in staff, thus contributing to a more sustainable size of its work force. Execution of theannual workprograms and financial management was satisfactory. BCEPA satisfactorily executedthe planned studies and updated the agricultural policy. IRAG satisfactorily implemented its workprogram and strengthened research programs, despite the delays in adopting the institutionalchanges and budget allocations. DNE, IRAG and SNPRV also improved collaboration intechnical areas (primarily livestock). Overall performance of the implementing agencies is ratedsatisfactory.

7.7 Overall Borrower performance:The Borrower's overall perfornance is judged satisfactory.

-18-

8. Lessons Learned

The main lessons learned are:

(i) Political buy in of Government into a proposed far fetching privatization is an absolutenecessity for its successful implementation. This can be achieved by demonstrating up-front thatprivatization can be a win-win proposition as in the case of DNA and DNE (cost to Governmentwas reduced, former employees were helped to start a new career, and beneficiaries saw the rangeof services and the coverage rate increased). In the case of IRAG where the gains were lessclearly demonstrated, the reform process was slow.

(ii) Reform is a long-term process that spans the life of more than one project. It requires theadoption of an agreed approach by all concerned parties to be successful. The case of thelivestock reforms is such an example. It has taken over a decade to implement and has broadsupport of all involved (Government, beneficiaries, employees and donors). It is considered amodel for other countries because of the gradual manner in which it was implemented.

(iii) Working through existing national directorates instead of project units, and using civilservants instead of contractual personnel for project implementation strengthens Government'scapacity and ownership.

(iv) The difficulty of scaling up a successful pilot. The pilot project was based on a successfulpilot program for USAID to train civil servants and motivate them in joining the private sector.The scaling up within the project failed as only very few civil servants left as a result of thetraining. It is, however, widely recognized that Ministry restructuring is an extremely difficultenterprise. Motivating and equipping staff so they will leave the public sector is not merelyachieved by providing training. A sound program must also assist concerned staff during thetransition. The establishment of private phytosanitary plant protection service providers andprivate veterinarians, which was implemented seperate from the pilot project, was more successfulfor this reason.

(v) When a program is cofmanced by several donors using different financing andimplementation procedures, it is important to come to clear arrangements regarding coordinationand information sharing. In this project these aspects were not well laid out, making it difficult toget access to information on project implementation aspects from the project's cofinanciers.

(vi) the failure of the Bank to provide adequate resources to ensure proper project supervisionand implementation assistance

(vii) Development objectives have to be more realistically assessed in particular in the realm ofinstitutional reforms on which a project has little control and where extensive policy dialogue isneeded

(viii) This operation was a fast track operation. Such a type operation bears the risk that certain

-19-

aspects of the project may not be ready for implementation. Built-in flexibility is therefore anessential feature of such a project.

(ix) Successful restructuring and functioning of a sub-sector requires that a) the policyenvironment be conducive to reform and privatization, and that, b) the right balance be struck interms of transfer of competencies to the private sector and grassroots/decentralized institutions.The public sector needs to maintain key regulatory and control functions. The livestock sector is agood example of such a restructuring.

(x) Services are greatly enhanced when accountability of service providers to the clients isimproved.

9. Partner Comments

(a) Borrower/implementing agency:The Borrower prepared a project completion report, which is available from project files. In addition, theGovernment provided comments on the ICR itself which were incorporated into the text. The sole areawhere the ICR and the Government differ is concerning the rating of the research component, whereGovernment feels that the rating should be satisfactory whereas the Bank feels that the rating should beretained as marginally satisfactory. The Bank's rating is based on the fact that not all institutionalobjectives could be achieved because of the delays in implementing the reforms. The Government feels thatregardless of these delays, much progress was made and that overall the objectives were achieved.

(b) Cofinanciers:No comnments were received.

(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):Not applicable.

10. Additional Information

No additional information is available.

-20 -

Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

Outcome I Impact Indicators:Indicator/Matrix Projectod in last PSR ActualLatest Estimate

Overall Sector All for 2000, except where otherwiseindicated.

Increase in Gross Agricultural Domestic not available 449 billionProduct (in constant 1989 GNF) to 447billion

not available 120 billion (1999, estimate for this year wasIncreased agricultural exports to 156 billion 130 billion; 2000 data are not yet available)GNF by 2000Food security index of 180 by 2000 not available 180 achieved in 1999 (2000 data not yet(1988=100) available)Land productivity for cereals index at 125 by not available not available2000Forest cover ('000 ha) of 13,982ha by 2000 not available 14,051 (1999, goal for this year was 14,041)Fertilizer use on arable land (kg/ha) not available 3.5 (2000 data not yet available; 1999 goalincreased to 5.0 kg/ha by 2000 for this year was 4.5)

Agricultural Extension50% adopton rate by 2000 (80,000 families) not available 46% (91,356 farm families)

Livestock

Census of livestock by categories (notdefined in SAR)cattle (1995=2,202,259; 2000=2,431,000) not available 2,787,058sheep (1995=612,294; 2000=727,000) not available 819,722goats (1995=728,681; 2000=865,000) not available 959,935pigs/swines (1995=46,160; 2000=59,000) not available 55,645Cattle slaughtered (1995=119,530; not defined in specific outputs (defined in 146,9802000=145,400) economic analysis annex)Live cattle sales (1995=44,682; not defined in specific outputs (defined in 80,0542000=90,200) economic analysis annex)Meat imports (1995=1,556; 2000=769) not defined in specific outputs (defined in 913

economic analysis annex)

Milk and milk product imports (not defined) not available 1995=20,679 tons; 2000=7,346Research

not specifically defined not applicable not applicable

Other components

not specifically defined not applicable not applicable

-21 -

Output Indicators:

Indicator/Matrix Projcted in last PSR ActuaLatest EstimatAgricultural Extension

24% of farmers families contacted throughCG by 2000 (160,000 farm families) not available 198,60040% of farmers contacted in 2000 are not available 46%womenLivestock

Vaccinations in 2000-CBPP: 500,000/year not available 708,167-PPR: 300,0001year not available 74,76020,000 Serological analyses per yearperformed by 2000 not available 25,347

40 private veterinarians established by 2000not available 47

500,000 PPCB vaccinations done by prvateveterinarians in 2000 not available 598,107900 GF per head of cattle consumption ofveterinary products in 2000 not available 753

End of projectThe SAR did not provide a logical framework, which was common at the time. Output indicators weredefined in broad terms (increase in agricultural GDP, etc.). The Form 590 and PSRs did not track theinfonnation in a transparent format. The ICR therefore presents the indicators included in the SAR.

-22 -

Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent) . .Appraisal ActuallLatest Percentage ofEstimate Estimate Appraisal

Project Cost By Component US$ million USS millionInstutional capacity building of MAEF 7.00 6.04Agricultural extension 29.70 11.37Agricultural research 20.40 7.86Livestock development and animal health 20.50 5.89Responsiveness to social, gender and enviromnental issues 1.80PPF 1.00 0.91

Total Baseline Cost 80.40 32.07Physical Contingencies 4.40Price Contingencies 5.70

Total Project Costs 90.50 32.07

Total Financing Required 90.50 32.07Total cost numbers per component are not available, as the cofinanciers applied their own procurement andfumding rules. In addition, most funds were not managed directly by the implementing agencies. Theactual cost column therefore only shows the contribution of IDA to the project. The cost for theResponsiveness to social, gender and environmental issues component is included in the other components.Actual total project costs are estimated at US$80-90 million.

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (A raisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)

Expenditure Category ICB Prcurement Method N.B.F. Total Cost

1. Works 0.00 1.00 0.00 2.80 3.80(0.00) (0.70) (0.00) (0.00) (0.70)

2. Goods 9.10 0.30 0.20 0.10 9.70(9.10) (0.20) (0.20) (0.00) (9.50)

3. Services 0.00 0.00 10.90 15.60 26.50(0.00) (0.00) (10.90) (0.00) (10.90)

4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 17.10 33.50 50.60(0.00) (0.00) (13.90) (0.00) (13.90)

6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Total 9.10 1.30 28.20 52.00 90.60(9.10) (0.90) (25.00) (0.00) (35.00)

A minor rounding error occurred because the data in the SAR are presented using one decimal. The totalof this table should therefore be US$90.5 million)

- 23 -

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)Procurement Method I

Expenditure Category ICB NCu Other N.B.F. Total Cost

1. Works 0.00 0.70 0.00 1 0.00 0.70(0.00) (0.49) (0.00) (0.00) (0.49)

2. Goods 5.60 0.20 0.22 0.00 6.02(5.60) (0.15) (0.17) (0.00) (5.92)

3. Services 0.00 0.00 11.71 0.00 11.71(0.00) (0.00) (11.71) (0.00) (11.71)

4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 17.35 0.00 17.35(0.00) (0.00) (13.88) (0.00) (13.88)

5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Total 5.60 0.90 29.28 0.00 35.78(5.60) (0.64) (25.76) (0.00) (32.00)

Data in this table show IDA financing only. Procurement for non-bank financed activities were procuredseperately and only incomplete information is available.

Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the IDA Credit. All costs include contingencies.

X Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contractedstaff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to(i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local govemment units.

Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent)I Percentage of Appraisal

Component Appraisal Estimate ActualLatest Estimate^ ~~~~~~~~IDA GoVt. CoF. IDA Govt. CoF. IDA IGoVt.| CoF.

Institutional capacity 6.20 6.04 97.4building of MAEFAgricultural extension 11.40 11.37 99.7

Agricultural research 8.40 7.86 0.33 93.6

Livestock development and 5.80 5.89 101.6animal healthResponsiveness to social, 2.10 0.00 0.0gender and environmentalissuesPPF 1.00 0.90 90.0

Information on the contribution by Government and the cofmanciers to the specific components is notavailable. The total Government contribution is estimated at about US$3.78 million.

- 24 -

Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits

The SAR did not present an overall rate of return for the project given its composite nature, butpresented an estimate for the livestock component (30 percent) and for the combined research andextension components (46 percent). The project impact study, which was not originally plannedbut requested by the Bank in 1999, was not carried out and estimates are therefore based oninformation obtained from the monitoring and evaluation units of DNE and SNPRV. Given theabsence of detailed price data that an impact study might have provided and the shortimplementation period of the project, the ICR can only provide broad indications and comparethese with the estimates in the SAR

The project has consistently met, and in the case of coffee exceeded, average adoption rates foragricultural crops as defined in Table 2, Annex 4, of the SAR. Average yields for the four maincrops for which data were available (rice, cassava, groundnuts and corn), were within 20 percentof appraisal estimates. In addition, overall project costs are expected to be close to appraisalestimates. Using the same parameters as the appraisal estimate, this would mean that theeconomic rate of return for the agricultural extension and research component wouldconservatively be re-estimated around 30-35 percent.

Appraisal estimate ICR estimate ICR estimate as % ofappraisal estimate

Crop adoption yields adoption yields adoption yieldsrate rate rate

Rice 61 2.18 50 1.92 82 88Groundnuts 56 1.50 72 1.55 129 103Corn 76 2.05 52 2.34 68 114Cassava 56 12.00 50 9.87 89 83Coffee 48 not available 94 2.00 196 not available

Note: for the appraisal, the highest adoption rate listed for the technical messages for each cropwere used. Similarly, the highest yield obtained for all the regions was used rather than theweighted average. In the case of the ICR estimate the weighted average was used, which islower.

In the case of livestock, actual project costs were estimated to be close to appraisal estimates also.Census data show that herd growth rates have exceeded appraisal estimates by about 15 percent.No information is available on milk production. It is, however, likely given the larger thanexpected herd increases and substantial decreases in milk and milk product imports, that theincrease in milk production was close to appraisal estimates. Using similar assumptions as thoseused by the SAR mission, the project benefits are expected to be at least as much. This would bein line with other, freestanding, livestock projects.

The fiscal analysis could not be replicated in the absence of information on rural tax collection.

- 25 -

Annex 4. Bank Inputs

(a) Missions:Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performa ce Rating

(e.g. 2 Economists, I FMS, etc.) Implementation DevelopmentMonth/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective

Identification/PreparationFeb. 25, 1992 - 21 1 FMSMarch 18,1992 1 Economist

I VeterinaryI Agro-EconomistI Civil Works Engineer

Feb. 14-25, 1993 12 1 Sr. AgriculturistI Ag. Services Specialist

Jan. 31 - Feb. 20, 21 1 Agricultural Scientist1994 I H.R. & Training Specialist

I Institutional Organization Sp.I Extension SpecialistI Village Org.&Private StrucSupport SpecialistI Research SpecialistI Economist

Nov. 14-18, 1994 5 1 Ag. Economist3 Extension SpecialistsI Economist

Feb. 26 - March 24 1 Economist19, 1995 4 Gender issues consultants

I IFD AdvisorI Extension Specialist

May 2-19, 1995 18 1 EconomistI Extension Specialist

June 19-30, 1995 12 1 Gender Issues SpecialistI Extension Specialist

Appraisal/NegotiationJun. 27-Jul. 27, 30 1 Economist1995 2 Extension Specialists

I Livestock SpecialistI H.R. Research SpecialistI Research SpecialistI Research Center Mgmt Sp.I Research Prog. SpecialistI Operation AnalystI Procurement SpecialistI Disbursement Analyst3 French donor3 USAID donorI European Union donor

December 1995

- 26 -

SupervisionDec. 8-20, 1996 13 1 Ag. Serv. Specialist S SMarch 3-7, 1997 7 1 Livestock Specialist S S

June 1-12, 1997 12 1 Research Specialist S SI Extension Specialist1 EconomistI Ag. Serv. SpecialistI Extension consultantI OP Specialist consultantI French donorI Livestock Specialist

Sep. 29, 1997 Procurement Specialist S SJan. 27 - Feb. 16, 21 2 Extension Specialist S S1998 1 Research Specialist

I Livestock Specialist1 OP Specialist Consultant

May 20-22, 1998 3 1 Research Specialist S S1 Extension Specialist

Nov. 1-20, 1998 20 1 Economist S SI Livestock SpecialistI Extension Specialist

April 12-23, 1999 12 1 Economist S S(MTR) I Project Advisor

I Research SpecialistI Livestock SpecialistI Decentralization Specialist2 Extension SpecialistsI FMS consultantI OP Specialist consultant

Nov. 1-12, 1999 12 1 Research Specialist S SI Min. Restruc.&Ag. TrainerI Livestock SpecialistI Extension SpecialistI Research & Soil Fertility Sp.I Extension Spec.&Privatiza SpI FMSI OP Specialist consultantI French Donor

Apr. 8-17, 2000 10 I Sector Director S SI Decentralization Specialist

July 10-18, 2000 8 1 Ag. Serv. Specialist S SI FMS

Aug. 6-14, 2000 9 1 Ag. Serv. Specialist S SI FMS

- 27 -

Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components

(H=High, SU=Substantial, MModest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)Rating

O Macro policies O H OSUOM O N * NAN Sector Policies O H * SU O M O N O NAZ Physical OH *SUOM ON ONA[I Financial O H OSUOM O N * NAO Institutional Development 0 H 0 SU 0 M 0 N 0 NAL Environmental O H OSUOM ON *NA

SocialZ Poverty Reduction 0 H 0 SU O M 0 N 0 NAZ Gender O H *SUOM O N O NAI Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N O NA

Li Private sector development 0 H 0 SU 0 M 0 N 0 NAEl Public sector management 0 H 0 SU O M 0 N 0 NAEl Other (Please specify) O H O SU G M O N * NA

- 28 -

Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

6.1 Bank performance Rating

F Lending O HSOS OU OHUI Supervision OHS *S O U O HU

O Overall OHS *S O U O HU

6.2 Borrower performance Rating

• Preparation OHS OS OU O HUZ Government implementation performance O HS OS 0 U 0 HU• Implementation agency performance O HS O S 0 U 0 HU

N Overall O HS O S 0 U O HUImplementmg agency performance is based on the overall performance of the four implementing agencies.

-29 -

Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

Staff Appraisal Report,

Project Implementation Manual

Annual Monitoring and Evaluation Reports of SNPRV and DNE

Project Aide M6moires

Individual Implementing Agency Project Completion Reports (BCEPA, DNE, SNPRV and IRAG)

- 30 -

MAURITA ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~IBRD 276

KSENEOAL~~~' -, - S E N E G A L GIESENEALY M A L I NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL SERVICES PROJECT

SIERA L~OB~-'r'C6TE

ATLATiC~•1te~DYIVOIRE ~GHANA

OCEAN~

GUINEAo.

BIRSST

Rain rarest Region Boundaries~~~~~LO PE -O EA~

SOvnnhoBuhovna-.- ntrtinlBndre

Light forest with Swampy Areas -I R R 20o

A T L A N T I C ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~ey td~,.t th gl tW , ,y ~exe-et4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Research Center~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~tCMtt19