RESTRICTFD

Report No. CA- 1 7a

This report is for official use only by the Bank Group and specifically authorized organizationsor persons. It may not be published, quoted or cited without Bank Group authorization. TheBank Group does not accept responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of the report.

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INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION

CURRENNT ECONOMIC POSiT ION

AND PROSPECTS

OF

HAITI

May 3, 1972

Central America and Caribbean Department

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ClIRRiRJGY FII TVATINTS

U.S. $1 = 5 Gourdes

1 Gourde (G) = U.S. g 20

All annual data are for fiscal years (ending September 30),unless specified otherwise.

MrAD2TVr nV rf%kT1irVX7rC

Page No.

BASIC DATA

SUl4ARY AND CONCLISIONS ........................ ,.. i-v

I. THE DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK. 1

Physical Endowment. 1Human Resources. 2Infrastructure. 4Economic Management. 5Economic Trends. 6

II. SECTORAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES. 7

Agriculture. 7Industry and Mining .13Highways .14Electric Power .15Telecommunications .16Education .16Public Health and Population Policy .17Community Development .18Sectoral Priorities .19

III. FISCAL, MONETARY AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTSPOLICIES AND PROSPECTS .21

Fiscal Policies and Prospects .21Monetary Policies and Prospects .26Balance of Payments .29Conclusion .35

This report is based on the findings of an economic mission to Haiti inNovember 1971 composed of Messrs. G.P. Pfeffermann (mission chief), H.B. Meier(investment analyst) and R.A. de Campos (assistant economist). Parts of thesectoral discussion draw on the Natural Resource Inventory of the Organizationof American States.

II. SOCIAL AND RELATED INDICATORS

Life expectancy (1970) b3 yearsBirth rate (1965-70) 44 per thousandDeath rate (1965-70) 20 per thousandInfant mortality (1970) 147 per thousand live birthsPopulation per physician (1968) 14,069Population per hospital bed (1968) 1,403Adult literacy (1970) 30 percent

BASIC DATA

Area and Population

Area: 28,700 square kilometersof which 27,750 on Island of Hispanida

1960 1967 1971

Population (thousands) 3,991 4,577 )4,968Armual rate of population growth % 1.8 2.0 2.1

GDP per capita at factor cost:(current US$) 87 81 108(constant 1964 US$) 91 75 82

I ECONOMIC INDICATORS

GDP at constant 54/55 factor cost(millions of gourdes) 1,671.2 1,580.1 1,877.5

Origin of GDP (in percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0Agriculture w9.1 51.1 lV8.2Mining 1.5 1.2 1.9Manufacturing 10.3 9.5 11.3Construction 3.3 2.7 3.6Power and Water 0.6 0.8 0.9Trade 12.4 10.6 9.9Other 22.5 2h.1 24.2

1960-67 1967-71 1960-71

Average annual charges in selected economicindicators (in percent)

GDP at constant factor cost -0.8 4-, 1.1Agriculture value added -0.3 2A8 0 8

Manufacturing value added -1.9 9.1 1.9E-norts of 0n00is Ql.h 91 1.7Imports of goods -1.0 10.h 3.0Cost of liv_ng index (lower classes) 3.7 2.1 3.1

1QA7 1QAQ 1971

Publie Fi nan-es (millions of vourdAls)

NAtMonnal (CovAnnm.nt.?

Total revenues 155.6 197.6 263.7Tortal ernaA treA 178.2 2Ono. 276.3

Net borrowing (-) 22.6 -12.3 12.6Revrenues as % of GDP 8.0 9.L 10.5Expenditure from funds earmarkedfor development (curent - capital) 'A'.8 18.6 18.9as % of total expenditures

1967 1969 i977

Money and Credit (millions of gourdes)

Net foreign assets -30.9 -29.1 452Net credit to National Government 159.8 186.3 193.Net credit to other public sector -3.0 8.3 t.hCredit to private sector 42.;. c9.u .5Other assets -16.5 -16.8 21-7TOUAL ASSEiS= LIA01-1T1- 151.8 197.6 -6.-7Currency and demand deposits 107.0 13137 1Savings deposits 34.1 2.2 67t.8Other 10.7 23.7 53--

Balance of Payments (million US$) 1960 1967 1971

EXports (fob) 38.1 32.2 h5.7Imports (fob) 3.4 hO. 6o.oTrade Balance -5.3 -8.2 LL-ilReceipts from tourlsm (gross) o.1 2.1 6.7Other services (net) -10.7 -12.0 -20 .Net Goods and Services -7.9 -18.1 -26.2Net transfers 9.2 17.2 2?.7CURRENT BALANCE (net) 2.3 -0.9 -.3.-.>Private direct investment 0.1 1.1 6.(Public sector borrowing (net) 1.3 -1.5 2.-.

Drawings on official loans 1.5 0.2 9Repayments of official loans -0.1 -0.9 -1 ŽExport credits and other (net) -0.1 -0.8 1.2

Other capital -1.1 -1.0Changes in reserves (- - increase) -2.6 2.3 -a.;

External Public Debt 1967 1969 1971

Public debt outstanding as ofSeptember 30 (million US$) 48,666 50,889 52,76 7 ,&

Public debt service ratio 2.7 0.0 2.1

IMF Position _(million US$ as of September 30)

Quota 15.0 15.0 19.0DGold tranche - - 1.9Credit tranche 9.3 11.6 159.0Drawings outstanding 10.8 9.L 3.1

of which compensatory 1.3 2.3 1.2Use of Fund credit 7.0 5.7Net foreign exchange reserves of thebanking system -6.2 -5.8 93 6

Coverage of current navments (no. of weeks) - - b

1/ Includes US$ 15.5 mill Ion repayable in local curre-ncy. Tne debu se viCe ,C-'!iJU

only reflects obligations in foreign currency.

STATISTICAL APPENDIX

I. Population and Employment

II. National Accounts

III. Balance of Payments and External Trade

IV. External Debt

V. Public Sector Finances

VI. Monetary Statistics

VII. Agricultural Statistics

VIII. Other Sectors

IX. Prices and Wages

Summary and Conclusions

1. After more than a decade of stagnation Hai-i's G"n has begun togrow at a satisfactory pace between 1968 and 1971. This reversal reflectseconomic recovery 4n several sectors, part4cularly construction, .anufac-turing, government and services, including tourism. Savings deposits ofthe bankin- systemafte.,at remaining virtually at the same level between1961 and 1967, almost doubled between 1967 and 1971. The resumption ofconfidence is a'l8o reflected in larger rem.lt-Cances from auroad. Tihe re-laxation of the political climate in 1971 further contributed to the im-prove.ment of ~the ecor.omic ~sit4Auai on. Durlng 1071 GDP grew by nearly 1 f

percent in real terms, the highest growth rate in over a decade. Foreignexch---,.ge- reserves a-"-o increased d4ur-in g Lthe p as t th llree years.

2. Of course, the growth performance of the past few years owes rtmuchto recovery after years of stagnation. The GDP per capita is still lowernow A.Wtar. 4it was In 1960, and somue oL the major sectors of the economy -agricultural exports, irrigation, transport - have not yet shown signs ofimprovement. However, the break with the trend of the previous decade isclear. Most fundamental long-range development problems remain to be solved.buU thLe resumIpta-L, of gruwtA and the new, more bus'iness-Inuled Government,make it more likely than in the past that action will be taken to come togrips with these problems. Because of the precarious balance of paymentsposition and the weakness of economic management, Haiti will depend agreat deal on external assistance iln devising and implementing developmentpolicies.

3. Macro-economic information about Haiti is very scant, and necessarilyrather unreliable, because of the preponderance of the agricultural sectorabout which relatively little is known. Investment and savings rates arelow by international standards. Public investment amounts to only 1-2 per-cent of GDP. The tax ratio - about 12 percent of GDP - is relatively highfor a country averaging around $100 per capita income. Because of thelow level of external assistance, a substantial part of public investmenthas been financed out of domestic resources. Tnere are no reliable data onpopulation and employment, but a very large fraction of the populationappears to be unemployed or underemployed. Manufacturing is one of thefew areas where employment has increased rapidly during the past few years,particularly as a result of the creation of over 100 export-oriented assemblyplants averaging about 100 workers each.

4. Although the country's resource base is quite poor in relation tothe population of 5 million, the degree of under-utilization of resourcesis large enough to offer ample scope for development during the next decade.in particular, the agricultural output of existing irrigation schemes couldbe increased two-fold, given adequate maintenance and some rehabilitationworks. Likewise, Haiti's tourist sector affords favorable development pros-pects. The absence of reasonably easy communications, however, is a majorobstacle to development in agriculture, tourism and other sectors. The

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two major highways - the Southern Road to Les Cayes and Jeremie, and theNorthe-r. Road to Cap Haitien - can.ot be used a1' year round. "Mle Southern

Road is only passable by jeep even in the dry season, except for the first35 -41 es from uor-au=rXlnce. For allprs the majo pro-vincial population centers are virtually cut off from the capital city." LA& reosruto oA the_. South._ e r _- In, o _ _ d.- -e_ _ _ 1 2__ tat on o_ _ L'L lotlrnA.fl&| s L~ sUs.L.LJLi IJL LiIw: .1U-LLc 1XL~U, :LI , L<:L l= - XZ LaXL.LUL UL LL1': LL1LU

Road and the creation of an effective road maintenance service are, there-fore, urgertly required. Further, a f'ew other relatively capital-intensL've

investments are clearly needed in power, telecommunications, and, at a.Later stage, 'rrigao.

5. In nwst sectors, huwever, there is a need for modest labor-intensiverehabilitation and maintenance efforts rather than for substantial capitaloutlays. Such efforts might be most successful if they relied heavily onlocal commun± ty development rather than on centralized government action.Experience suggests that a close link between user charges and user benefits,combined with administrative and budgetary decentralization and a good con-trol mechanism, can be successful. Largely self-financed regional and localautonomous agencies should be developed along the lines of the authoritiesfor the international airport of Port-au-Prince and for tne port. Tneseagencies would charge rates for road maintenance, irrigation, canal rehabili-tation and maintenance and other services. Tne provision of food for workwould further stimulate such community-based efforts. Stretches of highwayhave been built and maintained on this basis for as little as US"10 perworker per day and free food.

6. Haiti's fiscal performance has suffered from the excessive com-plication of the system. Tne Haitian authorities are aware of a need tostrive for simplification, notably through a selective reduction in earmarkedrevenues. Further, the authorities should, as a matter of top nationalpriority, consider a shift from taxes on coffee, which have serious dis-incentive effects, to progressive taxes on income, urban land and non-essential imports, wh4ch all afford ample scope for increase. The exces-sive deductions on personal income-tax should be reduced, and the presentsystem used for assessing taxes on commercial and industrial enterprisesstreamlined. The substitution of the tax on constructed property by anurban land tax with an efficient collection system would not only providea largely untapped source of revenue, but would also improve the equityof the tax structure. Import duties could also be substantially increased,serving both the fiscal objective of increasing revenues progressively,and from a balance of payments point of view, the need to limit imports ofluxury and non-essential goods.

7. Haiti has been successful in maintaining free convertibilitywithout exchange rate adjustment. However, it has failed to assure anadequate mobilization of domestic savings, largely because of unattractiveinterest rates on deposits. The creation in 1971 of a First National CityBank subsidiary in Haiti, apart from reflecting increased confidence in theeconomv on the part of the business community, is likely to raise interestrate on deposits somewhat. Unless a more competitive structure of interestrates exists, a high proportion of savings will continue to remain outside

the banking system or be Eransferred aDroad. tne National Bank is Halcitsprincipal fLnancial institution. It is not only the Central Bank, but func-tions also as the Treasury, the largest commercial bank and, through itsdirector, as the main policy influence in Haiti's development bank, theInstitute de Developmement Agricole et Industriel (IDAI). The National Bankhas been'th'e pirinc'pal deveL6pment institution,''and in the recent past helpedestablish the agencies in charge of electric power and telephones. It alsoexercises control in the management of the flour mill and the port of Portau Prince. The financial control functions of the National Bank have un-doubtedly been beneficial. For the future, however, the authorities oughtto consider giving greater investment decision-making independence to CONADEP(the planning office), and the sectoral agencies and development institutions,so that they can gradually assume more responsibility. Moreover, the benefitsof setting up two development credit institutions, one for agriculture and onefor industry - the main benefit being a greater sense of economic promotionthan at present - would ovt-weigh the possible drawbacks arising from theexistence of two such institutions instead of one in a small economy.

8. Haiti's foreign exchange reserves have increased in 1970 and 1971as a result of larger net inflows of private direct investment, some increasein public capital inflows. and SDR allocations. However, traditional exports- coffee, sugar, essential oils - are still below their historical level.Prospects for a sustained resumption of coffee growth, which would enableHaiti to fill its quota during the latter part of the 1970's, depend essen-tially on producer incentives. Producer incentives have been eroded duringthe past 15 years by a decline in world prices and simultaneous increase intaxation. Not only is Haiti's coffee taxation far heavier than in any otherproducing countrv of importance ($18 per baz worth about $45). but the taxesare insensitive to price changep and regressive. Because of insufficientproducer incentives. farmer- did not renlant sufficiently after the hurricanesof the mid-1960's to maintain a steady long-term output trend. Instead,farmers increased fond nroductionn mainly nf subshqisQtnrce crops and cuit

down production for export. As suggested in paragraph 6 above, the coffeetax rn,l1d be hpreut sibhQtntnial1v with,i t- Ince of rvpenur e f to he nharrrov,n nIn

if other, more progressive taxes were increased instead. It seems unlikelythat- cffee ex-nYtc wrli the future unless producers receivebetter comDensation. Sugar exports may well increase as a result of anexnansinn in refining canacitvy provdped farmers are willina to incrense

output at the very low prevailing price. The outlook for essential oils,citrts , trnniral fri tis and mfnnr agritl turral products presents ser4lou

cause for concern, again, because producer incentives have been eroded byhigh transport costs, administrative red tape and export monopolies.* Man.u-factured exports are expected to continue increasing, but the net foreignexchange gains from re-e r- aft-r asmby only repreaent- a amll share

of total exports. Hence, even rhotgr. in tne longer run these exports mayo,ri t-n hea-nme a mnr- source o- foerein z^hnan in th,e m-44im_t-ter f-he

net foreign exchange earnings will probably remain quite modest.

9. For the first time i^n ten years, gross tourism earnings exceeded$Q m41lion in 19a71 Tpi-4emt . s affords favorabl fordevelopment, because of Haiti's natural and cultural attractions and itslow-cost manpower. Several steps are required if touris, is to continue to

4 v

develop in the years ahead: (a' an !mprovement in transport and communica-tions; (b) the development of an agric'fltural sub-sertor to siinnlu hoftelsand restaurants in an organized. fashion; (c) improvement in hotel management,which will come about if the tvenTrent. -s successfill in attracting one ortwo international hotel chains; (e) a '.ore selective land concession policyenstring A a qid nro nun rather rhan nri1PcPee for fnrpeig rn rnt-trQ w4th4ou

adequate benefit for the country; (e) closer cooperation in tourist promotionhetween governrlent agencIes ann forelgn airlines and shipping, companies.

10. Merchand4se Tmnnrrs have incrrP2sed shvn1jv in 1970 -neA IQ71

reflecting a recovery from over ten years of economic stagnation. Thecormnnsit0-n of imnnrt-cz rniSS snom. questlonns ahont the deve.lTopmoent ob,jectI4vesand instruments of economic mavagement. Among the items that have increasedmnszr- rnni,1lv nr6 rqrq livwivr¶y frvt1 I f . -rnnci,ni , A-r-n)ilc ani t---t--i '

Conversely, imports of trucks, btusses and jeeps have failed to even beginto meet the traVnsport needs of the economy. Import duties are relativelylow by international standards -- they amount to about 20 percent of imports- ndA ecnformnt is-Aa+4 ,- d er Y.alti reiveso U.S. terann4Cp] -4--..e .o

imTprove the administrative efficiency of customs. This improvement mighthb conmnlemntedr hb n grnadual increaCs tn the novrall l evelI of customs tn ffs,

through higher levies on non-essetitial imports.

11. Kerosene imports are suJ iect to import Auties, when cheap kerosenesupplies mi&,t hnelp containso. erosion - one o-f t-he m.ost seri4o,us lon; ;te rmnthreats to economic development - by encouraging the population to substituteklerosene for -1-arc-oal from Haiti&. trees. Xxroee;ports shou'li be exemp:.et,di

NC 4.'C~ C IC LU UJiCI La A. A. -aLiA -,.QA. L - - A.LA C ~ -lC L' -,~7 -1r. UC AS -JJLA l C L" Il' X

from. Import duties until lign.ite is produiced domestically and distributed ar.aii equaC l or l.wercL pLc per calorie'. unl'IL. A stuUdy to ex-'?jlUL I tChe A! LhI.tIy

of lignite exploitation is being financed by the UND?.

12. During the past decadie Hiaiti has received very little officialextetnai- aid. AltogeLfeL o1- ia c.apital .-- M have aIvIed r aEd LvoutL ' Ioer

head, or $5 million a±inuallv. Ha.nIti's external publi.c debt amounred to$48.7 million at the end of 1971. Ahe endhe end of t970, alL ptblic externaldebt arrears have been eliminated.. The detit service ratio was of the ordercf 2 percent in 1971. Tirie ratin onr the existring debt s,bouId remain between2 and 3 percent through the 1970's. Howevet, the debt service rat.i:: alone.does not convey a realistic picture or the country's debt servi.cing capacity,which is limited by the rigid c.onstraints with which the balance of paymentsmust be managed. Even a small increase in suppliers' credits cOuld createdebt servicing problems and force the monetary authorities to slow down thepace of economic expansion in order to service the debt. The Government musttherefore show great restraint irn this area; it must on the other hand makeevery effort through its economic aud '-inancial policies to inspire confidenceamong the external lending agencies which are in a position to provide develop-ment assistance to Haiti on concesslonal terms.

l i. Yt seems reasoniable to expect Gul' to grow by about 4 percent peryear in real terms during the 1970's, provided producer incentives improve,increased amounts of external assistance are available, and public investnment

8nd manintenance are carried out judiciously. If, on the other hand, sufficientro,reign aid is not forthcoming, and exports do not increase - indeed. pros-pects in the absence of adequate incentive are for a continued decline incoffee exports in favor of subsistence crops - it is difficult to see hcw*4DP could grow by more than 1 to 2 percent per year. Only improved economicTanagement, with greater emphasis on maintenance. and stepped-up externalsic can bring about a measurable increase in real per capita income duringthe decade of the 1970's.

I. THE DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK

"Seen from the air Haiti is a jumble of wild cliffsand mountains, rent by plunging, tortuously twistedstreams and narrow, steep-walled canyons. The sweepof the great northern plain, the broad central plainfollowing the valley of the Artibonite River, thecoastal plain of Arcahaie between Port-au-Prince andSt. Marc, the plain of the Cul-de-sac between thebrakish lake Etang Saumatre and Port-au-Prince, andthe other pockets of extensive cultivation in thesouth are all visible; the mottled and attractivegreen of the growing sugar cane, coffee, rice, andsisal contrasts vividly with the visually pleasingearthy reds and browns which, however, reveal theextent of Haiti's well-advanced soil erosion. Thepeaks and sides of all but her highest mountains havebeen denuded of trees for fuel and, with the help ofviolent tropical storms, the richer topsoils. Herrivers consequently run brown, clogged with the humusand detritus of severe ecological neglect. There islittle terracing and even less contour plowing in aland of obsessively individualistic peasant farmerswhose holdings have been fragmented for generations." 1/

Phvsical Endowment

1. What lit-tlp land uep data iS availahIe confirms the observationsof the paragraph quoted above. Out of about 2.8 million hectares totalarea only abhnut 15 to 20 percent are arabrle- Recaiiue of the enormous ponu-lation pressure on land, much of the rest of the country is also cultivated,thereby contribuiting to deforestation; erosion and land exhaustion. However,the land resources of Haiti could undoubtedly generate an agricultural andlivestock nrodutrinn far in Perpnq of nresent levels nrovided they are usedmore efficiently. Violent hurricanes hit the country (particularly theSouthern peninsutila! every two or three years sweepnin away roffee trees.food crops and houses in their wake. Since coffee trees have a long gesta-tion period; hurriranes squal lv depress outnut for several years. Thenorthern part of the country, while it is better protected against hurri-canes. exnerienrPq frenutent and nften spvere droughts- which have causedserious famine in the relatively near past. Haiti's limited mining re-sources incluide conner b-auxit-e manganese, iron, lignite pnd some npetro-leum, and salt, in addition to sands and other construction materials.

1/ Hlaiti by Robert I. Rotberg, Houghton Mifflin, 1971, p.5.

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Until now only bauxite and copper have been exploited. Generally, it seemsthat Haiti's mineral resources do not afford promising prospects, with thepossible exception of lignite, which might be used to fuel a thermo-electricplant during the late 1970's. However, prospection permits have recentlybeen granted in the North and this might reveal new deposits, notably ofcopper. Haiti has many spots of beauty along its coasts and also in itsrugged mountains. A number of beaches exist, particularly along theSouthern coast of the Southern peninsula and near Cap-Haitien in theNorth. While liaiti's natural beauty compares favorably with many otherCaribbean islands it cannot be said that the country enjoys a clear ad-vantage over some other islands. Finally, although there is hardly anyinformation in this sector, it seems that the sea surrounding the islandis not devoid of sea-food resources, even though they are not exploitedat present.

Human Resources

2. Haiti's population cannot be estimated with precision but is inthe neighborhood of five million. Over 80 percent derive their income fromagriculture. Hence the population pressure on land is one of the highestin the world, and the average Haitian household cultivates less than onehectare. Density is especially high in the fertile valleys. The urbanpopulation consists essentially of the Port-au-Prince area comprising about450,000. In addition there are a handful of provincial cities, none ofwhich of more than 20,000.

3. It is generally estimated that the birth rate is of the order of40 per 1,000 and the death rate about 20 per 1,000 resulting in an annualDoDulation growth of abotut 2 nercent. The high death rate reflects Doorprotection against disease compounded by widespread malnutrition. In thecountryside- un to 30 nperrent of newhnrn habieA risk dving from tetanusduring the first month of life.. For the Haitian population as a whole,chances of rearhing the age of three are estimated at only slightly over70 percent, a high rate by international standards. The daily calorieavailahilitv qseeq tn hb nf thp nordepr nf v nno or less; for most of the DODU-

lation. Likewise, the average adult intake of protein and fat is extremelylo.- However, to the c-ual observer the population, especially in therural areas, does not have nearly as depressing an outward appearance asin most other countries with a -4rcapit- rnP of arond $100.

4. There are no employMent dat a in Hai. U Hver, -siderable un-employment and underemployment clearly exist at present, in spite of sub-stantial emigration, and of the recent upswing in economic activity. Inthe rural sector it is quite common to find adults who only work 2 or 3hiours a day in thLe iJels, because ou the verLy smaLdl size La holdings andthe almost complete absence of productivity-raising inputs. The veryelastic labor supply in the cities i:, evidenced by low daily wages (about$1) for workers whose productivity, according to foreign businessmen, oftenexceeds that of similar labor in the United States. In the provinces laborcan be obtained for road construction for as little as US410 per day plusfood.

5. Partly as a result of political factors but mainly because ofunattractive economic prospects, a very substantial part of Haiti's profes-sional "class" has emigrated, thereby compounding the shortage of qualifiedadministrators. There are said to be fewer Ilaitian medical doctors in Haitithan abroad, and while the medical profession may be an extreme illustration,a heavv "brain drain" has undoubtedly reduced the number not only of profes-sionals and managers, but also of qualified workers, mechanics, and otherskilled manpower available in Haiti. lHaitians generally emigrate to theUnited States and Canadla. Laborers also migrate to the Bahamas and theDominican Republic. Altogether between 5 and 10 percent of the Hiaitianpopulation lives abroad. Until 1971, the Government wlhile it taxed emigra-tion, did not altogether deter it, because emigration reduced potentialdomestic political onposition while increasing the flow of remittancesfrom abroad. The willingness of Haitians of most backgrounds to leavetheir country mist be borne in mind as one of the most important explana-tory factors for past performance and also as main element to be consideredwhen planning llaiti's future. So, for example, most forms of higher educa-tion and some forms of technriical education are likely to encourage emigra-tion, while other forms of training (e.g. para-medical personnel, low-levelteachers, low-level extension workers) are less conducive to emigration.

6. Although the official language is French, 80 to 90 percent ofthe population only speak creole, an idiom of Norman and African origins,and can neither read nor write. The llaitian culture, of which creole isthe medium, is striking for its originality and pervasiveness throughoutthe country. It includes a blend of animism and Christian religions, ahighly original artistic life, and generally provides the population witha sense of identity and pride.

7. The culture does not lend itself to the notion of consenstus onany particular national goal nrimarily because of what one might refer toas its atomistic nature. That is to say, family units tend to maintainthemselves autonomously to the extent possible on all levels, and to viewall, other families with a certain degree of suspicion and antagonism. Insuch an atmosphere, community is barely acknowledged, let alone nationala]legiance. Tlis, coupled wlth the profound social cleavage between thesmall numbers of educated elite and the remainder of the nopulation, helpsexplain how for nearly two centuries governments have survived without bring-lng noticeable imnrovements to rural life. Likewise, the atomistic culturehelps explain the intricate fiscal system consisting of a pyramid of ear-marked revenuie sources. In the words of a World Bank studv on the subiect."earmarking substitutes for a lack of trust between groups". 1/

I/ "Taxation an) Earnmarking in Develonine Countries" Working PaperNo. 43, 1969.

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Infrastructure

8. In many important sectors the quantity and quality of capitalassets was greatest during the 18th century. This is particularly true forhighways, irrigation, flood control and ports. In all these fields consider-able net dis-investment has taken place over the last 170 years as a conse-quence of insufficient maintenance. The two major highways -- the SouthernRoad to Les Cayes and Jeremie, and the Northern Road to Cap-Haltien -- cannotbe used all year round. The Southern Road is only passable by jeep evenin the dry season, except for the first 35 miles from Port-au-Prince,which have been reconstructed in high-cost concrete over the past fewyears. The Northern Road is not passable during and after heavy rains.Secondary roads are in even worse condition. For all practical purposes(tourism, agricultural marketing, etc.) the maior provincial centers ofpopulation are virtually cut off from Port-au-Prince. The roads restoredby the United States Marines (1915-1934) are scarcely better now than therest of the highway network 1/. Production of export goods on the SouthernPeninsula, as a result, is hampered by poor communications to the interna-tional port and airport at Port-au-Prince. A similar state of disrepairexists in ports exceDt in Port-au-Prince, where reconstruction and exDansionis underway. Apart from wharfs in Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haitien, the coun-try has no operational port. Small-scale transhipments in Les Cayes andJeremie take place, but are very uneconomic.

9. The water management infrastructure has much in common with theroad network and the nnrts Tt was highly develonpd in the 18th centurywhen Haiti was one of the world's foremost sugar exporters. Since then,apart from partially cnmnletpd Eximbank-financed irrigation works in theArtibonite valley, there has been no significant expansion of irrigationsystems. Indeed, because of general lack of maintenance, the country'sextensive irrigation network has deteriorated considerably and now yieldsonly a fraction of its initial economic benefits. ,AC a result, Haiti'spresent crop output only represents a fraction of what could be produced.The same deterioration can be found in flood control and drainageo A par-ticularly costly deterioration has occurred in the usually quite smallworks intended to protect h4ghways against water; hence water control de-ficiency compounds highway deterioration.

10. The balance of Haiti's infrastructure consists in a few domesticairstrips, an international Jet airport, a few gaso il-fueled electric plants,a hydro-electric plant at Peligre near the Dominican border, a water-treatment plant znd 1na ne0w wharf i,. Lort-au-rnce, a rULA.entary telecomm0uni-

cations system consisting of about 3,500 telephones in the Port-au-Princearea and a IhandfLul of telephones in the provinces. In addition, public sec-tor assets include schools and hospitals, and fragmented stretches of road.Near'Ly all infrastructure is concentrated in and around, or serves, the capi-tal city. Hence, Haiti's infrastructure presents a great number of seriousdefL'ciencies.

1/ Frequent hurricanes and difficult hydraulic conditions contribute toraising maintenance costs.

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Economic Management

11. For the past decade and a half economic management decisions werecentralized with the President. The cabinet and higher civil servants hadlittle effective power. At the same time, a host of cumbersome administra-tive regulations ruled most forms of economic activity in great detail. So,for example, numerous permits had to be processed and granted for most econ-omic transactions, particularly those involving exports. Howesver, the man-agerial and administrative staff required to process the flow of paperworkwas inadequate. Moreover, physical communication between the capital andthe provinces was difficult. The combination of formal administrativecentralization in Port-au-Prince and poor communications has undoubtedlyslowed down economic activity. It has furthermore encouraged the develop-ment of informal channels between the private and the public sectors, whichoften involved inefficiencies and fund diversions. In nractice. much de-pended on the private sector interest groups' ability to by-pass the formaladministrative apnaratus A soa to obtain a dtrlsion frnm the President.Furthermore, certain forms of economic activity, particularly those managedand ewhned by a few "elite" families, were vipwed hv t-he Preident- n apolitical challenge to the regime and as a result political consolidationwasoften achievbed a-t the cst of economic retrogression. Th. etdecllne offormerly active provincial centers (notably in the Southern peninsula) owesmiur.h tof-Vsh thVepreeAdir.ce of pnlitic-al n over e-nnnm4ie nh4ecti-4tsac nTi th art- ofthe previous regime.

12. After the death of Dr. Duvalier there is no doubt that the politi-cal atmosphere -hiGch prevailed 4n the past has i..nrnmaA Tlhe h4ei,ghly-c,n-

tralized decision-making under Dr. Duvalier has given way to a collectiveleadership of a cabinnet composed for ahbout one..-ha-lf of technrici4 ans. 'ever, the nature of the Government's economic policy-making process has notye GU. aS,geA c.fiar.l t l3. y, ar.dI cons4sts in large -. asure in a-' I --- ponses-to sudden crises or direct orders by the President (e.g. setting maintenanceworkms in miotior. or.ly when one of t6he m-a or higway becme --. Ia-------and to individual business pressures. The public investment planning agency,CNATNEP, ha some of the bast te4hr4cias ir the public sector, wheose t-rain-

ing and experience have been enhanced by the activities of a Planning Advi-ser seconded for abou-7 U.LIt. yetrs Ty the W Brk. o,wever, CONADEPlacks effective guidance. At present, CONADEP is only in charge of part ofthe In-vew ts4-elf quite 14-40-eA. Tswt fT, A - ... 14_1-z svofzcs -v&%J LCLU1 WL1.L1-L so0 suo v. r-LL u s L. L Ascu. n ".L"& G A- FtV -tical backing and investment funds allocation, it could become a usefultCool fCor innvest -r. plar-.nil ardsueviinLIJI± JIJL LL1~ MeIUALL kp.LCUL.1LLLL, C1AU 0 Uj=L VJ.OLULI.

1j. rFLscaL pol.icy 'Ls hamlpered bLUy tLthe exiLstence of1 a verLy 'Large nU-nberof earmarked funds, which partly overlap, some of which are administered bythie FLinance L'Ministry andu othlers by the National Bank and vaUious ULLIer

institutions. The National Bank (which acts as Central Bank, Treasury,mlajor coLu.utmercial bank and, through a subsidiary, as development bank),

- 6 -

exerciLses a necessary financi-al control and tries to limnit the expendituresof several agencies to the often scarce resources. So, for example, the

Central Bank acting as Treasury often fails to disburse public sector wages

on schedule in order to meet other (for example monetary) objectives.Likewise, the Public Works Ministry- depends for a large fracti on of its

operating funds on extra-budgetary revenues controlled by the Central Bank,and is therefore also restricted in its planning. Hence, while extreme

centralization of economic decision-making in the hands of the President

has been replaced by collective leadership, the fLormLal addministrative ap=

paratus has not been significantly changed. Indeed, released from the

presidential grip the bureaucratic apparatus rmay well 'ncrease its power

with the red tape this may entail. A substantial degree of administrative

simplification, streamlining and clarification of responsibilities in the

economic sphere will be necessary for longer-term economic improvement.

An obvious first step would call for the clear assignment of Public Invest-

ment Planning functions to the Economics and Finance Ministry; the Treasury

Department would be responsible for controlling the funds; at present these

two functions are not clearly divided with the result that people qualified

for controlling functions make investment decisions. in general the func-

tions of planning and executing should be separated out from the controllingfunction, whereby the controller should have power only to check whether

funds were spent according to budget.

Economic Trends

14. There are no reliable national accounts in Haiti. Estimates of

production suggest, however, that GDP stagnated between the late 1950's and

1968 while the population grew at about 2 nercent per year. Hence, real

GDP per capita declined during that period. The lowest point on the curve

was reached in 1967, when GDP in constant nrices was about 5 Dercent below

the 1960 level. Since then the situation has turned around and GDP has

grown ste-adily through 1971, reflecting economic recovery in several sectors,

particularly construction, manufacturing, government and services, including

tourism. Cement output went up from 38,100 tons in 1967 to 70Q00 tons in

1971, spurred on by a private housing boom and investment in small-scale

export plants. Power output increased from 68.2 millIon Kwh in 1967 to

86.2 million Kwh in 1971, flour output went up by 32 percent, shoe produc-

tion increased by 91 percent 1/ , and corn a.n.d rice production also increased

somewhat. The number of tourists nearly doubled between 1967 and 1971.

1/ Since 1968.

- 7 -

At the same time there are signs of improved confidence in the economy.Savings deposits in the banking system, after virtually stagnating between1961 and 1967, went up by G.33 million or almost 100 percent between 1967and 1971. The money supply followed a similar trend, reflecting increasesin consumption and private investment. The First National City Bank ofNew York opened a subsidiary in Haiti in 1971 and Chase Manhattan has an-nounced similar plans. Until 1971 the Royal Bank of Canada was the onlyforeign bank in Hlaiti. Finally, the resumption of confidence after manyyears is also reflected in larger remittances from abroad, which seem tobe tied in with the private construction activity. At the same time gov-ernment revenues have increased by 70 percent since 1967 after a long periodof stagnation. Foreign exchange reserves have also increased during thelast three years after seven years of decline.

15. Of course, the growth of the past few years represents to a largeextent a recovery from years of stagnation. The GDP per capita is stilllower than it was in 1960, and some of the major sectors of the economy(agricultural exports, irrigation, transport) have not shown signs of im-provement until now. In spite of the recent increase, foreign exchangereserves are at a very low level ($9.6 million or about 2 months imports).However, the economic improvement of the past few years is evident even tothe casual observer, and the break with the trend of the previous decadeis clear. Most of the fundamental problems of long-term development remainto be solved, but the resumption of economic growth and the new, morebusiness-minded Government, make it far more likely than in the past thataction will be taken to come to grips with these problems. Because of theprecarious balance of payments position and the weakness of economic manage-ment liaiti will depend a great deal on external assistance in devising andimplementing development policies. The resumption of economic growth hasincreased the Haitian rovernment's willinoness to seek external aid andadvice, and there is little doubt that the economic developments of the nextfew years will hp Prit-irllv infliipnepdi by t-hp volme nrnd the types of ex-ternal assistance available to Haiti.

TT= AErTORAT. PRORBT.F.M ANn POT.TrTES

Agriculture

16. Four agricultural products account for about 65 percent of Haiti'smprchan,disge . Cnaor,ffe aione makes up about 40 to 45 percent of ex-ports. The remaining 20 percent are divided about equally between sugar,sisal and essential oils. Over the past decade coffee exports ha decli4nedconsiderably, and the remaining three major agricultural exports have stag-nated or declined. Conversely there are ir.dications that crop productionfor domestic consumption (mostly subsistence agriculture) has increased sub-stan.tially during IthLe past AdecaAe. The naltlonal a..ounts for agriculturerest on this assumption and show an increase of nearly 10 percent in real

-8-

value added since 1968 when exports declined or stagnated. Physical obser-vation also suggests that food crops have progressed considerably duringthe past two decades: hill-sides that were formerly covered with forestsor coffee trees now produce food crops, and erosion is accelerated as aresult.

17. A brief analysis of trends in major export crops suggests that theshift from export to domestic crops can be explained largely as a rationalresponse of the peasant population to price signals. In the case of coffee,which is almost exclusively grown by smallholders who also grow foodcrops,producer prices have declined between the early 1950's and the late 1960'sas shown in the chart following page 8. The decline in producer pricesis only partly a reflection of the vagaries of world coffee prices. Taxeshave increased substantially, usually at the expense of producer pricesrather than of marketing markups. Because of the small size of averageholdings (less than one hectare per household) and the very high cost ofmeans to improve productivity relative to the farmers' income, most coffeeproducers cannot make up for declining prices by increasing output. Indeed,the typical farmer produces only one or two 60 kg bags of coffee a year,representing an income of some $36, and must sell to oligopsonistic tradersto whom he is often in usurary debt. Hence the only response to fallingreturns within the reach of most farmers is to protect themselves by reduc-ing coffee output to the minimum cash required and to reallocate land, timeand effort to the cultivation of subsistence crops whose real value remainsconstant over time. The recent creation of a coffee traders' associationthrough which all exports are to be channeled will, in all likelihood,further reduce nroducer returns.

18. At the same time as producer returns diminished marketing costswent up, partly because the average size of holdings declined since 1950,nnd t-he cond f-inn of rho roads deteriorated. Furthermore, as a result ofimport-substitution in flour, formerly the basic cargo for coastal shipsto provincial harbors, conastal shipping was sharpnlvy rt down and coffee,

a marginal cargo, had to be transported by road.

19. Most important, however, taxes on coffee are by far the highestamong coffee producing countries in Central Am,erica. 1/ Not only does thefiscal burden amount to about $18 per 60 kg bag 2/, but the absolute amounts b,e =e regarAles- of the -4-.- , ence,ro co ffee tavxe ae inot only 1vryt

high but also regressive. There is little doubt that an alleviation of cof-fee taxation reflected in hiaher producer #-turns would stimulate output.

Conversely, unless producers receive an adequate return, all other efforts(technical assilstar.ce, coffee t-ree distribDutilon, -int,roAuct.ion of fertilizer,etc.) are unlikely to put the country back in a position to fill its 490,000

1/ See appendix tables 5.4 and 7.2.

2/ For broken, unwashed arabica.

HAITlI: COIFFEE INDIICESBasic Quota (FOB Price, FOIB Price net of Taxes, aind Export Volume)(490,000 bags)

-- r I 7 I i I I~T I I-_F_ 106 / Producer and Marketing Fleturns Index (net of taxes) 2

10,, 105

100 1002 1 101 10

1()0~~~~~~~4 0 0st > 3j9 100~~~t%~ 100 98

~ ioo 98 97

v J* 4 isExport Volume! Index1

9 / 41951 55 = 100)

(0_ ___ _ a_ __ 91._. . I V___ __ __ _90 91190

90\ ~~8785

10 F i V12 y ea r vih i t i ng aver a base - 1 9 5 0 5 5 = -1 00.% 8B

70 e2lriv -_____________ base 1951_______ i951-55= 100) 71 #""V % 71

So'70tc lHa tian Ceffee Irist tute38 71 Rr7.(

2 66 40 63

60~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~6

4~55

1950 1955 1960 1965 19713

1Five year sh0ting avera cie base 1 95 1-55 I00

2Yeairly inoex, base 1951 = ISO.

Souirce Ha tian Coffee lrsztutoe.. WorlId Rnr,k-6321~ (R)

-9-

bags quota. The argument according to which hurricanes have been the maincause for the drop in coffee output is valid only during the gestation periodof destroyed trees. Statistics suggest, however, that even allowing for fourto five years gestation after major hurricanes. coffee production has con-tinued to decline. A reduction in coffee taxes would not necessarily entaila reduction in coffee revenues for the Government. This would depend on thefarmers' response to price incentives. If a 30 percent increase in producerprices (through lower taxes) brings about an even larger increase in output,the Government would stand to gain. If on the other hand farmers failed torespond to price incentive, the Government could still increase some otherrevenue flow (for example income taxes, taxes on real estate or importduties on nonessential goods) in line with its stated intentions. At anyrate, because of the overwhelming importance of coffee to Haiti, there arestrong reasons to reduce coffee taxation, making sure the benefits are ef-fectively transmitted to producers. One way to increase producer benefits,which has been successful in other coffee producing countries, consists inbroadcasting coffee prices in various markets. Since portable radios arequite widespread, market information might have a beneficial effect forproducers.

20. Once the Government has restored reasonable producer incentives,the main task ahead will be to increase productivity. This involves techni-cal assistance, better spacing and shading of coffee trees, replanting tolower the average age of trees. and provision of fertilizer. The HaitianMinistry of Agriculture is well aware of the technical aspects of coffeeimprovement and has a staff of 120 to 180 extension workers who could.with a modicum of additional training, carry out these tasks.

21. Three sugar refineries operate in Haiti and a further one isscheduled to start nroduction shortly. CaDacitv exp)ansion is expected tobe reflected in higher exports, subject to the farmers' willingness to in-rrease their outnut of cane. There are no reliable production statistics.It is estimated that Haiti produces 2 to 3 million tons of cane out ofwhich about 750,000 are refined in sugar mills. The three mills produceabout 75,000 tons of sugar per year, most of which is sold in the domesticmarket. Haiti has not filled its 30.000 tons U.S. prefererntial sugar quotain recent years. During the past three years sugar exports have averagedsliehtlv tinder 18;000 tons or 55 nercent of the exnort volume in the early1950's, although sugar prices for export are now higher than in the earlylq5O'8. Two factnrs hnue cont-ribtited to the derline in exports: the lim-ited refining capacity and a steady increase in domestic demand for sugar.As in the Acas nf soffee, lgglng nrneoductinn might also he explai ned in

terms of inadequate producer incentive. The mills pay producers $4.10 perton, but ma.n. p,roducers sr.e c.harged tra.n.oit cots, tah , frequientlyi

amount to $1 to $1.50 per ton. Producer prices have not changed since1948 and freceive less for thei4. cano th- 4-n o vu ntl-. or a ,.n -ducing country in the Caribbean.

- 10 -

22. The cost structure of sugar refining 1/ suggests that the mills,all of which are foreign-owned, are very profitable. Sugar taxation isrelatively light. The two smaller mills are exempted from export taxesunder the industrial incentive legislation, although one of them was estab-lished as far back as 1953. The larger mill, which belongs to the HaitianAmerican Sugar Company, is subject to export taxes, but has not in recentyears come within the profit bracket subject to income tax. The principaltaxes on crude sugar are an export tax of US41.43 per pound, and, for domes-tic output, two levies of US41.5 each per pound, one of which is collectedby the Finance Ministry and the other by the Regie du Tabac. Returns fromsugar refining amount to about 40 percent on sales after taxes for the maiorsugar mill, which produces mostly for the domestic market, as well as forthe three mills as a whole. As in the case of coffee, it would appear thatone of the main government policies required to resume historical outputlevels would be to increase producer prices. While in coffee this couldbe brought about by a reduction in taxes, in sugar, some form of a minimumnrodiicpr price legislation revised each year in the light of nrodrition oh-jectives and external prices might be considered by the Government.

23. The sisal industry has undergone a shift from plantation topeasant output of wild sisal during the last decade largelv as a result ofunattractive world prices. Sisal is mostly processed into twine for export.Becrmvqe of the infavorable world nrosnects for sisal no narticular nolirvmeasure is required in this area. Exports of essential oils (mainly vetiver)hvue inrreAsed from ahouit 100 tons in the early 1950's to shouit 00 tons inthe late 1960's. There are about 40 small essential oil distilleries inHaiti- Aftor 196Q9 hrjpvpr, expnorts dorlinpd hv onp-third in vnli,mp lnrgeluas a result of the creation of a marketing monopoly involving productionquotas for each distillery. The market4ing monopoly- Ihich was initiallyjustified by the Government on grounds of quality control, has had a de-pressing influence on producer prices and has therefore led to a drop inoutput. Much the same occurred in mangoes, citrus fruits and some exoticWoods. "e T many penits requIred to export these products could be nhnliShed

to encourage production.

24. The previous analysis has focussed on the problems of incentivesand miarkL et irimLperfections. LIL-.Ls flocus should n.ot detract froLm the more uL nda-

mental problems of agricultural productivity, which will have to be tackledin tne longer run if output is to keep up wiLtih popu'LatiLon gruwth anidU export

requirements. One of the main obstacles to productivity increases is thedeficiency of communications. Rehabilitation of the road net-work and offeeder roads will undoubtedly stimulate agricultural production and mightbe conducive to a more efficient regional specialization pattern. At pres-ent, because of transport deficiencies, producer prices for corn are threetimes higher in the North than in the South. Tnis report does not analyzesubsistence agriculture in any detail although this sector is of vital im-portance to the country. However, a few of the general obstacles to agri-cultural development (in cash and subsistence crops) can be pointed out.

1/ See Appendix table 10.1.

- 11 -

'11te Ftofr tnr machotU are, with a few exceptions, the only instruments usedin agriculture. Crop rotation is virtualy unknown: once a plot ijs ex-hausted it is left uncultivated for a few years and is used for livestock,but not sown with clover or other crops that coula speed up soil recovery.The very fluid land tenure where land changes hands fairly frequently encour-ages soii exhaustion and erosion. Government ownership of iand in the Nortn(dating back to King Christophe in the early 19th century) has not contributedeither to limiting erosion and soil exhaustion. Farmers generally do notselect seeds so as to improve crops, and there is hardly any protection againstplant diseases and insects.

25. Most of the efforts at improving agricultural methods and at re-afforestation, have been organized by religious groups. Some of these at-tempts have been very successful, but of limited scope. One ot the mainreasons for deforestation is that wood provides the only source of domesticfuel in the rural areas. The Government should give serious considerationto promote the exploitation of lignite at Massade and to exempt keroseneimports from duty. Inexpensive kerosene stoves can be produced locally andappear to be generally well-accented by the population. The high price ofkerosene relative to charcoal is one of the main obstacles to a greater useof liquid fuel.

26. Perhaps the most efficient approach to increase agricultural pro-ductivity in the medium-term would consist in improving existing irrigationsystems in the numerous fertile plains. The recent OAS Natural ResourceInventory for Haiti lists 18 irrigation and drainage projects encompassing57,000 hectares. Generally, Haiti's irrigation schemes lack adequate drain-age and salination problems arise as a result. Because of lacking mainte-nance, alluvial detritus carried by the rivers often clog water inlets. Theirrigation canals themselves are subject to sediment accumulation and becauseof disrepair seepage losses are considerable. Furthermore water charges areassessed without a clear criterion, and do not provide adequate maintenanceservices as a counterpart because they are collected by the Finance Ministryand flow into the general budget of the Government. Here is a case whereearmarked revenues flowing into local maintenance units could bring aboutan improvement in productivity. It has been estimated by the OAS studythat actual irrigation benefits usually do not exceed 40 percent of thepotential benefits in existing systems. A few instances of private locally-managed community development efforts show that considerable increments inproductivity can be obtained from simple maintenance without large capitalexpenditure. These examples suggest that a modicum of equipment and someorganizational talent often suffice to increase output. What is essentialis to maintain a climate of confidence between the peasants and the techni-cal cadres. Production increases will, however, require some investment instorage facilities. Moreover, development will have to be kept in pace withthe rise of incomes in the country as a whole, to avoid a drop in agricultu-ral prices. On the demand side there is considerable potential for rice,vegetables and fruits for domestic consumption and exports. Likewise, if aforeign company could, jointly with Haitian capital, resume banana planta-tion operations, the past record suggests that there is considerable poten-tial in this field.

- 12 -

27. In a later stage more abitious pro4ects ,mi,4ght become economic,for example, the completion of the Eximbank-financed Artibonite irrigationand drainage sy stem, *which co-vers ahout 20,000 hect,ares. Among ongoing -trv -

ects the most important is financed by bilateral German grants and consistsin dr1llin 25 wells 4the p n onf rG^n 24 xor _ _ o -4 an 1 A ti4-a-

successful project near Port-au-Prince. Because of the scarcity of capitalava1ilae for 4 rr4 gation mnd the -- !mpex politi-al nd ad-.4nistrative prob-lems involved, there are strong reasons to place most of the emphasis onmainten4-nce firest, then on rehahilitation, and -nly then, seve1ra yearslater, consider heavy investment in acreage expansion.

28. The livestock situation presents serious cause for concern. Thereare fn ..l ha a- Im-

44

4nh, nha14.s,rc1 naa ah- t-he ca1-f-le popula-

aze no reliabe herd statistics, but obs.ervers .agree that. Ith c- popula-tion has gone down sharply during the past 15 years. The decline is attri-butable umainly to ar 4iuperfect ... arket structure: .as.imiers, w-o generally --fvery few heads each, sell their best cattle to the only company equipped for

C pL L ', UL I LLa. L.La.A L ZAUU I_ LL.L = OL. A. L LAUL. LJS I FOLy a U LLI~ ~ LLi LIIexport (th_e Haitiran AmerifcanL "eat and ProAuce Comapar.y) ar.d -le rest on thedomestic market. As a result of this oligopsonistic situation producerprices are extre.uely low (Jaboult TJS 7 to 11 per pound on the hoof). .UUe

main reason why farmers have depleted the herd in spite of low prices lies-in th1e fLact 'la' cattle are one ofLL th- e very lew sources of cashl ava ilabl .ein case of emergency. Recently prices were raised by US02 per pound andlierTJ UCep±'LetLon seeris L [to V Lav furthe accleratedL as a resuLt. ±IIJ1.Ls 'L aLi

the more regrettable as fresh milk is not available at all in Port-au-Prince.In addition, structural factors keep Uown the 'Long-term growth potent'alL.The herd is scattered among a large number of peasants and females only ac-count for about one-hall of tne hera, whereas efficient nerd management aimsat raising the proportion of females to 90-95 percent. The Government mightconsider two policies to try to slow down herd depietion. It is possiblethat, if producer prices were brought up to the level of similar cattle-pro-ducing countries, producers would only need to sell fewer heads to meet theircash requirements. At the same time, doubling prices would provide a strongincentive to increase production. Second, some form of export quota mightreduce the slaughtering rate. However, Haiti's experience with export quotassuggests that this idea should be explored with caution lest producer returnsbe unfavorably affected.

29. With the exception of one or two medium-sized ventures, fisheriesare undeveloped in Haiti. Indeed, it is often difficult to find fresh fishon a coastal market. Even trade in dried fish, a useful source of proteinin West Africa, is not very developed. Because of the existing fish re-sources and the poor state of nutrition, it is urgent to study the fisheriessector. A cooperative expert of the ILO, attached to the UNDP in Port-au-Prince, is preparing a small-scale fisheries project near St. Marc. The IDBalso intends to provide technical assistance in fisheries.

- 13 -

Industry and Mining

30. Industry is fairly developed for a country of Hlaiti's economicsize. Tn addition ton "hzirt1-" inAtustriQ (cement, flour inxpnsncive tep-

tiles, cooking utensils, soap), and traditional exports (sisal twine, artsnei crafts?, a ve active small-scale export-oriented mnuractur4ngsector

has sprung up during the last decade, and its expansion has been stepped upduring the past two years. Most small export plfLnts are urLder Haita-n man-agement and housed in Haitian-owned buildings. Foreign participation isusually lIim ted to -redi t, .machiney a nd marketing arrangements. Most ofthese firms assemble or process imported components (electronic parts,sporlts goods, ajpparelC, undenw;ear, , et." fo. reCeppoLt, Caak.ing auvan.tage ofHlaiti's cost advantages in labor and freight to the United States. Theseplants employ aJboutL 10P,'000 people. T.lh LA 1971 In pr cn - U-J. t States

import surcharge has had no perceptible effect on this sector. The construc-ti on ly ITJ71AIT (th Central ark' devlorn agecy of .indus-r'larL*.UL uy LJI± l� LIJ%. %,L. .4. d± JJIF 0 U.LV=4.UPtCL 1L r1rCIII.Yj U.L ai LL LUUZ LJL_LaA &JCL r

near the international airport of Port-au-Prince is expected to furthersti'rulate expansionr by providing structures for purchsase or leasing tohouse machinery.

31. The main obstacle to expansion is scarcity of medium-term credit.Medium-term credit can only be obtained from IDAI, which is criticized byindustrialists for its cumbersome procedures and restrictive policies, orfrom abroad. As a result, most expansion has been financed out or ploughed-back profits and non-institutional credit. Foreign sources of credit havebeen reluctant to finance buildings and usually limit credit to equipmentand working capital. There is a clear need for a business-minded institu-tional source of medium-term credit for export industry expansion, but thiswould require a liberalization in the credit policies of the Central Bankin favor of medium-term credit. Tnis problem is discussed further in CnapterIII. Industrial incentive legislation is very generous. It provides a5-year of income tax exemption for new plants followed by a 5-year gradualphasing out of the exemption. Most imported inputs are exempt of customsduties.

32. Tnere are two mining operations in Haiti: a bauxite mine in theSouthern peninsula (owned and managed by the Reynolds Mining Company) and acopper mine in the North (owned and managed by a Canadian company). Both arefairly small operations. The bauxite deposit does not compare very favor-ably by international standards. Output is of the order of b60,000 shorttons per year and there are no plans for reduction or expansion for thenext few years. While bauxite provides $5 to 6 million in foreign exchange(gross of remittances) its extraction has aggravated erosion. In the ab-sence of legislation to this effect mining companies are not obliged toreclaim land after stripping it. It is only recently that some reclamationhas taken place on the bauxite mine site. Copper ore exports amount toabout 5,000 tons per year, or $1 to 1.5 million in gross foreign exchangeearnings 1/. Because of geological factors output is well below the capacity

1/ Copper export statistics appear to be unreliable and probably under-estimate actual shipments.

- 14 -

of the concentrating plant. if physical obstacles can be economically over-come, output may increase somewhat in the future. In the longer run, however,there are no plans to expand capacity. As mentioned in Chapter 1, large-scale exploration concessions in the North have recently been granted totwo foreign companies, which are mainly looking for copper. The futureof the sector will depend on findings during the next few years.

Highways

33. Haiti's road network of about 3,000 km, mostly built in the 1920's,and of which 186 km are paved (according to official statistics), has beendeteriorating rapidly for want of proper maintenance. Less than a decadeafter the termination of a Bank and an IDA-financed road maintenance proj-ect (141-HA; 32-HA), not even the main national trunk highways can be usedthroughout the year. Except for the first 35 miles of concrete road nearPort-au-Prince and some 100 km near Les Cayes, which is maintained in pass-able condition by the regional FAO/UNDP project, the Southern Road 1/ is intotal disrepair. A UNDP-financed study is being undertaken by IDB as execut-ing agency for constructing a new road. The Northern Road connecting thesecond largest city, Cap Haitien to Port-au-Prince cannot be used by carsafter heavy rains and even in the dry season it takes more than seven hoursfor a distance of 315 km. Most other roads 2/ cannot be used by passengercars. Improved maintenance of the road network is clearly of top priority.

34. Haiti's budget is at present insufficient to finance the machineryand materials needed to put the roads back into acceptable working condi-tion and to rebuild the road to the Southern Peninsula. Any external fi-nancing should be combined with technical assistance to ensure continuousroad maintenance. A road maintenance program was elaborated in 1971 by anexpert under the OAS Technical Assistance Program. 3/ In addition, Italcon-sult is carrying out a survey of the Northern Road under a US$180,000 con-tract to be financed _Jointly by the Italian and Haitian Governments. Fur-thermore, UNDP's financing of the study for the Southern Road includes anallocation for studying the overall national maintenance system.

35. The Government realizes that it cannot affort to build new roadsat the expense of a complete deterioration of the existing network. Mostofficials also recognize that concrete roads and often asphalt roads nrenot economically justifiable in a country with fewer than 30,000 vehicles.The e-onstrtution of the Southern Road (in concrete) has been slowed dr,wnaccordingly, pending recommendations of the UNDP-financed study. The PublicWorks Minicstry, which is in charge of road maintenance and constricrtin, hasundergone important organizational changes under the new Government. Thevarious road maintenance and rnnst'rrtlion agencies sch as the i-F ond Routierand the Service d'Entretien des Routes, have been incorporated into the or--ganiza-ion of the Public Works Minist ,.

1 300 kilometers from Port-au-Prince to Jeremie.2/ Except the Central Road between Port-au-Prince and the Peligre dam and

the road to Kenscoff, a resort suburb of Port-au-Prince.3/ The cost of road maintenance is estimated at US$3 million per year.

- 15 -

Electric Power

36. Before 1971 Haiti's power needs were inadequately supplied by high1-cost, often obsolete, diesel plants. Industrv relied mainly on their ownpower units, and the city of Port-au-Prince depended on an antiquated plantand obsolete distribution system. Electricity t'..efLs in Port-au-P:ince wereso widespread as to seriously threaten the financial viabilitv of the Com-pagnie d'Eclairage. The situation has improved a great deal since 1970.The Peligre hydroelectric plant has come into operation, the concession ofthe private Compagnie d'Eclairage expired, and a new public sector company,Electricite d'Haiti was created and now runs the power supply in themajor towns. Until now, however, Peligre is connected only to Port-au-Prince, and the rest of the country continues to rely on high-cost dieselgenerators. With the first Peligre turbine in operation, the Port-au-Princenetwork can easily handle the peak demand (18,500 kw). For the first timein decades black-outs have ceased to be a daily fact of life. Once thesecond Peligre turbine comes into operation in February 1972, the dieselunits in Port-au-Prince will only be used in emergencies and to satisfypeak demand. There will be a need to start building a third turbine atPeligre in 197; but-t this renuires further engineering studies. Bevyonr Pel1i-gre, only one river, the Saut Maturines in the Southwest, has any significantpotpntial for hvdroelprt-rir energy- Therefnr, t-hp TThe TlP is finnnrincy a

study to test the feasibility of using the Massade lignite deposits forthprmo-PePlt-ric, generationn Earlv finnncia-i1 planning will hp rpriiired to

avoid repeating the very costly Peligre financing. 1/

37. The diesel units in Port-au-Prince will continue to be operatedby technicians employe by the Compagnie 'Elirag, theItalian supplier C.I.E. will train Haitians after installation of the unitsin Peli,,re. Llowever, nro staff has- been trained to- manage the enlarged sys-

tem or to prepare long-term development programs. The modernization andunificatlon Lto 129,40.0t V of: th1e dAlstrib-Ut4on ne-.ork at a cost ofl. $-.5 LL

lion over five years will also put high demands on the power company's staff.In 1971, the Government contracted three hi±ghly qualified UT.l experts too adviseand train Haitians, particularly in the management of the power system, butonly used their services for a few weeks. Under a 070N-financed program.scheduled to begin in January, Electricite d'Haiti will receive assistancef.ro S experts in 1I- 1 h C of tari ff CL- -* x all. >- LAI. f J.._ V C - - - -1-1 -I-

preparation. Because of the almost complete lack of domestic know-how itwoulld ble clearly de.sir_ablle if an iternational oraiato oulA ass4st-Haiti in the preparation, financing and execution of an electricity devel-opment program.

1/ Suppliers' credits for this project virtually amounted to cash purchasesagainst imports. A contract was signed in May 1968 between Haiti andthe Italian firm C.I.E. to provide three turbines/generators and trans-mission lines from Peligre to Port-au-Prince at a cost of US$5.6 mil-lion, of which most was to be paid during construction.

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Telecommunications

38. Before 1969 the telecommunications situation of Hlaiti was verycritical. Because switchboards acquired in 1954 were not installed before1969, there were virtually no telephone services in the country. Since1969 some 4,000 lines operate. lhowever, as mentioned in Chapter I, thetelecommunications infrastructure remains very limited. A new 3,000-linecrossbar exchange purchased from Mitsubishi under an eight-year loan isscheduled to begin operations in Petionville in October 1972. The procure-inent of a new 10,000-line crossbar exchange for Port-au-Prince costing about$1.5 million has also been initiated. Bids for the exchange and distribu-tion equipment, including installation, have been invited from NorthernElectric and Mitsubishi. Old open wire lines with 22 VH1F channels for thenational long distance service exist to Les Cayes, Jeremie, Cap llaitien,Gonaive, Port-de-Paix, St. Marc and Jacmel, but service is unreliable. Newexchanges of about 200 lines eachl are being installed in the first four ofchese towns. Various alternatives for a new long distance network are understudy by consultants (Computer Sciences Corporation) who have already com-pleted a preliminary study. The elaboration of a development plan is beingfinanced by the UNDP and the IDB.

39. The feasibility of establishing a new international link is alsounder consideration. Haiti is connected via microwave circuits through theDominican Republic. Though the link has a potential capacity of 300 cir-cuits, Ilaiti wishes an alternative link for security reasons. The DominicanRepublic has proposed to build an Earth Satellite Station between the twocountries, but Hlaiti does not feel such an expenditure can be justified atthis stage. A microwave link to Jamaica from the highest peak in theSouthern Peninsula is being studied as an alternative.

40. The country's national telephone and telegraph system is managedby Telecommunirations d'Haiti S.A. (Teleco) in which the Government has a

majority participation since September 1971. Teleco's staff is sufficientt-o run the nresent system; but additional personnel is required to nlan orsupervise expansion. Haiti's telecommunications system being at the verybgcinnincg of developnnmPnt- teprhnicra assltran-_rP twinld he highlv dePsirahIl

at this stage to orient development into the right directions.

lducation

41. The paucity of Hlaiti's educational system reflects the poverty ofth ..L Yet lthe s ytem formally coversth t -n tir e sn from 1 kinder-

garten to university. Primary schools are run by the Education Ministry int'Le cities and thle A1griculture I .Lltty in theT rura areas ..Wil the L tw

systems are organically separate they both prepare pupils for the CertificatU r~~~~Luues r~~~~ L±ldLC I ~ LICL L)UL_ I 'J'.J' LIII_LULCI~ CL iidL LIUid'E-tudies 'rji-na'r-es. AlItogether abu 6,0 hlren attendu pr mr,dy schol'u,

including 62,000 in private schools, out of about one million children inprimary-school age. However, out of 2,900o primary teachers in the Minis tryof Education only 1,000 have completed teacher training. Furthermore, nearly60 percent or puplis in rurai primary schools are in the first grade and thethree first grades together include 85 percent of rural primary school ptupils.

- 1 7 -

Only about 800 pupils successfully complete the rural primary school cycleevery year. While the number of teachers in the public sector has notincreased much over the past decade, the number of private teachers hasincreased by about 45 percent. The Government runs 20 secondary schoolscovering 16,000 students, while 71 private secondary schools cater for11,000 students. The University of Haiti has about 1,400 students 600 ofwhich are in the medical faculty. Vocational schools (public and private)train about 13,000 students. In addition, the Office National d'Alphabetisa-tion et d'Action Communautaire (ONAAC), uncter the leadership of a young anddynamic director, reaches 150,000 adults and has led to some reduction inthe illiteracy rate.

42. Several important issues must be confronted in the field of ecduca-tion. First, although the bulk of the population only speaks creole theeducation system operates in French. While some need for an internationnllv-spoken language undoubtedly exists, it might be possible to educate a largernumber of children at the primarv and vocational levels nut nf the existIngbudget if creole also received official status. Furthermore the quality oftuition and the foreign-inspired examination reainrements nrmy resi-r-fict fth

number of school graduates while contributing to the "brain draint ". TheGovernment has recoenized that low tearhers' salaris have helr hback theexpansion of the public school system and President Jean Claude Duvalierhas announced that teachers' salaries would he ra4sed as of April 1972.What remains to be done is to define the objectives of the educational sys-tem In the lilht nf the countrvy's req:iirements annr of the heavyr "braindrain". Although understandable resistance exists against shifting to a"second rate" ed,cirational nt,t-ntit- there are strong arguments In favor of aheavier emphasis on low and intermediate-level training that could eventual-lv imorove agricrultural, medIcal and infratri-t-iure sevrces and maIntenancewhile reducing the incidence of skilled emigration. At any rate, it isworth noting that the populatIon has a strong interest in education, sevidenced by the success of missionaries in attracting children, and bythe large number of private -- lsa

Puihlir Hnelth nni Pnnuiltinn Policy

43. The Port-au-Prlnce/Petlonvll11 area has an urban population ofabout 450,000 out of a total population of about five million in the country.T1h.e rest of the population, with the excep--on of five o of 10,0 I to20,000, is dispersed, and because of lack of transport infrastructure,extremely d-ifficult to reach for the- provisi-4on of mle-dcal ser-vices. Prl

for this reason, until now public health efforts have aimed mainly at theeradication of d^isease that do not reqUi re lnliLvliual treatmiient. For examl-ple, a successful. US-supported malaria eradication effort has been pursuedAur4ng the- past decade, and urb-an an' rural water supply has Ien- pr-eI.. , U U U %A UaL L ULJ W1. ~pi Id tibeeii improvediwith the help of the IDB. There are only 300 to 400 medical doctors inIlC alt 4-J15 nurses andU about 800Uk paratmndical pesoUnIel., ofL whIicn only I 1v

have had formal training. Over 60 percent of doctors and 55 percent ofnurses work in, Port-au-Prince. "artly b- cus of l pub lic sector wages,

- 18 -

partly because of the general poverty of the country, the rate of emigra-tion is nprt1ii1cr1y high in the med4iral fipld. Olt of the SO t-n 60 tnid-i-

cal doctors trained in Haiti each year a high proportion leave the country.The inflow of private and nphlic technical ncsistance from ahroad can dolittle to compensate emigration by 11aitian doctors. As in education, theCovernment mfi4gh t improve doctor compensation in the public sector. In thelonger run, there is a need for shifting the educational emphasis fromfu]ly-trained doctors- to medical assistants c-aptble o-f deanling wri-htbulk of individual coverage in the cities and the rural areas, withoutattaining an inte-r.ationally competitive- rnange of skills.

44. 1-L .la hg p 4 1 4 -11 jJIA.Atatin- 4d p- in -I -c - 4t

arable land, suggests family planning as a priority sector for development.The atm ' zttitude .s favorAble to family pi-.nning (coupled with.infant care) and the leadership of the Public Health and Population Minis-try_. . f 1,4-4,_caliber. A n 41atioa F-4- - A-- s1 ̂ .A-_ AS41s_ _-_4LU r y tO vL t [14.51 Lcl4.4.JCL E Cl I1-CL4.liutCA.Z. UItL . 4) a S jL ..- CAL FC-- - Y. b_ Fao U c_

cently established to work out policy guidelines. The council includesrepresentatives of' e4ght puli agencie -- A of the Y.ai4-an RdCrss A

tIJDP contract was signed in September 1971 for assistance in this fieldover a five-year period. The ini4t4a1 C4nancing 'or the f4 rs twoyearso

over d i VC~yCdL .L III JL1 tI. L.JL± L 4.ULILLL. IJ. -L IO.I. L. LWU yvL3UK

operations amounting to $360,000 (the maximum that can be usefully absorbed)-a ale l _ee secureA _from. th I" Pou Ato . . _A-1 EgXDA _.. _ 41; .T-4 i 4 -1 1- - t :C -_ A

11;:0 allt CdUy UCCI £ OCL.UL 1 .U (JIIL LIUC 1411 U .Jpn4.L4.lIIufl E (ALS .I t4.saL4 Cl VLU U

would be concentrated in the Port-au-Prince area. The executing agency, theX n tlan A__4_ lethOgnzatilon fpI) "A %w4ill send technicians to `aiti intI- MIL 011 U.Lk-L II 110 LLL t~L14 .IWLLL kL U 01-U W U L.A. 0 L LOLSI I. L.LL LU [Id L I_

January 1972. The response of the population to existing family planningefforts undertakIen m(LaLd inly biy religious organiLzatiLoris augurs we'Ll fLor thesuccess of the Government's future efforts. Although Haiti's rate of popu-latlonI increase is not high51 LIL coi-Larison to other dUeve'Lopi'1ng countries(about 2 percent per year), and improvements in irrigation can bring aboutsubstantial increases in food production, the extrere density oi populationagainst arable land and the time-lag that exists between a drop in fertilityand a measurable slowdown in population expansion strongly point to the needto pursue an active family planning policy. Such a policy will acquire thehighest priority in the future if the death rate declines as a result ofmedical improvements.

Community Development

45. The Centre Rural de Developpement de Milot, a regional effort byCanadian missionaires, shows what can be achieved in a short time with a few(17) Haitian and foreign technicians and modest capital expenditure. Milotis a rural community of about 3,000 people in a fertile plain, 18 kilometerssouth of Cap llaitien. Before the community development effort began in 1968the town lacked electric power, adequate water supply, and irrigation, andeducation and public health were undeveloped. Agricultural development washeld back by lack of roads and livestock and poultry raising was embryonic.The road from Cap Haitien (a cruise ship stop-over and attractive touristresort) to Milot was passable only by jeep, which also held back tourism toKing Christophe's fortress, a spectacular tourist attraction.

46. Together with the local authorities, and with some funds from theHaitian Govem..mnt, the following irpro- were ...ade durlng- the- A p

four years, essentially with voluntary labor contributions by the localpopulation tJ.in exchLange for food: a rural pri-uma.ay schfloolt, a pre-vocationalLschool, a rural teacher training establishment, an alphabetization center,arL agricultural schaol, an exper4e.ntal far.,, (which now exports chicken anduvegetables to the rest of the country), the beginning of a dairy farm, amedical center, a social center, a small potab le water neW-.orkl, a powerplant and small distribution network, and the rehabilitation and maintenanceor the road to CaL p Stal-Len. ..e prJ ect includes a Ludium.r.sizeUd sugar plan-tation and is to becQme self-financing in the near future. Perhaps the mostipesve example o'L WLaL LaLL UC cn lIe acVCU WVL Lve w IIULUal confideUncle dLaU bsoUIIU

economic incentives, a savings institution has been set up, with 5 percentiLnteres . on dUeposiU ts art.dL 'Lo aris at :1 'v pejrLcent;- W.L Liless Jt:bb LLl.LI LWU ytarLb

nearly $50,000 were deposited by the local population, mostly small farmers.llis efix.ort of.L'ers HIcUi hl 0ope ilor the L[ uture Lin ter-lbi ofL resource mobilizationand utilization on a local scale. Milot has become one of the most affluentvillages in Haiti anu the qualLty ox Ille is VIsIDly bDeter tnere tnan inthe rest of the country.

Sectoral Priorities

47. There is a clear need for modest labor-intensive rehabilitationand maintenance-oriented efforts, rather than for substantial capital outlays.Such efforts might be most successful if they relied to a large extent onlocal community development rather than on centralized government action.The realization by the local population that efforts will yield tangibleresults for the community is a necessary condition for success. Past ex-perience suggests that much might be gained from administrative and budget-ary decentralization combined with a good control mechanism. Largely selt-financed regional and local autonomous agencies should be developed alongthe lines of the international airport of Port-au-Prince and the existingport authorities in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien. These agencies wouldcharge rates for road maintenance, irrigation canal maintenance and rehabil-itation, and other services. The provision of food for work would furtherstimulate such community-based efforts. Stretches of highway have beenbuilt and maintained on this basis for as little as USi1O per worker per dayand free food. Administrative decentralization and the use of revenue forlocal improvements might create a climate of confidence that is too oftenlacking when funds are centralized in the national budget and when the ini-tiative for works depends on a Ministry. In addition, a few relativelycapital-intensive investments are clearly required in roads, power, tele-communications, and, at a later stage, irrigation, as outlined in the pre-ce(ling sections.

48. The following table shlows major public investment expendituresduring the past three years and outlines a public investment program forthe future, which includes only projects of high priority. The table alsoshows the past sources of public investment financing. While HIaiti has

MAJOR FUBLIC INVES'ThENTS(million geo-des)

1969 1970 _ _ 1971 1972 _ _ _ _1973 1974 1975 1976Fixed Other Fixed Other Fixed Other Fixed Other Fixed Other Fixed Other Fixed Other Fixed titherSECTORS Ixce.De., Re.o Totai invent. De., Ep. T.xe Inves-t. D-.E p. Txte1 Ixv-et. Dex E-op Total, Iv-at. 0ev. EnF. Tote1 Ir-xt. flex Eep. Txtxi Ixvet. D.-En . T0 p tp.a 1evee. De.,o. E.T.t..t1

xe-Ky 10.3 0.5 10.8 18.7 0.5 111.5 24.0 0.5 25.1 20.0 7 0.0 5.0 - 5.0 10.0 - 10.0 20.0 -20.0 150 15.0

Tr--eF-t 12.0 - 12.0 7.6 - 7.6 0.5 - 0.5 15.0 - 15.0 55.0 - 5. 0 55. 0 - 35.0 35.0 -35.0 35,0 - 35.0Tolexe-innint i... ji - - - - - .. - - - 2.5 - 2. 5 5.0 - 5.0 2.5 - 2.5 2.5 -2.5 2.5 -2.5

Agrix-lt-r 0.4 8.0 8.4 0.4 8.8 9).2 0.2 15.0 15.2 2.4 11.0 17.4, 4.0 10.0 70. 0 4.0 15.0 19.0 10.0 15.0 25.0 1 5 1.0 2.5I.d-etry 1.0 1.0 0.8 - 0.R 1.6 - 1.6 1.0 - 1.6f 1.6 - 1.6 - - - - - - ..- -

Tee-lee 0.1 1.7 1.8 0.1 0.0 0).7 0.1 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.5 1.5 3.E 0.5 3.5 6.0 0.5 6.5 -0.5 0.5 .. 0.5 0.5

WOCt- 1S.FF

15.9 0.4 6.3 1.0 0.1 [.1 0.4 0.7 9.1 - - - - - - - - - -- - ..- -

Eden-tiWn 0.0 1.9 2.5 2.1 0.8 32.9 1.1 1.3 2.4 1.0 0.5 1. 5 1.0 0.5 1.S 1.0 0.5 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.5

Health - 10.9 10.5 - R. 13.h6 - 0.0 8.0 - 8.0 8.0O - 0.0 8.0 2.0 8.0 10.0 2.0 8.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 15.0

Cex-iety Develepeeni 0.7 0.7 - 0.7 0).7 - 0.9 0.9 - 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 - 1.5 1.5 - 1.5 1.5 .. 1.0 1.5

FrJ,i.veetrneet end Ren-erh - 5.4 5.4 - 7.5 7.0 - .0 0.0 - 8.0 0.0 10.0 ifl.0 - 10.0 10.0 - 15.0 10.0 .. 10.0 10.0

Total 30.3 29.1 59.4 30.0 27.1 57. 1 4.5 136.1 00. 43.5 33. 76.-5 44.0 36.0 80. 6 60. 5 35.5 96.0 70.5 35. 5 1060 60.0 23. 5 83.5

FINANCING

Nat illnl 40.6 40j.4 53.5

Cont1rol Cev-em-t 11.9 5. 2 10.8CONADEF 23.9 29).5 35.8

De.-lep-tee Budget (4.7) (07 6.73O.,ad Fed (89)(.0) (4.5)FeLigre Aenee..t (10.35 (08.0) (24.63

Pert Adeixiatretien 2.0 2.4 2.7IHPCADE 0.7 0.6 1.41DA00SEN 1.0 1,2 1.5COALF 0.1 0.5 0.2Water Serice 0.4 0).4 0.4ORAAC 0.6 0.6 0.7

Serev-ati-ea 10.0 16.7 27.1

UN 3.9 5. 7 7 .2UNCE]' 0.0 0.2.1PARSHOO 0.3 010.6Unted Staten 8.4 6.5 0.3

IDB 4.3 1.4 9.50AS 1.0 0.1 1.,

Tetat 59.4 5 7. 1 80.6 76.5 00.0 90.0 106.0 83.5

T/ h-gxh 1971 telxnenxteslvetot eeI h Fri-ato center

S--.z: CONADEF end Mix-le E.tinete-

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financed a verv substantial share of past public investment out of its ownresources, this was to a large extent a resuit of the unavailability ofexternal aid. While Haiti can be expected to continue to finance a size-able fraction of public investment, it will also continue to depend on ex-ternal aid. During the past three years Haiti financed 60 to 70 percent ofpublic investment out of domestic sources. It seems reasonable to maintainthat proportion in the future. Hence, if an increased external aid flowbecomes available, the level of public investment could be stepped-up pro-portionately. Apart from the financial transfer involved in external aid,Haiti would greatly benefit from the institution-building that accompaniesit, and the resulting increased efficiency of public expenditure.

III. FISCAL, MONETARY, AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTSPOLICIES AND PROSPECTS

Fiscal Policies and Prospects

The Nature of the Fiscal System

49. Haiti's public sector finances present a complex picture 1/. Thebudget accounts cover the greatest share of government revenues and expendi-tures, although their relative importance has been decreasing in recent years.The buclget accounts may be classified as follows:

(a) the fiscal accounts cover the ordinary revenues andexpenses of the various ministries, and include aMatching Fund which receives 5 percent of net fiscalreceipts to finance projects undertaken jointly withinternational organizations and autonomous agencies;

(b) the earmarked accounts cover the operating costs of thetwo tax collecting agencies, the Customs Administrationand the Internal Revenue Administration which keeprespectively 7 percent and 10 percent of theirrevenues to cover expenses, and the Special Fund forthe Service of the Public Debt which benefits fromspecial taxes of $3 per bag of exported coffee. $0.75per bag of sugar consumed domestically and also from 7.5percent of net customs receipts for servicing all publicdebt except coffee bonds.

The extrabudget accounts are divided into four main categories:

(a) the Development Budget covers those operations of the plan-ninP offirp (CONADEP) that are financed hy the D)evelnnmentBudget and the Special Post Office Tax. It does not includeall rent-ral Government develnnpmnr PwnPnfHitures;

1/ For a csnynopti viw co TAhble 51 in the … qt.tAt-ial Annpnfl…

- 22 -

(b) the Special Accounts cover a wide variety of operations.They include the national road maintenance service andthe fund for highway project counterparts and debtservicing, 1/ which receives the revenues from a basicand an additional. excise tax on gasoline, and the specialaccount for the construction of the Peligre hydroelectricplant, which receives the amortization payments from thesale of the sugar mill in the south, royalties on miningoperations, contributions from autonomous agencies andseveral indirect taxes. The operations of the reservefund for unexpected expenses, the special assistancefunds for sickness and unemployment benefits, the joint in-stirance and savings plan of the Haitian armed forces andother smaller accounts are also included under this heading;

(c) the Special Sinking Funds cover the servicing of theroffpp bonds from the revenues of a snecial tax ofUS$4 per bag of exported coffee; and

(d) the Non-fiscal accounts include a wide variety of minoronprationns

50. In suim. revenues stem from over 60 different taxes accruina to thebudget accounts and 35 taxes to the extrabudget accounts, many of which donot generate suffiripnt receints to covpr clopction rosts. The tahle on nage

23 shows the main public finance flows since 1966. The overly complicated sys-tem of oearmnrking intended to rpdniro noli tirnl intprfprpnrp annd qnfPOii'qrrfunds for essential outlays, reflects the lack of trust which exists in theGovernment sector. Consequently, the system is verv ricid, leaving littleroom for shifts in priorities over time.

Fiscal Management

51. In recent years, fiscal management has concentrated on equatingrevenu-es and-, expenditures on a cash basis. In the decision-ma-4ing process

of creating new taxes, little attention has been given to achieving equity4n te revenue structure. Also, the expenditure patterns have been increas-

inglv determined a priori through the extensive use of earmarking ratherLilaiL LLoi UU)11 d UUdgt LprLoess Essential. expenditures e.g. UdU Lt OL Vser Lci

and most development expenditures such as those of the Matching Fund, areLinanced fr?o[1m11 ea-rm arked revenues. The balacing ite ln the budgeL accounts

have been wages and salaries, their payment depending on the accumulation ofSuL1icient non-earmarked Lund's. Presently, thle payci,ent of goverC-Lierit ec,ploy-ees is approximately two months in arrears so that any current surplus gen-

1 Until early 19712 earmarked gasoline taxes were used LU .LInadUce LIt[ rUFoud

Routier, a Public Works Ministry fund included in CONADEP's budget.Since 19 7/ tne proceeds ol tLnese taxes are split JU/Ju Detween a newNational Road Maintenance Fund in the Public Works Ministry and a newCentral Bank fund for counterpart and debt service rinancing of inter-nationally supported road projects.

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FISCAL OPERATICJS OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

(millions of gourdes)

Fiscal Years ending September 30

66A 1967 196 1969lo 1070) 1071

Budget Revenue 129.5 118.5 12907 122.6 142.6 155.8Fiscal - z7 105.3 7". TEarmarked 29.5 22.8 24.4 23.5 26.4 29.7

E'xtr 'Dadget R1evenue 341.0x 37.1 Z I 54.4 -75.0 -8.o 107.9IZ.JLt~~~~~L~~ J4*~~..1 Jq..L (J* 1.1 U-) U .L .f.7

Non-fiscal Accounts 17i -T4 1.3 1.0 0.9 1.0DeveloDmertBudget 3.8 3.2 4.5 6.1 7.9 7.8Other Special Accounts 15.9 21.9 33.0 51.9 56.9 76.4Special Sinking Fund 11.3 10.7 10.9 14.2 13.0 17.5Other 1.6 0.1 4.7 1.8 4.2 5.2

,0U?f;gEtetU1U.L UUC -4, 7. LU 1.4 L34.Q4 i43.9 1.8Fsal 3.00.0 T=ZrS II275 .17 1 vo 141W4

Earmarked 20.8 1A.h L'.9 20-8 2___ 26j,

Extrabudget EXpenditure 34.4 38.7 56.4 75.5 84.7 108.5Non-fiscal Accounts 1-4 12 OA 06.2 3.0Development Budget 8.0 7.4 4.6 5.6 8.3 8.1Other Special Accounts 16.2 19.0 31.4 54.9 60.1 79.2Special Sinking Fund 3.7 3.5 4.8 5.1 4.7 5.7Other 5_1 7.6 I15 9 1 1o.4 12.5

Overall Surplus/Deficit 8.3 -22.6 _ 0.7 -12.3 - 3.0 -12.6Net External Borrowing _4@Z 7-75- -675 :zp5.~ - 6.4Net Internal Borrowing -7.5 31.5 11.8 12.5 1.1 17.8Changes in Deposits (-'increase) 3.0 - 4.6 - 4.6 5.4 - 4.3 1.8

Statistical Dis4 crep5n- 0.2 0.4 - 0.9 0.9 = 0.3 - 0.6

Source: Table 5.1

- 24 -

erated in the rash a._counts is immPdMatelv yhaorhbd i!1tO wnf-s. AS a result,

government agencies which benefit from earmarked revenues are reluctant to beintegrated into the main fiscal system. The availability of funds for de-velopment expenditures in this framework is not directly related to the ex-Is,tenre of a current surpl but rather to the performance of each indlri-dual account earmarked for these purposes - the Matching Fund, PeligreAc-count, Development Budget. Since 1969, disbursements from the MatchingFund have exceeded receipts through depletion of accumulated balances. There-fore, iinlecs the Tn earmrlkad chnareof itax receipt-s inc,r-easc, counterpart

funds for new undertakings could not be generated in the future except at theexnpnseo of onnoning nrn-,-Iat-o. The Cernt-ral lomnt Budget nresents asi-

lar picture. However, counterpart funds would be available for transportfvrom gasn1ne te v AQ1Q tlT A lne m -1r tIn rt f t-hg_ Peligr _yUdroelecart ric-

plant, revenues which have been earmarked for its account will become avail-able for other purposes.

Recent T71rends and Tax Structure

52. Ove1rAll c {It_ level of per a ince, tAh t x brden

is relatively heavy in Hlaiti, exceeding 12 percent of GDP 1/ in 1971, up fromtes th -an in percent in 19664K. Tn recent years the reenesofte extrabu<lgetI~~~~~I L 01 U iL1 L £1 UU LI L I L yO L A 'ii JI=_Vt:L&U~O LI 1_SX La

accounts have provided the greatest share of growth, averaging over 25 percentper nnuml since 196i6, tIIhus shtIC zI elastl-ciy to GDP L Ao oT 4. In 197

extrabudget revenues represented about 4.3 percent of GDP as compared toless than 2percent iln 11966. T,he growiLng tendency toward earmnarking acueLAI0 '.1.1 A ~I I I~gu 1 I,Lh1~Iy L) l Z.A 101 tI~0LLL) ULILLM

for the impressive increase in extrabudget revenues. Conversely, budgetrevenues IIcaire stagnatedU throuLghL 1969U. J.LIport Lduti.es h'1ave accounteUI' f or over50 percent of growth since 1966, as a result of increased imports rather than01 1heaVJler Linci1Ldence. Lax reLvenues of' thIle budLget Lhave renL,ained at 5 .0 percent

of GDP since 1966. In addition, the Regie du Tabac has tax revenues of theorder of C 60O million or approximately 2.5 percent of GDP.

53. Tne pattern of expenditures is largely determined by the structureof revenues. As with revenues, the extrabudget expenditures have become in-creasingly important altnough no details about their allocation are availa-ble. Budget outlays have grown at a much slower rate. Wages and salaries,which constitute the most important single expenditure item in the budgetaryaccount, have represented a stable share of total budget expenditures, atslightly under 70 percent throughout the 1966-71 period. Other current ex-penditures on goods and services, including debt servicing, are absorbing anincreasing share of budget outlays. While in 1966 the latter representedonly 17 percent of budget expenditures, their share in 1971 amounted to over27 percent. Expenditures from accounts related to development amounted toabout G 50 million in 1971, or close to 2 percent of GDP. This comparesfavorably with the level of development expenditures in 1966 of approxlmate-ly G 16 million, or less than 1 percent of GDP, and reflects a considerableeffort on the part of the Haitian authorities. Nevertheless, the revenues

1/ All ratios are expressed in terms of GDP at current factor cost.

- 25 -

of the Regie du Tabac remain completely divorced from the rest of the fiscalsystem. Their incorporation would considerably increase the funds availablefor public investment. Expenditures from the Regie du Tabac are believed tobe principally for internal security purposes, but this in itself does notjustify the secrecy surrounding its budget, which is a major source of dis-trust on the part of the private sector and external lenders.

54. Since 1967 the budget and extrabudget operations of the Governmenthave shown a deficit which has fluctuated considerably, reaching G 12.6 mil-lion in 1971, and has been financed almost exclusively out of domesticsources. 1/ There has been a net repayment of external debt averaging G 4million a year since 1966, except for 1970. In 1970 much of the foreigndebt was rescheduled and, as a result, the deposits which had accumulatedon the accounts of foreign creditors while arrears rose between 1967 and1969 were liberated and returned to the Government. Excluding 1970, netrepayments of external debt have averaged over G 5.5 million.

55. A detailed classification of taxes is only available for budgetrevenues. Direct taxes, excluding export duties, represent less than 15percent of budget revenues. Revenues from income taxes are held down by aninefficient collection system. Nevertheless, after stagnating sinre theearly 1960's, receipts from income tax reached G 17.8 million in 1971, ascompared to G 13.2 million in 1962. G 10.7 million in 1966, and C 12.5 mil-lion in 1969, reflecting the economic recovery. Direct taxes also includethe issuance of identity cards. required of all Haitians, and a tax on con-structed property. While tax receipts from identity cards have increasedthroughout recent years. reaching about G 3.0 million in 1971, those on con-structed property amounted to only G 0.6 million in 1971, the same level asin 1962.

56. Indirect taxes and export duties nrovide the bulk of hudaet revenuerepresenting almost 80 percent of the total. Import duties only representabout 20 percent of merchandise imports, but are the largest tax source inHaiti, amounting to C 61.6 million in 1971, and have contributed the bulkof budget revenue Rrowth in recent years. Export taxes provided C 19.8 mil-lion in 1971, of which G 18.8 million from the proceeds of coffee exports.Coffee export taxes in Haiti are more than twice as heavy na those of mnstcountries in Central America in the case of washed coffee, and three timesheavier In the case of unwashed and broken coffee, and absorb about 30 per-cent of proceeds from coffee exports. Excise taxes, over half of which areon flour and domestically consumed sugar, amounted to G 28.1 million in 1971.Other commodities subject to excises are cigarettes, alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, edible oil. textiles; soan, lard, etc. Excise tax re-ceipts fluctuated considerably throughout the 1960's reaching G 24.2 millionin 1965 and falling to G 15.2 million in 1969, when the flour mill was temepo-rarily closed down, but have since responded to the improving economicsituation.

1/ Mainly from the monetary authorities, except in 1971 when the Governmentborrowed G 8.9 from the private sector.

Fiscal Priorities

57. The Haitian authorities are aware of a need to strive for sitmplifi-cati4on of the fi scal sys-em...hrough a select've reduction, Lin eari-uar'-e' rev-LL J .1 &JL LLL A. L ~L LW LILU. I~�LL V L,LL±1 .. CLIdKC rev

enues. Some progress has already been made in this direction by the inte-gration of the TouriLst L i iJ ce, the 'na±tLari Coffee InLLstitute ana tne BorderControl Office into the main fiscal framework. The Municipalities have alsobeen recently integrated into the system. hnis step should not be allowed,however, to contribute further to the transfer of resources away from pro-vinclal centers into Port-au-Prince. Further efforts should be directed tothe elimination of earmarked revenues for the tax collecting agencies, plac-ing them under the Finance Ministry. Special emphasis should be given toconsolidating the revenues of the Regie du Tabac into the budget, and to chan-neling them into more productive uses than is now the case.

58. In certain cases, however, earmarking has made a positive contri-bution to the development effort by securing funds for specific investmentsor for general development expenditure. Tnis has been the case with theRoad Fund, the Peligre account and the Matching Fund. Similar earmarkingdevices could be used to provide funds for the expansion and maintenance ofirrigation systems, airports and sea ports, out of user charges.

59. The need to simplify tax legislation is being acted upon. A lawwas passed in 1971 to consolidate all previous legislation pertaining toexcise taxes. Similar legislation is being prepared for income taxes andcustoms duties. The study group which is presently undertaking this taskshould, as a matter of top national priority, consider a shift from disin-centive taxes on coffee to progressive taxation on income, urban land, andnon-essential imports. The excessive deductions on personal income taxshould be reduced, and the present system used for assessing taxes on com-mercial and industrial enterprises should be strearlined. The substitutionof the tax on constructed property by an urban land tax with an efficientcollection system would not only provide a largely untapped source of reve-nue, but would also improve the equity of the tax structure. Import dutiescould also be substantially increased, serving both the fiscal objective ofincreasing revenues progressively, and the need from a balance of paymentspoint of view to limit imports of luxury and non-essential goods.

n olc a r e

60. As noted in Chapter I the National Bank plays a very importantrole in economic policy-making. It is at the same time a Central Bank, themajor commercial bank, and it acts as the Government's Treasury. The Direc-tor of the Central Bank is Chairman and General Manager of IDAI, the IDB-supported agricultural and industrial development bank. The Central Bankalso has a decisive participation in the power sector (through Electricite(I'llaiti) and telecommunications. Furthermore, through the development bank,the Central lBank has a majority participation in several industries, andalso exercises a fair degree of control through its loans to the Southernsugar mill, which produces over one-half of Haiti's total sugar exports. The

- 27 -

concentration of responsibilities with the National Bank has arisen partlyout of a desire to apply that institution's traditionally high standards offinancial control to key sectors of the economy.

61. The table on page 28 shows that the Central Bank has been able toexpand credit during the past few years within the framework of IMF stand-byagreements, while building up foreign exchange reserves, and maintaining thefull convertibility of the gourde. There remains, however, a shortage ofmedium-term credit, which, as mentioned in the industrial section in ChapterII, may well have held back the expansion of small-scale export industry.The impact of this shortage has been partly offset by the substantial inflowof remittances from abroad.

62. As Treasury, the Banque Nationale effectively balances out revenueand expenditure by keeping current expenditure (mainly wages) in line withrevenues and debt servicing obligations. As a result, public sector wagesare often in arrears. During 1971, however, because of an increase in pub-lic revenues and a stabilization of public sector wages, arrears have gener-ally not exceeded four to six weeks. Although this represents an improve-ment, it still frequently obliges many public employees to borrow at inter-est rates up to 20 percent per month from non-institutional lenders. Betterplanning and coordination between the Finance Ministry anci the Central Bankwould be desirable to further reduce arrears in the future.

63. In addition to its role as the main commercial bank, the BanqueNationale also sets credit policy. Commercial banks do not extend creditfor more than 180 days, although some lines of credit are rolled over 18months. Furthermore, the Banque Nationale only pays about 3 nercent on sav-ings deposits, and the Royal Bank of Canada, the country's second largestbank, usually keeps its rate one percentage point below the Banque Nationale's.As a result there is little incentive to save with the domestic banking sys-tem; narticularlv since sonhistirated savers have the ontion of savingabroad to earn higher returns. Neverthieless, savings deposits increasedalmnot onp-third in 1471 The crrptinn in 1971 of A FirSt Nntional fitv

subsidiary in Haiti, besides indicating the resumption of a higher degreeof confidence in the economy on the part of the international business com-munity, will in all likelihood increase the competitiveness of the monetarymarket. Chase Manhattan's plans to follow suit should strengthen this trend,and interest rates on deposits are likely to rise as a result. Evidencesuggests the Pxistence of a substantial untaDped savings potential (e.g.the success of the Milot savings institution mentioned in Chapter II, andthe construction activity in the absence of institutional credit for thatpurpose). The creation of savings and loans associations in Port-au-Princeand in the mnaor nrnvincial towns would nrovide a welcome addition to theresource-mobilization mechanism of Haiti. To the extent that new institu-tionn d anni now interest- rate strucrtcure inrrense the resn1rrces of the hank-ing system, this will make it possible to lend more and for a longer term to

- 28 -

SUMMARY ACCOUNTS OF THE BANKING SYSTEM

(millions of gourdes)

Fiscal Years ending September 30

1o6A 1967 19o6 1969 1070) 1071

Foreign Assets (net) -19.3 -30.9 -33.2 -29.1 2.8 48.2

Domestic Credit (net) 166.1 182.7 202.6 226.7 227.6 248.5Central Government (net) I:W7U 159 170.37 :2 7 M. 193.3IDA.u (net)-27-. -45--3°5,Other Public Sector (net) 4.4 0.9 4.2 15.0 2.5 3.3CffhrCij1 rGntn1 -17.4 .-17.1 -18.2 -19.4 -2n0. -22.1Private Sector 39.9 42.4 47.1 49.0 55.7 68.5Unclassified (net) 6.1 o.6 3.8 ,.6 3.5 0.4

Total Assets = liabilities 146.8 151.8 168.4 197.6 230.4 296.7Liabilities to the

Private Sector 138.2 143.0 156,5 178.3 196.0 247,3Money 102.9 107.0 1I6.5 13i17 TIT2 MO 175.7

Currency (AP.5)fN (72.9) (78.3) (823.9) (91.)-I (-1 .9)

Demand Deposits (34.4) (24.1) (38.2) (48.8) (50.9) (66.4)Quasi Monev 35.3 _6_o hn.n L6.6 5hLo 72.0

Savings Deposits (33.4) (34-1) (35-3) (42.2) (49-8) (67.8)Other (1.9) (1.9) (4.7) (404) (4.2) (4.2)

Long Term Liabilities 8.6 8.8 12.9 19.3 21.8 26.6

SDR Contra-entry - - - - 12.6 22.8

Source: Table 6.1

64. The Institut de Developpement Agricole et Industriel (IDAI) whoseGeneral Manager and Mhn4rman is th Di4rector of tha Banaue Nationale. is theonly development credit institution in Haiti. IDAI extends development cred-its and technical assista^nc w,hilp 4ts r.hnidiarv, the Soi^ete d' EauinementNational (SEN) takes direct participations in enterprises. Furthermore, IDAIowns and rura several small i.n^dustries TDAT deirivsn mont of it- fundn from

customs revenues and IDB loans. IDAI and SEN both operate at a loss. Mostof th.eir dArect ir.vestments anr.e run un,.econo.a.M4 ofter. be en of nver-

staffing. Moreover, losses on loans amount to nearly 30 percent of theport-foli1o. Part of the unf.a-vor.able fin.ancial s ituatio0n cme, f-o& la^k of

trained personnel for project evaluation, especially in industry. There arer.o clear standards for the study.7 , a pp_va r r4J_on ofl

A certain degree of investment decision-making autonomy is required in themain development instit..o an.d iectors such., an povr and 4-l a,-mm,tnicst-one

while at the same time the financial control of the Central Bank should bem*4AitainA.

65. T.o sum up, .zait,i *haas b-eer successful. 4n m-in.fifning free cor.…verti-

bility without exchange rate adjustment. However, it has failed to assureaduequate sa-viLrgs mobui.L.Lzation, largely because of the= UMCo'pepti..V structure

of interest rates. The National Bank has been the principal development in-vL.LLUL±UIL, 8.LIU EL LII &tC;=LIL- pUL- II=LPWU CULkU±LvLI LIM L wil s .OLA j1 acLar L

electric power and telephones. It also exercises control in the managementUL LI J. .LUU U.L.LiL MI I.pilLUL narLIL. LLI L±-ro~UL .L lUo. th'e L.lour mill ard' the port ofL Port au Plrir.ce. T.'e firar.cial cor.trolfunctions of the National Bank have undoubtedly been beneficial. For thefuture, however, the authorities ought to consider giving greater investmentdecision-making independence to CONADEP, and to the sectoral agencies anddevelopment institutions, so that they can gradually assume more responsibility.Moreover, the benefits of setting up two development credit institutions, onefor agriculture and one for industry - the main benefit being a greater senseof economic promotion than at present - would outweight the possible drawbacksarising from the existence of two such institutions instead of one in a smalleconomy. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, a more efficient mobilizationof savings would make it possible to allow commercial banks to lend for overone year. Availability of more than one source of medium-term credit wouldundoubtedly improve allocative efficiency.

Balance of Payments

66. Tne table on page 31 shows the recent improvement in Haiti's bal-ance of payments. Exports have declined slightly during the 1960's averag-ing about $37 million. In 1970 and 1971, however, exports increased signi-ficantly, owing mainly to a recovery in coffee - although 1971 coffee ex-ports are still 5 percent below the past 12 years' average - and to increasesin exports of sugar, bauxite, essential oils, meat, twine and handicrafts.As noted in Chapter II merchandise exports consist mainly in agriculturalcommodities, and have been held back by lack of producer incentive and ad-ministrative export restrictions.

- 30 -

67. If present policies continue, sugar exports may well increase asa result of an expansion of the country's refining capacity so as to meetthe United States' preferential quota, provided farmers are willing to in-crease output at the prevailing prices. In later years, Haiti might alsosell on the world market, the rise in domestic consumption allowing. How-ever, the outlook for coffee, essential oils, citrus, tropical fruits andminor agricultural exports presents serious cause for concern. In the maj-ority of cases export volumes can be expected to decline, or at best remainat their present levels in the absence of adequate producer incentive. Evenif adequate incentive is given to coffee producers by shifting a sufficientfraction of coffee taxes to other sources of revenue (e.g. imports, income,urban land) coffee exports would only begin to expand after the gestationperiod for new trees. It seems unlikely, therefore, that Haiti will be ableto fill its coffee quota of 490,000 bags during the next few years. Miningexports are not expected to rise substantially over the next five years.Exports of manufactured goods are expected to continue increasing, but thenet foreign exchange gains from these exports (the locally added value)only represents about 30 percent of gross exports or about $3.5 million.Hence, even though in the longer run these exports may grow to become amajor source of foreign exchange, in the medium-term the net foreign ex-change earnings will probably remain quite modest.

68. After a decline in the early 1960's the number of airbornetourists increased fairly steadily, reaching about 40,000 in 1971, andrepresenting a gross annual foreign exchange flow of about $8 million.In addition cruise ships moor at Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haitien severaltimes a week, representing an additional foreign exchange inflow whichcannot be precisely quantified. The country has about 500 hotel rooms ofsufficient quality to attract foreign tourists, almost all of which are inthe Port-au-Prince area. At present, with the exception of a few weeksper year, there is excess capacity in hotel rooms. which could be largelyavoided through development of group tourism. Tourism undoubtedly affordsfavorable prospects for development, because of Haiti's natural and culturalattraction and its low-cost manpower. However, several steps need to betaken by the Government if tourism6 is to continue to develop in the yearsahead:

- 31 -

BALANCE OF PAYMEN TS

(millions of US$)

Fiscal Years ending September 30

1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971

Trade Balance - 5.9 - 8.2 - 2.4 - 5.4 -11.8 -14.3Ex=orts; FOB 3;7 7 -7r39 o07Imports, FOB 43M8 404 38.7 42.1 5*.8 60.0

Net Services -14.h _ 9.9 8.1 -10.2 -11.7 -11.9Tourism (net) 0.9 4.2

Credit (1.7) (241) 4-5) (5.4) (6.6) (8.7)Debit (4-9) (3.3) (3.6) (3.8) (4.3) (4.5)

Other (net) =-1.2 - 8.7 - 9.0 -11.8 -14.0 -16.1

Net Goods and Services -20.3 -18.1 -10.5 -15 6 -23.5 -26 2Net Transfers 17.6 1772 12. 1:. 8 2109 -T777

Net Current Balance - 3.3 - 0.9 2.3 0.2 - 1.6 - 3.5Direct Investment (net) . -8 3.1 6.0Central Govt. Borrowing (net) - o.8 - 1.5 - 0.3 - 1.1 o.5 0.3Public Agency Borrowing (net) o.2 - o.8 ;.5 1.5 2.0Other (net) 4.6 = 1.0 =4.3 2 . 0 42

Changes in Reserves (- increase) -0.8 2.3 0.4 - 0,8 - 6 9.0

Source: Tables 3.1 and 3,2

- 32 -

(a) Transport and Telecommunications. At present touristscannot easily move out of Port-au-Prince by road. Beachesare about an hour away from Port-au-Prince. The rehabili-tation of the highway network will undoubtedly give tourisman impetus. Domestic air transport is a monopoly of theHaitian armed forces, who use fairly obsolete planes and donot provide ground services and adherence to time-tablesthat might be expected in view of the sizeable revenues andlow costs involved. Private planes cannot land withoutPresidential authorization and runways are usually coveredby obstacles intended to prevent unauthorized landings.Clearly, as long as the psychological climate remains asgood as it is now a liberalization of air transport is calledfor. Furthermore, small irritants such as the collection ofparafiscal revenue by the armed forces during road-checks mustbe eliminated if tourists are to be expected to visit Haitimore than once. This is particularly true in the case ofthe Citadelle, the spectacular fortress near Cap Haitien,where para-fiscal tolls are collected without being alloca-ted to the improvement of the road to the fortress, whichis only practicable by horse and could be improved at littlecost to carry busses. Finally, an improvement in telecommu-nications is required if hotel and transport reservationsare to operate effectively for larger numbers of tourists.

(b) Further agricultural development will be required to feedthe tourists. At present food supplies appear to strainthe capability of the agricultural sector even in tropicalfruits, chicken and beef. What is needed here is mainlyorganization to develop a tourist-oriented agriculturalsub-sector tied in with hotel management.

(c) Improvement in hotel management. Tourism development willrequire a departure from the low-volume-high-price systemthat prevails at the moment in favor of a higher-volume-medium-price system. Such a snift can only occur if thereis a drastic change in hotel management skills. At present,hotels are rtn on an amateurish quasi-artisanal basis andthis precludes the development of larger-scale tourism. Oneway to improve standards would be for the Government to tryto attract international hotel management skills. Severalnew hotel projects have been submitted to the Government. AClub Mediterranee resort and a Holiday Inn hotel are the mostimportant. However, negotiations of the projects have notvyt hben completed. In the case of the Club Mediterranee nofinancial settlement has been reached between foreign invest-ors nnd Hlaitian 1nterests-

- 33 -

(d) A more sleciv concssins policy. Th.e Hai ti _,,Gvrnm.n

has traditionally been very liberal in granting land conces-sions to tourist promonters, even though none of thbe projectshave ever materialized sufficiently to attract tourists. AmLuchlt more selective concession pollicy is require if touris

is to develop on a sound professional basis.

(e) Closer cooperations with airlines and steamship companies forpromotion-. tLhle Gove.-rnent p±lans to epanLd th Le nurubuer oil IL-Lstourism offices abroad, at a substantial cost. It might bemoreLt: c:noUIUUU.t c LU Cuu aLoer ILUre CAL u -Sy WILLI dLLl I 11 U t daLU

steamship companies by participating in their promotion bud-get.

691. Mercnandise imports, which nave stagnated at about $40 millionduring the late 1960's, have increased to $51 million in 1970 and $60 mil-lion in 1971. Tne steep import function (about 1.27) 1/ reflects a periodof recovery after over a decade of stagnation. It cannot, therefore, betaken as a measure of the longer-term propensity to import. However, thecomposition of imports raises some questions about the development objectivesand instruments of economic management. Among the items that have increasedmost rapidly are passenger cars, luxury foodstuffs, consumer durables andtextiles. Conversely, imports of trucks, busses and jeeps, although increas-ing in recent years, have failed to even begin to meet the transport needs ofthe economy. Given the almost complete lack of trucks and busses in fairworking condition and the great scarcity of jeeps in the public sector onthe one hand, and traffic congestion in Port-au-Prince already verging onsaturation, on the other hand, it is doubtful whether present management ofimport duties is sufficient to avoid a breakdown of urban transport. Al-though they have been recently stepped-up, import duties for passenger carsare still low compared to other developing countries, (of the order of 40 to50 percent for most cars). Furthermore, enforcement is deficient, partlybecause of administrative factors, partly because of underinvoicing. Theoverall tariff level (customs receipts amount to about 20 percent of imports)is low and probably conducive to the strong propensity to import. Converse-ly, as mentioned in Chapter II, kerosene imports are subject to duty, whencheap kerosene supplies might help contain erosion by encouraging the popu-lation to substitute kerosene for charcoal from Haitian trees. Keroseneimports should be exempted from import duty until lignite is produced anddistributed at an equal or lower price per calorie unit. In sum, becauseof a relatively low level of customs duties and deficient enforcement, credit

1/ The import function represents the relationship between GDP growth andimport growth. An import function of 1.27 means that for 10 percent ofGDP growth imports have risen by 12.7 percent, both in real terms. Un-less exports are also dynamic, such a high import function presentscause for concern in the medium-term. The composotion of imports isshown in Appendix table 3.7.

- 34 -

policv carries the main burden of import control- which- whtle it may be ef-fective overall, lacks discrimination by types of imports. Haiti receivesUS technical assistance to imnrove the administrAtive effirienrv nf r,-tonma

This improvement might be complemented by a gradual widening of the spreadbetween duties on essential and non-essential imnnrt- without, hw-ever,

reaching a point where illegal imports will rise unduly.

70. The remainder of the invisible current balance consists in privatetransfers and services other than tourism. Over the past six years the twocategories of flows have roughly netted each other out. As the outflow ofother services (net) increased with the resumption of economic growth, sodid the flow of private transfers from abroad 1/. The deficit on goods andservices has fluctuated considerably during the last decade. After risingfrom $14.2 million in 1962 to $22.5 million in 1965, owing mainly to the fallinglevel of merchandise exports and tourism receipts, it decreased in the fol-lowing years to $10.5 million in 1968, as falling incomes affected the levelof imports. With the resumption of growth in 1969, the deficit has againincreased to slightly over $26 million in 1971. During the past decade Haitihas received very little official external aid. Altogether official capitalflows have averaged $4.9 million per year, consisting mainly in United Nationstechnical assistance and IDB loans. At the same time the net inflow of pri-vate capital averaged $2 million per year.

7~~~~ I 1 :Ao 1 402Ak@. .*A2F .Q7 4 1 1 I- / .. 4 I * . 1A Ak.J. CA L. L* . jJUSUL.LL U L U LU S Q. I LiJ.L 1 .. v iLL.L U. LL

undisbursed) at the end of September 1971. It consisted mainly of two Export-ImportB Ban k loans, contracted -in 1194-1 andu 1948Q, of which "2.8 r..llon rem.a-ir,

.LLLpJ A L 1JLLN LUIL , .IkLL A~LLVi L S..' I Qi .L /~u A. WLL.L L.L I .~ 0 L. A. ~.&.L.L L .cLai

outstanding, and a 1959 USAID loan of which $5.1 million repayable in localcurrency rerain outstanding. 'L Lhese three loans will entail dlebUt serviLce pay-ments of $1.1 million in 1972, rising to a peak of $2.8 million by 1978, anduecreas'Lng thereafter. Ioans fromLL priLvate sources, UILC o1. WhIcL. date bac

to the 1950's, amounted to $5.8 million at the end of 1971. Debt servicepayments on these will -amount to approxi-mately $2.0 million in 1972 owing tothe repayment of the supplier credit granted for Peligre hydroelectric plantbut shouldIa iFl in tLhe following years to 'less thLan $0.5. TIe LesL UL nici'L

external public debt consists of $5.4 million on highly concessionary termsfrom the IDB, repayable in local currency, an IDA credit OL $0.3 mlUliLon anaan IBRD loan of which $0.1 million remain outstanding and will be completelyamortized in mid-1972. A loan of $4.0 million contracted with the Banco deColonos de Cuba in 1958 remains outstanding in its entirety, but no paymenthas been requested by the creditor. As of the end of 1970, Haiti had eiimi-nated all its external public debt arrears. The debt service ratio was ofthe order of 2 percent in 1971. The debt service ratio on the existing debtshould remain between 2 and 3 percent through the 1970's. However, the debt

1/ Private transfers include aid by religious organizations, which playsan imrport-ant r0le In .aiti (amTuntina ton som $3 millinn npr year hp-

tween 1966 and 1971).

- 35 -

service ratio alone does not convey a realistic picture of the country's debtservicing capacity, which is limited by the rigid constraints with which thebalance of pavments must be managed.

72. AC mentinnpd in t-hp reu4ousniiq serti4nsj, Haiti 'q enort- nout-inook isuncertain. While earnings from tourism and small export industries can beexpec.ted t i- ncr.ease the outilook is les favrh1e for t-he bulk of e ,rnrt--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-- o

earnings, from agricultural commodities. At the same time, Haiti's levelof foreign exchange reserves is low in spite of recent improvements. Hencethe country faces fairly rigid balance of payments constraints with only ave 1 -li ted eA at, 4Ly to d-en the i^ct of shortf311s by dr ing d-n. re=serves. At the same time imports can be expected to continue to increase-ai ly -raidly iIflth et.. ,

6-s. -o a result, Hziti c .not affordU to

spend much foreign exchange to service external debt. On the other hand,because of the country' s povert-,y -A f the f4scal constraints ar 4 4-ng out

of poverty, Hiaiti depends overwhelmingly on outside assistance to financeand organize develop.m.ent efforts. U4..t4 t41now HRaiLtCi has onl- receivedU ut$1 per capita in external aid, and the very low level of aid has been a fac-t-or iLn t1he c ountry's poor economi-4c p e r f ormance.

73. Eve a smllincrease in supplilers' credi8 oldceaedetsev,'J. LVen a sma.L."L .LLI. OOLI OUJ.~L ~LU±LP LVUU.LU LLUCLL- UCUL 2%"LV-

icing problems and force the monetary authorities to slow down the pace ofeconomic ex-panis 'o n in orler t-o se,-V'Ace the debt. ".eGve,,-e -lbt.eeeconuLL t2jJdI~.UILLu LU~ LI ~ J.5..~LALL UCUL.. %L1 JUV=LLLU1=L1L st-eefore show great restraint in this area; it must on the other hand make everyeffort througi its economic aLu Lfnancala policies to inspire confidenceamong the external lending agencies which are in a position to provide de-velopment assistance to 'Haiti On cuucess'onal terms.

Conclusion

74. It is difficult to quantify Haiti's probable economic course duringthe next few years, if only because the experience of the past decade makesit hard to distinguish between medium-term recovery and the underlying longer-term forces at work. Furthermore, agriculture makes up one-half of GDP, andhence influences overalL Ude-veLopriLent to a siguificant extent, but quantita-tive information in this sector is scant, particularly for subsistence andfood crops, which make up the bulk Of output. Prospects for growth arereasonably good in manufacturing and construction, but will depend a greatdeal on continued net remittances from abroad, and on the gradual increasein national purchasing power, which will for many years to come be held downby the necessarily slow progress of agriculture. Export industries affordvery promising prospects, but represent too small a share of total outputto have mucn overall impact on national income. Even the net contributionof export industries to Haiti's foreign exchange earnings is small when setagainst traditional exports, mainly coffee. Tne importance of improvedeconomic management and of external assistance is clear. Improved economicmanagement is of particular importance in two areas: (a) its influence onproducer incentives, and (b) public investment. Unless producer incentives,particularly in the main traditional export crops, are improved to the pointwhere export production increases, through cuts in export taxes or other

- 36 -

means, agricultural meGar,dhai4se exports cannot b-e expected to increase mcuchu1Ia.A~ ~

5i~I..L. h~ ~L ~ . ~ ~..jI.) L .O LL L UV LA~ .LU LI. LLLd IUL.L

during the next five to ten years. If, on the other hand, adequate producerincertives are re-estOUablished, Y.aitLi car. exAect a sig.n.ificnt riLse n1L ex-ports

up to the point where its coffee and sugar quotas are met.

75. Public investment will also play a decisive role in Haiti's economicperLfoLmance. As ment'LonedU earlier, the vi rtual U ausence ofU iouerU-L coauiturtica-tion creates very serious obstacles to development; corn prices are aboutthree timies higher in the North thar in the South*. A limited trunk network-- the Northern and the Southern Roads -- would, if adequately maintained,enable the rural population to purchase more in real terms for a given mon-etarv outlay, as a result of a more homogenous national product market andiower transport costs. This alone is bound to bring abouL increases in Out-put. Furthermore, improved communications will help the export trade andtourism. Likewise, a phased expansion or power generating capacity is anecessary condition for industrial development. In sum, it seems reasonableto expect GDP to grow by about 4 percent per year in real terms during the1970's, provided producer incentives improve, increased amounts of foreignaid are availabie, and public investment and maintenance are carried outjudiciously. If, on the other hand,, sufficient foreign aid is not forthcom-ing, and exports do not increase -- indeed, prospects in the absence of ade-quate incentive are for a continued decline in coffee exports in favor ofsubsistence crops -- it is difficult to see how GDP could grow by more than1 to 2 percent per year. In other words, only improved economic managementwith greater emphasis on maintenance and stepped-up externai aid can bringabout a measurable increase in real per capita income during the decade ofthe 1970's.

STATISTICAL APPDN DL(

I. POPULATION

1.1. Population and Vital StatisticsI * 2 "InP-L-re in elected t'r ew.c rX+v~~yinenu -*12 -czL u u ZA I -W1 s

1.3 Selected Social Indicators1.4 AU ..L. -. Lu

1.5 Principal Causes of Mortalityi.6 Population Project i 01.7 Human Resource Structure in Public Health

II. NATIONAL ACCOUNTS

2.1 GDP by Industrial Origin2,2 Growth Rates of GDP at Factor Cost by Industrial Origin203 Structure of GDP by Industrial Origin

III. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND EXTERNAL TRADE

3.1 Balance of Payments - Current Account3.2 Balance of Payments - Capital Account3.3 Merchandise Exports3.4 Foreign Exchange Receipts from Tourism3.5 Exports to the United States of Light Planufactured Products3.6 Foreign Exchange Reserves3.7 Composition of Imports

IV. EXTERiNAL FJBLIC DEBT

4.1 Haiti - External Public Debt - Debt Repayable in Foreign Currency4.2 Past Transactions and Estimated Future Service Payments on

External Public Debt - Debt Repayable in Foreign Currency4.3 Haiti - Extermal Public Debt - Debt Repayable in Local Currency4.4 Past Transactions and Estimated Future Service Payments on

External Public Debt - Debt Repayable in Local Currency4.5 Debt Service Ratio, 1967-1980

V. PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTS

5.1 Fiscal operations of the Central Government5Q2 Budget Revenues5.3 Revenues from Excise Taxes5 .4 Comparison of Taxation on Coffee5.5 Revenues from Coffee Export Taxes

-2 -

VI. ACCOUNTS OF THE BANKING SYSTEM

6.1 Consolidated Summary Accounts of the Banking System6=2 Sunmmarv Accounts of the National 3ank6.3 Sammary Accounts of Private Banks

VTT. AGRICULTURE

7.1 Production of Selected Agricultural Commodities7.9 TDis brihiitAron of Rpturns from G.o4f'fee Ponrt

VTTT OTgh SEGWTORS

R 1 PrT-iAr-+.inn nf' R1ipari Miny-ranl nnA TnAiiczt.---in1 r1.nrmnAi+.itC

IX. pPrTC'- AmnT WrAr-

Y MT qCTT AMYTTC

10.2 Condition of the Road Network

Table 1.1: POPULATION AND VITAL STATISTICS l/

Mid-Year Birth Rate Death RatePopulation

1950 3,353

1960 3,9911961 4,o671962 4,1461963 4,226 46.8 22.71964 4,310 46.9 22.81964 4,396

1960-65 45-50 20-24

TfA5 4486 .. .

1967 4,5771968R 4; 711969 4,7681970 4,867==.

1 65-7n 43 9 fQ*Q

1971 )1-968

1/ The last census conducted in Haiti was in 1950, and its results havefrequntAybeen quesind Peet titcso popu.lation1 hacve

had to be estimated on a limited amount of available information,ar,d shIuildU eIiUre be UUsew ca UCoUnULQI1.

Source: Un ited Nations, Statistical Bulletin for Latinl Aner1ca.

Table 1.2: EPLOYMENT IN SELECTED ENTERPRISES 1/

End of Reporting Enterprises EnployeesFiscal Total Port u Other Total Port au OtherYear Prince Prince

1966 904 673 231 15,826 11,231 4,595

1967 988 727 261 18,490 12,887 5)603

1968 1,084 788 296 20,463 14,678 5,785

1969 1,154 826 328 21,516 15,567 5,949

1970 1,254 921 333 22,812 16,808 6,004

1971 1,380 1,002 378 25,015 18,825 6,190

1J Industrial and Commercial enterprises having one or more registeredemployees paid at the legal level of wages.

Source: National Office for Old-Age Insurance.

Table 1.3: SELECTED SOCIAL INDICATORS

(Demographic and Health)

Life Expectancy1960-65 45 years1970 48 years

Infant Mortality196L 172 per thousand live births1970 147 per thousand live births

Population per Hospital Bed

1968 1,403

Population per Physician1 Qt65 ]J.13n

1968 14,069

((i IaR t.l ral)

Primary

1970 14.9% of population 5-14 years

OS con Jl aU±r

1970 6.8% of population 15-19 years

Primary and Secondary

1970 12.4% of population 15-19 years

Higher

1970 0.2% per thousand inhabitants

Daily Newspaper Circulation 6 per thousand inhabitants

Sources: United Nations, Statistical Bulletin for Latin America,Haitian StaTistical institute, ONAUC, Ministry oI PublicHealth.

Tnhl1 1. NUTTTPITITO

Haiti

1958 1965 1970 American

abso- % of abso- % of abso- % of Standardlute standard lute standard lute standard

Calories AC. day -1, 58R0 A6 9 1 77n 70 R 1 7 lfn AR n 9 _nn

Protein-gr./day 37 61.7 46 76.7 40 66.7 60

Animal 8 1114.3 7 100.0 7 100.0 7

Pulses 12 120.0 11 111.0 ) 10

Other 17 39.5 30 69.8 ) 43

/_3___ o A P 5f '7 OA A1i o ,FVa' -gr./da 36v I572 1°. .4

Sources: 1958 - Sebrell and Coll, "Appraisal of Nutrition in Haiti". TheAmerican Journal of Clinical Nutrition, September-OctoDer, 1959.

1968 - FAD estimate.

1970 - Beghin, Fougere and King, Food and Nutrition in Haiti,Presses Universitaires de France, 1970.

Latin kmerican Standard - Man Land and Food, US Department ofAgriculture, Economic Research Service, November 1963.

Table 1.5: PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF MORTAIITY, 1970

Total O - 14 Years 15 and +

Absolute % Absolute % Absolute %

infectuous and ParasiticDiseases 857. 26.1 597 34.3 260 16.7

Heart and CirculatoryConditions 276 8.5 26 1.5 252 16.2

Nutritional Deficiencies 336 10.3 280 16.2 56 3.6

Conditions of theRespiratory, Digestiveand Intestinal Systans 4,5(5 - 7.5 773 44.7 79Z 50.8

Other Known Causes 253 7.C 55 3.1 198 12.7

Total Known Causes 3,20 100.0 1,731 100.0 1,558 100.0

Source: Ministry of Public Health from statistics furnished by hospitals only.

Table 1.6: POPULATION PfDJECTIONS

( t"Aousardo andA percent)

1970 1975 1980

Population 0 ropulati ton opulau Jr, a

Both Sexes0-14 1,862 38.26 2,065 38.25 2,290 3b.2415-44 2,232 45.66 2,476 45.86 2,745 45.8445-64 513 10.54 569 10.54 632 10.L)465 - 260 5.34 289 5.35 321 5.36

Total 3,867 100.00 5,399 100.00 5,958 1(0.00

Female0-14 917 37.6115-44 1,107 45.41 1,226 45.4 1,359 45.545-64 270 11.07 ..

65 - 144 5.91 ..

To-tal 2,438 100.00 2,699 2,969

Male0-14 945 38.90 ..

15-Wi 1.125 46.32 1,250 46.21 1,386 45.>45-64 243 10.00 .. ..

65 - 116 k.78 .. .. .. ..

Tiotal 2,h29 100.00 2,700 2.999

Source: Haitian Statistical Institute.

Table 1.7: HUMAN RESOURCE STRUCTURE IN PUBLIC HEALTH, 1970

(number of professionals and rates per 10,000 inhabitants)

In All Localities Port Au Prince

No. Rate No. Rate

Doctors 332 0.68 205 6.02

Dentist io4 0.21 34 1.00

Ehgineers 3 .01 3 0.10

Nurses 415 .85 228 6.70

Obstetricians 50 0.10 24 .71

Aides 771 1.58 245 7.20

Phamacists 111 0.22

Source: Ministry of Public Health.

Table 2. 1: GROSS IDMESTIC PRODUICT BY INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN, 1960-71

(in miillions of gourcies)

(Fiscal Years Ending Sept. 30)1960 1961 1962 1963 196)4 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 (est.)

(Constant 1954/55 Factor Costs)

Agriculture 825.1 770.5 846.8 792.1 785.4 798.2 820.9 808.2 1325.6 8)48.5 850.0 90)4.5

M'[ining 24.8 25.2 27.3 23.1 26.8 23.5 22.2 19.7 22.2 34.2 30.0 35.0

Mlanufacturing 171.)4 170.7 177.2 173.5 155.5 161.4 153.3 149.8 159.3 168.3 200.0 212.0

Construction 54.9 56.0 61.3 62.7 59.3 56.7 43.i3 43.2 47.3 53.1 61.0 67.5

Electricity and Water 9.6 11.1 13.0 172.5 12.1 13.2 12.6 13.5 12.2 14.9 15.0 16.0

Transport and Communications 56.1 62.0 63.1 53.5 46.6 47.2 39.9 39.9 60.5 58.6 61.0 63.0

Trade 207.2 167.0 2-16.5 18:2.3 168.3 176.4 175.;7 159.1 I/ 168.7 168.7 178.0 18',.0

F'inance 9.3 10.5 l.0 11.1 13.1 12.5 12.7 13.1 12.3 12.7 13.5 1)4.0

Housing 143.3 i146.1 149.1 143.8 148.3 149.5 154.:? 155.7 158.6 162.3 170.5 177.0

Government 79.0 84.1 91.5 84. 9 84.7 79.9 75.2 79.9 69.4 75.0 85.0 87.5

Flersonal Services 90.5 95.4 99.6 97.9 105.0 103.9 102.7 100.8 106.2 99.9 112.5 116.0

GROSS DOMESTIC PROIDJCT 1,671.2 1,5,98.6 1,75'6.4 1,642.6 1,605.1 1,622.4 1,612.7 1,580.1 1,6)42.3 1,696.2 1,77'6.5 1,877.5

(Current Factor Cost)

GROSS DDMESTIC PRODUCT 1,598.0 1,5':6.7 1,7:33.5 1,647.8 1,750.6 1,879.9 1,965.6 1,953.8 1,992.5 2,106.8 2,23)4.7 2,517.3

Source: CONADEP, Haitian Stai-istical Institute and Mission Estimates.

Table 2.2: GRO'ofTH RATES OF GDP AT FACTOR COST B3Y INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN(percent)

Fiscal Years EndingSeptember 30__ 9_ _9- :9 3919( L91970=5 70= 1971

Agriculture 0.4 2.8 -1.65 2.3 2.8 0.2 1.2 6.4

Mining 0.2 -*55 -11.3 12.7 514.1 -12.3 5.0 16.7

Construction 2.1 -22.8 -1.4 9,.5 12 .3 L4.9 1.5 10.7

Manufac-turing -0.3 -5.0 -2.3 6.3 5.6 L8.8 4.4 6.0

Electricity and Water 7.7 .I.. 6 7.l -9.6 2,2.1 0.7 2.6 6.7

Transport & Communications 3.1 -15.5 0.( 51.,6 -3.2 4.1 5.3 ,.3

WholesalLe & Retail Commerce 2.7 -.0.7 - 9. 6,,3 0D.0 5.5 0.2 .9

Banlcing, Insurance &5 Real Estate 7.3 1.6 3.1 -6.1 -3.3 6.3 1.6 3.7

Housing 2.0 3.8 1.0 1.9 2 .3 5.1 2.7 3.8

Government 1.3 -.5.9 6. 3 -13,2 8.1 L3 - 3 1.2 2.9

PersonaL Services h. c -.1.2 -1.9 5J4 -5.9 1L2.6 1.6 3.1

Gross Domestic Product 0.5 -5.6 -2.0 3.9 3 .3 14.8 1.8 5.7

…

Source: Table 2.1

Table 2.3: STRUCTURE OF GDP BY INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN(percent)

FiLscal Years ]3ndilyg ex)tember 30-…- --- 1 - _ 199- = 39R _ 1970 1971

Agriculture 49'4 1i9.2 50.79 51.1 50.3 50.0 47.4 48.2

Min-Ing 1.5 1.4 1.I 1.2 l.4 2.0 1.7 1.9

Construction 3.3 3.5 2.7 2.7 :2.9 3.1 3.5 3.6

Manufacturing 1CI.3 9.9 9.'5 9.5 9'.7 9.9 11.4 11.3

Electricity and Water 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9

Transport & Communication 3.3 2.9 2.5' 2.5 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.4

WhoLesale & Retail Commerce 12.4 10.9 10.9 10.6 10.3 9.9 10.1 9.9

Ban'king, Insurance & Real Estate o.6 0.8 o.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7

Housing 8.6 9.2 9. 6 9.9 9.7 9.6 9.7 9.4

Government li.7 4.9 4.7 5.1 4.2 4.h 4.8 i.7

Personal Services 5.4 6.4 6.4 6.3 6.5 5.9 6.4 6.2

Gross Domestic Product 100.0 1(0.0 LOO.O 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Table 2.1

Table 3.1: BAIANCE OF PAYMENTS - CURRENT ACCOUNT

(millions of US$)

(Fiscal Years EndirLg September 30)

1960 1961 1962 1963 19614 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 19'70 1971

Exports, FOB 38.1 30.3 40.8 43.2 36.o 37.8 37.9 32.2 36.,3 36,.7 39.,0 45.7Imports, FOB 43.4 51.9 47.9 39.2 37.1 42.6 43.8 4:. 4 38,7 42,1 50, 8 60.0Tr-ade Balance -5.3 -21.6 -7.1 4.() -1.1 -14.8 -5.9 -8.2 -2.14 -5.14 -11,,8 -14.3

Receipts from Services 16.3 14.8 13.3 9.7 7.3 7.1 7.7 8.8 11.2 11.9 13,6 16.5Other Transport (2.5) (0.8) (2.5) (2.3) (1.2) (0.9) (0.9) (1.5) (1.5) (0.9) (1,0) (1.2)Travel (8.1) (8.1) (6.0) (2.1) (0.9) (1.1I) (1.7) (2.1) (4.5) (5 J4) (6.6) (8-7)Investment Income ( )()(,)(.)(.()(,)().,(01) (0,,1) (0.1)

Government, n.i.e. (3.6) (4.1) (3.8) (4.1) (3-9) (3.4) (3.7) (3-8) (3.,8) (3,,9) (4,,5) (5.0)Other Services (2.1) (1.8) (1.0) (1.2) (1-3) (1.14) (1.14) (1-4) (1.14) (],6) (1.4) (1-5)

Payments for Services 18.9 17.7 20.4 20.8 22.3 24.8 22.1 18.7 19.3 22.1 25.3 28.4Freight -and Insurance (4.0) (4.8) (5-1) (4.7) (4.9) (5.2) (4.9) (4.0) (1 .1) (5,8) (8,.4) (10.2)Other Transport (1.2) (1.0) (1.1) (1.6) (1.2) (1.5) (1.2) (1.6) (1.7) (1.3) (1.5) (1.8)Travel (3.8) (2.2) (2.7) (3.7) (4.3) (5.6) (4.9) (3.3) (3.6) (3,8) (4.3) (4.5)Investment Income (14.1) (3.4) (6.1) (4.7) (6.2) (5.2) (3.9) (3.1) (3.3) (3.4) (3.4) (3.6)GovernmenL,, n.i.e. (3.8) (3.6) (3.4) (3.6) (3.3) (5-0) (5.0) (4.4) (4.3) (5.,4) (5.0) (5.3)Other Services (2.0) (2-7) (2.0) (2.5) (2.4) (2.3) (2.2) (2.3) (2.3) (2.14) (2.7) (3.0)

Net Se:rvices -2.6 -2.9 -7.1 -11.1 -15.0 -17.7 -14.4 -9.9 -8,.1 -10,2 -11.7 -11.9

Balance on Goods and Services -7.9 -24.5 -14.2 -7.1 -16.1 -22.5 -20.3 -18.1 -10,,5 -15,.6 -23.5 -26.2

Private Transfers 2.6 2.8 4.3 o.6 3.5 4.7 12,9 13.2 8.9 10.8 15.0 14.5Receipts (6.4) (7.3) (8-3) (7.2) (8.2) (10.9) (18.9) (18.3) (14.1) (17.1) (19.8) (19.8)Payments (3.8) (4.5) (4.0) (6.6) (14.7) (6.2) (6.0) (5.1) (5.2) (6.3) (4.8) (5.3)

Govermnent Transfers 6.6 11.6 2.7 3.2 2.9 4.1 4.1 14,0 3,9 5.0 6.9 8.2Receipts (6.6) (11.9) (3.2) (3.3) (3.0) (4.1) (141) (4. o) (3.9) (5.0) (7.0) (8-3)PaymTents (-) (0.3) (°.5) (0.1) (O.1) (-- -- -) (- -) (0.1) (0.1)

Net Transfers 9.2 14.14 8.0 3.8 6.4 8.8 17,,0 17.? 1?.8 15.8 21.9 22.7

CURREN'r ACCOUNT BALANCE 2.3 -10.1 -6.2 -3.3 -9.7 -13.7 -3.3 -0.9 2.3 0.2 -1.6 -3.5

Source: National Bank of the Republic of Haiti, Customs Administration, IDIU', = I Balance of Pa:Lents Yearbooks, and Mission Estimn-tes.

Table 3.2: BALANCE OF' PAYMENTS - CAPITAL ACCOUNT

(millions of US$)

(Fiscal YEars Ending Sept. 30)

1960 1961 1962 19631 1964 1965 1966 1967 1,968 1969 19170 1971

Current Account Balance 2.3 -10.1 -6.2 -3- 3 -9.7 --13.7 -3.3 --0.9 2.3 C.2 -1,,6 -3.5

Private Direct Investment (net) 0.1 0,5 1.2 -1.47 2.o -1 1.0 1.1 1.1l- 31 6.0

Central Govt. Borrowing (net) 1.3 2,6 0.5 -O.'5 1.0 1.1 -0.8 -1.5 -0.3 -1.1 0.5 0.3IDA net) _ 0 .1 - - - - _ _IBRD (net) 0.8 0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 --0.2 -0.1 -O, 2 -0.2 -0.2

Drawings (0.8) (0.5) (0,2) (0.1) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)Repayments (-) (0.2) (0.4) (0.4) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (0,,2) (0.2)

US Govermnent (net) o.6 2.1 1.1 -0.2° 1.7 1.7 -0.1 -°0.3 -D.1 0.1 -O,14 -0.7Draw:ings (0.7) (2 4) (1.5) (, - - - - - -Repayments (0.1) (.-) (0.4) (0.3) (-) (-) (0.3) (0.5) (D.2) (-) (0.6) (0-7)Capitalized Interest (-) (-) (-) (0.1) (1-7) (1.7) (0.2) (0.2) (O.1) (0.1) (0.2) (-)

Other -0.1 -0,1 -0.4 -0. -0.7 -0.4 -0.5 --1.0 -D.1 -1.0 1,,1 1.2

Public Agency X3orrovring (net) - - - 0. 0.3 0.7 0.3 - D.8 2_. 1.5 2.0IDB (net) - - - 0.- 0.3 0 .7 01.2 0, 2.0

Drawings (-) (-) (-) (0.3) (0.3) 0.7 (0.5) (0.2) (1.0) (1-4) (O.8) (2.3)Repayments (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (C).2) (0.2) (0-3)

Other (net) - - - - - - - - 1.3 0.9

Errors and Omissions 1/ -1.1 10,1 -0.3 -0.3 4.9 8.9 4.6 --1.0 -4.3 -2.5 0.4 2.2

SDR Allocations - - - - - - - - - - 2.5 2.0

Changes in Reserves (-increase) -2.6 -3.1 4.8 2.' 0.7 2.0 -0.8 2.3 0.4 -o.8 -6.4 -9.0National Bank -2 .9 -2, J 1.2 -0. 3 2, 3 -] - TTCommercial Banks 0. 3 -0.3 - IL -0.7 0.8 -0.5 - -O.4 0).3 -0.1 -0.8

1/ Includes private short-term capital (-increase in assets) and transactions it,h internat-ional organiqations.

Sources: National Bank of the Republic of Haiti, IMF, D-IF Balance of P ymenti Yearbooks and 14ission Estimates.

Table 3.3: MERCHANDISE EXPORTS

(Volume for perfume essence oils in thousand kilo; other items in million kilos; unit value in U.S. $ per kilo and value in millions of US$)

(Fiscal Years Erding Sept. 30) (Eleven Mlonths)

15950 1955 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1L967 1968 1969 1970 1970 1971

Cof'feeVolume 26.2 19.6 28.2 16,7 32.6 26.4 22.5 22.6 24.4 16.9 19.5 18.6 16.1 15.6 21.1UTnit Value .78 1.1'1 .72 .72 .63 .64 .78 . 86 .85 .81 .75 .74 .94 .94 .88ValuIm 20.5 23.0 20.2 12.1 20.7 16.8 ]7.6 19.4 20.7 :13.7 14.6 13.7 15.2 11.6 18.1

SisalVolune 3314 31.2 24.3 19.3 13.3 18.5 17.2 14.9 17.7 11.9 14.5 20.5 16.6 15.3 7.'9Unit Value .28 .17 .18 .18 .17 .20 .22 .17 .13 .12 .11 .12 .11 .11 .10Value 9.3 5.1 4.5 '3.4 2.3 3.8 3.8 2.5 2.3 1.4 1.6 2.5 1.8 1.7 0.8

Volume 31-3 16.1 33.1 10.7 16.8 19.1 14.7 23.2 29.0 32.1 24.1 16.9 18.0 15.4 19.1.

Unit Value .10 .08 .12 .11 .10 .11 13.3 .10 .10 .12 .13 .13 .14 .14 .15Value 3.0 1.3 3.9 1X.5 1.7 5.5 2.0 2.4 2.8 4.0 3.1 2.2 2.5 2.2 2.9

Baux iteVoluB e x e417.7 356?2.9 424.5 495.9 157.7 427.7 412.0 316.o 469.9 728.8 648.5 628.5 681.1Unit Value .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .(1 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .:01Value - 3.4 2.?9 3.5 4.9 3.9 3.9 3.6 2.8 4.1 6.2 5.6 ,;.5 56.9

Essential OilsVoiune 8814.7 125.8 105.6 165.5 187.0 118.5 114.2 166.1 226.9 236.2 342.5 306.3 206.0 177.2 349.6Unit Value 7.27 8.71 11.36 9.06 8.02 9.28 7.00 7.21 7.93 9.13 7.88 9.79 12.33 12.28 7.81ValueR 0.6 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.1 .8 1.2 1.8 2.7 2.7 3.0C 2.5 2.2 2.7

Copj)er OreVolwne - - - 7.5 18. 12.4 15.0 10.2 9.8 7.3 4.4 56.5 4.8 3.7 5.0Unit Value .13 .17 .20 .20 .23 .20 .21 .27 .25 .24 .25 .20Value - _ - 1.0 3.2 2.5 3.0 2.4 2.0 1.7 1.2 1.65 1.2 (.9 1.0

OtharErts (Value) '.1 4.:l 4.9 .4.9 7.9 8.6 4.9 6. 0 4.5 5.7 8.9 7.6 10.2 8.7 11.5

Tot; Exports (Value) 38.5 34.9 38.1 30.3 40.8 43.2 36.0 37.8 37.7 32.0 36.2 36.7 39.0 3'.8 43.2

Source: National Bank of the Republic of Haiti, Customs Admsinistration and Haitian Statistical Institute.

Table 3.h: FOREIGN EXCHANGE RECEIPTS FROM TOURISM

(in millions of U.S. dollars)

Fiscal Years ending September 30AA A7 'i o -i ,o 1070 1971

£71'/-/I-' LJ7I L

Net foreign exchange receipts -3.2 -1.2 0.9 1.6 2.3 4.2

Credit 1.7 2.1 L.5 5.4 6.6 8.7LE:qe nd4i+uUr e-I by torits-£JJ4~I1U.. UI ~ .J U'JtA.L .L. VD

arriving by plane(staying inH2aiti 'or fi-ve lays on tluheaverage) 1.3 1.6 3.8 5.0 6.1 7.9

J2,-pendiLu.L byL,U L) uri.sL s

arriving by boat(staying forone-hall day on the avaragaj 0.I 0.5 0.? o.L 0.5 0.8

INUJIILAUr of tourists darriving by

plane (thousand persons) 10.2 12.0 20.5 26.9 31.6 h1.6Nurnue or uf turIts arriving by

boat (thousand persons) 25.3 31.7 35.7 22.1 27.9 39.8

Debit 4.9 3.3 3.6 3.8 L.3 .5Haitians traveling u.7 0U.7 0.9 1.0Haitians studying abroad I.2 2.6 2.7 2.9 3.h 3.5

Sources: National Bank of the R-3public of Haiti; and National Office of Tourismand Public Relations.

Table 3.5: EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES OF LIGHT MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS

(in millions of US dollars)

Calendar Years 9 Months1967 1968 1969 1970 1970 1971

Total 3.2 6.1 8.1 11.1 8.0 10.8

Products Made of Domestic Materials 1.0 2.1 2.4 3.1 2.4 2.4Leather Manufactures 0.1 - 0.2 0T 0.2 0.2Wood Manufactures 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1Twine and Manufactures of Textile Fiber 0.4 1.4 1.2 1.8 1.7 1.6Arti'cles Made frum Textles 0.2 o.4 0.3Mats and Matting 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 - -

Works of ^it - - 0.2 0.1 0.1 -

Brooms, Brushes, etc. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2

Products Made of Imnported Materials 2.2 4.o 5.7 8.o 5.6 8.4Cotton Fabrics - 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1Ribbons and Lace 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1Appliance Parts - - - 0.1 0.1 0.2Transformers, Switchgears, etc. - 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.5Radio and Television Apparatus - - 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2Travel Goods and Handbags u.3 0.4 0.6 - - 0.1Clothing and Clothing Accessories o.4 0.9 1.3 1.8 1.1 1.4Foot,wear 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.8 1.3 1.8Sound Recorders - - - 0.1 0.1 0.iTnvs and Ghristmas l)eeorations - - 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3Sporting Goods 0.7 1.3 2.1 3.3 2.4 3.4Costume Jewelry - 0.2 - - - -

Source: US Department of Commerce.

Table 3.6: FOREIGN EXCHANIGE RESERVES

(in millions of U.S. dollars)

Septerber 30; 5 1966 1967 1968 1L969 1970 1971

Bankng sytem (net) -.147 -3.9 -6.2 -6.6 -5.8 0.6 9.6

National Bank (net) --.h3 -4(° -63 -37.1 -6.0 0.3 8.5Assets 2.0 1.T7 1.,3 73.1 3.9 9.7

Gold (0.7) (0.L) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)IMF gold tranche position (--) (--) (---) (.-) (__) (__) (1.9)Special drawing rights (--) (--) (---) (--) (--) (0.1) (1.1)Foreign currency holdings (,0.5) (0.5) (0.2) (0.5) (0.2) (0.4) (1.3)Deposits (0.°5) (0.14) (0.3) (0.9) (1.6) (2.7) (1.0)Iteims in transit (,0.3) (0.'7) (0,.7) (:1.0) (1.2) (0.6) (1-3)

Contractual liabilities *-6.3 -5.'7 -7.O -6.3 -5.9 -3.4 -1.2To foreign banks (--1.9) (-0.3) (-I-) (-0.2) (-0.2) (-0.5) (_-)Use of Fund resources (-14.14) (-5.14) (-7.0) (-6 i) (-5.7) (-2.9) (-1.2)

Payments arrears -- -- o0.6 -.3.3 -3.2 -0.3 __Commercial arrears (--) (--) (-0.5) (-2.1) (-0.9) (-0.3) (--)Extiernal public debt arrears (--) (--) (-0.1) (-1.2) (-2.3) (--) (--)

Ot:her banks (net) -0.4 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.3 1. 1Assets -. 0.1 O.i 0.27 1.1Liabilities -0.5 __ _. __ __-- --

Source: National Bank of the Republic of Haiti.

Table 3.7 COMPOSITION OF IMPORTS, c.i.f.

(In millions of U.S. dollars)

-~~~Fiscal Years ending September 30

_ 19_3 1964_-1965 1966 1967 15bd l6 9 17M71

A. Economic Classification

Total Imports 43.8 42.0 47.7 48.6 44.3 42.8 47.8 59.1Nondurable consumer goods 12.6 13iT I. T7 T1Th Tj l .O 19i-.6

Foodstuffs (8.1) (8.4) (9.2) (9.2) (9.1) (9.1) (9.4) (11.7)Beverages and tobaccoproducts (1.1) (1.1) (1.2) (1.0) (1.4) (1.0) (1.2) (2.0)

Chemical and pharma-ceutical products (2.8) (3.1) (4.0) (3.8) (3.6) (3.8) (3.3) (4.1)

Other (0.6) (1.0) (1.1) (0.5) (1.1) (0.4) (1.1) (1.8)Consumer durables ll.4 9.L 9.5 9.1 9.5 9.3 9.9 1.8Combustibles and

lubricants 2.1 2.6 1.6 1.8 1.7 2.5 2.7 3.3Raw materials 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.8 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.4Construction materials 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 2.8Capital goods 4.3 3.8 3.4 4.0 3.6 3.1 4.1 6.9for aericulture (0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1) (--) (--) (0.1) (0.2)for industry (1-3) (1.9) (1.6) (1.3) (1.) (1.2) (1.6) (2.9)for transnort (2.8) (1.8) (1.6) (2.6) (2.1) (1.9) (2.4) (3.8)

Other machines andequilpment 1.2 0.9 1.2 1.3 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.5

Unclassified imports 2/ 9.9 9.3 14.0 15.8 10.9 10.4 12.6 11.8

B. Tax Classification

Total Imports 43.8 42.0 47.7 48.6 44.3 42.8 47.8 59.1RPrnrdre hv uiQtoms R6.0 -- ,59 37A 7 6.0 17.9 1T.6 =. o :77

Dutiable (28.0) (27.9) (27.7) (26.9) (30.1) (25.9) (28.3) (39.2)Thitv-free (8.0) (8.0) (9.4) (9.1) (7.8) (9.7) (9.7) (15.7)

Not recorded by customs 7.8 6.1 10.6 12.6 6.4 7.2 9.8 4.2

Soul Ir n lOeneral GusQtnoms Adiminicstrat+.ion; 1Nstionna1 Rank nof tho R-mblih- nf' H-ai+fi :and-

mission estimates.

1/ Estimates.

2/ Includes imports not recorded by customs.

Table L.1 * MAI I

EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEUT OUTSTANUING AS UF SEPTEMBER 10, 1971

DEBT RIPAYASLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY

IN THOUSANDS Of U.S. DOULLARS

OLBT UUTSTANUIN(i SEPTEMBER 30, 1971

CRLOITUR COUNTRY UNDLS-TYPE OF CREDITOR DISdURSLD BURSED TUTAL

RANitL d0U -bG

ULNMANY i. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-11ACHMANY (F Lu.Lr.UFt) '; As

UNiTLU KINGU'iUM (Ul -

SUPPLILRb led24 - o24

LUt A 4 UUU - 4,UJQPRIVATLLY eLACED DUNUS 4'.000 4,000

I 1 rU 14. ~ 1431 0U A - 3Qu

LOANS FRUM INTL* ORGANIZATIONS 49' 493

CAi AUA , j U - IJ iuu

USM '0;011 - ),!

LUANS FRUM GOVERNMLNTS 3UQ911 - )i911

TUTAL EXTLRNAL PUULLC DEBT I) 37p228 37P226

NUTLI DEbT WITH A MATURITY OF OVER UNE YEAR

1) INCLUDLS PRINCIPAL IN ARREARS! AMUUNT6EXHAt'Y tFLUoKLeoUt) f

i T ~ ~ 1 UN .iLLU .\ . NUUUMUSA

SUhPI.Pi TLR 320

LiJti A 4, UUUPRIVATELY PLACLU BUNDS 4*OO0

uSM 1.LOANS FRUM GOVERNMLNTS 77U

TOTAL 5DU90

ECONOMIC ANU SOCIAL OATA DIVISIUNECUNUMIC PROGRAM DLPARTMENT

FEBRUARY 7, 1972

Tab:1e 4.2 - HAITI

PAS'T TRANSACTIONS AND EST1MATED FUTURE SERVICE PAYMENTS ON

EXTERNAL PUBLIC DLET AS OF SEPTREMBER )O, 1971Z!

OE13T REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY

IN THOUSANDS Clt UeS. DOLLARS

TCITAL PAGE: 1

DEB;T OUTSTANDING TRANSACTIONS DURING PIERIODBIEGINNING OF P'ERIOD CLATNICL

LA TION SDISBUIRSED INCLUDING COMMIr DISBURSE SERVICIE PAIYMENTS ADJUSTo

YEAIR ONLY IJNDISBURSEI) MENTS MENTIS PRINCIPAL. INTEREST TOTAL MENTS(C) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

196 7 38a007 38,007 610 I610 952 129 1.081 I196El 37.665 37.*665 40 40 292 6W4 35619-691 37J413 37,413 2,340 1,350 284 113 397197CI 38,479 39,4 6 168 1,.068 Io188i 403 1 '5911971 38,359 38,459 540 140 h2761,2 1:333 *5.090

1972, 32' 138 32' 13&/ - - 1,,6291 105 17r33 -2p 3O019731 268209 28 i209 1,,336 e82 1,418 -

i 97A 26.874 26 i87 4 - *1,675 7 1#742 -1975 25.199 25,199 - _ 1,72t6 52 1 7r78 8:I976, 23.474 23.474 P 1.655 405 2,060 -1977 21P819 21 819 e $ 1,085 737 .18211978 201735 20.73 - _ 1,11 7101 1,8151 9791 190621 19 621 Io 1147 6162 1,8509 91 980 1 8 475 18,475 - 1.235 621 1856 61981 17,24 10- 7 24 - -I1.312 57r7 1,889 -1982 15.929 2 9 15.92 1,277 532 1 lB09it983 14.652 14.65,2 - 1 326 4137 1 B 13 -1 98 4 13J326 13o326 3 - 1.37:3 4 40 1 .813 -1985 11.954 11 ,9514 1.421 392 1it13 -:1986 10).533 10J533 I - 1,471 3 42 19813

SEE FOOTNOTE3 AT END OF TABIES

Table 4.2 - HAITI

PAST TRANSACTIONS AND ESTIMATFD FUTURE SERVICE PAYMENTS ON

EKTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT AS OF SEPTEMBER RO, 1971

DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY

IN THOUSANDS OF UsS. DOLLAR:S PAGEE 2

S;UPPLIEIRS

DEBT OUJTSTANDING TRANSACTIONS DURING PERIODBEGINNING OF PERIOD CANCEL-

DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMITI DISBURSE- SERVICE PAYMENTS ADJUST-

YEAR ONLY LINDISBUIRSECI MIENTS MIENTS PRINCIPAL INlTEREST TOTAL MENTS(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)1 (:6) (U) (8)

1967 2,97'5 2,975 ' - 377 76 453 31.968 2'5913 2,598 ' - 97 21 118196 9 2#501 2#5U1 - - 59 - 591,970 2#442 2P44i _ 313 6,0 3,73 1.971 2, 129 2,129 - - 30 48 3153 -320

1.972 1s504 1,501 - 404 42 446 61 973 1,100 1 100 -U 300 311 31311I974 8010 80( ' - 30CI 2 3'1221.975 500 50( - - 30C' 13 313 31L976 2010 20() - 20C0 5 20 -5

Table 4.2 - HAII'I

PAST TRANSAC'IONS AND ESTIMATED F'UTURE SERVICE PAYMETS ON

E XTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT AS OF SEPTnMBER 30, 1971

DEBT FREPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY

IN TrHOUSANDS OF U.*S. DOLLARS PAGE 3

PRIVATELY PLACED BONDS

DEtlT OUTSTANDING TRANSACTIONS DURING PERIODBEGINNING OF fPERIOD CANCEL

L.AT IONS'

DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMITU DISiBURSEf SERVICE PAYMIENTS ADJUISTOYEAR ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS PFRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL HENTS

(1i) (2), (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (e)

1 967 44' O0CI 4O 000 - -19613 A4,000 41I0Ao e U

1 960 1 OCIO tip 000 ' ' r

1 9 70 l. " CI O 410 u O4o - -n -1971 4AOco 0i 000 0 ' ' *4'°°

1 97:2 ' - -2

Table 4.2 - HAITI

PAST TRANSACTIONS AND ESTIMATED FUTURE SERVICE PFAYMENTS ON

EXTE-RNAL PUBLIC DEBT AS OF SEPTEWBER IO, 1971

DE:BT REPAYABLE IN FOREIIGN CURRENCY

IN THOUSANOS OF UsSii OCILLARS PAGE hLOANS FROM INTL, ORGANIZATIONS

IBRO

DE13T OUTSTANDING TRANSACrIONS DURIING fPERIOOBEG;INNING OF PERIOO CCANCEL-

IL AT I ON S'DISBURSED INCLUUING COMMIT- DISBURSEs SERVICE PAYMENTS AOJUSTYEAtR ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS 1MEN TS PRINCIPAL IiTEREST TOCTAL MENTS(I1) (2) (3) (4) (5) C6) (7) (81)1967 I 1 216 1 126 - , 205 50 2551 9 613 921 9 2 1 - 72 40 1121 969 84 9 649 - 225 40 26519 70 624 624 - - 235 30 265 -197:1 3819 389 - 246 13 259

197:2 14,3 143 - - 143 5 148 -

Table 4.2 -- HAITI

PAST TRANSACTIONS AND ESTIMATED FUTIURE SERVICE PAYMENTS ON

EXTIERNAL PUBLIC OE8T AS OF S3P$TEMBER I0, 15971

DE'BT REPiAYAEILE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY

IN THOUSANDS OF UsSo DOLLARS ?AGS 5

L.OANS FROM INTLs ORGANIZATIONSIDA

OEBT OUTSTANDING TRANSACTIONS OURING fPERIOOBEGINNING OF PERIOD A ANC:EL-

LATIONSmDISBURSED INCLUIDINGi COM M ITo DISBURSE- SERVICE PAYMENTS AOJUST-

YEAR ONLY UNDISBURSED MENITS IMENIrS PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOlTAL NENTS(1) (2) (3), (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

1967 3150 30 ' - - 3 31968 350 350 - 3 3 -1969 350 3i - - 3 3 -1970 3150 3 -0 3 31971 3150 3iO ' '1 1

1972 350 350 * 2 3 41973 348 348 - - 4 3 61974 3145 34 5 - - 4 3 6 -1975 341 341 4 3 6 -1976 338 33B -3 4 3 61977 3:14 3314 - - 4 3 61978 331 3311 - 4 2 61979 3;27 327 - - 4 2 61980 32?4 3 24 - - 4 2 6 -1981 320 320 - - 4 2 61982 317 317 - - 7 2 91983 310 310 t 11 2 131 -1984 299 2$9 S , 11 2 1311985 289 289 * - 11 2 1311986 2.78 ?7'8 - * 11 2 13

Tab-Le 4.2 - HAITI

FIAST TRANSACT'ION'S ANI) ESTIMATED FUTURE SERVICE PAYMENTS ON

EXTE-RNAL PUBL IC DEBT AS OF SEPTENBIER RO, 1971

DEBT REPiAYAEILE IN FOREIGN CURRENiCY

IN THOUJSANIDS OF IJ.SS DOLLAIRS PAGE 6

LOANS FROM INTL. ORGANIZATIONS

DE13T OUTSTANDING T'RANSACrIOaNS OURING F'ERIODBEGINNING OF PERIOD CANCELO

ILATIONS-oDISBURSEO INCLUDINGI COMMIT- DISBURSE- SERVICE PAYMENTS ADJUST-YEAR ONLY UNOISBlJRSED M4ENTS I4ENTlS PRINCIPAL INTER'EST T CTAL MENTS(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) C7') (1)

1967 I 476 Itp476 - 205 53 25819 68 1i271 ils271 - 72 43 1151 9619 1*1I99 IJ199 - . 225 43 2681970 97'4 974 - 235 33 2681971 7'19 739 - . 246 14 260

197:2 493 493 - - 145 7 1521973 34 8 3M6 4 - 4 3 619Y74 345 345 - a 4 3 6 -197'5 34 1 341 - a 4 3 619 75 3118 33 8 - 4 3 6 a1977 3314 334 - a 4 3 6 a1978I 3311 331 - - 4 2 61979 327 327 - a 4 2 6 a19 8itB 324 324 - a 4 2 6 a1 98 I 320 320 - 4 2 6198,2 317 317 a - 7 2 91983 310 310 - - 11 2 13 a198 4 299 299 11 2 13 a198'5 269 2d9 i - 11 2 13 -19815 278 276 - a 1 2 13

Table 4.2 - HAITI

PAST TRANSACTIONS AND ESTIMkTED FUTuRE SERVICE PAYMENTS ON

EXTERNAL FPUBLIC IDEdlr AS OF vP'B,MR 8O, 1971

DIEBT REPAYAIBLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY

IN THOUSAINDS OF U.S. DOLLARS ?AGv q

LOANS FROM INT'L. ORGANIZATIONSIDA

DEBT OUTSTANDING TRANISACTIO1NS DURING PERIODBEGINNING OF PERIOD CANCEL'LATIONS#DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT' DISBURSE' SERVICE F'AYMENTS AOJlUST-YEAR ONLY UNDISBURSE.0 IMENlrS MENTS PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL MENTS(l) (2) (3) (4 c) (5) (6), (7) (8)

1967 3150 350 - 3 31968 350 350 . _ , 3 31 969 350 35i0 - - - 3 3 -1970 350 350 - - a 3 3 -1971 3350 350 0 - I I

1972 35'0 350 ' 2 3 4 a1973 3 48 348 4 ft 3 6 01974 3415 345 - 0 4 3 6 019715 341 341 a - 4 3 6 01976 338 338 r 4 3 61977 334 334 0 ' 4 3 6197t9 3'3 1 331 a - 4 2 61979 327 327 4 - 2 61980 324 324 4 -t 2 61981 3 20 320 4 - 4 2 6 01982 317 317 0 - 7 2 91983 310 310 a o 11 2 131 98 4 2919 299 t 11 2 131985 289 289 ' 11 2 131986 278 278 a - 11 2 13 0

Table 4.2 - HAII'I

PAST TRANSACTIONS AND ESI'IMAIED FUTUFE SERVICE PAYMENTS )N

EXTERNAL PUJBLIC DEBT AS OF SE!1TEBER 30, 1971

DEBT REPAiYABLE IN F-OREIGN CUFRRENCY

IN 'THOLUSANDS OF U*Ss DOLLARS PAGE 6

LOANS FFtOM INTL. ORGANIZATIONS

DEEBT OUTSTANDING TRANSACTlIONS DURING F'ERIODIBEGINNING OF PERIOD CANCEL-

lATIONSP

DISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- SERVICE PAYMENTS ADJUST-YEAR ONLY UNDISBURSED M4ENTS MENI'S PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL MENTS

(IL) (2) (3) (4) (4) (6) (7) C I)

1967 I1*476 ILP476 ' - 205 53 258 -

196B 1*271 IL,271 - - 72 43 1151969 '1199 1,199 - - 225 43 268 -

1970 9714 974 - - 235 33 268 -

1971 739 7319 - - 246 14 260

1972 493 493 ' - 145 7 1521973 3 48 3418 - 4 3 6

1974 3 45 345 ' 4 3 6 -

1975 3 41 341 - a 4 3 6 -

1976 33) 36 -* 4 3 61977 334 334 - 4 3 6 -

1978 331 331 - 4 2 di 1979 3:27 3;27 - * 4 2 6i1980 3:24 324 ' * 4 2 61981 320 320 ' * 4 2 -6i

1982 317 317 ' 7 2 9 -

1983 310 310 -l1 2 13l1984 2 9 299 - 'Li 2 13 l

1985 299 269 - .3I 2 13 -

1986 278 216 - U 2 13

Table 4 .2 - HAIT:

PLST TRAN'SACTIONS AND ESTNA7T]MD FIJTURE SERVICE PAYMENTS ON

EXTERNAL PUi3LIC DEBT AkS OF SErTEMBER 30, 1971

DEBT REPAYABLE IN FCIREIGN iCURRENCY

IN THOUSANDS OIV U.S. DOLLARS 'AGE 7

LOANS FROM GOVERNMENTSCANADA

DEBT OUTSTANDING TRANSACTIONS DURINCi PERIOIDBE GINNING OIF PERIOD

CANCEL-LA TIONSoD'IS8URSEO INCLUDING COMMIT* OISBURSE- SERVICE PAYMENTS AOJUSif*'YEAFt ONLY' U1NDISi8URSED MENTS MENTS PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL MENTS(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) ('7) (8)

1969 - - 2S30Q 1,310 - 70 701970 1.310 2.i300 9 S0 14O 1401 971 2o200 2.300 10D0 - -

19172 2, 300 2, 30U0 - -2, 301)

Table 4.2 - HAITI

PAST TRANSACTI:ONS AND ESTIMATIE FUTURE SERVICE PA'MENTS ON

EXTERNAL PUB3LIC DEBT iAS (F SEPTMBER 30, 1971

DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY

IN THOUSANDS OIF U*S. DOLLARS PAGEN 8

LOANS FROM 'aOVE:RNMENTSUS,A

OEBI OUTSTANDING TRANSACTIONS DURING PERIODBEGINNING OF PERIOD CANCEL-

L ATIONSoDISBURSED INCLUDING COMMIT DISEIURSE- SERVICE PAYMEN4TS ADJUST-YEAR ONLY UNDISBURSED MENTS MENTS PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL MENTS

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) t7) (a)

1967 29 556 29o556 610 610 370 3 3701968 29#796 29,796 40 40 123 1231969 29'713 29,713 4U 40 - a -1970 29'fi753 29,753 178 178 640 1710 810 01971 29#291 29,291 40 40 7 20 - 720 -770

1972 27 841 27 841 * , 1,080 55 1'135 -1973 26#761 26,761 - 1,032 49 1'081 In1974 25,729 25P729 - .1371 43 1,414 l1975 24P358 24p358 1,422 37 1 fi4591976 22'936 22P936 1,451 398 1I849 4-19 77 21*485 2 1485 _ 1'081 734 1'8151 978 20*404 20,404 - - 1,110 699 1*8091979 19,294 19,294 - - 1,143 660 1*803 0 1980 1I 8151 1 , 151 - - 1,231 619 1,8501981 16*920 16 920 -U 1,308 575 1*8831982 15*612 15,612 1,270 530 1,800 U1983 14*342 14,342 1,- 13315 485 1*800 0.1984 13,027 13,u27 -- 1362 438 1,80019d5 11*665 11,665 - 1,410 390 1J8001986 1O*255 10J 255 - - 1I460 340 1*800 -

Table 4.2 -- HAI]TI

PAST TRANSACTIONS AND ESTIMATED FUTURE 'SERVI.CE PAYNENTS ON

EXTERN,4L PUBLIC DEBT AS OF SEPI'EMBIER 3ID, 1971

DEBT REPAYA13LE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY

IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS PAGE 9

LOANS FROM GOVERNMENTS

DEBT OUTSTANDING TRANSACTIONS DURING PERIODBEGINNING OF PERIOD CANCEL,,

LATION5';DlISBURSED INCLUDINIJ COMMITO DISBURSEe1 SERVICE P'AYMENTS ADJUST'sYEAR ONLY UNDISBURSED MEN rs MENrS PRINCIPAL INTEREST T13TAL. MENTSc() (2) (3) (4) (5 (6: () (8)

1967 29*5'56 29,.556 6 10 610C 310 37 01968 29P7'96 29*796 40 40C 123 12311969 29*713 29*713 2*.340 1I,35C' - 70 7C°1970 31*063 32*05 3 176 1,,06El 6410 310 950 1971 31J491 31*591 40 140 720 7 720 -770

1972 30*1I41 30*14I1 ' I' 1*00ItO 55 1*135 -2,3001973 26*761 26*761 1,0'32 49 1.*081. -1974 25#7:29 25,72.9 ' - 1P371 43 1,p41414-1975 24* 3158 24*358 I an 1*422 37 1*45 So1976 22,936 22*936 - 4 1 398 1 *84 91977 21*4845 214 85 _ ,, 1*01 '734 1.*8151976 20* 404 20,4t)4 , 4 1*110 6S99 1 809 01979 19*294 19*2 94 - ,, 1143 S660 1,800. -1980 18*1l51 1BP 151 £ . 1,2 31 6s19 1*850 -1981 16* 920 16*920 - 1*308 575 1 88.3 -1982 15*612 15*6 I2 ' ' 1*1270 '530 1 80C 01983 14*432 1 4* 34I2 I 31 5 1485 1 80 n1984 13,0o27 13#027 - , 1*362 1438 1 800 -1985 11*665 11*665 - , 1*41I0 390 1*800 -19f86 10,255 1.25i5 - ' 1.460 340 1*800 -

T'abl e 4.2 - HAITI

PAST TIRANSACTIONS AND ESTIMATED FJTURE SERVICE PAYMEN'TS O]N

EXTE'ERNAL PUBLIC: DEET AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1971

DEBT REPAYABLE1 IN FOREIGN CURRENCY

IN THOUSANDS OF U.S,. DOLLARS PAGE 10

jvL For the -years 196 7-1972 showm on thi.s table, transactions are for f:isca'L years ended September 30. Amountsoutstanding are amounts at the beginning of the fiscal year, i.e. amounts outstanding shown on the 1967 lineare for October 1, 1966, and transactions are for the period October 1, 1966 to September 30, 1967. Startingwith 1973, data are for calendar years --Service during 1972 includes a period of 15 months, from October 1, 1971through December 31, 197'2.

,/2 Excludes arrears. (See Note below)NOTE: Includes service on all debt listed in Table 'L prepared February 7, 1972, witlh the exception of the following:

a) Loans for which repayment terras are rot available:Loan. from Canada goVerrnment $2,300

b) Principal in arrears:Suppliers $ 3.20Privately pl.aced bonds $L ,OooLoans from U.S. government $ 7'70

ECONOMIC AND 'SOCIAL DATA DIVISIONECONOMIfC PFOGRAM DEPARTM,1ENT

FEBRUARY 7, 1972

TABLE 4.3 - HA!IT

EXTEnNAL PUBLIC DEIT OUISTANDING- AS Up SEPTEI ,MBER 30, 1971

DFRT RIPAYARLE IN LOCAL CUHRLNCY

IN THOUSANUS OF U.S. UULLARS

UEBT UUTSTANDING S71TZKBEvR 30, 1971

CREDITuR CUUNTRY UNOISTYPE OF CR'D'TOR DiSbURSED BURSED TOTAL

!Do 5PD36 5#3(9 1U'415

LOANS FRUM INTL. URGANIZATIONS 5pu3b 5,379 1U415

USA 1 2 - t J124LOANS FRUM GOVLRNMENTS 5#124 .5-124

TUTAL EXTLRNAL PUbLIC DEBT 1,J160 5,379 15P539

NUTE' DLBT WITH A MATURITY OF OVER UNE YEAH

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DATA UIVISIUNECUNUHMIC PROGRAM DEPARTMENT

FEBRTARY 8, 1972

Table 14.4 - HAITI PAST TRANSACTIONS ANID ESTIMATED FUTURE SEIRVICE; PAYMENT,S

ON EXirERNAL PUBLIC DE1BT AS oF SEPTEMBER 3O, 1971/1

D1EBT REPAYABLE IN LOCAL CURRENCY

IN THOUSANDS OF UsSa DOLLARS PAGE 1

TOTAL

DEoir OUTSTANDING TRANSACTIONS DURING PERIODBIEGINNING 0F PERIOD CANCELO

LATIONS.DISBUFISED INCLUDING CcMMI iTr DISBURSE" SEIRVICE PAlYNEN4TS ADJUST-

YEAR ONLY UNOISEURSE.D MiENTS MENTS PRINCIPAL INTERE:ST TOTAL MENTS(1: (2) (3) (4) (5) C6) (7) (8)

1967 6.j025 9 9148 1,9300) 1 6 9 2Ai4 6di 312 '11968 5j.950 1.1003 802 1.8#42 206 85 291 -1969 7 J586 11.59 9 52 1p4314 231 23B 469 61970 ds'789 1,Iq420 5.i118 750 233 35,3 586 611971 9o 345 1.6. 304 6 9614 15 0 32'6 476 -621

1972 10i 16 0 15.5" 539 ' 2 003 3 El8 32'5 713 31973 11i.775 1.5. 151 1.688 4011 355 756 -1974 13tJ062 I 4 750 ' 166e6 4468 3 80 828 a197 5 141 302 1 4' 302 - - 4Af5 3 9 3 878 -1976 13. 817 1i 3.1 - ' 498 377 8751977 13 319 1,3o3:19 ° 513 3 61 874 -197 8 t2.806 12.8eu6 7 - 784 34 3 1.12? 21979 12j,022 I 2.022 2 80 3 3 2U 1.123 ,19O 1IJ 219 1.1.219 2 - 623 2 96 1I1191981 IO j 396 10.39J6 6 - 61.7 274 8a91982 9.,779 9.179 - 626 258 8 al419a3 9i13 9. 153 -' 635 2'11 8761984 8r518 8wil8 - 6415 225 R70 1v85 7. 73 7 d7 3 ' ' 655 208 863 -1986 7.218 72 18 - _ 666 16 856

Ti F TA', TR'IS ACTION' ARE, FOR F-i3(CAL 7EARS ENDE5 SEPTMEER 3. AONTSOCiT. PJ'ING ARE VMOTINTS AT THE; H.jiTJJtliOJ O;' TTE FISCAL YEAR, I.E., .AOUITS OUJTSTAITDNG SHOwN o01 TwE 1967 LINE AREFOR OCTOEBER 1, 1966, AND '2RA!15h,AeTI).!'' R,RE V T.R PF:P.EIOD Oc'CoBKR 1, -1966 TO SEK?EMBER 1O, 1967. STARiTING WITHI1973, DATA. ARE FOR 74T:NBkP),'-A1.' ?7T,7':,ip-'f'O 197? M2ORC . FET?TOD OF I' MONT,S, FROM OCTOBER 1, 1971TER)UGHi D7F(' 31. I I 97 7.

NODT: TLIf. . 2', . 2:' 'NG VT! ., i T CD,; FSBRUt19 8., 157'.

Table 4.4 - HAITI PAS' TRANSACTIONS AND ESTIMATED FUTE SERVICE PAYMENTS

ON EXTEiRNAL PUBLIC DEBT AS OF E'rEMBER 1O, 1971

DEf3T REPAYABLE IN LOCAIL CURRENCY

IN THOUSANDS COF U.S. DOLLARS PAGE 2

LOANS FROM INTL. ORGANIZATIONS18

DEBT OUTSTANDING TRANSACTIONS DURING PIERIODBEGINNI11G OF PERIIOD CANCIEL

LAT IIONS'DISfURSEI3 INCLUDING COMMITr DISBURSE SERVICE PAYMENTS ADJUST-

YEAR ONLY lUNDISBURSEO MENTS MENTTS PRINCIPAL. INTEREST TOrAL MENTS(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

19967 1,6 668 5s59 19300 169 17' 64 237 11968 1,664 6,71i ' 1,1D40 16 6 7 2 2 3 81969 2,5313 6,551 1I 382 231i 94 .325 -1970 3,689 6,320 5J 100 772 23.3 112 .345 11971 4J227 11,186 . 958 150 157 307 621

197 2 5p036 10s415 e 2p0 3 281I 147 42B81973 6 7519 10O1 34 - 1, 3688 31 3 1830 4493 31974 8, 133 9,821 - 1,588 3 22 208 530 -1975 9,4999 9'49 9 - - 331 2;26 '557 71976 9Y16 5 9D16 6 -13 34 0 2'16 '556 -1 977 8, 828 8, 82d ' 349 205 1554 4197 8 8 479 8J479 - - 614 193 807 -16979 7* 865 7'865 a 6 6214 11 6 aO0O0.1980 7s241 7,241 - 63 6 1'56 794 4

31981 6*60'5 6605 - 42:3 143 566 -1.982 6.182 60182 - - 425 134 559 a1983 5,757 5,757 - 421 1'24 '552 aI984 50329 5,320 - - 430 115 545 -

1.985 4,899 4,699 - - 432 10D6 538 819 86 4 467 4,467 - - 435 96 531 a

Table 4.4 - HALITI PAST TRANSACTIONS AND ESTMlkTED FUTURE SERVICE PAYMENTS

ON EXTERNAL PllBLIC DEBT AS OF 3EPIEMBEi. iC), 1971

DEBT FtEPAYABLE IN LOCAM CURRENCY

IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARSPAGTE 3

LOANS FlROM GOVERNMENTSUSA - AID

DEIT OUTSTANDING TRANSACTIONS DUJRINIG PERIODBEGINNING OF FERIOD CANCEL

LATIONS SDISBURSEO INCLUDING COMMIT' DISBURSE- SEFtVICE PAYMENTS ADJUSTSYEAR ONLY UINOtSBURSED mENTS MENTS PRiNCIPAL INTERIEST TOTAL MENTS(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (l) (8)

1967' 4,317 4J357 O- 71 4 75 a'I 96E 4,#286 4o286 802 802 403 13 53I9 69S 510048 5,048 '52 52 ' 144 144 -'I970C 5,100 5,100 18 18 In 241 241971 5,.118 5118 6 6 O 169 169 -

I9 72 5.^124 5.124 - - 107 178 285 -i19731 5. 017 5.u17 - 88E 1I75 263'I Y74 4'929 4 929 126 172 29B -:1975, 4o803 4 803 154 1167 321:1976 4.649 4A649 - - 158 161 319 -t977' 4,491 4,491 - 164 156 320 -vq 7 e, A 4.327 4.327 - 10 150 32019 79 4 i 57 4o157 - - 179 144 323 -19aa 3 978 3.979 -7 IH7 136 3251981 3,791 3j,791 ' 194 131 3251982 3D597 3,597 - - 201 124 325

S1983 3.396 3.396 - - 207 117 32419E14 3 p I389 3.189 - - 215 l10 3251965 2.974 2.974 - ' 223 102 325 -1986 2ff2751 2.751 - a 231 94 325 a

ECONONIWro AND SOCIAL DATA T)IVT'5IONECONOMIC fPOGPM DEPAXTMOENT

FEmRUA.o-Y 8, 1972

Table 4.5: DEBT SERVICE RATIO 1967-1980 o(mI a.-Ions 01 UOq arni percu,iiu

Exports of DebtDebt Service Goods and Service

Year Interest Amortization P t ;! Services 2/ Ratio

(Past)

1967 0.1 1.0 1.1 L'.0 2.71968 0.1 0.3 0.4 47.5 0.81969 0.1 0.3 0.4 48.6 0.81970 0.4 1.2 1.6 52.6 3.01971 0.1 1.3 1.3 62.2 2.1

(Proieeted on Outstanding Dbbt asof September 30, 1971)

1972 0.1 1.6 1.7 65.0 2.61971 0=1 1 A 1Lh 71.0 2.0

1974 0.1 1.7 1.7 77.0 2.21975 0.1 1.7 1.8 82.0 2.21976 0.4 1.7 2.1 89.0 2.41977 0.7 1.1 1.8 96.0 1.91978 0.7 1.1 1.8 103.0 1.71970 n 7 1 1 1.8 11r.r 1.6

1980 0.6 1.2 1.9 118.0 1.6

; lalK1 4.. W-4- Repayab1

i., Exc-lu wdnian-e paymen s o-f-- *b~~~~mj4.O ~~ " S _ ~~ j . aA J...~

suppliers credit for Peligre Hydro-electric Plant.

2/ Principal Assumptionst Sugar-full quota of 30,OOOT by 1973.CoYffoe-dvoli.1e uri 4 l 1 0976 then. rising toquota of 490,000 by 1980.ru~ rists-r--ingr by 4.W,WW tourist per year.Re-exports-10% p.a.

Othe-4%p.a.

Sourc,.e: Tab.1..loes 'J1 .- A r. '2

Table 5.1: FISCAL OPERATIONS OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT(millions of gourdes)

Fiscal Years ending September 301966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971

BUDGET REVENUE 129.5 118.5 129.7 122.6 142.6 155.8Fiscal Revenue 100.0 95.7 1 99.1 1 26.1

Customs Revenue (net) ; 50.2 57.0 61.0 67.3Customsq Revenuep (arnqsw (A.7) (61.9) (71.0) !71.7) (7h.q) (81.4!lesst 7.5% to SFSPD (4.2) (4.1) (4.6) (4.8) (4.9) (5.4)

7.0% to Customs Adm. (4.7) (4.7) (4.6) (4.8) (4.6) (5.5)

coffee to SFSPD (6.0) (4.3) (4-8) (3.6) (4-0) (5.2)Internal Revenue (net) 43.0 42.2 44.2 37.8 51.7 55.7

Internal Revenue (gross) 1/ (52-5) (51-4) (54-4) (48.1) (61.2) (69.2)lesss 10% Internal Revenue Adm- (6.6) (6.6) (7.2) (7.3) (9-3) (10.1)

US$0.75 Der bae of suearfor SFSPD (2.9) (2.6) (3.0) (3.0) (3-1) (3.5)

Other Fiscal Revenue 3.2 3.4 4.2 2.7 3.5 3.1

Earmarked Revenue 29.5 22.8 24.4 23.5 26.4 29.7Special Fund for Service of Public Debt 13.1 11.0 12.5 11.5 12.5 141.1Customs Administration 44.7 4.7 4.6 4.8 4.6 5.5Internal Revenue Administration 6.6 6.6 7.2 7.2 9.3 10.1Special Provision for Development 5.1 0.5 ..

EXTRABUDGET REVENUE 34.0 37.1 54.4 75.0 83.0 107.9Non-fisra1 a 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.0 0=9 1.0Development Budget 3.8 3.2 4.5 6.1 7.9 7.8Other Special Accounts 15.9 21.9 33.0 51.9 56.9 76.41Special Sinking Funds 11.3 10.7 10.9 14.2 13.0 17.5Other Accounts 1.6 0.1 4.7 1.8 4.2 5.2

BUDGET EXPENDITURE 120.8 139.5 128.4 134.4 143.9 167.5Fiscal Expenditure 100.0 121.1 112.5 113.6 120.6 141.

Wages and Salaries 7742 70.4 76 .O 9.1 1Other Current Expenditure 12.4 17.0 17.7 20.6 23.3 27.9Transfers, Cooperative Projects

anrd Contributions to internationalorganizations 3.5 6.0 1.8 5.8 6.4 7.0

Checks of Previous Years 14.5 21.3 15.1 1.3 3.7 5.8Matching Fund -_j 2.6 4.5 9.1 6.2 6.3

Expenditure from Earmarked Revenues 20.8 18.4 15.9 20.8 23.3 26.4Special Fund for Service of Public Debt 9 T 4.3 8.5 7T 10.9(ustoms Administration 4.7 4.7 4.5 4.9 4.9 5.1Internal Revenue Admin-str_ation 6.6 6.6 7.1 7.1 8.6 10.11Special Provision for Development 4.6 1.0 -- -- --

EXTRABUDGET EXPENDIT lUl I4. 38. 56- 75-5 810.aAfltAsULEj~~~~.T Y~~iNU111J1t~~~~, Ju.L j O.( !)0. - 00. ( 100..5Non-fiscal Accounts 1.1 I.2 1.1 __B' 1.2 3.0Development Budget 8.0 7.4 4.6 5.6 8.3 8.1Other Special Accounts 16.2 19.0 31.4 54.9 60.1 79.2Special Sinking Funds 3.7 3.5 11.8 5.1 4.7 5.7Other Accounts 5.1 7.6 11.5 9.1 10.1, 12.5

Over-all Surplus/Deficit 8.3 -22.6 -0.7 -12 -3.0 -12.6Budget 8.7 -10 i) -lV -. 1.Extrabudget -0.4 -1.6 -2.0 -0.5 -1.7 -0.6

NET EXTERNAL BDRRONG -1.0 -11.7 -5.6 -6.5 6.5 -6.11Drawings 2/ 1.0 1.1 0.7 °-5 0.8Repayments -5.0 -5.1 -1.6 -1.5 -5.9 -6.14Public Debt Arrears -- -0.7 -4.7 -5.5 11.6 -

N_T INT.NAL PBOROWING 31.5 11.8 12. 1.* 1 17

Private (net) ~4 ~ 2.9 -1.7 2.0 0.4-Mbnetary Authorities (net) -3.5 28.6 13.5 10.5 0.7 8.8

Overdraft (net) (-4.0) (27.4) (-25.2) (10.11) (3-5) -12.3Loans (net) (0.5) (1.2) (38.7) (0.1) (-2.8) 21.2

CHANGES IN DEPOSITS (-increase) 3.0 -4.6 -4.6 5-. -4.3 1.0

S'rATISTCTAL DISCRRPANCY 0= 0=4 -° 9 0.9 -3 a

Source: National Bank of the Republic of Haiti.

1/ Includes also 15% of municipalities funds2/ Includes capitalization of interest

Table 5.2: 3UDGE'T R9JENUES

(m.:Llions of gourdes)

Fiscal Years End-ing Sept3m'ber 30

1962 1963 196)4 1965 1966 19657 1968 1969 1970 1971 1/

TAX REVENUES -1292 -119.8 LiL. 1 116.9 1i 108.0 120.0 , B 134.7 216.6Customs Revenue 80.6 693.6 70.6 65.6' 68.7 63.2 71.0 71.7 74.5 83.4

Import Duties ('52. 0) (4'3-1) (47,.9) (43.1) (46.0) (45.3) (51.6) (54.9) (57.6) (61.6)Coffee Export Taxes (24.9) (25 0) (16-7) ( 17.-4) (19.3) (13.5) (15.6) (13-4) (14.0) (18.8)Other Export Taxes (2 .1) (4j.3) (3.2) (1.8) (2.6) (2.2) (1.6) (1.2) (1.0)Other (1.6) (1.5) (1.7) (1.6) (1.6) (:L.8) (1.6) (1.8) (1.7) (2.0)

Incomne Tax 13.2 15.4 14.1 12.0 :LO.7 11:.4 12.9 12.,5 15.7 17.8Enterprises (3-0.6') (1-1) (11--4) (9. 9) 1(8-7) (9'3,3) (10-3) (9-5) (12-2) (14-5)Individuals (2.6) (4t.3) (2,.7) (2.:L) (2.0) (2.1) (2.6) (3.0) (3.5) (3.3)

Excise Taxes 19.4 17.5 16.5 24.2 23.3 19.9 20.1 15.2 24.6 28.1Flour (11.33) (9.9) (9.2) (11. 1) (9.8) (7.4) (6.5) (1.3) (9.9) (12.0)Sugar (0.6) ((.3) -.. (5-7) (5.9) (15.2) (6-1) (6.1) (6.2) (7.0)Cigarettes, Oil & Other (7.5) (7.3) (7.3) (7.l4) (7.6) (7.3) (7.5) (7.8) (8.5) (9.1)

Other Tax Revenues 15.9 17.3 15.,9 124.9 :L.2 13.5 16.0 16.4 19.9 17.3Developed Properties (0.8) ((.8) (0.,7) (0.14) (O0.5) (0-5) (0-.) (0.5) (0.6) (C.6)Legal Transactions (13.7-) (14.8) (13,5) (12.7) (:L2.4) (1:L.1) (12.2) (12.:1) (:13.8) (1:1.9)Other (1 .)l) (1-7) (1.7) (1.8) (1.3) (L-9) (3-4) (4-8) (5-5) (,4-8)

NON-TAX REVENUES 7.1 11.2 14.6 8. 12.6 10!.5 9 .7 6.8 7.9 9.2

TDOTAL BUDGET REVENUE 136.2 131.0 131.,7 125.z6 129.5 118.5 l2.7 12 2.6S 142.6 .8

:L/ Eisthnate basied on first 10 months.

Sources: Finance Ministry, Customs Administration, Internal Revenue Aciinistration,, National &mk of the Repub.licof Haiti and Mission Estimates.

Table 5.3: REVVElS F.PnM EXCWI TAJYS

(In +housands of gourdIn

Fisc ' Yars ending Septe-.,br301 Mnh

1967 1968 1969 1970 1970 1971

v^+1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 0 o V7 '^n I *fln rf I re,. -^,1. 41.L ,r, on , .' t.' AO. 7.? 7 r__ __ _ _ _w_ww _,_ _ _ _ _ _4 1_v

A.A4 ,...~~~..... ~~~.-..4 .-~~ -... ~7 n fV' .7 r"% -7 0,fle a efnj .7 1 fl7 '7 7(AOrdinary excise t-axes .7,0 7,538 7,819- 8,50 7,25 V.7,700L II

Alcohol derived fromsugarcane 3Qr 33822

Alcohol derived fromothLer sbstics -- -- an -e

Liquor 160 226 241 335 293 322'w -eI 01 91 wLO 1r6 15 r% 2 w

VY±L ie iL-iL .LV LUU ±;P0 ±4V LOU

Stamp duty on alcohol 388 382 415 474 404 440ool t Ur lnks 32_35 7457 43 0Cigars 4 1 2 2 2 ICigarettes 2,66-4 2,681 2,771 3,138 2,7h1 2,861Processed tobacco 1 1 1 1 1 --

Edible oil 1,157 1,172 1,243 1,225 1,036 1,i92Lard 172 139 144 176 1h2 172Luxury foodstuffs 542 509 559 628 529 616Soap 776 825 715 660 538 579Textiles 42h 446 395 446 369 299Shoes 4 19 30 28 17 24Aluminum products 15 48 53 23 22 --Propane gas 40 39 32 46 38 25Others 184 212 220 203 185 126

Flour excise tax andearmarked excise tax 12,634 12,562 7,33 16,143 13,339 15,770

Flour 7,424 6 ,407 1,250 9,956 t,l52 9,906Sugar 5,210 6,075 6,085 6,187 5,157 5,86h

Sources: Ministry of Finance; and the National Bank of the Republic of Haiti andInternal Revenue Administration.

Tab.le 5.4: COMPARISON OF TAXATION ON COFFEE

Pricet perQuintal Cos ta Dominican('h6 kg.) Rica/l Guatemala/2 Hondurasia Nicar agual Republic Salva(lor Haiti/h

(US$ per h6 kg.)

20.00 Egxoneratied 2.00 4.83 1.13 Exonerated 2.00 13.3525.,00 3.00 Ch.83 1,.13 n2.50 13.3530.00 3.75 L483 1.,13 3.00 13.3535.,00 13.25 4.75 Lh.83 1-.13 4 4.00 13.35W0,,o 2.45 6.25 h.83 1,13 5.25 13.35h45.00 h.95 7.75: I.83 1,13 n6.75 13.35

(perce,nt of price per 46 kg.)

20.00 - 10.0 A1 .2 5.7 - 10.025.00 12.0 19.3 h4.5 - 10.0 66.830.00 - 12.5 16.1 :3.8 - 10.0 h4.535.00 3.8 13.6 1L3.8 3.2 - 11.h 38.1h0.00 6.1 15.6 12.1 ;2.8 - 13.1 33.4h5.00 11.0 17.2 L0. 7 ,2.5 - 15.0 29.7

.1"Ad valorem" tax: andl advertising tax.2/ Includes taxes earmarkedl for the National Coffee Association and the N$nicipal

Development Institute.3/ Includes tax earmarked f'or the Coffee Office.';/ Tax on unwashed arabica.

Source: OAS and National Bank of the Repub:Lic of Haiti.

Table 5.5: REVENUES FRO4M COFFEE EXPORT TAXESi906-i971

Tax Fiscal Year ending September 30Rate 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971

(In 60 Kilogram bags)

Exorts of coffee 1/ 1. i57 28, 627 2,n nnn 308 16A OA2 n,0C 38 1.A!

Washed Arabica 35,000 28,000 32,000 29,253 30,275 41,320UTnwashed Arvhirn 368,967 256.627 286,500 271.712 22L,861 307,600Brokens 1,200 1,000 1,500 7,181 10,889 9,543

(In U.S.dollarsper bag) (In thousands of gourdes)

Total coffee taxes collected II 3 C]9 ,185 OA>m Ro(, :d 24,36 qc C~,:) -30,251~~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~4 - . -,~Z ±Z.24t t -' -,

Budget revenue 19,604 13,758 15,414 13,450 14,049 18.790Fiscal revenue 13,526 9,h73 10,602 9,781 9,555 12,859

Washed Arabica 3.85 (569) (455) (520) (475) (583) (795)Unwashed Arabica 7.60 (12,914) (8,982) (10,028) (9,0o6) (8,545) (11,689)Brokens 7.85 (4h) (36) (54) (260) (427) (375

Earmarked reveriue 6,078 4,284 4,81 3,668 L,494 5Special Fund for Service

of Pulbhihr Tnbt 3.00 (6;078) (28h) (Li812) (i.668) (3.962) (521L,Special budget revenue 0.40 (--) (--) (--) (--) (532) (717)

Extrabudget revenue 14, 581 10,210 11,392 10 912 11 533 11,461Coffee bonds [.00 8,206 5,711 6,339 5, 73 T532 7,135National Coffee Office 1.00 1,519 1,071 1,203 1,156 1,330 1,792International Coffee 2/ 1.1 1. 1 1 C 717

Agreem,ent .r/ 241 1,1 ,2 ,3 1596 717National Office for 21

Alphabetization 0.261,- 2,u31 1,714 1.925 2,034 1,756 473Peligre hydroelectric 2/

project 0.50 -- -- -- 616 1,127National Defense Account 0.25 -- - -- -- LL440

Source: National Bank of the Republic of Haiti.

1/ Data correspond to exprvorts on which o1udget taxes ,re collected during the year because of ti.4ing

factors these exports are slightly different from exports shown in Table 3.3. They alsodiffer--and to an even greater extent--from exports on which extrabudeet taxes are collected. nartlvbecause of a substantial time lag on these collections.

2/ These taxes have recently been lowered so that for years prior to 1971 tax revenues are calculatedat different rates.

Table 6.1: CONSOLIDATE;D STJUMMARY ACCOUNTS OF TIEBANKING SYSTEM

(millions of gourdes)

September 301966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971

Foreign Assets (Net) -19.3 -30.9 -33.2 -29.1 2.8 48.2Assets 9.1 7.5 15.0 66 21.0 447"7Liabilities -28.4 -38.4 -48.2 -45.7 -18.2 3.5

Domestic Credit 166.1 182.7 202.6 226.7 227.6 248.5National Govt. (Net) 135.5d 170.3 1l6.3 12.6 193.3IDAI (Net) -2.7 -3.9 -4.5 -0.3 3.7 5.1Other Public Sector (Net) 4.4 0.9 4.2 8.6 2.5 3.3Official Capital and

Surplus (-) 17.4 17.1 18.2 19.4 20.4 22.1Private Sector 39.9 42.4 47.1 49.0 55.7 68.5Unclassified (Net) 6.0 -0.1 2.2 1.9 3.8 -2.1Interbank Float 0.1 0.7 1.6 0.7 -0.3 2.5

TOTAL ASSETS=LIABILITIES 146.8 151.8 169.4 197.6 230.h 296.7

Long-Term Liabilitiesto Intl. Organizations 8.6 8.8 12.9 19.3 21.8 26.6

SDR Contra-entry 12.6 22.8

Liabilities to PrivateSector 138.2 143.0 156.5 178.3 196.0 247.3

Money 102.9 107.0 116.5 131.7 172.0 175.3Currency (68.5) (72.9) (78.3) (82.9) (91.1) (108.9)Demand Deposits (34-l) (34.1) (38.2) (48.8) (50.9) (66.4)

Quasi-money 35.3 36.o 40.0 46.6 54.0 72.0Savings Deposits (33.4) (34.1) (35.3) (42.2) (49.8) (67.8)Other (1.9) (1-9) (4.7) (4.4) (4.2) (4.2)

Source: National Bank of the Republic of Haiti and IMF.

Thble 6.2. qITMMARY ACMJTNTT nOF THE NATIONA.L BRNK

(millions of gourdes)

September 30

1966 1967 1968 199 1970 1971

Foreign Assets (net) -19. ' 'Assets - .7 T 12.3 e1 19.7 39.3Liabilities -. -. 9 -4.60 -182 A

LMW (net) (-26.8) (-34-9) (-30-7) (-28-3) (-14.4) (3-5)Arrears on External Debt (--) (-0.7) (-5-9) (-11.6) (--) (__)Other Arrears (-) (-0-4) (-4-.2) (-3.6) (-0.6) (--)Arrears at Private Banks (--) (-2.1) (-6.5) (-1.1) (-0.8) (--)Other (-1.6) (-0.2) (-0.6) (-1.0) (-2-4) (--)

Domestic Credit (net) 14o.o 157.1 173.0 198.2 195.6 206.3National Government (net) 135. 159.5 170.3 T.73 182.6 193.3

Overdraft (--) (27.4) (2.2) (12.7) (16.2) (3.Other Loans (145-6) (146.8) (187-1) (167.2) (184-3) (205.5)Dposits (-) (9.8) (14.4) (19.0) (13.6) (17 9) (16.1)

IDAI (net) -2.7 -3.9 -4.5 -0. 3.7 5.1Loans (6.9) (6.8) (6.3) (5.9) (5.7) (8.3)Deposits and Cash (-) (-9.6) (-10.7) (-10.8) (6.2) (2.1) (3.2)

Other Public Sector (net) 41.4 0.9 4.2 8.6 2.5 3.3CAMEP (gross) (1-7) (2.1) (6.6) (12.5) (12.6) (12.8)COCEA (gross) (--) (--) (--) (0.9) (3.5) (4.8)Other (gross) (5-3) (4.2) (3.0) (3.6) (5.6) (7-0)Deposits (-) (-2.6) (5.4) (5.4) (8.4) (19.2) (21.3)

Official Capital and Surplus (-) 17.4 17.1 18.2 19.4 20.4 22.1Private Sector 21.h 24.8 26.2 26.9 30.0 34.1TUnclass'if7id (nt =4.9 =3.9 -2.8 -7 .

Uun ILa0I±eU \Inet) ---. J - 4 ~4 7 j.!--' 4

TOLTAT. A.SE T = L 2iljtie- s 120.2 125.5 137.4 168.1 19L.1 249.1

Liabilities to Banks (net) 15.2 15.6 9.7 23.6 20.3 2o.1Currency Holdings -(-7) (C) (3- °) (° 7) 0.) 0.6)Deposits (1M-5) (16.3) (10.5) (24.7) (2i.h) (28.))Loans (-) (-) (1.0) (1.b) (1.b) (1.9) (3.2)

Long-term Liabilities toInternational Organizations 8.6 5.8 12.9 19.) 21.d 26.6

SDR Contra Ehtry -- -- -- 12.6 22.d

Liabilities to the Private Sector 96.4 101.1 114.5 125.2 1L2.4 173.6Monev 82.6 67.) 97.4 105.0 116.6 143.3

Currency in Circulation (68.5) (72.9) (78.3) (62.9) (91.1) (108.9)Demand Deposits (14.1) (14.6) (19.1) (22.1) 27.5 (34.3)

Quasi Money 13.8 13.6 17.4 20.2 23.5 30.3Savings Deposits (11.9) (11.7) (12.7) (15.9) (19.8) (26.1)Other (1.9) (1.9) (4.7) (4.3) (4.0) (4.2)

So urce; . Nvational CZ.n-L ofn the Repubulic of Hailn n.Jd ™FT

Table 6.39 SUMMARY ACCOUNTS OF PRIVATE BANKS

(millions of gourdes)

September 301966 1967 - 96 169 1970 1971

Foreion ARsats (NMt) 0G Oe 207 1 0 1. rJ 1Assets 2.7 1.1 1.3r.,ahilities -- °-01 -0.3 -0.1 -

Positievn witn Vn+AnionlBank (Net) 1603 11.3 24.3 20.1 28.6

Currency Holdings na.3 10 0.7 Reserve Deposits 14.6 16.6 11.3 25.2 21.3 29.8T^^".s (-) -- 0.6 1.0 1.6 2.0 2.0

fl~rn^a4m,estic~44~ ~ A ~I. 0 R r 9R9 1 2. 97

Private Sector 1.7h 20.9 22.1 2 34.'rT.1 -4 44,-4 (t%T-+' i7. 7.3 7.1 5.9 0 5.3

Liabilities to the PrivateS eV ctJ or 3^8 if I 7 7.S c I .1* 7

Demand Deposits 20.3 e 19.1 4262 23A4 32.1Sja .L D-mosit s 21.5 2.L4 22.6L OX. 30.0 '. 7Other -- -- -- 0.1 0.2 --

Source: National Bank of the Republic of Haiti and IMF.

Table 7.1: PRODUCTIMN OF SELECTED AGRICULTURAL O0OMMDITIES

Fiscal Years endIn Segteu4ber 30-Q#I7 - 1 1970 1I71

Coffee (thousand 60 kilo-ewnhnem CAw -ao CS cw}d 1

Sisal (thousand short tons) 27 24 19 17 17 18Cottor.n (tJ.mion-Ar 250n u4i,

gram bags) 12 9 4 5 7 12Branaas (fllior. stamL) 17 17 13 14 141Cacao (thousand metric

ton) 2. e 2.7 o 2. 2.7 29 0 1

Corn (thousand metric

Rice (thousand metrio tons) 76 77 77 83 80 81Sugarcar (thIJAcusaA n Wd mUeric

tons) 4,952 4,900 49300 4,600 4s,800 4,90oSorgs)-jum (thulwuso-nd mst-ric

tons) 187 188 189 209 210 2U1t~srs (thous^d --- a 'a- tLOnS 142 3u P 1% 1 O4%%O I4LU5AMUM aWF,r.LU bUflW/ AgeLI JP 4'

Tobacco (thousand metricto- ns)P ;,9 ;.9 2% 2. 2.2r

buIZ3 1 c V.I I. A.L7 cOPotatoes (thousand metric

Manioc (thousand metrici i ili 12L 1.L ;3°J. 4JJ

o-er ce s Nation"' -D6Mnk- of -UhM nqUpulb 'il oWL a 'To nziL. n-A.xr -l "I rAI-Ory es eNational Council for Development and Planning.

Table 7.2i DI9ThtI TTION OF RETURNS FROM CDWFPF PYPORTq

(in U.S. dollars Der 100 kilorram and ner nent)

F.o.b. Export Tans intermediaries ProducerFiscal Year Prioe Am Aount Share Amount Shsre

190 102.00 16.hO 16% 11.60 11% 746.00 63%1952 lo4.o0 16.80 16% 13.20 12% 74.00 72%1953; °108.00 17.hO 16% 17.60 16% 73.00 68Bt

... ... ... ... ... ... ... . ..

1961 R0.00 2<.82 32, 1h.18 i8% 40..0O 50%1965 84.00 26.82 32% 23.18 28% 34.00 40%1966 85.0o 26.82 329 21.18 27%1 V.00 ),,i1967 79.00 26.82 34% 20.18 25% 32.00 41%12968 74.00 2 2 36% 16.18 22% 31.00 941969 72.00 26.48 37% 17.72 24% 28.00 39%1 070 oC8 An 17 -% 2 1 .17 992 17 -1 A Oq%

Sourcest Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs; General Customs Administra-tion; andA 41w U.4+4.- TIr4-itu-e fo. r ttw m PDro^t4-io ^f l ^P4 andA r 4Produco.4fAAW *AM.W&A *A&wu .. WWAMAww A&M A8JLw

Produce.

Table 8.1t PRODUCTION OF SELECTED MINERAL AND INDUSTRIAL COMMODITIS

r LwsUl Years -- iui--ig ,ae1lniulr 301966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971

Bauxite (thousand metrictons)3/ 412.0 316.o 469.9 763.8 648.5 705.0/1

Copper vtnousand metrictons)2/ 9.8 7.3 4.4 5.9 4.8 6.0

SuwnL' (thousand short tons) 64.8 60.5 63.7 58.2 63.9 68.6---- sses (million gallons) 3.5 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.8

Cement (thousand metric tons) 37.5 38.1 40.6 51.2 62.4 70.0Cotton textiles (million

yards) 4.3 3.8 4.0 3.5 3.6 5.9Cigarettes (millions) 348.0 351.0 3i4 2.0 361.0 420.7 451.4Flour (thousand metric tons) 45.4 41.3 11.1 10.9 4.i5 54.5Soap (thousand metric tons) 5.8 5.7 5.6 4.8 4.4 7.6Cookinq oil (thousand metric

tons) 5.3 4.7 4.7 5.0 4.9 8.2Lard (thousand metric tons) 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.5Shoes (thousand pairs) 53.6 45.l 187.8-3 173.1 221.2 357.9Soft drinks (million bottles) 15.9 13.9 14.8 20.5 25.5 26.6Perfume essence oils

(thousand kilograms)2/ 226.9 286.2 342.5 306.3 206.0 380.o0

Source: National Bank of the Republic of Haiti.

1/ 'stimates based on eleven months coverage.

2/ Export data.

3/ In 1968 coverage was extended to a manufacturer who was not previously listed.

tDo C) rH 'iP aO OJ C\M r-- rH C- L- 0 l' Uo '`\\0 CMc rH C\J.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .UC 0' tN a)OO\ Cy 0 rH CO OOCUH r-l * CU -- (O (U 0 C oC) 0 OC\j:1C) r C) r Hl r- H t ' 0 0 lH H cI I r-r IH Io 0 C\j OJ C\I OJ C\J OJ C\J c 0 CM cIi

r-- O C) 0 -- C o - Co 0 rH CM 0 \'0 lr\ CM \40 lA lj A\ r-i><' ..C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-P C)c'\r-0\0tr rv\O\.\) c4 cN 0 \0 * a:>CO c0 O r- C\j t- ON_o C) r1 ._0 CC) 0ao0 a cC) a0 C\ r1r-< I I -IH C) Hr-I

OC)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C

i) 02 O)

d) C., H1 r) t, C C

0A a 8......... ... ra 4..

Ur) O 0 \ ON O\ 0 C) rH r-H rH r- 0iI ICI St X a~~~~~r- r-l r-r- ri r-l r-I rt r1Sq<i41)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~24 ~~~~~0

ON, 4.)£ .r~~~~~~~~~~~43

r-I~~ -|! 4)

'cl E~~~~~C--'0O C) L-- H -.: ON CO CM Hi 0 co \-0-:: CC aj CM C ON 4 cr \JD-e (D CU\'IOI 0 C) r-i r- 4 C)C4 o tI OJ >~ _-4 '0Ur-i 4 ri cM rH ,D

HC) O C) r-i r-H H H HHH\ I_I

*r4

.4) I.V

C) co O rHi C -J UN 9 r- a C0 r-) O or\ J Br 0 r- CO O r-i0hC') C) '.C)O'-O\O \90 NO N( QD \;) E-r-- \0 94 O0 'sDD \0 \ 99 r-- c-

*-H F- O\ ON ON ON ON ON O\O\ Ch\ O Co C\ ON CN Ch 0 c)Ch O,C r ON\ O,\Hri r-ii r H r1 r-i rHi r1HrI i ri HH r-i Hri rHH r-i rQ4 r-i f- r r-l r-i c-H

Table 10.1: SUGAR REFINING SEX&TOR: ESTIMATED FINANCIALSITUATI A'

(millions of US$, except as noted)

MA.O T PPAfTIT(M nOTZ- T,YI APT

'Z'1 es -I .~~~~A 0 0.0,rs.-.s S'^1AS 8.0 1

f,.xports 1.5 1,9 3.4,

Excise Taxes 1.3 - 1.3=.-...4- Tie4- J e O .. O 7

Tobacco Monopoly 1.3 - 1l3

-s.8^-3 After Taxes 5.1 1.5 6.6Ex or4J¶.J -OL. C -L.9 ~Domestic 3.9 - 3,9

Prnd.wtion Costs 3.0 0.8 3.5Sugar Cane - -t U.u 4 .7Wages 0.2 0.1 0.3Fuel anu other inputs O.5 0. I

Zcs 2.i 0A .-L.7

7rT-iii t/Gross Sales 2;7T% 3E7R% 2HA3T

:ro>.t/vSa1es aIter taxes U41.2 h6,7%.axes/Gross sales 36.3% 21.1% 33. 3d%--ocuetion uosts/Gross Sales 37.5% L2.i% 38..4

?ersuction (000 short tons) 55.0 13.6 68.6EIrnorts iu.o 15.oi stic 24, 2

- -xport: 6.90/lb. .Taxes 4Export: l4d/J.b.Domestic: 7.40/lb. Domestic. 3.0- /1.O

Suigarcane Price - $4.10/short ton Yield - 10%

Br.ploy2ent (man/days): HASCO -120,000, Other - 30,000, Wages - $1.50/man/day

s. lo Haitian-American Sugar Company and Mission estimates.

Table 10.2n: WONDITAON OF THE ROAD NET'3RK

(in kilometers)

Concrete or_Asphalt Stone Gravel Dirt

Rou te Good Poor Poor GJood Poor Bad Badl Total

Total 186 100 17 i6o 517 h•66 .L 1.1 %W7

ljor roads 186t 78 17 40 209 60 158 743No. 1OCI: Port-au-Princa,

Gonaives, Cap-Haitien 10jl) 66 17 -- 63 ... -_ 2SO

No0 200: Port-au-Prince,Cayes (Southern Road) 24 6 -- -- 141 60 65 196

No. 21Lht CayeEs, Jaremie(Southern Road) -- -- 30 67 _ - 97

No. 300: Port-au-Prince,Hinche, Cap-Haitien 56 _ 10 38 - 93 205

Secondary ijoads! -- 22 3 66 182 70 3)13No.i 75(: Gonai,ves, Port-de-Paix -- -- T 77

No. 11:3: Gonaives, Mo:1 St. Nicholas --- -- -- 7 70

No. 102: Croix-des-Bonquets, Saltrcu - 22 -- 3 10 105 _ 1:0No. 30)5: g Mirebalais, Belladra -dr-- -- 56 - -

ODther roads -- 117 242 224 1 43 2K O6

Souarce: National Council for Development and Planning (CONADEP), Economic, ard Social Acti-on Plan

1970-71.

+ c A T-n 4 t )REPUBLIQUE D'HAITI z + o r A

Ichelle 1.3W&CIs W _/ W ) H ) __ t < _ S8 Q' )

Organisation des GttsAmnicains A D Et S T-

, .R _ O __ _ _ _ = CS Z

C~~~~~~ ~~ ~~~~~~\I)\2iC O . .. h.. /+ / N O

D~~ftJ..0#p*h&e..~~ OA.An.#*'N - \\-/' \ ,~ 'NJ 2~

-- raL~ ~ ~~~- YAc ; - :

9. 4r Wr su oi.:e ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ E'S~~~~

-w

M E 8 0 E A N T L L E S~~~~~~~~~~~~~~