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WORLD BANK CLIENT ANFD PARTNER SURVEY 2003
AFRICA REGION: ZAMBIA
TYPED VERSION OF ALL INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS.
QN 1:
HOW WELL DO YOU THINK THE BANK COMMUNICATES ITS MISSION TO REDUCE POVERTY TO VARIOUS CLIENT GROUPS [ SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, IMPLEMENTING AGENCY STAFF, PRIVATE SECTOR REPRESENTATIVES, DONORS, CIVIL SOCIETY] IN ZAMBIA?
R1.
Aware of the Bank’s mission to reduce poverty in Zambia because of the support extended to the project.
Some of the programmes of the Bank are clearly contradictory to the mission. Mission is sometimes lost in projects in which the Bank acts as coordinator of the
contributions of several donors.
R2.
Familiar with the mission to reduce poverty due to contacts with staff Dissemination of the mission of the Bank should not be restricted to officials only
but to all stakeholders, including the ordinary citizens.
R3.
The Bank’s mission is often stated in workshops and seminars But, the Banks activities in Zambia are not consistent with that mission In many instances, the Bank is perpetrating poverty in Zambia
R4.
Poverty reduction is a new mission for the Bank. Past failed adjustment programmes do not support the mission Ordinary Zambians are not aware of the mission
R5.
The mission is noble and relevant. Mission has not been sold to the people beyond the officials in close contact with
the Bank.
R6. Appreciation of the mission has been negated by the several programmes of the
Bank that have had negative effect. The mission has not been widely articulated
R7.
Public perception is that of a lending agent with the objective of making profits for the principal shareholders,
Bank is perceived to respect the interests of the financiers over those of the borrowers, particularly, poor countries.
R8.
Bank articulates poverty reduction as its mission but is hostile to human resources development. Retrenchment and wage freeze programmes being cases in point.
R9.
Aware of the mission from direct contact with the Bank. The mission is not well communicated to the general public.
R 10.
The mission of the Bank at face value is to combat poverty. General impression is that the Bank is responsible for creation of poverty in Zambia.
Bank is perceived to be a lending institution established to make profits. There should be a balance between development and sustainability.
R 11.
Familiar with the stated mission to alleviate poverty, but cannot identify a project that directly deals with poverty alleviation.
R 12.
All in the media are familiar with the stated mission. However, the programme is not well publicised.
R13.
Not heard of the Bank’s mission to combat poverty in Zambia.
R 14.
Bank has been associated with various programmes and projects culminating into the PRSP as its flagship intervention in poverty reduction.
Bank has till recently been closed to all but officials at Ministry of Finance and Bank of Zambia.
Bank is perceived as a front for the West to suppress local initiatives.
R15.
The mission is well articulated to policy makers only.
R16.
The mission of the Bank is not supported by its programmes and projects in Zambia.
R17.
Mission has been stated clearly in the bank’s various documents. Implementation of the of the Bank’s programmes is not consistent with the
mission.
R 18.
The mission might be poverty reduction but what is implemented on the ground is different.
R 19.
Familiar with the mission although the Bank’s projects do not support the mission.
R 20.
The message of the mission is being widely articulated through the PRSP and the various consultation for a .
R 21.
Familiar with the mission because of closely working with the Bank in the implementation of an HIV / aids intervention.
R 22.
Mission is clear and well articulated to those in close contact with the Bank. Not sure that the mission is known beyond those limits.
R 23.
Bank’s mission not well understood against the background of its projects and programmes which have created poverty, albeit in the short term.
R 24.
Of the view that the Bank’s mission is inconsistent with the way the Bank is perceived by the majority of the people in Zambia.
QN.2.
TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU FEEL THERE IS AGREEMENT BETWEEN ZAMBIA AND THE WORLD BANK ON DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES? HOW EFFECTIVE IS THE COUNTRY ASSISTANCE STRATEGY [CAS] PROCESS
AS A WAY OF REACHING SUCH AGREEMENT?
R 1.
There is complete agreement because the Bank responds to a country’s appeals. The CAS process has widened the consultation circle by inclusion of non-
governmental stakeholders.
R 2.
There is agreement on a proportion of objectives and policies. For instance on poverty reduction.
In some instances, there is no agreement. For instance, the tendering threshold of US 200 000 for international bidding is too low.
R 3.
There would appear to be both agreement and disagreement on objectives and priorities: Conditionalities that are part of the agreements negate the good intentions of good programmes.
CAS helps to harmonise understanding of negotiated programmes and projects.
R 4.
It is apparent that there is agreement because the Bank’s positions take precedent. National objectives are not taken seriously. The CAS process is a public relations exercise.
R 5.
There might be nominal agreement but the Bank is not responsive to changing needs of developing countries.
R 6.
There is agreement on the large projects such as agricultural food secucrity and income generation.
Prior to CAS, there was little consultation with other stakeholders.
R 7.
Negotiations are done at higher governmental levels. Ordinary citizens are content to trust their government.
R 8.
The problem would appear to be that Zambia has not fully defined its objectives and priorities.
Zambia responds to what the Bank offers. CAS will improve the situation through wide consultations.
R 9.
In most instances, the country merely accepts what is offered by the Bank. Projects are not evolved from the grassroots. Hence their lack of sustainability. The CAS is a positive step but is not deep enough.
R 10.
There is general agreement on objectives and priorities. There is often disagreement on the strategies employed to achieve the objectives.
CAS is a relatively new process and will be helpful to increase understanding of the role of the Bank.
R 11.
There is full agreement in the health sector where rehabilitation of health centres and clinics has been emphasised.
R 12.
In the education sector, the objectives and priorities of both the Bank and the country are in agreement.
Of late, the Bank has become more consultative through the CAS process.
R 13.
There is no agreement between the objectives of the Bank and the country. The Bank has its own agenda and imposes one solution on all developing
countries. Perhaps the government fails to negotiate adequately.
R 14.
There is no agreement between the government and the Bank. Out of desperation, the country is compelled to accept the conditions of the Bank.
CAS is cosmetic.
R 15.
The relationship between the Bank and Zambia is not based on equality; the government is desperate for financial assistance and is often compelled to accept the Bank’s conditions.
R 16.
The bank has a standard prescription for all issues of the third world.
R 17.
The Bank’ priorities are in managing the macro-economy with academic indicators.
R 18.
There is nominal agreement because the government is often the weaker partner in the negotiations.
Advantage has been taken by the Bank in the fact that the government is weak. CAS will help to sell the programmes more widely.
R 19.
Zambia has failed to define its objectives comprehensively. Zambia is compelled to respond to the Bank’s agenda.
Objectives of the Bank and the government do not necessarily have to be in agreement.
The Bank, as a multilateral institution, deals with governments only.
R 20
The Bank’s role in national development is not an easy one. It is often made a scapegoat for the failures of other parties.
CAS will help to bridge the information gap.
R 21.
The Bank was content to deal with governments until recently. The seminar and workshop consultations with selected individuals are academic.
R 22.
There is agreement because the Bank responds to the country’s request. CAS will assist with consensus building.
R 23.
The Bank has predetermined responses and agenda. CAS will facilitate the dissemination of the programmes beyond the confines of
the government.
R 24.
The Bank imposes its programmes on the country.
QN. 3a.
IN YOUR OPINION, WAS THE WORLD BANK HELPFUL TO YOUR GOVERNMENT IN PREPARING THE ZAMBIA POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY? IF YES, IN WHAT WAYS, E.G. CONSULTATION S WITH
STAKEHOLDERS, PRIVATE SECTOR, COMMUNITIES, ETC.
R 1.
Not aware of the Bank’s role in the preparation of the PRSP.
R 2.
Not familiar with the Bank’s role. Aware that there were wide consultations throughout the country.
R 3.
Aware that the Ministry of Finance was the principal agent for the preparation of PRSP.
R 4.
The bank assisted the government but not to civil society in the preparation of the programme.
Many meetings were held throughout the country.
R 5.
Bank was helpful in requiring the government to place PRSP into the formal plan
R 6.
The Bank allowed the government to define the programme but provided guidelines on how the policy should be framed.
R 7.
Bank played a positive role by ensuring that there was wide participation in the evolution of the PRSP.
R 8.
The lead institution in the preparatory stages was UNDP. The Bank played a supportive role.
R 9.
The Bank was instrumental in the conception of the PRSP Bank facilitated the participation of many classes people in workshops and
seminars.
R 10.
Bank arranged seminars and workshops in the provinces to sensitise other stakeholders.
R 11.
The Bank both initiated and facilitated consultations with various people in the country.
R 12.
PRSP is the brainchild of the Bank. Bank assisted with the preparation of the document. Bank also assisted in mobilising support for the programme from all stakeholders.
R 13.
Not familiar with the Bank’s role in PRSP.
R 14.
Bank played the role of sensitising stakeholders about PRSP.
R 15.
The Bank was involved in sensitisation of people.
R 16.
Not familiar with what the Bank did for PRSP.
R 17.
The bank was paty to the preparation of the PRSP
R 18.
Bank assisted with the preparation of the PRSP. Bank was responsible for the multi-sectoral consultations.
R 19.
Bank facilitated the preparation of the policy but refused to take responsibility for PRSP.
R 20.
Not aware of the Bank’s role.
R 21.
The Bank facilitated consultative for a for many groups of people.
R 22.
Bank assisted by bringing to bear the experience of other countries that had implemented PRSPs.
R 23.
Bank provided the framework for the programme and linkages to HIPIC. Bank financed consultative workshops and seminars for stakeholders.
R 24.
Not aware of the Bank’ role in PRSP.
QN. 3b.
HOW SHOULD THE BANK SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT IN IMPLEMENTING THE PRSP IN ZAMBIA? BY FACILITATING CONSULTATIONS? BY HELPING
WITH ANALYSES? BY HELPING WITH MONITORING? ANY OTHER?
R 1.
The onus for implementation of PRSP lies with the government.
R 2.
Bank should provide the resources for the implementation of the various activities of PRSP.
Bank should revise its requirement to seek international competitive tender for contracts of US$ 200 000. Local suppliers should be protected from external bidders that enjoy competitive advantages.
R 3.
Bank should continue to facilitate consultations. Bank should be involved in monitoring to ensure that the targets set in the
programme were achieved.
R 4.
Bank should provide financial assistance to the programme.
Bank should monitor implementation to ensure that priorities are in line with those specified in the documents..
Employment creation should be prioritised in the activities of the programme.
R 5.
There should be flexibility in the implementation of PRSP to adjust to the realities on the ground.
R 6.
Bank should monitor the progress in the implementation of the activities of PRSP. Bank should mobilise other aid agencies to support the programme.
R 7.
Bank should compel government to continue to involve the public in the implementation of PRSP activities.
Bank should monitor the implementation process sto ensure compliance with what has been agreed.
R 8.
Bank should monitor implementation of PRSP. Bank should keep close watch on government so that there are no deviations from
the principal targets.
R 9.
Bank should monitor to ensure that targets and objectives are achieved.
R 10.
There have so far been insufficient disbursements towards PRSP projects Bank should insist on monitoring and evaluation of activities of the programme Procurement of motor vehicles should not be excluded from the list of eligible
items. Bank should also not exclude the offer of inducements to implementers of
projects under PRSP.
R 11.
The Bank should consider relaxing some of the conditionalities to enable quick implementation of projects and activities.
R 12.
Bank should bring to bear the experience of other countries that have successfully implemented PRSP.
Bank should relax the requirement for counterpart funding.
R 13.
Bank should consider giving concessions if the implementation of the programme was to succeed.
R 14.
Bank should spearhead the monitoring of activities to meet targets. Bank should empower people with knowledge. Emhasis should shift from management of the macro-economy to job creation.
R 15.
Bank should consider imposing conditionalities dealing with poverty reduction on Zambia.
R 16.
Not know.
R 17.
The Bank should engage local consultants for monitoring both technical and financial indicators.
R 18.
Bank should strengthen the planning function in the Ministry of Finance. Bank should ensure that government ministries and departments consulted each
other more. There should also be cross sectoral disciplines.
R 19.
Bank should assist with skills training. Bank should take a leading role in the implementation of the activities.
R 20.
Bank should take leading role in monitoring performance of implementation.
As not all projects can be executed, it is important for the bank to assist witj prioritisation of the tasks of the [projects.
R 21.
Bank should promote strong partnerships between government and the private sector. The private sector is not only the Zambia Chambers of Commerce and Industry [ZACCI].
R 22.
Bank should compel government to be serious about implementation of PRSP projects.
R 23.
Bank should finance sectoral programmes such as the agricultural commercialisation project.
Bank should closely monitor the implementation of the activities of PRSP.
R 24.
Bank should work closely with implementers of projects and respond to changes that might be proposed.
QN. 4.
DEVELOPING A MORE RFFECTIVE PARTNERSHIP WITH OUR CLIENTS IS IMPORTANT TO THE WORLD BANK. TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU BELIEVE
THE BANK HAS MADE PROGRESS IN DEVELOPING SUCH PARTNERSHIP IN ZAMBIA IN REACHING OUT TO A WIDER RANGE OF STAKEHOLDERS?
R 1.
The Bank is still stiff and unfriendly to most people.
R 2.
The Bank is slowly changing its image but is still largely perceived to be inflexible and unaccommodating of different views.
R 3.
Effectiveness of partnership dependent on top leadership at Bank headquaters in Washington.
R 4.
Partnership with the Bank is weak. Partnerships more effective and stronger with supervisory missions.
R 5.
Rapport was improving. A recent video-conference helped to allay some of the misconceptions of some stakeholders.
Bank should be bold enough to venture beyond its traditional constituency of dealing only with governments. For instance, faith-based organisations have capacity to deliver services more efficiently.
R 6.
Partnership is still weak because Washington has overwhelming influence on the final outcome.
R 7.
Commendable effort is being made to improve the quality of partnership. CAS has broadened increased the numbers of stakeholders that participate in the development debates.
R 8.
The Bank is slowly coming round to solicit input into its planning from several organisations and stakeholders.
R 9.
Effective partnership is being forged as the bank widens its listenership and sources of information and data.
R 10.
Current level of heightened consultations is increasing effectiveness. Previously, relationships were not based on equality or mutual respect. The Bank tended to stifle initiatives other than its own.
R 11.
Partnership with the bank is effective when based on mutual respect and equality.
R 12.
Bank is becoming more responsive than in the past when it came with predetermined positions.
R 13.
Capacity building will assist to create mutual confidence and trust which are the pillars for effective partnership.
R 14.
Difficult to create effective partnership in an environment of inequality and with different agenda.
R 15.
Partnership between the Bank and the government is not based equality. The government is often made to accept the Bank’s position.
R 16.
The partnership is not effective.
R 17.
There is no effective partnership with the Bank.
R 18.
The Bank is becoming more open and friendly that previously. The role of the Bank in development is not well understood.
R 19.
There is no effective partnership between the Bank and the government. The government blames the Bank for any failures while the Bank disowns any responsibility.
R 20.
The existing relationship is good and effective.
R 21.
The partnership is not effective.
R 22.
Mutual respect for each over time will create more effective partnerships.
R 23.
There is much stronger partnership with the Bank’s head office than with the country office.
R 24.
The Bank has a fixed position on issues. This does not augur well for creation of effective partnerships.
QN.5.
THE BANK HAS MADE CAPACITY BUILDING A TOIP PRIORITY IN AFRICA. ARE THERE SPECIFIC ACTIONS YOU THINK THE BANK SHOULD TAKE IN
ZAMBIA TO IMPROVE ITS CAPACITY BUILDING EFFORT?
R 1.
Capacity building should go beyond seminars and workshops. Capacity building should have both formal and informal education and in
artisanal skills.
R 2.
Bank should support government in identifying skills gaps in Zambia. Bank should not exclude masters degree programmes in its capacity building
sponsorships.
R 3.
First and second degree sponsorships should not be excluded from capacity building programmes.
Bank should move from workshop training and provision of technical assistance.
R 4.
Bank should not rely too much on external technical assistance for capacity building. There is sufficient local expertise in Zambia.
R 5.
Bank should identify and commission local training institutions to undertake capacity building. For instance, the universities and the National Institute for Public Administration [NIPA].
Some NGOs can also be used for training.
R 6.
Capacity building is needed in areas of project formulation, implementation and monitoring.
Bank should also provide means for delivery of servicers.
R 7.
Bank should concentrate effort on building capacity in project implementation.
R 8.
Capacity building concentrated at head office administration. There is need to extend training to provinces and districts.
There is over emphasis in the provision of motor vehicles in the public service capacity building project [PSCAP].
R 9.
Capacity building should include the decentralisation of the auditor General’s office to the provinces.
Capacity building should embrace technical and professional training.
R 10.
Training should be co-ordinated.
R 11.
Human resource development is critical in view of the high attrition due to migration and HIV / aids.
Infrastructure rehabilitation and development should be prioritised in the health sector.
R 12.
Training under the PSCAP project should be related to long term needs of the country.
Training should be planned and coordinated.
R 13.
There is need to include hands-on artisan training. The country lacks technical level staff capable of undertaking practical tasks.
R 14.
PSCAP should strengthen existing training institutions including the universities.
R 15.
Workshop and seminar type training is inadequate. There is need for to include medium term and long term in-depth courses.
R 16.
Not familiar with the capacity building project
R 17.
Capacity building training should be undertaken across all levels from lower to high supervisory levels, including Permanent Secretaries.
At the lower levels, training should include hands-on training of technicians and craftsmen.
R 18.
Need to strengthen staff and institutional capacity rather than provision of vehicles and equipment.
Bank should consider providing incentives to people.
R 19.
Bank should provide equipment such as computers and connections to internet and websites.
PSCAP should have components for training in negotiations skills and strategy setting.
R 20.
Civil service reform has been running for along time with little tangible success.
R 21.
The private sector could be used for capacity building training.
R 22.
Capacity building at project level has been successful. Need to extend training to provincial and district levels.
R 23.
Capacity building training required at supervisory and lower levels. Need also for in-service training as well as sponsorships for higher degrees.
R 24.
Training planned by the Bank should be reconciled with the requirements of the country.
QN. 6:
IN YOUR OPINION, IS THE WORLD BANK DOING ENOUGH TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBIA IN FIGHTING THE SPREAD POF HIV / AIDS? IF
NOT, WHAT ELSE DO YOU THINK THE BANK COULD DO TO HELP?
R 1.
The Bank has made a welcome entrance to the fight against HIV/ Aids with its grant of US$ 40 million.
Disbursements to communities are slow due to the requirement for several bidders that cannot be met in the rural areas. The requirement should be relaxed for rural areas.
Bank should consider paying token allowances to motivate community volunteers.
R 2.
Bank’s assistance to combat HIV/Aids in the public service has made a big impact.
R 3.
It is expected that the Bank will expand extend its intervention. Assistance should be extended to cover treatment and care and to support widows
and orphans.
R 4.
It is commendable that the Bank converted the intended credit into a grant for HIV / Aids.
R 5.
Bank should assist to arbitrate with large pharmaceutical companies to reduce further the cost of medication.
Proceeds from the Bank’s grant should be utilised for retroviral drugs. Funds should also be available for training of staff involved in HIV / Aids.
R 6.
HIV /Aids is a cross-cutting issue. There is need to provide the means for dissemination of information.
R 7.
Resources of the Bank should also be used to address the underlying causes of HIV / aids including poverty.
R 8.
The Bank is playing a supportive role in the crusade against HIV / Aids.
R 9.
The intervention by the Bank is sufficient.
R 10.
The grant of US$ 40 million is sufficient.
R 11.
Large amount of the grant is spent on administration as opposed to delivery of services.
R 12.
Bank support should be extended to provide bursaries to orphans.
R 13.
The Bank should utilise faith-based organisations as they are better rooted to assist with communities to fight HIV / Aids.
R 14.
The Bank should implement intensive community-based programmes.
R 15.
Dissemination of information through videos has been found to be effective in the communities. Proceeds of the Bank should be utilised to acquire and equip video vans.
R 16.
Not familiar with the Bank’s support to HIV / Aids.
R 17.
Not aware of the bank’s role in HIV / Aids.
R 18.
There is a general lack of leadership in the fight against HIV / Aids in Zambia. Bank should assist in creating a strong leadership structure.
Co-ordination of donor support to HIV / Aids is lacking resulting in waste, duplication and poor service delivery.
R 19.
Support should be extended to combat poverty. Part of the funds from the bank’s grant should be utilised to establish soup
kitchens in schools in poor neighbourhoods. Training should not be restricted to medical staff but extended to many other
social disciplines.
R 20.
The Bank should work through existing organisations and structures rather than creating new ones.
R 21.
Bank should concentrate its resources on awareness campaigns and creation of employment.
R 22.
The Bank has done enough. The bottleneck is at the implementation levels.
R 23.
Bank’s assistance should be channelled through the National Aids Council.
R 24.
The Bank should relax the requirement for counterpart funding as the government is likely fail to meet the condition.
QN. 7.
IN THE FACE OF A COUNTRY CONTEXT CHARACTERISED BY CORRUPTION AND BAD GOVERNANCE, IN YOUR OPINION, SHOULD THE BANK:
A] STOP ALL LOANSB] LEND ONLY FOR SOCIAL PROTECTION PROGRAMMESC] LEND ONLY TO REINFORCE INSTITUTIONS AND
STRENGTHEN GOVERNANCED] CONTINUE TO LEND BUT REINFORCE PROCUREMENT
RULES AND PROCEDURES.E] OTHER (PLEASE SPECIFY).
R 1.
Bank should continue to lend in order not to affect the poor people even more adversely.
R 2.
The Bank should continue to extend credit but negotiate for conditions that promote good governance.
Lend also to strengthen watchdog institutions such as the Anti Corruption Commission.
R 3.
Bank should use its power and resources to effect change in governance and to fight corruption.
R 4.
Bank should place good governance and anticorruption as conditions for its credit.
R 5.
Bank should not curtail lending because that would affect the poor people. Bank should increase its range of partners and clients from government.
R 6.
Bank should continue to lend but strengthen identified areas of weaknesses.
R 7.
Lending should be made but selectively to projects that protect the weak and vulnerable.
Bank should assist to strengthen watchdog institutions.
R 8.
Curtailing lending would have adverse impact on the poor people. Bank should ensure that resources meant for development are not diverted by
individuals.
R 9.
Stopping to lend would not be an effective solution to combating poor governance and corruption in Zambia.
Bank should seek to strengthen institutions such as the Auditor General’s Office and the Anti-Corruption Commission.
R 10.
Problems of bad governance and corruption are chronic. They require well considered interventions.
Bank should assist to create the environment for good governance.
R 11.
Discontinuation of lending would harmful to the long term interest of the people. Bank should continue to lend to strengthen institutions combating corruption and poor governance.
R 12.
Bank should fund selected projects, particularly those that mitigate poverty.
R 13.
Bank should continue to lend but should pt in place stringent measures for monitoring utilisation of the resources.
Bank is not completely blameless in abetting corruption in Zambia.
R 14.
Bank should continue to lend but selectively to projects that support the poor.
R 15.
Lending should be restricted to support watchdog institutions and to alleviate poverty among the poor.
R 16.
The Bank cannot stop lending even to a corrupt country without that action having dire consequences on the ordinary people. The bank should instead devise mechanisms for imposing sanctions on the government.
R 17.
The Bank should continue to lend but ensure that its resources are not abused through corruption.
Bank should institute hands-on capacity building in all institutions that handle large contracts and tenders.
R 18.
Bank should lend selectively to institutions that combat poverty among the poor. Bank should strengthen watchdog institutions that fight corruption and bad
governance. Bank should establish service standards, undertake institutional reviews and carry
out periodic audits of project implementation.
R 19.
Bank should stop lending to directly to government but may finance watchdog institutions.
Often, it is donor funding that governments abuse.
R 20.
If the bank stopped lending, many innocent people would be adversely affected. In the circumstance, the Bank should lend selectively.
R 21.
Bank should lend to strengthen law enforcement and the judiciary. Bank should make anti-corruption as conditions for its loans and grants.
R 22.
Bank should have capacity to supervise and monitor the execution of projects financed with proceeds from its projects.
R 23.
Bank’s lending should be selective to projects that support the poor and strengthen watchdog institutions.
R 24.
Bank may continue to lend, but selectively.
QN. 8
IN THE WRITTEN QUESTIONNAIRE, WE HAVE ASKED YOU A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THEW WORLD BANK STAFF
WORKING IN ZAMBIA. WHAT ACTIONS WOULD OU RECOMMEND TO IMPROVE THEIR EFFECTIVENESS AND THAT OF THEIR MANAGERS.
R 1.
Bank staff at the country office are qualified but lack authority to make decisions.
R 2.
Effectiveness of the staff at the country office level would be enhanced if they had authority to make decisions based on the local conditions.
Currently, too may issues are referred to Washington.
R 3.
Bank should engage in insightful consultations and listen to local professional and technical expertise.
The Bank would appear to have standard prescriptions for all development issues. The country office is used more as a post box.
R 4.
The local office should have a deeper appreciation of the problems of the country and be able to prescribe solutions based on what obtains in that country.
Currently, the Bank would appear to implement global solutions.
R 5.
Bank should employ more people as referral experts. There is need, for instance, for a faith-based referral expert at the World Bank country office.
R 6.
The local office lacks the mandate to make decisions. More power should be devolved to the country office. The local office, if adequately staffed, could be more knowledgeable about the Zambian social and economic conditions.
The country office should have more authority.
R 7.
[Have not dealt with staff of the country office]
R 8
World Bank staff is too rigid mainly because they have no authority to negotiate or interpret matters differently from the Bank’s policy position.
R 9.
[ Have not directly dealt with the staff of the Bank}
R 10.
Staff of the Bank could be made more effective if they were vested with some power. Staff should be given power to make decisions on the basis of the local situation.
R 11.
The bank has staff with a high calibre. Unfortunately, staff has no authority o make decisions.
R 12.
Taking into account their qualifications and experience, The Bank’s staff is under-utilised.
Staff should be vested with more power.
R 13.
Staff of the country office should be used by the Bank as a source of own information for decision-making.
R 14.
The ordinary people have a poor image of the bank because staff is not interactive.
Bank staff in Washington has a superiority complex. As a result, Bank has a one track mind about interpretation of economic policy.
R 15.
Have had limited contact with Bank staff. Therefore unable to assess effectiveness.
R 16.
Not dealt with Bank staff directly to make an observation.
R 17.
Staff in the country office appear overworked. There is need to engage more people with appropriate qualifications and experience.
The conditions of service of professional staff should be enhanced to make them attractive.
R 18.
There is a high turnover of staff at the country office due to poor conditions of service. Conditions of service should be improved.
There is need to employ more technical and professional staff.
R 19.
Capacity of the country office is often restrained by the strategic policy and disposition of the Bank to a particular country.
More staff is required on inspection and monitoring tasks..
R 20.
The Bank staff has no authority and cannot be creative. More power should be devolved to the country office staff.
R 21.
Staff should expand information gathering channels beyond the government. Staff should consult with different interest groups in the country.
R 22.
Staff is adequate for the tasks.
R 23.
Creativity of staff is restrained by the Bank’s mandate in Zambia. Need to recruit more staff.
R 24.
Staff is knowledgeable but has lacks authority to make decisions. All issues are referred to Washington for decision.
QN 9.
WEWOULD APPRECIATE ANY COMMENTS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE WORLD BANK COUNTRY OFFICE IN ZAMBIA AND THE COORDINATION
BETWEEN THE COUNTRY OFFICE AND BANK HEADQUARTERS.
R 1.
The effectiveness of the country office is limited by lack of authority. Coordination with Washington is satisfactory.
R 2.
Delays area often encountered in getting feedback from headquarters because too many issues are referred to Washington
R 3.
Country office is effective as a screening point for matters to be referred to headquarters.
R 4.
The country office is fairly effective as a coordinator between the clients and Washington.
R 5.
Country office would be more effective if it had authority to make decisions based on the understanding of the issues.
R 6.
Although the country office has potential to do much more, it is deliberately designed to be a post box.
R 7.
Have not dealt with the office directly.
R 8.
Both the staff and the office could be more effective they were allowed to exercise some authority on some of the issues.
R 9.
Have not dealt with the office.
R 10.
The World Bank’s country office would be more effective if it had power to decide on some issues.
R 11.
The office’s linkage with NGOs is weak. The office must make deliberate effort to open its doors to civic organisations.
R 12.
The office should have some authority to make decisions within the agreed parameters.
R 13.
The country office is an effective coordinator.
R 14.
The country office in Zambia has a poor image owing to its strong stance on unpopular policies that are seem as responsible for the country’s current crisis.
R 15.
Have had no contact with the office.
R 16.
Have had no contact with the country office.
R 17.
The country office should consult various opinion leaders in the country.
R 18.
Under the old structure, country office was a mere post box. Some authority has been devolved to the office. The Bank should utilise the concept of the interim mission as this mechanism is more effective.
R 19.
The team leader sets the tempo and image of the Bank to the general public.
R 20.
Major weakness of the office is that it lacks authority to make decisions. It is a mere pillar box for Washington.
R 21.
The office lacks adequate authority. Most decisions are taken by the Washington office.
R 22.
The country office is effective as a coordinator.
R 23.
The World Bank has a highly centralised decision making structure. All material decisions are taken in Washington although the country office would have been more appropriate taking into account the issues involved.
R 24.
Country office would be more effective if it exercised authority and made decision based on the information available.
QN 10a.
IN WHAT AREAS HAVE ADJUSTMENT LENDING AND INVESTMENT LENDING HAD MOST POSITIVE EFFECTS IN YOUR COUNTRY? PLEASE GIVE EXAMPLES.
R 1.
Investment lending to the education sector and infrastructure, particularly, roads has had positive impact on the social and economic fronts.
R 2.
The Bank’s lending associated with roads, schools and clinics has been most successful.
R 3.
The Bank’s lending to rehabilitate and maintain both trunk and urban roads has been successful.
R 4.
Most of the investment lending for rehabilitation of schools, clinics and infrastructure could be said to have been successful.
R 5.
Bank’s role in establishment of secondary schools, hospitals and roads has had positive impact.
R 6.
Successes in investment lending include:a) the Rural Investment Fund
b) Zamsif
R 7.
Ending to the education and health sectors was successful
R 8.
The recent lending to support the Copperbelt diversification project could be said to be successful. He major bottleneck to the project is administrative deficiencies.
R 9.
Road sector support is an example of positive investment lending by the Bank.
R 10
Projects such as the Kariba Dam and the establishment of secondary schools in the 1960’s are examples of investment lending that had positive impact in Zambia.
R 11.
Rehabilitation of rural clinics was positive and successful.
R 12.
Investment in infrastructure has had positive results in Zambia.
R 13.
Support to education and health by the Bank was successful.
R 14.
Investments in education and health have been successful.
R 15.
Investments in the energy, education, health and squatter upgrading had positive impact.
R 16.
Aware that investment in education and health have been commendable.
R 17.
Most positive impact was achieved in the health and education sectors.
R 18.
Investments for infrastructure development has been positive.
R 19.
Examples of successful investment lending include those to schools and colleges and road rehabilitation.
R 20.
The Bank’s lending to support the privatisation of Zambia Railways has been positive.
R 21.
Bank’s lending for infrastructure, schools roads, clinics and telecommunications have been positive.
R 22.
The Zambia Social Investment Fund [ Zamsif] is an example of a good investment project supported by the bank.
R 23.
The rural investment Fund and Public Sector Capacity Building Project are examples of projects with positive impact on the economy.
R 24.
Investments in education, health and Zamsif have been successful.
QN. 10b
IN WHAT AREAS HAVE ADJUSTMENT LENDING AND INVESTMENT LENDING HAD THE MOST NEGATIVE EFFECTS IN YOUR COUNTRY? PLEASE GIVE EXAMPLES. HOW COULD THE SITUATION HAVE BEEN HANDLED DIFFERENTLY?
R 1.
Lending for structural adjustment has had most negative impact in Zambia. Structural adjustment has been superficial and experimental in Zambia. Structural adjustment programmes have been imposed on Zambia.
R 2.
Privatisation has been responsible for the collapse of industries and lack of growth in the economy.
R 3.
Lending for adjustment has had mixed results, most of which has been negative.
R 4.
Adjustment lending failed to achieve targeted results.
R 5.
Trade liberalisation and privatisation were done hastily with dire consequences on the economy of the country.
The Zambia National Commercial Bank [ZANACO] and Zambia Telecommunications Limited [ ZAMTEL] should be privatised to Zambians.
R 6.
ASIP failed because it supported headquarters only.
R 7.
The economy and country are in worse conditions due to liberalisation and privatisation.
R 8.
Blame for the poor implementation of of adjustment programmes should be shared equally between the country’s leadership and the bank.
R 9.
The intended benefits of social and economic adjustment were not realised owing to the failure in the management of the projects.
R 10.
ASIP was a failure and so were all the adjustment lending projects.
R 11.
Adjustment lending was poor and controversial leading to negative impact on the economy.
R 12.
Adjustment programmes were donor driven. Adjustment lending had negative consequences.
R 13.
All structural lending programmes were poorly executed.
R 14.
ASIP and the Private Sector Development fund are examples of failed investment lending.
R 15.
Economic restructuring including trade liberalisation and privatisation were academic exercises.
Adjustment lending is responsible for the collapse of the Zambian economy.
R 16.
SAPS were not well coordinated. The result is the poor performance of the economy.
R 17.
Privatisation was undertaken recklessly. Privatisation should have favoured Zambians.
R 18.
The Environmental Support Project and ASIP have failed due to poor design.
R 19.
Adjustment lending was imposed on developing countries . Private sector investment lending should have been targeted at small scale
Zambian enterprises utilising local raw materials.
R 20.
The poor state of the economy after a decade of adjustment lending is indicative of the failure of the programme in Zambia.
R 21.
Adjustment lending has not been successful partly as a result of the poor social and economic environment.
R 22.
There was a lack of seriousness in the planning and execution of adjustment programmes in Zambia. As a result, all adjustments have had negative effect on the economy.
R 23.
Adjustment lending failed and worsened the economic prospects in the country. The increase in poverty and the poor delivery of services to small scale farmers
are attributable to structural adjustment. Resources for adjustment were too thinly spread.
R 24.
Of all the structural adjustment projects, privatisation was the biggest failure.
QN. 11a
TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU BELIEVE THAT IMPLEMENTING LENDING CONDITIONALITIES HELPS GET RESULTS ON THE GROUND?
R 1.
Conditionalities are acceptable provided that they are reasonable and intended to achieve positive results.
R 2.
Lending conditions should be adjusted to the conditions obtaining in the client country.
R 3.
Conditionalities assist to trigger off certain actions. Without the conditions, governments might not achieve the desired results.
Conditionalities are performance indicators.
R 4.
Governments are often compelled to accept conditions out of desperation. Conditionalities should be agreed following wide consultations with several
stakeholder groups.
R 5.
Conditionalities dictate the agenda of the Bank rather than that of the country. . Conditionalities often strangle national ideals. Conditionalities not established in a transparent manner and appear to be an
imposition.
R 6.
Conditionalities are necessary and useful but must be flexible. Conditionalities are often not well researched.
R 7.
There is normally a lack of national consensus on the conditions set by the bank. Conditionalities hold poor countries to ransom.
R 8.
Conditionalities provide checks and balances, without which resources could be misapplied.
R 9.
Conditions help to keep government in check and to monitor implementation of agreed projects.
Bank should put implementation of the autonomy of the Auditor General’s office as a condition for assistance.
R 10.
Conditions are helpful in keeping governments in check. Conditionalities should be fully negotiated and agreed by all stakeholders. Often,
the negotiators of the conditions are different from the implementers.
R 11.
Conditions are inevitable. However, they should be relevant.
R 12.
Conditions are acceptable if they are fair and flexible.
R 13.
Conditionalities are necessary but should be fair.
R 14.
Conditionalities check propensity of government to spend on items that might not be necessary.
R 15.
Conditions are helpful.
R 16.
Conditions should be realistic and targeted to achieve positive results.
R 17.
Conditionalities are inevitable although they area most unpopular in Zambia.
R 18.
Conditionalities should be used to monitor performance of the client against some agreed criteria.
Conditionalities should be relevant and realistic.
R 19.
Conditionalities are acceptable as normal. However basis for conditionalities are not clear Bank should have continuous monitoring so that the borrower is kept in check.
R 20.
Conditionaloities are acceptable as long as they are not perceived to be onerous and imposed on the government.
R 21.
Conditionalities are often unfair and intended to extract extraordinary compliance from government on matters not related to the projects under implementation.
Conditionalities are often misguided.
R 22.
Conditionalities should be negotiated and agreed by the parties. Apparent conflicts arise where negotiators and implementers are different
peoples.
R 23.
Conditions are acceptable if they are related to project performance. Governments are often forced into accepting conditions because of desperation.
R 24.
Some conditions frustrate creativity and inhibit development.
QN. 11b.
WHAT IS YOUR EXPERIENCE WITH THE FLEXIBILITY OF THE WORLD BANK WITH RESPECT TO LENDING CONDITIONALITIES?
R 1.
The bank is inflexible.
R 2.
The Bank can be quite flexible. For instance, there was originally no funding for retrenchments but later the Bank revised its position.
R 3.
The Bank is inflexible with its conditions once these have been agreed upon. The Bank does not accept European Union procurement terms.
R 4.
Bank is not flexible with its conditionalities.
R 5.
The Bank is not flexible.
R 6.
The Bank is not flexible with its terms of loans once these have been negotiated.
R 7.
The bank is currently accommodating and more flexible than was the case previously.
R 8.
The terms are flexible. For instance, Zambia failed to qualify to HIPIC completion in 2003. The date was shifted to 2004.
R 9.
The Bank is not flexible with the coditionalities.
R 10.
Perception is that the Bank is not flexible.
R 11.
The bank should read and adapt its conditions to the unfolding social political circumstances.
R 12.
The terms of the bank are rigid and inflexible.
R 13.
The terms are not really flexible.
R 14.
Bank is inflexible.R 15.
The terms are not flexible enough.
R 16.
The terms of the loans are rigid because they do not reflect local conditions.
R 17.
Not flexible.
R 18.
There is no flexibility in the bank’s terms.
R 19.
Terms are not flexible because they are not negotiated locally but in Washington.
R 20.
Terms should not be too flexible lest they lose credibility. The terms are relatively flexible.
R 21.
The bank responds only when there is a general public outcry.
R 22.
The terms are flexible provided that the essence of the agreement id maintained.
R 23.
The Bank is not sufficiently flexible.
R 24.
The terms are not flexible.
QN 12.
WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW ABOUT YOUR EXPERIENCE WITH WORLD BANK PROCEDURES [ E.G. PROCUREMENTOF GOODS AND SERVICES, AUDITING OF PROJECT ACCOUNTS, SELECTION OF CONSULTANTS, DISBURSEMENT, ETC]. ARE WORLD BANK PROCEDURES CLEAR TO YOU? IF NOT, WHAT COULD THE BANK DO TO HELP WITH THIS?
R 1.
The procedures for procurement are comprehensive but clear. They ought to be more widely publicised to all suppliers and contractors.
R 2.
Procedures are clear and easy to follow. Bank prefers foreign consultants to local ones.
R 3.
The procedures are clear but cumbersome. It often takes toolong to procure goods and services on the bank’s terms.
There is a clear bias towards foreign suppliers of consulting services.
R 4.
Not familiar with the procedures of the Bank.
R 5.
The procedures are becoming clearer with more interaction. Thee is room for improvement.
R 6.
Procedures are clear but extremely cumbersome. There is too much paper work.
R 7.
Not aware of the bank’s procedures.
R 8.
Procedures are clear but rigid and cumbersome.
R 9.
Procedures are clear.
R 10.
The procedures are either cumbersome and unclear or Clear but unfamiliar!
R 11.
The Bank’s procedures are clear but laborious.
R 12.
The procedures are clear but cumbersome. Reliance on task managers in Washington is responsible for the delays in obtaining authorities.
R 13.
The procedures are clear but they are not locally based.
R 14.
The procedures are clear but deliberately cumbersome.
R 15.
Have no knowledge of the procedures.
R 16.
Not dealt with the Bank’s procedures.
R 17.
The procedures are internal but not clear to ordinary people.
R 18.
The procedures are clear but project design is often the problem. Part of the problem arises from the fact several account holders are not willing to
be accountable. Furthermore there is a lack of comprehensive local procurement procedures
R 19.
The procedures are clear but the Bank should acquaint local suppliers and contractors with the procedures so that they may participate in activities funded by the Bank.
R 20.
Bank procedures are good and clear. Procedures are perceived to be cumbersome due to lack of authority in the
country office to make final decisions.
R 21.
The procedures are clear and effective.
R 22.
The rules are clear and are designed to promote accountability and transparency.
R 23.
Procedures are clear.
R 24.
Procedures are clear but bulky.
QN. 13.
ARE YOU DIRECTLY AWARE OF CORRUPT PRACTICES CONCERNING WB PROJECTS? ( YES / NO). IF YES, DO YOU KNOW TO WHOM YOU CAN
ADDRESS YOUR QUESTION AND CONCERNS?
R 1.
Not aware of any.
R 2.
Not aware of any.
R 3.
Not aware of any
R 4.
Heard of misuse of HIPIC funds where District Commissioners draw funds for fuel.
R 5.
Not aware any.
R 6.
Not aware of any misuse of WB funds.
R 7.
Not aware but Bank should assist Zambia to attain high standards of probity.
R 8.
Not aware of any.
R 9.
Not aware of any.
R 10.
Not aware of any.
R 11.
Not aware pf any.
R 12.
Not aware of any.
R 13.
It can only be inferred from the large volumes of funds that are disbursed into the country but do not reach intended targets.
R 14.
Nepotism in Central Board of Health is a form of corruption.
R 15.
Not aware of any.
R 16.
Not aware of any.
R 17.
Not aware of any.
R 18.
Aware of a case in Zamsif due to lack of internal controls. The case was referred to the Anti-corruption commission for prosecution.
R 19.
The supply of computers to the judiciary involved corruption.
R 20.
Not aware any.
R 21.
Abuse of funds at FILMAP was an act of corruption.
R 22.
A member pf staff at Zamsif leaked tender information to to bidders. Case was referred to the anti-Corruption commission.
R 23.
Local competitive bidding that requires three bidders is open to abuse.
R 24.
Not aware of any.
QN 14a.
AS YOU MAY KNOW, THE WORLD BANK IS ACTIVELY SUPPOTING THE USE OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES(ICTs) FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND KNOWLEDGW SHARING ON
DEVELOPMENT ISSUES AND MORE EFFECCTIVE PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY. HOW EFFECTIVE DO YOU THINK THE BANK HAS BEEN IN
ZAMBIA IN THIS RESPECT?
QN. 14b.
HOW IMPORTANT IS ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE SHARING RESOURCES AND INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES TO YOUR WORK.
QN. 14c
WHAT ADVICE WOULD YOU OFFER THA BANK IN SUPPORTING THE USE OF ICTs FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENYT?
QN. 14d.
HOW MIGHT YOU ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO SUCH A PROCESS?
[Enumerator’s Note: Very few Clients on the survey list were familiar with the Bank’s recent intervention in ICT as a tool for socio-economic development in Africa. The questions were responded to in generalist terms. It was found prudent and economic to place the three questions together].
R 1.
Not familiar with the Bank’s ICT programmes to promote development ICT is important as it enables one to access information and data on any subject
of interest.
R 2.
Aware of the Bank’s supply of computers and other office equipment to its projects but not as part of a comprehensive ICT policy for economic development.
Bank should promote the use of ICT in schools and colleges.
R 3.
Not familiar with the Bank’s ICT programmes to promote development. However, ICT is critical.
R 4.
Not familiar with the Bank’s ICT programmes in Zambia.
R 5.
The project is new and not well articulated to a wider audience. Sharing of information is important. But Bank’s website is not easily accessible,
hence need to provide hard copies of some of the pertinent documents.
R 6.
Access to technical production information available would enhance productivity of farmers in Zambia.
R 7.
Although not familiar with Bank’s programme, ICT is important. Bank should be in the fore front to assist Zambia to use the technology for development.
R 8.
Few people have access to ICT in Zambia partly on account of the high cost of equipment and undeveloped telecommunications lines. Bank should assist to make ICT more accessible by influencing government to zero-rate computers.
R 9.
Computer technology is under-utilised in Zambia. Bank should assist the country to make full use of ICT.
R 10.
Not familiar with the Bank’s programmes in ICT.
R 11.
Wide use of ICT would enhance quality of medical diagnosis if peripheral medical facilities could be linked to major hospitals with senior doctors.
Medical research would also be enhanced.
R 12.
Bank should support the popularisation of ICT by funding computer training in schools.
R 13.
Not familiar with the Bank’s intervention in ICT.
R 14.
ICT is the competitive technology of the future. Bank should place emphasis on training in schools and access by funding expansion of telecommunications systems.
R 15.
Not familiar with the Bank’s programmes in ICT.
R 16.
Not familiar with the Bank’s programmes in ICT.
R 17.
ICT enables decision-makers access strategic information and data. Internet facility at Parliamentarians has enabled members to access quality information from parliaments around the world.
R 18.
Not familiar with the Bank’s programmes in ICT.
R 19.
Zambia is lagging behind in the use of ICT. Bank should help with popularisation of ICT by funding supply of computers to schools and colleges.
Bank should assist clients with training to appreciate ICT Government is wasteful with computers that are used merely as word processors.
R 20.
Bank has over-extended itself by entering ICT. ICT should be left to specialised agencies of the UN system.
R 21.
Those developing countries that will embrace ICT effectively will witness accelerated development growths.
Bank is not doing enough to broaden resource base and to get information from the private sector.
R 22.
Bank has been effective in supporting ICT for its clients. A lot more remains to be done to make ICT easily accessible by the majority of
people.
R 23.
Need for more capacity building in the use of ICT as a tool for development. Bank should provide equipment to enable access to information.
R 24.
Not familiar with the Bank’s programmes in ICT.
QN. 15.
YOU MAY BE AWARE THAT THE AFRICAN REGION OF THE WORLD BANK HAS BEEN TRYING TO IMPROVE THE WAY WE DO BUSINESS. HAVE YOU
NOTICED ANY CHANGE IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING ASPECTS OF THE WORLD BANKACTIVITIES IN ZAMBIA OVER THE LAST THREE YEARS: OUR
EFFEVTIVENESS? OUR CLIENT FOCUS? THE QUALITY OF THE BANK’S PRODUCTS AND SERVICES?
R 1.
In Zambia the Bank has disbursed large amounts of money without a commensurate return.
The bank is becoming more accessible by wider groups of stakeholders including NGOs and CBOs.
R 2.
Bank focus now on poverty reduction and wealth creation is a change from the structural adjustment approach.
R 3.
Bank making some effort to change its image and to be more accessible.
R 4.
Role of the Bank in Zambia has not been too clear. Perhaps focus on poverty reduction will clarify role.
R 5.
Bank opening up to non-governmental views. Lately, faith-based organisations have been participating in exchanges.
Bank is also attempting to identify more sources of information.
R 6.
Bank now responds more timely to client needs. Seen consultations and dialogue on project implementation. Bank now consults more widely.
R 7.
Observable change of approach as Bank now accommodates other stakeholders such as NGOs and faith-based organisations.
R 8.
Bank has not changed in its approach to dealing with issues in Zambia.
R 9.
Bank projects are better implemented with stringent monitoring.
R 10.
Seen improvements in the requiring wider participation. Not yet confident, however, that this s not mere window dressing.
R 11.
Bank is slowly changing by accepting participation and dialogue with NGOs.
R 12.
Bank has changed somewhat in the recent past by engaging in consultations with broad based group of society. Recently bank has permitted the procurement of books from ZEPH, a public sector supplier which was previously excluded from bidding.
Bank has become more responsive to client demands.
R 13.
Appreciate increased consultations. Bank’s participation in tackling poverty and HIV / Aids is an indicator of
responsiveness to critical needs of Zambia.
R 14.
There has been no change in the attitude of the Bank.
R 15.
Not noticed any clear strategic change in the Bank’s functions and focus.
R 16.
There has been no discernible improvement in the Bank’s approach to business in Zambia.
R 17.
Bank not changing fast enough in line with the demands of civil society.
R 18.
Bank is making some effort to be accommodating and participatory than was the case previously.
R 19.
Evident that the Bank is trying to change its image. More people now being consulted and participating in preparation and design of projects.
Leadership of bank at country office is key in creating a positive image for the Bank.
R 20.
Seen some changes but the bank still not open and transparent to Zambians.R 21.
Bank has started to engage more people in its discussions.
R 22.
Bank going out of its way to be accommodating of other views. Bank is now more accessible and is prepared to change its positions.
R 23.
Bank seems to be in transition from its previous image of dictating programmes and conditions.
Bank more consultative and keen to engage many views.
R 24.
Bank is attempting to break with the past image as an institution pursuing an external agenda.
Bank paying some attention to various groups of stakeholders. The Bank’s change from offering a line of credit for HIV / Aids to a grant is a case in point.
QN. 16
PLEASE FEEL FREE TO COMMENT ON ANY OTHER ASPECTS OF THE WORLD BANK ACTIVITIES.
R 1.
Bank should design country specific programmes and projects and be more flexible to accommodate variations.
Country should be allowed to define its development path.
R 2.
Bank should collaborate more with other development and donor agencies to minimise duplication and waste of resources.
Bank should be magnanimous and accept responsibility for failure of its programmes.
R 3.
There has perhaps been excessive reliance upon workshop-type of consultations as opposed to deep technical and professional reflections.
Bank should be flexible and treat cases on their own merits. The capacity of the local country office should be enhanced by adequate staffing
and authorised to make decisions.
R 4.
Bank should be open and transparent in its dealings with NGOs. Many of the Bank’s programmes should be harmonised to reduce contradictions:
for instance between poverty reduction and downsizing and privatisation. Role of the Bank in Zambia should be clearly stated.
R 5.
Bank should reconsider its policy not to pay allowances to activist volunteers working in the HIV / Aids programmes.
R 6.
The country office should be empowered to make decisions. Policy of the Bank not to use officers in the public service as consultants should
be revised in view of the tremendous experience of the staff.
R 7.
Bank should take time to appreciate a client country’s position before prescribing solutions.
Bank’s focus in Zambia should change to poverty reduction; employment creation in agriculture, tourism, industry and mining; combating corruption; education and health.
R 8.
Zambians are not fully engaged in the economy of the country. The Bank should promote Zambian participation in the real economy through development of the small scale sector.
Bank staff should make frequent visits to rural areas to witness the poor conditions of the people.
R 9.
The Bank’s consultations on projects should extend to the grassroots who are often the perceived beneficiaries of such projects. The people know what they want.
R 10.
There is need to design programmes with full appreciation of the existing conditions in the country.
Effort should be made to study failed projects as input for design of successive ones. Often, new projects are implemented without taking into account lessons of the failed projects.
R 11.
Zambia has no capacity for credit financing. Bank should consider grants only for Zambia.
R 12.
Bank should harmonise procedures with other donor agencies.
R 13.
At the end of each project, there should be a closure report that should be discussed with all concerned so that the lessons learned can be shared.
R 14.
Bank has been dogmatic by excluding alternative solutions. Capacity building should extend to high level staff including PS, Ministers and
Members of Parliament.
R 15.
Bank should employ more Zambians in senior positions at headquarters and elsewhere.
R 16.
Bank should mount public relations campaigns to explain its role and operations in Zambia.
R 17.
Though a multilateral agency, the Bank is perceived as a mouthpiece of the western donor countries with mandate to advance the west’s agenda, despite the consequences to developing countries.
Bank often acts as lead organisation for mobilisation of resources. It should, accordingly, take responsibility.
R 18.
Local staff in the country office should be given promotional and financial incentives.
There is a high turnover of staff on missions to Zambia making it difficult to achieve continuity. Bank staff on the Zambian desk should spend more time to appreciate the difficulties of the country.
R 19.
Bank must redefine its mission in Zambia. Bank relies to a great extent on foreign advisory services when local technical and
professional expertise is available. Bank should involve Members of Parliament in the design and implementation of
its programmes.
R 20.
Bank’s agenda in Zambia is not too clear. This must be defined unambiguously. The Bank should devolve authority to local office whose staff have a better
understanding of the issues. Bank must be open and transparent with Zambians and other members of the
donor community. Consultations are seen merely as a public relations exercise as decisions are made in Washington.
R 21.
Bank should continue to broaden its sources of information. Bank should in embrace the private sector, particularly, the Zambian small scale entrepreneurs.
R 22.
Bank must redefine its role in light of the poor state of the economy following decades of adjustment.
R 23.
Bank should adopt new approaches to development in Zambia in light of few successes achieved against large amounts of monies expended.
R 24.
Counter part financing is not realistic in view of the lack of resources with government. Bank should consider total financing if its projects are to be implemented.
_______________________________________________
20 February 2004
