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Wireless Security - What Were They Thinking ?. Brad “RenderMan” Haines RenderLab.net & Church of Wifi [email protected]. Introduction. Who am I? Why am I here? Why are you here? Scope of this talk Why you should stay awake. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Wireless Security - What Were They Thinking?
Brad “RenderMan” Haines
RenderLab.net & Church of Wifi
Introduction
• Who am I?• Why am I here?• Why are you here?• Scope of this talk• Why you should stay awake
Caveats“It is not the goal of this presentation
to tell you not to use wireless networks, but make you aware of the
risk so you can make informed decisions about your usage of
wireless technology and do everything possible to protect your organizations
network infrastructure, data and integrity of its client computers” - Paul
Asadoorian
Why are you here?
• 10/2003: Lowe's– Botbyl and Timmins access an unencrypted,
unauthenticated wireless LAN in Southfield, Michigan – Obtain access to internal servers across 7 US states– Crash PoS system while planting CC sniffing software– Apprehended by FBI, both plead guilty to charges
• 3/2004: BJ's– Wholesale merchant reports that a "small fraction" of its 8-
million customers may have had CC#'s stolen– FTC asserts charges against BJ's for unencrypted wireless
networks, default usernames/passwords and insufficient monitoring
– BJ's settles, recording $10M in legal costs, agrees to thorough external audits every other year for 2 decades
Why are you here?
• 1/2007: TJX– Marshalls department store in St. Paul
Minnesota WEP-protected WLAN compromised
– Estimates between 45.7 million and 200 million payment card numbers revealed
– 451,000 drivers licenses and SS#'s also compromised
– Forrester Research estimates the cost of the breach could surpass 1 billion dollars in 5 years
Why are you here?
• 6/2005: GE Money– Branch in Finland reports €200,000 stolen– Investigators traced attack to unprotected
consumer WLAN– Initial investigation against owner revealed
suspect not guilty, unprotected WLAN used to hide tracks
– Further investigation reveals GE Money data security manager and accomplices stole account information
Technology
Vulnerabilities
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
PHY/MAC802.11a802.11b,EAP/TLS,EAP-MD5
RegulatoryDomain
Extensions
QoS
802.11g,Europe5 GHz,WPA
802.11i,WPA2,Japan5GHz,
EAP-FAST
Radio ResourceMgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh
deployments
MIMO,WAVE,Mesh,
ExternalInternetwork,Mgmt. Frame
Protection
Performance,Net. Mgmt,3.65 GHz
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Early wardriving,early WEP
attacks
Windows wardriving
tools, growing attack tool
sophistication
Hotspotimpersonation,LEAP exposed
Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools
commodity
Hotspotmanipulation,QoS attacks,
WIDS fingerprinting
PEAP,TTLSLEAP
WIDS evasion,client attacks
gaining popularity,
fuzzing
Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver
vulnsAP Fuzzing?
RADIUS Fuzzing?802.11 VA Tools?
Attacks Against TKIP?
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timelines
Technology
Vulnerabilities
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
PHY/MAC802.11a802.11b,EAP/TLS,EAP-MD5
RegulatoryDomain
Extensions
QoS
802.11g,Europe5 GHz,WPA
802.11i,WPA2,Japan5GHz,
EAP-FAST
Radio ResourceMgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh
deployments
MIMO,WAVE,Mesh,
ExternalInternetwork,Mgmt. Frame
Protection
Performance,Net. Mgmt,3.65 GHz
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Early wardriving,early WEP
attacks
Windows wardriving
tools, growing attack tool
sophistication
Hotspotimpersonation,LEAP exposed
Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools
commodity
Hotspotmanipulation,QoS attacks,
WIDS fingerprinting
PEAP,TTLSLEAP
WIDS evasion,client attacks
gaining popularity,
fuzzing
Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver
vulnsAP Fuzzing?
RADIUS Fuzzing?802.11 VA Tools?
Attacks Against TKIP?
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timelines
• Most public attacks against unprotected networks• WEP attacks effective 6+ years after critical flaws announced• Emerging attacks of today not solved with standards
Lowe's
BJ's
GE Money TJX
Where it all started
• 802.11b - Released October 1999• 2.4Ghz, 11Mbit (4.5 nominal)• Popularity exploded with Apple Airport• Quickly took off and integrated into
everything• 40 bit (later 64, 128 bit) WEP, MAC filtering• 11 channels (North America)• WPA added later
Where it went from there
• 802.11a - Released October 1999• 5 Ghz, 54Mbit (~20 nominal)• Shorter range, less penetration• Not backwards compatible with 802.11b• 12 channels (North America)• More restrictions on use• 40 bit (later 64, 128 bit) WEP, MAC filtering• WPA added later
Where it went from there
• 802.11g - Released October 2003• 2.4Ghz, 54Mbit (19 nominal)• Quickly integrated into new devices• Backwards compatible with 802.11b• 11 channels (North America)• WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) + WEP
Technology
Vulnerabilities
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
PHY/MAC802.11a802.11b,EAP/TLS,EAP-MD5
RegulatoryDomain
Extensions
QoS
802.11g,Europe5 GHz,WPA
802.11i,WPA2,Japan5GHz,
EAP-FAST
Radio ResourceMgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh
deployments
MIMO,WAVE,Mesh,
ExternalInternetwork,Mgmt. Frame
Protection
Performance,Net. Mgmt,3.65 GHz
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Early wardriving,early WEP
attacks
Windows wardriving
tools, growing attack tool
sophistication
Hotspotimpersonation,LEAP exposed
Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools
commodity
Hotspotmanipulation,QoS attacks,
WIDS fingerprinting
PEAP,TTLSLEAP
WIDS evasion,client attacks
gaining popularity,
fuzzing
Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver
vulnsAP Fuzzing?
RADIUS Fuzzing?802.11 VA Tools?
Attacks Against TKIP?
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timeline
Where it all started to go wrong
• 802.11 broadcast beacons• Wardriving hit big after Defcon 9 (2001)• Shipped default open, anyone can connect• Wardriving community grew exponentially• Apple Airport ramped up sales and usage
Wardriving
• “The benign act of detecting wireless networks while in motion” - Blackwave
• Wireless networks are radios, Every card is a capable reciever
• Network information is broadcast with each packet – Network name, encryption status, associated clients all detectable
• Add GPS for making cool maps• Wigle.net – 12,000,000+ nets with location
(Oct, 2007)
Wireless is everywhere
• $30 for an AP at a computer shop• Most laptops come with WiFi built in• Personally discovered ~175,000
devices (~100,000 in Edmonton and area)
• #17 on wigle.net (soon to be 16)• Hotels, Airports, conferences, coffee
shops, restaurants, etc...• Can all be detected and catalogued
It's Everywhere!
Wardriving
• The presence of networks no longer secret• Many people ignorant of the issue• Wardriving brought the issue to the
forefront w/ pretty maps• Worldwide Wardrive brought it to the media
(and CSIS)• Not a huge issue• Cloaking does nothing to help, it's a radio!
Where it all started to go wrong
• MAC addresses can be observed without connecting
• Changing your own MAC address is easy– A simple perl script makes it easy in linux:– http://www.michiganwireless.org/tools/sirmacsalot/
• Simple program to change it in Windows– http://www.codeproject.com/tools/MacIdChanger.asp
• Only useful in keeping authorized users from connecting unauthorized things
Technology
Vulnerabilities
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
PHY/MAC802.11a802.11b,EAP/TLS,EAP-MD5
RegulatoryDomain
Extensions
QoS
802.11g,Europe5 GHz,WPA
802.11i,WPA2,Japan5GHz,
EAP-FAST
Radio ResourceMgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh
deployments
MIMO,WAVE,Mesh,
ExternalInternetwork,Mgmt. Frame
Protection
Performance,Net. Mgmt,3.65 GHz
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Early wardriving,early WEP
attacks
Windows wardriving
tools, growing attack tool
sophistication
Hotspotimpersonation,LEAP exposed
Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools
commodity
Hotspotmanipulation,QoS attacks,
WIDS fingerprinting
PEAP,TTLSLEAP
WIDS evasion,client attacks
gaining popularity,
fuzzing
Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver
vulnsAP Fuzzing?
RADIUS Fuzzing?802.11 VA Tools?
Attacks Against TKIP?
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timeline
Kismet
• De facto free site survey tool• Listens to all 802.11x traffic (monitor mode)• Detects 'cloaked' networks• Can include GPS for maps• Remote drone sniffers for distributed monitoring• Kismet-Newcore promises more features• Linux native, some windows support (Kiswin,
airpcap)• Should be in every wireless toolkit
Kismet
Netstumbler
• Windows based• 'Active' scanner• GPS capability• Signal to noise graph• Useful for quick surveys, antenna
alignment, etc
Netstumbler
Netstumbler
Technology
Vulnerabilities
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
PHY/MAC802.11a802.11b,EAP/TLS,EAP-MD5
RegulatoryDomain
Extensions
QoS
802.11g,Europe5 GHz,WPA
802.11i,WPA2,Japan5GHz,
EAP-FAST
Radio ResourceMgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh
deployments
MIMO,WAVE,Mesh,
ExternalInternetwork,Mgmt. Frame
Protection
Performance,Net. Mgmt,3.65 GHz
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Early wardriving,early WEP
attacks
Windows wardriving
tools, growing attack tool
sophistication
Hotspotimpersonation,LEAP exposed
Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools
commodity
Hotspotmanipulation,QoS attacks,
WIDS fingerprinting
PEAP,TTLSLEAP
WIDS evasion,client attacks
gaining popularity,
fuzzing
Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver
vulnsAP Fuzzing?
RADIUS Fuzzing?802.11 VA Tools?
Attacks Against TKIP?
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timeline
Hostspot Impersonation
• Hot spots gain popularity• Cafe's. Airports, hotels, etc• No discrimination of identical SSID's• 'Drift' to other networks• Man in the middle attacks, credential
snarfing, etc• Airsnarf, etc
Technology
Vulnerabilities
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
PHY/MAC802.11a802.11b,EAP/TLS,EAP-MD5
RegulatoryDomain
Extensions
QoS
802.11g,Europe5 GHz,WPA
802.11i,WPA2,Japan5GHz,
EAP-FAST
Radio ResourceMgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh
deployments
MIMO,WAVE,Mesh,
ExternalInternetwork,Mgmt. Frame
Protection
Performance,Net. Mgmt,3.65 GHz
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Early wardriving,early WEP
attacks
Windows wardriving
tools, growing attack tool
sophistication
Hotspotimpersonation,LEAP exposed
Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools
commodity
Hotspotmanipulation,QoS attacks,
WIDS fingerprinting
PEAP,TTLSLEAP
WIDS evasion,client attacks
gaining popularity,
fuzzing
Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver
vulnsAP Fuzzing?
RADIUS Fuzzing?802.11 VA Tools?
Attacks Against TKIP?
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timeline
WEP – What were they thinking?
• Based on RC4 (weak), 40 bit – Export restrictions
• Limited computing power onboard• 64-128 bit added later after export laws
relaxed• No standard key generation specified –
incompatibilities between brands• Many tried, a lot failed open• Who wants to type out a 64 char HEX key?
WEP cracking
• Goal is to collect enough IVs to be able to crack the key– IV = Initialization Vector, plain text appended
to the key to avoid repetition• Airsnort – 5-10 Million packets• Injecting packets to generate more IV's (faster)• Aircrack analyses the packets and gives you a
key• Needed 100K to 1M packets in early version (10
Min)• Aircrack-PTW – Need only 40-100K (~60 seconds)
Aircrack
Jamming / Interference
• Physics are harsh• Introduce more noise than signal• Microwave oven, cordless phone, baby
monitor or other sources• Accidental or intentional• Spectrum analyzer
Wavebubble
WPA
• WPA fixes many WEP flaws• Based on early 802.11i draft - Stop-gap• 256 bit key – Still RC4• Pre-shared key or Enterprise 802.1X• Standard key generation standard –
PBKDF2• Key salted with SSID• TKIP, MIC (Michael)• Sequence enforcement
Standards are hard - WPA
• WPA – Do more on old hardware• Feared mass obsolescence• Backwards compatibility• Needed soon• Not perfect, got the job done• Fixed a lot of WEP problems, weaknesses
WPA2
• Mandatory elements of 802.11i• Uses AES (CCMP) instead of RC4• Supports PSK and 802.1X mode• Very interoperable• Defacto standard for wireless
The Devil is in the Details
• WPA not without problems• People choose weak passphrases• Susceptible to brute force attack• “A key generated from a pass-phrase of
less than about 20 characters is unlikely to deter attack” - 802.11i spec
• Cowpatty, Aircrack
Cracking WPA
• Capture WPA 4-way handshake• Hash dictionary word with PBKDF2 and
compare output to capture• SSID salted into key• CPU intensive• Early programs had to start over each time
Cracking WPA Faster
• Genpmk and CoWF WPA tables• Pre-hash 1.2 Million words against top
1000 SSID's = 48 gig of WPA cracking torrent goodness
• Time / Memory trade off - calculate once, crack many
• Cracks WPA v1 and v2• Drastically faster checking onsite• Available after the talk and throughout the
con
coWPAtty
The Devil is in the details
• Michael countermeasures• 2 bad checks = Radio turns off• Defense against injection and manipulation• Several layers deep, should not normally
trip• “If a non-AP STA receives a deauthenticate
frame with the reason code “MIC failure,” it cannot be certain that the frame has not been forged, as it does not contain a MIC. The STA may attempt association with this, or another, AP” - 802.11i spec
Abusing Michael
• Sequence enforcement, encryption need to be successful before MIC checked
• MIC taken of data + header• Wireless multimedia specifications (QoS)• Seprate counters for different QoS bits• MIC does cover QoS bits which are not
encrypted.....
Abusing Michael
DataSequenceQoS
WPA Encrypted
MIC Checksum
Abusing Michael
• Capture high priority packet• Flip QoS bits• Retransmit to other counter• Sequence enforcement is maintained• Encrypted data decrypts successfully• MIC check fails from flipped QoS bits• 2 errors in 60 seconds = DoS condition• Clients continue to try and connect• Not in the wild, but soon...
Technology
Vulnerabilities
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
PHY/MAC802.11a802.11b,EAP/TLS,EAP-MD5
RegulatoryDomain
Extensions
QoS
802.11g,Europe5 GHz,WPA
802.11i,WPA2,Japan5GHz,
EAP-FAST
Radio ResourceMgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh
deployments
MIMO,WAVE,Mesh,
ExternalInternetwork,Mgmt. Frame
Protection
Performance,Net. Mgmt,3.65 GHz
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Early wardriving,early WEP
attacks
Windows wardriving
tools, growing attack tool
sophistication
Hotspotimpersonation,LEAP exposed
Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools
commodity
Hotspotmanipulation,QoS attacks,
WIDS fingerprinting
PEAP,TTLSLEAP
WIDS evasion,client attacks
gaining popularity,
fuzzing
Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver
vulnsAP Fuzzing?
RADIUS Fuzzing?802.11 VA Tools?
Attacks Against TKIP?
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timeline
Client attacks
• Karma• Cleartext traffic = easy manipulation• Airpwn• Management frames cleartext and
unauthenticated• Void11, deauth attacks• Driver attacks
Technology
Vulnerabilities
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
PHY/MAC802.11a802.11b,EAP/TLS,EAP-MD5
RegulatoryDomain
Extensions
QoS
802.11g,Europe5 GHz,WPA
802.11i,WPA2,Japan5GHz,
EAP-FAST
Radio ResourceMgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh
deployments
MIMO,WAVE,Mesh,
ExternalInternetwork,Mgmt. Frame
Protection
Performance,Net. Mgmt,3.65 GHz
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Early wardriving,early WEP
attacks
Windows wardriving
tools, growing attack tool
sophistication
Hotspotimpersonation,LEAP exposed
Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools
commodity
Hotspotmanipulation,QoS attacks,
WIDS fingerprinting
PEAP,TTLSLEAP
WIDS evasion,client attacks
gaining popularity,
fuzzing
Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver
vulnsAP Fuzzing?
RADIUS Fuzzing?802.11 VA Tools?
Attacks Against TKIP?
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timeline
Driver Vulnerabilities
• 2006 - Johnny Cache & David Maynor fuzz and break many drivers
• Death threats from Apple fanboys• Do not even need to be connected to a
network• Metasploit includes some driver exploits• Point n' pwn
Emerging threats
• Bluetooth – Highly overlooked• Security by obscurity and 4 digit PIN• Open Source protocol sniffer coming• RFID – Whole other talk• Speedpass broken• Passports blown wide open• RFID Virus
Standards bodies
• IEEE/IETF do good work• We can get on wirelessly at the office,
conferences• It could be a lot worse• Involves lots of blood, sweat, travel and
politics• Problems can be solved
Technology
Vulnerabilities
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
PHY/MAC802.11a802.11b,EAP/TLS,EAP-MD5
RegulatoryDomain
Extensions
QoS
802.11g,Europe5 GHz,WPA
802.11i,WPA2,Japan5GHz,
EAP-FAST
Radio ResourceMgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh
deployments
MIMO,WAVE,Mesh,
ExternalInternetwork,Mgmt. Frame
Protection
Performance,Net. Mgmt,3.65 GHz
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Early wardriving,early WEP
attacks
Windows wardriving
tools, growing attack tool
sophistication
Hotspotimpersonation,LEAP exposed
Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools
commodity
Hotspotmanipulation,QoS attacks,
WIDS fingerprinting
PEAP,TTLSLEAP
WIDS evasion,client attacks
gaining popularity,
fuzzing
Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver
vulnsAP Fuzzing?
RADIUS Fuzzing?802.11 VA Tools?
Attacks Against TKIP?
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timeline
The Future?
• RFID will be huge• Bluetooth will be huge• 802.11n will be 'interesting'• 802.11w will solve some problems• Hacker community will always be there to
break things
Thanks
• Josh Wright• Dragorn / Mike Kershaw• Major Malfunction / Adam Laurie• The Pauldotcom crew• Wirelessdefense.org
Questions?
www.churchofwifi.orgwww.personalwireless.org