World Bank Document · 2018. 7. 12. · Ibou Diouf, Volker Treichel, Jacques Morisset, Jean-Christophe Maur ICR Team Leader: Tanangachi Ngwira ICR Primary Author: Philip English

Document of

The World Bank

Report No: ICR00004481

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-56710; IDA-56720)

ON A

SERIES OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY CREDITS

IN THE AMOUNT OF EURO 90.4 MILLION (SDR 72.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO

BURKINA FASO

AND IN THE AMOUNT OF EURO 90.4 MILLION (SDR 72.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF CÔTE D’IVOIRE

FOR THE

FIRST AND SECOND REGIONAL TRADE FACILITATION AND COMPETITIVENESS DEVELOPMENT POLICY OPERATIONS

June 26, 2018

Finance, Competitiveness and Innovation, and Transport and ICT Global Practices Africa Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective December 10, 2017)

Currency Unit = CFA Franc (CFAF)

US$1= CFAF 586.008

SDR 1.00 = US$1.38144

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 - December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AEO Authorized Economic Operator AFRITAC African Regional Technical Assistance Centre BF Burkina Faso BSTR Road Transport Monitoring Note (Bulletin de Suivi de Transport Routier) CI Côte d’Ivoire DPO Development Policy Operation DUT Single Transport Document (Document unique du transport) EU European Union GDP Gross Domestic Product ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report IFC International Finance Corporation IMF International Monetary Fund IRU World Road Transport Organization PAMOSET Transport Sector Modernization and Corridor Trade Facilitation Project (Projet de

Modernisation du Secteur du Transport et de Facilitation du Commerce en Corridor) PCA Post-clearance Audit PDO Program Development Objective PSIA Poverty and Social Impact Analysis RTFC Regional Trade Facilitation and Competitiveness TA Technical Assistance TIWP Trade Information Web Portal TTL Task Team Leader WAEMU West African Economic and Monetary Union WTO World Trade Organization

Vice President: Makhtar Diop

Country Director: Pierre Frank Laporte

Senior Global Practice Director: Ceyla Pazarbasioglu

Practice Manager: Consolate K. Rusagara

Project Task Team Leaders: Ibou Diouf, Volker Treichel, Jacques Morisset, Jean-Christophe Maur

ICR Team Leader: Tanangachi Ngwira

ICR Primary Author: Philip English

The World Bank First and Second Regional Trade Facilitation Competitivess Development Policy Credit Operations (P129282, P158333)

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BURKINA FASO AND CÔTE D’IVOIRE

First and Second Regional Trade Facilitation Competitivess Development Policy Credit Operations (P129282, P158333)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DATA SHEET .................................................................................................................................................. 2

1. PROJECT CONTEXT, DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES AND DESIGN ............................................................ 9

2. KEY FACTORS AFFECTING IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOMES ........................................................ 13

3. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES .............................................................................................................. 21

4. ASSESSMENT OF RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ........................................................................ 24

5. ASSESSMENT OF BANK AND BORROWER PERFORMANCE ................................................................. 24

6. LESSONS LEARNED .............................................................................................................................. 26

7. COMMENTS ON ISSUES RAISED BY BORROWER/IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES/PARTNERS ................. 28

ANNEX 1: BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION PROCESSES ................................. 29

ANNEX 2: SUMMARY OF BORROWER'S ICR AND/OR COMMENTS ON DRAFT ICR ............................................. 31

ANNEX 3: COMMENTS OF COFINANCIERS AND OTHER PARTNERS/STAKEHOLDERS ......................................... 35

ANNEX 4: LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS .................................................................................................... 36


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DATA SHEET

A. BASIC INFORMATION

Program 1

Country Africa Program Name: Regional Trade Facilitation and Competitiveness DPO

Program ID: P129282 L/C/TF Number(s) IDA-56710, IDA-56720

ICR Date: 04/09/2018 ICR Type: 04/09/2018

Financing Instrument: DPL Borrower REPUBLIC OF CÔTE D’IVOIRE AND BURKINA FASO

Original Total Commitment

US$100.00 Million Disbursed Amount US$95.60 Million

Implementing Agencies:

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:

Program 2

Country Africa Program Name: Second Regional Trade Facilitation Competitiveness Credit

Program ID: P158333 L/C/TF Number(s) IDA-56710, IDA-56720, IDA-59250, IDA-59260

ICR Date: 04/09/2018 ICR Type: 04/09/2018

Financing Instrument: DPL Borrower REPUBLIC OF CÔTE D'IVOIRE AND BURKINA FASO

Original Total Commitment

US$100.00 Million Disbursed Amount US$96.51 Million

Implementing Agencies:

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:

B. KEY DATES

Regional Trade Facilitation and Competitiveness DPO P129282

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s)

Concept Review: 04/09/2014 Effectiveness: BF:1 06-Nov-2015 CI: 30-Sep-2015

Appraisal: 04/30/2015 Restructuring(s): n.a. n.a.

Approval: 06/16/2015 Mid-term Review: n.a. n.a.

Closing: 12/31/2015 12/31/2015


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Second Regional Trade Facilitation Competitiveness Credit P158333

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s)

Concept Review: 03/21/2016 Effectiveness: BF:22-Dec-2016 CI: 22-Dec-2016

Appraisal: 10/27/2016 Restructuring(s): n.a. n.a.

Approval: 12/13/2016 Mid-term Review: n.a. n.a.

Closing: 12/31/2017 12/31/2017

C. RATINGS SUMMARY

C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Overall Program Rating

Outcomes Moderately Unsatisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome High

Bank Performance Moderately Unsatisfactory

Borrower Performance Moderately Unsatisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)

Overall Program Rating

Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry Moderately Unsatisfactory Government: Not Applicable

Quality of Supervision: Moderately Unsatisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies:

Not Applicable

Overall Bank Performance

Moderately Unsatisfactory Overall Borrower Performance

Moderately Unsatisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators


Implementation Performance

Indicators QAG Assessments (if any)

Rating

Potential Problem Program at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality at Entry (QEA) None

Problem Program at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality of Supervision (QSA)

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status

Satisfactory


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Implementation Performance

Indicators QAG Assessments (if any)

Rating

Potential Problem Program at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality at Entry (QEA) None

Problem Program at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality of Supervision (QSA)

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status

D. SECTOR AND THEME CODES


Original (%) Actual (%)

Major Sector (as % of total Bank financing)

Transportation

Other Transportation 70 70

Industry, Trade and Services

Other Industry, Trade and Services 30 30

Major Theme/Theme/Sub Theme (as % of total Bank financing)

Economic Policy 50 50

Trade 50 50

Trade Facilitation 50 50

Human Development and Gender 20 20

Labor Market Policy and Programs 20 20

Active Labor Market Programs 10 10

Labor Market Institutions 10 10

Private Sector Development 25 25

Business Enabling Environment 25 25

Regulation and Competition Policy 25 25

Public Sector Management 5 5

Public Administration 5 5

E-Government, incl. e-services 5 5


Original (%) Actual (%)

Major Sector (as % of total Bank financing)

Transportation

Other Transportation 45 45

Ports/Waterways 11 11

Industry, Trade and Services


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Trade 44 44

Major Theme/Theme/Sub Theme (as % of total Bank financing)

Economic Policy 50 50

Trade 50 50

Trade Facilitation 50 50

Trade Logistics 67 67

E. BANK STAFF


Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Makhtar Diop

Country Director: Pierre Frank Laporte Ousmane Diagana

Senior Global Practice Director:

Ceyla Pazarbasioglu Anabel Gonzalez

Practice Manager/Manager: Consolate K. Rusagara John F. Speakman

Task Team Leader: Jacques Morisset, Jean-Christophe Maur

Volker Treichel, Ibou Diouf


ICR Primary Author: Edward Philip English


Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Makhtar Diop

Country Director: Pierre Frank Laporte Pierre Frank Laporte

Senior Global Practice Director:

Ceyla Pazarbasioglu Anabel Gonzalez

Practice Manager/Manager: Consolate K. Rusagara Rashmi Shankar

Task Team Leader: Jacques Morisset, Jean-Christophe Maur

Jacques Morisset, Jean-Christophe Maur


ICR Primary Author: Edward Philip English

F. RESULTS FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS

Program Development Objectives (from Program Document) The program development objective (PDO) is to reduce trade transaction costs along the Abidjan-Ouagadougou corridor by supporting the implementation of the two countries' reform programs for the transport and customs sectors.

Revised Program Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The PDOs remained the same throughout the series.


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Indicator(s)


Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years


Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1: Number of formally registered transport operators under new criteria for access to the profession

Value Quantitative or Qualitative

BF: 0 CI: 0

BF: 300 CI: 3,000

BF: 5 CI: 0

Date achieved 12/13/2015 12/31/2017 12/31/2017

Comments (including % achievement)

Target 0.2% achieved. A few trucking companies were registered by the Burkinabe authorities in late 2017, but new licenses will only be issued starting in late 2018. The Ivoirians had made less progress and their commitment is somewhat in doubt. The TTLs eventually gave the authorities a grace period of 2 years to allow them time to make the transition, but unfortunately the target was not changed.

Indicator 2: Proportion of non-compliant trucks controlled at weighing stations


BF: 80 CI: 85

BF: 35 CI: 35

BF: Not available CI: 46

Date achieved 12/13/2015 12/31/2017 03/31/2018


Some progress made in Côte d’Ivoire. Available baseline data from Afrique Pesage indicate overloading at 57% in 2015, declining to 46% in the first 3 months of 2018. No comprehensive data are available for Burkina Faso. Only data for overloading 20% above authorized levels are collected. This indicates no clear trend (6.5% in 2014, 4.2% in 2015, and 5.2% in 2016).

Indicator 3: Volume of trade in Côte d' Ivoire carried under a consignment note (million tons)


CI: 3.9 million

CI: 5 million CI: Not available

Date achieved 12/13/2015 12/31/2017 12/31/2017

Comments (including %

This indicator does not appear to be appropriate. The system prevailing in 2015 was not functional and no effective change has yet been made. A new


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achievement) consignment note has been developed and utilization was scheduled to begin in 2018, but it is not yet recognized by the Burkinabe authorities. The reform supported by the DPO was mutual recognition of their respective consignment notes, so it would have been better to select an indicator to measure its actual implementation.

Indicator 4: Number of transporters and shippers registered on the virtual freight exchange in Burkina Faso


BF: 0

BF: n.a. BF: 30 transporters, or trucking companies controlling a cumulated fleet of 150 trucks (whichever is higher) and 25 shippers

BF: 25 transporters and 35 shippers

Date achieved 12/13/2015 12/31/2017 12/14/2016 12/31/2017


Since the virtual exchange is not being used, the number of registered transporters and shippers is not a good indicator of results.

Indicator 5: Percentage reduction of new vehicle prices under fleet renewal mechanism (%)


BF: 0 CI: 0

BF: 35 CI: 25

BF: 35 CI: 20

BF: 16.7 CI: 0

Date achieved 12/13/2015 12/31/2017 12/14/2016 12/31/2017


Target 48 percent achieved in Burkina Faso but no reduction achieved in Côte d’Ivoire. Authorities are waiting for the PAMOSET financing arrangements to be set up. Authorization was given for the importation of 768 trucks in Burkina Faso, of which 369 had entered by April 1, 2018, and another 150 were on their way. Some importers may be having trouble securing credit.

Indicator 6: Reduction of container delivery prices in Abidjan compared to initial FEDERMAR tariff (%)


CI: 0

CI: 25 CI: 0

Date achieved 12/13/2015 12/31/2017 12/31/2017


No reduction achieved. FEDERMAR tried to increase the tariff, but it did not become effective. The liberalization of container delivery is not yet effective. According to the TTLs, some large shippers are now able to negotiate reduced rates.

Indicator 7: Number of transport operators authorized to deliver containers in Abidjan


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CI: 30

CI: 50 CI: Still dominated by one company

Date achieved 12/13/2015 12/31/2017 12/31/2017


Little progress achieved. The process of certifying operators has been suspended pending a legal case brought by the dominant actor in this activity. According to the TTLs, the monopoly enjoyed by the stevedoring company has weakened, with some subcontracting of container delivery to third parties. However, it is not clear if this results in any reduction in the prices charged to shippers.

Indicator 8: Proportion of transactions routed in customs' red channel (%)


BF: 25 CI: 56 (2014)

BF: 10 CI: 30

BF: 70 CI: 26

Date achieved 12/13/2015 12/31/2017 12/31/2017


Target achieved in Côte d’Ivoire, although the risk-based selection system was not yet operational for transit trade. Burkina Faso appears not to have made progress. The time required to clear customs has dropped significantly from 12.7 hours in 2015 to 7.7 hours in 2017. However, it does not appear that the system of risk-based selection is working. The short time for clearance suggests that the clearance process is not being done properly.

Indicator 9: Average transit time between Abidjan and Ouagadougou (hours)


140

100 Not available

Date achieved 12/13/2015 12/31/2017 12/31/2017


It is not possible to estimate this indicator given available data.

G. RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs


No. Date ISR Archived

DO IP Actual Disbursements (USD millions)

1 12/18/2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory 95.60

H. RESTRUCTURING (IF ANY)


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1. PROJECT CONTEXT, DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES AND DESIGN

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. In 2014, Côte d’Ivoire was still recovering from over 10 years of instability, which culminated in a brief civil war in 2011. The political and security crisis ended in 2011 with the inauguration of the Government of President Alassane Ouattara and the resumption of parliamentary activities.

2. Maintaining peace and promoting reconciliation were the most important challenges in 2014. Security remained problematic and many of the root causes of the country’s violent episodes remain to be addressed, in particular the security of land tenure, questions of national identity, and high levels of youth unemployment. A reconciliation process was under way but was proceeding slowly. The Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission presented its final report in December 2014; however, this was replaced in March 2015 by a National Commission for Reconciliation and Reparation for Victims (CONARIV). In addition, a dialogue framework between the Government and the opposition was put in place. New presidential elections were scheduled for 2015, which threatened to reopen recent wounds. However, the peaceful reelection of President Ouattara in October 2015 confirmed the stabilization of the country and provided a strong sign of political continuity.

3. Meanwhile, the situation was worsening in Burkina Faso in 2014. The gradual deterioration of the political and security situation since 2011 culminated in widespread protests that led to the ouster of President Blaise Compaore in October 2014, after 27 years in power, marking a historic turning point for the country. Following these events, a transition President and Government were appointed and a National Transition Council was installed to oversee general elections, which were scheduled for October 2015. However, in September, elements of the presidential guard, loyal to the former President, conducted a coup d’état and held the transitional President for six days. Finally, they relinquished their prisoner and elections were successfully held in late November 2015. Roch Kaboré was elected in a peaceful and transparent manner and the result was not contested. While there were some political tensions between the two countries in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt, the Burkinabé and Ivorian authorities resolved the dispute diplomatically and cooperation intensified. The evolution of the political situation in both countries warranted careful monitoring, notably to ensure that the root causes of past grievances were addressed. Overall, the commitment to their respective reform agendas, notably in the areas of focus of this series of operations, and the continued collaboration at the technical level, suggested that the political risk of slippage was limited.

4. Institutional capacity remained an issue in both countries. In Burkina Faso, technical capacity was limited, notably below senior levels. The political turmoil inevitably disrupted the focus on the reform agenda. The complex nature of some reforms (for example, reform of access to the trucking profession, introduction of freight exchanges, and interconnection of customs) implied that the Governments would not have the technical capacity to implement them alone and mitigating measures were required, including leveraging ongoing technical assistance (TA) funded by other donors. In Côte d’Ivoire, capacity was stronger and there were fewer changes in personnel during the period of the regional Development Policy Operation (DPO), but institutions had been weakened by the long period of unrest. Vested interests are firmly entrenched in both countries, and institutions tend to be venues to promote personal agendas rather than policy objectives. In Côte d’Ivoire, corruption was rampant under the previous regime. The conflict exacerbated tensions between staff within institutions, often dividing them between northern


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supporters of the new President and southern supporters of the previous one. Coordination between institutions was even more problematic as key players competed for power under the new administration.

5. The macroeconomic framework of the two countries was deemed appropriate. Côte d’Ivoire was one of the fastest growing countries in the world in 2013 and 2014, due in part to the rebound effect after years of unrest, but also to the renewed investor confidence. Burkina Faso had enjoyed average growth of 6 percent per year between 2005 and 2013 due to a booming mining sector, strong cotton prices, and sound economic management. Both also had a good track record of maintaining macroeconomic stability, confirmed by the fact that they were on track under their respective International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs. The fiscal deficit averaged only 2.0 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in Burkina Faso in 2014–2015, and 2.3 percent in Côte d’Ivoire. It was projected to rise slightly in both countries but remain at or below 3.5 percent in 2016. Public debt was projected to remain below 50 percent in Côte d’Ivoire, below 35 percent in Burkina Faso, and expected to remain stable in both cases. Tables 1 and 2 show the macroeconomic framework as it appeared at the time of appraisal of the first DPO.

Table 1. Côte d’Ivoire: Selected Economic Indicators, 2013–2016

2013 2014

(estimated) 2015

(projected) 2016

(projected)

GDP growth (%) 8.7 7.9 7.9 7.7

Inflation (%) 2.6 0.4 1.2 1.5

Fiscal balance/GDP −2.3 −2.3 −3.7 −3.4

Total revenues/GDP 18.5 17.9 18.8 19.0

Total expenditures/GDP 22.1 22.0 24.6 24.4

Current/GDP 17.6 18.1 17.2 16.7

Capital/GDP 11.5 11.1 11.8 11.7

Total public debt/GDP 43.7 46.6 45.6 43.9

Source: First DPO Program Document.

Table 2. Burkina Faso: Selected Economic Indicators, 2013–2016

2013 2014

(estimated) 2015

(projected) 2016

(projected)

GDP growth (%) 6.6 4.0 5.0 6.0

Inflation (%) 0.5 −0.3 0.7 1.8

Fiscal balance/GDP −3.5 −1.8 −2.5 −3.0

Total revenues/GDP 18.5 17.3 17.3 17.9

Total expenditures/GDP 27.4 23.2 24.8 25.6

Current/GDP 13.6 14.4 14.7 14.1

Capital/GDP 13.8 8.8 10.1 11.5

Total public debt/GDP 29.3 30.6 33.1 32.8

Source: First DPO Program Document

Previous World Bank Support and Rationale for Continued Intervention

6. The Regional Trade Facilitation and Competitiveness (RTFC) budget support series was designed to complement other regional and national investment projects. The Tema-Ouagadougou-Bamako and the Abidjan-Lagos regional projects aimed at facilitating trade and reducing transport costs along those corridors. Infrastructure investments and capacity building funded by these two projects were expected


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to support the implementation of key measures under the RTFC series; in turn, the RTFC program would create an enabling environment for the transport sector reforms supported under these other corridor projects. There was also a mutually supportive relationship with the West Africa Trade Logistics Project developed by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which focused on several corridors, including Abidjan-Ouagadougou, notably regarding customs interconnection and a trade information web portal (TIWP) for Côte d’Ivoire. It was also planned that the RTFC series would be supported by World Bank TA projects in both countries.

7. The design of the RTFC program was informed by lessons learned from previous investment lending operations and various studies on the transport sector in West Africa. Among the most important lessons was that ownership by only technical staff in the Ministry of Transport is not sufficient to ensure effective implementation of reforms, many of which are politically sensitive or under the mandate of different entities (for example, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, Ministry of Interior, and customs administration). Therefore, the reform program supported by the operation focused on critical cross-cutting policy measures, including areas such as customs and the port. Moreover, the reform of transport corridors had been characterized by inertia and required better regional coordination. The nature of the RTFC series as a regional budget financing operation would ensure that the finance ministries in both countries and their bilateral commission would take a leadership role in implementing the reform program.

8. The RTFC series supported priorities in both national plans and the World Bank strategies for both countries. The Governments of Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso had comprehensive programs of reform for transport modernization and trade facilitation in their national plans. Given its landlocked status, reducing high trade and transport costs was a priority for the Government of Burkina Faso, through investment in better infrastructure as well as reforms enabling the emergence of professional and efficient transport companies. In Côte d’Ivoire, the Ministry of Transport’s strategy to improve transport and facilitate exchanges along the Abidjan-Ouagadougou corridor incorporated significant policy reforms to modernize the road transport sector. The RFTC program was consistent with the objectives of promoting economic growth and strengthening economic governance identified in both IDA country strategies

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

9. The objective of this DPO series was to reduce trade transaction costs along the Abidjan-Ouagadougou corridor by supporting the implementation of the two countries’ reform programs for the transport and customs sectors. It consisted of five pillars: (A) Professionalizing and formalizing the trucking industry; (B) Modernizing the organization of the trucking market; (C) Enhancing the competitiveness of maritime and inland gateways; (D) Improving customs clearance; and (E) Facilitating transit.

10. The PDOs and original indicators were as follows:

• Pillar A: Professionalizing and formalizing the trucking industry

o Number of formally registered transport operators under new criteria for access to the

profession


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o Proportion of non-compliant trucks controlled at weighing stations

• Pillar B: Modernizing the organization of the trucking market

o Volume of trade in Côte d’Ivoire carried under a consignment note

o Percentage reduction of new vehicle prices under the fleet renewal mechanism

• Pillar C: Enhancing the competitiveness of maritime and inland gateways

o Reduction of container delivery prices in Abidjan compared to initial FEDERMAR tariff

o Number of transport operators authorized to deliver containers in Abidjan

• Pillar D: Improving customs clearance

o Proportion of the inventory of trade procedures and regulations published on the

TIWP

o Proportion of transactions routed in customs’ red channel

o Number of internal controls planned by the customs administration

• Pillar E: Facilitating transit

o Percentage of declarations at the border submitted prior to the arrival of the truck

o Average transit time between Abidjan and Ouagadougou

1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and Reasons/Justification

11. The PDOs remained the same but a few indicators were dropped in the second year of the series. One new indicator was added. The changes are summarized in Table 3.


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Table 3. Revisions to the Set of Key Indicators

Initial Indicators Revisions and Reasons

Pillar B: Modernizing the organization of the trucking market

Added to reflect one important reform: Number of transporters and shippers registered on the virtual freight exchange in Burkina Faso

Pillar D: Improving customs clearance

Proportion of the inventory of trade procedures and regulations published on the TIWP

Dropped due to difficulty in establishing the total number of procedures and regulations

Number of internal controls planned by the customs administration

Dropped because customs was not necessarily planning to change the number of controls

Pillar E: Facilitating transit

Percentage of declarations at the border submitted prior to the arrival of the truck.

Dropped because this was not linked to any of the reforms supported by the program

1.4 Original Policy Areas Supported by the Program

12. The program supported reforms in transport, trade facilitation, and customs. It included measures to professionalize the trucking industry, as well as improve its organization, reduce overloading, and renew part of the aging fleet. In Côte d’Ivoire, liberalization of the delivery of containers within Abidjan was judged to be important to break a de facto monopoly by a freight forwarding company and create new business opportunities for the trucking industry. Trade facilitation was promoted through the adoption of a single guarantee system, mutual recognition of consignment notes, a TIWP in Côte d’Ivoire, and a single window for completing trade documentation in Burkina Faso. Customs reform involved the automation of the selection of shipments for inspection, enhanced post-clearance audit, improved internal controls, oversight of customs brokers, and the initiation of customs interconnection.

1.5 Revised Policy Areas

13. There were no significant changes. The promotion of containerization was dropped in light of the political situation in Burkina Faso, which had temporarily discouraged this traffic.

1.6 Other Significant Changes

14. Before the second DPO was approved, the team was advised that there would not be the option of a second 2-year DPO series due to the lack of sufficient national IDA resources.

2. KEY FACTORS AFFECTING IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOMES

2.1 Program Performance

15. The program proceeded roughly on schedule. The program was supported by two single tranche operations. The First and Second Regional Trade Facilitation and Competitiveness DPOs were approved subject to the implementation of the respective prior actions. All prior actions were satisfactorily met before their respective Board approvals on June 16, 2015, and December 13, 2016. This was an impressive achievement given the political instability in Burkina Faso and the challenge of coordinating timely


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completion of reforms in two different countries. The program was launched with a transitional government in Burkina Faso, while the second operation was finalized under a newly elected government. This Government was not immediately convinced of the appropriateness of some prior actions, notably the proposed tax exemption for imported trucks. However, it agreed to honor the commitment of the previous Government. The presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire in 2015 could have distracted the authorities from approving the agreed reforms, but this did not seriously delay the first operation. Meanwhile, the pressure to keep up with the other partner country may have encouraged the delivery of reforms in both countries. In the end, the two operations were successfully completed in two consecutive years.

16. Reforms supported by the program have suffered some slippage and delays in implementation. The increase in overloading sanctions was reversed soon after its implementation.2 Agreement on the modalities of a mutually recognized consignment note had yet to be reached in October 2017. The registration of trucking companies using the new criteria had not begun, nor had the fleet renewal in Côte d’Ivoire. The liberalization of container delivery in Abidjan was being blocked by the dominant incumbent. The virtual freight exchange was not being used in Burkina Faso. No progress had been made on professionalizing customs brokers in Burkina Faso or registering Authorized Economic Operators (AEOs) in Côte d’Ivoire.

Table 4. Program Key Dates and Disbursed Amounts

Operation Approval Date Effectiveness Date Disbursed Amount

(SDR, millions) Closing Date

RTFC 1 June 16, 2015 BF: November 06, 2015 CI: September 30, 2015

34.85 34.85

December 31, 2015

RTFC 2 December 13, 2016 BF: December 22, 2016 CI: December 22, 2016

35.90 35.90

December 31, 2017

Tranche # Amount (SDR, millions) Expected Release Date Actual Release Date Release

RTFC 1 BF: 34.85 CI: 34.85

BF: November 06, 2015 CI: September 30, 2015

December 2, 2015 Regular

RTFC 2 BF: 35.90 CI: 35.90

BF: December 22, 2016 CI: December 22, 2016

December 30, 2016 Regular

2 However, higher sanctions on extreme overloading came into effect in December 2017 and appeared to have virtually eliminated overloading above 40 percent by March 2018.


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Table 5: Changes to First Operation RTFC 1 Triggers for the Second Operation RTFC 2

Original Triggers in RTFC 1 New or Revised RTFC 2 Prior Actions

Pillar A

A1 - Adoption of a regulatory framework (decrees and/or ministerial order) mutually elaborated between the two countries defining (a) the training curricula for road transport company managers and truck drivers, following best international practices (United Nations Conventions and IRU, the world’s transport organization) and (b) the criteria and certification mechanism for the creation of private institutions providing training and issuing certificates of professional competence for the trucking industry (BF, CI)

Formulation change to simplify and align with regulatory reforms undertaken in both countries: Adoption by the Rrecipient of regulations (decrees and/or ministerial orders) strengthening the training system for road transport operators (BF, CI)

A3 - Application of Article 11.a of WAEMU Regulation 14 on truck axle load standards (BF, CI)

Formulation change to make the measure broader and align with the September 2016 decision of WAEMU ministers: For purposes of applying WAEMU Regulation 14 and pursuant to the declaration by WAEMU infrastructure and transport ministers in Cotonou on September 23, 2016, adoption by the recipient of measures for the (a) acquisition and refurbishment of truck weighing equipment and (b) notification of increased sanctions for non-compliant operators (BF, CI)

Pillar B

B1 - Introduction in Burkina Faso of a virtual freight exchange that (a) is accessible only by compliant transporters, (b) is voluntary for both shippers and transporters, and (c) allows a competitive matching of transport services supply and demand (BF)

The proposed revision reflects a simplification of language of the prior action: Introduction by the recipient of a virtual freight exchange that makes available information on incoming freight (BF)

B1 - Transition to electronic interstate consignment notes and mutual recognition by BF and CI (Joint)

Formulation change to specify the documents mutually recognized by the two countries. The BSTR in Burkina Faso is already used in electronic form and the DUT in Côte d’Ivoire will be issued electronically as well. Mutual recognition of interstate consignment notes by the recipient and the partner; BF (BSTR) and CI (DUT). Signature by the Recipient and the Partner of a revised bilateral road transport agreement (protocole d’accord) dated May 12, 2016 (Joint)

B2 - Establishment by the Ministry of Transport of a mechanism to support fleet renewal for compliant transporters, including (a) provisions to lower the cost of vehicles (notably tax and customs duty exemptions); (b) provisions to facilitate access to credit; and (c) accompanying measures (BF; CI)

Simplification of the measure to align with the different measures adopted in the two countries: Adoption by the recipient of measures to support fleet renewal for compliant road transporters, through provisions to lower the cost of vehicles (notably tax and customs duty exemptions) (BF) Adoption by the recipient of measures to support fleet renewal for compliant road transporters, through


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provisions to facilitate access to credit (CI)

B2 - Revision of the technical inspection system and regulations for trucks to eliminate substandard vehicles (BF; CI)

Strengthening by the recipient of technical inspection of vehicles through the regulations, procedures, or strategies (BF; CI)

Pillar C

C1 - Adoption of a ministerial order reactivating the Commission on Competitiveness of Ivorian Ports (CI)

The measure is strengthened by including the organization of first meetings of this Commission: Adoption by the Recipient of a ministerial order reactivating the Commission on Competitiveness of Ivorian Ports and commencement of meetings (CI)

C1 - Revision of tariff structure and practices of container terminals in Burkina Faso to promote containerization (BF)

The recent decrease of containerized traffic resulting from the political trouble in Burkina Faso makes it difficult to consider a revision of tariff at inland container terminals in the short term. Other measures to promote containerization have been discussed with stakeholders (for example, establishment of a guarantee fund to ease the conditions imposed by shipping lines for the return of containers). However, these will take some time to develop and the TA projects being prepared in both countries are more adapted than a DPO to provide support.

Pillar D

D1 - Establishment of TIWP in line with Article 1 of the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement, based on the WAEMU template and best international practices (for example, WCO, World Bank) (BF, CI)

Progress toward the development and launch of the virtual trade single window SYLVIE in Burkina Faso represents an important change, which includes elements of a TIWP but goes beyond in terms of streamlining trade procedures. This justifies modifying the prior action for Burkina Faso, while the measure for Côte d’Ivoire is left unchanged (it is specified that the TIWP will be a pilot to reflect continuing IFC TA in FY17 to improve it. Development and launch by the Recipient of the electronic-based trade single window system (BF) Establishment by the Recipient of a pilot TIWP in support of Article 1 of the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement (CI)

D2 - Strengthening by the customs administration of (a) risk management through the interface of the traders’ risk profiles database with the customs management system) and (b) PCAs through the adoption of a PCA strategy and manual of procedures (BF, CI)

Formulation change to clarify the measure: Strengthening by the Recipient’s customs administration of the risk management system through (a) automated selectivity for customs controls and (b) modernization of PCA procedures (BF, CI)

D3 - Transposition of the revised WAEMU regulation governing the profession of customs brokers (BF, CI)

The revised WAEMU regulation in question has not been adopted at the regional level and is unlikely to be before the establishment of a common customs code at the ECOWAS level. This measure was, therefore, dropped.


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D2 - Adoption and implementation of a legal and regulatory framework defining the criteria and functioning of an AEO scheme (CI)

Formulation change to clarify the measure: Adoption by the Recipient of a regulatory framework (decrees and/or ministerial orders) defining the criteria and functioning of an AEO scheme (CI)

Pillar E

E1 - Interconnection by the two customs administrations of their information systems (Joint)

Formulation change to reflect the pilot nature of the interconnection that both countries’ customs administration will agree to adopt, paving the way for the implementation of the broader regional interconnection solution, which will be supported through the World Bank’s TA projects: Improvement of the Recipient’s customs administration by strengthening: (a) its internal procedures for customs control and (b) the oversight of licensed customs brokers (BF, CI) Signing of an agreement (protocol d’accord) dated April 28, 2016, by the Recipient’s and Partner’s customs administration of a pilot interconnection system allowing single transit declaration at the point of departure for transit between the two countries (Joint)

Note: WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union; BSTR = Road Transport Monitoring Note (Bulletin de Suivi de Transport Routier); DUT = Single Transport Document (Document unique du transport); WTO = World Trade Organization; ECOWAS = Economic Community of West African States; SYLVIE = Virtual Linkage System for Imports and Exports (Système de Liaison Virtuelle des Importations et des Exportations); PCA = Post-clearance Audit; WCO = World Customs Organization.

2.2 Major Factors Affecting Implementation

Support from World Bank Projects and Technical Assistance

17. The program was well-anchored in analytical work, but TA was more limited. Considerable economic analysis had been done on the weaknesses of the transport sector in West Africa, including the Côte d’Ivoire-Burkina Faso corridor. This was supplemented with a Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) and a political economy paper specifically for this program. Thus, the problems and potential obstacles were well understood. The European Union (EU) had ongoing TA in place in Côte d’Ivoire before and during the program, including some training funds. TA from the IMF African Regional Technical Assistance Centre (AFRITAC) unit based in Abidjan assisted with some customs issues. IFC supported the Ivorian TIWP and customs interconnection. However, two parallel World Bank TA projects (Transport Sector Modernization and Corridor Trade Facilitation Project [Projet de Modernisation du Secteur du Transport et de Facilitation du Commerce en Corridor, PAMOSET Burkina Faso and PAMOSET Côte d’Ivoire]) only became effective as or after the regional DPO was ending. These projects should have been in place at the same time as the Development Policy Financing. The Burkinabé Ministry of Transport tried to compensate with funds from the national budget, but this did not work out.


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18. Possibly, the most significant gap was in measures to compensate losers from the reforms. The PSIA and political economy work clearly identified the fact that there would be losers and that it would be important to facilitate their exit from the sector through retraining and assistance in establishing alternative livelihoods. The two PAMOSET projects mention the issue very briefly, but do not include a strategy or any significant resources.

Design

19. The program design was innovative and supported by considerable prior analysis. It was unusual for a DPO in that it focused on one specific problem – the high cost of transit trade – and then tackled the issue through its various components. It represented a clear vision of a very different future: modern trucks and trucking companies, respecting load restrictions, contracting directly with importers and exporters, with the help of a virtual freight exchange, and enjoying streamlined customs clearance and transit procedures. The one component which was weak and could have been dropped concerned the competitiveness of maritime and inland gateways. Breaking the dominant position of the port freight handler in delivering containers within Abidjan would have only had a very indirect impact on transit trade (by strengthening the profitability of some trucking companies), while exposing the program to resistance by a major vested interest, which eventually undermined two results targets. The only other measure in this component was the reactivation of the Commission on the Competitiveness of Ivoirian Ports, which is a rather weak reform. No reforms related to inland gateways were included.

20. The regional nature of the program was also new. This was the first time that the World Bank had tried to make budget support in one country also conditional on reforms in a neighboring country. The initial idea was to involve a larger group of countries facing the same problems, such as overloading. However, it was argued that such problems cannot be addressed in isolation and that a comprehensive approach could only be realistically developed with two countries at a time. Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso were chosen in part due to their close economic, political, and cultural relationship. However, the fact that they both had room within their IDA envelopes was also important once it was decided that regional IDA funds could not be utilized. In theory, a country such as Togo might have offered a better partner for Burkina Faso, as transit trade is relatively more important for it than for Côte d’Ivoire. Transit truck trade is a fairly low priority for Côte d’Ivoire as compared to the large domestic trucking industry. Côte d’Ivoire’s much larger and richer economy, combined with its coastal position, also makes for an uneven relationship with Burkina Faso. This would have been less of an issue with Togo. However, at the time, its macroeconomic situation precluded budget support.

21. The reduction in the length of the series was unfortunate. The program was initially designed to last four years, in recognition of the ambitious and difficult nature of the reforms. However, it was decided that the program should start with a two-year series in view of the risky political environment in both countries and the lack of experience with regional DPOs. The original plan was to consider a second two-year series afterward if the results were promising, but this was later dropped in favor of follow-up through two investment/TA projects due to a lack of national IDA funds. This is unfortunate because it was difficult to redesign the program over two years while maintaining the same, ambitious objectives. It is now clear that many reforms have not been successfully implemented, that they require intensive monitoring, and that further actions backed by budget support would probably be useful alongside the investment/TA projects.


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Changes in the Policy Matrix

22. Most changes in the triggers did not change the substance of the measure. In most cases, reformulation of the triggers served to clarify the exact nature of the proposed reform, sometimes in the light of more recent information. The impact of political instability in Burkina Faso necessitated the retraction of one measure on containerization. Delays in the adoption of a West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) directive required the removal of another measure on the professionalization of customs brokers.

Government Ownership

23. Government ownership was variable between components and between countries. The Presidents of both countries confirmed their ownership of the reform agenda, but this was not always reflected at the technical level. In Côte d’Ivoire, the commitment to customs modernization appears to have been strong, but less so in the case of modernization of the trucking industry. In general, the Government of Côte d’Ivoire may have had less ownership given the lesser importance of transit trade in its economy as compared to Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso appears to be more committed to implementing the new criteria for trucking companies and they were willing to forego tax revenue in the pursuit of fleet renewal. On the other hand, customs modernization has proceeded more slowly. Both countries showed weak commitment to the control of overloading, backtracking on reforms, while arguing that a broader, regional approach was needed to move forward.

Risk Identification and Mitigation

24. Risks were clearly identified and some mitigation measures were taken. The team recognized the many risks embodied in this innovative program. These included political instability, security concerns, vested interests, weak institutional capacity, the challenge of cross-country coordination, and negative social impacts. Preliminary analytical work clarified the challenges, and several joint missions by teams from the two countries helped build trust and understanding. TA from the EU in Côte d’Ivoire, IFC, and AFRITAC was in place at the start of the program. World Bank staff worked with the newly elected government in Burkina Faso to ensure its continued commitment. The program was reduced to two years to give the World Bank a chance to reassess the situation before moving forward.

25. However, some key mitigation measures were lacking. The delay in launching complementary World Bank investment/TA projects hindered implementation in both countries. It was understood that significant numbers of informal truckers would have to exit the sector once reforms were in place, but no effective measures were designed to facilitate their adjustment. A similar problem exists in the case of informal customs brokers and others selling goods and services at the border once reforms are in place to professionalize customs brokers and speed up border procedures, though here the issue was less urgent. The project team was encouraged by the Operations Committee to secure commitments from the two governments to fund compensatory measures, and an amendment to the Letter of Development Policy was agreed. However, the text was vague and did not lead to substantive actions.3 The decision not to proceed with a second two-year DPO series also increased the risk that reforms will not be fully

3 In the case of Burkina Faso, the authorities only referred to retraining, while clearly underlining the problem of funding. For Côte d’Ivoire, mention is made of financing to cover the social costs associated with new trucking licensing criteria, but there was no follow-up required since the criteria were not being implemented.


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implemented. The eventual launch of two national technical assistance projects is helping ensure follow-up in some areas, notably fleet renewal and customs interconnection. However, accompanying measures for potential losers continue to receive scant attention.

26. In some cases, the risks were worth taking and the outcomes are still unclear. Breaking the quasi-monopoly in container delivery in Abidjan was probably a worthwhile initiative which enjoyed some political support, and it may yet succeed. On the other hand, its link to the main PDO of reducing transit trade costs is small and the program’s overall risk could have been reduced by dropping it. Overloading could not be ignored, and regional pressure was being applied through WAEMU to encourage other countries to move in step with Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso. However, perhaps a more gradual approach, such as the one adopted by the WEAMU-Ghana meeting on September 28, 2017, would have reduced the risk of policy slippage.The World Bank might have sought more support from existing high-level, political fora such as the annual consultations between Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, and WAEMU ministerial meetings.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

27. The results indicators could have been better designed. The third indicator should have focused on the use of a new system of consignment notes since the system in place at the start of the program was dysfunctional. Also, it should have focused on the use of a mutually recognized consignment note for transit trade, which was the main objective of the program, rather than concentrating on overall trucking in Côte d’Ivoire, which is dominated by domestic trade. The transit time by road from Abidjan to Ouagadougou was a very appropriate indicator in theory, but unfortunately there was no easy way to measure it. It is also unclear as to how it is defined. For example, should it include customs clearance at the port of Abidjan, which was one of the issues covered by the program? The indicator for overloading also poses a problem because the authorities in Burkina Faso only collect data for overloading in excess of 20 percent. The baseline for the number of operators authorized to deliver containers in Abidjan (30) did not capture the de facto quasi-monopolistic situation which the reforms were designed to break. Three indicators were dropped in the second year after closer examination revealed their inappropriateness.

28. The targets were also overly ambitious. The objective for the number of transporters registered under the new criteria appears to have underestimated the difficulties inherent in the implementation of this reform. The same applies to the reduction in overloading, which is a perennial problem that has defied reform for many years. The importance of vested interests seems to have been downplayed in these cases, as well as in the liberalization of container delivery in Abidjan. The expected reduction in the price of imported trucks was inconsistent with the measure successfully introduced in Burkina Faso, as the maximum reduction achievable from tax exemptions was only half of the target figure. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, no reduction was feasible until the PAMOSET project could become operational. The program’s ambitions should have been further moderated when it was reduced from a four-year program to only two years.

Implementation

29. The Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) framework changed only modestly during implementation but did not improve. It was probably appropriate that three indicators were dropped, but, ideally, they


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would have been replaced by one or two new ones in order to have a more complete picture of the program’s results. The one indicator which was added, concerning the virtual freight exchange in Burkina Faso, does not appear to have been very relevant as this exchange was not being used.

Utilization

30. There is no indication that the Results Framework was used as a decision tool. This is not unusual for a DPO series. A good attempt was made to assess the degree of progress in October 2016, which highlighted many of the problems with the framework, but no changes were made.

2.4 Expected Next Phase/Follow-up Operation

31. Two follow-up investment operations have been launched. These national-level projects (PAMOSET Burkina Faso and PAMOSET Côte d’Ivoire) will provide important support for the implementation of many of the reforms initiated under the regional DPO. The initial plan to design a new two-year regional DPO was dropped, but national DPOs may be used to pursue one or two of the reforms.

3. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation Rating: Substantial

32. The broad objectives were very relevant and consistent with the two national development strategies. Modernizing the trucking industry, reducing overloading, facilitating transit trade and customs clearance are all important reforms. This is especially true for Burkina Faso as a land-locked country. Côte d’Ivoire had an interest in protecting its roads through axle load control and remaining competitive with alternative transit corridors. However, the overall objectives were probably of lower priority in Côte d’Ivoire than in the case of Burkina Faso.

Relevance of Design Rating: Modest

33. The project was very ambitious and innovative. This was one of the first times that the World Bank had agreed with countries to link their budget support to the simultaneous achievement of reforms at home and in a neighboring country. At the same time, it tackled a very difficult sector which had defied reform for decades due to the many vested interests.

34. However, the objectives were too ambitious for a two-year program with limited TA. The decision to design a two-year program was understandable but unfortunate. While the risks were clearly high and caution was warranted, the original intention to follow up with a second two-year DPO should probably have been pursued. The nature of the reform agenda, and the vested interests to be overcome, were such that it was not reasonable to expect major improvements in only two years. The approval of two investment/TA projects will help with implementation, but needed reforms may languish without further budget support. Furthermore, these two projects should have been approved earlier so that they could proceed in parallel with the DPOs.

3.2 Achievement of Program Development Objectives


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Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

35. One target was achieved and progress was made on three others. There were 13 targets. The fully achieved one was the reduction in the use of the red channel by the customs authorities in Côte d’Ivoire. Three others showed some progress, though the link with the prior actions was not strong in one case. Four of the indicators were not well defined or could not be measured with available data. The targets for five indicators were not achieved (see Table ).

36. Progress was made on other less tangible matters. Regular consultations improved understanding and the development of a common vision both between the two countries, and between the public and private sectors within each country.

Table 6. Achievement of Key Indicator Targets by PDO

PDOs Achieved Some Progress Not Achieved Not Applicable Total

Pillar A 1 2 1 4

Pillar B 1 1 2 4

Pillar C 2 2

Pillar D 1 1 2

Pillar E 1 1

Total 1 3 5 4 13

37. Pillar A: Little progress was made on the first objective to professionalize and modernize the trucking industry. Overloading was reduced somewhat in Côte d’Ivoire, though still well above the ambitious target level. However, it is unlikely that this can be attributed to the DPO program. The two actions in the program were (a) higher sanctions which were reversed after only a few weeks and (b) additional weighbridges at the port which were still not operational in October 2017. In Burkina Faso, fines are levied in the case of extreme over-loading (above 20 percent), and the use of weighbridges was extended. Unfortunately, appropriate data on overloading is not available.4 The most relevant reform for the achievement of this PDO was the registration of trucking companies using new licensing criteria. This had only begun in Burkina Faso by the end of 2017, but the licenses would not be available until the end of 2018. The process seems unlikely to start soon in Côte d’Ivoire.5 A new umbrella organization for the trucking industry was operational in Côte d’Ivoire, facilitating dialogue between the Government and the 350 truckers’ unions.

38. Pillar B: The second objective of modernizing the organization of the trucking industry was no more successful. The virtual freight exchange in Burkina Faso has not been used. Agreement in principle was achieved on the mutual recognition of consignment notes issued by the two countries, but the shippers’ council of Burkina Faso was still not satisfied with the proposal of their Ivorian counterparts. The indicator concerning the amount of trade under consignment notes in Côte d’Ivoire is not applicable because the current dysfunctional system has not yet been reformed and reliable data do not exist. Fleet renewal began in Burkina Faso with the help of tax exemptions on imported trucks. However, the impact to date is modest – 369 trucks imported by April 1, 2018, with another 150 on their way, compared to an

4 Data is only collected for overloading in excess of 20 percent of legal limits, and this shows no definite trend. 5 Apparently, the Task Team Leaders (TTLs) had given the authorities in each country a two-year grace period in recognition of the inherent difficulty in implementing this reform. However, this was not mentioned by the authorities and the target was not changed.


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existing stock estimated at 15,000. The importation of a total of 768 trucks has been authorized, though it is not certain that all applicants will obtain bank credit. Also, half of the approved trucks are for oil, which is not the sector most in need of modernization. A new PAMOSET project will continue this process by providing better access to credit. The fleet renewal program in Côte d’Ivoire will only begin under a similar PAMOSET project.

39. Pillar C: Progress on enhancing the competitiveness of maritime and inland gateways was focused on the port of Abidjan where it was thwarted by vested interests. A decree was passed to prevent freight handling companies from participating in the lucrative business of container delivery in Abidjan. However, this decision was contested by the dominant player and the committee responsible for authorizing trucking companies to enter this business had suspended its activities in October 2017 pending the outcome of legal proceedings. Thus, there appears to have been no progress on either of the corresponding indicators: an increase in the number of authorized companies and a reduction in the delivery price. However, it is reported that some large shippers are now able to negotiate lower prices.6 On the other hand, the Commission on the Competitiveness of Ivoirian Ports is operational.

40. Pillar D: Improving customs clearance has been the most successful part of the program. Both countries introduced an automated, risk-based process to select cargoes to be given full scrutiny through the red channel. As a result, the proportion of shipments passing through this channel decreased dramatically in Côte d’Ivoire, surpassing the target. The target set for Burkina Faso was probably unrealistic, being considerably lower than the one for Côte d’Ivoire. The use of the red channel in Burkina Faso has actually increased, though clearance time has fallen, and the low average clearance time suggests that the system is not really functional as yet. The single window in Burkina Faso was operational and gradually expanding to incorporate all administrations dealing with import and export clearance. The performance agreements with participating institutions as a way to speed up document processing was particularly encouraging. The Ivoirian website on trade rules and regulations was also functioning. On the other hand, little progress was made on professionalizing customs brokers by enforcing existing regulations.

41. Pillar E: Modest progress was made on facilitating transit trade. An agreement was reached to require a single guarantee for transit trade recognized by both countries. This is a reform which has been accepted at the WAEMU regional level for many years, but never effectively implemented. Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire may be the first countries to succeed, if they can avoid backtracking. The process of interconnection of the two countries’ customs systems has also begun and will be completed under PAMOSET.

3.3 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

42. While the objectives of the program were very relevant, the design was weak when compared to the ambitions, and the outcomes were disappointing. The program tackled some key issues. However, only one of the outcome targets was achieved, with some progress in only three others. There has been some slippage in reforms, and most components continue to face important risks in their implementation.

6 It was also reported by TTLs that the dominant company is now subcontracting some business to third-party truckers, but this does not necessarily weaken the position of that company, or mean lower prices to shippers.


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3.4 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

43. There has probably been no impact on poverty as of end-2017. Both the positive and negative impacts on poverty reduction were well described in the Program Document. However, the limited progress in reforms means that no impact is yet discernible. There does not appear to have been any reduction in the cost of transport, nor have any poor drivers or intermediaries lost their jobs. There are no significant gender or social developments to report.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

44. The program supported institutional change in the Ivorian trucking industry. An umbrella organization has become operational to federate the 350 trucking unions in Côte d’Ivoire. It appears to have the potential to become an effective, independent voice, which should facilitate dialogue with policy makers and hence the design and implementation of reforms.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts

45. There were no unintended outcomes or impacts.

3.5 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

Not applicable.

4. ASSESSMENT OF RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME Rating: High

46. The country context remains fragile and vested interests may block the implementation of reforms. The reduction in overloading is beginning to appear intractable with a fifth ministerial meeting held in September of 2017 at which the reforms were further delayed. Modernization of the trucking industry is moving very slowly and it is not clear whether there is real commitment to strictly apply the new criteria. Particularly in Côte d’Ivoire, the new criteria look too rigid to be practical. The liberalization of container delivery in Abidjan is blocked pending a legal case brought to court by the dominant incumbent. The customs administration in Burkina Faso is weak and its willingness to adopt a new, trade facilitation mentality is uncertain. Meanwhile, there is no evidence that transit trade has become more fluid and some indications that it may have become worse. The increasing security threat presented by Islamic extremists in Burkina Faso and Mali has resulted in increased controls in northern Côte d’Ivoire.

5. ASSESSMENT OF BANK AND BORROWER PERFORMANCE

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry


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Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

47. An impressive amount of preliminary analysis was conducted in the preparation of this program, but it seems to have had little impact on the design. Analytical work underlined the difficult nature of the proposed reforms and the potential for significant resistance from vested interests, while identifying various losers. Nonetheless, the World Bank proceeded with an ambitious reform agenda without accompanying measures to cope with this resistance or assist potential losers, some of whom could fall into poverty. No parallel TA funding was provided by the World Bank during the program, although some support was available from other sources. The duration of the program was shortened to two years, which was inadequate to complete the reform program, while the agreement to consider a follow-up two-year DPO was dropped. The Results Framework adopted overly ambitious targets resulting in a failure to achieve most of them.

(b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

48. The World Bank Group enjoyed a strong field presence while also encountering some changes in personnel. Transport specialists were based in both countries during the first phase of the program, supported by trade facilitation specialists in Washington. The local economist in Burkina Faso also played an important role. Some counterparts expressed satisfaction with the richness of the learning experience created by the World Bank staff. Both co-TTLs changed for the second operation, but one of the new ones was also based in the field, while some key Washington-based team members remained unchanged. However, the departure of the senior transport specialist in Abidjan and the period of uncertainty over his replacement, and that of his co-TTL, hampered supervision and implementation. The Results Framework should have been adjusted more substantially in the preparation of the second DPO, and some of the changes which were made did not improve the framework. The team might have considered delaying the second operation to give the authorities more time to implement meaningful reforms.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

49. Quality at entry was Moderately Unsatisfactory while quality of supervision was Moderately Satisfactory. Therefore, the overall World Bank performance is considered Moderately Unsatisfactory. The World Bank attempted to strike a compromise between an ambitious reform agenda and an unstable political context. While the reforms may yet bear fruit with support from the PAMOSET projects, the preliminary assessment is not encouraging.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Côte d’Ivoire: Moderately Unsatisfactory

50. The Government of Côte d’Ivoire demonstrated weak commitment to some of the key reforms, with the exception of customs. The critical reform to modernize the trucking industry was not well designed and there was, perhaps as a consequence, little commitment to implement it. There was no


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evidence that implementation had begun by late 2017. No progress was made in truck renewal. The process of certifying low-risk economic operators for rapid customs clearance was undermined by the unwillingness to provide incentives as proposed by customs. The reform of container delivery in Abidjan was not well managed, resulting in a blockage in the courts. Implementation of the agreement with Burkina Faso on the adoption of a single consignment note appears to have faltered due to intransigence on the part of the Ivoirians. Some progress was made on reducing the overloading of trucks, although not on the strengthening of controls, either in terms of fines or utilization of additional weighbridges. Ivoirian customs have done a reasonably good job at introducing risk-based management in customs clearance.

Burkina Faso: Moderately Unsatisfactory

51. The Government of Burkina Faso did better in some respects but less well in customs reform. Its commitment to modernizing the trucking industry seemed stronger than in Côte d’Ivoire given its more realistic design and the efforts being made to begin implementation in late 2017. However, implementation remained well behind schedule. The truck renewal scheme made progress thanks to the Government’s willingness to forgo taxes and duties on imports. The authorities showed some commitment to reducing extreme overloading by imposing significant fines, but did not make an effort to control other overloading or even collect data on it. Customs does not seem to conduct risk-based clearance procedures properly, with the use of the red channel increasing instead of decreasing. The virtual freight exchange was an interesting initiative but did not get used and may not have been appropriate under the circumstances.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Not Applicable.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

52. The rating for both governments was Moderately Unsatisfactory and there is no additional rating for implementing agencies.

6. LESSONS LEARNED

53. The regional DPO instrument is feasible at least for two countries with strong ties. This experiment was successful in the sense that the two countries worked together to ensure that reforms were implemented on a timely basis, permitting disbursements to take place in two consecutive years without serious delays. This applied to both national-level and joint reforms. Authorities confirmed that the joint program improved understanding and trust between their two countries. While the required measures differed in difficulty, there were many which were demanding, technically and/or politically. The close political, economic, and social ties between the two countries undoubtedly contributed to this success. Other countries in the region have shown interest in participating in similar operations. Many of the weaknesses in the program were due to its ambitious goals and inadequate design, and not the regional DPO instrument as such. The lessons learned here will be valuable for the design of a proposed regional DPO addressing similar issues in Senegal and Mali.

54. Availability of regional IDA funds would have opened up more options and perhaps improved the overall impact. The lack of national IDA resources was one of the major reasons for dropping a second


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two-year DPO series, which was, in turn, one of the major weaknesses of the program. Also, having access to regional IDA would have increased the number of eligible countries. The program might have been more successful if the two countries had more similar economic strength or attached more equal importance to the proposed reform agenda. For example, transit trade is much more important to the Togolese economy than it is for Côte d’Ivoire, and its economic relationship with Burkina Faso is more equal. However, it did not have any national IDA headroom for such a regional DPO (and its macroeconomic situation was not adequate to permit budget support at the time) so it was not considered. Another option worth considering would have been a broader program covering all the WAEMU countries plus Ghana, but with a narrower focus on controlling axle overload. This component of the regional DPO did not succeed in part because operators on the Côte d’Ivoire-Burkina Faso corridor were concerned that they would lose out to other corridors through Ghana, Togo, and Benin, unless those countries adopted similar reforms. Access to regional IDA funds would probably have been essential to design such an operation, by lifting the constraint of available national IDA funds and providing extra financial incentives. Such additional funds could have been used to finance accompanying measures and compensate losers.

55. Accompanying TA is essential to ensure reform implementation. National DPOs typically work best when they come in support of parallel investment projects which that can provide TA and other complementary funding. This regional DPO did not enjoy such support from World Bank projects until the end of the series. Limited help was provided by an EU project in Côte d’Ivoire, by the IFC, and by customs advice from the IMF AFRITAC unit, but this was not sufficient. While the PAMOSET projects will play an important role in assisting implementation of the DPO reforms, it would have been better if they had started at the beginning of the program and covered all the reform areas. Such TA/investment projects can also provide an incentive for implementation of reforms by sector ministries, by channeling resources to them in a way that budget support does not.

56. Difficult reforms require more than two years to work through the various stages and ensure implementation. This was understood at the beginning of the DPO series. Unfortunately, the initial commitment to a four-year program was weakened due to the level of risk inherent in the program. While the decision to break it into two two-year series is understandable, the subsequent decision to drop a second regional DPO series and rely on investment projects may jeopardize full implementation. There is a risk that the PAMOSET projects will disburse for fleet renewal and TA but without effective reforms. The World Bank might have considered delaying the second DPO to give the authorities more time to implement meaningful reforms, while benefiting from the new PAMOSET projects. Subsequent national DPOs may need to pursue some of the same reforms to ensure that they are completed.

57. Greater attention needs to be paid to prior analysis when designing a program. Both the PSIA and the political economy study identified the risk of obstruction by vested interests and the likelihood of significant groups of losers, including some poor persons. These do not seem to have been adequately taken into consideration in the DPO series or the accompanying PAMOSET projects. The need for compensatory measures was recognized in the Operations Committee review meeting prior to the first DPO, and an amendment to the Letter of Development Policy was added, but the commitments were vague and relied on government funding. In the end, no fund was set up to help informal truckers exit the industry, either through a parallel World Bank project or by the Government. Furthermore, the strength of vested interests related to overloading or the delivery of containers in Abidjan was identified in the PSIA but does not seem to have influenced the design of the program in practice.


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58. Greater care should be taken to define results indicators and targets. This is often difficult given the nature of a budget support series which tends to be broad in scope without the depth in any one area to ensure success. For example, it can be challenging to quantify the impact of a new law. Nonetheless, the final choices made are critical in determining the rating in an Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR). Several of the initial indicators in this program were inappropriate or not easily measured, and some were poorly defined. Targets were often overly ambitious given the short duration of the series and the challenging nature of the reforms. Some were more suitable for a four-year program supported by technical assistance projects, as was initially intended. The Results Framework should have been revised more substantially before the second DPO, but the World Bank policies make this difficult. Perhaps a Program for Results (P4R) approach should be considered for future operations of this type.

7. COMMENTS ON ISSUES RAISED BY BORROWER/IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES/PARTNERS

(a) Borrower/Implementing agencies

59. A French language version of the ICR was provided to both borrowers, who did not question the ratings. They did provide updated information on the reduction in extreme overloading in Côte d’Ivoire, and the increase in the number of new trucks imported into Burkina Faso. This information has been included in the final ICR.

(b) Cofinanciers

Not Applicable.

(c) Other partners and stakeholders

Not Aapplicable.


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ANNEX 1: BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION PROCESSES

(a) Task Team members Names Title Unit Responsibility/Specialty

First Regional Trade Facilitation and Competitiveness DPO - P129282

Volker Treichel Program Leader MFM Co-Task Team Leader

Ibou Diouf Lead Transport Specialist

GTI Co-Task Team Leader

Olivier Hartmann Senior Trade Specialist T&C Trucking industry

Jean-Christophe Maur

Senior Trade Economist T&C Trade

Mariam Diop Economist MFM Burkina project supervision

Aguiratou Savadogo-Tinto

Senior Transport Specialist

GTI Burkina transport

Antoine Coste Young Professional GFCPN Customs

Second Regional Trade Facilitation and Competitiveness DPO - P158333

Jacques Morisset Program Leader MFM Co-Task Team Leader

Jean-Christophe Maur

Senior Trade Economist T&C Co-Task Team Leader

Olivier Hartmann Senior Trade Specialist T&C Trucking industry

Mariam Diop Economist MFM Burkina project supervision

Aguiratou Savadogo-Tinto

Senior Transport Specialist

GTI Burkina transport

Anne Cecile Souhaid Senior Transport Specialist

GTI Côte d’Ivoire transport

Antoine Coste Young Professional GFCPN Customs

Tanangachi Ngwira Analyst GFCAC ICR Task Team Leader

Philip English Consultant GFCAW ICR Author

(b) Staff Time and Cost First Regional Trade Facilitation and Competitiveness DPO - P129282

Stage of Project Cycle

Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks US$, Thousands (including travel

and consultant costs)

Lending

FY12 7.18 36.08

FY13 0.9 11.60

Total: 8.08 47.68

Supervision/ICR

FY14 60.49 448.70

FY15 30.39 209.70

FY16 24.46 120.60

Total: 115.34 779.00

Total Lending and Supervision 123.42 826.68

Second Regional Trade Facilitation and Competitiveness DPO - P158333

Lending


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FY16 28.61 133.67

Total: 28.61 133.67

Supervision/ICR

FY17 41.39 198.77

FY18 5.63 40.25

Total: 47.02 239.02

Total Lending and Supervision 75.63 372.69


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ANNEX 2: SUMMARY OF BORROWER'S ICR AND/OR COMMENTS ON DRAFT ICR

Burkina Faso : Rapport d’évaluation des deux Crédits Régionaux pour la Facilitation du Commerce et la Compétitivité

Appréciation de la partie nationale

Ces deux opérations d’appui budgétaire régional sont conformes aux dispositions du protocole portant Cadre Général d’Organisation des Appuis Budgétaires (CGAB) en soutien à la mise en œuvre de la Stratégie de Croissance Accélérée et de Développement Durable (SCADD) et des politiques et programmes sectoriels qui en découlent.

Les deux CRFCC étant des appuis budgétaires non ciblés, sont fongibles et ne peuvent être dissociés des ressources propres du budget dans leur utilisation. En raison de leur prévisibilité, ils sont pris en compte dans la détermination des enveloppes sectorielles du CDMT et contribuent à tout ce qui a été réalisé par le budget.

Le CRFCC a été un cadre excellent pour le dialogue entre la Banque et le Gouvernement, mais aussi entre le Gouvernement burkinabè et celui de la Côte d’Ivoire pour la mise en œuvre des réformes conjointe et parallèle aux deux pays. Les réformes mises en œuvre sont pertinentes, cohérentes, flexibles et réalistes. L’arrangement institutionnel de la mise en œuvre de l’ABR a été à la hauteur des attentes du fait du rôle de facilitation et d’encadrement joué par la Banque Mondiale pour l’atteinte des résultats.

Dans l’ensemble, la mise en œuvre de ces mesures ont permis une adaptation des cadres institutionnels et règlementaires au nouveau contexte de développement et de mettre à niveau les services des transports et des douanes afin de répondre aux besoins de la population et de l’économie. Il a également permis d’appuyer les efforts de l’intégration régionale. Dans le cadre des transports et logistique, le CRFCC a contribué à créer des conditions pour l’émergence d’entreprises de transport entre le Burkina Faso et la Côte d’Ivoire et à renforcer le système de gestion des risques par l’automatisation de l’analyse des risques liés aux procédures de dédouanement.

Cet instrument de financement présente d’autres qualités qui en font son intérêt : (i) c’est un appui concessionnel en ligne avec nos engagements en matière d’endettement dans le cadre des programmes avec le FMI ; (ii) son décaissement est rapide, en tranche unique et on note une évolution positive concernant son alignement avec le cycle budgétaire; (iii) le programme de réformes pluriannuel et sectoriel sur lequel il s’adosse est issu des programmes et des mesures agréés par le Gouvernement et est en ligne avec les orientations de la SCADD; (iv) son évaluation se fait selon un cadre et un calendrier convenus à l’avance.

En dépit de tous ces points forts, le CRFCC en tant que opération pilote d’appui budgétaire régional a été confronté à des difficultés au cours de sa mise en œuvre. Les facteurs limitants de la portée du CRFCC se retrouvent tant au niveau du Gouvernement que de la Banque.

La difficulté majeure réside dans le fait que l’instrument n’est pas bien compris par l’ensemble des acteurs impliqués dans sa mise en œuvre. Le CRFCC est perçu au niveau des ministères comme un projet, ce qui traduit la non intégration des coûts de mise en œuvre des mesures par les sectoriels au niveau de leur


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budget. Pour les ministères, le Gouvernement doit mettre à leur disposition des ressources additionnelles au moment de l’exécution des mesures. Toute chose qui a ralenti, la réalisation des réformes convenues.

Etant donné que le décaissement de ces deux opérations était conditionné par la réalisation de toutes les mesures qu’elles soient conjointes ou pas par les deux pays et au regard des spécificités de chaque pays, la coordination entre les deux pays pour la mise en œuvre des mesures conjointes et parallèles n’a pas été toujours facile. En plus, chaque pays courait le risque de ne pas avoir le décaissement du fait de la réalisation des mesures par l’autre pays.

Il a souvent été noté des changements répétés ou d’ajout d’éléments de preuve de la réalisation des mesures par la Banque mondiale qui n’étaient pas prévus au départ. Cela a compliqué la mise en œuvre desdites mesures par les sectoriels chargés de leur réalisation.

Une autre difficulté est la faiblesse de l’appareil statistique dans les ministères sectoriels impliqués dans la mise en œuvre des mesures. Ce qui rend difficile l’accès aux statistiques et indicateurs requis pour l’appréciation des résultats.

Les accords de financement des deux CRFCC ont été signés respectivement le 8 juillet 2015 et le 14 décembre 2016 pour 44,7 millions d’euro soit environ 29,3 milliards de francs CFA pour chacun. Ces ressources ont permis des avancées significatives dans les domaines des transports et du commerce. Les principales réalisations sont retracées dans la partie suivante.


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Rapport de Synthèse et Perspectives du Programme d’Appui Budgétaire Régional Par l’équipe de la Côte d’Ivoire

L'Appui Budgétaire Régional pour la Côte d'lvoire et le Burkina Faso, ABR, est un programme innovant de la Banque mondiale destiné à faciliter les formalités douanières et la fluidité du trafic en matière du transport routier de marchandises sur le corridor Abidjan-Ouagadougou. Ce Programme s'adosse sur deux piliers essentiels que sont le Transport routier de marchandises et les Douanes.

L'ABR pour la C6te d'Ivoire et le Burkina Faso implique un agenda et une matrice adoptés et validés par les deux Etats et dont la mise en oeuvre complète devrait permettre d'aboutir à une gestion intégrée des frontières entre les deux pays, à travers le dédouanement, le régime de transit et la traversée des frontières.

Une revue exhaustive des matrices de Ia première et de la deuxième année laisse apparaitre que toutes les mesures réglementaires préalables contenues dans ces deux matrices ont été exécutées. Ces mesures se répartissent en trois catégories :

• Les mesures dites spécifiques: ce sont des mesures mises en oeuvre uniquement par l'un des deux Etats;

• Les mesures parallèles: ce sont des mesures identiques aux deux Etats, mises en oeuvre séparément mais de façon concomitante :

• Les mesures conjointes : ce sont des mesures identiques qui concernent les deux Etats et qui doivent être mises en oeuvre par eux de façon conjointe.

Etat D'Avancement

En termes d'acquis financiers, |'ABR a permis de mobiliser un montant total de deux cent millions (200,000,000) de Dollars us, à savoir cent millions (100,000,000) de Dollars US pour chacun des Etats, sous la forme de Crédits dont les Accords ont été signés en juillet 2015 (50 millions de Dollars US) et décembre 2016 (également 50 millions de Dollars US) entre chacun de ces Etats et la Banque mondiale.

Comme autres acquis, nous pouvons relever :

• la désignation des points Focaux des Structures et Ministères impliqués dans I'ABR :

• la création dans chacun des deux pays d'un Comité National ABR présidé par le Représentant du Ministre en charge de l’Economie et des Finances ;

• l’imprégnation et l’implication véritable des Structures et Ministères intervenant dans l'ABR ;

• la mise en place d'un budget de fonctionnement pour la Cellule de coordination et de Suivi de

• I'ABR, en Côte d'lvoire et au Burkina Faso.


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Dans le cadre de l’ABR, de nombreuses et profondes réformes ont été implémentées. Il s'agit, notamment : :

• Au titre de ta professionnalisation et de la formalisation de l'industrie du transport routier de marchandises;

• Au titre de la modernisation de l’organisation du marché du transport routier de marchandises ;

• Au titre de la compétitivité des ports et des plateformes logistiques intérieurs ;

• Au titre de l’amélioration des procédures de dédouanement ;

• Au titre de la facilitation de transit ;

• Au titre du renforcement des capacités de l’Administration des Douanes et des Commissionnaires en Douane Agréés en Côte d’Ivoire.

Les Difficultés rencontrés

Des difficultés ont été identifiées dans la mise en oeuvre des mesures contenues dans les différentes

Matrices. Ces difficultés se résument, pour l'essentiel :

• à la faiblesse des moyens. En effet, pour certaines activités, il a fallu solliciter un appui technique, logistique ou financier de la Banque mondiale ou d'autres institutions. Nous faisons référence à la mise en place du PWIC qui se fait avec I'accompagnement de la Société Financière Internationale (SFI) et l'interconnexion des douanes ivoiriennes et burkinabé dans le cadre d'une Convention d'assistance avec Ia Conférence des Nations-Unies pour le Commerce et le Développement (CNUCED);

• à I'absence de mobilité pour l'organisation de missions de contrôle ou de routine sur les sites ou dans les Structures concernés par I'ABR ;

• d’une certaine lenteur dans l'adoption des textes réglementaires ,

• à I'absence d'un mécanisme de motivation des membres du Comité National ABR en C6te d'lvoire.

• Le processus d'élaboration d'un projet d'arrêté portant fixation des indemnités des membres de ce Comité avait été initié mais n'a pu aller jusqu'à son terme.


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ANNEX 3: COMMENTS OF COFINANCIERS AND OTHER PARTNERS/STAKEHOLDERS

A French language version of the ICR was provided to both borrowers, who did not question the ratings. They did provide updated information on the reduction in extreme overloading in Côte d’Ivoire and the increase in the number of new trucks imported into Burkina Faso. This information has been included in the final ICR.


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ANNEX 4: LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

Afrique Pesage (Côte d’Ivoire), Annual Reports for 2015 and 2016, monthly reports from January to July 2017.

Afrique Pesage (Côte d’Ivoire) Info Stat du pesage, August 2017.

Annequin, Christel Contribution to the Database of the West Africa Regional Transport Observatory Abidjan–Ouagadougou Corridor, June 2013.

Burkina Faso, Rapport d’évaluation des deux Crédits Régionaux pour la Facilitation du Commerce et la Compétitivité (CRFCC), 2018.

Côte d’Ivoire, Rapport de Synthèse et Perspectives du Programme d’Appui Budgétaire Régional: Côte d’Ivoire – Burkina Faso, 2017.

Côte d’Ivoire, Fonds d’Entretien Routier, Note sur l’Application du R14.

Egis, Assistance Technique pour l’Amélioration de l’Organisation du Secteur des Transports routiers de Marchandises en Côte d’Ivoire, Mission 17 report for the European Union, June 28, 2017.

USAID (United States Agency for International Development), Impact of Road Transport Industry Liberalization in West Africa, May 2012.

World Bank, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire: Poverty and Social Impact Assessment (PSIA) of Road Transport Reforms along the Abidjan-Ouagadougou Corridor, June 2015. Washington, DC: World Bank.

World Bank, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso: A Political Economy Analysis of Transport Reforms – The Abidjan-Ouagadougou Corridor, May 2014.

World Bank Program Document for Proposed Credits to Burkina Faso and to the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire for a First Regional Trade Facilitation and Competitiveness Development Policy Operation, May 2015.

World Bank, Program Document for Proposed Credits to Burkina Faso and to the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire for a Second Regional Trade Facilitation and Competitiveness Development Policy Operation, November 2016.

World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit to Burkina Faso for a Transport Sector Modernization and Corridor Trade Facilitation Project, December 2016.

World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit to the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire for a Transport Sector Modernization and Corridor Trade Facilitation Project, June 2016.

World Bank, West and Central Africa Trucking Competitiveness, September 2017, draft.

Documents

World Bank Document · 2018. 7. 12. · Ibou Diouf, Volker Treichel, Jacques Morisset, Jean-Christophe Maur ICR Team Leader: Tanangachi Ngwira ICR Primary Author: Philip English