Working Libya Paper Updated (1)

N

ick

Per

ry

PO

ST

-QA

DH

AF

I L

IBY

A: T

HE

BE

NG

HA

ZI

CO

NS

UL

AT

E

AT

TA

CK

AN

D S

AL

AF

I M

ILIT

AN

CY

The 11 September Consulate attack in Benghazi exacerbated preexisting

fears about the stability of post-Qadhafi Libya. This paper is a sequential

analysis, exploring the history of Salafi-jihadi movements in Libya from

the rise of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group in the 1990s, their possible

links to al-Qa’ida, and the present day ideological violence. Who was

responsible for Ambassador Steven’s death? And is some Islamic fringe

movement attempting to play the role of spoiler?

Dr. Martha Crenshaw

26 November 2012

Post-Qadhafi Libya: The Benghazi Consulate Attack and Salafi Militancy

Nick Perry

1 | P a g e

Table of Contents

Introduction and Background – Why Worry about Libya’s Salafi-Jihadi Groups? .............2

Ambassador Christopher Stevens and the consulate attack ........................................................2

Prognostic violence and Libya’s persistent instability ............................................................3

Thesis and Summary of Contents ................................................................................................5

What is the current Salafi-jihadi situation in Libya? ...................................................................5

The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group – A Concise History and Present-Day Influence ..........6

The formation of LIFG ................................................................................................................6

Links to al-Qa’ida – Fact or Fiction? ......................................................................................7

Revisionist Studies of the Concepts of Jihad, Hisbah and Takfir .........................................9

The Recent History of Al-Qa’ida and Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) ..............12

Earlier, more vetted links with LIFG ........................................................................................12

Al-Qa’ida largely unsuccessful in reaching Libyan population ............................................14

Libya’s Pervasive Violence – Primarily Utilitarian/Political or Increasingly Ideological? .15

Utilitarian/political violence ......................................................................................................15

Ideological violence ...............................................................................................................17

The Rise of Libya’s Salafis and the Benghazi Consulate Attack ............................................18

Alleged complicity of Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi/Darnah ...................................................18

Alleged complicity of Abu Ubaidah Brigades/AQIM/AQI ..................................................19

Concluding Analysis ...................................................................................................................22

Dichotomy in opinion between U.S. government officials and policy analysts .......................22

Libyan people reject more extremist factions .......................................................................24


Nick Perry

2 | P a g e

Introduction and Background – Why Worry about the Salafi-Jihadi Groups?

On 11 September 2012, armed militants attacked the U.S. consulate in Benghazi. Killed

in the attack were United States Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens, SEALs Tyrone

Woods and Glen Doherty, and computer expert Sean Smith. Carnegie Endowment’s senior

associate Frederic Wehrey reflects fondly on the Ambassador and his unrelenting efforts to

stabilize a post-revolution Libya while encouraging ownership among the state’s inhabitants:

“such efforts must ultimately defer to the Libyans themselves, recognizing their right to shape

their own destiny. By nearly every account, Libyan and American, Chris Stevens embodied this

approach…he was famous for his infectious enthusiasm – for the enormous potential of the

country’s people.”1 Journalist and author Robin Wright remarked during a 2012 interview:

“Chris was an extraordinary envoy, in that he understood the streets as well as the elites. He

spoke the language. He understood the culture. And he had seen Libya through all three of its

phases…”2

The 11 September consulate attack in Benghazi marked the first U.S. ambassador to die

in the line of duty since 1979. And a flurry of reactions, from indifference to outrage and

condemnation – in both the West and in (predominately) Muslim countries – were broadcast live

and seemingly infectious. Contrary to most initial reports, the attack was not necessarily

detached or sequestered from Libya’s ongoing intercommunal strife. Nor was it catalyzed by the

anti-Islamic video Innocence of Muslims, per se. In fact, there had been a series of similar and

prognostic attacks in the months preceding the 11 September death of Christopher Stevens.

1 Frederic Wehrey, “Desperate Salafi Attack in a Weak Libya,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

September 12, 2012. 2 Frederic Wehrey, “Libyan Salafists Assert Power with Embassy Attack,” Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace – PBS Newshour, September 12, 2012.


Nick Perry

3 | P a g e

Although the country “conducted successful, transparent parliamentary elections on July 7, it

became less secure in the months that followed, particularly in the east.”3 Mostly unnoticed (or at

least uncovered) by the Western media, a series of car bombs, rocket attacks against police

headquarters, and assassinations of Qadhafi-era officials afflicted Libya’s more volatile eastern

region. These attacks, like the most recent Benghazi consulate attack, are symptomatic of the

state’s dire weakness and the coexisting reign of local militias.

The attack has exacerbated preexisting concerns about the stability of post-Qadhafi Libya

and the burgeoning influence of armed revolutionaries. The ancien regime’s fall created a vast

security vacuum, and the ensuing power struggles have been grievous and pervasive. The Libyan

state has been unable to successfully monopolize the use of force. As a result, the revolutionary

fighters – a residual product of the 2011 conflict that ousted Qadhafi – are currently engaged in a

protracted power-struggle for material wealth and political influence. The latest International

Crisis Group report, “Divided We Stand: Libya’s Enduring Conflicts,” warns that “although

Libya often is hailed as one of the more encouraging Arab uprisings, recovering faster than

expected, it is also a country of regions and localities pulling in different directions, beset by

intercommunal strife where well-armed groups freely roam.”4 In actuality, the Libyan state

struggles to maintain even a nominal degree of de facto control. The militias have become

emboldened by their newfound level of state-sanctioned autonomy and political-ascendency,

while the regular police and army remain comparatively weak, underfunded, “and tainted by

their association with the old regime.”5 In spite of the multilateral and largely altruistic efforts to

3 Ibid.

4 “Divided We Stand: Libya’s Enduring Conflicts,” International Crisis Group, September 14, 2012.

5 Ibid.

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/130-divided-we-stand-libyas-enduring-conflicts.aspx


Nick Perry

4 | P a g e

prop up Libya’s interim government, all could be for naught if the state fails to consolidate or

falls into the hands of Salafi-jihadists.

Libya remains in a fragile transition stage and violence (primarily rational or “utilitarian,”

although the East has seen a marked increase in ideological violence) remains pervasive. This

kind of regional instability is not unfamiliar to the U.S., nor is it inconsequential to our foreign

policy. Violent conflicts are not effectively contained by porous state borders, and Libya’s

current and forthcoming events will no doubt influence policy in neighboring Arab states –

Algeria and Tunisia in particular (a phenomenon referred to as the “spillover” effect). In the past

decade, the U.S. has demonstrated its willingness to combat the spread of Islamic

fundamentalism and jihadist movements, citing their intrinsic incompatibility with “Western”

liberal ideologies (and more specifically, their inimicality to U.S. national security). The recent

Libyan escalation in violence – and the perceived shift from utilitarian violence to ideological

violence – should not be quickly dismissed as inconsequential. Nor should it be prematurely

overstated. Albeit the evidence is primarily anecdotal, outwardly, there seems to be a

consolidating or reemerging Salafi-jihadi faction, particularly in Libya’s eastern cities. Any

operational ties to al-Qa’ida or its proxy organizations are largely unvetted; nonetheless, the

mere threat of “losing ground” to conservative Salafism, al-Qa’ida, or some similar ideological

organization has policy-relevance for the United States and our allies. The stagnation of Libya’s

power consolidation – as well as my own personal concern regarding the recent attacks – has

provided the impetus for the analysis that follows.


Nick Perry

5 | P a g e

Thesis and Summary of Contents

This paper is a sequential analysis of post-Qadhafi Libya, with special emphasis on the

myriad armed Salafi militias that struggle for material advantage and political influence. Quite

simply, what is the current situation in Libya? What are the implications, consequences, or long-

term political fallout of the consulate attack? And is there (veritably) some burgeoning militant

Islamic fringe movement impeding stability and state consolidation?

In order to better understand Libya’s contemporary Salafi movement, I will begin by

discussing the formation of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) in the 1990s and their ties

(both vetted and unvetted) to al-Qa’ida. How substantive a role did Islamic factions play in the

ousting of Qadhafi? How did they interact with other revolutionary brigades? Next, I will discuss

the more recent history of al-Qa’ida and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) as they

pertain to Libya and the LIFG. How substantive is al-Qa’ida’s influence in post-Qadhafi Libya?

Is the growing or reemerging ideological violence simply the product of a desperate Salafi-jihadi

fringe movement? Or is al-Qa’ida and/or its proxy organizations becoming increasingly

influential? Next, I will explore what some “brain-box” analysts have referred to as the shift

from “utilitarian” and “political” violence – comparatively rational violence that serves some

explicit purpose – to ideological violence, which reveals “the Salafis’ anguished search for

relevance in a country that is already socially conservative, but that has soundly rejected

dogmatic political actors in favor of technocratic ones.”6 Finally, what role did these al-

Qa’ida/Salafi groups play in the 11 September consulate attack and is al-Qa’ida truly attempting

to play the role of spoiler (as some senior U.S. government personnel insistently argue)?

6 Frederic Wehrey, “The Wrath of Libya’s Salafis,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 12,

2012.


Nick Perry

6 | P a g e

The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group – A Concise History and Present-Day Influence

To more thoroughly understand contemporary Libya, the reported upsurge of ideological

violence, and the 11 September consulate attack, it seems necessary to digress momentarily.

Exploring Libya’s history of militant Islamic organizations – with an emphasis on the more

enduring Salafi ideologues – should provide this paper with a basic analytical and contextual

framework from which to build upon. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), now called

the Libyan Islamic Movement for Change (LIMC), was established in the early 1990s by Libyan

Mujahideens returning from fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. These men were foreign

fighters, conditioned to wage jihad against the “heretical” Soviet communists during the

protracted “Bear Trap” war. The LIFG espoused two principle and guiding objectives. The first

objective was to oust the ‘Pharaoh’7 Muammar Qadhafi and his despotic regime, establishing in

its place an Islamic state based on Shari’a – the moral code and Islamic law of Islam. The second

objective was to further global jihadist ambitions generally. 8

According to the organization’s leadership, the Qadhafi regime was fundamentally anti-

Muslim and sadistically repressive, using torture and violence to placate or silence would-be

dissenters. Albeit Shari’a law was initially or outwardly embraced by Colonel Qadhafi, he later

“sidelined the ulama (clergy), seized control of the mosques, and nationalized their awqaf

(religious endowments).”9 Those who objected to Qadhafi’s idiosyncratic version of Islamic faith

were brutally repressed. Throughout the 1990s, the organization made several attempts to

7 The rebels often referred to Qadhafi as their “Pharaoh,” a term with negative connotations used to compare

Qadhafi to the Pharaoh of Egypt - a king who refused to allow the Israelis to leave Egypt despite Moses’s efforts and God’s call to “let my people go.” 8 START, “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.”

9 Gary Gambill, “The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group,” The Jamestown Foundation, March 23, 2005.


Nick Perry

7 | P a g e

assassinate Qadhafi, and violent clashes between state-sponsored security forces and the LIFG

became routine. By the late 1990s, however, the revolutionary Islamist movement in Libya had

been effectively decimated by the state’s security apparatus.10

A large fraction of LIFG members

were killed or imprisoned and the surviving Mujahideens were exiled or took refuge in Sudan,

Afghanistan, or Pakistan. By 2000, the LIFG’s Libyan leadership and their regional influence

had been wholly marginalized.

In November of 2007, al-Qa’ida ideologue Ayman al-Zawahiri and Libyan militant Abu

Laith al-Libi announced the LIFG - al-Qa’ida merger via an online statement.11

“We announce

we are joining al-Qa’ida as loyal soldiers,” al-Libi said. “The tyrant of Libya is pushing the

country into a new quagmire ... He suddenly discovered ... that America the guardian of the cross

is not an enemy.”12

Al-Zawahiri also spoke on the recording, welcoming his Libyan jihadists into

the al-Qa’ida fold: “Today, with grace from God, the Muslim nation witnesses a blessed step…

Honorable members of the Fighting Islamic Group in Libya announce that they are joining the

al-Qa’ida group to continue the march of their brothers...”13

This merger was at least

unanticipated, since the LIFG had historically and publicly rejected the more extremist

ideologies of al-Qa’ida and their proxy organizations.14

According to senior LIFG leaders, the al-

Qa’ida plan was “unworkable.”15

In fact, the LIFG had historically pledged their support to

Mullah Omar of the Taliban; LIFG spiritual leader Abu Munder al-Saidi “gave a series of

10

Alison Pargeter, “The LIFG’s Current Role in the Global Jihad,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, April 15, 2008. 11

Ibid. 12

Bill Roggio, “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Joins al-Qaeda,” The Long War Journal, November 3, 2007. 13

Ibid. 14

Pargeter, 2008. 15

Alison Pargeter, “LIFG Revisions Unlikely to Reduce Jihadist Violence,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, October 03, 2009.


Nick Perry

8 | P a g e

lectures in Afghanistan urging…” adherence to the Taliban’s edicts, rejecting bin Laden’s

ambitions to establish the “righteous caliphate of our umma” (often viewed as antagonistic to the

LIFG’s more regional ambitions).16

Perhaps most importantly, the leadership of the LIFG,

comprised of the group’s amir ‘Abdullah Sadiq, his deputy Shaykh Abu Hazim, spiritual leader

Abu al-Mundhir al Sa’idi and two other shaykhs – Muftah al-Sawadi and ‘Abd al-Wahhab Qa’id,

were incarcerated in the Abu Slim prison on the outskirts of Tripoli during Abu Laith’s merger

announcement.17

While the LIFG’s official leaders sat in prison, a markedly more ideological faction of

Libyan militants had wholly embraced the world of Jihad. In actuality – although Abu Laith was

in fact a member of the LIFG’s shura council – he was never legitimized in a leadership position,

nor was he authorized to speak on the group’s behalf. The statement was eventually labeled – by

LIFG leadership and Washington think tanks alike – as a fraught attempt to seize group control

and increase the LIFG’s (and Libya’s militant scene more generally) credibility and

relevance.1819

Regardless of intent or purpose, the alleged merger was short-lived – Abu Laith

was killed by U.S. forces in January 2008. With the LIFG’s more radical and ideological faction

seemingly neutralized or at least enfeebled – a casualty of George W. Bush’s “War on Terror,” –

16

Ibid. And Interview Oct 21, 2001, from bin Laden Message to the World, Verso, 2005, p.121. 17

“The LIFG Between Fragmentation and Joining al-Qa’ida (Arabic), www.almoslim.net, November 14, 2007. 18

Pargeter, 2008. 19

This is an important fact; the recent increase in violence has sometimes been attributed to various marginalized Salafi groups struggling for increased power and relevance. Is the recent violence, in fact, more “ideological?” Or is the past LIFG violence and present Salafi-militancy more comparable than originally thought?


Nick Perry

9 | P a g e

negotiations between the captive LIFG leadership and the Qadhafi regime were given fresh

impetus.20

During the end of 2009, the LIFG issued a 420-page document titled the Revisionist

Studies of the Concepts of Jihad, Hisbah and Takfir (verification and judgment of people).21

According to Alison Pargeter from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, the revisions

are a scholarly work that “draws on a range of Islamic references to condemn extremism and to

advocate a peaceful and patient approach to improving the state of umma (global Islamic

community).”22

The document was widely seen as a striking departure from conventional Islamic

thinking, particularly in regards to jihadist movements and the use of violence on behalf of Islam

(in obedience to what the Quran calls “the little jihad”). Specifically, the authors condemned the

use of violence against one’s own rulers.23

The revision was ultimately a product of resumed

negotiations – nearly three years of theological debate and mediation between LIFG leadership

and the Qadhafi regime. In a quid pro quo agreement, LIFG luminaries had renounced violence

in exchange for their freedom and pseudo-autonomy; shortly after the document was published,

nearly 70 senior LIFG members were released from Abu Slim prison in Tripoli.24

Predictably,

the sincerity of the group’s renunciation was widely questioned due to the security forces’

coercive tactics. Additionally, many conservative Salafis branded the Revisionist Studies as

concessive – a weak policy of placation that would ultimately catalyze the group’s demise.

20

The LIFG’s relationship with al-Qa’ida does seem to be a highly contentious issue. See the next section, “The Recent History of al-Qa’ida” for more information on the LIFG’s earlier interactions with al-Qa’ida and specifically bin Laden. 21

Pargeter, 2009. 22

Ibid. 23

Ibid. 24

Ibid.


Nick Perry

10 | P a g e

Throughout the 2011 revolution, the bulk of those associated with Islamic extremism in

Libya were former members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.25

Released from prison in

mass clemencies, influential figures such as the LIFG’s first amir, Muftah Mabrouk al-Wadi, and

brother of senior al-Qa’ida operative Abu Yahya al-Libi, Abd al-Wahhab Muhammad Qaid,

returned to their homes in Libya’s restive east just days prior to the outbreak of massive

demonstrations and violence.26

In all, some 400 prisoners were released under the direction of

Qadhafi’s son Saif al-Islam. Alison Pargeter, political analyst and Middle East/North Africa

specialist, has argued that “The deradicalization initiative was in part a publicity stunt, aimed at

bolstering the regime’s credibility in the West, as well as in eastern Libya.”27

After the revolution broke out, former LIFG members typically fought alongside the

rebels in small, less organized groups. However, a vast number of these Mujahideens had

acquired combat experience from fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan – an invaluable and scarce

asset during the 2011 efforts to oust Qadhafi’s fortified security apparatus. Notable LIFG amir

Abdel Hakim Belhadj is an illustrative example or case-in-point. Belhadj was at least partially

responsible for founding, and subsequently leading, the Tripoli Military Council – a

conglomeration of several revolutionary brigades involved in “taking” the capital following the

2011 battle of Tripoli.28

At its peak, Belhadj’s militia was an estimated 25,000 strong.29

Any

theories purporting an LIFG separatist movement during the 2011 revolution are dubious at best.

Nor has there been any substantive indication that the LIFG has consolidated or returned to

25

Alison Pargeter, “Are Islamist Extremists Fighting among Libya’s Rebels?” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, April 01, 2011. 26

Ibid. 27

Ibid. 28

Geoff D. Porter, “The Attack on the US Consulate: Emerging Signs of Jihadist Sentiment in Libya,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, September 26, 2012. 29

Ibid.


Nick Perry

11 | P a g e

jihadist activity, albeit some former members no doubt maintain certain fundamentalist

ideologies. In March of 2011, as mentioned in brief above, the group changed its name to the

Libyan Islamic Movement for Change (LIMC), arguably to placate residual Western fears of

Islamic fundamentalism and gain some degree of legitimacy as an organization (now partially

aligned with Western agendas).30

As Anis Sharif, a member of the LIMC’s politburo, rightly

observed, “it is the revolution of the Libyan people. It is not the revolution of political parties, or

organizations, or Islamists or fundamentalists.”31

And Abdel Hakim Belhadj – the former Libyan

terrorist once subjected to “extraordinary rendition” on behalf of the U.S. – conceded during a

2011 Washington Post interview, “The February 17th revolution is the Libyan people’s

revolution and no one can claim it, neither secularists nor Islamists,” he said. “The Libyan people

have different views, and all those views have to be involved and respected.”32

According to Aaron Zelin from The Washington Institute, the LIFG is split into two

political factions that contested the July 2012 legislative elections,

the broad-based moderate party Hizb al-Watan (HW), which Belhadj joined, and the

smaller, more conservative and Islamist-tinged Hizb al-Umma al-Wasat (HUW), which

most other LIFG members joined under the leadership of prominent figure Sami al-Saadi.

HW did not win any seats in the election, while HUW garnered one, which was allocated

to Abdul Wahhab al-Qaed, brother of the late Abu Yahya al-Libi, a senior al-Qa’ida

figure.33

30

Aaron Y. Zelin, “Jihadism’s Foothold in Libya,” The Washington Institute, September 12, 2012. 31

“Libyan Islamist to Al-Sharq al-Awsat: The Libyan People’s Revolution is not that of political parties of organizations or fundamentalists,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 21, 2011. 32

Rod Nordland, “In Libya, Former Enemy is Recast in Role of Ally,” The New York Times, September 1, 2011. 33

Zelin, 2012.


Nick Perry

12 | P a g e

It seems clear, then, that the Libyan people have typically renounced the more

conservative Islamic factions competing for political influence, despite the HUW’s single

seat. This is both encouraging and prognostic. While the elections were largely

successful, the mere presence of groups like the HUW will no doubt beset Libya’s

ongoing stability and democratization efforts. Additionally, the HUW and similar,

comparatively conservative groups are unambiguous evidence of a resilient Islamic fringe

movement in Libya.

The Recent History of Al-Qa’ida and Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

In order to discuss the early history of al-Qa’ida in Libya, I am going to digress back to

the contentious topic of LIFG-al-Qa’ida linkages. Important to note before moving forward is the

LIFG’s earlier (and seemingly more substantiated) ties to al-Qa’ida. According to several

sources, bin Laden was personally funding various LIFG enterprises throughout the early to mid-

1990s.34

One of the organization’s more notable operations, a failed attempt to assassinate

Qadhafi in 1996, was reportedly financed by the Saudi terrorist-luminary (and concurrently, by

British intelligence to the tune of $160,000, according to ex-MI5 officer David Shayler.).35

According to one report, for each LIFG militant that was killed “on the battlefield” (in the

furtherance of al-Qa’ida’s regional aspirations), bin Laden provided the organization with

$50,000 in monetary compensation.36

34

Gambill, 2005. 35

Gambill, 2005, citing "The Shayler affair: The spooks, the Colonel and the jailed whistle-blower," The Observer (London), 9 August 1998. Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquie substantiate this claim in their 2001 book Ben Laden: La Verite interdite (Bin Ladin: The Forbidden Truth). 36

Ibid.


Nick Perry

13 | P a g e

In general, however, the more contemporary links between LIFG residuals/Salafi militant

groups and al-Qa’ida are tenuous. As aforementioned, a radical (and disenfranchised) faction of

the LIFG announced the group’s loyalty to al-Qa’ida in 2007. However, this vow of loyalty was

quickly dismissed as illegitimate by LIFG’s senior leadership. Prior to and throughout the 2011

revolution, there were numerous (although not consistently vetted) reports of al-Qa’ida or proxy

organizations operating in and around Libya, particularly in the southern and eastern regions.

Sources in Tripoli have suggested that the resumption of negotiations/quid pro quo arrangements

between government officials and senior LIFG affiliates were motivated almost entirely by

Qadhafi’s caution and self-interest. With reports of an increasingly restive and militant eastern

region, and a burgeoning group of Libyan youth espousing al-Qa’ida-like ideologies, the regime

hoped to placate Islamic grievances by releasing more senior LIFG members.37

Notably, and as aforementioned, the evidence of a current al-Qa’ida/AQIM presence in

eastern Libya is largely anecdotal in nature. According to several AQIM websites, group leader

Abu Mus’ab ‘Abd al-Wadud has called for a jihad in Libya not only against Qadhafi, but also

against the West and specifically the United States, “as the foreign military intervention is a new

crusader war.”38

But the internet and its various individual communication tools that make up

“social media” are hardly the iron-clad evidence needed to alter current policy or target these

Islamic groups with more ferocity. Similarly, Qadhafi’s fear of Islamic revolutionaries and his

calculated moves to placate specific constituencies does not substantiate a present-day al-Qa’ida

presence. More interesting are the bin Laden allegations. For now, unfortunately, these claims

37

Pargeter, 2011. 38

http://www.benbadis.org/vb/showthread.php?s=b3cc5692c833943cc3c2fc3b634cb2f0&p=18976#post1 8976.


Nick Perry

14 | P a g e

remain inexplicit and do little to advance our investigation of present-day Libya (although they

should not be dismissed as necessarily inconsequential, either).

Despite the countless theories, most Middle-East/North Africa experts seem to agree that

al-Qa’ida has been largely unsuccessful in reaching the Libyan population. Its messages are often

fragmented and fail to conceptualize a cohesive vision for the future of Libya. In particular, as

policy analyst Barak Barfi has argued, “al-Qa’ida has struggled to place the country and the

uprising in an Islamic context.”39

In 2011, al-Qa’ida leaders released four separate statements –

two from its leaders based in Pakistan and two from its North African affiliate, AQIM. Jamal

Ibrahim Ishtawi al-Misrati – a Libyan affiliated with a Pakistan-based al-Qa’ida organization –

released a 10 minute video in mid-February. Muhammad Hassan Qayyid Idris, known as Abu

Yahya al-Libi, issued a 30-minute video in March. Also released in March was a statement from

AQIM’s leader Abdelmalek Droukdel, also known as Abu Mus’ab ‘Abd al-Wadud. And in

August, the head of AQIM’s council of notables, Abu Ubayda Yusuf al-Anabi, released a

previously recorded interview.40

Taken together, these four statements underscore the lack of

cohesion between al-Qa’ida organizations. Far from monolithic, all four messages overlapped

somewhat in content and “lacked a coherent overarching narrative beyond the nebulous call to

adopt Islam.”41

From these messages it seems obvious that al-Qa’ida and its proxy organizations are

struggling to keep the jihadist movement relevant in Libya. Misrati’s message was personal and

comparatively self-possessed, urging the Libyan population to embrace a future constitution

39

Barak Barfi, “Al-Qa’ida’s Confused Messaging on Libya,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, October 01, 2011. 40

Ibid. 41

Ibid.


Nick Perry

15 | P a g e

based on Shari’a. In contrast, Abu Yahya’s message was a “rambling polemic” against

authoritarian Arab dictators and their Western backers. Ultimately, it narrowly focused on

ambiguous Islamic slogans and failed to offer the Libyan rebels any substantive guidelines for a

post-revolutionary state. AQIM is often referred to as al-Qa’ida’s weakest link, and the messages

delivered by Droukdel and Al-Anabi emphasized the organization’s disjointed nature (and the

splits between AQIM’s ranks).42

Rather than focus on assuaging the state’s dire weaknesses

and/or persistent governance crisis, Droukdel discussed ambiguous conspiracy theories,

vehemently condemning the West for its alleged collusion with the Arab pharaohs. And albeit

Al-Anabi adopted a comparatively moderate stance, discounting fears of Western domination, he

too failed to move beyond opaque and irrelevant Islamic terms. Ultimately, all four messages

failed to conceptualize a framework for Libyans to adopt post-revolution. As Combating

Terrorism Center analyst Barak Barfi has argued, “While Libyans were debating the type of

political system to establish after Qadhafi’s removal from power, al-Qa’ida was recycling

general Islamic concepts that were irrelevant to the current political situation in the Arab

world.”43

What does this history tell us about Libya’s current trajectory? Are some remnants of

LIFG still active and influential in Libya today? And is al-Qa’ida attempting to play the role of

spoiler?

Libya’s Pervasive Violence – Primarily Utilitarian/Political or Increasingly Ideological?

Recent violence, including the 11 September consulate attack in Benghazi, indicates a

burgeoning ideological trend more consistent with Salafi-jihadi terrorism (although not

necessarily the increased presence of al-Qa’ida). During the past 10 months, the predominance of

42

Ibid. 43

Ibid.


Nick Perry

16 | P a g e

violence in Libya could be classified as “utilitarian” – violence for the purpose of achieving

some tangible goal.44

And disputes were often resolved via bloodless negotiations/concessions

between two or more parties.

Political violence – often in the form of targeted assassinations – was also commonplace,

particularly in Libya’s restive east. In contrast to what (for all intents and purposes) I refer to

here as “ideological violence,” these organized attacks were used to gain material wealth and/or

political influence.45

Often the targets/victims of these attacks have been loyalists to the ancien

regime (or simply individuals with suspected regime ties). Albeit the majority of assassinations

involved shootings, car bombs have also increased in frequency. On 19 August 2012, the New

York Times published an article detailing three deadly and conspicuous car bombs, detonated in

Tripoli. The first explosion occurred outside the Interior Ministry. Shortly after, two explosions

killed at least two and injured three more near a former police headquarters housed by Defense

Ministry personnel. A fourth bomb, also found near the Interior Ministry, failed to detonate.46

Notably, all four (politically-motivated) attacks targeted government security buildings.

According to journalist Kareem Fahim, these aforementioned attacks were the first deadly car

bombings since the fall of Qadhafi nearly a year ago.47

Geoff D. Porter from the Combating Terrorism Center offers two hypotheses for the

presence and resilience of utilitarian and/or political violence. First, the attacks could be an

attempt to increase (by force) the political vitality of one or several marginalized militia groups.

Second, the bombings could be an “outward manifestation of competition among different

44

Porter, 2012. 45

Ibid. 46

Kareem Fahim, “Two Die in Libya as Car Bomb Strikes Capital,” The New York Times, August 19, 2012. 47

Ibid.


Nick Perry

17 | P a g e

security services such as the Supreme Security Council, Libya Shield, the High Security Council,

the Tripoli Military Council, and the militias that are embedded within them.”48

Political

violence of this nature often functions as a warning to provisional or transitional governments:

exclude us from the political decision-making process and we’ll readily play the role of spoiler.

Notably, a third kind of violence, comparatively ideological, appears to be increasing in

prevalence or consolidating with utilitarian/political violence. The 11 September attack on the

U.S. consulate in Benghazi certainly lends some degree of credibility to this theory. However, a

preceding series of similarly “ideological” and violent attacks went largely unnoticed. On 6 June

2012, a group called the Brigade of the Imprisoned Shaykh ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman attacked

the U.S. consulate compound in Benghazi with an improvised explosive device (IED). The attack

(which was largely ineffectual) was allegedly in retaliation for the U.S. assassination of top al-

Qa’ida operative (and former LIFG member) Abu Yahya al-Libi in Pakistan.49

The attack’s

motivating ideologies and the group’s name are clear al-Qa’ida references, but the material

affiliation between al-Qa’ida and the Brigade of the Imprisoned Shaykh ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman

is unsubstantiated.50

Two other attacks were reportedly carried out by Ansar al-Shari’a

(Supporters of Islamic Law). On 11 June 2012, a convoy carrying the British ambassador to

Libya was struck by a rocket-propelled grenade. Two British “close protection officers” were

injured in the attack.51

Finally, the Tunisian consulate in Benghazi was attacked in reputed

48

Porter, 2012. 49

“Libya Unrest: UK’s Envoy’s Convoy Attacked in Benghazi,” BBC, June 11, 2012. 50

Porter, 2012. 51

Ibid.


Nick Perry

18 | P a g e

retribution for a controversial art exhibit in Tunisia that used dead bugs to spell “God” in

Arabic.52

The Rise of Libya’s Salafis and the Benghazi Consulate Attack

Even as LIFG put down its arms after the war and joined the political process, these new

jihadist groups began to grow in size and significance. The Ansar al-Shari’a jihadist groups are

relatively new in Libya. One of the largest is Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi (ASB) led by

Muhammad Zahawi. Notably, some journalists and Middle East/North Africa experts have

implicated the ASB in the 11 September Benghazi consulate attack, and witnesses report a vast

majority of the gunman that stormed the compound were carrying the black Ansar al-Shari’a

flag.5354

Additionally, according to “unidentified personnel” in Libya, Ansar al-Shari’a originally

claimed responsibility for the attacks via Facebook and Twitter, before removing the posts and

denying their complicity.55

The ASB has ties to several other Salafi-jihadist katibas (battalions)

in Libya, including Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah (ASD), led by former Guantanamo Bay inmate

Abu Sufyan bin Qumu.56

Like the Brigade of the Imprisoned Shaykh ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman,

ASB and ASD has no vetted operational links to al-Qa’ida, despite sharing much of its

ideology.57

Several days following Ambassador Steven’s death, ASB leader Zahawi agreed

(uncharacteristically) to an interview with BBC Arabic. During the interview, Zahawi referenced

52

Ibid. 53

Mel Frykberg, “Ansar al-Shariah, Linked to Diplomat’s Death, Sets Benghazi Rally to Counter Calls for Moderation,” McClatchy Newspapers, September 20, 2012. 54

Ibid. 55

“Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees,” CNN, October 24, 2012. 56

Zelin, 2012. 57

Ibid.


Nick Perry

19 | P a g e

prominent Salafi-jihadi ideologue and al-Qa’ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, calling his recent

statements “a wake-up call for Muslims. They help galvanize the Muslim nation, maintain its

dignity and pride. Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri is keen on safeguarding Muslim rights.”58

(According to one report, al-Zawahiri sent jihadists – including the Libyan al-Qa’ida member

Abd al-Basit Azuz – to Darnah following the 2011 revolution to establish a more prominent al-

Qa’ida foothold in Libya’s eastern region.)59

Although Zahawi explicitly denied any involvement

in the 11 September consulate attack, he in essence marginalized the killings of Ambassador

Stevens, SEALS Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty, and computer expert Sean Smith. Zahawi

emphasized infallible adherence to Shari’a as the sine qua non for devoted Muslims: "Do you

think that the killing of the US ambassador is more heinous than the several insults made about

the Prophet, peace be upon him? I swear by God that we can tolerate the killing of all people and

wiping all countries off the map but we cannot tolerate a single swear word that could hurt our

prophet.”60

[Emphasis mine]

The brigade’s ultra-conservative interpretation of Islam is unambiguous. Although any

ties to al-Qa’ida remain unsubstantiated, the groups’ ideologies remain remarkably similar;

ASB/ASD are clearly al-Qa’ida sympathizers at the very least. Zahawi and the ASB/ASD merit

continued observation, and their involvement with the 11 September consulate attack should not

be dismissed with passive indifference.

Most recently, the “prime suspect” (according to at least one developing source) in the

attack that killed Ambassador Stevens and three other Americans, Ahmed Boukhatala, remains

58

Ahmed Maher, “Meeting Mohammad Ali al-Zahawi of Libyan Ansar al-Sharia,” BBC Arabic, September 18, 2012. 59

Nick Robertson & Paul Cruickshank, “Source: Al Qaeda Leader sends Veteran Jihadists to Establish Presence in Libya,” CNN, December 29, 2011. 60

Ibid.


Nick Perry

20 | P a g e

free in Benghazi.61

Boukhatala is the leader of the Abu Ubaidah Brigades - a sub-group of the

larger Ansar al-Shari’a militia. The Abu Ubaidah Brigades allegedly operate as a de facto police

and military unit in and around Libya’s comparatively anarchic eastern region. As emphasized

above, the official or de jure Libyan state security forces lack the operational fortitude to

monopolize the legitimate use of violence. Albeit Boukhatala admits to being present at the

Benghazi consulate immediately following the 11 September attack, he denies any complicity in

the violence and blames the American deaths on the crude documentary Innocence of Muslims.62

Equally relevant (and informationally-opaque) is the 5 October 2012 arrest of a Tunisian

suspect at Istanbul’s Ataturk airport in Turkey.63

Tunisian Interior Ministry spokesperson

Tarrouch Khaled confirmed that Turkey’s anti-terrorism squad had arrested Ali Ani al-Harzi (at

the request of the U.S.) as he attempted to enter the country using fake passports.64

Former

director of CIA operations in the Middle East and CNN contributor Bob Baer emphasized the

significance of Marzi’s Tunisian nationality, claiming that “certain information puts him inside

al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM).”65

The FBI is expected to question the suspect “in the coming

days,” according to a U.S. government official with direct knowledge of the investigation.66

These promising yet strange developments, unfortunately, are neither confirmation nor refutation

of Ansar al-Shari’a’s/al-Qa’ida’s involvement in the 11 September consulate attack.

61

Elizabeth Palmer, “’Prime Suspect’ in Libya Consulate Attack Dares Govt. to ‘Arrest Me,’” CBS, September 20, 2012. 62

Ibid. 63

Bouazza Ben Bouazza, “Tunisia: Reported Benghazi Consulate Suspect Arrested,” The Washington Times, October 24, 2012. 64

Ibid. 65

Cooper, 2012. 66

Susan Candiotti & Ross Levitt, “FBI to Question Suspect in Benghazi Attack,” CNN – Security Brief, November 3, 2012.


Nick Perry

21 | P a g e

At least one developing report has also implicated al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), referencing

anecdotal evidence to link the comparatively large number of Libyan foreign fighters who were

sent to the Iraqi jihad and present-day ideological violence in Libya.67

CNN national security

contributor Frans Townsend commented,

…you worry about the bleed-off – that after the conflict these people will go back to their

home countries. And it wasn't just Libya, mind you, it was all across North Africa,

Yemen and throughout the Middle East. And this is sort of coming home to roost, that

original problem that we saw the fight – foreign fighter pipeline into Iraq years earlier.

And so, while unfortunate, it's not surprising. These guys return to their home

communities with this sort of sense of prestige having fought in a foreign conflict, they

come home and they take on these leadership roles in local extremist communities, and

so in that respect it's not entirely surprising but very unfortunate.68

This hypothesis is at least plausible, citing the substantial quantities of Libyan foreign fighters

sent to Afghanistan to wage jihad against droves of “heretical” Soviet communists. Upon their

return, these Mujahideens were decisively instrumental in the maintenance and direction of

Libya’s Salafi-jihadi scene, particularly in the east. Is it possible that the more recent influx of

Libyan foreign fighters were substantively influenced by AQI? And after returning from the Iraqi

jihad, maintained some material linkages? According to Brian Fishman and Joseph Felter,

Libyans made up the second-largest contingent of foreign fighters entering Iraq, “and evidence

of a well-established smuggling route for Libyans through Egypt, suggests that Libyan factions

67

Ibid. 68

Ibid.


Nick Perry

22 | P a g e

[were] increasingly important in al-Qa’ida.”69

Echoing Townsend’s sentiments, Chair for the

U.S. House Intelligence Committee Mike Rogers said at the end of September that “there is a

high degree of probability…” that the attack was orchestrated and carried out by al-Qa’ida or an

al-Qa’ida affiliated organization “that had a very specific target in mind.”70

Concluding Analysis

It is important to note that speculation does not prove correlation or causation; the large

majority of links between Salafi-jihadism and al-Qa’ida/ the 11 September consulate attack and

al-Qa’ida are tenuous. However, several things are imperative to keep in mind. First, the number

of senior-level U.S. government personnel who have implicated al-Qa’ida proper or al-Qa’ida

proxies to the 11 September Benghazi Consulate attack is not insignificant. Does there exist

some vetted (and classified) intelligence that proves al-Qa’ida’s complicity? Or are these claims

by government officials purely speculative?

Notably, there seems to be a marked dichotomy in opinions between (some of the)

government officials and think tank analysts. While dissatisfied, typically more conservative

public-office holders demand a more thorough investigation into al-Qa’ida’s role in Ambassador

Steven’s death, academics and reputable public-policy “brain-box” employees (generally with

extensive knowledge on Libya) tend to downplay al-Qa’ida’s complicity without entirely

dismissing the theory. Does this dichotomy lend credibility to the theory of classified

intelligence? In other words, are U.S. government officials with more advanced security

clearances privy to clandestine information regarding the attack? Or are these analysts more

69

Brian Fishman & Joseph Felter, “Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, January 02, 2007. 70

Mike Rogers, Interview, CNN, September 24, 2012.


Nick Perry

23 | P a g e

comprehensively knowledgeable on Libya’s history of Islamic extremism, and does that

knowledge somehow trump or void accusations made by Senator John McCain, U.S. House

Intelligence Chair Mike Rogers, former CIA director of operations in the Middle East Bob Baer,

and others? Finally, does the nature of “nonpartisan” or “independent” public policy think tanks

allow these analysts to be more moderate and objective in their analyses? Unfortunately the

answers to these questions remain unclear, but the very existence of such a dichotomy of

opinions begs for continued observation.

Finally, al-Qa’ida’s role in the 11 September Benghazi Consulate attack should not be

dramatically overstated. As aforementioned, a number of senior policy analysts caution at

arbitrarily and prematurely assigning blame. Carnegie Endowment senior analyst Frederic

Wehrey argues that the majority of the Salafi-jihadi groups are “home-grown” in nature, albeit

some ties [to al-Qa’ida] may still exist. There are signs that al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb

(AQIM) “is very interested in exploiting the chaos,” but there the solution is better governance.71

The underlying theme amid the chaos and frustration stemming from the 11 September consulate

attack seems unambiguous: one or a combination of Salafi militias, espousing comparatively

extremist ideologies that parallel al-Qa’ida’s, is responsible for the death of Ambassador Stevens

and the three members of his diplomatic mission. Which specific militia or Salafi-jihadist

organization deserves credit is less explicit.

In this conclusion, it seems appropriate (to digress slightly) to emphasize the situation in

Libya more broadly. Libyans - culturally, temperamentally, and historically – are not

71

Frederic Wehrey, “Libyan Salafists Assert Power with Embassy Attack,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – PBS Newshour, September 12, 2012.


Nick Perry

24 | P a g e

predisposed to support violent and radical Islamism, per se.72

In response to the 11 September

attack, Libyans mobilized to protest what they saw as an egregious and illicit act of aggression.

And this kind of public mobilization – whether in the form of protests or via social media – is not

uncommon in Libya’s fragile transition stage. Tribes, women’s groups, and civil society in Libya

have all mobilized to condemn the recent attacks on the Sufis. According to one source, in

response to the decimation of various Sufi sites, one Salafi brigade was forced to leave town by

an organized mob that opposed the group’s intolerant ideologies.73

The historic 7 July 2012 elections for the General National Congress (GNC) emphasized

the general “politico” condemnation of Libyan Salafism represented by the Hizb al-Watan

(HW) party – which counted former LIFG amir Abdel Hakim Belhadj as its most prominent

luminary – and Hizb al-Umma al-Wasat (HUW), whose candidates included LIFG figures such

as Sami al-Saadi and Abd al-Wahhab al-Ghayid, the brother of slain al-Qaeda deputy Abu Yahya

al-Libi. Wehrey states eloquently:

Tellingly,Umma al-Wasat secured only one seat; al-Watan, zero. Bereft of the political

platform of Egypt’s al-Nour party and lacking the stark secular-Islamist social divide that

has enabled Tunisian Salafis to play the role of provocateur, militant Salafis in Libya are

trying to muscle their way to prominence using violence.74

The most pressing issue, then, is likely not the presence of an extremist fringe movement with al-

Qa’ida-like ideologies, or prior LIFG members that still nurture some set of fundamentalist

aspirations, but the legitimacy and capacity of the country’s provisional government. The fall of

72

Ibid. 73

Frederic Wehrey, “The Wrath of Libya’s Salafis,” The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 12, 2012. 74

Ibid.


Nick Perry

25 | P a g e

the Qadhafi regime created a persistent governance crisis in Libya. As the official army and

police forces collapsed during the 2011 conflict, large numbers of armed groups – describing

themselves as brigades acting in the name of the 17 February revolution – cropped up in their

wake. The power vacuum caused by Qadhafi’s fall triggered/exacerbated sectarian and

intercommunal strife, and Libya’s interim government – the National Transition Council – was

essentially forced to harness the militias’ power to project its own authority. According to

Wehrey, “In the transition period, governing officials co-opted and deputized militia

commanders to quell tribal fighting.”75

Despite some marginal success, the current system of a

subcontracted security apparatus is unsustainable. The militias have become emboldened by their

newfound level of political clout and autonomy, while the regular police and army remain

comparatively weak, underfunded, “…and tainted by their association with the old regime.”76

With the election of a new parliament, the General National Congress, and the

installation of a new cabinet, Libya has reached a critical juncture. Moving forward, the

government has an opportunity to consolidate its power and expand legitimacy. The deaths of

Ambassador Stevens, SEALs Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty, and computer expert Sean Smith

are tragic reminders of the perennial problems of poor governance, not necessarily the result of a

burgeoning militant Salafi fringe movement or al-Qa’ida. And ultimately, the solution to such a

multifaceted and complex problem must be Libyan in origin, recognizing the sovereign right of

nation-states to shape their own destiny.77

“By nearly every account, Libyan and American,

Chris Stevens embodied this approach.” According to those who worked alongside him,

75

Frederic Wehrey, “Libya’s Militia Menace,” Foreign Affairs, July 12, 2012. 76

Frederic Wehrey, “Libyan Salafists Assert Power with Embassy Attack,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – PBS Newshour, September 12, 2012. 77

Ibid.


Nick Perry

26 | P a g e

Ambassador Stevens “…was famous for his infectious enthusiasm – even in those dark times,

under the most despicable of regimes – for the enormous potential of the country’s people.”78

78

Frederic Wehrey, “Desperate Salafi Attack in a Weak Libya,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 12, 2012.


Nick Perry

27 | P a g e

Works Cited

"Al-Qaeda Claims for Jihad in Libya." N.p., 21 Mar. 2011. Web. 18 Oct. 2012.

<http://www.benbadis.org/vb/showthread.php?s=b3cc5692c833943cc3c2fc3b634cb2f0>.

Barfi, Barak. "Al-Qa'ida's Confused Messaging on Libya." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point,

01 Aug. 2011. Web. 23 Oct. 2012. <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaida's-confused-

messaging-on-libya>.

Candiotti, Susan. "FBI to Question Suspect in Benghazi Attack - CNN.com." CNN. Cable News

Network, 05 Nov. 2012. Web. 26 Oct. 2012. <http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/03/us/benghazi-

attack-suspect/index.html>.

Cooper, Anderson. "CNN." Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees. CNN, 26 Oct. 2012. Web. 04 Nov. 2012.

<http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1210/24/acd.02.html>.

"Divided We Stand: Libya's Enduring Conflicts." - International Crisis Group. N.p., 14 Sept. 2012.

Web. 04 Dec. 2012. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/north-

africa/libya/130-divided-we-stand-libyas-enduring-conflicts.aspx>.

Fahim, Kareem. "2 Die in Libya As Car Bombs Strike Capital." The New York Times. The New York

Times, 20 Aug. 2012. Web. 29 Nov. 2012.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/20/world/africa/libyan-blasts-kill-2-outside-security-

buildings-in-tripoli.html>.

Felter, Joseph, and Brian Fishman. "Al-Qa'�™ida'�™s Foreign Fighters in Iraq | Combating Terrorism

Center at West Point." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point RSS. N.p., 02 Jan. 2007. Web.

04 Dec. 2012. <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaidas-foreign-fighters-in-iraq-a-first-look-at-

the-sinjar-records>.

Frykberg, Mel. "Ansar Al Shariah, Linked to Diplomatâ�™s Death, Sets Benghazi Rally to Counter

Calls for Moderation." Ansar Al Shariah, Linked to Diplomatâ�™s Death, Sets Benghazi Rally

to Counter Calls for Moderation. N.p., 20 Sept. 2012. Web. 15 Nov. 2012.

<http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/09/20/169207/ansar-al-shariah-linked-to-diplomats.html>.


Nick Perry

28 | P a g e

Gambill, Gary. "The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)." The Jamestown Foundation. N.p., 05 May

2005. Web. 01 Nov. 2012.

<http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=308>.

Ifill, Gwen, Robin Wright, and Frederic Wehrey. "Libyan Salafists Assert Power with Embassy Attacks,

Hoping to Catch Public Eye." PBS. PBS, 12 Sept. 2012. Web. 04 Dec. 2012.

<http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/weather/july-dec12/libya2_09-12.html>.

"Libya Unrest: UK Envoy's Convoy Attacked in Benghazi." BBC News. BBC, 06 Nov. 2012. Web. 18

Nov. 2012. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18401792>.

Maher, Ahmed. "Meeting Mohammad Ali Al-Zahawi of Libyan Ansar Al-Sharia." BBC News. BBC, 18

Sept. 2012. Web. 04 Oct. 2012. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19638582>.

Pargeter, Alison. "Are Islamic Extremists Fighting Among Libya's Rebels?" Combating Terrorism

Center at West Point. N.p., 01 Apr. 2011. Web. 03 Nov. 2012.

<http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/are-islamist-extremists-fighting-among-libya's-rebels>.

Pargeter, Alison. "LIFG Revisions Unlikely to Reduce Jihadist Violence | Combating Terrorism Center

at West Point." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point RSS. N.p., 03 Oct. 2009. Web. 15

Oct. 2012. <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/lifg-revisions-unlikely-to-reduce-jihadist-violence>.

Pargeter, Alison. "The LIFG's Current Role in the Global Jihad." Combating Terrorism Center at West

Point. N.p., 15 Apr. 2008. Web. 10 Nov. 2012. <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-

lifg%E2%80%99s-current-role-in-the-global-jihad>.

Porter, Geoff D. "The Attack on the U.S. Consulate: Emerging Signs of Jihadist Sentiment in Libya |

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point RSS.

N.p., 26 Sept. 2012. Web. 15 Nov. 2012. <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-attack-on-the-u-s-

consulate-emerging-signs-of-jihadist-sentiment-in-libya>.

""Prime Suspect" in Libya Consulate Attack Dares Gov't to "arrest Me"" CBSNews. CBS Interactive, 20

Sept. 2012. Web. 04 Dec. 2012. <http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-57516793-

503543/prime-suspect-in-libya-consulate-attack-dares-govt-to-arrest-me/>.


Nick Perry

29 | P a g e

Robertson, Nic, and Tim Lister. "Source: Al Qaeda Leader Sends Veteran Jihadists to Establish

Presence in Libya - CNN.com." CNN. Cable News Network, 30 Dec. 2011. Web. 11 Oct. 2012.

<http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/29/world/meast/libya-jihadists/index.html>.

Rogers, Mike. "Mike Rogers - The Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer - CNN.com Blogs." The Situation

Room with Wolf Blitzer RSS. CNN, 20 Oct. 2012. Web. 07 Nov. 2012.

<http://situationroom.blogs.cnn.com/category/mike-rogers/>.

Roggio, Bill. "Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Joins Al Qaeda." Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Joins Al

Qaeda. The Long War Journal, 03 Nov. 2007. Web. 13 Oct. 2012.

<http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/11/libyan_islamic_fight.php>.

"Terrorist Organization Profile - START - National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and

Responses to Terrorism." Terrorist Organization Profile - START - National Consortium for the

Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism

and the Responses to Terrorism, 2011. Web. 22 Oct. 2012.

<http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=440

0>.

Washington., Rod Nordland; Steven Lee Myers And Scott Shane Contributed Reporting From. "In

Libya, Former Enemy Is Recast in Role of Ally." The New York Times. The New York Times, 02

Sept. 2011. Web. 26 Nov. 2012.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/02/world/africa/02islamist.html?pagewanted=all>.

Wehrey, Frederic. "Desperate Salafi Attack in a Weak Libya -Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. N.p., 12 Sept. 2012. Web. 04 Dec. 2012.

<http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/12/desperate-salafi-attack-in-weak-libya/dtdp>.

Wehrey, Frederic. "Libya's Militia Menace." Foreign Affairs, 12 July 2012. Web. 16 Nov. 2012.

<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137776/frederic-wehrey/libyas-militia-menace>.


Nick Perry

30 | P a g e

Wehrey, Frederic. "The Wrath of Libya's Salafis." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. N.p.,

12 Sept. 2012. Web. 04 Oct. 2012. <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/12/wrath-of-libya-s-

salafis/dtaz>.

Zelin, Aaron Y. "Policy Analysis." Jihadism's Foothold in Libya. The Washington Institute, 12 Sept.

2012. Web. 20 Nov. 2012. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/jihadisms-

foothold-in-libya>.

Documents

Working Libya Paper Updated (1)