Wilson on Kripke's Wittgenstein-Michael Kremer

8/8/2019 Wilson on Kripke's Wittgenstein-Michael Kremer

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International Phenomenological Society

Wilson on Kripke's WittgensteinAuthor(s): Michael KremerSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 60, No. 3 (May, 2000), pp. 571-584Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2653815Accessed: 24/02/2010 19:45

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Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVol. LX, No. 3, May 2000

Wilson on Kripke's WittgensteinMICHAELKREMERUniversity of Notre Dame

George Wilson has recently defended Kripke's well-known interpretationof Wittgen-stein againstthe criticisms of JohnMcDowell. Wilson claims thatthese criticismsrest onmisunderstandingsof Kripkeand that, when correctly understood, Kripke's interpreta-tion standsup to them well. In particular,Wilson defends Kripke's Wittgenstein againstthe charge of "non-factualism"about meaning. However, Wilson has not appreciatedthe full significance of McDowell's criticism. I use a brief exploration of Kripke'sanalogy between Wittgenstein and Hume to put this significance in sharp relief. Itemerges that McDowell's response to Kripke's Wittgenstein account of meaning is inimportantrespects analogous to Kant's response to Hume's account of causality, par-ticularly Kant's complaint that Hume reduced the objective necessity of the causalnexus to a merely subjective necessity. In the same way Kripke's Wittgenstein reducesthe objective normativeforce of meanings to a "quasi-subjective,"community-relativestatus.

In "Semantic Realism and Kripke's Wittgenstein,"'GeorgeWilson defendsKripke'S2well- known interpretationof Wittgenstein3againstcriticisms by(among others)JohnMcDowell.4 Wilson claims that these criticisms rest onmisunderstandingsof Kripke's book and that, when correctly understood,Kripke's interpretation tandsup to them well. In particular,Wilson arguesthatKripke's Wittgenstein's"skepticalsolution'"5o the problemof meaning(and more generally rule-following) is "not committed to non-factualism"about meaning (and rule-following). (W, 99) I will arguethat Wilson doesnot appreciate he full significanceof McDowell's criticism.I will use a briefexploration of an aspect of Kripke's interpretationwhich has come in for

Philosophy and PhenomtenologicalResearch 83 (1998), 99-122. Henceforth W.Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press, 1982). Henceforth K.Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. (NewYork: MacMillan PublishingCo., 1968). HenceforthPI.John McDowell, "Wittgenstein on Following a Rule," Synthese 58 (1984), 325-63;henceforth Ml; and "Meaning and Intentionality n Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy," inFrench, Uehling and Wettstein, eds., The WittgensteinLegacy, Midwest Studies in Philos-ophy, XVII (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992); henceforthM2.Kripkeuses the less common spellings septicic" skepticall" and so on. I will only usesuch spellings in directly quoting extended passages fromKripke.

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little explicit discussion-his analogy between Wittgensteinand Hume-toput this significance in sharprelief.

IKripke portrays Wittgenstein, on the model of Hume,6 as developing a"skepticalargument"or a "skepticalparadox" boutmeaningandrule-follow-ing, to which a "skepticalsolution"is to be supplied. As I understand hisstructure,a "skepticalargument"begins with a certainphilosophicalview ofa phenomenon (meaning, causality, etc.) andarguesto a "paradox"n whichit seems (contraryto common-sense) that the said phenomenoncannot (beknown to) exist. Faced with such a paradox, there are three alternatives:embrace the skeptical paradox, adopt a "straight solution," or adopt a"skepticalsolution."Kripke distinguishes straightand skepticalsolutions asfollows: "Call a proposed solution to a sceptical philosophical problem astraight solutionif it shows thaton closer examination he scepticism provesto be unwarranted;an elusive or complex argumentproves the thesis thesceptic doubted. ... A sceptical solutionof a scepticalphilosophical problembegins on the contraryby concedingthat the sceptic's negativeassertions areunanswerable. Nevertheless our ordinary practice or belief is justifiedbecause-contrary appearances notwithstanding-it need not require thejustification the sceptic has shown to be untenable." (K, 66) It should beclear, however, that a skeptical solution will not embrace all the skeptic'snegative claims, since it will not embracethe conclusion that our ordinarypractice or belief is unjustified. But a skeptical solution is nonethelesssupposedto embraceandacceptthe skeptical argument hatleads to the skep-tical paradox-only at the last moment this is turned into a modus tollensargument against the philosophical conception of the phenomenon, withwhich the skeptic began, and anotherconception is put in its place. So ingrasping the import of a skeptical solution, it is important to recognizeexactly how far the proponentof the solution has to go along with the skep-tical argument. If we say (as Kripke sometimes does) that the skepticalsolution accepts the skeptical paradoxbut tries to disarmit, we have to beclearthat the skepticalsolution does not really embrace the full paradox; heskeptic's conclusions go beyond what the solution accepts to a furtherconclusion which the solution rejects. It is this feature of Kripke's setupwhich Wilson exploits to tryto answerMcDowell's criticisms.

The skeptical argument hatKripkedevelops begins with a conceptionofthe meaningfulness of language, which Wilson dubs "classical realism"or"CR." CR holds that a sentence has meaning in virtue of representing a"possiblefact,"that this possible fact serves as the "standard f truth" or the6 An Enquiry ConcerningHuman Understanding(Indianapolis:Hackett Pub. Co., 1977);

henceforth H.572 MICHAELKREMER


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sentence, and that it is established as this "standardof truth"by the priorintentions of speakers. (W, 106) The argument aims to show that, given(CR), we reach the paradoxicalresult that "No one ever means anything byany term" which Wilson dubs the "radicalskeptical conclusion"or "RSC".(W, 108) The "skeptical solution," Wilson emphasizes, draws back fromaccepting this skeptical conclusion.The skepticalsolution accepts the "basicskeptical conclusion" (BSC) that "There are no facts about S that fix anystandardof correctness or S's use of 'T"'(W, 107), but avoidsRSC by deny-ing CR.

Now so far, there is little to disagree with in Wilson's exposition. Butwherethingsbecome less clearis with Wilson's contentionthatby acceptingBSC but avoiding RSC, the skeptical solution also avoids non-factualismaboutmeaning (NF: "Thereare no facts about a speakerin virtue of whichascriptionsof meaning ... are correct,"W, 114). McDowell takes it that theskeptical solution,in accepting BSC, embracesa non-factualismabout mean-ing which is out of line with several key passages in PJ.7Wilson appearstoagree that non-factualismis not Wittgenstein's conclusion, but denies thatKripke's interpretation wrongly attributes such a view to Wittgenstein.Wilson thus ties NF to RSC, the skeptical conclusion which, according toKripke,Wittgensteinstops short of embracing.

In support of this reading of Kripke, Wilson argues that it is only CRwhich would move one from BSC to NF. (W, 114, 116) According toWilson, an ascription of non-factualism to Kripke's Wittgenstein is "allawry." (W, 119) He cites an extended discussion in the course of whichKripkesays:We donot wishto doubtordeny hatwhenpeople peakof themselves ndothersas meaningsomething y theirwords,as followingrules, heydo so withperfect ight.Wedo not evenwish to denytheproprietyf anordinaryse of thephrasethe fact thatJonesmeantadditionby such-and-suchsymbol',and ndeed uchexpressions o haveperfectly rdinaryses.Wemerelywish to denythe existenceof the 'superlativeact' thatphilosophersmisleadinglyattach o suchordinaryormsof words,nottheproprietyf theformsof words hemselves.K,69)Here, as Wilson sees it, Kripke'sWittgenstein carefully distinguishes BSCfrom NF, accepting the first while rejecting the second. Passages in whichKripke seems to ascribe NF to Wittgenstein can be understoodas strictlyspeaking ascribing only BSC; Kripke'soccasional "expositionallyunfortu-nate" way of putting the point is traceable to his own attraction to CR,which togetherwith BSC does entailNF.8

Notably the full text of ?201 (which Kripke quotes in part as stating the "skeptical para-dox") and ? 195.See W, 117, fn. 15. It should be noted that there are severalpoints at which Kripke seemsto attributeNF to Wittgensteinaside from the passage (K, 70) which Wilson discusses, forexample at K, 77 ("Recall Wittgenstein's sceptical conclusion: no facts, no truth-condi-

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Wilson is right to point out that in some sense Kripke's Wittgensteinadmitsa "factof the matter"as to whatwe mean by ourwords, what normswe are bound by in using words with those meanings, and so on. WhenMcDowell claims that Kripke's "apparatusof 'skeptical paradox' and'skepticalsolution' is not a good fit for Wittgenstein'stexts" (M2, 43) he isdoubting whetherthe sense in which Kripke'sWittgensteincan admit thatmeaning-attributions"state facts" is the sense in which Wittgenstein wouldadmit this. In what follows I want to explore a way of coming to seeMcDowell's point, throughpursuingKripke'sanalogybetweenWittgensteinandHume,on which the "skepticalapparatus"s built.

IIMcDowell opens his paper "Wittgenstein on Following a Rule" with afundamental complaint against readings of Wittgenstein like Kripke's.McDowell says that on such readings,"the most strikingcasualtyis a famil-iar intuitive notion of objectivity."9 I find it illuminating to read thiscomplaint of McDowell's in the light of Kant's remark about Hume's"skeptical solution" to his "skeptical doubts" about causality: "the veryconcept of a cause so manifestly contains the concept of a necessity ofconnection with an effect and of the strict universalityof the rule, that theconcept would be altogetherlost if we attemptedto derive it, as Hume hasdone, from a repeated association of that which happens with that whichprecedes, and from a customof connectingrepresentations, custom originat-ing in this repeatedassociation,andconstituting hereforea merely subjective

tions, correspond to statements such as 'Jones means addition by "+"."'), 97 ("ForWittgenstein, an explanationof this kind ignores his treatment of the sceptical paradoxand its solution. There is no objective fact ... that explains our agreementin particularcases."), and especially the summary of the argument at 108 ("The paradox can beresolved only by a skepticallsolution of these doubts'. This means thatwe must give upthe attemptto find any fact about me in virtue of which I mean 'plus' rather han 'quus',and must then go on in a certain way."). Wilson will have to interpret some of thesepassages (most plausibly, 77) as referring to a "skeptical conclusion" which is notembracedby the "skepticalsolution,"while interpretingothers (97, 108) as involving an"expositionallyunfortunate" onfusion between Kripke's Wittgenstein'sviews and viewswhich Kripke sees as logical consequences of them. The overall plausibility of thesemaneuvers s somewhat doubtful n my view.Ml, 325. McDowell actually opens by discussing Crispin Wright's Wittgensteinon theFoundations of Mathematics (London: Duckworth, 1980). However, it is clear thatMcDowell thinks of Wright's and Kripke's readings of Wittgenstein as very much of apiece, in spite of significant differences between them. In this paper I will treatMcDowell's opening remarksaboutWrightas also directedat Kripke.RobertBrandomdevelops a similar criticism of views like that of Kripke's Wittgen-stein, which he calls "communalassessmentregularity heories of normsimplicit in prac-tice," in Making it Explicit (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 1994), 37-42. Thequestion of the objectivityof linguisticnorms is a centralproblemof Brandom'sbook.

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of obligationrather han natural aw-what Wittgensteincalls "thehardnessof the logical must."(PI, ?437)

Kripkethengivesthe rough outlines of Hume's skeptical solution: Not an a priori argument,but custom, is thesource of our inductive inferences. If A andB are two types of events which we have seenconstantly conjoined, then we are conditioned ... to expect an event of type B on beingpresentedwith one of type A. To say of a particular vent a thatit caused anotherevent b is toplace these two events under two types, A andB, which we expect to be constantly conjoinedin the future as they were in the past. The idea of a necessary connection comes from the'feeling of customarytransition'between our ideas of these event types." (K, 67)Kripkehighlightsone "consequenceof Hume's skepticalsolution:" t leads tothe rejection of the intuitive idea that causal relations hold between eventsindependentlyof whathappenswith otherevents; given the skeptical solution"When the events a and b are considered by themselves alone, no causalnotions are applicable." This principle of the "impossibility of privatecausation" figures as a corollary of the skeptical solution which is itselfsupportedby the skepticalargument. K, 67-68)

Kripke's suggestionisthat Wittgenstein's argument against private language has a structure similar to Hume'sargumentagainst privatecausation.Wittgensteinalso states a sceptical paradox... accepts hisown sceptical argument and offers a 'sceptical solution'... [which] involves a skepticalinterpretationof what is involved in ... ordinaryassertions ... The impossibility of privatelanguage emerges as a corollary... the skepticalsolution does not allow us to speak of a singleindividual,consideredby himself and in isolation,as ever meaning anything.(K, 68-69)

IIIFor Kripke, "the philosophical merits of the Humean solution are not ourpresentconcern" since "ourpurposeis to use the analogy with the Humeansolution to illuminateWittgenstein's solution to his own problem."(K, 67)But for our purposes, a consideration of one form of criticism of Hume'ssolution-Kant's criticism-is very much to the point, if it will illuminateMcDowell's complaint against Kripke's Wittgenstein. Kant saw Hume asreducingthe necessity of the causal connectionto a "subjective" tatus. Thegroundof this complaintrests in Hume's treatmentof the "idea of necessaryconnexion" as arising from the impression "which we feel in the mind" of a"customary ransition rom one objectto its usual attendant."H, 50) This isas much as to say thatin calling a causal connection"necessary" am simplyreportinga fact aboutmyself-that I have experienced objectsof these kindstogether sufficientlyoften to induce in me a habit of expectingthe second onexperiencingthe first. Moreover,this fact aboutmyself is dependenton thehistory of my personal experience and so parochial to me. If I judge thatevents of typeA cause events of type B, andyou judge instead that events of

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typeA cause events of type C, there is nothingin Hume's account to explainwhy one of us should count as right and the other wrong. In fact our judg-ments do not even conflict for Hume; in a sense the word "cause" or Humeis indexical, and my judgments aboutcause have as little chance to conflictwith yours as would assertions we both make using the word "I",or tensedassertionsmade by me at different times. It may be argued that the situationis even worse for Hume: since I cannotshare your impression of customarytransition,I cannot even shareyour idea of necessary connection;your asser-tion that A causes C rather han B threatensto become incomprehensible tome.12 In any case, there seems to be no way in which Hume can accountforany possibility of my correctingmy causal beliefs in the light of yourdiffer-ing experienceand udgment.

Hume's analysis of causation commits him to a subjectivism similar tothat which Hobbes expressed about evaluative language in writing "thesewords of good, evil, and contemptible are ever used with relation to theperson that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so..."13Subjectivism about causation is a consequence of Hume's account of theorigin of causal beliefs in processes of habituationand association, whichnecessarilytakeplace within a single individual,andof the idea of necessaryconnection as arising from the impression which these processes engenderwithin that individual of a "customarytransition." Thus while Hume canadmitthatwe haveknowledgeof causeandeffect, this is in the end subjectiveknowledgeof thepastcourse of ourown experienceand ourresultingpresentexpectations.

Kant,in oppositionto Hume, wants to defend the "objectivevalidity"ofour concept of causality (among others). And to this end he employs histranscendentaldeduction, whose point is to establish not just the origin ofour concept, but by what right we apply it to the objects of our experience.(CPR, A84/B116ff) Kant'sargumentshares with Hume's skeptical solutionthe consequencethat therecan be no "privatecausality."This is because, forKant, to say of an event a that it causes an event b is to place these eventsundertypesA andB which are relatedby a generalrule.However,Kant doesnot see this rule as merely expressing a subjective feeling originatingfromthe parochial ordering of my experience. Kant rejects Hume's picture ofexperienceas consistingof initiallyunrelated,atomic data. The events whichwe experience are experiencedas causally relatedto one another; t is only12 This may be to paint too bleak a picture. Perhaps Hume could respond to the present

objection through appeal to the workings of the sentiment of sympathy. My purpose inraising this worry here is largely to highlight an analogous worry in McDowell'scomplaint against Kripke's Wittgenstein.

13 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, in Great Books of the Western World, vol. 23 (Chicago:Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), 61 (henceforth L). We will return o Hobbes' viewbelow in connectionwith Kripke'scommunitybased "skepticalsolution."

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given this that they can be experienced as related to one another in oneconsciousness.If we were to be given a sequenceof event-experienceswhichdid not alreadyhave a causal interconnectednessbuilt into them,therewouldbe no reason to view these as making up the stream of experience of onesubject,rather hanmany. (CPR,A189/B232ff)As Kripkemight say, the philosophicalmerits of this Kantianresponse toHume are not our present concern. (Nor, fortunately, are the interpretivemerits of my reading of Kant!)Ourpurposeis to use the analogy with theKantian argument to illuminate McDowell's complaint against Kripke'sWittgenstein. Kripke himself at times treats Wittgenstein's argument ashaving an "obvious Kantianflavor"(K, 62); but in so doing he assimilatesKant and Hume too closely, in one breath ascribing to Wittgenstein a"deductionakin to Kant's,"in the next a "scepticalsolution."(K, 100-101)Kripkeloses sight of the differencebetweenthe sense of the question "Howare causal judgments possible?" as posed by Hume and Kant-the formerseeking for the subjective origin of our idea of causality, the latter for theobjective source of ourright to apply it to objects-and so he loses sight ofan analogous ssue concerningourconceptof meaning.

According to Kripke, Wittgenstein's skeptical solution to his paradoxaboutmeaningturns on a rejectionof truth-conditional ccountsof meaningin favor of an account of meaning in terms of justification-conditions. (K,71ff) Wittgenstein'scontention that "themeaningof a word is its use in thelanguage"(PI, ?43), appliedto the meaning of meaning-attributions,eads usto examine "underwhatcircumstancesattributions f meaningaremade andwhat role these attributionsplay in ourlives." (K, 86) We considerfirst "oneperson ... in isolation" and find that "all we can say... is that our ordinarypracticelicenses him to applythe rule in the way it strikes him."(K, 87-88)This however, neglects the dimension of objectivity of meaning which ourordinarypractice nvolves. In fact, the conclusion we have to draw is that "ifone person is considered in isolation, the notion of a rule as guiding thepersonwho adoptsit can have no substantivecontent."(K, 89)

To give this notion some content, we need to "widen our gaze ... andallow ourselves to considerhim as interactingwith a widercommunity." K,89) Whenwe do so, we can "discern ough assertability onditions" ormean-ing-attributions,and give an account of their "role and utility in our lives."(K, 90, 92) An individualis provisionallyentitled to attributea meaning toher words on the basis of her feeling that she "knows how to go on." Butother individualswill or will not make such meaning-attributionso her, onthe basis of a comparisonof her uses of the wordwith their own inclinations.(K, 90-91) This practicedependsfor its usefulness on the bruteempiricalfactthat the members of a communityagree for the most part n their inclinationsto "go on." Given such agreement,practicesof meaning-attributionan playa very useful role in facilitatingsocial interactions n the community;absent578 MICHAELKREMER


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such an agreement, these practices will lose their point. (K, 91-92) If anindividual is sufficiently out of step with community practices, then she willnot be accepted by the communityas a rule-follower,or as meaninganythingby her words;she "simplycannotparticipaten the life of the community andin communication." K, 92)

IVThis account of Wittgenstein's views on meaning and rule-followingmanages to secure a degree of objectivity in that judgments aboutmeaningare not left entirely up to individual anguage-usersn the mannerof Humpty-Dumpty.This is because any individual's claim to mean somethingby theirwords is subjectto acceptanceor rejection by the communityon the basis ofthe external check that their usage line up with generally accepted usage.Nonetheless this account of meaning-attributions emains in a broadsensesubjectivist;and this is the point of McDowell's criticism. Hume's accountof causality reduced the seeming necessary connection between cause andeffect to a subjective feeling of customary transition on the part of theindividual. This led, as we saw, to problems of relativism and perhapsevenincommensurability-causal judgmentsthat diverge from my own are eitherincomprehensible o me or, if I can comprehend hem, do not really conflictwith mine; in either case therecan be no question of correctingmy causaljudgments in the light of others'. Kant, in trying to secure the right to anobjective concept of necessity, was seeking a view which would explain theintersubjective validity of causal judgments;this requiresboth that others'causaljudgmentscan be comprehensibleo me, andthat,when ourjudgmentsdiverge,one of us can be rightand the otherwrong.

Now Kripke's Wittgenstein's account of meaning does not reduce thenecessity, or binding force, of the meaningnexus to the individuallanguage-user's feeling that this is the "way to go on." So this account is not purelysubjectivist.However-as is often remarked-this accountmerely transfersthe difficulties of subjectivismfrom the level of the individualto that of thecommunity.The "skeptical olution"reducesthe normativenecessityor bind-ing force of the meaningnexus to the collective inclinations of the commu-nity; at the level of the community,as McDowell (following Wright)puts it,we lose the "ratification-independence"f our meaning-attributions. Ml,325-26) In consequence, the skeptical solution opens the gates to radicalincommensurability and relativism at the intercommunity level. Kripkehimself suggests that, faced with a form of life other thanourown, Wittgen-stein should say that "we could describe such behavior extensionally andbehavioristically, but we would be unable to find it intelligible how thecreature finds it naturalto behave in this way." (K, 98, fn. 78) But even ifsuch incommensurabilitywere avoidable, there would remain the threat ofrelativism-faced with a community whose meaning-attributionsdiverge

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systematicallyfrom ourown, there would be no roomfor ajudgmentthat wewere right and they were wrong.Thustherewould be no room for the possi-bility of ourcoming to correct our linguistic practicesin the light of such aconfrontation.In this sense, when Kripkewrites that for Wittgenstein"thereis no objective fact ... thatexplains our agreementin particularcases" (K,97, my emphasis) he is stating a conclusion which is attributedcorrectlyboth to his "skepticalparadox"andto his "skeptical olution."

It may be helpful to compare Kripke'sWittgenstein's attemptto secure akind of objectivityfor meaning-attributionso Hobbes' account of evaluativelanguage, mentionedbrieflyabove. Hobbes says that"good"and "evil"are"used with relation to the person that useth them." He goes on to explain,however, why this is so: "therebeing nothingsimply and absolutely so; norany common rule of good andevil to be taken from the natureof the objectsthemselves; but from the person of the man, where there is no Common-wealth; or, in a Commonwealth, romthe personthatrepresenteth t; or froman arbitratoror judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up andmake his sentence the rule thereof."(L, 61) In a Commonwealth in whichindividuals have submittedtheir wills to that of the sovereign, there is anobjectivesense of "good"and"evil,"since all have united their wills into onethroughauthorizing he sovereignto act andjudge on theirbehalf. The objec-tivity of these evaluative terms extends only to the boundaries of theCommonwealth, however; if the sovereigns of different Commonwealthsestablish divergent norms of good and evil, there is no saying that one ofthem is rightandthe otherwrong.In consequenceCommonwealthsstand toone another n that state of war from which theirinstitutionwas to free theircitizens; andthey have absolutelibertyin theirdealingswith one another. L,114) At the level of the Commonwealth t remainstruethat the words"good"and "evil" are said with relationto those who use them; while Hobbes hassecured within each Commonwealth a kind of objective use of evaluativelanguage, this is a "quasi-subjective"use when considered at the inter-community level. The same can be said about the objectivity secured byKripke's Wittgensteinfor attributions f meaning.

As I readMcDowell, then, his complaintagainst Kripke's interpretationof Wittgenstein echoes Kant's critique of Hume's skeptical solution.McDowell does not explicitly mention Kant in developing his critique,butthe connection is broughtout in his argument hatWittgensteinallows us toarrive at a "radically different conception of what it is to belong to alinguistic community,"accordingto which "sharedmembership n a linguis-tic community ... equips us to make our minds available to one another, byconfrontingone anotherwith a different exterior from that which we presentto outsiders." (Ml, 350) This conception entitles us to say that "sharedcommandof a language equips us to know one another'smeaning withoutneedingto arrive at thatknowledge by interpretation, ecause it equipsus to580 MICHAELREMER


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hear someone else's meaning in his words."(Ml, 350-51) Accordingto thisconception,"alinguistic communityis ... boundtogether,not by a match inmere externals (facts accessible tojust anyone),but by a capacity for a meet-ing of minds." (Ml, 351) In a footnote, McDowell adds: "If I am right tosuppose that any merely aggregative conception of a linguistic communityfalsifies Wittgenstein,then it seems that the parallelthat Kripke drawswithHume's discussion of causation. ... is misconceived. Wittgenstein'spictureof language contains no conception of the individual such as would corre-spond to the individual cause-effect pair, related only by contiguity andsuccession, in Hume's picture of causation." (Ml, 362, fn. 45) HereMcDowell's readingof Wittgensteinechoes Kant'sargument hat there is nosuch thingas the experienceof an isolatedcause-effectpair.Justas for Kant,for my experienceto constitutethe experienceof one subject,it mustalreadybe knit together by cause-effect relations involving general laws, so forMcDowell's Wittgenstein, or our activities to constitutethe language-useofone community, they must alreadybe knit together by norms with generalbindingforce, which make it possible for us to understand ne another.

VI have arguedthat McDowell's criticism of Kripke's readingof Wittgensteinparallels Kant's reaction to Hume's account of causality. I will close bybriefly addressing three issues. First: is McDowell right to see Kripke'sWittgensteinas giving up the objectivityof meaning? Second: is McDowellright to see this as a philosophically objectionable aspect of the skepticalsolution?And third:does thisconstitute a fair criticismof Kripke'sinterpre-tation of Wittgenstein (however things may stand with the philosophicalposition thatKripkeattributes o Wittgenstein)?

Wilson points out that, for Kripke, Wittgenstein does not deny "theproprietyof an ordinaryuse of the phrase'the fact that Jones meant additionby such-and-sucha symbol'." (K, 69) He suggests that this admission onKripke'spartis good groundsfor not attributingnon-factualismto Kripke'sWittgenstein. He writes that while "Kripke'sWittgensteinholds thatascrip-tions of meaning .. do not have classical realist truth-conditions... it isdoubtful that it follows from this, at least for Kripke's Wittgenstein, thatmeaning ascriptionsare notproperly houghtof as, in some sense, describingfacts about language-users..." (W, 114) He thinks it is only the perspectiveof the classical realist which would lead to this conclusion. If he can keepfirmly in view his rejectionof (CR), Wilson thinks, "usingthe resourcesofthe 'skeptical solution', Kripke's Wittgenstein will want to offer his ownaccount of what uses of languagecan count as fact-describing.And, I can notsee that anythingin the 'skepticalsolution' forecloses that option for him."(W, 114) However, it does matter what kind of account of fact-statinglanguage,andespecially of the meaningof the word "fact" s availablefrom

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within the skepticalsolution,if it is to avoid the quasi-subjectivismdescribedabove.

Wilson seems alive to this pointat the end of his essay, when he states asa "second esson" of his paper hat "theremaybe a different orm of 'semanticrealism' ... thatmay turnout to be available to a proponentof the skepticalsolution." (W, 122) This form of semantic realism will hold that "meaningascriptions,when true,are truein virtueof facts about the speaker,"withoutbasing this on classical realism. However, it will not base this on "adeflationaryor minimalistaccount of truthor facts or both"either.(W, 121)Wilson does not explain why he adds this condition to his description of''semantic realism" but presumably his thought is that a minimalist ordeflationaryaccountof facts or truthwill be partandparcelof an anti-realistview of meaning. While this is itself debatable,'4what is clear, is that theskeptical solution in combination with a minimalistor deflationaryview ofeither truthor facts leads at best to a quasi-subjectiveview of meaning-attri-butions-for if to call something "true"or a "fact" is to do nothing morethan assertit, and if the assertabilityconditions for meaning-attributions rethose given by the skeptical solution, then there will indeed be no sense inwhichgiven two differentcommunities,endorsing wo differentsets of normsof meaning,one of them can be said to be rightand the otherwrong.Hence ifthe proponentof the skepticalsolution is to aspireto semanticrealism, theyneed some accountof facts and truthotherthana deflationary ne.

But here it is surely worthremarking hatKripke's Wittgenstein avoidsdenying"perfectlyordinaryuses" of fact-talkappliedto meaning-attributionsby adoptinga deflationary nterpretationof "fact"and "true."AccordingtoKripke, "Wittgenstein's way with such objections [that we call meaning-attributions "true" or "facts"] is short. Like many others, Wittgensteinaccepts the 'redundancy' theory of truth..." (K, 86) Consequentlyit is notKripke's Wittgensteinwho presentsus with the novel possibility of a differ-ent form of semantic realism. Kripke's Wittgenstein is precisely the anti-realist that McDowell claims him to be, on Wilson's own account of whatsemanticrealismrequires.Now Wilson might reply thatKripke's "skepticalsolution"can be detached rom the"redundancy"heoryof truthandgraftedonto some as yet unheardof account of "true" and "fact" which is neitherdeflationarynor yet a version of classical realism. But this is nothing morethan a bare possibility without the provision of the details of such anaccount.And what is neededto answerMcDowell's chargeof non-factualism,14 InMakingt Explicit,Brandomries o construct theorywhichcombines strongnotionof objectivitywitha deflationaryccount f truth ndfacts.He does thisby abandoningthe "communityassessment" approachto linguistic norms of Kripke's Wittgenstein infavor of what he calls a "social-perspectival"approachbased on an "I-thou"ratherthana "I-we" form of sociality. I will not attempt here to evaluate the success of this

ambitiousproject.582 MICHAELKREMER


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or betterquasi-subjectivism, s an accountof "true"and "fact"which can becombined with the skeptical solution without generatingeitherrelativism orradical ncommensurability.

Some may object at this point that although I (with McDowell) am rightto see "quasi-subjectivism"s a consequenceof Kripke'sWittgenstein'sview,there is nothing wrong with this consequence. After all, it might be urged,don't we all know by now that individualswithradicallydifferentconceptualschemes live in incommensurableworlds, that there is no way for them tounderstandorjudge one another? t would obviously be the work of anotherpaperto discuss this issue; butI will recordmy disagreementhere with sucha view. Followed out consistentlyit leads to such absurdconclusions as thatwe can neverhave any reasonto alterourconceptualscheme or the rules ofourlanguage;that faced with a groupwhose form of life differsfromours inimportant espectswe cannot understand hem or learnfromthemin any way;and that we can never criticize the practicesof a group whose form of lifediffers from ours.'5

Finally then, having granted that Kripke's Wittgenstein is open to thecharge of falling into quasi-subjectivism,and that this is perhapsa philo-sophically objectionable position, what can we conclude aboutthe interpre-tive issue-is Kripke's Wittgenstein "a good fit for Wittgenstein's texts?"My conclusion here will be somewhatdisappointing.I don't at presentsee aconvincing way to prove thatWittgensteincan't be readas a Humeanquasi-subjectivistaboutmeaning.Texts such as those McDowell cites (PI ??138-39, 151, 195, 198, 201-2, 208-10 etc.) do supporta readingof Wittgensteinas holding to an objective view of meaning. But Wittgenstein's words aremalleable enough to support nterpretinghim as holding a quasi-subjectivistview as well. So in the end I claim only to have made clear a differencebetweenKripke'sand McDowell's WittgensteinswhichWilson overlookedor15 A somewhat different objector might ask whether McDowell's own discussion of mean-

ing as secured throughsharedtraditionsand customs embodiedin the languageof a livingcommunity does not lead to a kind of relativistic quasi-subjectivismas unacceptableasKripke's. McDowell would I think diagnose this objection as resting on an unquestionedassumption that the only objectivity that we can recognize in the post-medieval world isthe kind of objectivity secured by naturalscience; on this view unless we can reduce thephenomenon of meaning to terms that can be accommodated in natural science(paradigmaticallyphysics) then objective meanings will have to be conceived as involv-ing "spooky" supernaturalnorms. This presupposition McDowell tries to show to beunnecessary through his Aristotelian conception of "second nature,"according to whicha capacity to recognize objective meanings and values can be acquired through aprocess of Bildung, of initiation nto a set of practices,customs andtraditions, ncludingashared language. According to McDowell this conception allows us to embrace a"naturalizedplatonism" n which meanings and norms are recognized as objective with-out "spookiness." It is of course beyond the scope of this paper to assess this"therapeutic" esponse, which McDowell develops at length in Mind and World,as wellas "Two Sorts of Naturalism"n Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory,R. Hursthouse,G. LawrenceandW. Quinn,eds. (Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1995).

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at least underplayed. f I admit to a preference or McDowell's reading,I canbase this only on a (here unargued)preference for an objective view ofmeaning,combined withinterpretive harity.

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Documents

Wilson on Kripke's Wittgenstein-Michael Kremer