Wittgenstein o n Non-Mediative Causality

J A M E S C . K L A G G E

IN THE LATE AUTUMN OF 194 7 W i t t g e n s t e i n d i c t a t e d a s e l e c t i o n o f m a n u s c r i p t m a t e r i a l to a typ i s t 1 t h a t c o n t a i n s s o m e r e m a r k s so s t r i k i n g t h a t t h e y m e r i t e x t e n s i v e q u o t a t i o n :

9o3 . No suppos i t ion seems to me m o r e na tu ra l than that the re is no process in the bra in cor re la ted with associat ing o r with th ink ing ; so that it wou ld be impossible to r ead o f f though t -p rocesses f r o m brain-processes . I m e a n this: i f I talk o r wri te the re is, I as- sume, a system of impulses go ing ou t f r o m my bra in and cor re la ted with my spoken or wri t ten thoughts . But why shou ld the system con t inue f u r t h e r in the d i rec t ion o f the cent re? Why should this o r d e r n o t p r o c e e d , so to speak, o u t o f chaos? T h e case wou ld be like the f o l l o w i n g - - c e r t a i n kinds o f plants mul t ip ly by seed, so that a seed always p roduces a p lan t o f the same k ind as tha t f r o m which it was p r o d u c e d - - b u t noth,ngin the seed co r r e sponds to the p lan t which c o m e s f rom it; so tha t it is imposs ib le to infer the p rope r t i e s or s t ruc ture o f the p lan t f r o m those o f the seed tha t it comes ou t o f - - t h i s can only be done f r o m the history of the seed. So an o rgan i sm m i g h t c o m e into be ing even ou t o f s o m e t h i n g qui te a m o r p h o u s , as it were causelessly; a n d the re is no reason why this shou ld no t really ho ld for o u r thoughts , and hence for o u r ta lk ing a n d writ ing. (Zettel 6o8)

9o4 . I t is thus per fec t ly possible that cer ta in psychological p h e n o m e n a cannotbe invest i- ga ted physiologically, because physiological ly n o t h i n g c o r r e s p o n d s to them. (Z 6o9)

9o5 . I saw this m a n years ago; now I have seen h im again, I r e c o g n i z e h im, I r e m e m b e r his name. A n d why does the re have to he a cause o f this r e m e m b e r i n g in my ne rvous system? W h y m u s t s o m e t h i n g or o ther , wha teve r it may be, be s to red -up the re in any form? W h y must a trace have b e e n lef t beh ind? W h y should the re n o t be a psychologica l regula r i ty to which no physiological regular i ty co r responds? I f this upsets o u r concepts o f causality, then it is h igh t ime they were upset . (Z 61o)

~TS ~29 (dictated in late autumn 1947, from manuscript MS 134, remarks dated April 4, 1947), posthumously published as Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. t, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 198o), abbreviated as RPP/Iin what follows. I have changed the translation of the last word in w and the last word in w .

[653]

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906. The prejudice in favor of psycho-physical parallel ism is also a frui t of the primitive concept ion of grammar. For when one admits a causality between psychological phe- nomena, which is not media ted physiologically, one fancies that in doing so one is making an admission of the existence of a soul alongside the body, a ghostly soul-nature. (cf. Z 6a 1)

9o9 . Why should not the initial and terminal states of a system be connected by a natural law, which does not cover the in termediary state? (Only don ' t think of efficacy/ znfluence [Wzrkung]!) (Z 613)

918 . . . . W e l l - - b u t now that the structure of the eye is k n o w n - - h o w does it come about that we act, react, in this way? But must there be a physiological explanat ion here? Why don ' t we jus t leave explaining a l o n e ? - - B u t you would never talk like that, if you were examining the behavior of a mach ine ! - -Wel l , who says that a living creature, an animal body, is a machine in this s ense? - - (Z 614)

L e s t y o u th ink , o r h o p e , t he se i d e a s w e r e j u s t a p a s s i n g f a n c y o f W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s , i t is w o r t h n o t i n g t ha t t he se p a s s a g e s w e r e a m o n g the o n e s t h a t h e c u t f r o m this t y p e s c r i p t to save in a b o x a n d r e a r r a n g e a n d p e r h a p s rev ise fo r f u t u r e use . T h e y w e r e p u b l i s h e d p o s t h u m o u s l y as Zettel. 2

W h a t a r e we to m a k e o f t h e s e s t r i k i n g ideas? D o t h e y h i n t a t "myst ica l v i t a l i sm"? Is t h e r e an i n t e l l e c t u a l t r a j e c t o r y a l o n g w h i c h t h e y can b e l o c a t e d a n d a p p r e c i a t e d , even i f p e r h a p s u l t i m a t e l y r e j e c t e d ? O r is h e s i m p l y m a k i n g a " n a t u r a l " o b j e c t i o n to r e d u c t i o n i s m a b o u t m e m o r y ? 3

I n an e a r l i e r p u b l i c a t i o n I b r i e f ly o f f e r e d a m o t i v a t i o n f o r t h e s e views,4 b u t I n o w have m o r e to say a n d wish to t ry aga in . E a r l i e r I saw these pas sages p r i m a r i l y in r e l a t i o n to W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s o t h e r v iews a b o u t m e n t a l p h e n o m e n a , b u t I n o w t h i n k s o m e t h i n g c a n be g a i n e d by s e e i n g t h e m in r e l a t i o n to his v iews a b o u t causa l i ty . U n f o r t u n a t e l y c a u s a l i t y is n o t a top ic a b o u t w h i c h Wi t t - g e n s t e i n h a d a lo t to say, a n d , c o n s e q u e n t l y , h is views o n causa l i t y have n o t b e e n m u c h d i s c u s s e d in t he s c h o l a r l y l i t e r a t u r e .

By f a r the l a r g e s t n u m b e r o f c o m m e n t s W i t t g e n s t e i n m a k e s a b o u t "cause" a r e i n t e n d e d to d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n t h e causa l a n t e c e d e n t s o f a p h e n o m e n o n (such as a e s t h e t i c a p p r e c i a t i o n , o r an ac t ion) a n d its r e a s o n s , g r o u n d s , o r m o - tives. I n t hese cases W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s p o i n t is t ha t he is n o t i n t e r e s t e d in the f o r m e r - - t h e c a u s e - - b u t in t he l a t t e r . I t is s o m e w h a t s u r p r i s i n g , t h e n , to f ind h i m m a k i n g c l a ims a b o u t w h a t is usua l ly , f r o m his p o i n t o f v iew, i r r e l e v a n t . I n

Zettel, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967). Abbreviated as Z in what follows. Anscombe's translations m Zettel are sometimes different from her translations m RPP/I.

3StephenStich accuses Wittgenstein of mystical vitalism in his review of RPP/I in the T~mes Lzterary Supplement, April 3, 1981, 374. Peter Hacker characterizes the remarks as completely natural in Wzttgenstezn: M~nd and Wall, vol. 4 of An Analytzcal Commentary on the "Philosophical Invest- zgations" (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1996), 5o2n.

4"Wittgenstein and Neuroscience," Synthese 78 (1989): w

W1TTGENSTEIN ON NON-MEDIATIVE CAUSALITY 655

such cases one can imagine h im claiming, for example, that for all we know, or for all he cares, things could be as he suggests in these pas sages - - fo r it matters not at all how they are for the purposes of our ord inary talk about memory , the mind, etc. On this view, he has no reason to doubt the existence or possibility of causal explanations, he is only rejecting their relevance to phi losophical issues.

In fact Colin McGinn, in an admirable a t tempt to make some sense of these passages,5 construes them in accordance with this approach. McGinn says that Wittgenstein makes the mistake of inferr ing a metaphysical possibility (things could be this way) f rom an epistemic possibility (for all we know, and so far as our ord inary practices go, things could be this way).

But Wittgenstein is no t asserting a mere possibility in which he is not, in any case, very interested. He is asserting someth ing stronger , and he is taking a direct interest in it.

Wha t exactly is Wit tgenstein asserting (and no t asserting) in these pas- sages? In keeping with his typical style he asks m a n y questions. Of the ~1 sentences I have quoted, ten are questions. Admittedly, near ly all of them seem rhe to r i ca l - - in the sense that he seems to have a certain answer in mind. But still, he is no t explicitly asserting that answer. O f the remain ing indicative sentences, the central ones are all couched in a non-assertoric mood : "No supposi t ion seems to me more natural t h a n . . . " , "The case would be like the f o l l o w i n g . . . " , " . . . m i g h t . . . " , "It is thus perfectly possible t h a t . . . " . So cau- don is advised. Nevertheless, the tone of the passages is unmistakable: Witt- genstein apparent ly commits himself to certain possibilities, sees them even as likely, 6 and, most strikingly, seems to hope they are actualized.

Next, notice that Wittgenstein ment ions three different realms in which causality is operative. O n e is the realm o f the brain and its connect ion or relevance to mental p h e n o m e n a (associating, thinking, r emember ing , and be- havior, talking, writing). A second realm is that o f plants and their p ropaga- tion f rom seeds. Third , in the last remark he ment ions machines. In that last remark it is clear that he wants to say different things abou t these different realms, since he contrasts a machine with "a living creature, an animal body."

So what differences does Wittgenstein think there are between the realms, so far as causality is concerned?

In my opinion Wit tgenstein is here making no claim about how things are, or migh t be, with plants. I think he is no t using plants as ano the r example o f what he is claiming about brains. Rather, I think he is here using the case only

5 Wittgenstein on Meamng (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, a984), 114- 5. 6 Cf. also Last Writings on the Phdosophy of Psychology, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1982) w . The generally hypothetical tone of his remarks, however, fits well with the strategy of loosening the grip of a picture on us. As will become clear, that, I believe, is his main concern.

656 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 7 : 4 OCTOBER 1 9 9 9

to i l lus t ra tewhat h e is c l a i m i n g (is poss ib le ) fo r b ra in s . W e will c o m e b a c k to the case o f p l an t s , h o w e v e r , w h e n we c o n s i d e r t he d e v e l o p m e n t o f W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s v iews o n causa l i ty . T h e f ina l q u o t e d r e m a r k s u g g e s t s t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n is m a k - i n g n o spec ia l c l a ims a b o u t causa l i ty at al l as i t r e l a t e s to t he r e a l m o f m a c h i n e s .

W h a t t h e n is W i t t g e n s t e i n say ing a b o u t causa l i ty in t h e r e a l m o f t he b r a i n ? T h e f i rs t t h i n g to say is t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n is n o t q u e s t i o n i n g the e x i s t e n c e o f causa l i ty in t he r e a l m o f m e n t a l p h e n o m e n a ( " . . . w h e n o n e a d m i t s a causa l i ty b e t w e e n p s y c h o l o g i c a l p h e n o m e n a . . . " R P P / I w A n d h e is n o t c l a i m i n g t h e r e is in t he se l f a n y t h i n g l ike a cause less o r i g i n a t o r o f ac t ion.7

N e x t , W i t t g e n s t e i n is d i s m i s s i n g the n e e d f o r a c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n b r a i n p r o c e s s e s a n d t h o u g h t s . W h a t e x a c t l y W i t t g e n s t e i n m e a n s by this so r t o f "cor re - l a t i o n " will r e q u i r e f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n . B u t the l o g i c a l l y w e a k e s t r e a d i n g o f i t is t h a t t h o u g h t s n e e d n ' t be reducible to b r a i n p rocesses .

T h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n i n t e n d s n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n th is l og ica l ly w e a k r e a d i n g is p e r h a p s s u g g e s t e d by the f o l l o w i n g p a s s a g e , f o u n d b e t w e e n s o m e o f those q u o t e d e a r l i e r :

908. Imagine the following phenomenon . I f I want someone to take note of a text that I recite to him, so that he can repeat it to me later, I have to give him pencil and paper; while I am speaking he makes lines, marks, on the paper ; if he has to reproduce the text later he follows those marks with his eyes and recites the text. But I assume that what he has jo t ted down is not writing, it is not connected by rules with the words of the text; yet without these jot t ings he is unable to reproduce the text; and if anything in it is al tered, if part of it is destroyed, he gets stuck in his ' reading' or recites the text uncer ta inly or carelessly, or cannot find the words at a l l . - -Th i s can be i m a g i n e d ! - Wha t I call jo t t ings would not be a renderzngof the text, not a translation, so to speak, in another symbolism. The text would not be stored up in the jott ings. And why should it be s tored up in our nervous system? (Z 612)

T w o r e c e n t i n t e r p r e t e r s , M i c h e l t e r H a r k a n d P e t e r H a c k e r , have t aken n o n - r e d u c i b i l i t y to be t he q u i t e l i m i t e d p o i n t t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n is m a k i n g , s T h e y h a v e i n t e r p r e t e d W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s c o m m e n t s as h a v i n g the l i m i t e d a im o f a t t a c k i n g W o l f g a n g K 6 h l e r ' s p a r t i c u l a r v iews c o n c e r n i n g the t r ace t h e o r y o f m e m o r y . K 6 h l e r m a i n t a i n s tha t :

all sound theories of m e m o r y . . , will be hypotheses about physiological traces. Fur ther - more, each of these theories will have to assume that the proper t ies of the traces cor respond more or less to those of the processes by which they were produced.9

7 He is no advocate of agent-causation. In fact Smythies' notes of W~ttgenstein's "Lectures on Freedom of the Will," Phzlosoph~cal Occaswns: 1912-x95 r, Klagge and Nordmann, eds. (Indianapo- lis: Hackett, 1993) suggest he is a compatibllist.

SMichel ter Hark, "Electric Brain Fields and Memory Traces: Wittgenstein and Gestalt Psy- chology," Phzlosoph~cal Investzgatzon 18 (1995); and Hacker, W~ttgenstan: M~nd and W~ll, vol.4, 496- 5o3 . Ter Hark refers to reductxon as "isomorphic correlation."

9W. K6hler, Gestalt Psychology (New York: Liveright, x93o), 2 lo.

W I T T G E N S T E I N ON N O N - M E D I A T I V E CAUSALITY 657

A n d K 6 h l e r goes o n to a s s u m e t h a t this t race m u s t n o t o n l y be an i s o m o r p h i c r e d u c t i o n o f t he e x p e r i e n c e tha t p r o d u c e d it, b u t t ha t it m u s t e n d u r e w i t h i n the b r a in to a c c o u n t fo r the m e m o r y it u l t i m a t e l y l eads to:

Some authors seem to think that we need not assume an entity which survives during the interval as a representative of that previous experience, and which becomes effec- tive when present circumstances are favorable. They ought to realize what this view implies: a first event would influence a second event, even though between the two there is an empty period, no connection and no continuity . . . . I should hesitate to adopt this not ion which is so strikingly at odds with all our fundamenta l ideas of functional in terdependence or causation.l~

T h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n is r e s p o n d i n g to K 6 h l e r is s u g g e s t e d by s o m e s imi la r i ty o f p h r a s e o l o g y a n d by the fac t t ha t in the o r i g i n a l h a n d w r i t t e n m a n u s c r i p t , be - t w e e n the t yped r e m a r k s n o w n u m b e r e d 9o8 a n d 9o9, t h e r e was a pas sage n o t i n c l u d e d in the t ypesc r i p t t h a t r e ad :

The Gestalt psychologists have served psychology well by demonstra t ing the unlikeli- hood of certain hypotheses concerning psychological connections, but they have formu- lated other worthless hypotheses? 1

W h i l e s o m e o f W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s r e m a r k s a re c lea r ly d i r e c t e d aga in s t the n e e d f o r an i s o m o r p h i c c o r r e l a t i o n , t he i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r he g o e s f u r t h e r t h a n that .

Sec t ion 9o8 (Z 612) m a y be r e a d as s u g g e s t i n g t h a t he d o e s n o t w i s h to go f u r t h e r t h a n that . T h e j o t t i n g s , w h i c h a re n o t in i s o m o r p h i c ( reduct ive) co r r e l a - t ion wi th the r e c i t a t i o n , a re su f f i c i en t a n d also, in this case, n e c e s s a r y fo r the r e p r o d u c t i o n . 1

Is he also a r g u i n g aga in s t the n e e d f o r any k i n d o f c o r r e l a t i o n at all? S o m e o f the l a n g u a g e a l r e a d y q u o t e d sugges t s so: " . . . p h y s i o l o g i c a l l y n o t h i n g c o r r e - s p o n d s to t h e m " (9o4); a n d " W h y m u s t s o m e t h i n g or o t h e r , w h a t e v e r it m a y be, be s t o r e d - u p t h e r e in any form?" (9o5). A n d the d i scuss ion o f seeds also

loW. K6hler, ThePlace of Value in a World ofFacts (NewYork: Liveright, 1938 ), 234- 5. The last- quoted sentence could well be what Wittgenstem is echoing in RPP/I, 9o5 (Z 61o), last sentence.

,1 MS 134, lO6, quoted by ter Hark, 114 What significance is there in the fact that Wittgen- stein did not include this remark in the typescript? Could it be that he wished to construe his remarks more broadly than the specific target he began with? Surely if meaning is use, then the meaning of the remarks in the typescript is not constrained by the more specific context in which they may have been originally composed in the manuscript.

1~ There are two problems with using this passage to support the acceptance of mediation with the rejection of reduction: l) Though we are asked to imagine the situation as one m which the jottings (and hence mediative mechanisms) are necessary, we can as easily imagine a situation in which they were not necessary. Indeed, the seeds are offered as just such an alternate possibdity. 2) While the jottings themselves do not constitute a reduction or isomorphic correlation, one who wished to defend the need for ~somorphic correlation could continue to insist that the relevant isomorphic correlauon still does exist in the brain, and the jottings are merely a marker for them.

658 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 7 : 4 OCTOBER I 9 9 9

sugges ts this m o r e radica l view. T h i s m o r e rad ica l v iew cou ld be cal led the d e n i a l o f s u p e r v e n i e n c e - - v i z . , tha t t he r e cou ld be a d i f f e r ence in m e m o r i e s , or r e s u l t i n g p lan t s , w i t h o u t a n y d i f f e r e n c e in b ra ins , or seeds. '~ Or , in o the r t e r m i n o l o g y , it cou ld be cal led the d e n i a l o f the n e e d for a med ia t i ve a c c o u n t o f c a u s a l i t y m n o t on ly tha t causal i ty n e e d be m e d i a t e d by s o m e t h i n g f r o m wh ich (and by i tself) the o r ig in or resu l t c ou ld be d i s ce rned , b u t tha t the causal i ty n e e d be m e d i a t e d by a n y t h i n g , a ny d i f f e r e nc e , a t all. I n the second passage f r o m K 6 h l e r q u o t e d above it is this m o r e r ad ica l p o s i t i o n tha t K 6 h l e r is c o n c e r n e d with . W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s d i s a g r e e m e n t wi th K 6 h l e r takes h i m b e y o n d m e r e l y r e j ec t i ng the r educ t ive t race t h e o r y of m e m o r y .

A ve ry c o m m o n a n d cen t ra l s t ra tegy of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s is to a rgue aga ins t ce r t a in s e e m i n g l y n a t u r a l a s s u m p t i o n s t ha t we m a ke , o r p i c tu r e s t h a t ho ld us capt ive. T h a t seems to be w h a t he is d o i n g here . T h e issue h o w e v e r is, exactly wh ich p i c tu r e is he a r g u i n g agains t? H a c k e r a n d ter H a r k t h i n k it is the r educ t ive p ic tu re . I t h i n k tha t it is, m o r e radical ly, the med ia t i ve or m e c h a n i s - tic p i c t u r e (which e n c o m p a s s e s the r educ t ive p i c t u r e as well). T h a t the m e c h a - nis t ic p i c tu r e does h o l d us capt ive is well i l lus t ra ted by Q u i n e a n d U l l i a n w h e n they wr i te :

The physicist Lord Kelvin said a century ago that he never felt he had fully explained a process until he had explained it in terms of impacts; and most of us still feel that this is explanation at its best?4

A n d in a passage t ha t W i t t g e n s t e i n w o u l d have b e e n qu i t e f ami l i a r with, Os- wald S p e n g l e r r e m a r k s :

Helmholtz observed, in a lecture of 1869 that has become famous, that "the final aim of Natural Science is to discover the motions underlying all changes, and the motive forces thereof, that is, to resolve itself into Mechan ics . " . . . The specific tendency of all West- ern mechanics is towards an intellectual conquest by measurement, and it is therefore obliged to look for the essence of the phenomenon in a system of constant elements that are susceptible of full and inclusive appreciation by measurement, of which Helmholtz distinguishes motion (using the word in its everyday sense) as the most important .

'3Ter Hark refers to this more radical position, which he does not attribute to Wittgenstein, as a denial of ter Hark's "first sense" of correlauon (122-3). It seems to me that one of the motlva- tions of both ter Hark and Hacker is to find an interpretation of Wittgenstein that is palatable to our ordinary sensibilities. Yet it is clear to me that Wittgenstein sees himself as taking quite striking posmons here. I think he sees our ordinary beliefs as soaked with implicit philosophical require- ments that he will not accept. We must allow Wittgenstem to be radical in his views, even when they take him beyond what we might find to be palatable. The principle of charity only operates once one's interpretation is consistent with the rest of the evidence. I see ter Hark and Hacker as operating under a principle of misplaced charity.

14 Web ofBehef, ~d ed. (New York: Random House, 1978), 1 a 4.

W I T T G E N S T E I N O N N O N - M E D I A T I V E C A U S A L I T Y 659 S p e n g l e r t h e n goes o n to c o m m e n t in a w a y t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n h i m s e l f c o u l d h a v e w r i t t e n :

To the physicist this definit ion appears unambiguous and exhaustive, but to the sceptic who has followed out the history of this scientific conviction, it is very far from being either. To the physicist, present-day mechanics is a logical system of clear, uniquely significant concepts and of simple, necessary relations, while to the o ther (the sceptic) it is a picture distinctive of the structure of the Western European spirit, though he admits that the picture is consistent in the highest degree and most impressively convincing. I t is self-evident that no practical results and discoveries can prove anything as to the "truth" of the theory, the picture?5

T h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s c o n c e r n is as r a d i c a l as r e j e c t i n g this p i c t u r e is c o n f i r m e d by w r i t t e n r e m a r k s o f his n o t i n c l u d e d in t h e t y p e s c r i p t q u o t e d a b o v e :

Nothing is more impor tan t in explanat ions of thought and bra in processes than throw- ing away all the old prejudices about causality. This seems to me by far the most impor tan t step. 16

W e can g a i n a f u l l e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s p u z z l i n g r e m a r k s b y e x a m i n i n g s o m e o f his e a r l i e r i d e a s a b o u t causa l i ty . T h e m a i n r e m a r k s o f i n t e r e s t o c c u r in l a te S e p t e m b e r o f 193 7, w h e n W i t t g e n s t e i n was w r i t i n g h is f i r s t - d r a f t t h o u g h t s in t he m a n u s c r i p t - b o o k h e n u m b e r e d XV.x7 T h e s e i d e a s w e r e l a t e r e l a b o r a t e d by W i t t g e n s t e i n in l e c t u r e s a t C a m b r i d g e in t he L e n t t e r m o f 1938. T h i s m a t e r i a l (wr i t ten , as wel l as r e m a r k s m a d e in lec tures ) is d i r e c t l y r e l e v a n t to u n d e r s t a n d i n g the p u z z l i n g r e m a r k s w i th w h i c h I o p e n e d this p a p e r b e c a u s e i t is spec i f i ca l ly a b o u t t h e two k i n d s o f p l a n t s p r o p a g a t e d b y the i n d i s c e r n i b l e seeds .

A n i n t e r e s t i n g fac t a b o u t t h e s e e a r l i e r p a s s a g e s is t h a t t h e y m a k e n o r e f e r - e n c e o r a l l u s ion to t h e b r a i n o r m e n t a l p h e n o m e n a a t all. T h e y a r e so le ly a b o u t p l a n t s a n d seeds , a n d t h e y t h e n go o n to c o n s i d e r t h e p o s s i b l e c o n s e q u e n c e s fo r causa l i ty in g e n e r a l . L ike t he l a t e r p a s s a g e s h o w e v e r , t h e s e e a r l i e r p a s s a g e s a r e in a n o n - a s s e r t o r i c m o o d . W i t t g e n s t e i n is n o t c l a i m i n g t h e r e a r e p l a n t s a n d seeds l ike this . H e is a sk ing us to i m a g i n e t h e r e a re , a n d t h e n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s e n s u i n g . H i s m a i n i n t e r e s t is in u n c o v e r i n g o u r a s s u m p t i o n s a n d

15 Oswald Spengler, TheDecline of the West, vol. 1, revised ed., trans. C.F. Atkinson (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1926), 377 (abridged one volume edition, 188). For a fuller discussion of Spengler's influence on Wittgenstein, see my paper "Wittgenstein in Exile," to be presented at the Claremont Philosophy of Religion conference: "Religion and Wittgenstein's Legacy," Claremont, California, February, ~ooo.

~6MS 134, lO4- 5, quoted by ter Hark on p. 128--originally appearing between RPP/I, 9o6 and 9o8.

17MS 119, later published in edited form by Rush Rhees as "Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness," reprinted in Philosophzcal Occasions: z912-z95z , 368-426; including lecture notes by Rhees that comprise a portion of Appendix A, on 4o7-411.

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p i c tu re s by c o n s i d e r i n g how we w o u l d reac t in these cases. H e r e is the mos t p o i g n a n t passage f r o m R u s h Rhees ' s no te s of the 1938 lec tures :

There is something like action at a distance here- -which shocks people. The idea would revolutionize science . . . .

Today, in case we actually discovered two seeds which we could not distinguish, but one produced a poppy and the other a rose, we should look frantically for a d i f ference . - -But in other circumstances we might give this up - -g ive up looking for a difference. This would be a t remendous thing to do - -a s great as recognizing inde- terminacy. We would no longer look for the difference, and so we would no longer say there must be a difference. Now (today) we have every reason to say there must be a difference. But we could imagine circumstances where we would break this tradi- tion. (411)

I f W i t t g e n s t e i n was s imply r e j ec t i ng the n e e d for r educ ib i l i t y or i s o m o r p h i c co r r e l a t i on , it is d o u b t f u l tha t he w o u l d c o n s i d e r the r e s u l t i ng pos i t i on to be as " t r e m e n d o u s . . . as r e c o g n i z i n g i n d e t e r m i n a c y . " T o r e t u r n to K 6 h l e r ' s ideas, W i t t g e n s t e i n is d i f f e r i n g f r o m h i m n o t on ly in his r e q u i r e m e n t for i s o m o r p h i c co r r e l a t i on , b u t also in his r e q u i r e m e n t of med ia t ive causality.IS

T h e r e m a r k s a t t r i b u t e d to W i t t g e n s t e i n in these l ec tu res are cons ide rab ly m o r e subt le t h a n the b l u n t e r r e m a r k s of the late I94OS. H o w do they differ?

C o n f u s i o n is sure to fol low f r o m ph ra s e s like: "nothing in the seed corre- s p o n d s to the p l a n t wh ich c o m e s f r o m it" (RPP/I, 9o3), o r "the two p l an t s have exact ly the same seed" (PO, 41o) , or "the seed o f this (plant) , which is exactly like tha t o f the first" (PO, 375). T h e s e p h r a s e s m a k e an a s s u m p t i o n tha t ap- pea rs to be far too i m p o r t a n t to be m a d e in this con tex t : T h e y a s sume tha t f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n c a n n o t reveal a n y d i f f e rences , a n d they also a s sume that s o m e o n e , p r e s u m a b l y s t a n d i n g ou t s ide o u r inves t iga t ive contex t , can k n o w this. T h e y nea t ly step a r o u n d the p r o b l e m tha t nega t ive ex i s ten t ia l s are no tor i - ous ly h a r d to establ ish.

I n t e r e s t i ng ly , this q u e s t i o n a b l e a s s u m p t i o n is on ly t e m p o r a r y in the case of the two ph ra se s f r o m the late 193os (PO, 41o: "But if we discover a differ- e n c e . . . " ; a n d 375: " A n d n o w suppose tha t in the f o r e g o i n g e x a m p l e some- o n e had at last s u c c e e d e d in d i scover ing a d i f f e r e n c e . . . " ) , b u t n o t in the case of the p h r a s e f r o m the late 194os. I n his ea r l i e r d iscuss ions he is m o r e likely to set the scenar io as: "seeds wh ich we cou ld n o t d i s t i ngu i sh" (PO, 411), o r "we

lSThese passages about seeds seem to me to cinch the case that Wittgenstein is asking us to consider not simply that there is failure of isomorphic correlation, but that there is failure of supervenience. (I made this point already in note 24 of "Wittgenstem and Neuroscience," 338-9 .) If the two seeds are the same, then there is not only no difference that isomorphically corresponds to what produced or will result from the seed: There is no difference of any kind associated wxth what produced or will result from the seed. The seed passages also fit with the radicalness of MS 134, ao4-5, quoted above.

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can find no d i f fe rence be tween t h e m " (375), whe re "could" and "can" suggest an implicit "so far ."

W h e n Wit tgens te in says, according to the lecture notes (41 i) , "n0w (today) we have every reason to say there mus t be a d i f f e rence" he is precisely art iculat- ing the po in t that makes his la ter p r o n o u n c e m e n t s seem so obtuse. T h e la ter p r o n o u n c e m e n t s sound as t hough he thinks we could, and p e r h a p s shou ld , j u s t change ou r minds abou t these t h i n g s - - i n d e e d , as t h o u g h he has a l ready changed his mind. O f course, if these p h e n o m e n a actually o c c u r r e d - - l i t e r a l l y indiscernible seeds p roduc ing d i f fe ren t plants , and the l i k e - - t h e n we would be forced into sympa th iz ing with Wit tgens te in ' s compla in t s in the la ter remarks . But no th ing "now (today)" can play that role, as he ear l ier acknowledged . Rather , his ear l ier po in t was that "in other (my emphasis) c i rcumstances we m i g h t give this u p - - g i v e up looking for a difference. This would be a t r e m e n - dous thing to do . . . . We could imagine c i rcumstances where we would b r e a k with this t radi t ion." So, in fact, we can' t , now, jus t b r eak with this t radi t ion.

W h y not? P e r haps this would best be u n d e r s t o o d by t rying to describe the "other c i rcumstances" in which we could j u s t "give this up ."

Certa inly widespread fai lure to f ind d i f fe rences in the face of d i spara te effects could be such a c i rcumstance. But I d o u b t that is wha t he has in mind . Rather , I th ink he is cons ider ing cases whe re the occasional fa i lure to f ind d i f ferences would no t be t rea ted as a failure, r equ i r ing d e e p e r investigation, bu t would be accepted. W h a t would c i rcumstances have to be like for that to be so?

One way o f seeing what Wit tgenste in is imag in ing is to recall his c a m p a i g n against essential ism abou t concepts . Wi t tgens te in d iagnoses us as l abor ing u n d e r the a s sumpt ion that all instances of a concep t m u s t share an essence. We have an u r g e to believe that there m u s t be such an essence, even if we have been unable to articulate it. Wi t tgens te in uses, mos t f amous ly bu t not exclu- sively, the e x a m p l e of a game to suggest that in fact no t all instances share an essence. But m o r e broadly, he wants to p e r s u a d e us that concepts do no t n e e d to be leg i t imated by essences. T h e y have all the uni ty that they need by the var ious and sundry connec t ions and similarities tha t go u n d e r the ( somewha t misleading) rubr ic o f "family r e semblances . " Wit tgens te in neve r denies tha t some concepts have essences - -espec ia l ly technical c o n c e p t s - - b u t only denies that all mus t have them to be legi t imate concepts .

Read back t h r o u g h the series of puzzl ing r emarks at the beg inn ing o f this paper , subst i tut ing the essentialist p ic ture o f concepts as the object o f suspi- cion in place of the media t ive concep t ion o f causality, and you would be surpr ised how m u c h sense they make . T h e str iking di f ference , however , be- tween concep tua l essential ism and media t ive causali ty is tha t Wi t tgens te in thinks we can, and should, resist the u rge to insist on essential ism in this, the actual, world. A n d this, I th ink we will agree, has some plausibili ty to it. Bu t we

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c a n n o t g e t o u r s e l v e s to f ee l l ike t h a t a b o u t m e d i a t i v e causa l i ty . So, w h a t e v e r i t is a b o u t o u r c i r c u m s t a n c e s t ha t a l lows us "now ( today)" to r es i s t t h e u r g e to e s s e n t i a l i s m m a y be w h a t we a re l o o k i n g fo r in t r y i n g to d e s c r i b e t h e "o the r c i r c u m s t a n c e s " in w h i c h we c o u l d j u s t g ive u p the s e a r c h fo r d i f f e r e n c e s .

T h o u g h we m a y f i n d e s s e n t i a l i s m a b o u t c o n c e p t s to be i n t u i t i v e l y n a t u r a l , we h a v e n o spec ia l s t ake in t h a t i n t u i t i o n . O u r use o f (at least) m a n y c o n c e p t s is n o t d e p e n d e n t o n t h e i r h a v i n g a n essence . E s s e n t i a l i s m is a m e t a - i s s u e in r e l a t i o n to the r o l e o f c o n c e p t s in o u r o r d i n a r y p rac t i ce s . T h e p r a c t i c e s can p r o c e e d w i t h o u t i n t e r r u p t i o n i f we d r o p the c o m m i t m e n t to e s sen t i a l i sm. T h a t is w h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n m o s t w a n t s us to see. ( I f s o m e p r a c t i c e s d o h a p p e n to p r e s u p p o s e e s s e n t i a l i s m in s o m e i m p o r t a n t way, t h e n i t is still o p e n to W i t t g e n - s te in to b e c o n t e n t w i th o u r r e q u i r i n g e s sences fo r t he c o n c e p t s t h a t a r e c e n t r a l to t h o s e p r a c t i c e s - - e . g . , t he n e e d to " o p e r a t i o n a l i z e " c o n c e p t s in science.) T h e key to r e s i s t i ng the u r g e to e s s e n t i a l i s m lay in o u r ab i l i t y to r e d u c e o u r e x p e c t a - t i ons a n d r e s t c o n t e n t w i th a n a c c o u n t o f un i ty , in t e r m s o f s imi l a r i t i e s a n d c o n n e c t i o n s , t ha t is less t h a n we e x p e c t e d a n d t h o u g h t we n e e d e d . I n p a r t i c u - lar , t h e r e w e r e few p r a c t i c e s t ha t w o u l d be u n d e r m i n e d by o u r r e l i n q u i s h i n g the u r g e to e s sen t i a l i sm.

W h a t w o u l d t h i n g s have h a d to b e l ike fo r us to b e unable to r e l i n q u i s h this u r g e ? P e r h a p s i f we h a d b e e n a soc ie ty o f Socrateses we w o u l d have b e e n u n a b l e to r e l i n q u i s h e s sen t i a l i sm . S o c r a t e s t h o u g h t t h a t p r a c t i c e s r e v o l v i n g a r o u n d a c o n c e p t w e r e n o t w e l l - f o u n d e d u n t i l the c o n c e p t c o u l d be d e f i n e d in essen- t ia l i s t terms.~9 A w e l l - f o u n d e d p r a c t i c e w o u l d be o n e in w h i c h we c o u l d cer t i fy i n s t a n c e s o f the c o n c e p t by u s i n g t h e e s sence . F o r e x a m p l e , S o c r a t e s p l e a d s w i th E u t h y p h r o (Euthyphro 6e) : "Te l l m e t h e n w h a t th is f o r m i t se l f is, so tha t I m a y l o o k u p o n it, a n d u s i n g i t as a m o d e l , say t h a t a n y ac t i on o f y o u r s o r a n o t h e r ' s t ha t is o f t h a t k i n d is p i o u s , a n d i f i t is no t , t h a t it is no t . "

I f we v a l u e d this so l id f o u n d a t i o n e n o u g h we c o u l d r e f o r m (or r ep l ace ) o u r c o n c e p t s by s t i p u l a t i n g t h e i r essences . T h o u g h t h e r e d o u b t l e s s w o u l d be s o m e a d v a n t a g e s to p r a c t i c e s t ha t h a d this so r t o f so l id f o u n d a t i o n , t h e y a r e n o t w o r t h t he costs o f t h e i r p u r s u i t 3 ~

So, a r e we a soc ie ty o f Soc ra t e se s w h e n it c o m e s to m e d i a t i v e causa l i ty? In a w o r d , Yes. T h e p r a c t i c e s o f s c i ence have b e c o m e c ruc ia l p r ac t i c e s to us, a n d t h e y s e e m to p r e s u p p o s e a m e d i a t i v e c o n c e p t i o n o f causa l i ty . T h a t is, b e c a u s e o f t he c e n t r a l i t y o f a sc ient i f ic v i e w p o i n t to us, we c a n n o t g ive u p the u r g e to

10In the "Dictations to Schlick" (MS 302, 14) Wittgenstein writes: "I cannot characterize my standpoint better than by saying that it is opposed to that which Socrates represents in the Platonic dialogues" (quoted and translated by Garth Hallett, in his Companion to Wittgenstein's "Phdosophzcal Investzgatzons" [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977], 771 ).

2~ indeed, seems to be the goal of elimlnative materialists, at least with respect to mental concepts. For a discussion of the costs, see w167 9 of my paper cited m note 4 above.

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look for, or have someone else look for, or at least believe in the existence of, media t ing differences where there are different effects. '~

U n d e r what "other" circumstances could we "give this up"? I think there are at least three such circumstances, which I shall try to describe. Briefly, science migh t have a different role within society, science migh t draw dif ferent conclusions, or science might be pract iced differently. Each of these possibili- ties has some interest for the light it casts on Wittgenstein 's thinking.

z) Science might have a different role within society. We tend to give science a sort of h e g e m o n y that is no t inevitable. We tend to suppose that a scientific under - standing of p h e n o m e n a is bo th possible and impor tan t for all realms, whe the r or no t that unders tand ing is being pursued, and regardless of our par t icular relation to the pursui t of that unders tand ing . Since science presupposes a medi- ative concept ion of causality, we hold all o f our uses o f "cause" hostage to this unders tanding . I f it were possible to insulate some of our ord inary practices f rom science and its assumptions, then non-mediat ive causality could be ac- cepted. We could relax with lowered expectat ions for causality. ~

This in fact seems to be how it is with respect to the search for and discov- ery of essences for ord inary concepts. People were able to unde r s t and ord inary concepts long before science got involved in a search for their essences. In what ways are our ord inary concepts hostage to the discovery of (or failure to discover) essences? More specifically, how apt are we to change our ord inary uses because of scientific discoveries?

The answer is that it depends on the practice. We have made such changes in the case o f concepts like "consumpt ion" and "leprosy." In the f o r m e r case, we have d r o p p e d the concept because no single physiological condi t ion turns out to underl ie the wide variety of cases that used to be g r o u p e d u n d e r that rubric. The concept has f r agmen ted into lung cancer, tuberculosis, p n e u m o - nia, pleurisy, and so f o r t h - - e a c h of which, save pe rhaps lung cancer, does have a respectable under ly ing essence. "Leprosy" was originally a gener ic term for chronic degenerat ive skin infections. Af te r Hansen ' s work in 1873 identify- ing the bacteria responsible for certain o f these infections, the term "leprosy" came to denote the specific infection p r o d u c e d by that bacteria, also labeled "Hansen ' s Disease." The revised and nar rowed concept excluded o ther super- ficially similar condit ions that had previously been included.

In contrast, there are cases like ' l ade" where the fact that scientists have f o u n d the concept to straddle two different minera l s - - j ade i te and n e p h r i t e - -

2~ Sciences are not the only source of this urge. Amateur and professional auto mechanics have it as well. And I am not saying that all manifestations of science have this urge. But certainly science is the salient embodiment of the urge in our culture.

~2 Wittgenstein: "Let us represent seeing to ourselves as something enigmatic!--without intro- ducing any kind of physiological explanation.--" (RPP/I963).

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has n o t u n d e r m i n e d t h e u s e f u l n e s s o f t he c o n c e p t f o r o r d i n a r y p u r p o s e s , such as j e w e l r y - m a k i n g . A q u e s t i o n o f c u r r e n t p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n t e r e s t is w h e t h e r m e n t a l c o n c e p t s such as "will ," "be l i e f , " a n d " p a i n " a re , o r s h o u l d be , suscep t i - b le o r i m m u n e to sc ien t i f ic advances .

I n a n y case, t h e r e a r e c o n c e p t s t h a t have p r o v e n i m m u n e to r e v i s i o n de- sp i t e t h e f a i l u r e to d i s c o v e r an u n d e r l y i n g essence , o r even the d i scove ry o f d i s j o i n t essences , b y sc ience . T h e key p o i n t is t ha t c o n c e p t s a n d p r a c t i c e s can have a p e r f e c t l y r e s p e c t a b l e l i fe o f t h e i r own r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e i r l ack o f sc ien- tific u n d e r p i n n i n g s . So, in t he case o f causa l i ty , t he q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r t h e r e a r e o r d i n a r y uses o f t h e t e r m a n d a s s o c i a t e d p r a c t i c e s t ha t have a m o m e n t u m a n d d i g n i t y o f t h e i r o w n t h a t m a k e s t h e m r e s i s t a n t to t he ef fec ts o f scient i f ic i nves t i ga t i on . I n t h e s e cases, t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r a m e d i a t i v e a c c o u n t o f the i r c ausa l i t y c o u l d b e a c h i e v e d w o u l d b e u n i m p o r t a n t . O n e c o u l d r e s t c o n t e n t wi th t h e n o n - m e d i a t i v e a c c o u n t . I t w o u l d n ' t be s e e n as a f a i lu re in n e e d o f e v e n t u a l c o r r e c t i o n . W e w o u l d n ' t a l l ow the a g e n d a o f sc ience to set t he s tan- d a r d s o f l e g i t i m a c y f o r all o u r p r a c t i c e s . W e w o u l d n ' t be h e l d c a p t i ve by a c e r t a i n n a r r o w p i c t u r e o f causa l i ty33

W i t t g e n s t e i n s e e m s to be t r y ing to b r i n g us c l o s e r to this so r t o f c i r c u m - s t a n c e b y s o m e o f his w o r k in t h e l a te i 93os . I n his l e c t u r e s o n a e s t h e t i c s g iven in the E a s t e r t e r m o f 1938 h e d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h r e e d i f f e r e n t uses o f "cause" : "(1) E x p e r i m e n t a n d s tat is t ics , (~) R e a s o n , a n d (3) Mechan i sm."~4 T h e f i rs t two can o p e r a t e w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t he th i rd . A n d in the "Cause a n d Ef fec t" d i s cus s ion c i t ed e a r l i e r , he e m p h a s i z e s t he d i f f e r e n t ways we have o f e s t ab l i sh - i n g a n d t h i n k i n g a b o u t causes ( 3 8 7 f ) . I n b o t h t hese cases W i t t g e n s t e i n is e m p h a s i z i n g the a d e q u a c y a n d i n d e p e n d e n c e o f t h e s e p r ac t i c e s f r o m a n y t h i n g tha t sc i ence m a y a d d o r s u b t r a c t f r o m t h e m 3 5

I t h i n k the b e s t way to give a s y m p a t h e t i c r e a d i n g to W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s r e m a r k s at t he b e g i n n i n g o f th is p a p e r is to see t h e m as t r y i n g to m o v e us t o w a r d s an i n s u l a t i o n o f m e n t a l c a u s a t i o n f r o m p h y s i o l o g y . I t h i n k it has to b e a d m i t t e d t h a t we c a n n o t j u s t d e c i d e to i m p o s e th is i n s u l a t i o n , the way W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s r h e t o r i c a l q u e s t i o n s s e e m to sugges t . B u t p e r h a p s we can see h i m as s p e a k i n g pvo lep t i ca l ly , in a n a t t e m p t to p e r s u a d e us t ha t m e n t a l c a u s a t i o n is w o r t h i n s u l a t i n g f r o m p h y s i o l o g y .

'~JRecall Wittgenstein's work as a gardener in 192o and again in 19~6. A gardener needs to know where the seeds came from to be able to know what they wall produce, but has no concern for the internal structure of the seeds.

~4See the lecture notes by his students, published as Lectures and Conversatzons on Aesthetzcs, Psychology and Rehgtous Belief (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), x 3, n 4.

~sThis is the tactic that Malcolm seems to favor for dealing with these issues. See, e.g,, Norman Malcolm's Memory and Mind (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, t977), ch. VII, where he defends "mnemic causation."

W I T T G E N S T E I N O N N O N - M E D I A T I V E C A U S A L I T Y 665 2) Science might draw different conclusions. T h i s s e c o n d c i r c u m s t a n c e i m a g -

i ne s t h a t sc ience , p u r s u e d even w i th its o w n p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s a b o u t m e d i a t i v e causa l i ty , w o u l d c o m e to see o n its o w n t e r m s t h a t the e x p e c t a t i o n was i n a p p r o - p r i a t e . T h e n o t i o n o f m e d i a t i v e c a u s a t i o n is p a r t o f t he s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y ' s m e c h a n i s t i c p i c t u r e o f t he u n i v e r s e as a b u n c h o f m i n i a t u r e b i l l i a r d ba l l s m o v i n g a n d co l l id ing . B u t we k n o w t h a t th is is a fa lse p i c t u r e . I n d e e d , t he s t age was set fo r s e e i n g t h r o u g h th is i l l u s ion by N e w t o n h i m s e l f , w h e n he c h a r a c t e r i z e d the f o r c e o f g r a v i t y w i t h o u t o f f e r i n g a n y m e c h a n i s m o r e x p l a n a - t ion o f it. W e have j u s t b e e n too l o n g in a c k n o w l e d g i n g t h a t t h a t is h o w all sc ience is: W e d o n ' t , a n d can ' t , h a v e m e d i a t i v e m e c h a n i s m s all t h e w a y d o w n . Sc ience will e v e n t u a l l y f r ee i t s e l f f r o m its o w n fa lse a n d o u t m o d e d p i c t u r e .

T h i s a p p r o a c h is c l ea r ly b e i n g i n v e s t i g a t e d b y W i t t g e n s t e i n in his l e c t u r e s o n ae s the t i c s :

� 9 we wish to get r id of connect ion altogether. We wish to get r id of the not ion of mechanism, and say: 'I t 's all concomitants. ' Why 'all'? You would have to specify what is a case you wouldn ' t call concomitance. "Tracing a mechanism is only f inding concomi- tance. In the end it can all be reduced to concomitance." � 9 Cf. "Physics doesn ' t explain anything. I t jus t describes cases of concomitance." �9 �9 (You can look on the mechanism as a case of concomitant causal phenomena . You don ' t of course.) You say: "Well, this moves this, this this, this this, and so on. ''~6

T h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n is i n t e r e s t e d in th is a p p r o a c h is a lso s u g g e s t e d b y his a l l u s i o n to the case o f i n d e t e r m i n a c y (411) in his l e c t u r e s in L e n t , 1938. I n d e - t e r m i n a c y was a p o s i t i o n r e a c h e d by a sc i ence t h a t h a d b e e n c o m m i t t e d to d e t e r m i n i s t i c a s s u m p t i o n s - - a l t h o u g h it i t se l f c a m e to see r e a s o n s to r e j e c t t h e m . Sc i ence was ab le to r e l ax w i t h i n d e t e r m i n a c y , n o t s e e i n g i t as a f a i l u r e to b e c o r r e c t e d e v e n t u a l l y , b u t a n a c c e p t a b l e r e s t i n g p l ace . (Whi l e t h e r e r e m a i n s c o n t r o v e r s y a b o u t th is a m o n g i n t e r e s t e d phys ic i s t s a n d p h i l o s o p h e r s , i t is still a g o o d i l l u s t r a t i o n o f w h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n is l o o k i n g for .) Sc ien t i s t s f r e e d t h e m - se lves f r o m the g r i p o f a c e r t a i n p i c tu re�9

3) Science might be practiced differently. S c i e nc e c o u l d be a p r a c t i c e t h a t d i d n ' t l o o k f o r m e c h a n i s m s a t all. W h i l e th is m a y be the m o s t f a r f e t c h e d o f t he t h r e e k i n d s o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s in w h i c h we c o u l d a c c e p t n o n - m e d i a t i v e causa l i ty , i t is p r o b a b l y a lso t he o n e t h a t is d e a r e s t to W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s h e a r t . T h i s s t a n c e to- w a r d s sc ience was f a m i l i a r to W i t t g e n s t e i n f r o m the sc ient i f ic w o r k a n d wr i t - i ngs o f J o h a n n W o l f g a n g G o e t h e , I t is h a r d to f i n d p a r t i c u l a r p i t h y p a s s a g e s to q u o t e f r o m G o e t h e o n this t op ic , f o r i t is b e s t r e p r e s e n t e d b y h is w h o l e a p - p r o a c h to sc ience . B u t h e r e a r e a few:

2616-17 . Unfortunately the lecture notes are very choppy, and it is often very hard to assess, from the notes, what is going on in the lectures. Nevertheless, lacking better evidence, we limp along with this.

6 6 6 J O U R N A L OF THE H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 7 : 4 O C T O B E R 1 9 9 9

In reality, any a t t e m p t to express the i n n e r na tu re o f a th ing is fruitless. W h a t we pe rce ive are effects, and a comple t e r eco rd o f these effects o u g h t to encompass this i n n e r nature.~7

I t w o u l d great ly benef i t knowledge , science, technology, and art if the beaut i fu l subject o f color theory could be f r eed f r o m its t radi t ional a tomist ic restraints and isolation, and r e t u r n e d to the genera l , dynamist ic f low of life and activity . . . . ~8

S o m e d a y s o m e o n e will wri te a p a t h o l o g y of e x p e r i m e n t a l physics and b r ing to l ight all those swindles which subver t o u r reason, begu i le o u r j u d g e m e n t and, wha t is worse, s tand in the way o f any pract ical progress . T h e p h e n o m e n a mus t be f r eed once and for all f r o m thei r g r im to r tu re c h a m b e r o f empir ic ism, mechan i sm, and dogma t i sm; they mus t be b r o u g h t be fo re the j u r y o f m e n ' s c o m m o n sense?0

T h o u g h W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h G o e t h e ' s w r i t i n g is w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d , G o e t h e ' s i n f l u e n c e h a s n o t b e e n s u f f i c i e n t l y a p p r e c i a t e d . a o O n e s u b t l e b i t o f c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e f o r G o e t h e ' s i n f l u e n c e o n W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s t h i n k i n g h e r e is t h a t t h e p o p p y a n d r o s e p l a n t s m e n t i o n e d b y W i t t g e n s t e i n in h i s 1938 l e c t u r e s a b o u t c a u s e a n d e f f e c t a r e b o t h s p e c i f i c a l l y d i s c u s s e d by G o e t h e in his w o r k The Metamorphosis o f Plants.3x

I n W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s a n d G o e t h e ' s v i ew , m e c h a n i s t i c s c i e n c e p u t s u s in a f l a w e d r e l a t i o n s h i p to t h e w o r l d . I t is a p e r v e r s i o n o f t h e s e a r c h in w o n d e r t h a t G o e t h e t h o u g h t s c i e n c e s h o u l d be . I n s t e a d , as S p e n g l e r w r o t e :

O n e day we shall no l o n g e r ask, as the N i n e t e e n t h Cen tu ry asked, wha t are the valid laws unde r ly ing chemica l affinity o r d i a m a g n e t i s m - - r a t h e r , we shall be amazed indeed tha t minds o f the first o r d e r could ever have been comple te ly p r e o c c u p i e d by quest ions such as these. We shall inqu i re whence came these fo rms that were p resc r ibed for the Faus t ian spirit, why they had to c o m e exclusively to this one Cu l tu re a n d wha t deep

~7 Preface to Goethe's Theory of Color, reprinted in Saentific Studies, vol. 12, Douglas Miller, trans. and ed. (New York: Suhrkamp, 1987), 158.

�9 s Theory of Color, Part 5, w reprinted in Saentzfic Studies, 276. ~9 Maxims and Reflectzons, w reprinted in Saentzfic Studies, 3o9 . S~ are the most relevant positive references: RPP/I, v. 1, sections 889 & 95o; Culture and

Value, trans P. Winch (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 10-11; and Waismann's Pnnciples of Lmguistzc Phdosophy, 8o-81. Though Wittgenstem's Remarks on Colouris largely critical of Goethe's Theory of Color, that does not eliminate the possibility of a deeper affinity. Cf. Wittgen- stein's letter to Malcolm of 16January, t95o. Although Wittgenstein does not mention Goethe in his 1931 list of influences (C&V a 9), he does list Spengler, who absorbed (and often cited) many of Goethe's ideas about science. Wittgenstein and Goethe agree, among other things, on the prefer- ence for surveyable description over explanation, a distrust of "progress," and the value of won- der. Brxan McGuinness characterizes Goethe's influence on Wittgenstein as follows: "To say what Ludwig admired in Goethe would almost be to say what he found remarkable or worthwhile in hfe, so many are the themes and attitudes from Goethe that recur in his thought" (Wittgenstezn: A L~fe, Young Ludwzg (x 889- z 92 I) [Berkeley: University of Cahfornia Press, x 988], 34- 5)-

3~ Wittgenstein's comments are noted m P O p . 411, quoted earher. Goethe mentions double poppies in w and the proliferated rose in w 3, of The Metamorphoszs of Plants, reprinted in Scientific Studies.

W I T T G E N S T E I N ON N O N - M E D I A T I V E C A U S A L I T Y 667 m e a n i n g there is in the fact that the f igures we have ob ta ined a p p e a r e d in jus t this pic ture- l ike disguise. And , be it said, we have today ha rd ly yet an inkl ing o f h o w m u c h in o u r r e p u t e d l y object ive va lues and expe r i ences is only disguise, only image and expression.32

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

~ Spengler, The Dechne of the West, vol. 1,425 (~2). Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the Virgima Philosophical Association,

Williamsburg, VA, October, 1993; University of South Carolina, April, 1994; and Virginia Tech, April, 1996. It has benefited from comments made on all of those occasions, as well as from comments by P.M.S. Hacker, Paul Humphries, J im Peterman,Jesse Bohl, David Stern, and Alfred Nordmann.