World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/... · 2016, this time extending south to the Equatoria regions where the SS-EARTTDFP-financed regional road was located. Violent

Document of

The World Bank

Report No: NCO00004670

NOTE ON CANCELLED OPERATION REPORT

(IDA-53630)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 52.2 MILLION

(US$80 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN

FOR A

SOUTH SUDAN – EASTERN AFRICA REGIONAL TRANSPORT, TRADE AND

DEVELOPMENT FACILITATION PROJECT

FIRST PHASE OF PROGRAM

April 9, 2019

Transport Global Practice

Africa Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective September 30, 2018)

Currency Unit = South Sudan Pound (SSP)

SSP149.32 = US$1

SDR1 = US$1.39525000

FISCAL YEAR

July 1 - June 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AfDB African Development Bank

ASA Advisory Services & Analytics

CPMS Corridor Performance Monitoring System

DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo

EAC Eastern Africa Community

EATTFP East Africa Trade and Transport Facilitation Project

EPC Engineering, Procurement and Construction

ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessment

FSI Fragile States Index

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GRSS Government of the Republic of South Sudan

ICT Information and Communication Technology

IDA International Development Association

IEG Independent Evaluation Group

IPF Investment Project Financing

JIMC Joint Inter-Ministerial Committee

KeNHA Kenya National Highway Authority

KICTA Kenya Information and Communications Technology Agency

KRA Kenya Revenue Authority

MoFCEP Ministry of Finance, Commerce and Economic Planning

MoTI Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, Kenya

MoTPS Ministry of Telecommunication and Postal Services

MTRB Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges, South Sudan

OPRC Output and Performance-Based Road Contract

OSBP One Stop Border Post

PIU Project Implementation Unit

PMT Project Management Team

SETIDP Sudan Emergency Transport and Infrastructure Development Project

SOP Series of Projects

SSCS South Sudan Customs Services

SSNBS South Sudan National Bureau of Standards

SSRA South Sudan Roads Authority

TA Technical Assistance

UN United Nations

UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services

Vice President: Hafez M. H. Ghanem

Country Director: Carolyn Turk

Practice Manager: Maria Marcela Silva

Project Team Leader: Muhammad Zulfiqar Ahmed

NCO Team Leader: Emmanuel Taban

NCO Primary Author: Alan G. Carroll

The World Bank (P131426)

Page 1 of 24

Africa

South Sudan- Eastern Africa Regional Transport , Trade and Development Facilitation Program (Phase

One)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

D A T A S H E E T ............................................................................................................................................. 2

A. BASIC INFORMATION ................................................................................................................................ 2

B. KEY DATES .................................................................................................................................................... 2

C. RATINGS SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................. 2

D. SECTOR AND THEME CODES .................................................................................................................. 2

E. BANK STAFF .................................................................................................................................................. 3

F. RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs ............................................................................... 4

1. CONTEXT, PROJECT DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES, AND DESIGN ............................................. 5

2. POST-APPROVAL EXPERIENCE AND REASONS FOR CANCELLATION .................................... 12

3. ASSESSMENT OF BANK PERFORMANCE ........................................................................................... 15

4. LESSONS LEARNED ................................................................................................................................... 18

ANNEX 1: BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION PROCESSES . 20

ANNEX 2: LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS .................................................................................... 23

M A P .................................................................................................................................................................. 24


Page 2 of 24

D A T A S H E E T

A. BASIC INFORMATION

Country: Africa Project Name:

South Sudan- Eastern

Africa Regional

Transport, Trade and

Development Facilitation

Program (Phase One)

Project ID: P131426 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-53630

NCO Date: 01/07/2019

Financing Instrument: IPF Borrower: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH

SUDAN

Original Total

Commitment: USD 80.00M Disbursed Amount: USD 1.84M

Revised Amount: USD 9.57M

Environmental Category: B

Implementing Agencies:

Ministry of Roads and Bridges

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:

B. KEY DATES

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 01/17/2013 Effectiveness: 12/31/2014 12/22/2014

Appraisal: 11/25/2013 Closing: 12/30/2019 09/14/2018

Approval: 05/20/2014

C. RATINGS SUMMARY

Performance Rating by NCO

Outcomes: Not Applicable

Risk to Development Outcome: Not Applicable

Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

D. SECTOR AND THEME CODES


Page 3 of 24

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Information and Communications Technologies

ICT Infrastructure 19 19

Transportation

Rural and Inter-Urban Roads 59 59

Public Administration - Transportation 15 15

Industry, Trade and Services

Public Administration - Industry, Trade and

Services 7 7

Original Actual

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Economic Policy 63 63

Trade 63 63

Trade Facilitation 63 63

Private Sector Development 22 22

Jobs 12 12

Job Creation 12 12

Public Private Partnerships 10 10

Urban and Rural Development 24 24

Rural Development 12 12

Rural Infrastructure and service delivery 12 12

Urban Development 12 12

Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery 12 12

E. BANK STAFF

Positions At NCO At Approval

Vice President: Hafez M. H. Ghanem Makhtar Diop

Country Director: Carolyn Turk Bella Bird

Practice Manager: Maria Marcela Silva Supee Teravaninthorn

Project Team Leader: Muhammad Zulfiqar Ahmed Tesfamichael Nahusenay

Mitiku

NCO Team Leader: Emmanuel Taban


Page 4 of 24

NCO Primary Author: Alan G. Carroll

F. RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs

No. Date ISR

Archived DO IP

Actual

Disbursements

(USD millions)

1 08/26/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately

Unsatisfactory

0.00

2 04/09/2015 Moderately

Unsatisfactory

Moderately

Unsatisfactory

0.60


Unsatisfactory

Moderately

Unsatisfactory

2.33

4 06/28/2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately

Satisfactory

2.80


Unsatisfactory

Moderately

Unsatisfactory

1.70

6 03/06/2018 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 1.81


Page 5 of 24

1. CONTEXT, PROJECT DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES, AND DESIGN

Country Context

1. The South Sudan - Eastern Africa Regional Transport, Trade and Development Facilitation Project

(SS-EARTTDFP) was conceived as a key element of a multi-country program (see the next section). By

2013, when this project was identified and prepared, the Bank had been supporting regional integration

through multi-country programs for a number of years. This approach was first formalized in 2008, with

the publication of the Bank’s Regional Integration Assistance Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa. 1 A

subsequent Bank strategy document, Africa’s Future and the World Bank’s Support to It,2 issued in 2011,

reinforced the importance of the regional development approach, which was seen as especially relevant

from the infrastructure and trade perspectives, to overcome the physical disadvantages of land-locked

countries such as South Sudan. The Project Appraisal Document (PAD) of the SS-EARTTDFP laid out

the regional development rationale and expected benefits in detail.3

2. The economy of South Sudan, which became an independent country in 2011, has been dominated

by oil exports. The country is dependent on its principal southern neighbors, Uganda and Kenya, for its

flows of formal trade with the outside world. These links are restricted due to limited transport access and

logistical/institutional bottlenecks. South Sudan remains extremely fragile, lacking many of the basic

conditions to support development. At the time of appraisal of the SS-EARTTDFP, South Sudan was

estimated to have a population of about 12.3 million and a GDP of US$9.3 billion (2012). With a land area

of about 648,000 sq. km, South Sudan is endowed with abundant natural resources, including a large

amount of good quality rain-fed agricultural land, potentially irrigable land, aquatic and forest resources,

and significant oil reserves. Yet, in 2016, more than 82 percent of South Sudanese were living under the

international poverty line (poverty headcount), placing South Sudan amongst the poorest countries in the

world. Currently, South Sudan ranks 181 out of 188 countries in the Human Development Index, including

an average life expectancy of only 56 years.4 The continuing internal conflict has impeded the application

of effective macroeconomic policies and aggravated South Sudan’s economic collapse, as reflected in

significant monetization of the fiscal deficit, high inflation, a wide spread between the official and the

parallel market exchange rates, and disrupted trade flows.5

3. The World Bank had been a partner since 2005 in the establishment of the Sudan Multi-Donor

Trust Fund-National (MDTF-N) and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Sudan (MDTF-SS). These

MDTFs were intended to follow up the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) for Sudan signed in

January 2005.6

1 The World Bank, Report No. 43022-AFR, March 18, 2008. 2 The World Bank, February 2011. See various parts of the document; see especially “Box 9: Regional approaches as game changers”. 3 Project Appraisal Document, South Sudan – Eastern Africa Regional Transport, Trade and Development Facilitation Project, First

Phase of Program, Report No. PAD646, April 15, 2014, pp. 1-6. 4 South Sudan Economic Update, July 2018, World Bank. 5 Op. cit. 6 The 2005 CPA was an accord signed between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). The

CPA was meant to end the second Sudanese civil war, develop democratic governance, and share oil revenues. It also set a timetable

for a Southern Sudan independence referendum.


Page 6 of 24

4. The history of the SS-EARTTDFP, from its inception, has been intertwined with prolonged armed

conflict. The end of the second Sudanese civil war in 2005 ushered in a period of relative calm leading to

the foundation of the Republic of South Sudan in 2011. Immediately thereafter in 2012, the country started

to experience scattered inter-ethnic warfare, and South Sudanese forces carried out a short-lived seizure of

the Heglig oil fields in lands claimed by both Sudan and South Sudan. In December 2013, fighting broke

out between forces loyal to the President his former deputy, igniting the South Sudanese civil war. Ugandan

troops were deployed alongside South Sudanese government forces against the rebels. The United Nations

sent peacekeepers to the country as part of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). This

phase of the conflict focused mainly on the Upper Nile and Jonglei regions in the north of the country.

Numerous ceasefires were mediated and subsequently broken. A peace agreement was signed in Ethiopia

in August 2015 under threat of United Nations sanctions for both sides. The conflict erupted again in July

2016, this time extending south to the Equatoria regions where the SS-EARTTDFP-financed regional road

was located. Violent military operations caused massive population displacement and the destruction of

livelihoods, which in turn fueled the creation of multiple localized armed groups. In September 2018, a

“Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan” was signed between the

government and the opposition in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. However, armed conflict and violence against

civilians have continued.

5. Throughout these years of warfare, thousands of civilians have been killed, widespread human

rights abuses have been documented, essential civilian infrastructure such as clinics, hospitals, and schools,

have been looted, destroyed, and abandoned, and more than four million people have been forced to flee

their homes, about 200,000 of whom are sheltering in United Nations compounds and hundreds of

thousands as refugees in neighboring countries.7 Through the end of 2018, about 400,000 people were

estimated to have been killed in the war. As of the writing of this NCO, the food security situation has

continued to deteriorate, with nearly seven million people, or two-thirds of the country, facing extreme

hunger, according to leading international aid agencies.

Sectoral Context

6. As of 2012, South Sudan’s road network totaled 12,642 km, of which around 4,000 km were all-

weather gravel roads and the rest were tracks and trails. Maintenance was weak, so that most roads were

in poor to very poor condition, especially in rural areas that are largely inaccessible during the six-month

rainy season (April to October). These conditions made transportation in South Sudan slower and more

expensive than almost anywhere else in Africa. This, in turn, hindered farmers’ access to key inputs and

their ability to move their products to local and regional markets.8 Shortly before the SS-EARTTDFP was

prepared, the World Bank had assessed the country’s transport sector management institutions as being “at

a formative stage”, with the capacity of the Ministry of Roads and Bridges (MRB), which had the overall

responsibility for the road infrastructure, as weak.9 More recently, the Bank has observed that, since the

conflict re-started in 2016, no road works of any kind have been carried out, and sector institutions have

become dysfunctional.

7 Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/africa/south-sudan# 8 Implementation Completion and Results Report, South Sudan Rural Roads Project, Report No: ICR00004114, World Bank, June 12,

2017. 9 Op. cit.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heglig

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Mission_in_South_Sudan


Page 7 of 24

7. Soon after South Sudan was founded, when there was considerable goodwill in the international

community toward the country, the World Bank and other development partners sought opportunities to

support activities that would produce substantial development impacts while being relatively simple and

straightforward, in view of the country’s very limited capacity. As a result of a 2013 donors consultative

meeting focused on South Sudan and Kenya, the improvement of the key Juba-Nadapal road section within

South Sudan of the Juba-Nadapal-Eldoret Corridor (extending into Kenya) provided a good prospect for

an intervention that met the aforementioned criteria. The engineering design studies for this road segment

had been carried out under a project financed by the MDTF-SS.

8. The PAD for the SS-EARTTDFP observed that, geographically, the southeastern states of South

Sudan are the closest to the sea ports and agricultural markets in the neighboring countries of Ethiopia and

Kenya. The development potential along the Juba-Nadapal road includes agriculture production (forestry,

fishery, tea, coffee, cereals, live-animal and animal products); cement and lime industries; and mining of

gold and semi-precious stones. The improved road also would facilitate the delivery of social and

administrative services and promote commercial services, including storage facilities and road-side

businesses.

9. From the regional standpoint, intra- and inter-regional trade and development were being hampered

by the relatively poor transport links between the countries of Eastern Africa, the unsatisfactory

performance of the ports of Mombasa and Dar-es-Salaam, the high cost of internet access in South Sudan,

and an array of technical, political and policy-related factors.10 The Juba - Nadapal - Eldoret road was

envisioned as an extension of one of the East African Community (EAC) road corridors linking South

Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda, and further connecting to the Dar-es-Salaam – Dodoma – Isaka

corridor, which joins the Trans East African Highway at Dodoma. The Juba - Nadapal - Eldoret road also

was seen as a complement to the Kampala-Juba-Addis Ababa corridor development, facilitated by the

African Development Bank (AfDB), which shares the Juba – Kapoeta section (240 km) and links South

Sudan to Djibouti port.

Rationale for Bank involvement

10. By the time that South Sudan gained independence, the World Bank had become invested as a

leading development partner for the country, to some extent because of its role as the manager of the

MDTF-SS. Over the period from late 2012 through the end of 2013, when the EARTTDFP was prepared

and appraised, South Sudan, despite suffering from some low-level, localized conflicts, was judged by the

Bank and other development agencies to offer good prospects for socio-economic progress, provided that

international support would be forthcoming.

11. The South Sudan project was packaged as part of a regional program (see below). At that time, the

World Bank considered that it had developed a valuable body of experience and expertise with regional

(multi-country) operations, making it well placed to take the lead in the proposed EARTTDFP.

12. Another significant element of the Bank’s involvement was that, at the time that the project was

prepared, the Bank had declared itself ready to increase assistance to fragile and conflict-affected countries

10 High logistics costs, cumbersome customs regulations, informal cartels, and limited competition in the trucking industry. Supply

chains to South Sudan are long and rely on a sequence of discrete operations involving many procedures, agencies and services, all of

which are prone to rent-seeking and over-regulation.


Page 8 of 24

(FCCs).11 The Bank was in the process of establishing a fragile states hub in Nairobi, and had, in the

“Africa’s Future” report of 2011, expressed its willingness to take risks in supporting fragile and conflict

affected countries, as reflected in the document’s statement, “As an operating principle, we should view

the Bank’s primary reputational risk in fragile and conflict situations as the risk of operational inefficacy,

that is, of not achieving results in peace consolidation and early development.”12

Project Development Objective

13. The project development objective was to enhance regional connectivity and integration of the

Recipient with its Eastern Africa neighboring countries, and its access to sea ports.

Program and Project Components

14. Multi-Country Program. The EARTTDFP program was to be implemented as a three-phase

Series of Projects (SOP) using Investment Project Financing (IPF). The program met the guidelines for

IDA Regional Program Funding. The provisional scale of the overall program was estimated at about

US$1.3 billion. The first project, which is the subject of this NCO, had a total cost of US$255 m., of which

US$80 m. were to be from an IDA credit, US$150 m. were to be provided by the China Export Import

Bank as a loan (parallel financing), and US$25 m. were to be counterpart funds from the Government of

the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS).

15. The second phase of the regional program (P148853), covering Kenya, was approved by the World

Bank’s Board on June 11, 2015, with a closing date of December 31, 2021. It has a total cost of US$676

m., comprising an IDA credit of US$500 m. to the Government of Kenya and US$176 m. in government

counterpart funding. Component 1 covers upgrading the Lokichar-Nadapal/Nakodok road in Kenya up to

the limits with South Sudan. Component 2 includes support for the implementation of trade facilitation

measures, including designing a One Stop Border Post on the border of South Sudan and Kenya, a social

infrastructure needs assessment, design and implementation of pastoralist roadside markets, and

implementation of trade and development facilitation measures, including designing export processing

zones, provision of site and services, and certification of products.

16. The third project in the program, as yet not prepared, was intended to enhance support to trade

facilitation measures along the priority corridors linking South Sudan to Mombasa and Djibouti seaports

and finance the rehabilitation of the remaining sections of the Nadapal - Eldoret road in Kenya not financed

under the first and second projects. This project was estimated to cost about US$175 million.

17. The South Sudan project covered the following:

a) Component 1: Support to the Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges (MTRB) (US$222

million of which IDA financing was US$47 million). The sub-components were: (a): Upgrading

of approximately 125 km of the Juba-Torit road section of the Juba-Nadapal-Eldoret Corridor. This

was to be financed mainly by a loan from the China EXIM Bank (as parallel co-financing to the

project). (b): (i) Construction and rehabilitation, within the Recipient’s territory, of bridges between

11 Africa’s Future and the World Bank’s Support to It, op. cit., p. 34, para. 99. 12 Africa’s Future and the World Bank’s Support to It, op. cit., p. 37, para. 113.


Page 9 of 24

Kapoeta and Nadapal and upgrading of approximately 40 km of the Kapoeta- Narus road section

of the Juba-Nadapal-Eldoret Corridor and (ii) related supervision costs. (c): Road repairs of

approximately 190 km of road sections, within the Recipient’s territory, between Torit and Kapoeta,

and Narus and Nadapal.

b) Component 2: Facilitation of Regional Transport, Trade and Development (US$12 million of

IDA financing). This component aimed to support promotion of sound transport, trade and

development facilitation measures, increasing the efficiency of the corridors. This included: (a):

Support to the Ministry of Finance, Commerce and Economic Planning (MOFCEP) and the South

Sudan Customs Service (SSCS) in the facilitation of regional trade and transport through the

establishment of an institutional base and legal framework, including: (i) the harmonization of

customs procedures and the legal establishment of a One Stop Border Post (OSBP) in Nadapal; (ii)

the provision of advisory services for the modernization of the Recipient’s custom services; (iii)

the implementation of an integrated border management system; and (iv) the provision of advisory

services and equipment for the establishment of a trade information platform within the MOFCEP.

(b): Support to MTRB in the facilitation of regional trade, transport and development, including:

(i) the carrying-out of a trade and development facilitation study and transport review on key

national corridors; (ii) the preparation of a transit transport agreement protocol and related support

to the Recipient’s national corridor management committee; (iii) the preparation of legal

agreements and regulations for the establishment of a vehicle overloading control system; (iv) the

development of a legal framework on traffic and safety, and the carrying out of a road safety audit

along part of the Juba-Nadapal-Eldoret Corridor within the Recipient’s territory; (v) the

implementation of a Corridor Performance Monitoring System (CPMS); and (vi) the carrying-out

of studies and ESIAs for the simplification of export-import processes, the certification of products

and the provision of services at rest stops.

c) Component 3: Institutional Development and Program Management (US$6 million of IDA

financing), including: (a): Strengthening of MTRB’s institutional capacity through the provision

of advisory services and training, and the preparation of a sectoral governance and anti-corruption

strategy. (b): Provision of advisory services to MTRB to strengthen its safeguards management

capacity. (c): Provision of advisory services, training and logistical support, including office

equipment, materials and supplies, and operating costs as required to sustain the management and

coordination of project implementation activities, including audits, and the monitoring and

evaluation of progress achieved in the execution of the project.

d) Component 4: Connecting Juba with Fiber Optics (US$15 million of IDA financing).

Construction of a fiber optic cable, alongside the part of the road located in the Recipient’s territory,

from Juba to Lokichoggio in the Republic of Kenya at the Juba-Nadapal-Eldoret Corridor.

Project costs and funding

18. Table 1 summarizes the cost and funding of the SS-EARTTDFP.


Page 10 of 24

Table 1: Project Cost and Funding (US$ million)

Components IDA GRSS China EXIM

bank

Total

Support to MTRB 47 25 150 222

Transport, trade and development facilitation 12 12

Institutional development and program management

support

6 6

Connecting Juba with fiber optics 15 15

Totals 80 25 150 255

Implementation Arrangements

19. The project implementation agencies were MTRB and SSCS, with the former as the lead agency.

SSCS was responsible for implementing the trade facilitation component. MTRB established a Program

Management Team (PMT), and SSCS established a Project Implementation Unit (PIU). MTRB was

responsible for the financial management and procurement of the Information and Communication

Technology (ICT) component on behalf of the Ministry of Telecommunication and Postal Services

(MoTPS). The Bank’s policy on “Situations of Urgent Need of Assistance or Capacity Constraints”, which

permits some alternative implementation and preparation provisions, was not triggered in the Bank’s

appraisal of the project.13

Risk Analysis

20. The overall risk of the EARTTDFP was rated “high” at appraisal, as part of the program was to be

implemented by a country affected by conflict, and implementation required the engagement of two

countries and multiple agencies. The program also required that significant financial resources be

contributed by multiple development partners. The Operational Risk Assessment Framework (ORAF)

presented in the PAD for the South Sudan project was comprehensive, and it rightly highlighted the highest

risks and main mitigation measures as being in the areas of implementation capacity, governance,

construction costs, insecurity, and armed conflict. The ORAF did not explicitly address the risk that the

country (including the project area) might be engulfed by more widespread warfare with resultant adverse

impacts on local populations. Technical and management capacity risks and gaps in financial management,

procurement, and safeguards capacity were to be mitigated by the engagement of consultants. Governance

risks were to be addressed by a Governance and Anti-corruption (GAC) Action Plan, but the PAD did not

specify how this would be carried out. The risk ratings are listed in Table 2.

13 Under the Bank’s policy for Situations of Urgent Need of Assistance or Capacity Constraints in force at the (then under OP 10.00,

paragraph 12), the following exceptional arrangements could be applied in a project: (i) defer environmental and social requirements

to the project implementation stage; (ii) use exceptional alternative legal and operational implementation arrangements; or (iii)

consolidate the normally sequential stages of identification, preparation and appraisal into a single review.


Page 11 of 24

Table 2: Risk Ratings at Appraisal

Risk Rating: H (High Risk); S (Substantial); M (Moderate Risk); L (Low Risk)

Rating

ggggg

gggg Project Stakeholder Risks S

Implementing Agency Risk

- Capacity H

- Governance H

Project Risks

- Design H

- Social and Environmental S

- Program and Donor S

- Delivery Monitoring and

Sustainability

H

- Other (Optional) H

Overall Implementation Risk H

Quality at Entry

21. The program design had taken into consideration the recommendations of an evaluation by the

World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of regional (multi-country) programs.14 These focused

on country commitment, matching the scope to national capacities, delineation of roles at the regional and

national levels, and accountable governance arrangements. Also, the program had been intended to reflect

the early lessons gained from the East African Trade and Transport Facilitation Project (EATTFP)

(implemented between 2006 and 2015) regarding the need be realistic in terms of scope, timeline and

outcomes.

22. In the event, although the project design contained relatively simple and straightforward roadworks

under Component 1, it also included challenging institutional modernization, reform, and capacity-building

elements under Components 2 and 3 which, in retrospect, were overly ambitious given the country and

institutional contexts.

23. The decision to use parallel co-financing for the project’s major civil works component greatly

increased demands and risks in project coordination and implementation. The SS-EARTTDFP was

designed as one of the first initiatives of a joint partnership between the World Bank and China EXIM

Bank to enhance growth and poverty reduction in Africa. An agreement had been signed in September

2013 between the President of the World Bank and the Chairman of the China EXIM Bank spelling out

the core principles to guide projects to be co-financed between the two entities.

24. Despite the outbreak of civil war in December 2013, the Bank’s senior management agreed, in

April 2014, to send the project to the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors for approval, acknowledging

that the project was high risk and that armed conflict could disrupt or even halt the project, citing the

14 The Development Potential of Regional Programs - An Evaluation of World Bank Support of Multi-country Operations, World Bank

Independent Evaluation Group, 2007.


Page 12 of 24

country’s “instability and insecurity” and noting that “The anticipated benefits of this project have to

overcome the challenges of implementing the project in a conflict-affected country with limited capacity,

spot insecurity and land mines, and raising the finance required to meet the huge investment.” The Board

approved the project on May 20, 2014. The World Bank Financing Agreement (FA) was signed on June

12, 2014, and the credit became effective on December 22, 2014.

2. POST-APPROVAL EXPERIENCE AND REASONS FOR CANCELLATION

This section provides a summary of the key factors that affected the project’s implementation and led to

its cancellation. Readers are referred to the supporting documents listed in Annex 2 for details on all

aspects of project implementation.

25. Activities carried out. Up to mid-2016—when the World Bank put project implementation on

“hold” (also referred to as a “pause” in some documents) due to a renewal of widespread armed conflict—

various preparatory activities were carried out, including repackaging of the road upgrading contracts,

recruiting technical assistance consultants, preparing Terms of Reference for priority studies and

assignments, formation of PIUs in SCSS and MoTPS, and preparation of bidding documents for the ICT

components. A consultancy services contract was signed in March 2014 for preparation of the Output and

Performance Based Road Contracting (OPRC) bid documents and the design review for reconstruction of

bridges, culverts and the gravel sub-base between Kapoeta and Nadapal. The consultant encountered

difficulties in fielding experts to South Sudan due to the perceived insecurity in the country and had to

deploy a locally-based firm to carry out the reconnaissance survey and comparison of the original design

with the situation on the ground. In October 2014, the consultant submitted its interim report, a draft of

the OPRC bidding document, and the updated feasibility report and conceptual design report with

confidential engineering cost estimates. These cost estimates came out to be about 80 percent higher than

the original 2011 estimates, mainly due to the addition of significant margins to cover the new insecurity

related risks, price increases over the intervening three years, and the inclusion of asphalt overlay works

at the end of the OPRC period, which were considered essential for establishing all weather connectivity

on the corridor. These cost escalations were addressed on the Bank-financed side by reducing the length

of the gravel sub-base works and on the China EXIM side by increasing the loan from US$ 116 million to

US$ 169 million.

26. The GRSS signed a commercial contract on November 30, 2015 with a consortium of Chinese

contractors to undertake the upgrading works from Juba to Torit (including the Torit by-pass), funded by

the co-financing loan from the China EXIM Bank. The contractors had mobilized their equipment in Juba

and had started site inspection before the mid-2016 resumption of armed conflict.

27. By the time of the project’s closure in September 2018, disbursement of the IDA credit remained

very low, at US$1.84 m. (2.3 percent of the original committed amount as of January 2018).

28. Armed conflict. By far the leading factor that affected the project’s implementation was armed

conflict (see the brief chronology under Country Context, above). The Bank’s Implementation Status and

Results Report (ISR) No. 2 of April 2015 noted substantially decreased performance of the Government’s

main Project Management Team (PMT) due to the worsening security situation. The procurement

processes for the civil works, monitoring, and institutional development consultancies had been planned


Page 13 of 24

to commence in the third quarter of 2016, but the Bank decided to halt all project activities in July 2016

due to the uncertain security and fiscal environments, the resultant continuing decline of capacity of the

implementing agency, and the inaccessibility of the road works area. As of March 2017, nearly three years

after the project’s approval and nearly two and a half years after the credit’s effectiveness, very few

substantive outputs had been produced.

29. Limited government implementation and financial capacity. The Bank’s Aide Memoire of

September 2015 noted that “The combined effects of the conflict and complexity of the project are causing

delays and cost overruns, which over time may lead to failure to achieve the objective of the project and

may [require] looking into alternative project management arrangements, including engaging a project

management firm like United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) that could operate in the

current working environment in South Sudan.” The numbers and scope of the contracts to be managed

were evidently overtaxing the capacity of the implementing agencies, apart from the effects of the conflict.

The capacity of the PMT was further weakened following the exit of key staff, including the project

coordinator, after the outbreak of the wider conflict in July 2016. The Government appointed another

project coordinator whom the Bank felt was not adequately qualified. Overall, in the last two years of the

project, the GRSS was unable to maintain effective implementation capacity. On the financial side, in

March 2015 the GRSS informed the Bank that it would not be able to meet its commitment to provide the

counterpart financing (US$ 25 m.) due to the financial crisis associated with the conflict and the declining

international price of oil. Up to the date of cancellation of the credit, no government counterpart funds had

been disbursed to the project.

30. Delay in Co-Financing with China EXIM Bank. The China EXIM co-financing was to fund the

major civil works under the project and was essential to fulfilling the project development objective. The

expectations of the GRSS and the World Bank of materializing this co-financing contributed to prolonging

the project until mid-2018. Even so, the World Bank’s Financing Agreement did not prescribe any “cross

conditionality” with China’s loan. A covenant in the Bank’s Agreement merely gave a deadline of 12

months from the effectiveness date of the Bank’s credit for the effectiveness of the Chinese Co-financing

Agreement. On the other hand, China EXIM’s “Facility Agreement” with GRSS included a “Condition

Precedent of Initial Utilization” [of China EXIM’s loan facility] that GRSS must produce documentation

from the World Bank confirming that “the procurement process for the works, monitoring, and several

consultancy services as described in the letter delivered by the World Bank . . . dated July 20, 2017, has

successfully completed and that the World Bank is ready to disburse under the IDA Financing

Agreement”.

31. As early as mid-2015, the Bank started to consider whether the South Sudan project may have to

be restructured to achieve the connectivity objective, in case the planned parallel financing from the China

EXIM Bank for the upgrading of the Juba-Torit road did not come through. Alternatives considered

included limiting the project to reconstructing bridges and rehabilitating the existing gravel road.

Nevertheless, the Bank’s emphasis remained on trying to consummate the Chinese financing. The China

EXIM Bank approved a loan of US$169 million on December 27, 2015. Subsequently, China EXIM

notified the World Bank that the loan signing could not occur as planned in July 2016, due to the renewed

conflict in South Sudan.15 The Bank’s management provided two extensions for the deadline of the credit

15 According to project documentation, apart from the direct effects of the security situation on the feasibility of carrying out road

works, the China EXIM Bank was concerned about the effects of the drop in international oil prices and the consequent risk of economic

collapse of South Sudan, given that their loan agreement with South Sudan was based on a barter arrangement for South Sudan’s oil.


Page 14 of 24

covenant regarding the signing of the Co-Financing Agreement, with the last one expiring on August 31,

2016. Finally, on September 7, 2017, the GRSS and China EXIM signed the loan agreement in China.16

Up to the time that the World Bank credit was cancelled in August 2018, work under this contract was

limited to surveys and design work.

32. Based on information obtained from representatives of China EXIM for this NCO, China EXIM’s

loan agreement has lapsed and is now invalid because the GRSS did not meet its conditions for

effectiveness and disbursement (including the condition about World Bank readiness to disburse as

mentioned above).

33. Relation to Kenya SOP2 project. Another consideration in prolonging the project was the wish

of the stakeholders to try to preserve the integrity of the regional SOP program, with its expected synergies

of development benefits for South Sudan, Kenya and other neighboring countries. As noted above, the

second phase project of the regional SOP had been signed with Kenya in mid-2015. In the end, when

overriding considerations caused the Bank to cancel the South Sudan project (see Assessment of

Operational Risks, below), it was determined that the Kenya project would still be economically and

socially viable on its own. An analysis performed in 2018 showed that estimated traffic demand on the

Lokichar-Nadapal/Nakodok road in Kenya would be reduced by about 20 percent; the net present value,

considering an already expected 20 percent increase in costs, would decrease by US$176.2 million (from

US$504.5 million to US$328.3 million); and the economic internal rate of return (EIRR) would be reduced

from 24.5 percent to 19.2 percent, remaining well above the threshold of 12 percent. Apart from this, the

upgrading of the Kenya road will facilitate provision of humanitarian aid to South Sudan.

34. Assessment of Operational Risks. In late 2017, the World Bank carried out an assessment of the

operational risks to and the feasibility of the project going forward. This was originally conceived as a

joint assessment with China EXIM, but in practice it was carried out by the Bank between December 2017

and May 2018. The main findings of this assessment were as follows:

• At the time, the armed conflict had spread across much of the country, and the conclusion of the

assessment was that the situation was unlikely to change for the better soon.

• The fragmented political process showed few signs of improving or bringing peace, the security

situation in the country was on the downside, and the raging civil war posed an extraordinary risk

to the implementation of the project.

• Lack of access to project sites and severely weakened institutional capacity created insurmountable

challenges in supervising works and safeguards compliance, verifying outputs achieved, and

conducting audits of activities executed in project sites outside Juba

• Furthermore, due to the passage of time and the changes since the project’s approval, the

Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) and Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) no

longer provided coverage of all project impacts. The environmental and social risk profiles of the

project had increased significantly. Based on the assessment, the World Bank considered that it

16 The agreement called for the Juba-Torit road to be constructed by a consortium of Chinese contractors using the “Engineering,

Procurement, and Construction” (EPC) contracting model which was a pre-requisite for China EXIM loan approval.


Page 15 of 24

was improbable that the Government would be able to meet its safeguards obligations in view of

its eroded capacity to plan and implement.

35. Suspension and cancellation. As a result of the findings of the risk assessment, the Bank’s

management decided to cancel the project. Bank management met with officials of the China EXIM Bank

to inform them of the Bank’s position and obtain their views. In accordance with normal procedures under

Section 6.02 of the applicable General Conditions, the Bank first notified the GRSS on June 29, 2018 of

the suspension of the credit, citing the existence of “an extraordinary situation . . . which makes it

improbable that the Project can be carried out or that the Recipient or the Project Implementing Entity will

be able to perform its obligations under the Legal Agreement to which it is a party” and that “make it

improbable that the Program, or a significant part of it, will be carried out.”

36. The World Bank officially notified the GRSS of the cancellation of the project in a letter to the

Minister of Finance dated August 15, 2018, and the cancellation officially took effect on September 14,

2018.

3. ASSESSMENT OF BANK PERFORMANCE

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

During project preparation

37. The documentation for the South Sudan project indicates that the project was prepared with due

attention to the Bank’s technical, fiduciary, and safeguards standards, and that the project was thoroughly

reviewed at the concept, quality enhancement, and appraisal stages. Nonetheless, the Bank failed to take

into account that the project’s design—involving not only road works but also advanced customs and

trade reforms, institutional development, and fiber-optics development—was too complex relative to the

very weak institutional capacity and skills of a newly-established and extremely poor country. Appraisal

of the ability of the institutions involved in the project—MTRB, SCSS, MoTPS, and MoFCEP—to absorb

capacity and system strengthening interventions was inadequate.

38. The Bank had been pro-active in facilitating the financing of feasibility studies and detailed

designs for the road under a previous Bank-financed project, Sudan Emergency Transport and

Infrastructure Development Project (SETIDP, P095081). The Bank worked actively with the GRSS

during project preparation to obtain the services of a consultancy firm to prepare the OPRC documents

before commencement of the procurement of the civil works contracts. In the event, this process was

delayed as a result of the crisis that erupted in December 2013, and the consultancy services started after

project approval.

39. The Bank’s decision to approve the project in May 2014 could be questioned, in light of the

outbreak of armed conflict in the country in December 2013. But, at that time, the scope of the conflict

seemed limited, and it was impossible to foresee how the civil war would expand in geographic coverage

and severity over the next several years. The momentum behind the project was enormous, fueled by

intensive technical preparation, a high-visibility financing partnership with China, and the fact that the

project was part of a regional integration program with Kenya and potentially other countries. In this


Page 16 of 24

context, it is worth quoting at length from the final Board-approved PAD, which reflects a somber

assessment of the project’s risks:

“The project is located in areas so far not affected by the violence which broke out in December

2013. It remains a top priority for the Government given the country’s landlocked status and the

need to develop an efficient regional development corridor through Kenya to the sea port of

Mombasa. The corridor is an alternative safe and efficient route for humanitarian aid operations

transiting through Kenya. If the conflict is not resolved quickly, it may pose some risks, including:

(i) diverting the attention of the Government from development projects implementation; (ii) the

ability of the government to ensure law and order in the project area could be weaker and safety

of contractors working on the project would be at risk, and may lead to abandonment of the works;

(iii) the risk level of the country will be high and responses to invitation to bid may not only be

limited but costs of construction could go beyond the expected limit; (iv) the ability of the

government to implement the project may be compromised and an independent project

management firm or a UN Agency like United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS) may

have to be engaged to be manager of the civil works contracts and deliver the monitoring and

supervision services of the road improvement and fiber installation, as well as the technical

assistance to the modernization of the SSCS; and (v) the government contribution to the project

may not flow as expected.”17

40. Although the Board approved the project, it is relevant to note that three members of the World

Bank’s Board abstained from voting to approve it. Their governments reportedly shared the view that

South Sudan was not ready for such a long-term development investment and should continue to receive

only humanitarian assistance.

During implementation.

41. The Bank’s project team carried out five missions to South Sudan after Board approval,

supplemented by two reverse supervision missions in Kenya after mid-2016, when the security situation

forced the halting of missions to the country. During the first two years of implementation, before the

project was paused, the Bank was pro-active in various ways. It supported a project launch workshop in

September 2014 that engaged key stakeholders, including MTRB, MoTPS, Customs, Commerce, Ministry

of Finance, Ministry of Physical Infrastructure Eastern Equatoria State, private transport operators,

Members of Parliament, civil society, and Bureau of Standards, among others. The Bank followed up on

the Project Preparation Advance, including reviewing the design of the Juba - Nadapal road, preparation

of the bidding document for the OPRC contract, preparation of environmental and social safeguard

instruments, recruiting technical and fiduciary specialists, and conducting training. The Bank also worked

to facilitate the activation of the China EXIM loan by guiding the GRSS though the many required steps.

The Bank’s detailed supervision missions and Aide Memoires, which included comprehensive lists of

follow-up actions, helped the GRSS to keep the project on track.

42. As noted above, the Bank paused the implementation of the SS-EARTTDFP as of July 2016 due

to the renewed outbreak of civil war and the inaccessibility of the project road area. The World Bank

17 This text, under the heading “Impacts of the Conflict in South Sudan on the Project” (paragraphs 15-17), was added to the final,

Board approval version of the PAD.


Page 17 of 24

office in Juba was relocated to Nairobi as a security precaution. As part of the response to the restarted

conflict, the Bank put in place a set of enhanced operational measures for assuring fiduciary oversight and

compliance for the Bank’s portfolio. For the SS-EARTTDFP, a considerable flow of contacts continued

over the next 18 months between the Bank, GRSS, and other stakeholders at the Bank’s senior

management and technical levels. Between November 27 and December 1, 2017, the Bank and a

delegation from the GRSS conducted a reverse mission in Addis Ababa to review the project’s status as

the first step for carrying out the Assessment of Operational Risks. During the life of the project, the Bank

team produced six Implementation Status and Results Reports (ISRs) and six detailed Aide Memoires.

43. As of March 2017, according to the ISR of that date, the Bank team was still viewing the “pause”

of project implementation as temporary and was seeking ways to continue the project, including extending

the legal covenant for signing of the China EXIM Bank loan, relocating the staff of the Government’s

Project Management Team to Nairobi to sustain capacity during the pause period, and considering a

formal project restructuring. At the same time, there was consensus among all the key players---the Bank,

China Exim Bank as well as the Chinese Ministry of Finance, that if the security situation continued to

deteriorate and no signs of improvement were evident by the end of the year, the Bank would take steps

to cancel this project.

44. By November of 2017, after the World Bank Annual Meetings, the Bank’s management had

reached agreement that the project needed to be cancelled, in view of the continued deterioration of the

country environment and the implausibility of achieving the project’s objectives. The challenge was to

manage the cancellation process carefully in order to ensure support for the decision from key

stakeholders, primarily the China EXIM Bank. The Bank proposed preparation of an Operational Risk

Assessment as the key vehicle for this process (see above). The Assessment was carried out by Bank staff,

vetted by Bank management, and shared with China EXIM. A senior Bank manager travelled to Beijing

in March 2018 to present the findings and consult on the Bank’s decision to cancel the project, to which

China EXIM agreed after some discussion.

45. It might be argued that the Bank should have cancelled the project much sooner, perhaps as early

as mid-2017. At that point, one year had passed since the civil war had resumed and the project’s

implementation had been put on hold. It did take the Bank a long time to sort out its views about the

project, taking into account the pending Chinese co-financing and the need to ensure that the Kenya

project of the IDA-financed regional program would remain politically and economically viable on its

own.

46. Conclusion. The Bank’s performance can be assessed in two stages: (i) between entry and up to

the implementation pause in 2016 and (ii) from the implementation pause onwards until cancellation.

While there were some shortcomings in the project’s quality at entry, those might have been remedied by

project restructuring if the project had not been derailed by the country conditions. The Bank’s original

risk assessment was reasonable. Although the Bank knowingly took a high risk in deciding to approve the

project in early 2014, this cannot be characterized as a reckless decision under the circumstances. During

implementation up to the pause, the Bank took the necessary steps to support implementation and

continuously monitored the situation, maintaining timely engagement with GRSS. On the other hand,

during the last two years after the project was paused, the Bank’s performance had some important

shortcomings related to: (i) managing the uncertainty of the project’s situation, leading to differences of

opinion between the Bank’s Global Practice, the Regional VPU, and the Country Management Unit on


Page 18 of 24

whether, when and on what basis to cancel the project, and (ii) processing the actual cancelation after the

decision was made. Coordination of internal actions during the final months of the project could have

been better. In retrospect, more decisive intervention at different levels could have led to an earlier

cancellation of the project, avoiding extra administrative costs and risk exposure.

47. Taking into consideration the above, the Bank’s performance overall is rated Moderately

Satisfactory.

4. LESSONS LEARNED

48. Simple project design. In this project, the World Bank failed to apply the well-established lesson,

reinforced by numerous IEG reviews, that project designs should be kept simple in situations of weak

client capacity. This example of the Bank’s support for an unduly complex project in a weak environment

indicates a lack of rigor in appraising clients’ institutional absorptive capacity. It also reflects internal

incentives to commit IDA resources18 and apply leading-edge concepts to projects (in this case, regional

trade and transport facilitation) regardless of their appropriateness in a specific context. It is hoped that the

experience of this project may contribute to an acceptance by the Bank that sometimes, very simple,

unsophisticated project designs are for the best.

49. Co-Financing Risks. The decision to use the South Sudan EARTTDFP as one of the first vehicles

for the World Bank-China EXIM partnership was made without considering whether such an arrangement

was appropriate, given both the fragile country context and the fact that the two financing partners had

very different motivations and perspectives. Moreover, the project depended on the Chinese co-financing

for its primary justification, because China EXIM’s loan covered the upgrading of the main trunk road. In

the event, these factors combined to produce a very long delay in approving the Chinese co-financing and

a prolongation of decision-making on the project’s cancellation. In this regard, it is worth noting that the

covenant in the Bank’s FA giving a deadline for the signing of the China EXIM agreement proved

meaningless, as it and its repeated extensions were not met and the Bank did not enforce it. The experience

of this project suggests various lessons:

• Conflict-affected, fragile countries, especially where there are high risks to civilians, may not be

the most appropriate settings for untested co-financing partnerships between entities that have very

different outlooks and interests.

• If co-financing in such situations is deemed necessary, the World Bank should ensure that it has

very clear understandings and coordination arrangements with financing partners on how to deal

with armed conflict outbreaks and their associated social and environmental consequences,

including “worst case” scenarios.

• As a general practice in co-financing, but especially in high risk, conflict-affected situations, the

World Bank should ensure that projects are designed in such a way that preservation of a co-

financing arrangement does not become the overriding consideration when severe problems arise.

For example, the project could be designed to be economically viable without the co-financing and

able to be quickly restructured should it become necessary.

18 The SS EARTTDFP was approved in May 2014, just before the end of IDA 16 in June 2014.


Page 19 of 24

50. Cancellation as a positive response. The experience of this project shows that the operating

environment in a fragile and conflict-affected country can change quickly and unexpectedly, and that there

are limits to what the Word Bank can do when armed conflict engulfs a project area or an entire country

program. If measures such as changing the project’s geographical focus or using alternative

implementation arrangements (e.g., a U.N. agency) are insufficient, cancellation may be the only option.

In such circumstances, the Bank should not view cancellation as a failure, but rather as a necessary and

appropriate response as part of its policy of making carefully considered investments in high-risk

situations.

51. Bank management intervention to address critical conditions. In future similar situations,

where country conditions become so severe that a project’s implementation has to be paused and Bank

missions suspended for extended periods, decision-making on the project should be promptly and

effectively escalated to higher management levels in the Bank. This is especially necessary where differing

perspectives between internal Bank units may need to be harmonized and/or where there is potential for

serious reputational risks for the Bank. In this regard, the Bank may benefit from drawing on its recent

experience in establishing new practices and protocols related to the management of social safeguards

risks in projects.


Page 20 of 24

ANNEX 1: BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION PROCESSES

(a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/

Specialty

Lending (from Task Team in PAD Data Sheet)

Tesfamichael Nahusenay

Mitiku Sr Transport. Engr. AFTTR Team Leader

Josphat O. Sasia Lead Transport Specialist AFTTR Co-Task Team Leader

Wolfgang M. T. Chadab Senior Finance Officer CTRLA Senior Finance Officer

Hassine Hedda Senior Finance Officer CTRLA Finance Officer

Gibwa A. Kajubi Senior Social Development

Specialist AFTCS Senior Social Development Specialist

Yasmin Tayyab Senior Social

Development Specialist AFTCS

Senior Social

Development Specialist

Alexandra C. Bezeredi Regional Environmental

and Safeguards Advisor AFTSG

Regional Environmental

and Safeguards Advisor

Ntombie Z. Siwale Senior Program

Assistant AFTTR

Senior Program

Assistant

Benqing Jennifer Gui Information Officer TWICT Information Officer

Adenike Sherifat

Oyeyiola

Sr Financial

Management Specialist AFTME

Sr Financial

Management Specialist

Teguest Demissie E T Temporary AFTTR Contractor Telesec Temporary

Services

Svetlana Khvostova Operations Officer AFTSG Operations Analyst

Maiada Mahmoud Abdel

Fattah Kassem Finance Officer CTRLA Finance Officer

Tadatsugu Matsudaira Senior Trade Facilitation

Specialist AFTTR

Senior Trade Facilitation

Specialist

Juliana C. Victor-

Ahuchogu

Senior Monitoring &

Evaluation Specialist AFTDE

Senior Monitoring &

Evaluation Specialist

Daniela Anna B. D.

Junqueira Senior Counsel LEGAM Senior Counsel

Muhammad Zulfiqar

Ahmed Sr Transport. Engr. AFTTR Sr Transport. Engr.

Joel Buku Munyori Senior Procurement

Specialist AFTPE

Senior Procurement

Specialist

Timothy John Charles

Kelly

Lead ICT Policy

Specialist TWICT

Lead ICT Policy

Specialist

Lucy Anyango Musira Program Assistant AFCE2 Program Assistant

Suzan Poni Piwang Team Assistant AFMJB Team Assistant


Page 21 of 24

Josphine Kabura Kamau Financial Management

Specialist AFTME

Financial Management

Specialist

Anjani Kumar Senior Procurement

Specialist AFTPE

Senior Procurement

Specialist

Emmanuel Taban Highway Engineer AFTTR Highway Engineer

Bedilu Amare Reta Consultant AFTHE Environmental Specialist

Supervision/NCO (from Task Team Members in all archived ISRs, if available)

Tesfamichael Nahusenay Mitiku Task Team Leader GTI01 Sr Transport. Engr.

Muhammad Zulfiqar Ahmed Task Team Leader (ADM) GTI01 Sr. Transport Engineer

Emmanuel Taban Highway engineer GTI01 Highway engineer

Jennifer Gui ICT Policy Specialist TWICT ICT Policy Specialist

Wenxin Qiao Transport Specialist GTR07 Transport specialist

Tim Kelly Lead ICT Policy Specialist GTI11 Lead ICT Policy Specialist

Joseph Nyabicha FM Specialist/consultant GGODR FM Specialist

Christine Kandaru Operations Analyst Operations Analyst

Anton Baare Sr. Development Specialist GSU07 Sr. Development Specialist

Dorothy Morrow Akikoli Program Assistant AFMJB Program Assistant

Kenneth Ocheng Kaunda Consultant GGODR Procurement Specialist

Jean Lubega Kyazz Operation officer Trade and competitiveness

Stephen Amayo Sr. Financial Management

Specialist GGO25 Sr. Financial Management Specialist

Teguest Demissie Team Assistant GTIDR Team Assistant

Grace Tabu Program Assistant AFMJB Program Assistant

Ankur Huria Sr. Private Sector Specialist GTCTC Sr. Private Sector Specialist

John Bryant Sr. Environmental Specialist GEN01 Sr. Environmental Specialist

Syed Sada Team Assistant GTI01 Team Assistant


Page 22 of 24

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle

Actual Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

Staff Weeks and Cost (Bank Budget Only) USD Thousands (including travel and

consultant costs)

Lending

Total: 92.46 / 361,248.83 602,799.06

Supervision/NCO

Total: 126.63 / 510,273.1 679,181.3


Page 23 of 24

ANNEX 2: LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. Project Appraisal Document April 2014

2. Implementation Status and Results Reports

• #1 August 2014

• #2 April 2015

• #3 December 2015

• #4 June 2016

• #5 March 2017

• #6 March 2018

3. Mission Aide Memoires

• October 2014

• February-March 2015

• September 2015

• March-April-May 2016

• October-December 2016

4. Management letter, October 2015


Page 24 of 24

M A P

Documents

World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/... · 2016, this time extending south to the Equatoria regions where the SS-EARTTDFP-financed regional road was located. Violent