Work of the European and UK Space Agencies€¦ · 9. The Horizon 2020 programme retains many of the arbitrary restrictions of former Framework R&D programmes, for example forcing

Published on 28 October 2013 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited

House of Commons

Science and Technology Committee

Work of the European and UK Space Agencies

Fourth Report of Session 2013–14

Additional written evidence

Ordered by the House of Commons to be published 17 July and 9 October 2013

Science and Technology Committee

The Science and Technology Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the Government Office for Science and associated public bodies.

Current membership

Andrew Miller (Labour, Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Chair) Jim Dowd (Labour, Lewisham West and Penge) Stephen Metcalfe (Conservative, South Basildon and East Thurrock) David Morris (Conservative, Morecambe and Lunesdale) Stephen Mosley (Conservative, City of Chester) Pamela Nash (Labour, Airdrie and Shotts) Sarah Newton (Conservative, Truro and Falmouth) Graham Stringer (Labour, Blackley and Broughton) David Tredinnick (Conservative, Bosworth) Hywel Williams (Plaid Cymru, Arfon) Roger Williams (Liberal Democrat, Brecon and Radnorshire) The following members were also members of the committee during the parliament: Gavin Barwell (Conservative, Croydon Central) Caroline Dinenage (Conservative, Gosport) Gareth Johnson (Conservative, Dartford) Gregg McClymont (Labour, Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) Stephen McPartland (Conservative, Stevenage) Jonathan Reynolds (Labour/Co-operative, Stalybridge and Hyde)

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The Committee is one of the departmental Select Committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No.152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk

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The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the Internet at http://www.parliament.uk/science. A list of reports from the Committee in this Parliament is included at the back of this volume. The Reports of the Committee, the formal minutes relating to that report, oral evidence taken and some or all written evidence are available in printed volume(s). Additional written evidence may be published on the internet only.

Committee staff

The current staff of the Committee are: Dr Stephen McGinness (Clerk); Jessica Montgomery (Second Clerk); Xameerah Malik (Senior Committee Specialist); Victoria Charlton (Committee Specialist); Darren Hackett (Senior Committee Assistant); Julie Storey (Committee Assistant); Henry Ayi-Hyde (Committee Office Assistant); and Nick Davies (Media Officer).

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All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Science and Technology Committee, Committee Office, 14 Tothill Street, London SW1H 9NB. The telephone number for general inquiries is: 020 7219 2793; the Committee’s e-mail address is: [email protected].

List of additional written evidence

Page

1 Royal Aeronautical Society (ESA 001) Ev w1

2 Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd (SSTL) (ESA 003) Ev w2

3 College of Science and Engineering, University of Leicester (ESA 008) Ev w4

4 National Oceanography Centre (ESA 010) Ev w6

5 Professor Michael Sheehan (ESA 012) Ev w8

6 Unite (ESA 017) Ev w11

7 Royal Academy of Engineering (ESA 018) Ev w11

8 Institute of Physics (ESA 020) Ev w14

9 Dr Kevin Madders (ESA 021) Ev w16

10 Met Office (ESA 023) Ev w20

11 Alba Orbital Ltd (ESA 025) Ev w22

12 CGI IT UK Limited (ESA 015) Ev w22

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Science & Technology Committee: Evidence Ev w1

Written evidence

Written evidence submitted by the Royal Aeronautical Society (ESA001)

1. The Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS) is the world’s only professional body dedicated to the entireaerospace community. Established in 1866, the Society has 16,000 members in over 100 countries (including3,500 classified as young members), and is a leader and provider of foresight within the aerospace community.A wide range of Specialist Groups, including the Space Group, support the work of the Society. It also has aCorporate Partners’ scheme affording direct links to aerospace and aviation companies.

Q1. What are the strengths (S) and weaknesses (W) of the funding, organisation, and work of the EuropeanSpace Agency?

2. S: ESA offers a space career path for engineers, technicians and scientists, both directly as ESA employeesand also through its commitment to support a competitive industry. The continental scale of this careeropportunity makes it more globally competitive (and thus more sustainable) than would that of a nationalagency.

3. S: ESA undertakes extensive outreach to schools and Universities directly and indirectly. The ESERO-UK facility at York University is an example of this. ESA’s outreach is especially strong because it embracesindustry and academia. ESA’s outreach function is important because space plays a significant role in attractingyoung people to STEM-based careers.

4. W: ESA’s scope of activity omits most aspects of military space. The military or security sub-sector ofspace is a large, technology-stretching and growing area. It is fragmented across Europe and thus more difficultto include in career roadmaps than the civil space sector covered by ESA.

Q2. In light of the European Commission’s recent Communication on relations between ESA and the EU(COM 2012 671), what relationship between ESA, the EU and the UK would provide the most effectivegovernance regime? Why?

5. The Royal Aeronautical Society supports excellence in the engineering and science of space. We recognisethat achieving this excellence is only affordable by having an industry that can compete in world markets,thereby amortising the cost of investment for Europe’s own programmes over a larger set of programmes.

6. The strong and multi-level relationships between Member States, ESA and industry (underpinned by theresearch community) have been the key to Europe creating and sustaining a globally competitive space industryover the past 40 years. Any new governance arrangement should retain and strengthen these links.

Q3. How effective is the EU’s support for research and innovation in the space sector? What effect havechanges to the Multi-Annual Financial Framework had on ESA and support for the space sector from theHorizon 2020 programme?

7. In hi-tech areas such as space, the best innovation often comes from a model where (a) the funding agencyacts as customer for a system or service and (b) industry decides what technical innovations to incorporate inorder to deliver the system or service. When a funding agency fulfils that role, it can then complement it byfunding specific R&D which helps to clarify its own requirements and reduce the risks associated with futuresystem or service procurements. ESA has an operational model that conforms to this, while the EU has onlyrecently begun to move in this direction.

8. The most significant role of the EU in space has been to help fund navigation and surveillance systems:EGNOS, Galileo and GMES. Initially these funds had to come from budgets that had an R&D flavour and thisresulted in delays while legal routes were found through the funding regulations. The Multi-Annual FinancialFramework puts this funding on a more sensible basis, allowing the European Commission to be the customerfor systems and services.

9. The Horizon 2020 programme retains many of the arbitrary restrictions of former Framework R&Dprogrammes, for example forcing companies to work with potential competitors in other countries. The spacepart of Horizon 2020 is therefore unlikely to be as fruitful as ESA’s equivalent R&D programme in producinginnovation that is market-oriented.

Q4. How effective has the UK Space Agency been and what improvements could be made? Is the UKeffectively exploiting opportunities for growth in the space sector or could more be done?

10. The UK Space Agency provides a one-stop shop for information about, and decisions on, UK’s publiclyfunded non-military space activities. In this respect it has replaced the separate activities of individual ResearchCouncils and other Agencies. The Royal Aeronautical Society welcomes this outcome and has benefited fromthe more coordinated nature of the information and support now available. The UK Space Agency has providedspeakers and financial support for some space-related elements of our series of lectures and conferences.

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Ev w2 Science & Technology Committee: Evidence

11. We understand that the UK Space Agency is intending to articulate a national space policy that willcover space security (military space) as well as civil/commercial space. We would welcome such a civil-military policy document since it would help us to educate our members and the public about Britain’s spaceactivities in the round. It would also help us to provide guidance to young people about the nature and directionof Britain’s space activities.

Q5. Does the UK get good value for money from its membership of ESA? How does its return on investmentcompare to other countries?

12. From the perspective of the Royal Aeronautical Society, the UK gets excellent value for money fromour membership of ESA. We therefore welcome the increase in the UK subscription to ESA announced inNovember 2012. The first major benefit (and in this we benefit more than any other ESA member countryexcept Ireland and the associate member Canada) is that the information and outreach material produced byESA is in English, and its staff can engage with the public in English.

13. The second and equally obvious benefit is that we participate in space programmes of a scale that wecould not afford by ourselves at a cost that is a fraction of what it would cost us alone—one can debate whetherthat fraction is one sixth (as per our proportion of GDP in Europe) or one fifth or one quarter, etc, but it is asmall fraction. The benefit to the UK is more than the proportional cost because we have a diverse industry inboth the upstream and downstream parts of the sector and they can extract commercial benefits in just aboutany programme that ESA undertakes—contrast this with a small European country with experience in just afew niches of the space sector, and thus will only benefit when an ESA programme involves one of thoseniches. The Royal Aeronautical Society welcomes these benefits of ESA’s programmes since the outreachbenefits that we exploit largely track those commercial benefits.

Q6. How resilient is the UK’s space-based infrastructure? Are threats from space debris or solar activitybeing appropriately mitigated? What role do, or should, ESA and the UK Space Agency play in addressingthese issues?

14. The Royal Aeronautical Society has submitted evidence to the Science & Technology Committee2010–2011 Inquiry on Scientific Advice and Evidence in Emergencies that included a discussion about therisks associated with extreme solar activity.1 We drew the Committee’s attention to the work of industry inevaluating the risks of this and other threats to Britain’s space infrastructure for the Centre for Protection ofNational Infrastructure (a unit in the Home Office). We pointed out that NASA’s ACE spacecraft is currentlythe only means of directly measuring material ejected by the sun before it reaches the Earth. We then notedthe initiative by Strathclyde University to define a highly innovative concept to place a space probe even closerto the sun than ACE. The result would be a tripling of the warning time afforded by ACE, which would benefitthe operators of equipment in space and on the ground that is at risk of being damaged unless powered down.

15. As concerns space debris, the Society is actively engaged in the debate about the scale and nature of therisks and the options for action. We published an overview of the subject in the May 2012 issue of AerospaceInternational, and we will be holding a one-day conference on the topic on 2nd July 2013 at our LondonHeadquarters. We take the view that Britain’s space activities should be undertaken in accordance with bestpractice engineering and operational standards, which increasingly includes avoiding the creation of furtherspace debris and reducing the existing population of debris to below the self-sustaining level.

16. We note that the UK has unparalleled experience of monitoring space debris through the long-standingoperation of Europe’s most powerful radar at RAF Fylingdales in Yorkshire. We are encouraging the relevantUK government agencies to make as much as possible of this industrial and operational experience availableto our European colleagues, since as members of ESA we have a moral responsibility for that proportion ofthe space debris problem emanating from ESA programmes.

April 2013

Written evidence submitted by Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd (SSTL) (ESA003)

Declaration of Interest

SSTL is a prime contractor for the supply of complete satellite systems or parts of systems. SSTL makesuse of UK government investments through R&D funding sources such as those of the UKSA and TechnologyStrategy Board. SSTL is also a major supplier into the European Space Agency for a variety of projects inEarth Observation, Science, Telecommunications and Navigation. SSTL is also a major supplier to the EUGalileo programme, being responsible for the provision of 22 navigation payloads as part of the system’s “fulloperational capability” phase.

This input has been prepared by Philip Davies and reviewed by SSTL’s Group CEO Matt Perkins and BoardChairman, Prof Sir Martin Sweeting.1 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmsctech/498/498.pdf

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1. Q1 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the funding, organisation, and work of the European SpaceAgency?

2. The funding arrangements for ESA do provide long term stability of the programmes with commitmentstypically made by the member states for three to five years into the future.

3. The pan-European nature of the funding does provide a sufficient level of funding for Europe to be self-reliant in space with all key technologies available in Europe.

4. ESA’s industrial policy—particularly the aspects about “juste retour” to the member states has the benefitthat it encourages all nations to invest in ESA but with the downside that it often leads to anti-competitivepractices (eg bolstering inefficient organisations/companies) which can, in certain cases, hamper Europeancompetitiveness on the global commercial market. As a minimum measure the “juste retour” constraints needto be spread across programmes rather than flowed down to each individual programme.

5. The “stovepiping” of the ESA funding leaves ESA with too little flexibility over how its overall budgetis allocated to its different activities.

6. ESA’s organisation is very bureaucratic and this leads to a large proportion of the overall ESA budgetbeing used to fund ESA rather than being available to industry and academia outside. Typically 20% of theoverall budget is allocated to ESA’s internal activities. This can partly be explained by looking back historicallyto when ESA was a young organisation and was required to be able to “help” the nascent space industry. Inthis day and age where industry is now mature this policy needs to be reviewed as ESA could act as a “lightertouch” procurement agency.

7. The governance of ESA is very bureaucratic. It could be argued that the member states get too involvedin the detail of ESA’s activities.

8. The extremely thorough working methods of the agency, whilst leading to a very high mission successrate, have the downside that they impose a huge amount of additional work on the suppliers with consequentimpacts on price and schedules. More flexibility is needed, particularly at the lower end of ESA’s programmes.

9. Q2. In light of the European Commission’s recent Communication on relations between ESA and the EU(COM 2012 671), what relationship between ESA, the EU and the UK would provide the most effectivegovernance regime? Why?

10. To answer this question one must look at the respective roles of the three organisations. ESA is a pan-European R&D organisation whereas the EU and UK have a broader interest in the use of space to benefit theEuropean citizen. Any governance regime must acknowledge those different roles and the tensions within egan R&D organisation will want to push technology forward whereas an operational organisation will be morefocused on minimising costs and schedules. The model that has worked well in Galileo is that where the EUgathers requirements and uses ESA as the procurement agency to procure a system that meets the EU’srequirements.

11. Q3. How effective is the EU’s support for research and innovation in the space sector? What effect havechanges to the Multi-Annual Financial Framework had on ESA and support for the space sector from theHorizon 2020 programme?

12. The EU’s framework programmes are too slow and cumbersome to be useful on many aspects of R&D—it typically takes 12–24 months between coming up with an idea and starting a FP7 project. Combiningthis with the artificial need to involve several countries is not a fruitful way of producing competitivecommercial products.

13. Inclusion of GMES in MAFF is a good thing—it finally brings some stability to the funding for GMES.

14. Q4. How effective has the UK Space Agency been and what improvements could be made? Is the UKeffectively exploiting opportunities for growth in the space sector or could more be done?

15. The UK space agency generally performs well and is usually supportive of industry but is often hamperedin what it can achieve by the fact that most of its funding is committed to be spent via ESA. The UK standsout as somewhat of anomaly amongst the “big 4” European space faring nations. In contrast with France,Germany and Italy, who all have a large national programme as well as being major contributors to ESA, theUK has a relatively small national programme. France, Germany and Italy use their national programmes to(a) implement small missions of national importance, (b) develop technologies applicable to both ESA andcommercial activities and (c) as a means of fostering international collaboration through bilateral missions withother nations.

16. On the subject of bilateral missions the UK is regularly approached by other nations who would like towork with the UK on a “no exchange of funds” basis but as the UK does not have any significant fundingavailable for these activities they generally come to nothing in the end. As en example France approached theUK for two activities in the last decade and these were eventually done by France in collaboration with Indiaand Israel.



17. Q5. Does the UK get good value for money from its membership of ESA? How does its return oninvestment compare to other countries?

18. The UK gets good value from the large programmes where UK generally finances at GDP proportion(~17%) but gets full access to all mission data.

19. Q6. How resilient is the UK’s space-based infrastructure? Are threats from space debris or solar activitybeing appropriately mitigated? What role do, or should, ESA and the UK Space Agency play in addressingthese issues?

20. The situation could be improved by better “space situational awareness” using both ground-based andspace-based observation of debris, near Earth objects and space weather.

April 2013

Written evidence submitted by the College of Science and Engineering

at the University of Leicester (ESA008)

1. This evidence is a coordinated response from key departments and centres at the University of Leicesterthat have an involvement or interest in space research. These include the Department of Physics & Astronomy,the Space Research Centre, the Department of Chemistry, the Department of Engineering, the Department ofGeography and the Centre for Landscape and Climate Research. Leicester is well known as a leading universityfor space-related research. It is strongly engaged in UK government agencies, research councils andinternational space agencies. The academic and research staff who contributed to this response are: Prof MartinBarstow (Head of the College), Prof Mark Lester (Head of Physics & Astronomy), Prof George Fraser(Director, Space Research Centre), Prof Paul Monks (Department of Chemistry, Director of G-STEP) and ProfJohn Remedios (Head of Earth Observation Science).

2. Declaration of interests: The University of Leicester receives grant and contract funding from the EU,UK Space Agency and ESA to pursue its space research programme.


3. S: The use of space has become essential for a modern developed society. Key aspects of benefit to thepopulation at-large include communications, environmental monitoring, navigation and a host of other linkeduses. Membership of ESA gives the UK access to a space infrastructure together with scientific and technologydevelopment programmes that could not be maintained nationally. Without these UK industry and academiacould not remain globally competitive.

4. S: Overall, ESA has a broadly balanced programme without any one country being dominant. There area range of mandatory and optional programmes that deliver an à la carte system allowing the UK to balanceits expenditure to match its particular priorities. The UK is able to exert influence in ESA by choosing whereit invests its contribution.

5. S: The ESA science programmes in astronomy, solar system science and exploration and Earth observationscience are broad based and of a quality that is competitive with the US. These programmes are essential tothe international competitiveness of UK space science. The UK could not develop large projects of its ownand, outside ESA, could only ever be a minor partner in bi-lateral opportunities.

6. S. ESA is a technical, highly capable agency which offers industry and academia excellent support indeveloping European abilities to undertake major space activities/

7. W: ESA is a complex organisation and, inevitably, management processes and decisions can becomepolitical. The priorities of members can be in conflict. In particular, some of the larger countries may havenational projects and technical capabilities that they wish to protect. Large programmes such as launchers maydominate some ministerials, which is not always desirable for UK interests.

8. W: While the ESA science programme is generally excellent, it does not appear to be as flexible indeveloping new opportunities as that of NASA (eg recent Earth Venture program). Its cost effectiveness mayalso be questionable. Although it is difficult to compare costs directly with NASA, there is an impression thatsimilar size projects cost more within the ESA system. Improved efficiency of management and implementationof ESA missions could allow more activity within the current funding envelope.


9. There is a conflict between programme delivery and regulation. The latter is the area where the EU canbe most effective, but drawing in ESA as a part of the EU is likely to decrease efficiency of the R&D effortand delivery of the space missions by diminishing the input from the national space agencies that oversee their



space programmes and fund associated instrument development and construction. The agencies provide directand positive links to the user community (particularly in the case of UKSA) through their advisory bodies.This important element would be lost in a more centralised “ownership” of ESA by the EU.

10. It must be noted that there are member states of the EU which are not members of ESA and significantplayers in the ESA context (ie Switzerland and Norway; Canada, as an associate member) which are outsidethe EU. This may be a significant obstacle to common governance,


11. The EU’s support for space research and innovation has been significant for those sectors identified aspriorities (GMES, Earth Observation, Integrated Applications, Exploration..) but it has had little impact onareas such as space astronomy and solar system science and exploration.

12. The EU support is less likely to be long-term strategic, which is vital in the space sector, and continuousevolution of EU staff means less ability to implement programmes at the necessary speed and with technicalunderstanding.

13. The Horizon 2020 programme has increased support for space but it required a great deal of activity toensure the EU signed up to major space elements such as GMES.


14. The creation of the UK Space Agency has been of great importance in re-establishing the UK as a space-oriented nation. Prior to this UK input into Ministerial and Agency meeting was quite weak. The authorityvested in the Minister at the November 2012 ESA Council of Ministers gave him a better platform to negotiateUK’s part in the future programmes that were decided. It also helped that the UK stance on space is more pro-active and the importance of space to the economy (as demonstrated by the Space Innovation and GrowthStrategy) has leveraged additional support to creation of national infrastructures and to ESA programmes fromTreasury. The Agency seems to be very aware of the need to drive economic growth, but also of supportingacademic-industry interactions leading to innovation.

15. In principle, the existence of the UK Space Agency should allow a coherent national approach to spacepolicy. This should bring together institutional, defence and commercial space interest together to developnational priorities and goals. Investment in ESA and national facilities (such as the Harwell SatelliteApplications Catapult Centre) can then be better exploited. There is a continuing need for the agency to developfurther leadership particularly in developing and driving UK priorities into ESA.

16. The creation of the agency has removed significant responsibility for space research from the Scienceand Technology Facilities Council and Natural Environment Research Council. As the Agency operates underdifferent rules the relationship between provision of research facilities (funded by the agency) and theirexploitation (funded by STFC, NERC) needs to be carefully monitored. This “dual key” approach may giverise to problems of continuity of funding of satellite experiments as responsibility passes from STFC to UKSAand back to STFC as a mission develops. There may also be an inevitable tension between science prioritiesas judged by STFC, NERC and operational priorities as judged by UKSA. There is a requirement for betterdefinition of the dual-key mechanism.

17. The existence of the Agency should allow the possibility of greater flexibility in developing bilateralcooperation with other national agencies. However, in reality the level of funding provided only services thecommitments to ESA and does not currently allow developments outside ESA projects. There needs to be abalance between support for ESA projects and bi-lateral opportunities. The lack of a bilateral funding lineinhibits engagement with the space programmes of the USA China, Brazil and India. Overall the Agency’sportfolio and budget is probably under-strength,a natural consequence of being a new agency.


18. The scale of the ESA programmes from which the UK benefits could not be afforded by the UK alone.Therefore, in this respect, the UK gets good value for money from our membership of ESA. Nevertheless,there are inefficiencies in the way ESA provides facilities that could be removed to increase the overall value.

19. The return the UK gets from it ESA membership is heavily dependent on the availability of funds toprovide instrumentation for space missions and then for scientific exploitation. There is a critical risk ofimbalance as rising direct contributions to ESA are not necessarily matched by appropriate funding to theAgency and Research Councils.




20. Currently there seems to be a lack of clear leadership on space situational awareness in terms of wherethese activities should be focussed. There is an inevitable mix of civil, defence and science interests, whichmay be difficult to balance. The UKSA, however, needs to take a proactive role in bringing together ways inwhich all risks from space debris and/or solar activity can be mitigated, remembering that these can impactground based as well as space based assets.

April 2013

Written evidence submitted by the National Oceanography Centre (ESA010)

Declaration of Interests

The National Oceanography Centre (NOC)2 is a research centre wholly owned by the Natural EnvironmentResearch Council (NERC).3 NOC undertakes integrated ocean research and technology development fromthe coast to the deep ocean. The Satellite Oceanography group at NOC (NOC-SO) delivers fundamental globalearth observation ocean research, and consultancy and training in ocean remote sensing techniques to monitorthe ocean, shelf seas and coastal regions. NOC-SO is actively engaged with the European Space Agency, whichis a major funder of the NOC-SO activities in the form of contracts. NOC-SO has developed close relationshipswith key stakeholders in the space sector, particularly in the UK with companies such as SSTL and Astrium.NOC’s position within academic research and its long-term strategic outlook allows it to define and developnew satellite missions, sensors and Earth Observation products that address the needs of operational users,enhance the international competitive advantage of the UK space industry and are of benefit to science.

1. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the funding, organisation, and work of the European SpaceAgency?

1.1 ESA is a major funder of research and development (R&D) in Earth Observation, mainly throughcontracts awarded after open competitive tendering across its member states. ESA’s tendered work is clearlytied to the overall scientific objectives outlined in ESA’s well publicized and regularly updated strategy, whichaccounts for latest technical advances and awareness of the evolving needs of its users. Contracts are closelysupervised by highly qualified technical officers from ESA and characterised by a clear set of deliverables tobe produced within a usually tight schedule.

1.2 Despite tough demands and relatively small budgets (typically <500,000 Euros), ESA R&D contractsare prestigious and sought-after, as they produce well-focused cutting edge research on technically challengingtopics and promote the development of new capability, which itself often leads to further funding opportunities.

1.3 ESA is also one of very few funding bodies that will support all partners, academic and industrial alike,at 100% funding level. This promotes real working partnerships and the development of long-term relationshipsbetween academia and industry. It also provides the means to collaborate with partners in other Europeancountries by way of small project teams, without the heavy administrative burden imposed by current EUfunding schemes (eg FP7).

2. In light of the European Commission’s recent Communication on relations between ESA and the EU (COM2012 671), what relationship between ESA, the EU and the UK would provide the most effective governanceregime? Why?

2.1 NOC is not in a position to comment on the most effective governance between ESA, EU and UK.

2.2 However, the “rapprochement” of ESA towards the EU that is proposed by the European Commissiondoes not seem desirable, since it will undoubtedly disrupt ESA’s ability to deliver as a “world-class organizationthat deserves credit for European successes in the space field over the last decades”, a fact that is recognisedby the Commission itself.

2.3 While investments in ESA have led to major successes and the development of a strong, internationallycompetitive European space sector, the scientific and economic returns on the large investments made in EUscience programs are arguably less clear. ESA’s funding of space R&D shows detailed understanding of thescientific drivers and industrial capability in Europe, leading to well-focussed projects. In contrast, the EUfunds mainly large projects, selected after grading by non-specialist anonymous peer-reviewers, wheresignificant resources are diverted away from research to deal with the EU’s bureaucratic demands and unwieldymanagement tools.2 www.noc.ac.uk3 www.nerc.ac.uk



2.4 In addition, whereas there are clear established channels for the UK to make its voice heard within ESA,the ways to influence the EU are more opaque and drawn-out and may result in a loss of influence in decisionsrelevant to the interests of the UK space sector.

3. How effective is the EU’s support for research and innovation in the space sector? What effect havechanges to the Multi-Annual Financial Framework had on ESA and support for the space sector from theHorizon 2020 programme?

3.1 NOC is not in a position to comment on the impact of changes to the Multi-Annual Financial Frameworkon ESA and support from Horizon 2020.

3.2 Projects funded so far under the Commission’s FP7 Space calls do not generally support new R&D inthe space sector but tend to exploit opportunities arising from previous investments by ESA. EU funded spaceprojects are mainly concerned with facilitating access to established Earth Observation (EO) data products, orwith the exploitation of existing EO products for societal and economic benefits.

3.3 There is no or little EU investment in designing/building new space instrumentation, developing newalgorithms and products, or in validation and quality control of EO products. The latter are areas of researchthat score badly in competitive science assessment systems (including those in the UK) and are thuspredominantly funded by ESA. Yet, these activities are essential to bridge the gap between two end points—development of satellite missions and sensors on the one hand, and the downstream exploitation of establishedEO products for environmental science, operational monitoring and commercial services.

4. How effective has the UK Space Agency been and what improvements could be made? Is the UKeffectively exploiting opportunities for growth in the space sector or could more be done?

4.1 NOC welcomed the increased UK contribution to the ESA budget at the last ministerial meeting in 2012.This visible commitment by the UK to space sent a strong message across Europe and immediately opened upnew opportunities for the UK to benefit from its investments in ESA.

4.2 NOC also welcomed the establishment of the UK Space Agency (UKSA) as the means of providingnational focus and coordination of space activities. There is, however, much room for improvement, inparticular regarding UKSA’s detachment and inaccessibility from the UK space community. While werecognize that UKSA is currently undergoing management changes, we can only hope that these changes willaddress the shortcomings of its operations so far. The main issues with UKSA are as follows:

4.2.1 Insufficient scientific or technical awareness by UKSA representatives attending important officialmeetings (eg ESA PBEO4 and GMES5). This contrasts with other European countries whose representativeshave enough scientific understanding to grasp the nature and relevance of issues being discussed.

4.2.2 Poor communication with the UK space community of UK strategic interests and priorities. Forexample, little is known about the motivation for the UK’s increased contribution to ESA, or about which ESAprograms are seen as UK high or low priorities.

4.2.3 No transparency about the interactions between UKSA and other UK agencies with interests in spaceand Earth Observation, eg NERC, National Centre for Earth Observation, Centre for Earth ObservationInstrumentation, DEFRA, Met Office, etc. These interactions are the main routes to ensure integration of spaceactivities within the UK. Yet there are no visible signs of their effectiveness, or even of their existence. Animportant example relates to the UK position of the funding of Jason-CS to ensure continuity of high-precisiontime series of sea level measurements from satellite altimeters.

4.2.4 It is important that the respective responsibilities of UKSA and NERC to support research that bridgesthe gap between technology development, science advance and exploitation are clarified. The UK needs toavoid the situation where academics who engage with the private sector to develop and validate new missions,sensors and products are seen by NERC as falling under the remit of UKSA, and by UKSA as falling underthe remit of NERC. The ambiguity about who funds such important inter-disciplinary research is likely tooriginate from tight budgetary conditions both in NERC and UKSA.

4.2.5 With the exception of the small but very successful Centre for Earth Observation Instrumentation, therehas been little opportunity in the UK in recent years for open competitive tendering for research relatingspecifically to space and Earth Observation. The Harwell ISIC6 and Space Catapult initiatives are likely topresent such opportunities in future but it remains unclear (after more than 2 years since they were set up) howacademic and industrial players can best engage with these, and what form these opportunities will take.5. Does the UK get good value for money from its membership of ESA? How does its return on investmentcompare to other countries?

5.1 The UK geo-return within ESA is now close to 1, meaning that we receive most of our investments intoESA back in the form of contracts. This is a substantial improvement from the situation just a few years ago.4 PBEO = ESA Earth Observation Programme Board5 GMES = Global Monitoring for Environment and Security6 ISIC = International Space Innovation Centre



5.2 With limited UK funding for Earth Observation in recent years, ESA has provided a lifeline for manyEarth Observation scientists in the UK and contributed to the development of long-term partnerships betweenUK academia and industry. Participation in ESA programs contributed to new scientific and industrial capabilityin the UK space sector, which now gives the UK a competitive edge in relation to new opportunities withinESA (eg Earth Explorer 9) and elsewhere (eg SSTL’s7 involvement in the NASA CYGNSS and NSPO8/NOAA9 FORMOSAT-7/COSMIC-2 missions).

6. How resilient is the UK’s space-based infrastructure? Are threats from space debris or solar activity beingappropriately mitigated? What role do, or should, ESA and the UK Space Agency play in addressing theseissues?

6.1 NOC is not in a position to comment on the resilience of the UK space-based infrastructure, or the threatto space debris or solar activity.

April 2013

Written evidence submitted by Professor Michael Sheehan (ESA012)

How resilient is the UK’s space-based infrastructure? Are threats from space debris or solar activity beingappropriately mitigated? What role do, or should, ESA and the UK Space Agency play in addressing theseissues?

1. UK space-based infrastructure is highly vulnerable to disruptions caused by debris collisions and spaceweather events.

2. Unexpected loss of satellite capabilities can have major humanitarian impact. In the UK, applications ofone satellite system, the GPS position, navigation and timing network include for example, “transport,agriculture, fisheries, law enforcement, highways management, services for vulnerable people, energyproduction and management, surveying, dredging, health services, financial services, information services,cartography, safety monitoring, scientific and environmental services, search and rescue, tracking vehicles andvaluable or hazardous cargoes and quantum cryptography”.10

3. Satellite loss also has military implications for the UK. In 2009 the inactive Cosmos 2251 satellite collidedwith an active satellite from the Iridium constellation. The UK uses Iridium for communications purposes andthe 2009 collision caused a 36 hour loss of capability for NATO forces operating in Afghanistan, when the gapin the network was over the ISAS operating area. The UK’s NATO allies France and Germany have hadto carry out collision avoidance manoeuvres with their SAR-Lupe radar reconnaissance and Helios opticalreconnaissance satellites in recent years to avoid collision with space debris. The defence element is alsoimportant in that while there are existing military assets that can contribute to addressing the space debrisproblem, such as the French GRAVES system and RAF Fylingdales, these are military capabilities that haveprotocols that may make it problematic to simply integrate them in an overall European capability.

4. As a geographical region, space can be thought of in terms of “environmental security” reflected in theconcept of “space sustainability”, that is, the ability of the space environment to continue to be a place wherespace activities can be successfully conducted. It fits into a broad “human security” approach to space, it drawsattention to the crucial issue of the long-term management and use of space, and it links the military, scientificand economic dimensions of space security.

5. Although space is effectively infinite in geographical terms, in the current era, the areas of space used byhumans are fairly limited and overwhelmingly dominated by activities in Earth orbit. With more states andcompanies launching satellites the environment is becoming increasingly crowded, particularly at 36,000kilometres in the Geosynchronous Earth Orbit, (GEO). Because of this orbital overcrowding can exist and thus,despite its size, space is for practical human purposes a “limited resource”, and surprisingly, a resource thatcan be “damaged” (at least temporarily), by its users, in the sense of debris or frequency interference preventinga satellite from operating normally. Orbital slots in the most popular orbits, and optimum frequencies forsatellite communication are in relatively limited supply. There are therefore resource issues in effect.

6. The debris issue is extremely problematic. While it is now a standard practice to de-orbit satellites at theend of their useful life, huge numbers of objects remain in orbit from earlier space missions and previouscollisions. There are nearly 12,000 pieces of space debris 10cm or larger being tracked by NASA. Because ofthe extremely high speeds that objects in orbit possess, even comparatively small pieces have very high impactvelocities. A fragment as small as a micron can damage sensitive optics, while a piece as large as a centimetrecan cause serious damage or even destroy a satellite. There are an estimated 300,000 smaller objects in orbitthat are too small to track, but are large enough to cause damage.7 SSTL = Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd8 NSPO = National Space Organisation of Taiwan9 NOAA—National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration USA10 Royal Academy of Engineering, Global Navigation Space Systems: Reliance and Vulnerabilities, (London, Royal Academy of

Engineering, 2011), p. 13.



7. According to the “Kessler Syndrome” theory, a limited number of future collisions by producing morefragments which in turn collide with other objects, could cause a disastrous cascading effect of debris in LowEarth Orbit, which has the potential to render the obit effectively unusable. NASA’s chief scientist for orbitaldebris has argued that the Kessler effect is inevitable unless urgent steps are taken to remove the debris.

8. The term “space debris” currently lacks an internationally agreed upon and legally binding internationaldefinition.

9. The debris issue requires the ability to “predict and protect”. In order to successfully address the debrisissue two capabilities are required, firstly the ability to locate and track debris and secondly the ability toremove it from orbit.

10. A critical capability required to address the debris issue is the capacity to detect and track debris andother objects in space, a resource known as Space Situational Awareness, (SSA). The European Space Agencyand EU have an SSA system under development. European SSA will initially draw on existing assets andcoordinate their capabilities. It is proposed to be supplemented in the future by new infrastructure, though onlymodest progress on this has so far occurred. It is currently being implemented as an optional ESA programme.49.65 million Euro’s for the initial programme were authorised by the ESA Ministerial Council in November2008. The programme formally began in January 2009 and aims at attainment of a full European SSA capabilityby 2020.

11. ESA’s initial SSA program is designed to provide a design for the overall system structure, to definepolicies relating to governance and data, establish data management centres and to introduce precursor servicesbased on currently existing European capabilities. Thirteen ESA member states, including the UK, participatedin the initial SSA programme. The EU was given the status of observer in the programme.

12. As part of this programme ESA funded a number of studies, including the Proof of Concept for EnablingTechnologies for Space Surveillance (Contract number 21270/07/NL/ST, prime contractor Onera, and contractnumber 21399/08/NL/ST, prime contractor EADS Astrium). There were also a large number of researchcontracts implemented under the SSA element of the European Space Agency’s GSTP4 programme. Theseincluded studies on; Definition of Ground Segment for a UHF Radar for the European SSA System, SSA Radarand Optical Sensor Data Fusion for Orbit Determination of GTO and GEO Objects, Large Aperture WideAngle Optical System for Debris Mapping, Space Based Survey Tracking Telescope, Space Based ImagingTelescope, Dutch Open Telescope Upgrade, X-Ray Solar Imager, H-Alpha Solar Telescope Network, NextGeneration Micro Debris and Meteoroid Analyser Prototype, High Performance Distributed Solar Imaging andProcessing Prototype, Next Generation Space Environment Information System, Distributed EnvironmentalData-Driven Analysis System, Virtual Space Weather Modelling System and the Prototype Compact WideAngle Coronograph for SSA.

13. ESA’s technology investigation programmes for SSA reflected the broader policy related capabilitypreparatory programme sought by the ESA PB-SSA (2009)6 document and the European Union’s EC FP7Cooperation Theme “Space” Work Programme of 30 July 2009.

14. These included ESA research on Development of SSA Standardisation, Customer Requirements forSpace Surveillance, Customer Requirements for Space Weather and NEO’s, System Requirements for SpaceSurveillance, System Requirements for Space Weather and NEO’s, Overall Architectural Design for EuropeanSSA System, Use and Augmentation for Existing Operational Software, Data Centres Systems Optimisation,Mapping SSA Services with CCSDS Architecture, Analysis of Formats for Orbital Data Products, PhasedArray Digital Beam Forming, Optimisation of Radar Processing Techniques, Wide Eye Telescopes, TaskingStrategies for Ground-Based SSA Telescopes, Space-Based Telescopes (Initial Analysis), Analysis andEvaluation of National Assets, Preparation of Precursor Services for Space Surveillance, Selection of RadarSite and Frequency Coordination, Preparation of the Radar Site Infrastructure, and Configuration of the ESASpace Debris Telescope.

15. It can be seen from the above that the ESA has been actively engaged in a programme designed toidentify the SSA assets Europe already possesses and the elements needed to fill the gaps and acquire a fullSSA capability by the target date of 2020.

16. There is a clear need for debris remediation efforts to begin the gradual removal of the larger debrisobjects from orbit. The UK currently has no national policy on this issue, but is associated with ESA policies.

17. The ESA itself has become responsible for a major potential space debris problem because of the failureto de-orbit the large Envisat satellite before it ceased functioning. Because it chose to continue operatingEnvisat until there was insufficient fuel to de-orbit it, the 26 metre wide, 8,000 kilogram object now posesmajor dangers. ESA has been clearly negligent on this issue. The UK has announced its willingness to play anactive part in ESA remediation measures associated with the Envisat satellite.

18. UK industry has begun to propose technology systems that could address the issue, for example the“space harpoon” system proposed by Dr Jaime Reed of Astrium UK which has been tested at the prototypestage at the Stevenage facility. Astrium is investigating alternative debris mitigation technologies at its Frenchand German sites.



19. It is also relevant that the EU draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities sets out debris mitigationguidelines. The EU’s FP7 research call in 2010 allocated 18 million Euro’s to studies on (i) Security of spaceassets from space weather events and (ii) Security of space assets from on-orbit collisions.

20. The EU will have to develop the governance model that eventually integrates European SSA assets.

21. Space weather effects also threaten UK space capability and have wider potential for humanitarianimpact. Space weather, charged particles and magnetic fields ejected from the sun, can cause significantdisruptions to satellites, ranging from temporary interference with on-board systems to complete failure,particularly for satellites operating in geostationary earth orbit. Solar flares deliver x-rays, ultraviolet rays andgamma radiation which can interfere with radar and telecommunications and produce radio interference. Theloss of the Galaxy 15 satellite in 2010 was attributed to the effects of a high-energy solar flare.

22. The sun also discharges solar proton events which have been shown to have a wide variety of impactson human security including “satellite disorientation, spacecraft electronics damage, spacecraft solar paneldegradation, extreme radiation hazard to astronauts, launch payload failure, high altitude aircraft radiation,shortwave radio fades, ozone layer depletion, cardiac arrest, dementia and cancer”.11

23. Space storms can also heat up the Earth’s atmosphere, causing it to expand and increase the drag onsatellites operating in low orbits, thereby shortening their lifetime. Major space weather episodes can alsopump up the radiation in the Van Allen belts by as much as 10,000 times their normal levels, damagingelectronic components on board satellites. In 2011 the UK added space weather to its national risk register.

24. ESA have also funded a program of research into technologies capable of addressing the space weatherthreat. These included studies on; Analysis and Evaluation of Existing SWE Assets, Implementation Design ofSpace Weather Instruments, Definition and Detailed Design of Space Weather Services Prototypes.

25. In relation to the threats to satellites the above ESA programme also included studies on mitigationtechnologies for the threats posed by natural orbiting Near Earth Objects, (NEO’s). These included studies of;Analysis and Evaluation of Existing NEO’s Assets, Implementation Design of NEO’s Detectors, Definition andDetailed design of NEO’s Services Prototypes, and Preparation for the Delivery of Precursor Services in theArea of NEO’s.

26. ESA research in the areas of debris and space weather is complemented by the research being carriedout under the EU’s FP7 Programme. The EU programme followed discussions with ESA designed to avoidunnecessary overlap of activity.

27. EU funded research has focussed on; early warning and forecasting methods to enable mitigation ofspace weather effects on space technologies, efforts to develop countermeasures against harmful space weathereffects on humans, and development of models to improve prediction capabilities.

28. Projects directed at the space debris issue have focussed on developing satellite constellation architecturesthat allow redundancy of capability and individual satellite design changes that would make it less likely thata collision that only damaged part of the satellite would affect the whole system.

29. The European Defence Agency, EDA has also being doing preparatory work on defence requirementsrelated to SSA capabilities and has adopted a list of requirements designed to reduce the chances of collisionswith European military satellites in Low Earth Orbit.

30. The European Union has now taken over the lead role on SSA issues. This is appropriate given thegovernance issues involved. In practice, harmonisation is often facilitated by the “double hatting” of keyindividuals. For example Professor Richard Crowther of the UK Space Agency is both the UK representativeon the UN interagency committee addressing the space debris issue, and the UK representative on ESA’sInternational Relations Committee.

31. Overall, ESA has played an important and effective role in addressing the space debris and space weatherissues by identifying existing capabilities and the missing capabilities needed to acquire an effective SSAarchitecture. However, phase 2 of the programme to achieve 2020 capability requires high level politicalsupport from EU heads of government and commitment of funding to ESA and national space organisationsto develop and deploy the necessary technologies. Similar political and financial support is needed for the evenmore difficult task of developing debris mitigation technologies acceptable to the international community.

Declaration of Interests.

Professor Michael Sheehan is Professor of International Relations at Swansea University. He has no personal,financial, or other conflicting interests in ESA, EU or UKSA .

April 2013

11 James A. Marusek, Solar Storm Threat Analysis, (Bloomington, Indiana, Impact, 2007), at http://www.breadandbutterscience.com/SSTA.pdf, p. 3.



Written evidence submitted by Unite (ESA017)

This response is submitted by Unite the Union. Unite is the UK’s largest trade union with 1.5 millionmembers employed across the private and public sectors. Unite members work in a range of industries includingmanufacturing, financial services, print, media, construction, transport and local government, education, healthand not for profit sectors.

The industry is an economic success story contributing £9.1 billion to the UK economy and employing29,000 people. At a time when our manufacturing base is under threat we must do all we can to retain andgrow industries such as Space.

The Space industry in the UK is one of the fastest growing industrial sectors. Space services and applicationsare crucial to the strategic economic development of commercial, security and military Space systems. TheUK is a global leader in space-related innovation and research and development. Because of this evolutionsome of the most profitable and technologically advanced enterprises in the world are based in the UK.

As well as being a substantial generator of economic activity in its own right, the sector also stimulatesGDP and employment throughout the rest of the economy. The sector currently employs around 29,000 peopleand with planned investment in the sector could increase employment levels to 100,000 people.12

In addition to the economic impact of the industry, space is making an increasingly important contributionto social policy and engagement in the form of the UK’s vital contribution to satellite technology and thegreater access to free or low cost broadband for UK citizens.

This is a key plank in achieving Lisbon Treaty objectives of a smart, sustainable and inclusive economy,providing highly skilled jobs, boosting innovation and increasing technological R&D.

Unite welcomes the UK government announcement of investment of £1.2 billion into some of Europe’sbiggest space projects through the UK Space Agency, a 25% increase in investment in the European SpaceAgency (ESA). However, Unite would be concerned if this amount of investment into ESA did not transmitinto significant space projects and an increase in space related jobs.

Unite believes the UK could have a much stronger role in ESA. We believe this could be achieved byensuring there is at least one UK director at ESA encouraging a more pro-active approach to supporting UKindustrial priorities.

The long term nature of technological R&D in the space industry means that government investment iscrucial especially for SMEs and those micro companies that often drive R&D and innovation. R&D isincredibly important as an enabler for economic growth and encourages the industry to remain competitive andexploit any competitive advantage.

Unite believes the formation of the UK Space Agency is of vital importance to the progression and growthof the space industry in the UK. The last government’s commitment to supporting and investing in the industrywas very welcome and the result of that commitment is a space agency with its own budget and a clear roleto aid the advancement of the sector globally.

In conclusion, Unite believes it is vital for government to put in place the essential elements needed topromote growth. These include; funding and support to enable innovation and research and development toflourish. Financial investment for science based training and degree programmes, investment in technologicalinventions which may need seed capital to allow growth. And, most importantly to ensure that the UK educationsystem is fully funded and fit for purpose. Young people are the inventors, engineers and technicians of thefuture. Without a challenging and holistic education system the UK will lose out to emerging economies suchas India and China.

April 2013

Written evidence submitted by Royal Academy of Engineering (ESA018)

Introduction

The Royal Academy of Engineering is pleased to submit evidence to the House of Commons Science andTechnology Select Committee inquiry into the European and UK Space Agencies. This response has beenprepared following consultation with a number of our Fellows with expertise in this area, both in industryand academia.

Key points:

— There is great potential for space related SMEs to increase innovation and growth in the spacesector. This should be exploited by making the European Space Agency (ESA) funding processmore accessible to SMEs and directing certain ESA funding programmes towards smallerenterprises.

12 CBI—How the UK’s space industry is aiming for the stars



— The UK national space programme, in contrast to the other “big 4” European space sectornations (France, Germany and Italy), is relatively small. Increasing the size of the current UKnational space programme should secure more available funding for the following purposes:

— to implement small missions of national importance;

— to develop technologies applicable to both ESA and commercial activities; and

— as a means of fostering international collaboration through bilateral missions with othernations.

— To address the issue concerning the resilience of UK space-based infrastructure and threatsfrom solar activities, the Academy directs the committee to its 2013 report titled Extreme spaceweather: impacts on engineered systems and infrastructure.13 Focusing on the UK, it assessesthe resilience to space weather events of a variety of engineered systems and identifies ways toprepare for and mitigate such events. The report outlines the Academy’s key recommendations.


ESA funding: strengths

— The funding arrangements of ESA provide long term stability for programmes withcommitments typically made by the member states for three to five years into the future.

— The total ESA funding across Europe is at a level to allow the region to be self-reliant in spacedevelopments with all key technologies being available within Europe.

— ESA’s industrial policy (particularly the aspects about “juste retour” to the member states) hasthe benefit of encouraging all nations to invest in ESA.

ESA funding: weaknesses

— ESA’s industrial policy can lead to anti-competitive practices, for example bolstering inefficientorganisations or companies, which can, in certain cases, hamper European competitiveness onthe global commercial market. As a possible measure, the “juste retour” constraints could bespread across programmes rather than flowed down to each individual programme. In addition,the “stovepiping” of ESA funding often leaves it with little flexibility over how the overallbudget is allocated into its different activities.

— ESA is known to provide very significant sums for a few large scale enterprises. Innovativesmall enterprises are less likely to receive funding.

— SMEs are unlikely to seriously attempt to gain ESA funding. It is rare for an SME to have theeffort available to pursue ESA funding, with academics being more likely to have the resourcesto develop a bid. Expertise and experience of bidding to ESA are key ingredients for fundingsuccess, resulting in the majority of potential users and SMEs not attempting to apply forfunding.

Whilst ESA has been effective in funding academics, the UK is currently a hub of innovative, small space-related companies and SMEs that are not yet supported by ESA. It is well known that growth can stem fromSMEs; therefore, it is recommended that ESA should consider directing funding to SMEs working in the spacesector. Directing funding to SMEs may be easier if operated independently within the UK rather than via ESA.

ESA organisation and work: strengths

— ESA operational methods are very detailed. However, while this leads to a very high missionsuccess rate, it has the downside of imposing a large amount of additional work on supplierswith consequent impacts on price and schedules. More flexibility is needed, particularly at thelower end of ESA’s programmes.

ESA organisation and work: weaknesses

— The organisation of ESA is very bureaucratic. This leads to a large proportion of the overallESA budget being used to fund itself rather than being available to outside industry andacademia. It has been suggested that 20% of the overall ESA budget is allocated to itsoperational activities. This can perhaps be partly explained by ESA’s history, when as a youngorganisation it was required to help develop the nascent space industry. Now, where the spaceindustry is mature, this policy needs to be reviewed, perhaps to move ESA towards acting as a“lighter touch” procurement agency.

— The governance of ESA is also very bureaucratic, with member states closely involved in thedetail of ESA’s activities.

13 Extreme space weather: impacts on engineered systems and infrastructureA report reviewing the impacts of space weather on engineered systems and infrastructure (February 2013)



2. In light of the European Commission’s recent Communication on relations between ESA and the EU (COM2012 671), what relationship between ESA, the EU and the UK would provide the most effective governanceregime? Why?

The appropriate relationship depends on the respective roles of ESA, EU and UK. ESA is a pan-Europeanresearch and development (R&D) organisation whereas the EU and UK have a broader interest in the use ofspace to benefit the European citizen. Any governance regime must acknowledge these differing roles and thetensions between them, for example an R&D organisation is likely to aim to drive technology forward whereasan operational organisation will focus more on minimising costs and schedules.

A model that has worked well in the past, such as for Galileo, is where the EU gathers requirements andutilises ESA as the procurement agency to procure a system that meets EU’s requirements.

3. How effective is the EU’s support for research and innovation in the space sector? What effect havechanges to the Multi-Annual Financial Framework had on ESA and support for the space sector from theHorizon 2020 programme?

The EU’s framework programmes are somewhat slow, with the result that they fail to be useful on manyaspects of R&D. On average, it takes 12–24 months between coming up with a concept and starting a FP7project. Combining this with the need to involve several countries means that the programmes are not the bestway of producing competitive commercial products.

Inclusion of the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) in Multi-Annual FinancialFramework (MAFF) is welcomed and will bring stability to the funding for the GMES.

We would like to highlight again the potential of SMEs to increase innovation in the space sector, whichwould benefit greatly from more direct EU and ESA support.

4. How effective has the UK Space Agency been and what improvements could be made? Is the UKeffectively exploiting opportunities for growth in the space sector or could more be done?

The UK space agency generally performs well and is supportive of industry; however, its achievements areoften hampered because the majority of its funding is committed to being spent via ESA. The UK stands outas an anomaly amongst the “big 4” European space sector nations. In contrast with France, Germany and Italy,who all have a large national programme as well as being major contributors to ESA, the UK has a relativelysmall national programme. France, Germany and Italy use their large national programmes:

— to implement small missions of national importance;

— to develop technologies applicable to both ESA and commercial activities; and

— as a means of fostering international collaboration through bilateral missions with other nations.

The UK is regularly approached by other nations to undertake bilateral missions on a “no exchange of funds”basis. Presently, the UK does not have significant funding available for these activities, preventing the UK fromtaking part in more international collaborations. It is recommended that increasing the size of and improving thecurrent UK national programme will foster more collaboration between the UK and other key nations in thespace sector.

There is an absence of a well-defined space engineering (as opposed to science) research programme in theUK universities. There is a need for a national programme and, as part of this, more low TRL academicresearch as well as high TRL SME R&D.

5. Does the UK get good value for money from its membership of ESA? How does its return on investmentcompare to other countries?

It is agreed that the UK gets good value for money from its membership of ESA for large programmeswhere the UK generally finances at GDP proportion (~17%) and gains full access to all mission data.


The Academy refers the committee to its 2013 report titled Extreme space weather: impacts on engineeredsystems and infrastructure. A summary report14 is also available.

The report identifies and explores in considerable depth the consequences of space weather events on theelectricity grid, satellites, avionics, air passengers, signals from satellite navigation systems, mobile telephonesand more. Focusing on the UK, it assesses the resilience to space weather events on a variety of engineeredsystems and identifies ways to prepare and mitigate for such events.

The study demonstrated that solar superstorms are indeed a risk to the UK’s infrastructure. With respect tosatellites and the services that depend on them, the report made the following conclusions:14 Extreme space weather: impacts on engineered systems and infrastructure (Summary report) (February 2013)



Some satellites may be exposed to environments in excess of typical specification levels, soincreasing microelectronic upset rates and creating electrostatic charging hazards. Because of themultiplicity of satellite designs in use today there is considerable uncertainty in the overall behaviourof the fleet but experience from more modest storms indicates that a degree of disruption to satelliteservices must be anticipated. Fortunately the conservative nature of spacecraft designs and theirdiversity is expected to limit the scale of the problem. Our best engineering judgement is that up to10% of satellites could experience temporary outages lasting hours to days as a result of the extremeevent, but it is unlikely that these outages will be spread evenly across the fleet since some satellitedesigns and constellations would inevitably prove more vulnerable than others. In addition, thesignificant cumulative radiation doses would be expected to cause rapid ageing of many satellites.Very old satellites might be expected to start to fail in the immediate aftermath of the storm whilenew satellites would be expected to survive the event but with higher risk thereafter from incidenceof further (more common) storm events. Consequently, after an extreme storm, all satellite ownersand operators will need to carefully evaluate the need for replacement satellites to be launched earlierthan planned in order to mitigate the risk of premature.

It highly recommends a UK Space Weather Board should be initiated within government to provide overallleadership of UK space weather activities: observations and measurements, operational services, research andrelated technology developments. In regard to the latter the board should, through its leadership, support andfacilitate the UK space sector to enable it to respond to ESA and other space environment missions.

The Academy would also like to refer the committee to its 2010 consultation response to the inquiry onScientific advice and evidence in emergencies.15 The response highlights the importance of internationalcoordination in preparing for and reacting to emergencies involving space weather events.

Space weather sensors and predictions are an international endeavour; moreover the impact of extreme solarstorms will be global. Realistically, the US will be a focus for space weather monitoring and notification asUS society and defence are highly reliant on space assets. The US electricity network is also located at a highergeomagnetic latitude than the UK system making it more susceptible to such events. ESA has the remit toprovide the civilian focus for solar storm monitoring and space weather in Europe and will develop high levellinks into the US programme.

April 2013

Written evidence submitted by the Institute of Physics (ESA020)


1. The European Space Agency (ESA) operates with a clear mission-led focus and a structure that ensuresbuy-in from nation states and other space-related organisations. As a technical, rather than political,organisation, the ESA is able to concentrate on the issues which are essential to achieving its objectives.

2. Its key strengths are its leadership and mode of governance. Through a member-based structure, the ESAis able to bring together different aspects to create a stronger whole. For example, the UK’s strength in smallsatellite production and space science enables it to contribute to these programmes within the ESA at a highlevel, and to benefit at a similar level. Within this arrangement, stability and commitment in funding throughmulti-year plans agreed with member states results in well-defined projects and measurable outcomes ofprojects and programmes. The dependence of the ESA on the funding decisions of member states could beseen as perhaps a weakness as well as a strength. But this in many ways is mitigated by strong technicalleadership within the organisation and the high-level agreement of long-term arrangements.

3. The ESA’s ability to leverage the strengths of its member agencies allows it to deal as an equal withlarger and perhaps better equipped space agencies such as a NASA and the Russian Space Agency. Theserelationships, along with the ESA arrangements with other national spaces agencies, such as the Canadian,Swiss and Norwegian agencies, also means that ESA is well-placed to offer contract services to other nations.

4. One of the drivers of the ESA’s success is its geo-return policy (juste retour) which enables the nationstates to retain a focus on their chosen areas—for example, stronger domestic industries, government prioritiesor academic strengths—confident that the ESA will reward them with equivalent value in contracts. The ESAalso enables member states access to expertise and experience not necessarily available domestically. Forexample, Belgium has no distinct “space agency”, but instead funds the ESA directly and allocates its share ofjuste retour monies to companies and sectors it feels are beneficial to its national economy. This method ofallocating funding does increase the overall cost of ESA missions but has shown success in connecting withdifferent priorities of national governments over many years.15 Scientific Advice and Evidence in Emergencies

The Royal Academy of Engineering response to the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee (September 2010)http://www.raeng.org.uk/societygov/policy/responses/pdf/Response_to_Scientific_advice_evidence_emergencies.pdf



2. In light of the European Commission’s recent Communication on relations between ESA and the EU (COM2012 671), what relationship between ESA, the EU and the UK would provide the most effective governanceregime ? Why ?

5. The relationship between the ESA and the European Commission is complex and it should be noted thatthe ESA, and European space science and technology in general, is succeeding under the current governancearrangements. For example, programmes such as the Galileo Navigation System have been successfullydeveloped and deployed though a partnership between the ESA and a number of other European and nationalagencies. Indeed, it may be that some of the current tensions could be avoided with a clearer statement on thefuture management arrangements for Galileo and the roles of the European GNSS Agency (GSA).

6. The ESA is a technical operation that operates within a narrow scope. The focus that can result from whatis essentially a single-mission agency should not be lost within an understandable enthusiasm to centralise theEuropean science landscape. While closer collaboration with other European science programmes, particularlythe Horizon 2020 programmes, will undoubtedly generate some advantages and efficiencies, this may well alsohave a cost.

7. Under the current governance arrangements, the space agencies of member states have a clear and directinfluence of the direction of the ESA. This model, combined with the recent introduction of the UK SpaceAgency (UKSA) has benefited the UK. The UK’s strength in telecommunications and small satellitetechnologies has allowed it to take a lead in this area within the ESA. The recently secured funding for theISIC in Harwell, and the decision to base new telecoms satellite monitoring headquarters in the UK is avindication of this approach16 and an illustration of the advantages to the UK of the current governancestructures.

3. How effective is the EU’s support for research and innovation in the space sector? What effect havechanges to the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) had on ESA and support for the space sector fromthe Horizon 2020 programme?

8. It is too early in the cycle of the MFF to make a clear judgement on the effects of changes to the budgetsof European space science and technology, and it should be noted that the way in which the ESA is funded—though multi-year contributions from member states directly, rather than through central EU budgeting—willinsulate it from such changes. At this stage it is possible that the proposed Horizon 2020 budget may be subjectto a significant reduction over the spending period. But even if this is avoided, it is clear that there will bechallenges ahead if European space activities are to maintain their current position. As with other internationalprojects, it should ideally be the case that the ESA budget should have long-term stability as far as possiblegiven the funding pressures on all research budgets. Its role in the global space science and technologycommunities requires that it is seen as a “reliable partner”, able to engage confidently on the timescalesscales required for launches and their longer term developments that typically take years and in and in somecases decades.

4. How effective has the UK Space Agency been and what improvements could be made ? Is the UKeffectively exploiting opportunities for growth in the space sector or could more be done ?

9. Since its establishment in 2010, the UKSA has been working to bring together many disparate fields andcultures under a single umbrella. The transition of some areas of administrative and governance functions tothe UKSA areas has not been simple or smooth, and there remains work to be done to ensure that relationshipsbetween UKSA and closely-related research councils such as STFC and NERC, and their respective academiccommunities, are maintained and strengthened.

10. However, the rationale for the creation of a UK space agency has not changed. A single focal point,nationally and internationally, will enable a more coherent space science and technology sector within the UK,and allow the UK to punch its weight with international agencies, particularly within the ESA. The recentannouncement from the ESA to locate its tele-communications hub in Harwell is a very positive sign.

11. Additionally, when talking about the ability of the UK to exploit and build on the strength of its spacesector across the broader economy, the role of the ESA and the need for a strong, central UK voice should notbe neglected. Judicious allocation of juste retour (understanding the roles of SMEs) and other intangiblebenefits, and more specifically, working to ensure that ESA’s focus is closely aligned with the sectors in whichthe UK economy has strength, will be essential.

12. The UKSA is still very much a new organisation, building on the work of the previous British NationalSpace Centre (BNSC), and the establishment of a steering group that embraces a range of larger companiesand stakeholders within the leadership function of the UKSA was a welcome development. There is a concernthat, if the UK economy is to fully benefit from the investment through both the UKSA directly, and alsothrough the ESA programmes, greater use should be made of smaller companies in the supply chains andenabling technology sectors such as photonics. While the space sector is a significant contributor to the UK16 www.heraldseries.co.uk/news/10044791.Space_centre_investment_sees_100_new_jobs



economy,17 and has been identified as one of the key technologies to bring the UK economy back to growth,such strategies should take account of these technologies and businesses. The space sector does not exist in avacuum and a strong, broad industrial base is essential to ensuring that the UK can involve itself in high-valuesupply chains.

13. As it develops, we would look to the UKSA to bridge some of the gaps that have been apparent in thepast between space technology and research. It is currently the case that, broadly, the ESA will undertaketechnical programmes while the national science agencies will take on the data analysis and research. Thisdiffers from the approach taken by, for example, NASA which will typically support both the mission and theexploitation of the data produced. There have been recent cases where UK researchers have been involved ata high level in the design and commissioning of ESA programmes, but were unable to access the results of themissions due to funding not being awarded by domestic research councils. For a split arrangement to beefficient and functional, the UKSA and the ESA must work with domestic agencies at an early stage, on theunderstanding that any UK research council funding will be awarded on a competitive, peer reviewed basis.

5. Does the UK get good value for money from its membership of ESA?

14. It is clear that the UK receives a significant proportion of what it invests in science back through ESAcontracts that support high-technology companies. This, together with the opportunities that such high-level,high-technology international collaborations bring suggests in fact that the UK receives a significant return onits investments. For example, investment through the Advanced Research in Telecommunications Systems(ARTES) has been reported to have produced returns of 7:1.18

15. As such, the questions should perhaps instead be : How does the UK’s return on investment compare tothat in other countries ? And how well does the UK steer this reciprocal investment to best grow its space-related economy ? These are areas that the committee might consider.

16. The ability of the UKSA to drive the ESA into areas where the UK has strength is important, but alsoimportant is the strength of the broader UK science and technology base, and the capability of it to “absorb”this investment. The recent strategies for the space sector have been an advantage and they are long-termventures requiring a long-term commitment from government will be required if the UK is to keep pace withEuropean competitors.


17. At the ESA ministerial council on November 2012 the UK agreed to invest £6 million in the ESA SpaceSituational Awareness programme which retains a focus on monitoring developments in space debris and spaceweather, and links closely with other national and international programmes.19 At the same meeting theprogramme’s mandate was extended to 2019.20 This was a welcome extension of the UK’s role in theprogramme. The UKSA Space Leadership Council includes members from the MOD, DfT and the BIS, and iswell placed to advise on all aspects of space weather.

April 2013

Written evidence submitted by Dr Kevin Madders (ESA021)

Profile and Declaration of Interest

1. I am a space policy consultant and visiting professor of Space Policy and Law at KU Leuven and ofInformation Society Law at King’s College London. I have been involved in space affairs for over 25 years,including several as an ESA official. I have acted as expert to the European Commission and ESA on spacepolicy formation and co-organized the European Space Policy Workshops at KU Leuven which preceded andthen reviewed the European Space Policy that was adopted in 2007. I served on the BNSC European AffairsAdvisory Board, on which I was among those calling for a UK space agency. I am the author of A New Forceat a New Frontier, which sought to unravel what had been termed the European space sector’s “intimidatingcomplexity”. The book, which includes major UK space developments, also explored governance issues, aninquiry developed in later debate (see References). Finally, I am an evaluator for EU Framework ProgrammeSpace Calls.

2. My aim with this evidence is to address what seem to me the main governance issues raised by theinquiry, not to provide an individual position on each question.17 The Impact of Space Derived Services and Data, Oxford Economics 2009 http://www.parliamentaryspacecommittee.com/media/

publications/The%20Case%20for%20Space.pdf18 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmbis/173/173.pdf19 http://news.bis.gov.uk/Press-Releases/UK-secures-1–2-billion-package-of-space-investment-683b9.aspx20 www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Operations/Space_Situational_Awareness/About_SSA



3. I declare that I both advise and contract with governmental and private entities, in particular throughSystemics Network International, of which I am managing partner. This evidence is, however, submitted in apersonal capacity. I am subject to some confidentiality constraints.

The Return of Serious UK Commitment to Space and its Implications

4. The Committee’s inquiry is very timely. Its primary focus is of course on UK interests. And those interestshave witnessed a transformation over the past decade, culminating in boosts to UK funding in ESA in 2008and 2012, the creation of the UK Space Agency, and formation of a strategic industrial and research clusterfor space around Harwell—the site since 2009 of an applications-oriented ESA Establishment. Britain is takingits place again at the top table in European space and is set to become one of the top three investors in ESAover the timeframe 2013–2018. A well-targeted contribution under ELIPS will furthermore see genuine UKparticipation in the International Space Station programme. These developments of course complement majorexisting strengths in space applications and science, while the British flair for innovation is exemplified by theReaction Engines’ Skylon project.

5.1 join many from the space community in welcoming this transformation, and I will not dwell on theperiod that preceded it. This has been covered in my own work and in others’. The focus with space is nowon innovation for growth within a wider S&T policy aimed at revamping the UK economic model. This clearlyaccords with UK long-term interests and rightly attracts good cross-party support. But the change in policycannot wipe away overnight the legacy of the partial UK disengagement from space over previous decades:The UK Space Agency remains fairly small, its proportion of funding going to ESA is high in relation to thenational programme, and, within ESA funding, it is striking that the UK,* unlike France, Germany or Italy, isnot prominent in itself thrusting one or more major R&D mission programmes forward.

6. The point here is that the UK has still much to do if it wants to complete its transformation in space andthereby reap the full rewards this expanding sector offers. The UK Parliament will have a key role in thisrespect, not only in supporting the UK Space Agency as it develops and in conducting much-needed pro-competitive reform of the Outer Space Act, but in encouraging programmes and commercial initiatives thatcan place Europe and the UK at the vanguard of space development. Skylon may come into question here, asmay entirely new prospects such as asteroid mining, so far only being targeted only by American companies.But, whatever the UK itself does, it is plain that its capacity to go it alone in space will always remain limited.It is also difficult to conceive that the UK, whatever the outcome of a referendum on EU membership, willhave much reason to change horses from the European space structures it has become so deeply embedded insince the early 1960s.

7. Against this background, it becomes vital for the UK to consolidate its own position in space within afavourable European environment. And this environment, as the Committee has realized in opening its inquiry,is changing fundamentally due to the rising importance of the EU in the space field, even before the changemade by the Lisbon Treaty that explicitly gave the EU space policy and programmatic competence and freedomto establish “appropriate relations” with ESA.

8. The consequences for each country of this change in the European space landscape are profound. But myabove remarks already indicate that the UK’s profile in ESA is not currently one that need bind its hands—adifferent situation than that of a country like Germany, which has a greater vested interest in the ESA statusquo. I shall return to the opportunity this flexibility offers towards the end of this evidence.

9. Ibelieve it unlikely the UK will leave the EU, but one must still allow for this possibility and I do so inthe following remarks. If it were to happen, the effects of withdrawal within the EU would probably be mainlybudgetary for space, but not structural. The UK would be placed in a similar position to either Norway orSwitzerland. Accommodations will be required for those countries under any governance reform, as theEuropean Commission recognizes in its Communication COM 2012 671 (hereafter the “2012Communication”).

The Paradigm Shift in EU-ESA Relations

10. While the UK in 2013 contributes less than 10% to ESA’s coffers, income from the EU is over 21%. Ifit were an ESA Member State, the EU would therefore already be ESA’s third largest contributor. But the EUis of course not a Member State, and is not allowed to be under the ESA Convention. The “third party” fundingit passes through ESA is, moreover, different in kind (mainly procurement for utilization purposes rather thanfor major R&D). And the EU spends further sums on European space research and applications that do notpass through ESA. It is true that these sums are currently relatively low but are set to increase under theMultiannual Financial Framework 2014–2020. The total the EU currently plans for space under the MFF issome €11.5 billion. When ESA was founded, it was zero. Space was also practically nowhere on theCommission’s radar. Today, it is an integral part of numerous EU policies and has made it into both the EU’scharter and European Council business.



The Current EU-ESA Relationship and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaties

11. This game-changing development was foreseeable from the time of the 1986 Single European Act (SEA),which endorsed a European Community R&D competence, and from moves that culminated in the 1992Maastricht Treaty. The first Communication by the European Commission on space indeed did not take longto follow (1988) and made claims whose chief political tenets of legitimacy, democratic accountability etc.,one finds repeated in the 2012 Communication. A European Space Policy for the EU, ESA and their combinedMember States was then arrived at, fitfully, in 2007. This underpinned a common and evolving architecture,which was then in turn endorsed in the Lisbon Treaty but left unsolved key issues of institutional convergencealready plain to several commentators from the SEA onwards. Supported by an inter-institutional frameworkagreement only from 2004, dialogue and cooperation between the EU and ESA nevertheless slowly but surelygrew across the entire period.

12. In retrospect, a number of things stand out from this thumbnail history. First, it was ESA Member Stateswhich showed the greatest caution towards the kind “rapprochement” the 2012 Communication advocates. Ihave witnessed this first-hand over the entire period in question and it is pertinent here to mention that, basedon our work in ESA, my colleague Walter Thiebaut and I suggested, in an article entitled “Two Europes inOne Space”, an agreement between ESA and the European Community to facilitate institutional convergence.This seemed a self-evident need, and certain to take time and care to work out. But in the event it took twelveyears to arrive at the 2004 framework agreement; it took less than ten to place men on the Moon. Meanwhile,the ESA Executive has taken some courageous positions on the relations that should prevail between the EUand ESA. In its long-term perspective document aimed at ministers, Agenda 2011, the ESA Director Generalgrasped the nettle and proposed “to make ESA become an Agency of the EU”. His current Agenda 2015 recallsthis proposal but notes “this perspective was challenged by Member States”.

13. I draw the Committee’s attention to this, because it is often thought that the EU is involved in somekind of hostile take-over of ESA. This is plainly not the case. While serving its Member States, each institutionis ultimately the steward of the general European interest. And the ESA Executive is in a position to understandin terms of programmes and their management the drag on Europe’s potential that results from unnecessaryand protracted institutional bifurcation, whereas the signs pointing to ESA one day becoming an EU agencyare unmistakeable. As a good manager, ESA therefore wants to clarify this issue to be able to get on with itsreal work of delivering its part of a world-class European space programme in concert with national and EUprogrammes. And here it is important to note that this, apparently, is the driving motive behind the PoliticalDeclaration endorsed by the ESA ministerial Council in November 2012 in its Resolution No. 4, to which Iwould recommend the Committee gives its attention alongside the 2012 Communication.

The Member State Perspective and the Reform Planning Horizon

14. It is also worth noting that Member States’ perspectives were for historical reasons formed in ESA in amanner entirely divorced from the EU system. What emerged was a kind of “bottom-up” cooperative and inlarge part optional participative system, whose baseline common element is today ESA’s Science and BasicTechnology programmes. Such a system relies either on coalescence around further commonly held programmeobjectives, for which there is not always scope, or on one or more Member States providing the financial andpolitical impetus for programmes, alone or on the basis of cross-programme understandings. It is an attractivesystem, supported by an efficient organization in ESA and accompanied by the industrial return system, onwhich I am sure the Committee will be extensively briefed. In short, the system has both advantages anddefects, the worst of which is that a period of disagreement over aligning interests and programme objectivescan cause the system to unravel. Gaps in programmes are furthermore inevitable in such a system, which canundermine the coherence of the entire programme structure. Operational utilization activities have, in addition,generally been less well catered for and are indeed subject to major constraints under the ESA Convention.And it must not be forgotten that ESA is limited only to space, whereas the uses to which space tools can beput are far wider, especially today. Unsurprisingly, this is where Member States tend to be most united inencouraging a strong EU role in support of utilization based on the panoply of EU policies.

15. But any move away from an ESA system that in practice has industrial return at its heart can strike atboth national objectives and industrial capacity cultivated in some cases over decades. It is for this reason thatstrong caution among many Member States is not only understandable but indicated. Despite some of thelanguage in the 2012 Communication, the Commission is perfectly aware of this but, equally, makes the pointthat some solution must be found. It then uses the traditional Commission approach, well tried in reformingother sectors in which Member States have major strategic interests such as telecommunications, of initiatinga process with a clear and realistic planning timeframe for undertaking the necessary adjustments. Here, thetarget timeframe for change is 2020 to 2025, since most of the major programmatic orientations have been setto 2020. The maximum “negotiation” period prior to fundamental governance change being initiated is hence2014 to 2018, as clarity will already be needed before the next major planning cycle.

Some Suggestions for a Way Forward

16. The maximum period for negotiation just estimated is based not on positions taken by the Commissionand in ESA but on the difficulty of the issues that must be resolved. I know that there are hopes to resolvethem already in 2014 and would indeed regard this as ideal. Delay is also not in the UK interest, since it is



rebuilding its space profile and will need a stable governance environment in which to make its policy choices.But uncertainty abounds in reshaping such a complex and strategic part of the European architecture. It ishence best, I would suggest, to plan for this and to ensure a process is in place that is robust enough to handlethe various issues on a rolling basis.

17. By its nature, such a process has to depart from a business as usual approach, with the different “spaceEuropes” each busy principally with defining their own positions. If one accepts the simple premise that someform of accommodation is required under an overall EU policy umbrella (which is difficult to deny in light ofthe Lisbon Treaty), then it should follow that the process should be an inclusive one under the generalorchestration of the EU. However, I would emphasize that—being an inherently intergovernmental questionaffecting an independent intergovernmental organization and a set of Member States that will probably cometo include all EU ones but also some non-EU ones—it would seem appropriate that the Presidency of theEuropean Union should take the lead role. I believe this would also set the minds of several Member Statesat rest.

18. I would also stress that any change of space governance in Europe will affect many interests. Alreadysome of the changes that have occurred, namely in relation to delegation of responsibilities by the EU to ESAfor Galileo and GMES, have produced cause for concern. All institutional actors, but also stakeholders in thesector (and not only the major industry and operators lobbies), should be able to contribute, as shouldrepresentatives of the general public including of course parliamentarians. If this additional premise is alsoaccepted, this would then imply convening some sort of conference.

19. I believe such a conference is already long over-due. A similar mechanism was, I would add, instrumentalin resolving major space policy issues in the 1960s and early 1970s and gave birth to today’s ESA.

20. If the suggestion for a conference approach is pursued, then I would also recommend that it address aspriority overall political goals (the 2007 European Space Policy is out of date) and an overall programme plan(a goal sadly not followed through sufficiently from 2007). It is necessary to proceed from these to the desiredgovernance architecture, which will not be as simple as a clean separation of policy elaboration in the EU andprogramme implementation in an EU ESA, even if this may be the main governance model many will naturallywish to explore.

21. I would also suggest that, in the interests of efficacy, the essential political thrust be maintainedthroughout such a conference’s life. With the multiplicity of the legal issues one can think of, it would be wiseto give those prominence only once agreement has been reached on the main principles. Thus, I would furthersuggest that the conference’s terms of reference be widely drafted so as to allow resort to the full extent ofoptions available under the Lisbon Treaty. These might include resort to the enhanced cooperation fall-backwhich is there provided for. Such a mechanism, combined with amendments to ESA’s Convention andappropriate agreements, may prove apt in particular to accommodate Member States’ vital concerns andmaintain programme involvement by non-EU ESA Member States and of Canada under its CooperationAgreement.

Conclusion: A Smart Governance Architecture for Europe and the UK

22. My advice to the Committee in the changing environment relevant to space governance is twofold: 1)not to foreclose the option of ESA (and thus with the bulk of UK civil space investment) entering under theEU umbrella and 2) to assess, not in “one go” but stepwise over the coming approximately one year, how bestto calibrate both funding and non-funding policy tools so that the UK has the chance of benefitting from thefoil potential space has to offer. In both regards, it might be that, for the type of programme the UK hascurrently prioritized, features of the EU system might in the end be the more rational option. This will not betrue of all ESA Member States.

References

Madders, KJ, A New Force at a New Frontier: Europe’s development in the space field in the light of its mainactors, policies, law and activities from its beginnings up to the present, Cambridge University Press, 625 pp.

Madders, KJ, and Thiebaut, WM, “Carpe diem: Europe must make a genuine space policy now”, Space Policy,Vol. 23 (2007) 7–12.

Madders, KJ, and Thiebaut, WM, “Two Europes in one Space: The Evolution of Relations between theEuropean Space Agency and the European Community in Space Affairs”, Journal of Space Law, Vol. 20(1992) 117–132.

Wouters, J, and Madders, KJ, “Taking Stock of Europe’s developing space policy: from the European spacepolicy workshops to the European space policy forum”, Space Policy, Vol. 20 2004, 31–36.

April 2013



Written evidence submitted by the Met Office (ESA 023)

Introduction

1. Satellites are critical to the Met Office; they now have a greater impact on weather forecast skill than anyother source of data. Weather and climate-related satellite data, images and products—are delivered 24 hoursa day, 365 days a year by the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites(EUMETSAT) to the National Meteorological Services of the organisation’s member and cooperating states inEurope, as well as other users world-wide.

2. The UK has been a Member State of EUMETSAT since its establishment in 1986. Since then, the MetOffice has led representation to EUMETSAT on behalf of the UK, with the UK Space Agency fulfilling therole of Industry Focal Point. Since EUMETSAT’s core satellite programmes are procured in partnership withESA, the Met Office works closely with the UK Space Agency to coordinate our EUMETSAT and ESArepresentation. The UK Space Agency occasionally attends EUMETSAT meetings, and Met Office staff attendrelevant ESA meetings on an agenda-driven basis. The UK is a long-term supporter of EUMETSAT’s user-driven “value for money” philosophy and the UK approach to representation maximises our ability to maintainthis position, while UKSA involvement ensures that UK industry is well-positioned to respond toEUMETSAT contracts.

3. The Met Office is a major user of earth observations, helping to make the best use of the UK’s investmentin this important field. In this context, the Met Office has a strong team of scientists dedicated to exploitingsatellite data. We have fully resilient satellite reception systems for both broadcast and directly-received polarsatellite data, with independent uninterruptible power supplies and processing across two IT halls at ourheadquarters.

What are the strengths and weaknesses of the funding, organisation, and work of the European SpaceAgency?

4. The Met Office considers the European Space Agency, on the whole, to be a good example of an effectiveand well-focused intergovernmental organisation. There will always be areas in which ESA can improve andbecome more efficient, but from our perspective ESA provides reasonable value for money in a complexenvironment.

In light of the European Commission’s recent Communication on relations between ESA and the EU (COM2012 671), what relationship between ESA, the EU and the UK would provide the most effective governanceregime? Why?

5. The different memberships and the different financial tendering processes make it difficult to consider afuture situation in which ESA could work closely enough to the EU to consider its incorporation as suggestedby COM 2012 671.

6. Recent examples of the EU passing Delegated Agreements directly through to ESA as non-competeddirect contracts (for instance for the implementation of the GMES/Copernicus Space Component) highlightwhere progress is being made. For further progress to be made we would recommend a separation of keyactivities into: (i) research missions/programmes and (ii) operational missions/programmes, and to review whatGovernance structures and key actors are required for each.

7. Historically, ESA has operated R&D programmes as its priority activity. The governance structures forthese have been effective. More recently, there has been an increasing involvement from ESA in the creationof major programmes which will deliver operational space missions over decades with recurrent units (egGalileo and Copernicus). With the EU’s increasing interest and provision of precursor funding for theseoperational missions, and the relative novelty of these types of missions to ESA, there is a need to carefullyconsider the right Governance structure. Copernicus is currently actively considering the most appropriategovernance structures for the Space element—of which a continuation of the existing Delegated Agreement toESA is one option. Importantly, there are other actors and other governance options which need to beconsidered.

8. The right future Governance structure needs to ensure that there are effective processes in place tonegotiate strong financial commitments from all relevant actors to maintain an operational programme. Therecent EU multiannual financial framework (MFF) negotiations on Copernicus operations funding have notbeen optimal for the long-term viability of the programme, in particular supporting the innovation and growthagenda. The successful relationship between ESA and EUMETSAT for operational meteorological programmescould serve as a good model.

How effective is the EU’s support for research and innovation in the space sector? What effect have changesto the Multi-Annual Financial Framework had on ESA and support for the space sector from the Horizon2020 programme?

9. Space has been a major growth area of investment from the EU and we have seen a step change increasein funding from FP6 to FP7 Cooperation: Space Work Programme funding from €0.25 billion to €1.4 billion.



This is set to at least stay neutral under recent top level discussions on the MFF for 2014—2020, and be setat €1.4–1.5 billion. This has been a major achievement which has allowed the EU to invest in the developmentof initiatives such as Copernicus and, importantly, the creation of a range of new pre-operational services inenvironmental themes which support the innovation and growth agenda. This is a good platform from whichthe EU can do more to support, improve and make more effective research and innovation (R&I) with a focuson the following three factors:

10. Improve the cross-programme, cross-DG linkage between Space activities funded by DG Enterprise andR&I funding through the EU’s major research programme Horizon 2020. Improved linkages and joint callsbetween the “Industrial leadership: Space” and “Societal Challenges: Climate Action” major strands of Horizon2020 would be beneficial.

11. Consideration of better outreach processes from H2020 projects, so that (a) a greater range of potentialusers can have easier access to project outputs; (b) information gathering activities are supported which gather,collate and feed through user requirements to be included in R&I projects.

12. Consideration of a sustainable EU funding stream to support coordinated, collaborative Europeanoperational Space programmes.

13. Horizon 2020 developments are recognising and responding to these key considerations, and weencourage this to continue. A key risk here is that the Horizon 2020 timeline is very short, and may not beable to fully consider these before launch. To mitigate this the EU should continue to engage with MemberStates to ensure that as Horizon 2020 progresses under future calls, these issues are effectively addressed.

14. Under FP7 the increased financial investment from the EU had a very noticeable and positive impact onESA, and stimulated far closer discussions to improve interactions between the EU and ESA. This led, inparticular, to the Delegated agreement placed by the Commission with ESA for the Copernicus SpaceComponent development. However, the recent MFF settlement (to be ratified by European Parliament) hasplaced some uncertainty due to the less than requested financial budget from the EU for Copernicus operations.

How effective has the UK Space Agency been and what improvements could be made? Is the UK effectivelyexploiting opportunities for growth in the space sector or could more be done?

15. The UK Space Agency, as the body responsible for civil space policy, has had a significant impact sinceits formation in providing much needed clarity across the space community—from science and research toindustry—on the strategic issues and on leading the UK’s representation to ESA and other international players.In particular, there is an improved understanding and consensus, through open discussion, on UK priorities andthese are fed well into shared European missions. The close links between UKSA and the Space LeadershipCouncil is an important aspect of developing this coordinated and UK-wide approach and UKSA is well placedto ensure emphasis remains on protecting economic growth and the UK’s space assets. The Met Office has agood working relationship with UKSA through initiatives such as the Natural Hazards Partnership and reliesheavily on it to ensure developments in space weather prediction in the UK take full advantage of work beingled by the ESA Space Situational Awareness programme.

16. The UK Space Agency’s continuing effectiveness as the lead UK agency on space matters will, however,depend on it being well resourced. Initiatives across the space community are being developed quickly andwill put additional pressure on resources. As with any drain on resources, there is a risk that longer termstrategic issues may suffer as near-term “must do” work is necessarily prioritised and completed.

Does the UK get good value for money from its membership of ESA? How does its return on investmentcompare to other countries?

17. We have no reason to doubt that the UK’s overall return from ESA is appropriate for our level ofsubscription. The meteorological programmes are of course of particular interest to the Met Office, and theUK investment in meteorological programmes has improved dramatically following a significant subscriptionto Metop-SG at the 2012 Ministerial Council. This will enable UK industry to secure not only significant rolesin the development of satellite instrumentation, but to benefit from the purchase of recurrent units byEUMETSAT.

How resilient is the UK’s space-based infrastructure? Are threats from space debris or solar activity beingappropriately mitigated? What role do, or should, ESA and the UK Space Agency play in addressing theseissues?

18. The threat from solar activity, manifested as space weather, has been recognised in the National RiskRegister as presenting a moderate to high level of risk to the UK. The Met Office owns this risk.

19. The provision of warnings is an important and effective step in managing the risks from space weatherevents and, as noted in the recent Royal Academy of Engineering report,21 although forecast capability iscurrently limited furthering developments in this field could change how space weather risks are mitigated. In21 Extreme space weather:impacts on engineered systems and infrastructure www.raeng.org.uk/news/publications/.../space_

weather_full_report_final.pdf



this context, the Met Office is progressing the UK—US agreement to, in the first instance, mirror the NOAASpace Weather Prediction Centre (SWPC) data services.

20. As well as fully exploiting the Met Office’s existing hazard management expertise and resilientinfrastructure, this initiative will pull from the full range of space expertise and resources present in the NaturalHazards Partnership, such as those within British Geological Survey, Natural Environment Research Council,the Science and Technology Research Council and the UK Space Agency—whilst ensuring that space weatherservices are developed to specifically focus on the particular risks to and needs of UK interests and, importantly,are fully integrated into well established warning processes, practices and procedures.

21. The Met Office is developing a UK space weather service, assisted by a capital grant from BIS to meetsome of the IT infrastructure costs. The establishment and funding of an operational space weather service thatmeets the minimum UK requirement does, however, depend on establishing a clear requirement, agreeing therisks and benefits of such a service and putting it on a sustainable footing.

April 2013

Written evidence submitted by Alba Orbital Ltd (ESA 025)


1. As a young entrepreneur running a UK based small satellite startup I can only describe my experiencewith UKSA and the Satellite Licensing process as very difficult. It is has been noted that major problems existand hence why a consultation was carried out last year. The results are now almost over a year overdue. Thisdoes help confidence, investment, startups or growth.

2. While there is a lot talk about changing the process, it is currently the most expensive, lengthy and difficultto navigate procedure in the world. It is not helping Satellite entrepreneurs and therefore not helping growth.

3. For example, it currently costs £6,500 to fill in an application form for this process (the most expensivein the world), although Universities do not have to pay anything. I do not understand the logic behind this?Are university satellites somehow more valuable to UK plc than small startup’s satellites. That can be the onlylogical conclusion.

4. Second example, it takes six months to go through the gauntlet. This is by far the longest process in theworld. There are also no guarantees of licensing success. You could spend six months and £6,500 (which is alot of money to a startup) only for your application to be thrown out.

5. Third Example, two years accounts are needed. Startup don’t have two years accounts.

6. In summary, the only two options small companies face for licensing a satellite is to get an exemptionfrom the Secretary of State (RT Hon David Willetts MP) or move the company to another country. This isobviously not going to create growth or Jobs in the UK Space Sector. I would recommend a urgent fix to thesystem before we lose more talent and investment to other countries asap.

Declaration of Interests

Tom Walkinshaw

Founder of Alba Orbital Ltd

July 2013

Written evidence submitted by CGI IT UK Limited (ESA015)

1. Founded in 1976, CGI is a global IT and business process services provider delivering high-qualitybusiness consulting, systems integration and outsourcing services. With 71,000 professionals in 40 countries,CGI has an industry-leading track record of on-time, on-budget projects, aligning our teams with clients’business strategies to achieve top-to-bottom line results. Our space experience includes provision of IT servicesto ESA, especially in the programmes that involve European Union funding: Galileo, GMES and EGNOS. Wealso provide IT services to UK public sector space organisations including the Ministry of Defence and theUK Space Agency.


2. S: ESA acts very effectively as a home market for space products, systems and services. Its continentalscale is beneficial because it ensures a scale of business that is significant in world term and allows industryto invest accordingly. Its procurement policy of open competitive tendering and (unlike many EU development



programmes) paying commercial prices ensures that the best companies thrive and the tax payer gets valuefor money.

3. S: ESA (unlike NASA for example) has a mandate to help industry become competitive in world marketswhich it has successfully implemented over the past 40 years.

4. S: The hi-tech nature of ESA’s programmes often requires industry to provide leading edge solutionswhich enhance industry’s global competitiveness.

5. S: Informatics (software intensive technologies) where CGI operates is an increasingly important domainfor ESA’s programmes, because of trends such as higher data rates, more sophisticated operational scenariosand complex operations. For the past 40 years, UK companies have been leaders in this domain within ESA.

6. S: ESA works well with European multinational companies that have operations in several Member States,thereby recognising the investment made by industry to address Europe as a single market.

7. S: ESA can move rapidly when necessary to address a new opportunity and when its Member States sowish. For example, there have been occasions when ESA has effectively lent money to the EuropeanCommission in joint ESA/EC programmes (such as EGNOS) because of the longer time-to-fruition of manyEC initiatives.

8. W: One of the weaknesses of ESA’s optional programmes is that industry from non-subscribing countriesis excluded—this has applied to UK industry for ESA’s launcher and human spaceflight programmes formany years.

9. W: ESA has a relatively small involvement in secure space programmes (ie: what the man in the streetmight call “military space”), the largest such activity being part of the Galileo programme. This means thatEurope’s space security activities are dealt with at national level and as a result are somewhat fragmented,thereby limiting the ability of industry to build globally competitive products. Note that we consider that the“peaceful uses” restriction in ESA’s Convention is not a stumbling block to extending ESA’s reach in thisdomain since this is the same wording as in the United Nations Charter (which feels able to initiate extensivemilitary action).


10. In programmes such as EGNOS, Galileo and GMES, the EU has effectively been a combination of (a)an extra Member State of ESA and (b) an eventual owner of its systems.

11. The EU’s role as extra Member State works effectively, bringing extra funding and ideas into ESAprogrammes.

12. The EU’s role as eventual owner of systems developed by ESA works less well at least in part becausethe European Commission is not mandated and structured for such a role. The use of organisations such asEumetsat (public sector) or Inmarsat (private sector) to eventually own the systems developed by ESA hasbeen successful—if necessary creating these organisations from scratch for that purpose.

13. The Committee is right to recognise that the governance must accommodate Member States as well asthe EU and ESA. Another axis that should be recognised is industry. The Member State-Industry-ESArelationship is crucial to the success of ESA because it ensures that (a) Member States can make decisions toinvest in new ESA programmes following a dialogue (usually informal) with industry on its R&D priorities,estimates of costs, competitive positioning, etc. The future EU-ESA relationship should preserve (and ideallystrengthen) these links between industry, the UK and ESA.


14. For CGI the EU support has been difficult to exploit because the EC has required industry to formconsortia across borders but has hitherto failed to recognise the various national subsidiaries of a multinationalas representing separate national industries in that context. We hope that the next round of EC R&T support(Horizon 2020) will become more like ESA in recognising this aspect of the pan-European investment ofmultinational companies.


15. The UK Space Agency’s focus on wealth creation activities has strengthened its links to the privatesector, which we welcome.



16. The UK Space Agency is continuing the UK’s long-standing focus on commercially relevant (as opposedto prestige) applications of space. CGI is in line with most parts of UK industry in welcoming this focus sinceit helps us generate commercial opportunities from the work funded by the UK Space Agency.

17. We welcome the UK Space Agency’s support for the Space Innovation and Growth Strategy (IGS)“Restack” exercise. CGI made major investments of manpower and funds in the original IGS and we are keento ensure that it leads to sustainable and export-led growth.

18. We await with interest the unified space policy document promised by the UK Space Agency coveringmilitary and security aspects of space as well as the civil domain. In general we look to the UK Space Agencyto produce added value over and above the activity of its component parts, for example by seeking commonalityof technology across programme sectors and encouraging industry to exploit that commonality. We wouldwelcome the UK Space Agency being measured in terms of the extent to which its new combined formproduces outputs beyond the sum of those that would have been produced by the constituent components thatcame together to form it—the whole should exceed the sum of the parts.


19. The continued growth of UK’s space industry employment and revenue indicates we are getting valuefor money.

20. Return on investment in some other countries as measured by ESA geographical return is inflated becauselarge parts of the relevant programmes are awarded single tender. UK industry almost always has to competefor ESA business (the ExoMars Rover is probably the largest current exception) which (a) keeps our industrykeenly competitive and (b) results in our ESA geographical return oscillating in response to the results ofindividual procurement competitions.


21. Resilience: the CGI study for the Centre for the Protection of critical National Infrastructure (CPNI) ofthe resilience of several economic sectors against threats to space-based infrastructure provided valuablequantitative evidence on this point. The CPNI should be urged to ensure the continuation of that work to coverall relevant sectors of the UK economy and society. In response to the global cyber threat including data storageand flows to satellites and space ground infrastructures a National Space Security Policy should be published.

22. UK industry has a strong heritage related to tracking of space debris, so we must ensure that UK playsa full part in any European initiatives (whether through ESA or multilaterally) so that UK industry can buildon its heritage and avoid industry in other countries being given the opportunity to overtake us.

April 2013

The Stationery Office Limited10/2013 032590 19585

Documents

Work of the European and UK Space Agencies€¦ · 9. The Horizon 2020 programme retains many of the arbitrary restrictions of former Framework R&D programmes, for example forcing