Word Bynum Holy Feast

8/10/2019 Word Bynum Holy Feast

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STEVEN SHAVIRO

WITHOUT CRITERIA

Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics

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Without Criteria


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Technologies of Lived Abstraction

Brian Massumi and Erin Manning, editors

Relationscapes: Movement, Art, Philosophy, Erin Manning, 2009

Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics, Steven Shaviro,2009


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Without Criteria: Kant,Whitehead, Deleuze,andAesthetics

Steven Shaviro

The MIT ress !ambridge, Massachusetts London, England


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" 2009 Massachusetts Institute of Technolog#

All rights reserved$ %o &art of this boo' ma# be re&roduced in an# form b# an#electronic or mechanical means (including &hotocoing, recording, orinformation storage and retrieval) *ithout &ermission in *riting from the

&ublisher$

+or information about s&ecial uantit# discounts, &lease emails&ecial-sales.mit&ress$mit$edu

This boo' *as set in /aramond and otis semi1sans b# Binghamton alle#

!om&osition in 3uar'$ rinted and bound in the 4nited States of America$

Librar# of !ongress !ataloging1in1ublication 5ata

Shaviro, Steven$6ithout criteria 7 8ant, 6hitehead, 5eleue, and aesthetics : Steven Shaviro$

&$ cm$Includes bibliogra&hical references$ISB% 9;9?;=1< (hardcover 7 al'$ &a&er)>$ 6hitehead, Alfred %orth, >@>9;$ 2$ Aesthetics$ $ 5eleue, /illes,>92?@>99?$ $ Ceidegger, Martin, >;2@>=;$6?S 2009>92Ddc22

200>2

>0 9 < ; = ? 2 >
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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Contents

Series +ore*ord vii

reface7 A hiloso&hical +antas# i

1 Without Criteria >

2 Actual Entities and Eternal Objects >;

3 Pulses of Emotion ;

4 Interstitial Life ;>

5 od, or !he "od# $ithout Or%ans 99

6 Conse&uences >

eferences >=

Inde >;>


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!echnolo%ies of Li'ed Abstraction

Erin Manning and Brian Massumi, editors

FWhat moves as a body, returns as themovement of thouht!G Hfsubectivit# (in its nascent state)Hf the social (in its mutant state)

Hf the environment (at the &oint it can bereinvented) FA process set up any"here reverberatesevery"here!G

The Technologies of Lived Abstraction boo' series isdedicated to *or's of transdisci&linar# reach inuiringcriticall# but es&eciall# creativel# into &ro1 cesses ofsubective, social, and ethical1&olitical emergence abroad inthe *orld toda#$ Thought and bod#, abstract and concrete,local and global, individual and collective7 the *or's

&resented are not content to rest *ith the habitual di1visions$ The# e&lore ho* these facets come formativel#,reverberativel# to1 gether, if onl# to form the movementb# *hich the# come again to diJer$

ossible &aradigms are man#7 autonomiation,relationK emergence, com&leit#, &rocessK individuation,(auto)&oiesisK direct &erce&tion, embodied &erce&tion,&erce&tion1as1actionK s&eculative &ragmatism, s&eculativerealism, radical em&iricismK mediation, virtualiationKecolog# of &ractices, media ecolog#K technicit#K

micro&olitics, bio&olitics, onto&o*er$ et there *ill be acommon aim7 to catch ne* thought and action da*ning,at a creative cross1 ing$ The Technologies of LivedAbstraction series orients to the creativit# at this crossing,in virtue of *hich life ever#*here can be consideredgerminall# aesthetic, and the aesthetic an#*here alread#&olitical$

FConcepts must be e#perienced! $hey are lived!G


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Preface: A Philoso(hical )antas#

This boo' originated out of a &hiloso&hical fantas#$ Iimagine a *orld in *hich 6hitehead ta'es the &lace ofCeidegger$ Thin' of ho* im&ortant Cei1 degger has beenfor thin'ing and critical reection over the &ast sit#

#ears$ 6hat if 6hitehead, instead of Ceidegger, had setthe agenda for &ostmodern thoughtN 6hat *ould&hiloso&h# be li'e toda#N 6hat diJerent uestions might*e be as'ingN 6hat diJerent &ers&ectives might *e bevie*ing the *orld fromN

The &arallels bet*een Ceidegger and 6hitehead arestri'ing$ %ein and $ime *as &ublished in >92;, Processand Reality in >929$ T*o enormous &hi1 loso&h# boo's,almost eact contem&oraries$ Both boo's res&ondmagisteri1 all# to the situation (IOd rather not sa# the crisis)

of modernit#, the immensit# of scientiPc and technologicalchange, the dissolution of old certainties, the increasingl#fast &ace of life, the massive reorganiations thatfollo*ed the horrors of 6orld 6ar I$ Both boo's ta'e forgranted the ineistence of foun1 dations, not even Patingon them as missing, but sim&l# going on *ithout concernover their absence$ Both boo's are antiessentialist andanti&ositivist, both of them are activel# engaged in*or'ing out ne* *a#s to thin', ne* *a#s to do&hiloso&h#, ne* *a#s to eercise the facult# of *onder$

And #et ho* diJerent these t*o boo's are7 inconce&ts, in method, in aJect, and in s&irit$ IOd li'e to gothrough a series of &hiloso&hical uestions and ma'e aseries of (admittedl# tendentious) com&arisons, in order tos&ell out these diJerences as clearl# as &ossible$

> $he &uestion of beinnins 6here does one start in&hiloso&h#N Ceidegger as's the uestion of Being7 F6h#is there something, rather than nothingNG But 6hiteheadis s&lendidl# indiJerent to this uestion$ Ce as's,

instead7 FCo* is it that there is al*a#s something ne*NG


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6hitehead doesnOt see an# &oint in returning to ourultimate beginnings$ Ce is interested in creation


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rather than rectiPcation, Becoming rather than Being, the%e* rather than the immemoriall# old$ I *ould suggestthat, in a *orld *here ever#thing from music to 5%A is

continuall# being sam&led and recombined, and *here theshelf life of an idea, no less than of a fashion in clothing,can be measured in months if not *ee's, 6hiteheadOsuestion is the trul# urgent one$ Ceidegger ees thechallenges of the &resent in horror$ 6hitehead urges us to*or' *ith these challenges, to negotiate them$ Co*, heas's, can our cultureOs incessant re&etition and rec#clingnonetheless issue forth in something genuinel# ne* anddiJerentN

2$he &uestion of the history of philosophy Ceideggerinterrogates the histor# of &hiloso&h#, tr#ing to locate the

&oint *here it *ent *rong, *here it closed do*n the&ossibilities it should have o&ened u&$ 6hitehead, to thecontrar#, is not interested in such an interrogation$ FIt isreall# not sufPcient,G he *rites, Fto direct attention to thebest that has been said and done in the an1 cient *orld$The result is static, re&ressive, and &romotes a decadenthabit of mind$G Instead of tr#ing to &in do*n the histor#of &hiloso&h#, 6hitehead t*ists this histor# in *onderfull#

ungainl# *a#s$ Ce mines it for une&ected creatives&ar's, ecer&ting those moments *here, for instance,lato afPrms Becoming against the static *orld of Ideas,or 5escartes refutes mind@bod# dualism$

3$he &uestion of metaphysics Ceidegger see's a *a# outof meta&h#sics$ Ce endeavors to clear a s&ace *here hecan evade its gras&$ But 6hitehead doesnOt #earn for areturn before, or for a lea& be#ond, meta&h#sics$ Muchmore sub1 versivel#, I thin', he sim&l# does meta&h#sicsin his o*n *a#, inventing his o*n categories and *or'ingthrough his o*n &roblems$ Ce thereb# ma'esmeta&h#sics s&ea' *hat it has usuall# denied andreected7 the bod#, emo1 tions, inconstanc# and change,the radical contingenc# of all &ers&ectives and allformulations$

4 $he &uestion of lanuae Ceidegger ehorts us toFhear'en &atientl# to the oice of Being$G Ce is al*a#sgenuecting before the enigmas of Lan1 guage, the *a#sthat it calls to us and commands us$ 6hitehead ta'es a

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much more o&en, &luralist vie* of the *a#s thatlanguage *or's$ Ce 'no*s that it contains m#steries, thatit is far more than a mere tool or instrument$ But he also*arns us against eaggerating its im&ortance$ Ce al*a#s&oints u& the


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inca&acities of languageD*hich means also theinadeuac# of reducing &hi1 loso&h# to the interrogationand anal#sis of language$

5$he &uestion of style A &hiloso&herOs attitude to*ardlanguage is also em1 bodied in his st#le of *riting$CeideggerOs contorted *riting combines a height1 enedomantic &oeticism *ith the self1referential interrogationof linguistic roots and meanings$ ItOs a st#le as &ortentousand eas&erating as the m#ster1 ies it claims to disclose$6hiteheadOs language, to the contrar#, is dr#, gra#, andabstract$ But in this academic, fuss#, almost &edantic&rose, he is contin1 uall# sa#ing the most astonishing

things, reigniting the &hiloso&hic sense of *onder atever# ste&$ The neutralit# of 6hiteheadOs st#le is *hatgives him the freedom to construct, to reorient, to s*itchdirection$ ItOs a 'ind of strate1 gic counterinvestment,allo*ing him to ste& a*a# from his o*n &assions andinterests, *ithout thereb# falling into the &retense of auniversal higher 'no*l1 edge$ 6hiteheadOs languageehibits a s&ecial sort of detachment, one that continuesto insist u&on that from *hich it has become detached7&articulars, singularities, and &ers&ectives that are al*a#s

&artial (in both senses of this *ord7 &artial as o&&osed to*hole, but also &artial in the sense of &artialit# or bias)$

6$he &uestion of technoloy Ceidegger *arns us againstthe danger of tech1 nological Fenframing,G *ith itsreduction of nature to the status of a Fstanding reserve$GCe demonies science, in a manner so s*ee&ing andabsolute as to be the mirror image of scienceOs o*nclaims to uniue authorit#$ But #ou canOt undo *hat6hitehead calls the Fbifurcation of natureG b# sim&l#dismissing one side of the dichotom#$ 6hiteheadOs accountof science and technolog# is far subtler than CeideggerOs,in &art because he actuall# understands modern science,as Ceidegger clearl# does not$ +or 6hitehead, scientiPcand technical rationalit# is one 'ind of Fabstraction$G This,in itself, is not an#thing bad$ An abstraction is asim&liPcation, a reduction, made in the service of some&artic1 ular interest$ As such, it is indis&ensable$ 6e cannotlive *ithout abstractionsK the# alone ma'e thought andaction &ossible$ 6e onl# get into trouble *hen *e etendthese abstractions be#ond their limits, &ushing them into

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realms *here the# no longer a&&l#$ This is *hat 6hiteheadcalls Fthe fallac# of mis1 &laced concreteness,G and itOsone to *hich modern science and technolog# have beenes&eciall# &rone$ But all our other abstractionsDnotabl#including the abstraction *e call languageDneed to bea&&roached in the same s&irit of

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caution$ Indeed, 6hiteheadOs reservations about sciencerun entirel# &arallel to his reservations about language$(B# rights, Ceidegger ought to treat sci1 ence and

technolog# in the same *a# that he treats language7 forlanguage it1 self is a technolog#, and the essence of *hatis human involves technolog# in ust the same *a# as itdoes language)$

7 $he &uestion of representation Ceidegger mounts anincessant critiue of re&resentationalist thought$ As *ebusil# re&resent the *orld to ourselves, he sa#s, *e donot allo* it to stand forth in its Being$ 6hitehead similarl#criti1 cies the *a# that 6estern &hiloso&hical thought,

from 5escartes on*ard, has ecessivel# &rivileged Fclearand distinctG conscious &erce&tion (*hat 6hite1 head callsF&resentational immediac#G), ignoring the *a#s that this&erce&1 tion is al*a#s alread# grounded in our bodies,and in the inheritance of the &resent from the &ast(through the &rocess of *hat 6hitehead calls FcausalefPcac#G)$ But thereOs a big diJerence here of em&hasis$+or Ceidegger, re&re1 sentation is the problem7 one Pnds itever#*here, and one must al*a#s be vig1 ilant against it$+or 6hitehead, this concern is eaggerated and mis&laced$

In ever#da# life (if not in &ost1!artesian &hiloso&h#)re&resentation &la#s onl# a minor role$ Even *hen *e dore&resent, *e are also feelin our bodies, and feel' in"ith our bodies$ The Ceideggerian (and deconstructionist)critiue isnOt *rong so much as it isnOt all that interestingor im&ortant$ ather than insist1 ing on critiue,therefore, 6hitehead sho*s us ho* the *orld is alreadyother*ise$

8 $he &uestion of sub(ectivity Ceidegger &olemicall#uestions the ram&ant subectivism of the humanisttradition$ Ce see's to undo the illusion of theautonomous, essentialied ego, *ith its voracious *ill1to1&o*er$ Hf course, this aggressive uestioning is the i&side of CeideggerOs ontological &rivileging of Man as theFshe&herd of Being,G and as the site *here Languagemanifests itself$ The subect must be understood as aneJect of Language, because Lan1 guage is *hat calls to usand interrogates us$ %o*, nothing could be more for1 eignto 6hitehead than this *hole &olemic$ As before, this is

not because 6hitehead is concerned to defend *hat

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Ceidegger is attac'ing, but because his interests lieelse*here$ 6hitehead does not see the subect as aneJect of language$ ather, he sees subectivit# asembedded in the *orld$ The subect is an irreducible &artof the universe, of the *a# things ha&&en$ There is noth1ing outside of e&erienceK and e&erience al*a#s ha&&ensto some subect or


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other$ This subect ma# be human, but it also ma# be adog, a tree, a mush1 room, or a grain of sand$ (Strictl#s&ea'ing, an# such entities are *hat 6hite1 head calls

Fsocieties,G each com&osed of multitudes of Factualoccasions,G *hich themselves are the subects inuestion$) In an# case, the subect consti1 tutes itself inand through its e&erienceK and thereu&on it &erishes,entering into the Fobective immortalit#G of being aFdatumG for other e&eriences of other subects$ In this*a#, 6hitehead abolishes the ontoloical &rivileging ofhuman beings over all other subectivities$ This doesnOtmean, of course, that the diJerences bet*een humanbeings and other sorts of beings are irrelevantK such

diJerences remain &ragmaticall# im&ortant in all 'inds ofsituations, and for all sorts of reasons$ But in undoing theontological &rivilege of being hu1 man, 6hiteheadsuggests that the critiue of the subect need not be socom1 &ulsive a focus of &hiloso&hical inuir#$

If 6hitehead *ere to re&lace Ceidegger as theins&iration of &ostmodern thought, our intellectuallandsca&e *ould loo' uite diJerent$ !ertain &rob1 lemsthat *e have been overl# obsessed *ith *ould recede in

im&ortance, to be re&laced b# other uestions, and other&ers&ectives$ 6hat Isabelle Stengers calls aFconstructivistG a&&roach to &hiloso&h# *ould ta'e&recedence over the tas's of incessant deconstruction$6hiteheadOs thought has a 'ind of cosmic iron# to it,*hich oJers a *elcome contrast both to the narcissistictheoriing to *hich the heirs of Ceidegger are &rone, andto the fatuous com1 &lacenc# of mainstream American&ragmatism$ 6hiteheadOs meta&h#sics is a ramshac'leconstruction, continuall# o&en to revision, and not an

assertion of absolute truths$ It stands outside the dualitiesDthe subect or not, meaning or not, humanism or notD*ith *hich recent theoretical thought has so oftenburdened us$ 6hitehead both eem&liPes, andencourages, the virtues of s&eculation, fabulation, andinvention$ These ma# be o&&osed both to the dogmatismof humanistic or &ositivistic certitudes and to theendless dis1 avo*als, s&litting of hairs, and one1u&manshi&that has characteried so much recent academic Ftheor#$G

Without Criteria is an e&erimentK it is an attem&t to

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rethin' F&ostmod1 ernG theor#, and es&eciall# the theor#of aesthetics, from a &oint of vie* that hear'ens bac' to6hitehead instead of Ceidegger$ I do this largel# b#reading 6hitehead in conunction *ith /illes 5eleue$5eleue *rote onl# brie# about 6hiteheadK it is unclearho* familiar he *as *ith 6hitehead, or to

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*hat degree he *as inuenced b# 6hitehead$%evertheless, as I *ill tr# to sho*, there are im&ortantafPnities and resonances bet*een the *or' of

6hitehead and that of 5eleue$ In this boo', I have tried toestablish a sort of rela# bet*een the t*o thin'ers, so thateach of them hel&s to resolve difPcul1 ties in the *or' ofthe other$ I started this boo' reading 6hitehead from a5eleuian &ers&ectiveK b# the time I *as Pnished, I foundm#self, instead, reading 5eleue from a 6hiteheadian&ers&ective$ This reversal of &ers&ec1 tives is one of theeJects that reading 6hitehead, and *riting about him, hashad on me$ !ritical *riting should al*a#s be atransformative e&erience$ As Michel +oucault &ut it man#

#ears ago7 F*hat *ould be the value of the &as1 sion for'no*ledge if it resulted onl# in a certain amount of'no*ledgeable1 ness and not, in one *a# or another andto the etent &ossible, in the 'no*erOs stra#ing aPeld ofhimselfNG (+oucault >9


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LeibniK *hen the# do refer to 8ant, it is most often in a dis1&araging *a#$ 5eleue even sa#s that his o*n boo' on8ant a&&roaches 8ant as an Fenem#$G %evertheless, Iargue that certain crucial as&ects of 8antOs thought &avethe *a# for the &hiloso&hical FconstructivismG embraced b#both 6hitehead and 5eleue$ I am thin'ing &articularl# of8antOs aesthetics (above


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all, his FAnal#tic of the BeautifulG in the Third !ritiue), ofhis transcendental argument in the +irst !ritiue (*ith*hat 6hitehead calls its Fconce&tion of an act of

e&erience as a constructive functioningG), and of hisTranscendental 5ialectic in the second half of the +irst!ritiue (*hich oJers an alternative to, and an antici&ator#criticism of, the Cegelian dialectic)$

In the *ords of Michel +oucault, 8ant in these tetsmade an Fo&eningG in 6estern thought because heFarticulated, in a manner that is still enigmatic,meta&h#sical discourse and reection on the limits of ourreasonG (+oucault >9999, 2)$

In the course of its readings of 8ant, 6hitehead, and5eleue, Without Criteria see's to address a range ofissues that are crucial to cultural theor# toda#$ Thecritical aestheticism that I discover in the conunction of8ant, 6hitehead, and 5eleue hel&s to illuminatecontem&orar# art and media &ractices (es&eciall#develo&ments in digital Plm and video), contem&orar# sci1entiPc and technological &ractices (es&eciall# the recentadvances in neuro1 science and in biogenetic technolog#),and controversies in cultural theor# and Marist theor#

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(such as uestions about commodit# fetishism, aboutimma1 nence and transcendence, about the role ofauto&oietic or self1organiing s#s1 tems, and about the*a#s that FinnovationG and Fcreativit#G seem to havebecome so central to the d#namics of &ostmodern, or &ost1+ordist, ca&italism)$ +or the most &art, I do not addressthese matters directl# hereDthat *ill be a

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tas' for another boo'$ But m# interest in them has largel#sha&ed m# selective readings of the tets of 8ant,6hitehead, and 5eleue$

%o boo' is ever *ritten in a vacuumK and m#intellectual indebtedness in the case of Without Criteria ises&eciall# great$ M# boo' is largel# *ritten in the marginsof Isabelle StengersOs magniPcent Penser avec Whitehead$6ith this tet, Stengers both made 6hitehead accessibleto me for the Prst time, and o&ened u& the uestion of6hiteheadOs afPnit# *ith 5eleue$ Erin Manning and BrianMassumi encouraged me to *rite this boo', nurtured itthroughout the stages of its &re&aration, and invited me anumber of times to their semi1 nars and forums in

research creation, *here I *as able to &resent &ortions ofthis tet, and *hich &rovided me *ith the intellectualstimulus that I needed to com&lete it$ Among the man#other &eo&le *ith *hom I discussed m# *or', or *ho readand commented on &ortions of the manuscri&t, I&articularl# *ish to than' 8eith obinson, !harles Stivale,5aniel Smith, Tim !lar', Sha in 6ei, 6illiam +lesch,obert /ooding16illiams, and Barrett 6atten, as *ell asthe anon#mous readers of m# manuscri&t for MIT ress,the members of the Sense Lab at !oncordia 4niversit# in

Montreal, and the readers of m# blog the inocchio Theor#(htt&7::***$shaviro$com:Blog)$

Some sections of this boo' have &reviousl# been&ublished else*here$ An earlier version of cha&ter >a&&ears in *ensorium: Aesthetics, Art, +ife, ed1 ited b#Barbara Bolt, +elicit# !olman, /raham Qones, and Ashle#6ood*ard (London7 !ambridge Scholars ress, 200;)$ A&ortion of cha&ter 2 a&&ears in *ecrets of %ecomin:eotiatin Whitehead, Deleuze and %utler, edited b#oland +aber (%e* or'7 +ordham 4niversit# ress,

2009)$ A version of cha&ter a&&ears in $he A-ectReader, edited b# /reg Seig*orth and Melissa /regg(5urham7 5u'e 4niversit# ress, 200


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*

Without Criteria

FThere is no science of the beautiful Udas *ch1neV, butonl# critiue,G 8ant sa#s in the Criti&ue of )udment,Fand there is no Pne Usch1nV science, but onl# Pne artG(>9;2)$ Most recent discussions of 8antOs aesthetics

have concentrated on his anal#sis of the sublime (*hichis seen as &rePguring modernistDor &ostmodernistDconcerns and &ractices), rather than on his anal#sis ofthe beautiful (*hich is generall# regarded as ratherconservative and old1fashioned)$ In *hat follo*s, Iendeavor to suggest, against this com1 mon *isdom, that8antOs account of beaut# is uite radical in *a#s that havenot #et been sufPcientl# recognied$ +or 8antOs theor# ofthe beautiful is reall# a theor# of aJect and of singularit#Kand it im&lies an entirel# ne* form of udgment$ In the

FAnal#tic of the BeautifulG in the Third !ritiue, 8ant ste&sbac' from the legitimiing and universaliing &roects ofthe Prst t*o !ri1 tiues, in order to &roblematieuniversaliation and legitimation themselves$ Beaut#cannot be udged according to conce&tsK it is a matterneither of em1 &irical fact, nor of moral obligation$ This is*h# there is no science of the beautiful$ +or 8ant,aesthetics has no foundation, and it oJers us no guaran1tees$ ather, it thro*s all norms and values into uestion,or into crisis$ Even if 8ant himself ultimatel# shrin's from

the more radical im&lications of his theories, a certaincritical aestheticism still haunts his tets, and es&eciall#the Third !ritiue$ M# aim in Without Criteria is to unearththis subterranean di1 mension of 8antOs argument, and totrac' its crucial role in the meta&h#sical s&eculations ofAlfred %orth 6hitehead and /illes 5eleue$>


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1.My starting point for these readings and speculations is an article I wrote quite some time

ago: eauty !ies in the "ye# $%ha&iro '((')* In that te+t, I argued for the continuing rele

&ance of the -eautiful, rather than the su-lime, for a contemporary or postmodern# aesthetics.


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Beaut#, 8ant sa#s, is not cognitive, not conce&tual$FA udgment of taste is not based on determinateconce&tsGK that is to sa#, the conce&t behind such a

udgment (if it can be called a Fconce&tG at all) Fdoes notallo* us to cognie and &rove an#thing concerning theobect because it is intrinsicall# indeterminable andinadeute for cognitionG (8ant >9)$ There is noobective or scientiPc *a# to determine *hether an obectis beautiful, andD if it isDto e&lain *h#$ This is because ofthe strange status of aesthetic udg1 ment$ I ma# udge ao*er to be beautiful, #et I 'no* that Fbeaut# is not a&ro&ert# of the o*er itself GK the o*er is beautiful Fonl#b# virtue of that characteristic in *hich it ada&ts itself to

the *a# *e a&&rehend itG (>?)$ So beaut# is notobectivel# there, in the *orld$ It is not in natureK it israther something that *e attribute to nature$ Anaesthetic udgment, therefore, is one F*hose determiningbasis cannot be other than sub(ectiveG ()$

et at the same time, beaut# isnOt merely subective$It isnOt ust some1 thing that *e &roect u&on *hatever it isthat *e see, hear, feel, touch, or taste$ The attribution ofbeaut# is not an arbitrar# im&osition$ There is nothingabout it that is s&ecial, or &articular, to the &erson *ho

ha&&ens to be ma'ing the udgment$ It is not evenFuniversall#G subectiveK for, in contrast to an em1 &iricaludgment of the understanding, a udgment of taste doesnot involve the mindOs active im&ressing of its o*n!ategories u&on a &assive eternal *orld$ ather, audgment of taste involves an uncoerced response, on the&art of the subect, to the obect that is being udgedbeautiful$ Aesthetic udgment is a 'ind of reconition7 itOsan a&&reciation of ho* the obect Fada&ts itself to the *a#*e a&&rehend it,G even though, at the same time, itremains indiJer1 ent to us$

IOm inclined to read Fada&tG here in a 5ar*inian sense(even though, of course, 8ant could not have intended itthis *a#)$ 5eleue and /uattari

I e+plored the rami/cations of Kant0s claim that a 1udgment of taste is nonconceptual. I

sug gested that there was a close af/nity -etween Kant0s notion of -eauty and Deleuze0s

!ha


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notion of singularity. and I proposed that a radicalization of Kant0s Antinomy of 2aste#

$3456, '3(ff*) could lead to the transformation of Kant0s sensus communis into a

culti&ation and sharing of the highest possi-le degree of singularity# $%ha&iro '((', 36),

or into what today we should call a dissensus $7anciere '((8) rather than a consensus* All

these points are pursued further,and e+panded on, in the course of Without Criteria*


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(>990)$

ou might sa# that the beaut# of the orchid is *hat6hitehead, in Process and Reality, calls Fa lure forfeelingG (>929:>9;


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2. Whitehead does not ignore the question of 1udgment. -ut he regardsjudgment as a

much nar rower term thanproposition* Any proposition that is admitted into thought is

there-y felt, and

2


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Though 8ant refers to Fudgments of tasteG rather thanto F&ro&ositions,G he is in accord *ith 6hitehead at leastto this etent7 he sa#s that aesthetic udgments have

nothing to do *ith determinations of truth and falsehood$(The# also have nothing to do *ith moral determinationsof good and evil$) This is because a udgment of beaut# isaJective, rather than cognitive$ More &recisel#, it is afeeling entirel# divorced from obective 'no*ledge$ FAudg1 ment of taste,G 8ant sa#s, Fis merel# contemplative,i$e$, it is a udgment that is indiJerent to the eistence ofthe obect7 it UconsidersV the character of the obect onl#b# holding it u& to our feeling of &leasure anddis&leasure$G Such a udgment Fis neither based on

conce&ts, nor directed to them as purposesG (8ant >9)$ In an aesthetic udgment, I am not assertingan#thing about *hat is, nor am I legislating as to *hatought to be$ ather, I am being lured, allured, seduced,re&ulsed, incited, or dissuaded$ And for 6hiteheadD if note&licitl# for 8antDthis is &art of the &rocess b# *hich Ibecome *hat I am$

Beaut# is therefore an event, a &rocess, rather than acondition or a state$ The o*er is not beautiful in itselfKrather, beaut# happens *hen I encounter the o*er$

Beaut# is eeting, and it is al*a#s imbued *ithotherness$ +or although the feeling of beaut# isFsubective,G I cannot e&erience it at *ill$ I can onl# Pndbeaut# *hen the obect solicits me, or arouses m# senseof beaut#, in a certain *a#$ Also, beaut# does not survivethe moment of the en1

-ecomes a feeling* ut only some of these feelings are 1udgments* In the realization of

propo sitions, 91udgment0 is at &ery rare component, and so is 9consciousness0 # $34'43465,

358)*

More speci/cally, the term 91udgment0 refers to three species among the

comparati&e feelings* * * * In each of these feelings the datum is the generic contrast

-etween an o-1ecti/ed ne+us and a proposition whose logical su-1ects ma;e up the ne+us#

$i-id*, '6()* 2hat is to say, a 1udgment in&ol&es a felt contrast# -etween a state of affairs

$an o-1ecti/ed ne+us#) and a hypothesis $a proposition#) concerning that state of affairs*

2he three species# of 1udgment are the af/rmati&e $the 9yesform0 #), the negati&e $the

9noform0 #), and the uncertain $the 9suspenseform0 #)* 2hus, what Whitehead calls

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1udgments are the feelings corresponding to the cognitions that Kant calls 1udgments of the

understanding, or 1udgments -ased on determinate concepts# $3456, '3


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counter in *hich it is created$ It cannot be recovered onceit is gone$ It can onl# be born afresh in another event,another encounter$ A subect does not cognie the beaut#

of an obect$ ather, the obect lures the subect *hile re1maining indiJerent to itK and the subect feels the obect,*ithout 'no*ing it or &ossessing it or even caring about it$The obect touches me, but for m# &art I cannot gras& it orla# hold of it, or ma'e it last$ I cannot dis&el its otherness,its alien s&lendor$ If I could, I *ould no longer Pnd itbeautifulK I *ould, alas, merel# Pnd it useful$

This is *h# the a&&rehension of beaut# isdisinterested$ The beautiful obect is unconcerned *ithmeK and in return, I have no actual interest in it$ I donOt

care *hat benePt it can oJer me, or *hat em&iricalFgratiPcationG (8ant >99


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rece&tionD the e&erience of beaut# is one of distanceand se&aration$ This distance is not a mere absenceK it issomething &ositivel# felt$ 6hen I contem&late somethingthat I consider beautiful, I am moved &recisel# b# thatsomethingOs se&aration from me, its eem&tion from thecategories that I *ould normall# a&&l# to it$

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This is *h# beaut# is a lure, dra*ing me out of m#self$Aesthetic e&erience is a 'ind of communication "ithoutcommunion and "ithout consensus$ It can be shared, or

held in common, *ithout uniting the ones *ho share it$This is all because it is Fa universal communicabilit# thatis indeed not based on a con1 ce&tG (8ant >9,


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possi-ility of actualization*


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*a#s remains apart from me, outside of m# control$ It issomething su&eruous and su&&lemental, #et inesca&able$I &ursue m# &assions *ithout regard to m# interests and

needs, and even to their detriment$At the same time that &assion is divorced from need,

it also does not have the grandeur and seriousness that*e commonl# associate *ith desire$ 8ant is uite e&licitabout the diJerence bet*een Fthe &o*er of desireG (astheoried in the Second !ritiue) and the Ffeeling of&leasure and dis&lea1 sureG that is the main to&ic of theThird (8ant >9=)$ Ce dePnes desire as Fthe &o*er ofbeing the cause, through oneOs &resentations, of theactual1 it# of the obects of these &resentationsG (ibid$)$

This is a difPcult formula1 tion, but it is *orth un&ac'ing$5esire, for 8ant, is *hat determines the *ill$ It cannot beunderstood in terms of negativit# and absence, for it is anactive, autonomous &o*er of the mind$ The Fobect ofdesireG is not something that the subect lac'sK to thecontrar#, it is *hat the subect imagines and creates$ Theact of desiring is the cause, and the eistence of thedesired obect is the eJect$

4. In thus relating passion and disinterest, I am drawing a parallel -etween the paralyzing

&ision of the intolera-le descri-ed -y Deleuze $see pre&ious note) and Andy Warhol0s self

descri-ed affectless gaze# of -asically passi&e astonishment# $Warhol 346>, 3(. cf*

%ha&iro '((8, 3


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3'4), or the accursed share# not re duci-le to the demands of utility $3455)*

= ;


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In short, desire produces the real$? 8ant insists thatthe em&irical eis1 tence of failed and unfulPlled desiresdoes not contradict this formulation$ +or even *hen a

desire turns out to be FinsufPcient,G so that the cor&orealforces it calls on are unable to full# actualie its obect,there is still a &osi1 tive Fcausal relationG bet*een thedesire as a mobiliation of force, and the eJect to*ard*hich it *as striving (ibid$, >;)$ This is also *hat lin'sdesire to moralit#$ In its &ure form, the &o*er of desireis eason and universal La*7 it legislates, and &roduces,the categorical im&erative$ Hf course, ust as em&iricalactions never full# conform to the categorical im&erative,since the# have other motivations than that of res&ect

for the La*, so em&irical desires are never &ure, butal*a#s F&athological,G or tinged *ith interest$%onetheless, even the most limited and &athologicaldesire, far from com1 &romising the La*, bears *itnessto it, as a sort of Fevidence of things not seen$G

6e can thus o&&ose desire to &assion, reason tofeelings of &leasure and dis&leasure, moral disinterest toaesthetic disinterest, the concerns of the Sec1 ond !ritiueto those of the Third$ 5esire is autonomous, absolute, anduni1 versaliing, *hereas &assion is heteronomous,

gratuitous, and singular$ eason transcends all interestsKaesthetic feeling subsists beneath or before an# inter1ests$ 5esire is active and e&ressive7 it comes out of thesubect and legislates

5.Deleuze and =uattari $345'?), or selfen1oyment# $38>,

'54), precisely to the e+tent that it is itself a product of this satisfaction* Eor -oth

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Whitehead and Deleuze and =uattari, this in&ersion implies a mo&ement from the world

to the self $rather than, as in Kant, from the self to the world), and implicitly pri&ileges

passiondisinterest o&er desire*


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for the *orld$ assion, in contrast, emerges out of the*orld and a&&roaches, or &ro&oses itself to, the subect$More &recisel#, &assion is not ust &assive (as its

et#molog# suggests), but h#&erbolicall# more1than1&assive$ The subect is not so much acted u&on as it isincited to re1create itself$ 5esire is ho* the self &roectsitself into, and rema'es, the *orldK aesthetic feeling is ho*the *orld &roects itself into, and rema'es, the self$

These diJerences corres&ond to 8antOs doctrine of thefaculties$ FAll of the soulOs &o*ers or ca&acities,G he sa#s,Fcan be reduced to three that cannot be derived furtherfrom a common basis7 the conitive po"er, the feelin of

pleasure and displeasure, and thepo"er of desireG (>9=)$ The doctrine of the faculties has little currenc# toda#Kbut even if it is ust a Pction, it is a use1 ful and illuminatingone$ +or the doctrine of the faculties allo*s 8ant to dra*crucial structural distinctions$ 6hereas cognition anddesire are &o*ers (0er' m1en), the aesthetic ca&acit# is afeeling (.ef2hl)$ !ognition and desire o out from thesubect to the *orld, *hile the &leasure of beaut# comesinto it, from else*here$ In desire, as in cognition,e&erience begins *ith the subectK in aesthetic feeling,e&erience begins outside, and culminates, or eventuates,

in the subect$All this can also be stated in terms of 8antOs

distinction bet*een con1 ce&ts of understanding andideasK and among ideas bet*een aesthetic and rationalones$ FIdeas, in the broadest sense, are &resentationsreferred to an obect $ $ $ but are such that the# can stillnever become cognition of an ob1 ectG (8ant >9@2>?)$ So man# of our thoughts are not statements ofmatters of factK so man# of our utterances are notconstative$ And these noncognitive F&resentationsG arethemselves of t*o sorts$ Aesthetic ideas are Finnerintuitions to *hich no conce&t can be com&letel#adeuateG (>


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conce&tsG (2>?)$ An aesthetic idea is a singularintimation of beaut#K it F&rom&ts much thought,G but Fnolanguage can e&ress it com&letel# and allo* us to gras&itG (>


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sublime e&erience, but I am im&elled to s&ea' endlessl#about m# failure to understand it$=

8ant famousl# *rites in the +irst !ritiue that

Fthoughts *ithout con1 tent are em&t#K intuitions *ithoutconce&ts are blindG (>99=, >0;)$ This is su&&osed tomean that intuition and conce&t must al*a#s go together$But no*, in the Third !ritiue, he discovers the actualit# ofcontentless thoughts and blind intuitions$ +or rationalideas are &recisel# thoughts that no content can PllK andaesthetic ideas are intuitions that admit of no conce&t$Hnce *e leave the realm of the understanding, *ediscover a fundamental as#mmetr# bet*een conce&ts andintuitions, such that each of them eceeds the &o*ers of

the other$ In the Second !ritiue, *e are obliged to afPrmDand indeed to live b#Dcertain conce&ts, even though *e'no* them to be undemonstrable$ But at least *e stillhave conce&ts, and the *ill that legislates these conce&tsis still, ultimatel#, our o*n$ The Third !ritiue goes muchfurther, as it dis1 &enses *ith conce&ts altogether, as *ellas *ith an active, orginar# self$ Aes1 thetic ideas are nomore moral than the# are conce&tual$ Beaut# is felt, ratherthan com&rehended or *illed$ Intuition is decou&led fromthought$

In Process and Reality 6hitehead cites 8antOs famousstatement about intuitions and thoughts t*ice, in orderto &oint u& this disconnection$ Ce ironicall# acce&tsF8antOs &rinci&le,G onl# to a&&l# it Fin eactl# the converse*a# to 8antOs o*n use of itG (>929:>9;9)$6hitehead suggests that 8antOs s#stem is founded onthe Fsu&&ressed &remiseG that Fintuitions are neverblindG7 that is to sa#, that all a&&rehension is, in &rinci&leand in fact,

6.2his approach to the su-lime would seem to -e the strategy of deconstruction, which I

largely regard as a footnote to Kant* Facques Derrida0s lifelong tas; as a philosopher was

-asi cally the Kantian one of critiquing what Kant calls transcendental illusions:

sophistries not of human -eings -ut of pure reason itself* "&en the wisest among all

human -eings cannot de tach himself from them. perhaps he can after much effort

forestall the error, -ut he can ne&er fully rid himself of the illusion that incessantly teases

and moc;s him# $Kant 344?,


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ceaselessly interrogates these illusions that are -uilt into the &ery nature of rationality

itself, and endea&ors, patiently and carefully, to undo them, while remaining aware that

such an undoing will ne&er -e de/niti&e or /nal* In sum, Derrida is the great twentieth

century thin;er of the Kantian su-lime, whereas Whitehead and Deleuze are $more

interestingly to my mind) thin;ers of the Kantian -eautiful*


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alread# governed b# conce&ts$ But this &remise must bereected, once *e have reected 8antOs FobsessUionV *iththe mentalit# of Xintuition,O and hence *ith its necessar#

involution in consciousnessG (ibid$)$ Some &ages later,6hitehead acce&ts 8antOs claim that Fin ever# act ofe&erience there are ob1 ects for 'no*ledge,G obectsthat, in &rinci&le, can be 'no*n$ But 6hiteheadimmediatel# adds that there is no reason to assume thatthese obects actuall# are cognied, or that cognitionactuall# is involved, in an# given e&erience$ Most of thetime, it is not$ FThe inclusion of intellectual functioning inthUeV act of e&erienceG is in fact uite rareK Fno'no*ledgeG is b# far the most usual case (>??@>?=)$

6hitehead describes the diJerence bet*een his o*n&hiloso&h# and 8antian critiue thus7 F+or 8ant, the *orldemerges from the subectK for the &hiloso&h# of organism,the subect emerges from the *orldDa Xsu&erectO ratherthan a XsubectO G (6hitehead >929:>9;)$ In this *a#, he &erforms a&hiloso&hical Fself1correctionG of the Finitial ecess ofsubectivit#G of 8antOs o*n critiues (>?)$

6hitehead continues to as' the 8antian uestion ofFconstructive functioning,G of ho* the subect arises inand through e&erience$ 8ant and 6hitehead do not&resu&&ose a subect eisting outside of, and &rior to, e1&erience, as 5escartes doesK but neither do the# dissolvethe subect into the u of e&erience, as Cume does$Co*ever, 8ant assumes, in the +irst !ri1 tiue, that

6ithout


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e&erience is fundamentall# conscious and cognitive$6hitehead sa#s, to the contrar#, that Fin general,consciousness is negligibleG in subec1 tive e&erience(>929:>9;>


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&h#sical feelingsG (229)$ These F&h#sical feelingsG &recedethe subectK the lat1 ter is best described as theintegration (in a uasi1mathematical sense), or as the

FendG (both seuentiall# and causall#), of the former$ Thesubect is so1 licited b# the feelings that com&rise itK itonl# comes to be through those feel1 ings$ It is not asubstance, but a &rocess$ And this &rocess is not usuall#consciousK it onl# becomes so under ece&tionalcircumstances$ This is *h# 6hitehead devalues'no*ledge, inverting the 8antian relation bet*een sub1ect and obect, self and *orld$

This is also *h# 6hitehead sa#s that the subect is notself1&er&etuating, but must be continuall# rene*ed$ The

subect does not outlive the feelings that animate it atan# given moment$ FThe ancient doctrine that Xno onecrosses the same river t*iceO is etended,G 6hiteheadsa#sK Fno thin'er thin's t*iceK and, to &ut the mattermore generall#, no subect e&eriences t*iceG(>929:>9;;,20


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outside of e&erience, and no e&erience *ithout asubect$ FThe *hole uni1 verse,G 6hitehead sa#s, Fconsistsof elements disclosed in the e&eriences of subectsG(ibid$, >==)$ There is al*a#s a subect, though notnecessaril# a hu1 man one$ Even a roc'Dand for thatmatter even an electronDhas e&eri1 ences, and must beconsidered a subect1su&erect to a certain etent$ A falling


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roc' Ffeels,G or F&erceives,G the gravitational Peld of theearth$ The roc' isnOt conscious, of courseK but it is a-ectedb# the earth, and this bein a-ected is its e&erience$

6hat ma'es a subect1su&erect is not consciousness, butunit#, identit#, closure, and transcendence$ Each subectis Fsomething individual for its o*n sa'eK and thereb#transcends the rest of actualit#G (ibid$, 9=;, >;;)$ In the moment of its actualiation, asubect is entirel#, irreducibl# sin' ular$ ight after*ard,

of course, the moment &asses, and the subect is Fob1ectiPedG as a FdatumG for other occasionsK but that isanother stor#$

I have been d*elling on 6hiteheadOs self1&roclaimedinversion of 8ant, because I *ant to suggest that 8anthimself alread# &erforms something li'e this inversion, orself1correction, in the Third !ritiue$ +or there, 8ant &ro1&oses a subect that neither com&rehends nor legislates,but onl# feels and re1 s&onds$ The aesthetic subect doesnot im&ose its forms u&on an other*ise chaotic outside

*orld$ ather, this subect is itself informed by the *orldout1 side, a *orld that (in the *ords of 6allace Stevens)FPlls the being before the mind can thin'$G Being thusinformed, the aesthetic subect is contemplative7 it isneither active nor uite &assive, nor even reall# self1reeive, but best de1 scribed grammaticall# in themiddle voice (*hich unfortunatel# doesnOt eist in /ermanor English)$ In aesthetic contem&lation, I donOt have&articular feelings, so much as m# ver# eistence issus&ended u&on these feelings$ The onl# Fcausalit#G of an

aesthetic &resentation, 8ant sa#s, is Fto 3eep Uus inV thestate of UhavingV the &resentation itself$ $ $ $ 6e liner inour contem&lation of the beautiful, because thiscontem&lation reinforces and re&roduces itself G (>9


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enters into it$ The feelings cannot be se&arated from thesubect for *hom the# eistK #et the subect itself canonl# be said to eist b# virtue of these feelings, and inrelation to them$

E&ressed in this auto1aJecting short circuit, and*ithout an# conce&t to determine it, beaut# is al*a#ssingular$ An aesthetic udgment res&onds to a uniuesituationK it cannot be re&eated, generalied, or codiPedinto rules$

>2 >


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In 8antOs terms, *e are faced *ith Fthe universalit# of asingular udgmentG (>9)7 the claim to beaut# isabsolute, and #et at the same time limited to ust this one

instance$ Each encounter *ith beaut# is somethingentirel# ne*K each aesthetic udgment res&onds to acontingenc#$ This is *h# beaut# is incommunicable7 itcannot be co&ied and imitated, ust as Fit cannot becouched in a formula and serve as a &rece&tG (>;;)$ather, 8ant sa#s, beaut# is e#emplary (>;?)$ An art*or'of genius, for instance, Fis an eam&le that is meant notto be imitated, but to be follo*ed b# another genius$ $ $ $The other genius, *ho follo*s the eam&le, is aroused b#it to a feeling of his o*n originalit#, *hich allo*s him to

eercise in art his freedom from the con1 straint of rulesG(>?;) are Fthe subectiveconditions for our em&lo#ment of the &o*er of udgmentas suchG (>??)$ In short, there are no rules, methods,

foundations, or criteria for the creation and a&&reciation ofbeaut#$ All *e have are eam&les of *hat is beautiful, andthe Fsubective conditionsG for striving to eual orsur&ass them$;

8antOs aesthetics is ust one &art of his s#stem$ Ceinsists that aesthetic udgments are noncognitive, in orderto diJerentiate them from udgments of understanding(*hich concern matters of em&irical fact) and frommoral udgments (*hich are categorical obligations orcommands)$ This attem&t to distinguish diJerent sorts of

udgment, and to circumscribe the &o*ers and limits ofeach, remains crucial toda#$ +or it *arns us against thetotalitar1 ianism of reason, or (to e&ress the &oint moremodestl#) against the endeavor of scientists, &hiloso&hers,&olitical des&ots, and religious fanatics to im&ose a uniPedPeld of assessment, in *hich the same fundamentalcritical standards

!ha


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7. Derrida0s frequent discussions of exemplarity, of the noncoincidence -etween the

e+ample and that of which it is an e+ample, of the way that an e+ample always carries

-eyond itself # $3448,


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*ould a&&l# across all disci&lines$ Such an im&ositioncould onl# have cata1 stro&hic conseuences, for it *ouldmean the end of an# sort of novelt#, cre1 ativit#, or

invention$ %eedless to sa#, this dream of totaliingreason is as inca&able of realiation as it is undesirable in&rinci&le$ But it is also a dream that never goes a*a#,since it is *hat 8ant calls a Ftranscendental illusion,G aself1dece&tion built into the ver# nature of reason$ Since*e are al*a#s being lured b# this illusion, li'e moths to aame, *e al*a#s need 8ant to *arn us against it$ In theend, of course, the mania for reason, truth, foundations,and universall# valid criteria is as singular, as gratuitous,and as intractable as an# other &assion$ As 6hitehead

sa#s, Fthe &rimar# function of theories is as a lure forfeelingG (>929:>9;


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/enetics and biotechnolog# are even more&er&leing, since the# are less about understanding theeternal *orld than the# are about e&eriment1 ing onDand thereb# alteringDourselves$ 6e are on the verge ofdevelo&ing the abilit# to clone ourselves, to t*ea' ourgenetic ma'eu&, to h#bridie ourselves

> >?


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through gene s&licing, to incor&orate silicon chi&s into ourbrains, to inter1 face machiner# directl# *ith our nervouss#stems, and to reset our neuro1 transmitter and

hormone levels at *ill$ Such &ractices are inherentl# ris'#and un&redictable$ Co* can *e come to terms *ith formsof F'no*ledgeG *hose ver# eJect is to change *ho F*eGareN Co* do *e udge these disci&lines, *hen the#undermine, or render irrelevant, the ver# norms andcriteria that *e use to ground our udgmentsN 6hat *ill*e do *hen advances in these &ractices force us toredePne, ever more radicall#, *hat *e mean b# such basicnotions as self, life, humanit#, and natureN The ne*biolog#, as much as an# ne* *or' of art, reuires us to

abandon ever#thing *e thin' *e 'no*, and ma'e singularudgments that cannot be subsumed under &reeistingcriteria$ Aesthetics &recedes cognition in such cases,because *e are dealing *ith &rac1 tices that can onl# becom&rehended through the ne* categories that the#themselves create$ The uestion *e should be as'ing,therefore, is not7 Co* can *e establish valid criteria andcritical standardsN but rather7 Co* can *e et a"ay fromsuch criteria and standards, *hich *or' onl# to bloc'innova1 tion and changeN

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+

Actual Entities and Eternal Objects

In a short cha&ter of $he /old that constitutes his onl#etended discussion of Alfred %orth 6hitehead, /illes5eleue &raises 6hitehead for as'ing the uestion,F6hat Is an EventNG (5eleue >99, ;=)$ 6hiteheadOs

*or' mar's onl# the third timeDafter the Stoics andLeibniDthat events move to the center of&hiloso&hical thought$ 6hitehead mar's an im&ortantturning &oint in the histor# of &hiloso&h# because heafPrms that, in fact, ever#thing is an event$ The *orld,he sa#s, is made of events, and nothing but events7ha&&enings rather than things, verbs rather than nouns,&rocesses rather than substances$ As 5eleuesummaries it, Fan event does not ust mean that Xaman has been run over$O The /reat #ramid is an event,

and its duration for a &eriod of one hour, thirt# minutes,Pve minutes $ $ $ , a &assage of %ature, of /od, or a vie*of /odG (ibid$, ;=)$ Becoming is the dee&est dimension ofBeing$>

Even a seemingl# solid and &ermanent obect is aneventK or, better, a multi&licit# and a series of events$ Inhis earl# meta&h#sical boo' $he Con' cept of ature(>920:200), 6hitehead gives the eam&le of!leo&atraOs %eedle on the ictoria Emban'ment inLondon (>=?J$)$ %o*, *e 'no*, of course, that this

monument is not ust Fthere$G It has a histor#$ Its granite*as scul&ted b# human hands, sometime around >?0

-ce$ It *as moved from Celio&olis to Aleandria in >2-ce, and again from Aleandria to London in >


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throughout Without Criteria, is deeply inde-ted to a num-er of recent studies comparing the

two thin;ers: most nota-ly those -y Keith 7o-inson $'((?), Fames Williams $'((>, 66

3((), and Michael Balewood $'((>)*


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other*ise cease to eist$ But for 6hitehead, there ismuch more to it than that$ !leo&atraOs %eedle isnOt ust asolid, im&assive obect u&on *hich certain grand historical

eventsDbeing scul&ted, being movedDhave occasionall#su&ervened$ ather, it is eventful at ever# moment$ +romsecond to second, even as it stands seemingl#motionless, !leo&atraOs %eedle is activel# hap' penin$ Itnever remains the same$ FA &h#sicist *ho loo's on that&art of the life of nature as a dance of electrons, *ill tell#ou that dail# it has lost some molecules and gainedothers, and even the &lain man can see that it gets dirt1ier and is occasionall# *ashedG (ibid$, >=;)$ At ever#instant, the mere standing1in1&lace of !leo&atraOs

%eedle is an event7 a rene*al, a novelt#, a freshcreation$

That is *hat 6hitehead means, *hen he sa#s thateventsD*hich he also calls Factual entitiesG or FactualoccasionsGDare the ultimate com&onents of realit#$Co*ever, I am being a little slo& here$ In Process andReality (>929:>9;9:>9=;, 20@20)$ 6hitehead sometimes also callsthem endurin ob(ects (>929:>9;09)$ !leo&atraOs

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%eedle is a societ#, or an enduring obectK for thatmatter, so am I m#self (>929:>9;=>)$

To summarie, an FoccasionG is the &rocess b# *hichan#thing becomes, and an FeventGDa&&l#ing to a neus ora societ#Dis an etensive set, or a tem1 &oral series, ofsuch occasions$ This contrast bet*een individualbecomings,


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and the &rogressive summation of such becomings, iscrucial to 6hiteheadOs meta&h#sics$ An actual occasion issomething li'e *hat 5eleue calls a sinu' larity7 a &oint

of inection or of discontinuous transformation$ %oactual occasion comes into being e# nihiloK rather, itinherits its FdataG from &ast occasions$ et each actualoccasion is also self1creating, or causa sui, b# virtue of thenovel *a# in *hich it treats these &reeisting data or&rior occasions$ Cence, no occasion is the same as an#otherK each occasion introduces some1 thing ne* into the*orld$ This means that each occasion, ta'en in itself, is a&uantum7 a discrete, indivisible unit of becoming$ But thisalso means that oc1 casions are strictl# limited in sco&e$

Hnce an occasion ha&&ens, it is alread# over, alread#dead$ Hnce it has reached its Pnal Fsatisfaction,G it nolonger has an# vital &o*er$ FAn actual occasion $ $ $ neverchanges,G 6hitehead sa#sK Fit onl# becomes and&erishesG (>9:>9=;, 20)$ And a &erished occasionsubsists onl# as a FdatumG7 a sort of ra* material, *hichan# subseuent occa1 sion ma# ta'e u& in its o*n turn, inorder to transform it in a ne* &rocess of self1creation$

In contrast to the immediate becoming and &erishingof actual occa1 sions, change al*a#s involves a

com&arison$ It can be understood as a &assage bet"eenoccasions, or as the Froute of inheritanceG (6hitehead>929:>9;


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committed to the idea of a -ecoming of continuity*# 2he pro-lem for -oth thin;ers is how

to resol&e the conicting claims of unity and multiplicity, or how to achie&e what

Deleuze and =uattari $3456, '() call the magic formula we all see;G@!H7A!I%M

= MJI%M*# Deleuze, fol lowing %pinoza and ergson, opts for radical continuity, and

hence leans toward monism more than Whitehead, whose quantum theory of e&ents puts

more of an emphasis on irre duci-le plurality*

>< >9


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Becoming is not continuous, because each occasion, eachact of becoming, is uniue7 a F&roduction of novelt#Gthat is also a ne* form of Fconcrete to1 gethernessG

(2>), or *hat 6hitehead calls a concrescence$ Somethingne* has been added to the universeK it mar's a radicalbrea' *ith *hatever *as there before$ +or its &art,continuit# al*a#s has to become, &recisel# because it isnever given in advance$ The continuit# im&lied b# theeistence of an endur1 ing obectDli'e !leo&atraOs%eedle, or li'e m#selfDis something that al1 *a#s needsto be activel# &roduced$ %othing comes into being onceand for allK and nothing ust sustains itself in being, as ifb# inertia or its o*n inner force$ ather, an obect can

onl# endure insofar as it rene*s itself, or creates itselfafresh, over and over again$

At ever# moment, then, the continuing eistence of!leo&atraOs %eedle is a ne* event$ ou canOt bum& into thesame obelis' t*ice$ All the more so, in that the same logicholds for me m#self, as *ell as for m# &erce&tion of the%eedle$ At an# given instant, m# encounter *ith the%eedle is itself an event (6hitehead >920:200, >=9)$ Thisencounter might ta'e the form of m# sur1 &rise at seeingthe %eedle for the Prst timeK of m# close scrutin# of its

aesthetic featuresK of m# barel# conscious recognition of itas I *al' negligentl# b#K of the &ain in m# forehead, as I'noc' against it, *ithout loo'ingK of m# vague

In any case, the ad&antage of Whitehead0s e&ent epochalism,# or atomism on the

le&el of actual occasions, isGas =eorge 7* !ucas e+plainsGthat it allows him to a&oid the

s;epti cal implications of an apparent 9parado+ of -ecoming0 common to ergson and

Fames* 2he parado+ is that an undifferentiated continuity of -ecoming, since it neither

-egins nor ends, cannot itself -e concei&ed of as determinate or concrete, nor can it

meaningfully -e said to gi&e rise to a plurality of distinct e+istents# $!ucas 344(, 33


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recei&e* An entity0s sat isfaction# consists not in persisting in its own -eing, -ut in

achie&ing difference and no&elty, in introducing something new into the world*


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memor# of having seen it #ears agoK or even, if I havenever been to London, of m# reading about it in6hiteheadOs boo'$ Each of these encounters is a fresh

eventK and each of the selves to *hich it ha&&ens is also afresh event$ erceiv1 ing the %eedle is not something thatha&&ens to me as an alread#1constituted subect, butrather something that constitutes me ane* as a subect$That is to sa#, *hereas for 8ant, and most &ost18antianthought, Fthe *orld emerges from the subect,G in6hiteheadOs &hiloso&h# the &rocess is inverted, so thatFthe subect emerges from the *orldDa Xsu&erectO ratherthan a XsubectO G (6hitehead >929:>9;) notion of

indi&iduation* %imondon draws e+tensi&ely on the e+ample of a crystal -eing precipitated

out of a solution, which I ha&e -orrowed as a metaphor here* In addition, %imondon0s

account of perception as dispara- tion, a process where-y indi&iduation creates a

relational system that 9holds together0 what prior to its occurrence was incompati-le#

ActualEntities

and


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$2oscano '((?, 3


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*hich stands there *hether I loo' at it or not$ Hr, to &ut itmore &recisel#, the event b# *hich the %eedle stands onthe ictoria Emban'ment is diJer1 ent from the event b#

*hich I &erceive the %eedle standing on the ictoriaEmban'ment$ But these events are both of the samenatureK the# are both Fs&o1 'enG or e&ressed in the same*a#K and the# eist together in one and the same *orld$?

In order to s&ea' adeuatel#D*hich is to sa#,univocall#Dabout events, 6hitehead reects the Fsubect1&redicate forms of thoughtG (>929:>9;


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that the differences he notices -etween Whitehead and Deleuze are matters of -alance#

or emphasis, rather than fundamental in compati-ilities*


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vie*G ()$ In altogether abolishing the distinctionbet*een substance and mode, 6hitehead convertsS&inoa from a logic of monism to one of &lural1 ism (;)$

In Process and Reality, Fmor&hological descri&tion isre&laced b# descri&tion of d#namic &rocess$ AlsoS&inoaOs XmodesO no* become the sheer actualitiesK sothat, though anal#sis of them increases our understand1ing, it does not lead us to the discover# of an# highergrade of realit#G (;)$ +or 6hitehead, there is nothingbesides the modes, no uniPed substance that subsumesthemDnot even immanentl#$ Even /od, 6hiteheadsuggests, is natura naturata as *ell as natura naturans,Fat once a creature of creativit# and a condition for

creativit#$ It shares this double character *ith all crea1turesG (>)$ In itself, ever# individual Factual entit#satisPes S&inoaOs notion of substance7 it is causa sui G(222)$ The modes, aJections, or actual occasions are allthere is$=

There is therefore no stable and essential distinction,for 6hitehead, bet*een mind and matter, or bet*eensubect and obect$ There is also no stable and essentialdistinction bet*een human and nonhuman, or even be1t*een living and nonliving$ ItOs not that such distinctions

are unim&ortantK often the# are of the greatest&ragmatic im&ortance$ I should not treat a human beingthe *a# that I treat a stone$ But *e need to rememberthat these distinctions are al*a#s situational$ The# arediJerences of degree, not diJerences of essence or 'ind$6hitehead see's to &roduce a meta&h#sics that isnonanthro&omor&hic and nonanthro&ocentric$ This meansthat he is a secular and naturalistic thin'er, but one of aver# s&ecial sort$ Ce reects su&ernatural e&lanations,holding to *hat he calls the ontoloical principle7 theclaim that Factual entities are the onl# reasonsG(>929:>9;


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6. Whitehead0s re1ection of %pinoza0s monism in fa&or of William Fames0s pluralism

goes along with his re1ection of %pinoza0s conatus in fa&or of Fames0s $and ergson0s) sense

of continual change, -ecoming or process, or what he also calls creativity*

22 2


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or be#ond it$ Even the conce&t of /od needs to besecularied, e&lained in em&irical terms, and located*ithin &henomenal e&erience (20;)$

In this regard, it is im&ortant to note that 6hiteheadal*a#s see'sDas does 5eleue, after himDto conciliatehis arguments *ith the Pndings of e1 &erimental science$Too man# t*entieth1centur# &hiloso&hers reect scienceand technolog# as abusive FenframingsG of e&erience(Ceidegger), or as eer1 cises in Finstrumental reasonG(Cor'heimer and Adorno)$ 6hitehead, ho*1 ever, is&ositivel# stimulated b# the science of his da#7 the theor#of relativit#, and to a lesser etent uantum mechanics$Hne of his goals is to create a meta1 &h#sics that frees

itself from the outdated assum&tions of classical(!artesian and %e*tonian) thought as thoroughl# ast*entieth1centur# &h#sics does$ This doesnOt mean that&hiloso&h# is subsumed into science (as certain &osi1 tivistand anal#tical &hiloso&hers *ould *ish)K 6hitehead, no lessthan 5eleue, insists on the essential diJerence bet*eenthe &hiloso&hical enter&rise and the scientiPc one, andthe irreducibilit# of the former to the latter$ But 6hite1headOs meta&h#sics al*a#s &resumes a res&ect for thePndings of &h#sical sci1 ence$ Toda#, 6hiteheadOs thought

(li'e that of 5eleue) can be brought into fruitful contact*ith such livel# areas of contem&orar# scientiPc researchand debate as com&leit# theor# (obinson 200?) andneurobiolog# (red 200?K Me#er 200?)$

But 6hiteheadOs ontological &rinci&le also im&liesthat &h#sical scienceD*ith its reection of the Fsearch fora reason,G its se&aration of ues1 tions of ho" fromuestions of "hyDis not altogether adeuate for com&re1hending realit#$ It is incom&lete$ As Isabelle Stengers(200?, ;J) &uts it, science is a necessar# condition for

understanding the *orld, but not a sufP1 cient one$ Tosto& at the level of scientiPc e&lanation *ould be toacce&t the Fbifurcation of nature into t*o s#stems ofrealit#,G one the realm of Fmole1 cules and electrons,Gand the other that of mental &henomena (Loc'eOs Fsec1ondar# ualitiesG) li'e Fthe greenness of the trees, thesong of the birds, the *armth of the sunG (6hitehead>920:200, 0@>)$ To overcome this bifurcation,6hitehead, li'e Leibni, see's a FsufPcient reasonG for all&he1 nomena$ And as 5eleue (>99, >) sa#s,

!ha


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commenting on Leibni, Fa cause is not the reason beingsoughtG hereK or at least, the causalit# traced b# &h#s1ical science is not enouh of a reason$ As 5eleue furthere&lains, LeibniOs &rinci&le of sufPcient reason Fclaimsthat ever#thing that ha&&ens to a thingDcausationsincludedDhas a reason$ If an event is called *hat ha&&ens


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to a thing, *hether it undergoes the event or ma'es itha&&en, it can be said that sufPcient reason is *hatincludes the event as one of its &redicatesG (ibid$)$ 6e

cannot ignore the &h#sical chain of causalit# that is at*or' in a given eventK but *e do not *ant oure&lanation to sto& there$ 6e also Freuire tounderstand,G as 6hitehead sa#s (cited in Stengers 200?,2), the reason behind this chain of causalit#, theFdecisionG that ma'es of it *hat it is$ 6hitehead *arnsus that such F XdecisionO cannot be construed as acasual adunct of an actual entit#$ It constitutes the ver#meaning of actualit#G (>929:>9;


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occa sions, -ut societies and enduring o-1ects* At the same time, these societies and

enduring o-1ects are themsel&es composed of nothing more than a set of actual occasions,

together with the historical routes# $Whitehead 34'43465, ?


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*ith Fantitheses,G or Fa&&arent self1contradictions,G6hiteheadOs /od nei1 ther selects among thealternative &ossibilities in the manner of LeibniOs

divinit#, nor FsublatesG the o&&ositions into a higher, self1reeive and self1 diJerentiating unit# in the manner ofCegelOs Absolute$ ather, 6hiteheadOs /od o&erates Fashift of meaning *hich converts the o&&osition into acontrastG (>929:>9;


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344


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reuiring a sufPcient reason for all &henomena,6hitehead necessaril# chal1 lenges the foundingassum&tion of modern scientiPc reason7 that of a Fs&lit

subectG (Lacan >9;9;0, >* ut e&en granting Llar;0s interpretation, Whitehead is suf/ciently open as

regards =od and the chaosmos# as to not altogether e+clude Deleuze0s readingGat least in

the way that I am citing it here* &erall, I am less concerned with reconstructing

ActualEntities

and


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Whitehead0s thought precisely than in delineating the outlines of the encounter -etween

Whitehead and Deleuze, an encounter that changes our apprehension of -oth of them*

2= 2;


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and com&leit#, are all treated in the same manner$>0 6hen6hitehead *rites of the Fmental &oleG of an electron, or amonument, *e must remember that Fmental o&erations

do not necessaril# involve consciousnessGK indeed, mostoften the# ha&&en entirel# *ithout consciousness(6hitehead >929:>9;


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In any case, the dictum of a at ontology at least applies to anything that we may en

counter in li&ed e+perience, since e&erything from a neutrino to the cosmos as a whole is

equally a society# in Whitehead0s de/nition of the term*


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the classical &hiloso&hical tradition from 5escartes to the&ositivists of the t*entieth centur#, is one sort of&rehension$ But it is far from the onl# one$ Hur lives are

Plled *ith e&eriences of Fnon1sensuous &erce&tionG(6hite1 head >9:>9=;, >)7 from our a*areness ofthe immediate &ast (>), to the feelings *e have of FtheX"ithnessO of the bodyG (6hitehead >929:>9;2)$ F6esee the contem&orar# chair, but *e see it "ith our e#esKand *e touch the contem&orar# chair, but *e touch it"ith our handsG (=2)$ Hr again, F*e see by our eyes, andtaste by our palatesG (>22)$ In the same *a#, Fa ell#Pshadvances and *ithdra*s, and in so doing ehibits some&erce&tion of causal relationshi& *ith the *orld be#ond

itselfK a &lant gro*s do*n*ards to the dam& earth, andu&*ards to the lightG (>;=)$ These are all &rehensions$ +orthat matter, the earth &rehends the sun that gives itenerg#K the stone &re1 hends the earth to *hich it falls$!leo&atraOs %eedle &rehends its material sur1 roundingsKand I &rehend, among other things, the %eedle$ A ne*entit# comes into being b# &rehending other entitiesKever# event is the &rehension of other events$>>

All this a&&lies, it should be noted, not onl# to theencounter bet*een subect and obect, but also to

encounters bet*een one obect and another, as *ell as to*hat is commonl# called the Fidentit#G of the individualsubect$ Self1identit#, the relation of a subect to itself, hasthe same structure as the re1 lation of a subect to anobect$ The# are both grounded in &rehensions$ I &re1 hend!leo&atraOs %eedle afresh ever# time I &ass it, or thin'about it$ But also, I continuall# &rehend m#selfK I rene*m#self in being, at ever# instant, b# &rehending *hat I*as ust a moment ago, Fbet*een a tenth of a second and

11. As Deleuze puts it: "&erything prehends its antecedents and its concomitants and,

-y de grees, prehends a world* 2he eye is a prehension of light* !i&ing -eings prehend

water, soil, car-on, and salts* At a gi&en moment the pyramid prehends Japoleon0s

soldiers $forty cen turies are contemplating us) and in&ersely# $Deleuze 344


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'((?, 6)* %econd, Deleuze fails to mention the temporal dimension of prehension*

An actual entity does not prehend what is contemporaneous with it, -ut only what lies in

its past $although this is usually its immediatepast, so that the distinction is for the most

part unnoticea-le)*

2< 29


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half a second ago$G Such an immediate &ast Fis gone,and #et it is here$ It is our indubitable self, the foundationof our &resent eistenceG (6hitehead >9:>9=;, >)$

An Fenduring obectG can onl# &ersist through time, andretain a certain Fidentit#G amid the becomings that it&asses through, b# virtue of Fa genetic character inheritedthrough a historic route of actual occasionsG (6hitehead>929:>9;09)$ I am onl# the Fsame,G onl# able toFsustain a characterG (?), to the etent that I continuall#,and activel#, ta'e u& this in1 heritance from the immediate&ast$ M# self1identit#, or the manner in *hich I relate tom#self, is the e&ression of such an inheritance7 the&rocess b# *hich I receive it, reect on it, and transform

it, again and again$>2 And the same could be said, more orless, for !leo&atraOs %eedle$ The onl# diJerence is that Ita'e u& m# inheritance from the &ast on a higher andmore reeive level than does a &lant, a stone, or anelectron$

If Being is univocal, and ever#thing is an event, andthe human and the rational hold no s&ecial &rivileges, thene&istemolog# must be demoted from the central role thatit generall# holds in &ost1!artesian (and es&eciall# &ost18antian) thought$ The *hole &oint of 6hiteheadOs

&hiloso&h# is Fto free our notions from &artici&ation in ane&istemological theor# of sense1&erce&tionG (6hitehead>929:>9;


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appercep tion* Whitehead $34'43465, 3>?) in&erts# the Kantian analysisGor, as I prefer

to say, converts it from a cogniti&e to an e+periential -asisG-y replacing Kant0s a-stract

temporality with ergson0s concrete duration,# or -etter with what William Fames calls

the specious present*#


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e&istemological investigations7 5escartesOs methodicaldoubt, CumeOs s'e&ti1 cism, and 8antOs transcendentaldeduction$ In all these cases, continuit# and causalit# are

in fact alread# &reassumed b# the arguments that claimto &ut them into doubt (or, in the case of 8ant, toground and authorie them)$ Cume, for instance,uestions causalit# b# arguing that all *e can reall# 'no*of a necessar# lin' bet*een events is their constantconunction in memor#$ Such a conunction, Cume sa#s,must be ascribed to our habits and associa1 tionsK it is inour minds, rather than in the *orld$ But 6hitehead reectsthis ver# distinction$ Ce remar's that Fit is difPcult tounderstand *h# Cume e1 em&ts XhabitO from the same

criticism as that a&&lied to the notion of Xcause$O 6e haveno Xim&ressionO of Xhabit,O ust as *e have no Xim&ressionOof Xcause$O !ause, re&etition, habit are all in the sameboatG (ibid$, >0)$

In other *ords, habits and mental associations couldnot themselves be &osited *ithout the hidden assum&tionof *hat 6hitehead calls causal ef' 5cacy7 Fthe sense ofderivation from an immediate &ast, and of &assage to animmediate futureG (ibid$, >;


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the greatest boo's of modern &hiloso&h#G (5eleue >99,2


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Ped !ategories of the understanding in 8antOs Criti&ue ofPure Reason$ 8antOs categories are logical ande&istemologicalK the# Fbelong to the *orld of re&re1

sentationG (5eleue >99, 2929:>9;99, 2


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* * * 7ather, Whitehead0s preKantianism plays much the same role in his thought as it

does in Deleuze: a way of approaching and confronting the aporias of Kantianism as

preparation for the laying out of an essentially postKantian philosophy of creati&ity and

-ecoming* Whitehead is a deeply postKantian philosopher in much the same way that

Deleuze is postKantian*#

2


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There are, of course, im&ortant diJerences bet*een8antOs transcenden1 tal argument and 5eleueOsinvocation of the virtual$ +or one thing, 8antOs stance is

legislative and uridical7 he see's to distinguish legitimatefrom ille1 gitimate uses of reason$ 5eleue see's rather(citing Artaud) Fto have done *ith the udgment of /odGKhis criterion is constructivist rather than uridi1 cal,concerned *ith &ushing forces to the limits of *hat the#can do, rather than *ith evaluating their legitimac#$ Also,8antOs transcendental realm deter1 mines the necessar#formDbut onl# the formDof all &ossible e&erience$5eleueOs virtual, in contrast, is Fgenetic and &roductiveGof actual e&eri1 ence (5eleue >9@?2)$ +inall#,

8antOs transcendental realm has the structure of asubectivit#K at the ver# least, it ta'es on the bare form ofthe FIG in the Ftranscendental unit# of a&&erce&tion$G But5eleueOs virtual is an Fim1 &ersonal and &re1individualtranscendental PeldG (5eleue >990, >02)K it does nothave the form of a consciousness$ In ma'ing thesecorrections to 8ant, 5eleue himself does *hat he credits%ietsche *ith doing7 he Fstands U8an1 tianV critiue onits feet, ust as Mar does *ith the UCegelianV dialecticG(5eleue >9>)$ Somethingthat is merel# &ossible has no claim to eistence, and nointrinsic mode of being$ Its onl# &ositive characteristics arethose that it borro*s from the real that it is not$ The

!ha


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&ossible Frefers to the form of identit# in the conce&tGK itFis understood as an image of the real, *hile the real issu&&osed to resemble the &ossibleG (2>>@2>2)$ That is tosa#, the &ossible is eactl# li'e the real, ece&t for thecontingenc# that it does not, in fact, eist$ And the real isnothing more than the the *or'ing1out of *hat


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*as alread# &rePgured and envisioned as &ossible$ Inthis mirror &la# of resemblances, there can be nothingne* or une&ected$ 6hen a &ossibilit# is realiedD*hen

it does come into eistenceDno actual creation has ta'en&lace$ As 5eleue sa#s, Fit is difPcult to understand *hateistence adds to the conce&t *hen all it does is doubleli'e *ith li'eG (2>2)$

The virtual, on the other hand, is altogether real inits o*n rightK it F&ossesses a full realit# b# itself G (ibid$2>>)$ It is ust that this realit# is not ac1 tual$ The virtual isli'e a Peld of energies that have not #et been e&ended, ora reservoir of &otentialities that have not #et been ta&&ed$That is to sa#, the virtual is not com&osed of atomsK it

doesnOt have bod# or etension$ But the &otential forchange that it oJers is real in its o*n *a#$ In the roustianfor1 mulation so freuentl# used b# 5eleue, the virtual isFreal *ithout being ac1 tual, ideal *ithout being abstractG(20


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bodies$ It is a matter, as 5eleue &uts it in $he +oic of*ense, of Fbodies *ith their tensions, &h#sical ualities,actions and &assions, and the corres&onding Xstates ofaJairs$O These states of aJairs, ac1 tions and &assions, aredetermined b# the mitures of bodies $ $ $ all bodies arecausesDcauses in relation to each other and for eachotherG (5eleue >990, )$

?


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Ever#thing in the *orld is determined b# such &h#sicalcausesK the# consi1 tute a necessar# condition for ever#eventDbut as *e have seen, not a sufP1 cient one$

This linear causalit#, and this necessit#, are *hat 8antsee's to guarantee against CumeOs s'e&ticism$ But if *eacce&t 6hiteheadOs critiue of Cume, then *e can onl#conclude that 8antOs ver# search for such a guarantee issu1 &eruous$ !ausal efPcac# is al*a#s alread# at *or'in the de&ths of bodies$ 8ant never uestions CumeOsinitial dubious assum&tion7 that causalit# can1 not befound out there, in the *orld, and that conseuentl# itcan onl# be located in here, in the mind of the &erceiver$Cume a&&eals to habit as the basis of the mindOs

ascri&tion of causalit# to thingsK 8antOs transcendentalargument converts this em&irical generaliation into ana priori necessit#$ But 8ant still acce&ts *hat 6hitehead(>929:>9;?;) calls the sub(ec' tivist andsensationalist &rinci&les derived from Loc'e and Cume$>?

In conse1 uence, 8antOs transcendental deductionremains caught *ithin Fa logic of tracing andre&roductionG (5eleue and /uattari >92), Fa tracingof the transcendental from the em&iricalG (5eleue>99, >)$ 8ant merel# transfers the structure of causal

efPcac# from the *orld to the subect a&&re1 hending the*orld$ The &ossible ust doubles the real, *ithout addingan#1 thing to it$

5eleue converts 8antOs argument from &ossibilit# tovirtualit#, and from the role of guaranteeing causalefPcac# to one of &roviding sufPcient rea1 sons, b# &ositinga diJerent sort of transcendental logic$ Alongside theactual, material FconnectionG of &h#sical causes to oneanother, there is also a virtual relation, or a Fbond,G lin'ingFeJects or incor&oreal eventsG among themselves

(5eleue >990, =)$ The virtual is the realm of eJectsse&arated from their causes7 FeJects in the causal sense,but also sonorous, o&tical, or linguistic Xef1 fectsO G (;), or*hat in the movies are called Fs&ecial eJects$G EJectscome after

15. As Whitehead $34'43465, 3>6) speci/es: 2he su-1ecti&ist principle is, that the

!ha


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otentialsG (6hitehead >929:>9;9>) that enterinto, and hel& to dePne, these occasions$ 6hen Fthe&otentialit# of an eternal obect is realied in a &articularactual

= ;


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entit#,G it FcontributUesV to the dePniteness of that actualentit#G (2)$ It gives it a &articular character$ Eternalobects thus ta'e on something of the role that

universals (?9) &la#ed in older meta&h#sical s#stems$ But *e havealread# seen that, for 6hitehead, a Fconcrete &articularfactG cannot sim&l# Fbe built u& out of uni1 versalsGK it ismore the other *a# around$ 4niversals, or Fthings *hichare eternal,G can and must be abstracted from Fthings*hich are tem&oralG (0)$ But the# cannot be conceivedb# themselves, in the absence of the em&irical, tem&oralentities that the# inform$ Eternal obects, therefore, are

neither a priori logical structures, nor latonic essences,nor constitutive rational ideas$ The# are adverbial, ratherthan substantiveK the# determine and e&ress ho" actualentities relate to one another, ta'e one another u&, andFenter into each othersO constitutionsG (>9)$ Li'e8antian and 5eleuian ideas, eternal obects *or'regulativel#, or &roblematicall#$>=

To be more &recise, 6hitehead dePnes eternal obectsas follo*s7 Fan# entit# *hose conce&tual recognition doesnot involve a necessar# reference to an# dePnite actual

entites of the tem&oral *orld is called an Xeternal obectO G

16. Whitehead0s account of eternal o-1ects thus has strong af/nities with Kant0s

transcenden tal argument* Fust as Kant sought to re1ect -oth idealism and empiricism -y

posing the tran scendental in opposition to -oth the transcendent and the mere u+

of sensations, so Whitehead argues against two opposed, -ut complementary,

philosophical positions* n the one hand, to assert the o-1ecti&e reality of sensa or qualia is

to re1ect mainstream empiricism and positi&ism* Erom !oc;e through Bume, and right on

up to midtwentiethcentury posi ti&ism, sensa are regarded as secondary qualities,# not

present in reality, -ut only in the mind* 2he doctrine of pri&ate psychological /elds# still

remains a feature of our commonsense un derstanding of the world today, e&en though, as

Whitehead $34'43465,


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"eality)* As I will discuss in chapter >, e&en =od, who is a-le to en&ision the totality of

eternal o-1ects, must -e &iewed as an empirical entity rather than as a transcen dent one*


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17. It is important to recall here that, for Whitehead, all entities feel and ha&e feelings,

and not1ust sentient ones*

< 9


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t*o elements can Pnd no inter&retation of &atent factsG(


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descri-e the de&elopment of the weather, the changing -alances -etween predators and

prey in an ecosystem, the irregularities of a heart murmur, and the uctuations of the

stoc; mar;et* Whitehead see;s -oth to ac ;nowledge this in&eterate @latonism and to

indicate its limitations*


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real, because the# are themselves Fe&eriencedrelations,G or &rimordial ele1 ments of e&erience$>9

But even though eternal obects are altogether real,

the# are not the same as actual entities$ Li'e 5eleueOsvirtualities, the# are &recisel# not ac1 tual$ This isbecause, in themselves, the# are not causall# determined,and the# cannot ma'e an#thing ha&&en$ Eternal obectsFinvolve in their o*n natures indecisionG andFindeterminationG (6hitehead >929:>9;


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nothing, nothing, noth ing, -are nothingness# $Whitehead 34'43465, 3?6)* And amid all

this e+perience, he says, we /nd oursel&es in a -uzzing world# $i-id*, >()Gdeli-erately

echoing Fames0s famous de scription of the -looming, -uzzing confusion# of the stream

of consciousness*

0 >


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b# *hat 6hitehead calls the inression of s&eciPc eternalobects into it$ FThe term XingressionO refers to the&articular mode in *hich the &otentialit# of an eternal

obect is realied in a &articular actual entit#, contributingto the deP1 niteness of that actual entit#G (6hitehead>929:>9;


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much as the actual and the &a

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