Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No. 15193

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

ZIMBABWE

EMFRGENCY DROUGHT RECOVERY AND MITIGATION PROJECT(CREDIT 2399-ZIM)

DECEMBER 20, 1995

Macro, Trade and Industry DivisionSouthern Africa DepartmentAfrica Regional Office

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(at appraisal)

US$] = Z$4.874US$I = SDRO.730US$1 = NKK6.500

(at implementation)

US$1 = Z$6.337US$1 = SDRO.721US$1 = NKK6.780

FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER

July I - June 30

DEFINITIONS

Types of emergency assistance referred to in the text:

Relief Immediate assistance tendered with the aim ofpreserving human and animal life.

Short Term Recovery Assistance within a one year time frame with theaim of restoring assets and their productivity.

Medium Term Recovery Assistance beyond the one year time frame with theaim of restoring assets and of rehabilitatinginfrastructure.

Preparedness Assistance in the form of training, contingencyplanning, organizational restructuring with the aimof improving the future management ofemergencies.

Mitigation Assistance in the form of policies, procedures andprograms with the aim of reducing vulnerability tothe future emergency and its negative impact.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GLOSSARY

CMB Cotton Marketing BoardCSFP Child Supplementary Feeding ProgramDDF District Development FundDRP Drought Recovery ProgrammeDSW Department of Social WelfareDWD Department of Water DevelopmentEDRMP Emergency Drought Recovery and Mitigation ProjectESAP Economic Structural Adjustment ProgramEWP Emergency Water PlanFEWS Famine Early Warning SystemFFW Food for Work ProgramGDP Gross Domestic ProductGMB Grain Marketing BoardGOZ Government of ZimbabweICB Intemational Comp-titive BiddingICR Implementation Completion ReportIDA International Development AssociationIFAD Intemational Fund for Agricultural DevelopmentLEDP Letter of Emergency Drought PolicyMIC Ministry of Industry and CommerceMLAWD Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water DevelopmentMLGRUD Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban DevelopmentMOF Ministry of FinanceMOHCW Ministry of Health and Child WelfareMOP Memorandum of the PresidentMOTE Ministry of Transport and EnergyMPCNH Ministry of Public Construction and National HousingMPSLSW Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social WelfareNAC National Action CommitteeNCPCC National Civil Protection Coordination CommitteeNCU National Coordinating UnitNEPC National Economic Planning CommissionNGO Non Govenmmental OrganizationNCK Norwegian KronerNORAD Norwegian International Development AgencyNRZ National Railways of ZimbabweOD Operational DirectiveO&M Operations and MaintenancePCR Project Completion ReportPWP Public Works ProgrammeRBZ Reserve Bank of ZimbabweSAC Structural Adjustment CreditSAL Structural Adjustment LoanSADC Southern Africa Development CommunitySDR Special Drawing RightSIDA Swedish Intemational Development AgencyUNCHS United Nations Centre for Human SettlementsUNDP United Nations Development ProgramUNICEF United Nations Children's FundUSAID United States Agency for Intemational DevelopmentVOC Vote of CreditWB World BankWFP World Food ProgramWHO World Health OrganizationZESA Zimbabwe Electricity Supply AuthorityZFU Zimbabwe Farmers Union

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the perfornmance of theirIofficial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed wiihout World Bank authorization.

ZIMBABWE

EMERGENCY DROUGHT RECOVERY AND MITIGATION PROJECT(Credit 2399-ZIM)

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

PREFACE .................................................... iEVALUATION SUMMARY .................................................... i

A. Introduction ................................................... iB. Project Objectives and Components ................................................... iC. Implementation Experience and Results ................................................... iiD. Summary of Findings, Future Operations and Lessons Learned ................................................... iii

PART 1: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT .................................................... 1A. Project Identity .................................................... IB. Project Background ................................................... lIC. Project Objectives .................................................... 2D. Achievement of Project Objectives .................................................... 3E. Implementation Record and Major Factors Affecting the Project ..................................................:.4F. Project Sustainability .................................................. 9G. Bank Performance ................................................. 10H. Borrower Performance ................................................. 1 I1. Assessment of Outcome ................................................. . 12J. Future Operations ................................................. 12K. Key Lessons Learned ................................................. 13

PART II STATISTICAL ANNEXES

Table 1: Summary of AssessmentsTable 2: Project TimetableTable 3: Loan/Credit Disbursements: Cumulative, Estimated and

ActualTable 4: Studies Included in ProjectTable 5: Project CostsTable 6: Project FinancingTable 7: Status of Legal CovenantsTable 8: Bank Resources: Staff InputsTable 9: Bank Resources: Missions

APPENDICES

A. Aide Memoire (ICR Review Workshop)B. Borrower Contribution to the ICRC. Procurement and Disbursement Summary TablesD. List of Reports in the Project File

Map

ZIMBABWE

EMERGENCY DROUGHT RECOVERY AND MITIGATION PROJECT[CREDIT 2399-ZIM]

PREFACE

1. This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Emergency DroughtRecovery and Mitigation Project in Zimbabwe for which Credit 2399-ZIM in the amountof SDR 109.5 million (US$150 million equivalent) was approved on June 24, 1992 andmade effective on July 28, 1992.

2. The Credit was closed on March 31, 1995 compared to the original closing date ofMarch 31, 1994. Final disbursement took place on November 16, 1995, at which time theundisbursed balance of SDR 20,126,308.16 (US$ 27,914,435) was canceled.Cofinancing was provided by the Government of Norway.

3. The ICR was prepared by Stephen Brushett, Task Manager, AF1ZB of theSouthern Africa Department, Africa Region with additional contributions from CaesarChidawanyika, AFIZB, and Amanda Hammar, consultant. The ICR was reviewed byAtaman Aksoy, Chief, Macro, Trade and Industry Division (AF 1 MI) and by JudithEdstrom, Operations Adviser (AF IDR) of the Southern Africa Department, AfricaRegion. Rutendo Nyoni (AF 1 ZB), Rita Attia (AF 1 MI) and Joyce Chinsen (AF 1 EI)provided administrative and editorial support.

4. Preparation of this ICR was started during the Bank's supervision mission ofSeptember 1993 further to which an Issues Paper was prepared and reviewed in the Bankin November 1993. The ICR is also based on the President's Report; the CreditAgreement; implementation review reports and mission Aide Memoires; correspondencebetween the Bank and the Borrower; internal Bank memoranda; documentation on the1991/92 drought emergency and its aftermath prepared by the Borrower and by externalagencies. The Borrower contributed to the preparation of the ICR through preparing itsown completion report and through commenting on the draft ICR. A joint Government-Bank workshop to review the ICR was held June 21, 1995 in Harare, Zimbabwe.

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ZIMBABWE

EMERGENCY DROUGHT RECOVERY AND MITIGATION PROJECT(Credit 2399-ZIM)

EVALUATION SUMMARY

A. Introduction (Sections A, B)

1. The Emergency Drought Recovery and Mitigation Project (EDRMP) supportedby IDA Credit 2399 was the first emergency operation (in terms of OD 8.50) undertakenby the Bank in Zimbabwe. The project was intended to respond to the extraordinary andincremental foreign exchange requirements arising out of the failure of rains in the1991/92 growing season (the worst drought experienced by Zimbabwe in this century)which resulted in severe food and water shortages and which devastated the small scalecommunal farming sector.

B. Project Objectives and Components (Section C)

2. The project was defined as the Government's drought relief and recovery programas articulated in a Letter of Emergency Drought Policy (LEDP) prepared with extensiveassistance from the Bank, agreed at credit negotiations and signed June 2, 1992. Theproject's two principal objectives were the alleviation of human suffering and therestoration of productive capacity. The objective of the IDA credit was to provideZimbabwe with timely financial resources to finance this program and thus to helpnarrow the anticipated balance of payments gap resulting from incremental imports andreduced exports.

3. The total program cost was estimated as US$1,043.5 million of which US$788.3million in foreign exchange over the period April 1992 to August 1993. The programhad six principal components, i.e.:

(a) Importation of foodstuffs (US$453.6 million);

(b) Agricultural recovery program (US$263.3 million);

(c) Drought related truck and rail transport (US$217.2 million);

(d) Emergency water supply rehabilitation (US$58.3 million);

(e) Drought relief and supplementary feeding programs (US$48.9 million);

(f) Institutional strengthening (US$2.4 million).

4. In order to contribute effectively to Zimbabwe's financing needs, Bank support tothe project was designed to ensure rapid disbursement of the IDA Credit against anagreed and broadly defined list of eligible imported goods and services using appropriateprocurement procedures, principally simplified international competitive bidding (ICB).There were no special credit covenants or agreements.

5. The project objectives were reasonable and the project was designed to addressZimbabwe's drought recovery needs in an appropriate fashion. While the program wasgenerally well specified, the rehabilitation and recovery needs of the power sector hadbeen omitted and had subsequently to be included in the project.

C. Implementation Experience and Results (Sections D, E, F, G, H, I)

6. The project was successful in so far as the Government's drought relief andrecovery program, funded inter alia by the IDA Credit, alleviated human suffering,ensured adequate food supplies and contributed to rebuilding the small scale agriculturalsector which recorded a significantly increased harvest in 1992/93. A number ofelements in the recovery program, notably in the water sector, were not completed withinthe original time frame but have subsequently been addressed. Achievement ofinstitutional development objectives was patchy. A number of possible organizationaland policy improvements were identified. In addition, awareness of the need to preparefor, and properly manage drought, was heightened. However sustainability is rated asuncertain because of a lack of follow through on a comprehensive policy and institutionalframework for drought preparedness and drought mitigation.

7. An estimate of the actual total cost of the Government's program is put tentativelyat US$928.2 million for which financing of US$447.2 million is estimated to have comefrom external sources. The cost of emergency food imports is estimated as US$470.0million, the agricultural recovery program as US$87.6 million and the water program asUS$72.9 million. This suggests the LEDP estimate was on the high side, borne out bythe fact that in aggregate more foreign exchange was made available to finance droughtneeds than could be readily absorbed, i.e. the US$23.5 million equivalent canceled out ofthe IDA Credit and the very limited recourse to funds reallocated out of ongoingIDA/IBRD operations. Government did experience shortfalls in local currency arisingout of the inadequacy of budgetary allocations in 1992/93 and to some extent insubsequent years. The program was implemented in a timely manner where this wasdriven by tight deadlines, i.e. delivery of imported food and preparation for the 1992/93agricultural season. However some elements of the program were still being completedin the early part of 1995.

8. Only US$126.5 million equivalent of the US$150 million equivalent IDA creditwas disbursed. Of that only US$63.8 million was disbursed in the period of most criticalneed up to June 1993, and only US$73.8 million was disbursed up to the projectedcompletion of the project in September 1993. A number of factors contributed to thisrelatively disappointing disbursement performance. Project implementation was to be the

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responsibility of established units in the relevant executing ministries. However theircapacity was demonstrably not sufficient to handle the extra volume of work.Responsibility for project coordination was initially unclear and only resolved once theproject was underway. Procurement planning which should in retrospect have started atthe earliest opportunity only began after credit effectiveness was declared. Certain adhoc measures to address critical capacity constraints, taken together with a concertedBank/Borrower effort to accelerate procurement, were somewhat effective in improvingperformance.

9. The Bank performed commendably in assuring the quick processing of the Creditin line with OD 8.50. A significant contribution was made to the preparation of theGovernment's LEDP. Greater attention could have been given upfront to defining anappropriate project implementation structure and to accelerated procurement planning.The supervision effort was though substantial in quantitative terms and generallyeffective. The Borrower performed very well in being able to deliver the criticalelements, especially food relief, of the program under tight time and resource constraints.Greater use could have been made of external assistance, including private sector andNGOs, and there may have been benefits derived from greater decentralization ofresponsibility for implementation on the ground. Neither the Bank nor Borrower wasfully effective in delivering on the institutional development objectives of the project.

10. Overall the project outcome is assessed satisfactory. Major relief objectives wereachieved and the emergency situation was responded to in a timely and effective fashion.The recovery effort is only assessed as marginally satisfactory in the light ofimplementation delays in the emergency water program and the underachievement oftargets for the agricultural recovery program. The institutional development componentis rated as unsatisfactory. Limited institutional capacity was built for future droughtmanagement, and proposed policy and organizational improvements have still not beenfollowed through.

D. Summary of Findings, Future Operations and Lessons Learned (Section J, K)

11. Project implementation experience demonstrated the usefulness of the acceleratedproject processing framework as per OD 8.50. The project was though hampered bylimited implementation capacity, which was not fully addressed during projectimplementation. In addition, experience suggests that laudable attempts to design a fastdisbursing project, through such instruments as a positive import list, can be underminedby inadequate or tardy procurement planning and implementation.

12. Whilst the project was designed to respond to a specific drought emergency, boththe Bank and Borrower have realized that drought is, and will continue to be, a recurringphenomenon in Zimbabwe. This underlines the importance of more systematicallypursuing efforts at building drought management capacity, clarifying institutional rolesand developing a policy framework. Improved macroeconomic management andforecasting and improved sector planning, especially in the agriculture, water and power

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sectors which remain vulnerable to periodic drought of varying intensity seemparticularly important. This could initially be supported by the Bank through economicand sector work and agreed operations in the relevant sectors.

13. A lesson for the future is to more clearly distinguish between relief and short termrecovery on the one hand and medium term recovery and mitigation with regard tomethods of delivery and timeframe. Speed and effectiveness of implementation (with thebenefit of external and extraordinary assistance) must take priority for the former,whereas for the latter capacity building for the reduction of drought vulnerability shouldbe the focus. Drought and how it should be managed should feature more clearly infuture country assistance strategy and in Bank operations in Zimbabwe.

ZIMBABWE

EMERGENCY DROUGHT RECOVERY AND MITIGATION PROJECT(Credit 2399-ZIM)

PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT

A. Project Identity

- Project Name: Emergency Drought Recovery and Mitigation Project- Credit No: 2399-ZIM- RVP Unit: Africa Region, Southern Africa Department- Country: Zimbabwe- Sector: Emergency- Subsector: Agricultural Recovery

B. Project Background

1. The Emergency Drought Recovery and Mitigation Project (EDRMP) wasprepared by the Bank, using accelerated procedures provided for under OperationalDirective (OD) 8.50 on Emergency Recovery Assistance dated November 28, 1989, inresponse to the Government's request for assistance in the face of the most severedrought to afflict Zimbabwe (and Southern Africa generally) in this century. The majorlikely consequences of the drought, arising out of the failure of the rains in the 1991/92agricultural growing season, perceived at the time were: (a) food shortages which wereexpected to persist from April 1992 through August 1993, such shortages beingexacerbated by unusually low levels of grain stocks on hand at the beginning of 1992; (b)agricultural sector devastation, particularly in the small scale and communal subsectors,given anticipated acute shortages of seed and other inputs and of draught power; (c)reduced availability of safe water in both rural and urban areas with a potential negativeimpact on individual health and, directly ar.d indirectly (through curtailed hydroelectricitysupply), on productive sector output; and (d) risk of accelerated urban in-migration as aresult of declining income opportunities in the rural areas related to the drought.

2. EDRMP was prepared in the context of major economic transformation inZimbabwe, in the wake of the adoption in early 1991 of a Bank-supported EconomicStructural Adjustment Program (ESAP). The 1991/92 drought was seen as posing athreat to the successful implementation of ESAP and as having the potential to derail thepolicy reform process. From the outset the project was thus conceived with the objectiveof increasing resource transfers to Zimbabwe, from the Bank group as well as from otherdonors, to close the anticipated resource gap and to underpin continued economic reform.At project appraisal, GDP was anticipated to fall 9 percent in 1992 rather than increase 5percent as originally projected. The Government's fiscal deficit target of 6 percent ofGDP in 1992/93 was no longer viewed as feasible given anticipated drought reliefexpenditures. Drought induced imports, coupled with the loss of expected exports, wereanticipated to increase the 1992 current account deficit to nearly 20 percent of GDP

-2 -compared to 11 percent previously forecast. At the time of the February 1992Consultative Group meeting the Bank's preliminary estimate was that additional droughtrelated external financing of US$400 million would be required in 1992.

C. Project Objectives

3. The Drought Relief and Recovery Program. EDRMP was defined as theGovernment's drought relief and recovery program. The two principal objectives of theprogram were: to address the risk of widespread famine in Zimbabwe; and to provide theconditions under which the productive sectors could rebound quickly from the drought.The Government's programn was articulated in a Letter of Emergency Drought Policy(LEDP) which was prepared with extensive assistance from the Bank, agreed atnegotiations and signed June 2, 1992. The program had the following six principalcomponents, which covered immediate relief, short and medium term recovery as well asdrought mitigation and preparedness measures:

(a) Importation of foodstuffs (US$453.6 million);(b) Agricultural recovery program including tillage services, seed and crop

chemical distribution, and importation of equipment and spares (US$263.2million);

(c) Drought related truck and rail transportation (US$217.2 million);(d) Emergency water supply rehabilitation (US$58.3 million);(e) Expanded programs of Food for Work (FFW), Public Works and Child

Supplementary Feeding (CSFP) (US$48.9 million); and(f) Institutional strengthening aimed at improving short term drought

management capability and longer term drought mitigation capacity(US$2.4 million).

4. Total program cost was estimated as US$1,043.5 million of which US$788.3million in foreign exchange including US$334.7 million for non-food components. Theprogram was an ambitious one given the timeframe of April 1992 to August 1993. Thiswas however of necessity driven by the nature of the emergency and was an appropriateresponse in the circumstances. Comprehensive as it was, not all the elements of thedrought recovery program were fully defined at project appraisal. No provision wasmade for the power sector for which existing sources of finance, including the Bank'songoing and proposed lending operations, were expected to be sufficient to meet droughtrelated needs from the second half of 1992 onwards. This was addressed through theaddition of a power sector recovery component in September 1992 which provided forincremental electricity imports (in the light of low water levels and limited generationcapacity at Kariba) and for rehabilitation of the main thermal power plant at Hwange (toincrease its reliability and power availability factor). This notwithstanding, the project'sobjectives were reasonable and, subject to provisos discussed below, the project wasdesigned to meet Zimbabwe's drought recovery needs in an appropriate fashion.

5. Bank Group Support. Bank Group support to the project was primarily throughthe provision of an IDA credit of SDR 109.5 million (US$150 million). In designing the

credit, it was intended to give Government maximum flexibility in the use of IDA creditproceeds. To this end 100% of the proceeds of the credit were to be used to finance itemson a broadly defined positive list of imported goods and services for drought recoveryand mitigation purposes (though not for food relief). Procurement arrangements wereintended to support quick disbursement - goods and services to the value of overUS$500,000 were to be procured on the basis of simplified international competitivebidding (ICB); goods and services below this threshold were to be procured on the basisof at least three quotations from at least two countries. Limited provision of up toUS$500,000 was made for direct contracting and in addition a special procedure wasincluded in the Credit agreement for the procurement of seeds.

6. In line with OD 8.50, it was envisaged that the Bank's contribution would besupplemented by reallocation of the proceeds of Bank loans under implementation. Thiswas anticipated to amount to US$37 million, i.e. US$25 million from Urban II (Loan3079), US$7 million from Agriculture Credit and Export Promotion (Loan 3063) andUS$5 million from Railways II (Loan 3273). In addition and at the request of theGovernment, the Bank agreed to administer grant funds of NKK7 million (US$1 millionequivalent) from the Government of Norway which were to be used to finance studiesand technical assistance required for drought mitigation under the program.

D. Achievement of Project Objectives

7. The project was successful in that the two major goals were achieved - the risk offamine was averted, the recovery of the productive sectors of the economy wasfacilitated. This finding is qualified by the fact that the achievements were more limitedin the case of medium term recovery and mitigation than in the case of relief and shortterm recovery.

8. Imports of foodstuffs, including maize, wheat, sugar, pulses and oils, in theperiod to June 1993 were critical in averting famine - not a single death was reported asdirectly attributable to drought related malnutrition. In agricultural recovery, aninnovative program for the distribution of seed, fertilizer and crop chemical packs tocommunal and small scale farmers was mounted in short order. Despite the failure of thetillage program to take off to any extent and despite the fact that the crop pack programhad to be scaled back because of budget and procurement induced delays, these inputshelped promote a major turnaround in agricultural output and a consequent increase inrural incomes from early 1993. The emergency water plan helped to meet most of theimmediate needs and more particularly enabled Government to accelerate its program foraugmenting water supplies, though more so in rural than in urban areas. The additionalprogram component for the power sector had a positive impact on availability andreliability of electricity supply through both facilitating a higher level of power importsand financing the rehabilitation of the Hwange power station. Achievement ofinstitutional development objectives was patchy and capacity building for futuredrought management was very limited. The project did however help identify areas forimprovement in the management of the drought relief and agricultural recovery programand also facilitated the introduction of new technologies in the water sector.

- 4 -

9. A significant inflow of incremental external resources, including but not limitedto the IDA credit, was effected. This inflow assisted the economy to recover to a certainextent the growth momentum that was impacted adversely by the drought. Real GDPgrowth of about 2.4 percent was recorded in 1993 on the back of major increases inagricultural output in the 1992/93 growing season and of a rebound in manufacturing andservices activity in the second half of the year. 1994 growth was 4.9 percent. Asanticipated the fiscal deficit rose in 1992/93 to an estimated outturn of 11.4 percent ofGDP but this was reduced to 7.8 percent in 1993/94. Drought induced imports of anestimated US$400 million pushed the 1992 current account deficit to 11.4 percent ofGDP. The deficit narrowed in 1993 but was still 5.7 percent of GDP given thestagnation in export levels. As these began to rebound in 1994 the deficit was cut furtherto 4.5 percent of GDP. A project risk identified at appraisal was that Zimbabwe mighthave faced difficulties in continuing to meet its external debt obligations. External debtincreased sharply in 1992 and the debt service to exports ratio reached 31.8 percent at theend of that year and an estimated 31.2 percent at end 1993. Whilst this ratio is high,Zimbabwe has still been able to service its debts and the problem is expected to ease asexport earnings rebound. A facilitating factor was that most drought assistance was ongrant or concessional loan terms.

E. Implementation Record and Major Factors Affecting the Project

10. Project Processing. The project was prepared in short order in the light of theemergency situation. Government requested Bank assistance on March 18, 1992 and acombined preparation and appraisal mission was fielded March 23, 1992. The missioncompleted its work within four weeks. Due to accelerated procedures for projectprocessing as per OD 8.50, negotiations for the IDA credit were completed before endMay and Board approval was obtained June 24, 1992. The IDA credit for EDRMP wassigned June 30, 1992 and became effective July 28, 1992. The Bank fielded a launchmission beginning July 27, 1992 just prior to which (July 13-14, 1992) a procurementplanning workshop for executing agencies was organized with Bank support. Thismission was instrumental in focusing Government attention on how the proceeds on thecredit were to be used and in drawing up a timetable for key procurement actions.

11. Project Implementation Overview. In line with the Government's programoutlined in the LEDP, EDRMP was expected to be completed by September 1993. Theprogram was generally implemented in a timely manner. However it was eventuallycompleted only in May 1995 due to delays in implementation of elements of the mediumterm recovery program - even then the mitigation program was only partially completed.Two particular factors delayed implementation of the recovery program: thereprogramming of the emergency water plan to bring in the private sector for boreholedrilling; the introduction of a power sector component to finance inter alia spare parts forthe overhaul of Hwange power station. Both these elements however eventuallycontributed, and still are contributing, significantly to the drought recovery process.Implementation of the main components of the project is treated in turn below.

- 5 -12. Food. 2.5 million tons of foodstuffs were imported by June 1993. In general,food was efficiently distributed internally though transportation bottlenecks at districtlevel did occur. Otherwise the performance of regional and domestic infrastructureexceeded nearly all expectations, the capacity of said infrastructure to handle theunprecedented level of food imports being cited as a major project risk at appraisal. Thiswas critical in averting the main risk of the drought - widespread famine. The foodimportation effort facilitated the Government's drought relief and child supplementaryfeeding programs which, supplemented by donor and NGO assistance, reachedrespectively 5.9 million persons and 1 million children at their height in October/November 1992. Government's PCR suggests an average 88 percent of those applyingfor relief were fed - an impressive achievement given that at times this was equivalent to50 percent of the total population of the country. There were though some downsidefactors, i.e.: the average relief distribution per head worked out at about 5-7 kg per headas opposed to the 15 kg per head objective because of transport and budget constraints; itproved difficult to develop an effective targeting strategy such that much of the reliefeffort benefited households other than the poorest; the FFW program was somewhat lessproductive than expected as the planning of the component was deficient; additionally,implementation was adversely affected by the fact that materials were not made availablein the required quantities in a timely fashion.

13. Agricultural recovery. An estimated 920,000 farm households were assistedwith inputs ("crop packs") thus setting the stage for a significant recovery in agriculturaloutput in the 1992/93 season. This helped to offset another project risk cited at appraisal,that urban rather than rural constituencies would receive a disproportionate share ofproject financing and thus benefits. Food security was in effect restored in most areas ofthe country as a result of the project which produced major increases in production andyields over 1991/92. Nonetheless performance fell well short of target in that, because ofbudget and procurement induced delays, the program could not be mounted on the scaleoriginally envisaged, i.e. crop packs were sufficient for 0.5 hectares per household, andnot 1.25 hectares as per the program. A successfully implemented cotton inputs schemehelped about 100,000 individual farmers and over 1,000 groups obtain seeds and inputson a credit basis - the impact on cotton output in both 1992/93 and 1993/94 has beensignificant and is expected to be sustainable. Much less successful were the livestock andtillage programs - only 2 percent and 10 percent of the respective programs werecompleted. Both were underfunded and late in starting and had a minimal impact.Government's PCR suggests, for the tillage program at least, that greater success couldhave been achieved if farmers had shared costs with the Government.

14. Emergency Water. The project successfully addressed critical water shortagesand helped avert possible health risks from unavailability of potable water, especially inthe rural areas. Between June 1992 and June 1993, water point availability improved dueto a combination of emergency works and river and water table recharge from the1992/93 rains. The project was successful in that most physical targets were met. 95percent of the original borehole siting and drilling program and 80 percent of the welldeepening program were completed. Completion was delayed by slow procurement,especially for the additional private sector drilling program so that the medium term

recovery effort was not achieved during the project's original time frame. Sustainabilitydepends on improved future contingency planning and on greater attention being paid towater conservation strategies as well as on increased local participation in planning,operating and maintaining water points.

15. Power Sector. The project facilitated incremental importation of power, largelyfrom Zaire and Zambia, to address a larger than originally anticipated shortfall in supplyin 1992 and 1993. In addition, spare parts and equipment for the Hwange power stationwere imported to increase the reliability and efficiency of this source of thermal power.The results were strongly positive in that power availability improved over the course ofthe project life and the costs to industry and commerce were minimized. These resultsare expected to be sustainable given the strong performance of the parastatal ZimbabweElectricity Supply Authority (ZESA) which implemented a Performance ImprovementProgram starting in 1994 and which continues to enjoy Bank support through an ongoinglending operation, Power III (Loan 3639).

16. Institutional Strengthening. Some progress was made on the program of studiesand technical assistance to be undertaken under the project. Technical assistance designedto strengthen implementation capacity for relief and recovery was generally timely but itseffectiveness was somewhat reduced by confusion in the roles to be played by differentagencies of Government. The components aimed at drought mitigation and preparednesslacked consistent and clear attention and there was very little follow up on the activitieswhich were completed. However the EDRMP experience has strengthened theconstituency within Government for greater strategic attention to be paid to droughtmanagement in Zimbabwe.

17. Project Costs and Financing. Project cost has been estimated as US$928.2million, 12 percent less than projected at appraisal. Total cost of food imports isestimated as US$470 million of which about US$244 million was financed fromGovernment's own resources and about US$226 million by donors. The agriculturalrecovery program was estimated to have cost US$87.6 million compared to a projectedUS$263.3 million which reflects the degree of underachievement of physical targets. Theemergency water plan was estimated to have cost US$72.9 million compared to aprojected US$58.3 million, reflecting some reprogramming and the cost ofimplementation delays. Even with the addition of the power sector component, whoseestimated cost is US$62.2 million, total foreign financing of US$754 million (of whichUS$326 million from domestic contribution) was more than adequate to meet theincremental foreign exchange requirements of the program. Local cost financing wasexpected to be provided entirely from domestic contribution. Such financing was notalways made available in a timely or sufficient manner during project implementation.The local cost requirements of the program, and this was particularly the case for theagricultural recovery component, were not fully reflected in the 1992/93 budget. Thedeficiency was however made up in supplementary allocations and recourse to donorfunds. Further to a Government request, the Bank agreed to finance out of the IDAcredit, on an exceptional basis, up to US$8 million of the foreign exchange component oflocally produced fertilizer. In addition, the Bank agreed to finance a portion of the local

costs of the borehole drilling program. Notwithstanding these measures, the local costsof the medium term elements of the recovery and mitigation program, especially with thewater sector and the livestock program, were also not fully budgeted for in the followingtwo fiscal years.

18. Bank Financing. Only US$126.5 million equivalent disbursed out of theUS$150 million equivalent IDA credit. Given both that the credit proceeds were to beallocated on a flexible basis, as needed by Government, against a positive list of importsand given that total foreign financing for the project was more than adequate, this is notnecessarily surprising. It could be argued that a greater portion of credit proceeds couldhave been disbursed if local costs had been made eligible at the outset - given that localcost financing turned out to be a bigger constraint than foreign financing. IDA creditproceeds were allocated in the following manner: Electricity imports US$27 million;power sector spares US$20.2 million; petroleum products US$16.3 million; agriculturalrecovery program US$32.2 million; emergency water program US$24.3 million; other(FFW program support, truck and tractor spares) US$6.5 million.

19. The Bank agreed to make available 20 percent of the proceeds of SAL/SAC I(Loan 3434/Credit 2331), i.e. US$35 million equivalent, to help finance the purchase ofimported maize. Very limited recourse otherwise was made by the Government to fundsreallocated under existing projects supported by Bank loans or IDA credits. OnlyUS$995,000 was utilized for railway spares (Railways II Project, Loan 3273). The Bankagreed to reallocate an amount of US$3.9 million from the Agricultural Credit and ExportPromotion Project (Loan 3063) for the purposes of financing stockfeed but this optionwas never exercised by Government. Similarly no proposals were forthcoming for thereallocation of Urban II Project (Loan 3079) loan proceeds for priority urban waterprojects. The IDA administered Norwegian grant funds were not utilized at all, althougha number of activities for which the funding was earmnarked were either successfullyaccomplished, i.e. a drought relief program review workshop; a retrospective analysis ofthe agricultural recovery program, or started, i.e. an urban water conservation strategy(see Table 4).

20. Disbursement. Disbursement performance lagged behind expectations with onlyUS$63.8 million equivalent disbursed in fiscal year 1992/93 against a projected amountof US$85 million. Only US$73.8 million had been disbursed by the original completiondate of the project, that is September 30, 1993 (the original credit closing date was March31, 1994). These lags are accounted for by delays in the implementation of the mediumterm recovery and mitigation components of the project that obliged Government to maketwo separate requests for extension of the credit closing date in order to facilitatedisbursements. The Bank agreed to a six month extension of the credit closing date toSeptember 30, 1994 further to Government's request of November 5, 1993. A secondextension to March 31, 1995 was agreed on the basis of Government's request datedSeptember 2, 1994. The final disbursement was on November 16, 1995.

21. Both Bank and Borrower were conscious of the need to address the abovereferenced lags in disbursement through amendment to the disbursement provisions of the

-8-credit agreement. A number of actions were in fact taken which helped somewhat toaccelerate disbursements during the life of the project, although, as discussed below,weaknesses in procurement and project management arrangements were fundamentally atthe root cause of the lags. Firstly, the Bank agreed to increase the authorized allocation tothe Special Account from US$10 million to US$25 million. Secondly, the Bank agreedto three separate requests from Government to amend the disbursement (andprocurement) schedules of the credit agreement. The amendment of September 23, 1992added water sector and electricity sector items to the positive list and increased the ceilingfor negotiated direct procurements to US$5 million from US$0.5 million. Theamendment of May 19, 1993 further widened the provision for electricity imports andraised the direct procurement ceiling again to US$10 million. The amendment of January19, 1995 added a provision for the financing of 80 percent of local costs of water sectordrilling services and consultancy services.

22. Procurement. A number of factors inherent in the procurement arrangements forthe project contributed to the relatively disappointing disbursement performance in spiteof the above mentioned measures. The design of the procurement arrangements as wellas the management of procurement under the IDA Credit do not appear to have been fullyconsistent with the needs of quick disbursement. Whilst it may be acknowledged thatsimplified ICB was chosen in an effort to accelerate the procurement process andprobably helped to contain costs of imports, the threshold of US$500,000 appearsrelatively low compared to that agreed for previous and ongoing structural adjustmentoperations in Zimbabwe. Also, relatively limited provision was made for special ordirectly negotiated procurement in the credit agreement (though the ceiling for directcontracting was subsequently increased) which could have been effective in acceleratingprocurement for the short term recovery component of the project, especially inagricultural recovery. Provision was made for retroactive financing of up to 20 percent ofthe credit amount but this was only used to a limited extent (for electricity imports) due tothe difficulty in identifying any qualifying procurements.

23. More critically perhaps were the capacity constraints which emerged inGovernment procurement units which had been anticipated in project documents, butwhich were not fully reflected in project design. Lack of timely procurement planningand the delays in getting procurement done created a major initial difficulty which theBank and the Borrower seem to have been constantly struggling to overcome. Up untilJuly 1992, very little attention appears to have been given to procurement planning whichthus delayed the start of procurement and disbursement under the project. This processneeded to start, in retrospect, at a much earlier stage in the project cycle in order, withregard to public sector procurements, to clearly identify and budget the cost of items to befinanced out of the credit. Nonetheless it should be acknowledged that a considerableeffort was then invested by both Bank and borrower staff to take the necessary steps forprocurement to go forward. Bank input of staff time (including 100 staffweeks ofsupervision) was well in excess of what had been forecast and Government took anumber of albeit ad hoc measures to strengthen the capacity of existing procurement unitsboth of which responses were effective up to a point. In any event, limited experiencewith Bank procurement procedures was a constraint experienced in some of these units

- 9 -It could be thus argued that much stronger consideration should have been given upfrontto the employment of appropriately qualified and mandated procurement agents or similarexternal assistance - and that the Bank should have tried harder to overcome anymisgivings Government may have had on this matter.

24. Project Management. Implementation of the program, and of the particulartasks associated with procurement and disbursement of the IDA credit, placedconsiderable strains on Govermment capacity. A considerable number of Governmentofficials had, in addition to the regular tasks, to carry out drought related activities. Thegovernment established a special Task Force of the National Civil ProtectionCoordination Committee (NCPCC) under the chairmanship of the Vice President tomanage the relief and recovery effort. The Task Force was assisted by six technicalsubcommittees and an advisory council with private sector representation. The TaskForce performed well, in relation to the implementation of the relief program, in spite ofthe acute pressure of time and its limited capacity. It did not have direct responsibility forthe management of the IDA financing, nor generally for medium term recovery andmitigation, which was left unclear at project preparation and negotiation. It was finallyresolved only on July 21, 1992 that the Ministry of Finance (MOF) would take on thisresponsibility, one which it is not normally asked to fill nor indeed is it well equipped tocarry out. MOF nonetheless was instrumental in coordinating procurement through themedium of weekly meetings with Bank and executing agency staff which helpedaccelerate implementation. These meetings however tailed off towards the middle of1993 after which there was no formal coordinating mechanism for management of projectimplementation. Responsibility for the management of the institutional developmentcomponent, much of which was expected to be financed out of the IDA administeredNorwegian grant, was also unclear until it was established in December 1992 that thiswas to be coordinated by the National Economic Planning Commission (NEPC). Whilsta number of planned activities did eventually proceed, overall coordination of thiscomponent was lacking and no funds were withdrawn from the grant. From thisexperience, it could be argued that project management could have been improved if animplementation unit of dedicated staff had been created, possibly under the Task Force,to handle the IDA funded component at least through the short term recovery phase.Alternatively, a more systematic approach to strengthening the capacity of existingagencies, greater use of private sector and NGO capabilities and, where feasible,decentralization of management of implementation to provincial or district level mayhave paid greater dividends.

F. Project Sustainability

25. The project's primary aim was to respond effectively and in a timely fashion to aspecific emergency. However, as per OD 8.50, it was recognized in the design of theproject, and is reflected in the Government's LEDP which sets out the relief and recoveryprogram, that drought mitigation policies should be developed and requisite measuresimplemented. Whilst such measures have not been pursued on a systematic basis acrossthe board, nor was the IDA administered Norwegian grant provided to this end utilized, astart has been made in drawing lessons from the 1991/92 drought emergency and in

- 10-applying this to institutional roles and the design of mitigation policies. This isparticularly true in regard to agricultural and social welfare policies and programs. Inboth cases there is a particular enhanced awareness of the need for drought preparedness,contingency planning and associated training with the emphasis on pushing responsibilityto the provincial and district level where possible. However the follow up to date onconclusions and recommendations arising out of this work has been very limited. By theadmission of its own PCR, Government needs to diligently pursue this to ensure that thenecessary capacity building measures are taken, that institutional roles are clarified, andthat the design of future assistance strategies is strengthened. In addition, it will beimportant that appropriate policies are put into effect and maintained in sectors likely tobe impacted negatively in future by periodic drought of varying intensity. This certainlyapplies to the agricultural sector and specifically to grain stocks and early warningsystems in order that the impact of future droughts on food supplies is mitigated. Theabsence or incompleteness of such policies is widely seen in retrospect to haveexacerbated the impact of the 1991/92 drought.

26. Project sustainability also arises in the sense that considerable additions toinfrastructure, particularly in the water and power sectors, have been brought about. Thispotentially will help mitigate the impact of any future droughts, but only if theinfrastructure is properly operated and maintained. The role of communities will becomemore important in the future for the water sector. At the onset of the drought, watershortages were exacerbated by the poor state of repair of many facilities. It is importantthat the drought recovery investments be fully integrated into ongoing sector programsand that the medium term funding for these programs is secured. The need forappropriate policies on operations and maintenance in the power sector also applies onthe same grounds as well as on the management of the level of water in Lake Kariba forhydroelectric power generation. This is being pursued in the context of the Bank'songoing lending to the power sector.

27. On balance however sustainability is considered uncertain. There is a continuedabsence an overarching institutional framework for drought preparedness and droughtmanagement and the incompleteness of the application of lessons to strategy and policyformulation in the various sectors. There is a stronger constituency than hitherto toaddress these weaknesses, as evidenced by the discussion at the Bank-Government jointICR review workshop. There is also evidence at sectoral level, at least in power andagricultural sectors, that national strategies and investment planning, are now factoring inmore systematically drought preparedness and mitigation. These developments howeverwill need to be underpinned by a more consistent economy wide approach to droughtmanagement for the project to be considered sustainable.

G. Bank Performance

28. The Bank performed creditably in facilitating the quick processing of the projectand using the provisions of OD 8.50 to accelerate the various preparatory steps up toBoard approval. The project appears in the circumstances to have been well designed,with some provisos, to respond to the emergency at hand and generally matched up well

-11 -with the need for flexibility in the use of IDA funds. Substantial input was made into thepreparation of the Government's LEDP outlining the program the project was intended tosupport - this included assistance in the design of a highly innovative approach toagricultural recovery. Procurement arrangements however do not appear to have beenfully compatible with the need for rapid disbursement of funds and the Bank should haveeither anticipated, or else pressed Government harder, on solutions to implementationproblems that were likely to arise. The Bank did however provide very intensive supportto Government throughout project implementation which was facilitated by assigningtask management to the Zimbabwe Resident Mission. In addition there was intensiveinvolvement of specialist procurement staff which helped the process of training of keyGovernment staff in Bank procurement procedures both through formal workshops andinformal on-the-job training. Generally the Bank fitted well into the role of supportingthe efforts of the Government. Where it tried to go ahead of Government it was lesssuccessful. An example of this was the program of studies under the Norwegian grantwhere the Bank sought to take initial responsibility to accelerate the process. Thishowever appears to have resulted in a problem of ownership of the program whichadversely impacted implementation and delayed the benefit to be derived from thestudies. Though formal responsibility was vested as of December 1992 in the NationalEconomic Planning Commission (NEPC), ownership of the program was still weak andthis surely contributed to the lack of disbursement of the Norwegian funds and the limitedfollow up to the studies that were undertaken.

H. Borrower Performance

29. The Borrower performed well with regard to the implementation of the programwhich imposed tremendous pressure on the Government apparatus to deliver the reliefand recovery effort in a short time frame. Government ownership of the project, with theexception noted in the paragraph above, was clear from the outset as the project was infact the Government's program. The necessary broad and high level commitment to theprogram existed throughout. Whilst the overall organization and management of theprogram was good, existing units and structures in the key executing agencies were notup to managing all elements of the program in a timely fashion. Limited capacity andlack of appropriate emergency procedures clearly delayed procurement, particularly thatfinanced out of the proceeds of the IDA Credit. Underfunding of some aspects of theprogram, as set out in the LEDP, in the 1992/93 budget also hampered implementation.However the Borrower was responsive to the need to strengthen coordination andmonitoring arrangements in the course of implementation and this helped keep delayswithin reasonable limits. Performance could perhaps have been further improved if moreinvolved staff were dedicated to project implementation throughout rather than having tobalance this with their other responsibilities. However the approach to increasingimplementation capacity was more ad hoc than systematic. In future emergencies,greater use from the outset of private sector and NGO capabilities might help reduce theimplementation bottleneck. One aspect of the program however was not given systematicattention - institution building for longer term drought preparedness and droughtmitigation measures. For the benefits of project to be sustainable, the Borrower will needto continue to address this matter and to build on the results of the response to the

- 12-1991/92 drought. Government's own PCR clearly recognizes a number of weaknesses inthe response to the drought and discusses the type of institutional structures andpreparedness and mitigation programs and policies that might be put in place.

I. Assessment of Outcome

30. In overall terms, the outcome of the project is rated as satisfactory. The projectlargely achieved its objectives of alleviating suffering and restoring productive capacityin the aftermath of the 1991/92 drought. This achievement was in the face of very tighttime constraints, limited institutional capacity and imperfectly defined policy andinstitutional framework for drought management. In terms of addressing the specificcomponents of the drought, the project was fully satisfactory with regard to the foodrelief and associated transportation component which, quite rightly, was given highestpriority by Government and donors. The recovery elements of the program, both shortterm and the medium term, are assessed as only marginally satisfactory (with theexception of power, which was fully satisfactory) as the project objectives were onlypartially achieved during the project timeframe - the physical shortfall on the agriculturalrecovery program is most striking here. The institutional strengthening component,which did have some short term elements but was mostly oriented towards longer termmitigation, is assessed as unsatisfactory. In assessing the contribution of the IDA creditseparately, the outcome is marginally satisfactory given the objective of providingZimbabwe with incremental financial resources was achieved. This assistance was nothowever as timely as it should have been, or needed to be, and its beneficial impact wasthus much less than anticipated.

J. Future Operations

31. There is no plan for the future operation of the project as the project was explicitlydesigned to address the consequences of the 1991/92 drought over the period April 1992to August 1993. However current and future operations of the Bank in Zimbabwe, asreflected in the Country Assistance Strategy, will need to demonstrate, where applicable,how the process of continued improvement in drought management capability will besupported. Operations in the urban and rural infrastructure sectors, and in the power andagriculture sectors will all contribute in this fashion. With regard to the water sector, theBank will agree with Government on the monitoring indicators that will be used tomeasure future performance in the rural water subsector with a particular view toensuring: the integration of facilities provided under the project into the core nationalprogram; the adoption of an appropriate policy and institutional framework; adequateallocations for operation and maintenance expenditure; and enhancement of the role ofbeneficiary communities in the management of water supplies. These concerns should beintegrated into any future support of the Bank Group for water resources management inZimbabwe, which may now become a higher priority given the continuation of dryconditions in the country since the 1991/92 drought.

- 13-K. Key Lessons Leamed

32. The principal lessons learned from the EDRMP operation are given below insummary form:

(a) From the viewpoint of the Bank, OD 8.50 provided a very usefulframework for accelerated project processing in an emergency situation.EDRMP suffered though, as have many Bank/IDA funded emergencyprojects, from slow disbursements and delays in implementation whichdetracted from what was in many respects a successful project.Implementation arrangements would ideally need to be more carefullydesigned and fully articulated at the outset to provide additionalimplementation capacity, in particular in the area of procurement planningand monitoring, for the duration of the emergency. This could be achievedby the use of procurement agents or other short term external assistance,which could come from official sources or alternatively the private andNGO sectors. Such measures would need to be accompanied bydeveloping Government's own emergency procedures;

(b) EDRMP experience illustrates the difficulty of keeping the relief and shortterm recovery effort and the medium term recovery and long termmitigation process in reasonable balance during implementation. It issuggested that these elements need to be more clearly distinguished andthat the relief and short term recovery effort be managed, as proposedabove, on an extraordinary basis. The medium term recovery andmitigation effort would seek to emphasize the importance of institutionbuilding but would need to provide a more realistic time frame for suchactivities to be completed. EDRMP experience also suggests that morethought and attention has to be given to thinking through the mitigationstrategy, if not possible at the outset, then at least at some defined pointduring project implementation;

(c) EDRMP experience suggests limits to the usefulness of the exclusive useof a positive list of eligible imports approach to the provision of IDAassistance in emergencies, particular where local financing shortages maybe important and where local products and suppliers are available. Theeligible list of imports approach also created expectations about projectimplementation and credit disbursement that were not realisticallyachievable, given the procurement arrangements and the constraintsexperienced in project management. Any future emergency operationswould need to define upfront how and when goods and services wereexpected to be procured;

(d) Both Government and Bank were able to garner considerable experiencefrom the project from which to fine tune their future approaches. It is thusimportant on both sides that the drought is not considered an isolated event

- 14 -(particularly as drought is a recurring phenomenon) but that mechanismsare set in train to take on board lessons learnt and translate into effectivefuture action. To this end Government should be encouraged to developappropriate policy framework for drought preparedness and mitigation.The Bank could assist through targeted economic and sector work andselected lending operations.

ZIMBABWE

EMERGENCY DROUGHT RECOVERY AND MITIGATION PROJECT(Credit 2399-ZIM)

PART II: STATISTICAL ANNEXES

Table 1 Summary of Assessments

A. Achievement of objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Notapplicable(10 ("I) (1/) )

Macro policies n nn

U U Li U

Sector policies

Li U U U

Financial objectives n n n n

U ULi U U

Institutional development n n nI/

i Li Li U

Physical objectives n n n n

11 U U U

Poverty reduction n n n nw/

11 U U U

Gender issues n n n n

11 U U U

Other social objectives n n n n-V

Li U U U

Environmental objectives n nn

Li U U U

Public sector management n n n v

Li Li U U

Private sector development n n n n

Li Li U U

Other (specify n n n nLi Li U U

B. Project sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain(/) (1) (/)

n n n

U UiL

HighlyC. Bank performarice satisacltor Satisfactory Deficient

(8/) (/) (1/)

Identification n

Preparation assistance n n n./

Appraisal n n /

Supervision n n

UJ U U

HighlyD. Borrowerp1erformance satisfactor Satisfactory Deficien

Preparation) n/ n/Preparationnnn

Implementation nn

Covenant compliance n n nV/

U u U

Operation (if applicable) n n nU U U

Highly HighlyE. Assessmet of outcome' satisfactry Satisfactory Unsafisfactr unsatisfactor

n n n n

U u U U

lRelief Highly Satisfactory

Short term recovery Marginally Satisfactory

Medium term recovery Marginally Satisfactory

Drought migation and preparedness Unsatisfactory

Table 2: Project Timetable

Date actualSteps in Project Cycle Date planned latest estimate

Identification (Executive Project Summary) NA

Preparation March-April 1992

Appraisal March - April 1992

Negotiations May 26-28, 1992

Letter of emergency drought policy June 2, 1992

Board presentation June 24, 1992

Signing June 30, 1992

Effectiveness July 10, 1992 July 28, 1992

Project Completion September 30, 1993 May 1995

Credit Closing March 31, 1994 March 31, 1995

Table 3: Loan/Credit Disbursements. Cumulative Estimated Actual

(US$ millions)

FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96

Appraisal estimate 85.00 150.00 150.00 150.00

Actual 63.80 109.94 120.90 126.5

Actual as % of estimate 73.06 73.29 80.60 84.30

Date of final disbursement November 16,1995

Table 4: Studies and Technical Assistance included in Project

Study/Technical Assistance Purpose as defined at Status Impact of Studyappraisal/redefined

Food Security Project Reform of pricing policy, agricultural Successfully completed with USAID assistance. Study had major impact on agriculturalparastatal reform and strategic planning sector reform and is supportive of

drought mitigation.

Technical and Engineering Support to institutional capacity to Drought related assistance completed though Assistance helped accelerate procurementAssistance to NAC manage drought related needs in rural NORAD support for the sector is ongoing. in emergency water and other

water sector components of the Government'sprogram.

Emergency preparedness Assessment of early warning systems Successfully completed with USAID assistance. Famine Early Warning System (FEWS)study and information flows has helped increase Government capacity

to respond to drought relief needs.

Technical assistance to Support to institutional capacity for Planner was provided with NORAD assistance Assistance helped increase capacity at aDepartment of Social Welfare management, monitoring, auditing and and USAID helped fund short term assistance critical juncture. Proposals for long term

accounting related to Food for Work for monitoring. strengthening of drought relief programProgram. developed at April 1993 workshop but

not yet acted upon.

Assistance to the NAC for Provide training to operatives in use of Program mounted in 1992/93 for DDF and New technology has gained acceptancehydrogeology technology this technology in rural water sector. DWD operatives with SIDA assistance. in Zimbabwe. Effectiveness in practice

has been limited by inadequate O&Mprovision.

Drought mitigation study Design sectoral strategies to minimize Government decided not to proceed although A number of retrospective studydrought impact on productivity, funding identified under IDA administered conclusions and recommendations areincomes and services Norwegian grant. Retrospective studies of being acted upon.

agricultural and water programs undertakeninstead. Agricultural report submitted October1993.

Study/Technical Assistance Purpose as defined at Status Impact of Studyappraisal/redefined

Implementation of disaster Follow up to recommendations of No action although funding identified under N/Amanagement strategies earlier studies including contingency IDA administered Norwegian grant.

planning for future disasters. Government however now intends to reviewarrangements and commence capacity buildingprogram in 1995.

Assistance to the Ministry of Support to institutional capacity for Successfully completed with UNICEF Options for medium term reinforcementHealth planning, logistics and nutritional assistance. of the program are to be reviewed.

surveillance for child supplementaryfeeding program.

Drought emergency relief Logistical support and enhancement of Successfully completed with USAID assistance. Support to transport operationsprogram early warning systems on region wide coordination during 1992/93 was critical

basis. to the successful food importationprogram.

National urban water Develop strategy and a program for loss Ongoing with funding identified under IDA Limited impact thus far. Awareness ofconservation strategy reduction including training workshops. administered Norwegian grant. Program need for improved water management

guidelines developed and initial workshops held has been raised. Government will seekbut program implementation has been delayed. funds to enable program to continue.Bulawayo case study completed with ODAassistance.

Contingency study of urban Analysis of prospective impact and Study completed October 1992 with UNCHS No follow up. Some recommendationsin-migration response to accelerate urban in- assistance. likely to be pursued under disaster

migration. management program review.

Assistance to implementation Provide a fund to finance short-term Government determined extra assistance was not N/Aof agricultural recovery hiring of local consultants to augment needed.program implementation capacity.

Study on non-traditional Study and action plan for encouraging No study was undertaken. However such N/Aincome generating activities non-traditional income generation activities are to be supported through a newly

activities in drought prone areas. approved IFAD project.

Table 5: Project Costs

Appraisal estimate Actual/latest estimate

Local Foreign Total Local Costs Foreign TotalCosts Costs Costs

Item (Z$mn) (US$mn) (US$mn) (Z$mn) (US$mn) (US$mn)

1. Food Imports - 453.6 453.6 - 470.0' 470.0

2. Drought relief 67.1 4.2 17.5 23.52 1.62 4.72

3. Public Works 44.0 1.6 10.4 36.93 - 5.83

4. Child Supplementary Feeding 102.3 - 21.0 78.44 30.94 43.84

5. Transportation 434.5 130.3 217.0 562.55 90.9I 179.7

6. Agricultural Recovery 591.2 145.2 263.3 211 .J6 54.3' 87.66

7. Emergency Water 36.5 51.0 58.3 153. 7 48.67 72.97

8. Institutional Capacity Building - 2.4 2.4 - 1.58 1.58

9. Power Sector NA NA NA 40.08 55.98 62/28

Total 1,275.6 788.3 1,043.5 1,106.0 753.7 928.2

l RBZ estimate2 DSW and Bank estimate3 -4CPCC report4 IUNICEF and MOHCW estimate (inc. UNICEF direct contributions of US$2,548 million)5 WFP estimate average Z$225/ton local transport6 From Working Paper (Caesar Chidawanyika)7 From Working Paper (Amanda Hammar)B Bank estimate

NB: Appraisal ex rate USSI = ZS4.870Estimate ex rate (1994/95) US$ = Z$6.337

Table 6: Project Financing

Appraisal estimate Actual/latest estimate

Z$mn (IJS$mn) Z$mn (US$mn)

Local Foreign Total Local Costs Foreign TotalCosts Costs Costs

Source

IDA- EDRMP 150.0 150.0 28.1 121.1 126.5

IBRD - Existing loan portfolio - 37.0 37.0 - 1.0 1.0

IBRD/1DA - SAL/SAC I - - - 35.0 35.0

Cofinancing institutions - 1.0 1.0 - -

Other extemal sources - 300.0 300.0 116.5' 270.71 289.11

Domestic contribution 1,275.6 301.5 556.5 961.4 325.9 476.6

Total 1,275.6 | 788.3 | 1,043.5 1,106.0 753.7 928.2

1 Estimate based on NCPCC and other reports

NB: Appraisal ex rate US$1 = Z$4.870Es.imate cx rate US$1 = Z$6.337

Table 7: Status of Legal Covenants

Agreement Section Covenant type Present Original Revised Description of Covenant Commentsstatus fulfillment date fulfillment date

Credit 3.02 Procurement C Life of project Life of project Carry out procurement in Compliedaccordance with Schedule 3 unlessotherwise agreed

3.03 Institutional CP Life of project Life of project Maintain National Civil Protection Committee was actuallyCoordination Committee until wound up in May 1993.project completion.

3.04 Project C Life of project Life of project Maintain procurement units Complied, but units were notImplementation existing in project executing generally fully effectiveArrangements agencies until project completion without external assistance

3.05a Monitoring/Review C 11/92 9/92 Exchange views regularly on the Complied, first supervisionproject, the first such no later than mission in September 1992four months after crediteffectiveness

3.05b Monitoring/Review CP 11/92 9/92 Borrower to provide report before Reports were prepared oneach such exchange of views different components of the

program in varying degreesof detail and regularity.

3.06 Accounts/Audit CD 3/94 and 3/95 9/94 and 11/95 Maintain project accounts and Complied with delay.records and submit audit reportswithin 9 months of the close of thefiscal year

C ComplianceCP Partial ComplianceCD Compliance with delay

Table 8: Bank Resources. Staff Inputs

Stage of Planned Revised Actualproject cycle

Weeks US$ Weeks US$ Weeks US$

Through appraisal 11.9 1,400 13.8 38,800

Appraisal-Board 47.4 20,700 50.0 136,900

Board-effectiveness 9.4 - 12.8 34,200

Supervision 19.5 36,400 56.9 36,400 100.1 265,100

Completion 9.0 28,200 9.0 28,200 10.4 29,300

TOTAL 28.5 64,600 134.6 86,700 187.1 504,300

Table 9: Bank Resources. Missions

Pcrtbfrance RatingsSpecialized

Stage of No. of Days in staff skillsproject cycle Month/Year persons field represented

Implementation Development Types of problemsstatus objectiv es

Through appraisal 3-4/1992 8 20 Country Economist. Urbani Planner. Legal na na naCounsel. Agricultural Economist, TransportSpecialist, Ilydrogeologist. Food SecuritySpecialist. Water Engineer. Health & NutritionSpecialist

Appraisal through Board approval na na na na na na na

Board approval through na na na na na na naeffectiveness

Supervision 1 7-8/1992 5 iO Country Economist. Food Security Specialist. 2 1 Procurement, Disbursement,Procurement Specialist, Agricultural Economist, Project Manapement.Rural Water Specialist Counterpart Financing

Supervision 11 10/1992 5 10 Procurement Specialist, Agricultural Economist, 2 1 Procurement. ProjectRural Water Specialist Management, Counterpart

FIinancing

Supervision III 2/1993 3 10 Procurement Specialist, Agricultural Economist. 2 2 Procurement. StudiesRural Water Specialist

Supervision IV 6-7/1993 3 10 Procurement Specialist, Agricultural Economist, 2 StudiesRural Water Specialist

Completion 9/1993 3 10 Procurement Specialist, Agricultural Economist, 2 2 naI__________ I_________ Rural Water Specialist _ I_

N.B. (1) 6 formal missions were carried out including a combined preparation/appraisal, four supervisions and a completion mission.(2) Most project supervision was carried out by the Resident Mission from February 1993 through project completion workshop held in July 1995. This is not reflected in the above data.

Annex A

Emergency Drought Recovery and Mitigation Project

Implementation Completion Report/Project Completion Report Workshop

June 21, 1995 Harare Sheraton

AIDE MEMOIRE

1. A workshop took place Wednesday June 21, 1995 at the Harare Sheraton todiscuss and exchange views on the findings and recommendations of the draftImplementation Completion Report (ICR) prepared by the Bank and the draft ProjectCompletion Report (PCR) prepared by the Government of Zimbabwe for the EmergencyDrought Recovery and Mitigation Project (EDRMP). Copies of both documents hadbeen distributed to the relevant agencies in advance. The meeting xx as chaired jointly byMr. S. Brushett, Deputy Resident Representative of the World Bank in Harare and TaskManager for EDRMP and by Mr. F.B. Simango, Deputy Director for Monitoring andEvaluation, National Economic Planning Commission (NEPC). Ms. A. Hammarfacilitated the discussion on follow up action for the improvement of droughtmanagement in Zimbabwe. A list of workshop participants is at Attachment I. Theworkshop agenda is at Attachment 2.

2. Mr. Brushett made the opening presentation from the point of view of the Bank.He briefed participants on the differences between the PCR and the new style ICR whichhad replaced it as of January 1994. The ICR was intended to be a forward lookingdocument laying strong emphasis on the application of lessons learned from projectexperience in the continued operation of the project and like future operations. The twofundamental considerations were project outcome - highly satisfactory, satisfactory,unsatisfactory or highly unsatisfactory, and project sustainability - likely, unlikely oruncertain. The Bank had reached some tentative conclusions which it was happy todiscuss in the workshop. Outcome had been rated satisfactory given that the fundamentalobjectives of the project, which was the Government's drought recovery and mitigationprogram dated June 1992, had been achieved. Sustainability was rated likely, thoughthere was room for arguing for a rating of uncertain given that follow through on theinstitutional development component of the project had been patchy. Mr. Brushettinvited the workshop's views. A total of 15 participants completed Table 1: Summary ofAssessments. The analysis of responses is attached.

3. Mr. Brushett outlined a number of issues raised in the 1CR that might bediscussed. He mentioned that it was important to draw a distinction in so doing betweenthe project, i.e. the Government's program and the IDA credit which was provided tofinance a portion of the (foreign exchange) costs of the program. With regard to themanagement of the credit, a number of concerns could be legitimately raised, i.e. wasthere room for improvement in procurement design and planning, what more could havebeen done to streamline project implementation. Other concerns were of a broader natureand included: the limited extent to which external assistance especially from the NGO

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and private sector was used during the program; and the limited follow up on studies andtechnical assistance provided under the project for drought management capacitybuilding. Mr. Brushett finally requested help in completing a number of tables in theICR, with particular regard to total project costs and financing. No complete estimate hadthus far been prepared but it was intended that a tentative estimate be provided in the finalversion of the ICR.

4. Mr. Simango laid out some of the principal findings and recommendations of theGovernment report which had been prepared on the basis of work carried out by anInterministerial Task Force. He prefaced his remarks by stressing the priority thatshould be placed on reflecting on the recurrence of drought, its economic impact andintegration in the planning process for the future. Drought appeared to be morefrequent and 1991/92 could not be looked on as an isolated event unlikely to reoccur. Mr.Simango referred to the various components of the program and notkd that the needs ofthe power sector had not originally been included. Whilst the project was well preparedand appraised, most of the work had been done by thie Bank and the government rolewas a secondary one, with minimal involvement of provincial and district planningstructures, mainly due to capacity limitations within government. There were problentsin project management since there was no clear definitions of responsibilities withingovernment. Government capacity was stretched during project implementation and thisresulted at times in weak coordination of the different inputs to the program and shortfallsin coordination, e.g. of the NGO role. This also contributed to the fact that in terms ofthe achievement of physical objectives the programn fell short in many areas, such as croppack distribution. There were absorption capacity problems in the water sector too, suchthat for example not much advantage was taken of the introduction of the hydrofracturingunits. Mr. Simango made mention of the fact that there had been follow up on the lessonslearned from the drought experience in some cases, notably the Department of SocialWelfare which held a workshop in April 1993. Government's view was thatcoordination, planning and drought management continued to be weak. Theinstitutional structure for drought management needed to be strengthened and theestablishment of a permanent institutional structure dedicated to drought managementhad to be seriously considered.

5. The joint chairmen invited reactions to the two presentations with a view todeveloping a list of issues for plenary discussion. Fourteen (14) points were raised by theparticipants and noted for discussion after brief presentations from the line ministries.These points were as follows:

* The need to clarify the respective role of Bank, Government and others inthe project appraisal process;

* The need to clarify coordination responsibility - NEPC role seen as notclear and not felt; what should be Finance's responsibility;

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* The contribution to implementation delays of a lack of knowledge ofWorld Bank procurement procedures;

* Better coordination needed of procurement and delivery processes as wellas of reporting and monitoring on project progress;

* The framework for management in a drought situation, clearly specifyingresponsibilities, is not clear - is there a role for a permanent institutionalstructure;

* The planning and policy framework for targeting of drought assistanceneeds reconsideration;

* The need to phase implementation and get a realistic ume scale for adrought recovery program;

* Greater attention needed to be given to financial coordination andaccounting;

* Communication needs to improve in future to keep all parties informed onkey changes and processes;

* Appropriate and responsive emergency procedures should be developed;

* Experience has demonstrated the need to keep political andpractical/operational approaches to emergency needs in balance;

* There is a need for adequate documentation and information flow;

* There should be a defined ox, :rall structure for program monitoring,supervision and management; and

* Clear financial arrangements are needed in order to assure the efficiency ofvarious activities.

6. Ms. Hammar added four additional issues on the basis of her reading of the draftICR and PCR:

* There are capacity constraints under emergency conditions - short termand long term solutions may be different, i.e. external assistance in theshort run, capacity building in the long run;

* Project design experience suggests the need for clearer objectives,targeting and an explicit implementation planning framework;

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* The right balance has to be struck between relief, recovery and mitigationeach of which has particular policy, planning and institutional responses;and

* Expectations have to be brought closer to realities in respect of resources,capacities and timeframes.

7. The joint chairmen invited representatives of the diffe~rent ministries and agenciesrepresented to present their views on the successes and failures of the program from their(sectoral) point of view. They regretted the fact that, despite confirming their attendance,some ministries and agencies were not represented at the workshop that is Health andChild Welfare; Social Welfare; Transport and Energy; District Development Fund;National Coordination Unit. Mr. Mathende of Agriculture suggested that the appraisal ofthe project had been hurried and there had generally been inadequate Lime for preparationof project components. Delays in procurement and shortfalls in the availability offunding had both contributed to the need to scale back the agricultural recovery program.Mr. Chitsiko of Agritex referred also to the inadequacy of inputs in relation to theoriginal size of the program. This also raised the targeting issue - who should havebenefited most from the scarce resources available? It might be preferable in future tosubsidize inputs rather than give free handouts. There was also a need to promotemore appropriate agricultural strategies in future, inter alia to economize on the use ofwater. Dr. Madzima suggested that whilst the livestock component encountered no majorimplementation problems, there were delays traceable to unfamiliarity with World Bankprocurement procedures in his department. Government Tender Board also proved to bea bottleneck at times. He mentioned that there was an ongoing medium term mitigationprogram for the livestock sector. Mrs Zimba also referred to implementation delays inthe water sector that were related to problems of procurement, within government and theWorld Bank, which were however eventually ironed out. Another problem was theshortage of staff who could be dedicated to the project - a full time central projectcoordinator might have been helpful.

8. Mr. Masoso for the Reserve Bank focused on issues relating to the disbursementof the IDA credit. One constraint was the low level of resources actually available in theSpecial Account at any given time. More frequent replenishment was hindered by theunavailability of documentation on a timely basis. This was not helped by inadequatestaffing for the project in the concerned line ministries. A further problem was the needto set aside Special Account funds against letters of credit. Messrs. Chidavaenzi andMakuwaza of Finance commented on project implementation and accountingarrangements. Not everything could be foreseen in the design of an emergency operation.However the situation in 1991/92 was not helped by the rigidity of the procurementprocedures, e.g. no fast track for financing, issuance of licenses. Coordination could haveworked better had the concerned ministries and agencies attended the weekly meetings ona regular basis and at the appropriate level. Finance's specific role in the emergency stillpresupposed that the ministries were basically responsible for implementation.

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9. Ms. Haminar, in leading the discussion of issues raised, organised the materialinto five broad headings: institutional framework; policy framework; procedures;financing; and planning.

Institutional framework - The existence of the Civil Protection Act and theresponsibilities given to the Minister of Local Government and others in a disastersituation was recognised. However the ministry had limited capacity (the civilprotection department having been disbanded) and the act did not go into detailwith regard to drought emergencies. The National Civil Protection Plan was notwell known to ministries - it needs fuller dissemination. This plan establishedhow the ministries are charged with the preparation of sector plans which effortnow needed to be redoubled. The need for coordination was recognised as thefocal point for coordination differed, i.e. Local Government for implementation,NEPC for planning, Finance for resource mobilisation. NEPJ is better placed toplan and coordinate the programme, hence its role needs to be developed andtechnical assistance is being sought to this end. The link between the occurrenceand nature of droughts (and other emergencies) and the economic planningframework and targets had to be developed. NEPC should look at emergencies as"dynamic planning opportunities" and coordinate the translation of lessonslearned into future drought planning. On the whole the workshop endorsed theview that the coordination of emergencies should be within the establishedplanning system.

Policy framework - The workshop favored the idea of an overall national policyframework for disaster management. The Civil Protection Act provides a broadframework and a National Plan for Civil Protection was developedfor theimplementation and interpretation of the provisions of theAct. It wasrecognised that the provisions of the Act might not be fully utilised andfamiliarity of the various ministries and agencies with the Act had to be increased.A national policy should build up frem sectoral policies which were not fullydeveloped, though recent progress in some areas e.g agriculture and water wasnoted. In such sectoral policies, it would be helpful to distinguish betweendisaster reaction, mitigation and the underlying need to respond to socialproblems and poverty issues. The workshop felt that targeting of droughtassistance was a matter that had not been satisfactorily resolved and a matter thatshould be given close attention in the development of sector policy.

Procedures - Participants generally accepted that emergency procedures neededto be well integrated into existing procedures and institutional framework.Nonetheless at the point of emergency declaration, it should be clearer than it isnow what emergency procedures come into effect and what regular proceduresthey would supplant. Otherwise much of the discussion focused on procurementand the need for Tender Board to develop its procedures to account for anemergency. Both regular and emergency procedures would have to be

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disseminated and thoroughly understood by ministries and agencies otherwise thebenefit of having such might not be realised.

Planning - There were several dimensions to planning for the drought emergency- and it was the responsibility of all concerned ministries and agencies, and notjust NEPC, to take appropriate steps. A better job had to be done on collection,analysis and communication of information. Indicators needed to be developedfor drought declaration, with particular regard to leading indicators of an expecteddrought situation. Planning needed to be informed by identification of vulnerablegroups in a drought situation and how best to respond to this vulnerability. Broadobjectives and goals could be developed on this basis, but this would have to besupplemented by more detailed implementation planning once the nature anddimensions of a particular drought emergency were known. Such implementationplanning was a weak area and helped explain some of the shortfalls in theresponse to the 1991/92 drought. Lessons from that experience ought to beapplied. A suggestion made was that (some) ministries could develop a "rapidresponse mechanism" to be put into place in the event of an emergency - people tobe involved and