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8/12/2019 Wittgenstein Reads Heidegger 4 - Presentation 5-28-10
1/22
Dr. Paul M. Livingston
Department of Philosophy
University of New Mexico
May 15, !1!
THIS IS A DRAFT VERSION
PLEASE DONT QUOTE OR CIRCULATE WITHOUT PERMISSION
Wittgenstein reads Heidegger Heidegger reads Wittgenstein!
T"in#ing Lang$age %&$nding W&r'd
"his is a tale of two rea#ings, an# of a non$encounter, the misse# encounter %etween two
philosophers whose legacy, as has %een note#, might &ointly #efine the scope of pro%lems an#
'uestions left open, in the wa(e of the twentieth century, for philosophy to#ay. "here is, as far
as ) (now, exactly one recor#e# remar( %y *ittgenstein that #irectly a##resses +ei#egger an#
there is exactly one recor#e# remar( %y +ei#egger that refers to *ittgenstein. -s rea#ings, %oth
remar(s are, at %est, partial, elliptical, an# glancing. )nterestingly, as ) shall argue, each is
actually a profoun# misrea#ing of the one philosopher %y the other. y consi#ering these two
mis$rea#ings, ) shall argue, we can un#erstan# %etter the relationship %etween the two great
twentieth century investigators of the o%scure lin(ages among %eing, language an# truth. -n#
we can gain some insight into some of the many 'uestions still left open %y the many faile#
encounters of twentieth century philosophy, up to an# inclu#ing what might %e consi#ere# the
most #efinitive encounter that is still routinely misse#, miscarrie#, or misun#erstoo#, the
encounter %etween the /tra#itions0 of /analytic0 an# /continental0 philosophy, which are still
wi#ely suppose# to %e #is&oint.
1
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).
) %egin with the sole recor#e# remar( %y *ittgenstein on +ei#egger. )t comes in the course of a
series of #iscussions %etween *ittgenstein an# mem%ers of the ienna 2ircle hel# in the homes
of 3rie#rich *aissmann an# Morit4 chlic( an# later collecte# un#er the title Wittgenstein and
the Vienna Circle. "he remar( #ate# Decem%er 6!, 177, rea#s8
9n +ei#egger8
) can very well thin( what +ei#egger meant a%out eing an# -ngst. Man has the #rive to
run up against the %oun#aries of language. "hin(, for instance, of the astonishment that
anything exists. "his astonishment cannot %e expresse# in the form of a 'uestion, an#
there is also no answer to it. -ll that we can say can only, a priori, %e nonsense.
Nevertheless we run up against the %oun#aries of language. :ier(egaar# also saw this
running$up an# similarly pointe# it out ;as running up against the para#oxo ahea# an# spea( nonsense = it #oesn@t matterA01
1BCu +ei#egger8 )ch (ann mir wohl #en(en, was +ei#egger mit ein un# -ngst meint. Der Mensch hat
#en "rie%, gegen #ie >ren4en #er prache an4urennen. Den(en ie 4.. an #as rstaunen, #ass etwas
existiert.Das Erstaunen kann nicht in Form einer Frage ausgedrckt werden, un# es gi%t auch gar (eine
-ntwort. -lles, was wir sagen mEgen, (ann a priori nur Unsinn sein. "rot4#em rennen wir gegen #ie
>ren4e #er prache an. Dieses -nrennen hat auch :ier(egaar# gesehen un# es sogar gan4 Fhnlich ;als-nrennen gegen #as Para#oxon< %e4eichnet. Dieses -nrennen gegen #ie >ren4e #er prache ist #ie Ethik.
)ch halte es fGr sicher wichtig, #ass man all #em >eschwFt4 G%er thi( $ o% es eine r(enntnis ge%e, o% es
*erte ge%e, o% sich #as >ute #efinieren lasse etc. $ ein n#e macht. )n #er thi( macht man immer #en
ersuch, etwas 4u sagen, was #as *esen #er ache nicht %etrifft un# nie %etreffen (ann. s ist a priori
gewiss8 *as immer man fGr eine Definition 4um >uten ge%en mag $ es ist immer nur ein
MissverstFn#nis, #as igentliche, was man in *ir(lich(eit meint, entspreche sich im -us#ruc( ;Moore
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"he remar(, which has since %ecome somewhat notorious, was first pu%lishe# in the Hanuary,
17I5 issue of thePhilosophical Review, %oth in the original >erman an# in nglish translation.
3or reasons that have never %een explaine#, in %oth the >erman an# nglish texts, *aissman@s
title, the first sentence, an# the last sentence were there omitte#, so that the remar( as a whole
appeare# to ma(e no reference either to +ei#egger or to -ugustine. ;Jou can come to your own
conclusions a%out why this might have %een, an# what it might show a%out the extent an# nature
of the analyticKcontinental #ivi#e, at least at that time
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philosophical metho#s coul# har#ly %e more #ifferent8 >.. Moore an# t. -ugustine. "he
concern that lin(s -ugustine, :ier(egaar#, Moore an# +ei#egger, across centuries of
philosophical history an# #espite o%viously #eep #ifferences is something that *ittgenstein #oes
not hesitate to call /thics,0 although his own elliptical #iscussions of the status of ethics an# its
theory are certainly anything %ut tra#itional. ome years earlier, in the ractatus, *ittgenstein
ha# #escri%e# /ethics0 very %riefly an# elliptically as /transcen#ental,0 hol#ing simply that /it is
impossi%le for there to %e propositions of ethics0 an# that / ethics cannot %e put into wor#s.0
"he position expresse# in this %rief passage is, however, further spelle# out in the %rief /Lecture
on thics0 that *ittgenstein ha# #elivere# to the /+eretics ociety0 in 2am%ri#ge &ust six wee(s
earlier, on Novem%er 1O, 177. )n the /Lecture,0 *ittgenstein consi#ers the status of what he
calls /a%solute &u#gments of value,0 &u#gments that something simply is valua%le, o%ligatory or
goo# in itself, without reference to anything else that it is valua%le for. +is thesis is that /no
statement of fact can ever %e, or imply, a &u#gment of a%solute value.0 ;p. 67
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not have %een, or might have %een otherwise, it ma(es no sense to won#er a%out the worl#@s
existing at all. )t is thus exclu#e# at the outset that the /experience0 that one is tempte# to put as
the e"perienceof such won#er can %e meaningfully expresse#, an# it is a (in# of para#ox that
any factual or psychological experience shoul# even so much asseemto have this significance.
-n# if someone were to o%&ect that the existence of an experience of a%solute value might in#ee#
%e &ust a fact among others, for which we have as yet not foun# the proper analysis, *ittgenstein
suggests that it woul# %e possi%le to respon# with a (in# of imme#iate universal insight that, /as
it were in a flash of light,0 illuminates the essential connection of this experience to the reality of
language itself, which shows up in the failure of any attempt to express it.
eturning to the remar( of Decem%er 6!, *ittgenstein@s remar(a%le suggestion here is, then, that
all of the philosophers he mentions ;Moore, -ugustine, an# :ier(egaar# as much as +ei#eggerreece such a presencing
leaps into view. )%pokeimenonis in fact the %eing as it lets itself %e seen, an# this
means8 that which is there %efore the eyes, as it %rings itself forth from itself. "hus the
mountain lies on the lan# an# the islan# in the sea.
uch is the >ree( experience of %eings.
3or us, %eing as a whole = ta onta= is only an empty wor#. 3or us, there is no longer that
experience of %eings in the >ree( sense. 9n the contrary, as in *ittgenstein, /the real is
what is the case0 ;/Wirklich ist( was der Fall ist0< ;which means8 that which falls un#er a
#etermination, lets itself %e esta%lishe#, the #etermina%leree(s, on the contrary, this experience of %eings is so rich, so concrete an#
touches the >ree(s to such an extent that there are significant synonyms ;-ristotle,
Metaphysics -ree(s. )t is authentically8 ta alethea, what is reveale# in unconcealment,
what postpones concealment for a time it is ta phainomena, what here shows itself from
itself. ;p. 65ree( sense0
permits an# is permitte# %y, +ei#egger suggests, an experience of /what S %eing is0 for the
>ree(s, namely presencing an# #isclosure, the truth of what shows itself from itself as it itself is.
uch an experience of %eings not only remains faithful to their un#erlying character as it shows
itself %ut is also, +ei#egger says, /so rich0 an# /so concrete0 that its synonyms in >ree( connect
it to the un#erlying meanings of truth ;aletheia, or unconceale#ness< an# in#ee# to the very
meaning of what it is to %e aphenomenonat all. "his is the occasion for +ei#egger@s mention of
the mo#ern conception that he attri%utes to *ittgenstein, accor#ing to which all that exists is the
real in the sense of the /#etermina%le0 or /#etermine#0 an# there is no possi%ility any longer of
anything li(e a compara%le insight into the character of the ta onta, what #etermines %eings as a
whole.
+ei#egger@s rea#ing of *ittgenstein is a misrea#ing in an even more #irect an# o%vious sense
than is *ittgenstein@s rea#ing of +ei#egger, forty$two years earlier. 3or the sentence that
+ei#egger here attri%utes to *ittgenstein is a %latant an# #irect mis'uotation. "he first sentence
of the ractatusrea#s, /"he worl# is all that is the case0 ;Die Welt is !lles( das der Fall ist.ree( experience of ta onta, an experience to which, he
says, we #o not have access to#ay. Nevertheless we can still contemplate the >ree( experience
of the ta onta, which once allowe# %eings to show themselves /from themselves0 as the pure
%eings that they are. "his experience is an experience of won#er that connects the existence of
in#ivi#ual %eings with the experience of the whole, an experience of the con#itions of presence
that ma(e it possi%le for any %eing to %e. ecalling the earlier #iscussion, we might in#ee# call
this an /experience of won#er0 at the existence of the worl#, &ust the (in# of experience that
*ittgenstein #iscusse#, %oth in the %rief passage on +ei#egger an# in the /Lecture on thics.0
ut it was, of course, the whole point of *ittgenstein@s consi#eration of thics to #eny that the
content of such an experience coul# ever successfully %e expresse#. 3or the attempt to express
won#er at the existence of the worl# yiel#s rather, accor#ing to *ittgenstein, only the su##en
insight that there is no fact an# no collection of facts whose truth = nothing, then, withinthe
worl# = can suffice to capture the reality of the con#itions that prece#e all facts an# all truths.
ut at the same time, there is no position outside the worl# either, from which what one tries to
express %y means of an expression of won#er at the existence of the worl# = or what, we may
a##, one might try to express %y a #escription of the historical #etermination of %eing aspresence, even the #etermination of the %eing of %eings as such = coul# in#ee# %e (nown an#
asserte#.
III
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) have argue#, then, that loo(ing at the ways %oth +ei#egger an# *ittgenstein misun#erstoo#
each other can reveal the existence of profoun# an# foun#ational pro%lems that are still open
to#ay. "here are, in particular, two interrelate# pro%lems here that ) woul# li(e to emphasi4e as
profoun#, important, an# still lac(ing any o%vious solution. "he first is the ancient pro%lem of
the nature an# structure an# meaning of the logos, which su%sumes %oth the more local
twentieth$century philosophical in'uiry into language an# the metho#s of formal an# sym%olic
logic that have simultaneously #efine# many twentieth$century approaches. "he secon#, as we
have repeate#ly seen, is the pro%lem of the totality8 the pro%lem of our access ;if such there %eerman< as something which has e#ges, something which forms a %oun#e# whole an#
can thus %ecome a #istinct o%&ect of stu#y or of philosophical theori4ing. ;p. 5