THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

History 28702 Constantin Fasolt Fundamentals 24301 Office: HMW 602 Spring 2011 Office hour: W 3:30-5:00 HM 130 Phone: 702-7935 MW 1:30-2:50 icon@uchicago.edu

WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is one of the most original works in the history of philosophy. It addresses some of the most familiar questions philosophers have kept asking across the centuries. (What is truth? What is meaning? What is consciousness? What is the relationship between mind and body? What is the relationship between my mind and other minds?) It is relatively short. Its style is as simple as it is beautiful. Its influence has reached far and wide beyond the limits of philosophy. Yet its meaning is deeply controversial and, by some accounts, has barely begun to be understood. This is in part because Wittgenstein broke radically with some of the most common assumptions human beings, especially educated human beings, like to make about themselves, their minds, and the world. It is also because Wittgenstein's method shatters the traditional philosophical mould. The purpose of this course is to give students with no prior training in philosophy intellectual access to the Philosophical Investigations. It is founded on the assumption that, quite apart from their standing in the philosophical tradition, Wittgenstein's teachings are profoundly interesting in their own right and shed much light on some of the most vexing intellectual problems encountered in history, religion, psychology, and other areas of knowledge in the humanities and social sciences. More important, they hold out the promise of liberation from some of the heaviest burdens placed on the shoulders of human beings by what often passes for common sense. The method of this course is simple. We are going to read and discuss the Philosophical Investigations as carefully as is possible in ten weeks. That's all we are going to do. It's more than enough. Though I recommend other readings below, only one of them is required. The format will be flexible. I will focus on explaining what I take Wittgenstein to be saying, but I will also try to leave room for questions and discussion. In the first three weeks of the course we are going to give the entire book a quick read-through. That will give you a minimal degree of familiarity with the Philosophical Investigations as a whole, a preliminary sense of the way the book is organized, and an overview of the many different themes it addresses. During those three weeks I will focus on the most basic issues Wittgenstein raises, and the most fundamental ways in which his perspective differs from others. That is not very difficult. But it is crucial, because the simplicity of Wittgenstein's writing often prevents novices from grasping just what he is driving at.

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Once we have completed our rapid overview of the book as a whole, we are going to go back to the beginning and start reading from scratch, this time with a focus on delving more deeply into some of the central issues Wittgenstein raises. We are going to read selected passages with careful attention to detail and implications. We will read slowly, paragraph by paragraph, but we will not necessarily follow the sequence of paragraphs that Wittgenstein laid down for his readers. The book keeps circling around closely related themes and keeps approaching them from different angles. Often we may therefore move forward to later paragraphs, where a theme that has attracted our attention is considered in more depth, or backwards, in order to retrace our steps and the steps of Wittgenstein's argument. That is in keeping with the spirit of the Philosophical Investigations. As Wittgenstein put it in his preface, "my thoughts soon grew feeble if I tried to force them along a single track against their natural inclination.—And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investigation. For it compels us to travel criss-cross in every direction over a wide field of thought.—The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of these long and meandering journeys." We are going to follow Wittgenstein on these meandering journeys. We are not going to force our reading and thinking to follow a single track against our natural inclination. We are going to linger in some regions and we are going to hurry past others. We are not going to read each part of the book with the same degree of attention. The direction and the speed of our reading will depend on the difficulties we are going to encounter as we grapple with particular issues. They will also depend on your preferences. I will ask you about your preferences, and I will adjust my procedure accordingly. The point of the course is not to compel you to spend the same amount of time on every paragraph, but to make you familiar with the most basic ways in which Wittgenstein departed from the common wisdom and the reasons why that matters. Wittgenstein did not give his readers many clues to what they were going to find in different regions of the terrain through which he traveled. He simply divided his book into successive paragraphs of varying length without giving them any titles, headings, or subdivisions. That is important. Wittgenstein was convinced that any subdivision of his book into "chapters" or "sections" devoted to distinct "topics" would be artificial at best, and all too likely to conflict directly with his fundamental purpose. But that makes it difficult for readers to orient themselves in the Philosophical Investigations. In a course designed for beginners, some means of orientation is needed. I have therefore appended a table of contents to this syllabus in which the text is divided into sections according to topics. You will soon realize how artificial these divisions are. But they may help. Registration is limited to undergraduate students. There are no prerequisites other than a willingness to read, think, write, and speak your mind in class. A Note on the Text: The text of the Philosophical Investigations has a complicated history. You do not need to know that history, but there is one issue that deserves special mention.

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When G. E. M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees published the first edition of the Philosophical Investigations in 1953, two years after Wittgenstein's death, they decided to divide the text into two parts. The first part consisted of a typescript with 693 numbered remarks that Wittgenstein had carefully revised over many years and completed no later than 1946. The second part consisted of 372 unnumbered remarks Wittgenstein had selected from manuscripts written from 1946 to 1949. Ever since the publication of the first edition of the Philosophical Investigations, there has been some doubt about the wisdom of the decision to include "Part II." It was written later than "Part I," its subject matter is distinctly different from "Part I," and it was not nearly as carefully revised and re-arranged as "Part I." The editors of the text we are going to use—the 4th edition, published only in 2009—have therefore decided to restrict the title Philosophical Investigations to the part that used to be called "Part I" and to treat "Part II" as an independent piece of writing, which they have called Philosophy of Psychology—A Fragment. There is little doubt that this way of presenting the text is more faithful to Wittgenstein's view of his work. We are therefore going to follow the new edition in referring to "Part II" as Philosophy of Psychology—A Fragment. But for more than half a century readers of Wittgenstein have been familiar with the Philosophical Investigations as a single book divided in two parts. Even the editors of the new edition could not bring themselves to exclude "Part II" from their edition. Although they gave "Part II" a new title, their edition continues to includes all of the material that was included in the first edition. Although they would like to restrict the title Philosophical Investigations to the part that used to be called "Part I," they give the same title to the whole volume. We are therefore going to read the whole book. Required Readings:

I have asked the Seminary Co-op to keep these books available for purchase: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen = Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte, rev. 4th ed. (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009). ISBN: 1405159286. Marie McGinn, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations (London - New York: Routledge, 1997). ISBN: 0415111919. Also available online through the Regenstein Library Catalog.

Recommended Readings:

For students who would like to read further, I have asked the Seminary Co-op to keep the following books in stock as well: Duncan Richter, Historical Dictionary of Wittgenstein's Philosophy (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2004). This is a very handy tool for beginners. It includes a chronology, an overview of Wittgenstein's life and thought, a bibliography, and short articles on philosophical concepts and doctrines, people Wittgenstein knew, philosophers who mattered to him, places he visited, works he never published, and

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so on. It also gives clear guidance on some of the fundamental issues on which the most careful readers of Wittgenstein disagree with each other. Hans-Johann Glock, A Wittgenstein Dictionary (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996). This is also for beginners, but written at a more technical level than Richter's Historical Dictionary. It consists of a series of essays on key concepts in Wittgenstein's philosophy, alphabetically arranged, with abundant cross-references, a good index, and bibliographical guidance. Gordon P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, 4 vols. (Chicago - Oxford: University of Chicago Press - Blackwell Publishers, 1980-1996). There is no better single tool to gain a detailed understanding of the Philosophical Investigations. Each of the four volumes consists of two parts. In one part, the authors offer short, systematic essays designed to explain Wittgenstein's treatment of particular topics. In the other part, the authors comment in detail on each successive paragraph of the Philosophical Investigations. Throughout, the authors do an outstanding job of placing Wittgenstein's views in a larger philosophical and historical context, showing the relationship between different passages, and explaining their place in Wittgenstein's thinking and the development of his thinking over time. Hacker takes strong and often controversial interpretive positions. But though one may disagree, one cannot but admire the depth and thoroughness with which these volumes seek to clarify every possible question that can arise in reading the Philosophical Investigations. Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1991). This is widely regarded as the best biography. I have asked Regenstein Library to keep all of these books on reserve.

Requirements:

1. Attendance and class participation. I will not keep formal track of attendance and participation, and I will not weigh it as a specific percentage of your grade. But if I have any doubts about which grade to give you for the course, I will rely on my judgment of the difference your presence in class made to this course to make a decision. 2. A paper of five to ten pages (plus a separate title page), double-spaced in a standard font: 50% of the grade. Choose one of the following sections and explain its meaning as thoroughly as you can:

Philosophical Investigations 25, 65, 81, 89, 90, 108, 109, 125, 198, 199, 201, 211, 219, 241, 242, 244, 246, 257, 258, 265, 293, 302, 304, 308, 339, 350, 352, 398, 402, 412, 415, 429, 442, 466, 485, 486, 527, 571, 583, 584, 591, 613, 636, 638, 693. Philosophy of Psychology—A Fragment 1, 90, 91, 92, 93, 348, 355, 360, 371

Turn in two hard copies of your paper. Do not send email attachments. The paper is due in my office by 5 pm on Tuesday of seventh week (May 10). Papers that arrive in

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my office later than that will be considered late. The grade for late papers will be lowered in steps. An A paper will get an A- if I receive it later than 5 pm on the day the paper is due. If I receive it the next day, it will get a B+. If I receive it the day after that, it will get a B, and so on. Papers that are not turned in at all will get an F. 3. A take-home final examination of five to ten pages (plus a separate title page), double-spaced in a standard font, on a question to be announced in the final class of the quarter: 50% of the grade. Turn in two hard copies of your final examination. Do not send email attachments. The final is due in my office by 5 pm on Tuesday of exam week (June 7). Late examinations will automatically get an F.

The following rules are elementary, but I state them anyway so as to be clear about them. Your papers must be the result of your own independent work. You must cite page numbers and/or book, chapter, section, and paragraph numbers for all quotations and references. In the first note in which you refer to a book or article, you must identify the author, full title, city of publication, publisher, date of publication, and relevant page numbers; in subsequent notes you need to identify only the author, short title, and relevant page numbers. You do not need to use any readings beyond those required for this course, but if you do use any other source, cite it each time you use it with appropriate footnotes, endnotes, or parenthetical notes. If you use someone else's words, you must use quotation marks. Do not refer to the web unless you have no other choice. If you do refer to the web, identify not only author and title, but also the address of the page to which you are referring and the time at which you accessed it. Proofread your paper before handing it in. Using a spell-checker is not good enough. Make sure that your paper has a title page and page numbers, and that you have not omitted any necessary quotation marks or citations. If you have any doubts about matters of style or formatting, look for the answer in the Chicago Manual of Style. It is your responsibility to follow these rules. If you don't follow them, you will hurt your grade you and you may run the risk of committing plagiarism. For more information, see Charles Lipson, Doing Honest Work in College: How to Prepare Citations, Avoid Plagiarism, and Achieve Real Academic Success (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

If you have questions, ask.

Special note on Friday make-up classes Because I will travel to Europe in early April, there will be no classes on Wednesday, April 6, and Monday, April 11. The first make-up class will be on Friday, April 15, 1:30-2:50. The second make-up class will be on Friday, May 6, 1:30-2:50. Both classes will meet in Harper 140. Students who cannot attend the make-up classes because of a scheduling conflict, but would like to arrange for some alternative way of dealing with the material covered in those classes should get in touch with me.

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Schedule of readings: PART ONE: OVERVIEW During the first three weeks of the course, we will follow a fixed schedule of readings in order to go at least one time through the whole text of the Philosophical Investigations, including the part previously known as "Part II" and now called Philosophy of Psychology—A Fragment. Week 1, Monday: Introduction to the course Week 1, Wednesday: Philosophical Investigations, preface and nrs. 1-133 (pp. 1-57) Week 2, Monday: Philosophical Investigations, nrs. 134-315 (pp. 57-111) Week 2, Wednesday: no class Week 3, Monday: no class Week 3, Wednesday: Philosophical Investigations, nrs. 316-570 (pp. 111-159) Week 3, Friday (make-up class, meets in Harper 140): Philosophical Investigations, nrs. 571-

693 (pp. 159-181) Week 4, Monday: Philosophy of Psychology—A Fragment, sections i-xiv (pp. 182-243) PART TWO: CLOSE READING In weeks 4-10 our schedule will be flexible. We will return to the beginning of the Philosophical Investigations, focus on passages of particular interest, and proceed in whatever direction at whatever pace is most productive for the class. At some point during the course you should read Marie McGinn's Guidebook to Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations. It is very clear, and it gives excellent advice on further reading.Because our schedule is flexible, I will not assign specific readings for particular weeks. You do not need to read the book all at once, and you should probably not read it until we have completed the first part of the course. But I do expect you to read the whole book at some point and to keep referring to it in order to clarify particular issues as they arise, especially when you are writing your papers. The following topics will occupy much of our attention:

• The reality of language • Wittgenstein's critique of the Augustinian picture of language • Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy • The difference between understanding and interpretation • The mind and the external world (the inner and the outer) • The individual and society • Solipsism and relativism • Truth and knowledge • Intention and the will • Meaning • The asymmetry of persons

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Ludwig Wittgenstein, Phi losophi ca l Inves t i ga t ions (previously known as PART I of the Philosophical Investigations)

Sections Topics Pages

Preface Origins and character of the book 1-4

nrs. 1-7 Introduction: The Augustinian picture and the fog it spreads; the reduction of language to naming; language games

5-8

nrs. 8-88 The reality of language 8-46

nrs. 8-25 Use of language and forms of life & logic; the reality of language; its manifolds 8-16

nrs. 26-32 Naming: what is it really? It presupposes language 16-19

nrs. 33-36 Spirits; mental objects; essences: fictions of minds tied in knots 19-22

nrs. 37-64 The relation between names and things: it's not about essences, atoms, or simple elements, but about meaning and use

22-35

nrs. 65-88 Family resemblance; the damage done by the need for exactitude; certainty and doubt; language is not a calculus

35-46

nrs. 89-133 The task of philosophy 46-57

nrs. 89-90 The concept of a grammatical investigation 46-47

nrs. 91-107 The temptation to look for a crystalline, necessary, unchanging, logical essence 47-51

nrs. 108-115 Some of the reasons for the temptation 51-53

nrs. 116-133 How to conduct philosophy without giving in to the temptation 53-57

nrs. 134-242 What understanding is and what it is not 57-95

nrs. 134-142 The theory that propositions represent the world like a picture does not explain anything; understanding presupposes the ability to apply the picture

57-62

nrs. 143-155 Understanding a series of numbers in counting or a series of letters and words in reading is not a mental process or a state of the brain

62-67

nrs. 156-164 The case of reading shows that learning to follow a rule depends on context 67-72

nrs. 165-171 It doesn't help to say that reading is some kind of peculiar process 72-76

nrs. 172-178 It doesn't help to look for some kind of special experience 76-78

nrs. 179-184 Learning how to follow a rule consists of mastering a certain use 78-80

nrs. 185-197 The use of a rule makes it possible to create definitions, but such definitions do not predetermine the future. They merely seem to do so.

80-86

nrs. 198-205 Following a rule is a custom. It is not an interpretation. 86-88

nrs. 206-217 The ability to follow rules is grounded in the shared behavior of humanity 88-91

nrs. 218-242 The illusion of compulsion created by rules and the reality of human agreement in form of life and agreement in judgments—what Cicero called consensus iuris

91-95

nrs. 243-315 Arguments against the possibility of a purely private language 95-111

nrs. 243-255 Sensations aren't "private." One does not learn of them from observation 95-98

nrs. 256-280 Back to St. Augustine and the imaginary subjectivity in naming: there is no naming without a public language; defense of objectivity

98-103

nrs. 281-288 Attack on Cartesian dualism 103-105

nrs. 289-315 Attack on Cartesian introspection. What seems to be the result of introspection is in fact avowal in the first person, not description of a mental process

106-111

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nrs. 316-570 Truth and knowledge 111-159

nrs. 316-362 Thoughts and their expression versus the experience of pain; identity and the law of contradiction

111-121

nrs. 363-397 Images and imagination; reality, theology, words 121-127

nrs. 398-411 Self and self-reference; the visual room; solipsism and the distinction between self and other

127-131

nrs. 412-427 The false "mystery" of consciousness 131-135

nrs. 428-465 Intentionality: the harmony between language and reality. Attack on dualism and the correspondence theory of truth; wishes, orders, & expectations; negation

135-141

nrs. 466-490 Certainty; grounds for belief; the past; experience and justification by experience 141-145

nrs. 491-570 Language as an instrument: the flexibility of language and the varieties of meaning; fact & fiction; negation

145-159

nrs. 571-693 Philosophical psychology 159-181

nrs. 571-610 Psychology versus physics: hoping, believing, expecting, thinking; not "now," but over time; context and surroundings; intention; familiarity & recognition

159-167

nrs. 611-628 The will: intending to do something; trying; acting 168-171

nrs. 629-660 Intending something; predicting something; remembering one's intention; history and the past

171-176

nrs. 661-693 Meaning: the connection between words and things 176-181

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Phi losophy o f Psycho logy—A Fragment

(previously known as PART II of the Philosophical Investigations)

Sections Topics Pages

i Hope, grief, and fear are neither "sensations" nor "grounded" 183

ii Meaning and reference 184-185

iii Images 186

iv On certainty and the soul 187

v Behavior and doubt about its meaning 188-189

vi The "feeling" or "atmosphere" accompanying words: how that happens 190-192

vii Memories and consciousness 193

viii Kinaesthetic sensations 194-195

ix Grief & fear; the objectivity of descriptions 196-198

x Belief: Moore's paradox 199-202

xi Seeing, meaning, believing, and understanding: different ways of seeing are not different ways of interpreting what is seen

203-240

xii The relationship of concepts to nature 241

xiii Memory 242

xiv Psychology: an experimental method combined with conceptual confusion 243