Working with Islamocracy

U.S. Foreign Policy Toward the New Egypt

Heather McCormic

12/1/2011

Prof. Amy Oakes, Govt 329-01

“If Egypt fails, so does the Arab spring” (Traub 2011).

The hurdle that Egypt must approach and surpass is the transition from the temporary

Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) regime to the civilian, democratic rule to be

determined by the November 28, 2011 parliamentary election (Traub 2011). The SCAF is

clinging to the power it gained since Mubarak’s fall in the spring; it is constantly changing the

amendment process for the constitution, limiting what future parliamentary drafters can do. This

action has angered not only the Islamists, but the liberals as well (Economist 2011). Egyptians

now wonder about the SCAF’s commitment to transitioning power to the newly elected

parliament; though the voters become weary, they do not lose hope that they will see the January

revolution come to fruition in the near future (Economist 2011).

As Egypt grows into its new government system, the United States (US) must be open to

cooperate with any of the parties that may rise above the others, regardless of their ideologies. In

this paper I will explore the histories and ideologies of two Egyptian political parties, the New

Wafd Party and the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party. I will then predict which

parties will gain the greatest number of seats following the November 28 election, and what

those results imply for Egypt and the United States. Last I will evaluate two policy choices that

the United States President may follow, and make my recommendation for future relations with

Egypt. Change is upon both the Arab world and the United States’ policy toward it. The end

result of the former is not in American hands; nevertheless, the latter is still yet to be determined.

Challenge: Projection for the Egyptian election

The results from Egypt’s first election since the ouster of Mubarak will determine the

future path the new government will take as the democracy develops. However, the results from

the recent parliamentary elections have yet to be revealed; additionally, the SCAF has not

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established any timeline for the turn-around of the results. Unfortunately, there remains the

possibility that the SCAF may not relinquish the keys to the capital to the newly elected

parliament at all (Traub 2011). The transition from the current military regime’s rule to that of

the new-fangled parliament may turn out to be slow, so slow in fact that the SCAF must continue

to serve as the interim government for months to come (Traub 2011). Egyptians were baffled by

the format of the election ballot and the system of voting overall; this, combined with the

citizenry’s dissatisfaction with the SCAF, has made filling the 498 available seats much more

frustrating than the young democracy foresaw (Hassan 2011; Hill 2011). Parties supporting

major contenders for these parliamentary seats have aligned themselves into electoral blocs

based on certain ideological similarities; these overlaps primarily focus on domestic

infrastructural policy, not foreign relations. Two individual parties that will be examined here are

the liberal New Wafd Party, and the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party

(FJP).

I. New Wafd Party

The New Wafd Party, while not currently aligned with any particular electoral bloc, is a

contender for a share of seats in the future Egyptian parliament because of its rightest liberal

views (Hill 2011). Though the term “liberal” does not have a pristine connotation among

Egyptians, there is hope for the revival of the movement; for example, the Muslim Brotherhood

and other Islamist parties that have been condemned of sponsoring terrorist activity have

overcome much negative propaganda in the past. If the Brotherhood could rise from the ashes of

its razed legacy, so can the liberal movement (Hamid 2011).1 After the spring revolution, the

1 Two major flaws in the Wafd Party cause the current Egyptian public to be wary of the New Wafd Party. The first is that throughout its time as the dominant political party between the end of World War I and 1936, the Party did not invest in recruitment strategies oriented toward youth mobilization. This fact looms over the Party today in the midst of the January revolution spearheaded by a young generation (Tardos Feb 3 2011). Second, the former Wafd Party failed to oppose the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, prolonging British presence in the state; this silence caused the majority to go unheard. After these disappointments and former President Nasser’s ban on all political

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New Wafd Party joined the National Democratic Alliance for Egypt electoral bloc dominated by

the FJP. By October, the New Wafd Party left the coalition on the grounds that there was not a

sufficient number of candidate slots on the coalition’s electoral list to support both it and the FJP;

also, the Party understood that the Brotherhood’s Islamist agenda and its own more secular

emphasis were not compatible in the long run (Hill 2011). The New Wafd Party’s platform

primarily focuses on national unity and the protection of personal freedoms and human rights. It

strongly advocates for the development of both the private and public sectors of the Egyptian

economy, along with price stabilization in the national market (Carnegie Endowment 2011).

II. Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party

Conversely, the FJP is one of the more moderate Islamist groups seeking to win seats in

the future parliament. The Brotherhood, also called the Ikhwan (“Brothers” in Arabic), was

banned along with the Wafd Party in 1952 by former Egyptian President Nasser; all parties were

reinstated after the January 25 revolution (Metz 2011; Wickham 2011; Tadros 2011; Brown

2011). For the last 80 years, the Ikhwan has gained grassroots support by debasing the notion

that it is a terrorist-supporting organization (Hill 2011). The Brotherhood has strengthened its

public image using social media like Facebook and Twitter, and has also helped construct solid

infrastructure and other social services for localities such as building schools and mosques (Bohn

2011; Luenen 2011). It has vocalized the public desire for earlier elections for parliament, the

need for civilian rule, and the ouster of the military regime in direct opposition to the SCAF

(Casey and Kutsch 2011).

Now the dominant party in the National Democratic Alliance, the FJP supports the bloc’s

nationalistic foreign policy that backs away from Western relations (Hill 2011). However, the

parties in Egypt following the Free Officers Revolution of 1952, the Wafd Party faded from the Egyptian political scene to return in 1983 as the New Wafd Party (Metz 2011; Wickham 2011).

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individual coalition parties have few similarities in their ideal domestic policies. In particular, the

FJP advocates for the inclusion of sharia law at a moderate level to rally support individually

while using the Alliance to garner a wider support base; this could result in the FJP’s control of

the highest percentage of seats relative to other parties (Zirulnick 2011).

III. Predicted results

The likely result of this election is that the National Democratic Alliance will win as a

coalition; the FJP, being the largest of the parties aligning with the group, could possibly gain

thirty to forty-five percent of the vote, as it slated candidates for roughly half of the contested

seats (Hendawi 2011; Farwell and Weinbaum 2011). The supporting evidence for this claim is

threefold: the FJP has set itself up for success by garnering support from a wide base via

grassroots efforts and its electoral bloc; the public may react to the Islamist parties’ release from

the government’s repression by electing their candidates in a wave of religious sentiment; and

the election ballot voting system (made up of closed party lists) gives the highly organized FJP

the upper hand because, as a religious movement, it has more innate organization and has a

narrow set of fundamental beliefs that attracts confused voters, overwhelmed by the myriad

parties and electoral blocs (Hill 2011; Luenen 2011; Hassan 2011; Hamid 2011).2

Tunisia’s elections were similar to the outcome predicted here; the Brotherhood won the

election with a plurality (forty-three percent), not a majority. The primary reason that the

Democratic Alliance may not win the majority of the contested seats is because it is competing

with the Islamist electoral bloc, which includes the extremely conservative Salafi party

(Zirulnick 2011). Despite institutional advantages that the Islamist parties will benefit from, there

are so many parties and individual localized constituencies that it is incredibly unlikely that any

2 Examples of Islamist parties gaining public support after the removal of a repressive regime are Iran after the removal of the Shah, and later in Iraq following the ouster of Saddam Hussein (Luenen 2011).

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party will win the majority (Hassan 2011). The Wafd Party may indeed still secure a significant

portion of the vote; however it will not win more than the larger, more efficiently organized FJP

(Hamid 2011). In all, plurality is the only way for all parties to benefit from the elections because

so many separate ideologies under one umbrella party will not satisfy anyone’s wants or needs,

especially among the more liberal parties (Tadros 2011).

IV. Implications for Egypt and the United States

Many commentators on the Egyptian election developments are pessimistic about the

possibility of a Brotherhood victory; claims of the Ikhwan’s intent to destroy Israel and impose

strict sharia law on citizens float among the Egyptians and in cyberspace (Morris 2011). Some

liberals believe that once the Islamists gain the power they seek, they will violently turn on the

public and abandon democratic rule altogether (Economist 2011). I, however, argue that an FJP

victory will not cause such a drastic, devastating change. Egypt will become more Islamicized,

but this will not lead to a regional collapse or international dilemma in any way, especially if the

Brotherhood stands firm on its platform ideals. Unfortunately, a negative consequence of an FJP

plurality is that the new parliament will be fragmented; however, a party could win the most

seats relative to other parties and consequently have the loudest (and most unifying) voice among

the dozens (Hassan 2011).

The United States, a bystander in the Egyptian elections, must wait patiently for the

election results to be announced. It must come to understand that Egypt could very well mix both

secular and Islamist ideologies, which could lead to an anti-Western or anti-American

government. The possibility of an Egypt lacking a pro-Western, pro-American, pro-Israel

government should encourage the United States to seek new foreign policy options to approach

Egypt. The next section details two U.S. policy responses to the changing political balance in

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Egypt under the assumption that the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party wins a plurality of

the vote.

Responses, assuming the FJP wins a plurality of the vote

I. Refuse to cooperate

To show U.S. public disapproval of a mixed government that includes both a secular and

Islamic wing, the United States could refuse to work with the new Egyptian government.

Egyptian policymakers have already shown the West that they do not wish to cooperate, even

when they could benefit unilaterally. For example, Egypt recently rejected a loan from the

International Monetary Fund for $3 billion USD in a burst of anti-Westernism (Traub 2011). If

the Egyptian government refuses to accept assistance from the West, the United States and its

allies no longer have any incentive to continue to extend a philanthropic arm to it. Where there is

nothing to gain, the United States should not offer to give.

Additionally, Egypt’s new government will most likely be an enemy of Israel, one of the

United States’ most prominent allies in the Middle East (Hadar 2011). The United States must

defend its interests in the Middle East, most importantly its allies because of the changing

political dynamics and risk of conflict. By cooperating with Egypt, the rising leader of the

region, the United States could lose sight of its past agreements and alliances. Most importantly,

Israel, located in a conflict-prone area due to multiple land disputes, could be compromised if the

United States and Egypt were to come to an agreement clashing with the pre-existing US-Israeli

alliance. Undermining this long-standing alliance to gain from a newly established government

could come across as rash to other states.

By cooperating with Egypt, the United States could put itself in a position where the

former could be the driving actor. The alliance forged could wholly depend on cooperation from

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the Egyptians, which may not be constant or true. Egypt could distance itself from the United

States to regain power in the Arab world that so disapproves of America and its ideologies. In the

end, the United States may not gain from the new Egyptian government at all (Zakheim 2011).

There are two major faults in refusing to cooperate with the new Egyptian government.

First, such an impetuous action could be harmful to U.S. interests in both the short- and long-run.

By severing ties with Egypt, the United States would restrict its own trade, and would negatively

influence future negotiations and agreements with many states in the Arab world other than

Egypt itself (Traub 2011). Second, by acting abrasively toward the new government, the United

States could provoke Egypt and put Israel, the closest U.S. ally to its borders, at even greater risk

of attack (Traub 2011). There is continuing concern about the new Egypt’s stance on cooperation

with Israel; without knowing how Egypt will approach Israel, the United States cannot risk

allowing Israel to fight with its neighbors as it did during the era surrounding the Six-Day War

(Hadar 2011). Though Egypt could work with Israel toward a permanent peace treaty, the

possibility that Egypt could act inimically poses too great a risk to leave to chance. By refusing

to keep an open dialogue with a potentially aggressive Egypt, the United States could put Israel

in a debacle that it unilaterally cannot avert or defeat.

II. Cooperate, even if the new government has an anti-Western sentiment

The United States, as a democracy, has the innate ability to work toward compromise

with actors, whether individuals or states; this is inherent in the design of our governmental

infrastructure. Democracies are able to cooperate with various regime types; nonetheless, as

Egypt now shares the title of democracy with the United States, cooperation with the state has

been made easier because of shared ideologies, including the preservation of individual freedom,

promotion of human rights, and creation of economic stability. Unfortunately, there is no

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guarantee that Egypt will completely agree with the US or its Western allies, though the Muslim

Brotherhood is not irrevocably anti-American. In all, the only vital condition that must be met

for cooperation to be viable between the United States and Egypt is that the new state parliament

must not sponsor terrorism against the homeland or U.S. allies. This is necessary for the

protection of the American people, and U.S. assets abroad.

Cooperation with Egypt is more than simply meeting at a round table and loftily

discussing hypothetical agreements. The United States must learn to lead from behind, not from

the front; the US will encounter severe limitations when attempting to dominate the government

and manipulate it to cater to U.S. interests. Instead, American diplomats must encourage Egypt

to work toward its own goals, as in many cases Egypt’s constituency will not agree with that of

the United States (Pillar 2011). Also, the United States must avoid aligning itself or supporting

particular parties during and after elections; by siding with one ideology or another, the United

States may inadvertently impose its own worldview and self-interest on Egypt, causing Egyptian

voters and leaders alike to turn away from cooperation with the US. The United States must

stand back and declare its own principles to Egypt without demanding that they be revered in its

society. These principles are simple: the United States must not approve of violence, must

support decisions made via popular sovereignty, and must declare human rights as the first

priority. Most importantly, the United States must make abundantly clear the fact that it desires

strong, cordial relations with the new Egyptian government regardless of the party in power

(Pillar 2011). Lastly, the United States must work directly with Egypt to ensure that concrete

plans are made to continue to foster the newly forged relationship (Hadar 2011).

By working with the Egyptian government, the United States can avoid the potential

pitfalls associated with non-cooperation. Regardless of the outcomes of compromises and

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cooperative talks, the United States will ensure the longevity of its relationship with Egypt by

maintaining a non-imposing stance on Egyptian issues. In the short- and long-term, the US will

be able to work openly with Egypt economically, politically, and socially. By maintaining

healthy ties to Egypt, the United States can develop those skills necessary to effectively extend

the olive branch of peace and prosperity to other Middle Eastern and North African states which

would otherwise refuse to cooperate (Pillar 2011).

Open dialogue with Egypt could consequently promote peace between Egypt and Israel.

If Egypt felt connected to the United States, and saw it as an asset, then Egyptian leaders would

act in a way that would preserve those political bonds made. Israel, by extension a part of the

United States, would not be challenged by Egypt so long as the United States remained an

Egyptian ally. In the case that Egypt leans more toward an anti-Western sentiment, the United

States could act still act as a mediator between the states. Because the US would have an interest

at stake, it would be held accountable as the third party in any negotiations to enforce any

decisions or compromises made (Walter 2007, 350-364). Overall, cooperation with Egypt will

benefit the state itself, the United States, and its allies.

Cooperation is the most feasible option for the United States’ policy on Egypt because it

falls into line with decisions and actions already being taken by U.S. forces. For example, U.S.

forces in Egypt helped prepare all political parties that came to receive training on polling and

other electoral processes equally. Assistance was provided to parties from all ideological

backgrounds, including Islamism; however, this was wholly reliant on the parties’ initiative to

send their representatives (Rogin 2011). As Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton stated in a

recent speech, “…we welcome…dialogue with those Muslim Brotherhood members who wish to

talk with us” (Clinton 2011).

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By working closely with Egypt, the United States can begin reaching out to other Arab

states to extend the same level of cooperation to them as well. These Arab states may be more

open to starting an ongoing dialogue with U.S. diplomats in response to witnessing successful

cooperative measures between Egypt and the US, especially if the United States maintains

peaceful, productive relations with an Egypt that does not consider itself pro-Western (White

2011). In essence, the United States cannot risk being hypocritical in the Middle East; it must

show the same respect and openness to all Arab states so as to preserve its integrity and good

relations among all possible allies (Askari 2011). The primary goal in cooperating with any and

all states, particularly those in the Arab world, is that the US will oppose human rights violations

and the repression of freedoms in all negotiations, peace talks, or roundtable discussions (White

2011).

If Egypt is not strictly anti-American, it can act as an intermediary for the United States

to those anti-American states and parties that the US cannot approach alone (Pillar 2011). The

United States must constantly work toward open cooperation, negotiations, and agreements to

reduce the anti-American sentiment in many Arab countries; by sending Arabs to hostile states

ahead of American diplomats, the United States can start moving toward establishing direct

relations with those states currently against cooperation with Western states. Working off of the

relationships Arab states already have established amongst each other can provide insight about

societies and cultures that otherwise would remain a mystery to American diplomats. Also, the

United States must respect the decisions of the different constituencies to show that it is open and

willing to work with them if they so desire (Pillar 2011).

An issue that might arise when attempting to cooperate with Egypt directly is that

Americans assume that the U.S. government cannot work with an incompletely secular state built

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on the fundamental ideologies of Islam. Many critics of US-Muslim Brotherhood cooperation

claim that the Ikhwan will seek to draft a constitution grounded solely in sharia (Morris 2011).

Others point out that Egypt has never been, and likely never will be, a completely secular state

especially in the midst of the rise of Islamist groups. Consequently, Egypt will always have

problems with secular-religious conflict (Agrama 2010, 498). Additionally, Americans are not

comfortable confronting the reality of their Islamophobia (Pillar 2011).

However, the above concerns are mice to the elephant of cooperation with Egypt; they

pose a small threat to a great cause. First, the United States did not separate its culture, its history

from politics, yet it was founded on religious doctrine. Egypt should be allowed to base its

modern politics on its religion as the United States has and will continue to do in years to come

(Wright 2011). “[D]emocratic politics and piety are not necessarily contradictions,” hence

religion and politics can work side by side without combating one another (Wright 2011).

Additionally, Islamist rule in Egypt does not necessarily dictate that a specific type of foreign

relations will be set in place; Islamists are much more concerned about the development of

domestic law (Pillar 2011). The larger issue at hand for Egyptian politicians is whether Islamist

groups like the FJP can work with their own political opponents within the state (Brown 2011).

Overall, Islamophobia must be broken within the individual. It is not going to crumble

because of some grand dialogue between U.S. diplomats or President Obama and the leaders of

the Islamist movements; it will instead be gradual, like the resumption of normal diplomatic ties

with Egypt as a whole (Brown 2011). The American public must keep in mind that the United

States has worked with Islamic states in the past, and has worked with Egypt before as well. “[A]

good, principled posture toward Egypt shouldn’t be bad politics” on the home front (Pillar 2011).

Now Egypt is a democracy, and the voices of its people are being heard. The US should

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encourage the members of the new civil society to take part in their government, and should not

discourage them by refusing to participate in Egypt’s political arena. A strict codified observance

of separation of church and state is only followed in the US and France; other democracies work

hand in hand with the religious backgrounds of their citizenries. As a whole, “Islamocracy” is

indeed acceptable now (Etzioni 2011).

Conclusion

After the last ballots are counted in the upcoming months, Egypt will finally be able to

see the change that began in January 2011. Democratization in Egypt was not predicted; it is

difficult even now to predict the direction in which it will progress. However, no outside actor

can determine Egypt’s fate. The United States cannot attempt to shape Egypt or the Middle East

at large; the only appropriate U.S. reaction to the new democratic policy and culture in Egypt is

adaptation to the newly emerging actors (Pillar 2011).

I suggest that U.S. foreign policymakers cooperate with Egypt as much as the voters will

allow because of the possible avenues that could open for the United States to access. Though

the American public may be reluctant to reach out so openly to the Middle East, the reasons it

could possibly want to hold back are overblown. The United States has much in common with

Egypt, including a governmental framework based on religious doctrine. Those critics of

cooperation with Egypt claim that it is lost to American interest because Hosni Mubarak, the pro-

American dictator-president was ousted. Egypt is not, and never was, lost. It is simply becoming

what its people demand of it, and America is in no place to say that the Egyptian people desire

another outcome (M.S. 2011).

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