Wills Cases Full Text 840

8/12/2019 Wills Cases Full Text 840

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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000]

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,[1]petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA

MARLENA[2]COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PURISIMA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,[3]dated December 23, 1993,in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision of Branch 52 of the Regional TrialCourt in Bacolod City, and ordered the defendants-appellees (including hereinpetitioner), asheirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with itsfruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. JorgeRabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was institutedas a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of theBacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted in SpecialProceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, containedthe following provisions:

"FIRST

I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadillaresident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:

(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.RT-4002 (10942), which is registered in my name according to the records of theRegister of Deeds of Negros Occidental.

(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and therights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by thechildren and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.

xxx

FOURTH

(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and JorgeRabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of theBacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), andalso at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, JorgeRabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria MarlinaCoscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25)

piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.


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FIFTH

(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of theBacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shallhave the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of

his testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December ofeach year.

SIXTH

I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that the oneto whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage thissaid Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect anddeliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela yBelleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export andTWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the

buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my command in this myaddition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize this LotNo. 1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my neardesendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have the obligation to give the ONEHUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I further command in thismy addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obeyand follow that should they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate withothers than my near descendants and my sister." [4]

Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. JorgeRabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny(petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.

On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint,docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City,against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subjectCodicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, inthat:

1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic

Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, ormortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the testatrix.

2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100)piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff MariaMarlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of thecomplaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.

3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided thatin case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgageeshall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein

private respondent.


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The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs toreconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation ofTCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a newcertificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.

On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on March 28, 1990 theOrder of Default was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed hisAnswer, accordingly.

During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:

On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin, son-in-lawof the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact ofdefendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a Memorandum ofAgreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:

"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of TCT No.44489 will be delivered not later than January of 1989, more specifically, to wit:

75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in any ofour names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, duringDecember of each sugar crop year, in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this isconsidered compliance of the annuity as mentioned, and in the samemanner will compliance of the annuity be in the next succeeding cropyears.

That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88, will be

complied in cash equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned therein and which isas herein agreed upon, taking into consideration the composite price of sugar duringeach sugar crop year, which is in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVETHOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).

That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered cash installment,payable on or before the end of December of every sugar crop year, to wit:

For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,payable on or before December of crop year 1988-89;

For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,payable on or before December of crop year 1989-90;

For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,payable on or before December of crop year 1990-91; and

For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,payable on or before December of crop year 1991-92."[5]

However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement except for apartial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.


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On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the complaintand disposing as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the action isprematurely filed as no cause of action against the defendants has as yet arose in favor

of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance of the command as mandatedexaction from them simply because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the titleholder/owner of the lot in question, does not warrant the filing of the present complaint.The remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being in the category as creditor of the leftestate, it is opined that plaintiff may initiate the intestate proceedings, if only to establishthe heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and semblance to herclaim under the Codicil.

In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely filed isDISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED."[6]

On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of thetrial court; ratiocinating and ordering thus:

"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right toreceive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, JorgeRabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants-appellee'sadmitted non-compliance with said obligation since 1985; and, the punitiveconsequences enjoined by both the codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No.

1392 and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such non-compliance,this Court deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from theestates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellantmust institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure theappointment of an administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's legalheirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her legacy of100 piculs of sugar per year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.

Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one enteredordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over LotNo. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.

SO ORDERED."[7]

Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner found his way tothis Court viathe present petition, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering thereversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6 ofthe Codicil, and in ruling that the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modalinstitution within the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.

The petition is not impressed with merit.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in accordance withArticle 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in deviating from the sole issueraised which is the absence or prematurity of the cause of action. Petitioner maintains that


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Article 882 does not find application as there was no modal institution and the testatrixintended a mere simple substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to besubstituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should the obligation to deliver the fruits toherein private respondent be not complied with. And since the testatrix died single and withoutissue, there can be no valid substitution and such testamentary provision cannot be given any

effect.

The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason that thesubstituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as "neardescendants" without a definite identity or reference as to who are the "near descendants" andtherefore, under Articles 843[8]and 845[9]of the New Civil Code, the substitution should bedeemed as not written.

The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the Court ofAppeals deviated from the issue posed before it, which was the propriety of the dismissal ofthe complaint on the ground of prematurity of cause of action, there was no such deviation.

The Court of Appeals found that the private respondent had a cause of action against thepetitioner. The disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the privaterespondent had a legally demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil;on which issue the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.

It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted fromthe moment of death of the decedent[10]and compulsory heirs are called to succeed byoperation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimateparents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs.[11]Thus, the petitioner, his motherand sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latterby operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were

transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights andobligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. JorgeRabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of hisdeath. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of thedecedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. JorgeRabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.

In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subjectto the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent

every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to hisrights and title over the said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation todeliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of theinstituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, thefulfillment or performance of which is now being demanded by the latter through the institutionof the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner andthe trial court erred in dismissing the complaint below.

Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions is notapplicable because what the testatrix intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was tobe substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should there be noncompliance with the

obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.

Again, the contention is without merit.


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Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of theheir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) providefor the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heirshould die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in asimple substitution,[12]or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it

be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution.[13]

TheCodicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir byreason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation.[14]In the case under consideration, theprovisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due topredecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute him.What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill theconditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over tothe testatrix's near descendants.

Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is correct. In afideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and totransmit the same later to the second heir.[15]In the case under consideration, the institutedheir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is withthe near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of afideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir thepreservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation topreserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissarysubstitution." [16]Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. Theproperty will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation todeliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.

Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under Article863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not bebeyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution istherefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir. [17]In the caseunder scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. JorgeRabadilla.

The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subjectCodicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code isthe provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil Code provide:

Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the propertyleft by the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be considered as acondition unless it appears that such was his intention.

That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that theinstituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testatorand for the return of anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits andinterests, if he or they should disregard this obligation.

Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding

article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be compliedwith in a manner most analogous to and in conformity with his wishes.


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The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law ofsuccession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testatorstates (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by thetestator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir.[18]A "mode" imposes anobligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the

succession.[19]

On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition musthappen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The conditionsuspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. [20]To someextent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.[21]

From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrixintended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly wordedthat the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, MarlenaCoscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr.Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on

the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be notcomplied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. Themanner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in naturebecause it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy ofsuch institution.

Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposedupon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itselfthat such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should beconsidered as modal and not conditional. [22]

Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private respondent hasonly a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself from the instituted heirbecause the right to seize was expressly limited to violations by the buyer, lessee ormortgagee.

In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to theapplication of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the wordsof the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made. [23]Suchconstruction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted. [24]

Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One Hundred

(100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on theinstituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should theysell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property involved. The Codicil further providesthat in the event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena BellezaCoscuella shall seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-performance of the said obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the property andreversion thereof to the testatrix's near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearlyimposed by the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest,the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should equallyapply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.

Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable settlement, thesaid obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the lessee, and whateverobligation petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee; that petitioner is deemed to have


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made a substantial and constructive compliance of his obligation through the consummatedsettlement between the lessee and the private respondent, and having consummated asettlement with the petitioner, the recourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment of theobligation under the amicable settlement and not the seizure of subject property.

Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a persondisposes of his property, to take effect after his death. [25]Since the Will expresses the manner inwhich a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testatormust be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement whichwould thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSEDand the decision of the Court of Appeals,dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as tocosts

SO ORDERED.

Melo, J., (Chairman), concur in the separate opinion of Justice Vitug.

Vitug, J., see separate opinion.

Panganiban, J.,join the separate opinion of Justice Vitug.

Gonzaga-Reyes, J., no part.


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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 112443. January 25, 2002]

TERESITA P. BORDALBA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OFNICANOR JAYME, namely, CANDIDA FLORES, EMANNUEL JAYME, DINAJAYME DEJORAS, EVELIA JAYME, and GESILA JAYME; AND HEIRS OFASUNCION JAYME-BACLAY, namely, ANGELO JAYME-BACLAY, CARMENJAYME-DACLAN and ELNORA JAYME BACLAY, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the October20, 1992 Decision of the Court of Appeals [1]in CA-G.R. CV No. 27419, which affirmed withmodification the Decision[2]of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. MAN-386.

The instant controversy stemmed from Lot No. 1242 (Lot No. 799-C) with an area of 1,853 squaremeters and located at Barrio Looc, Mandaue City. The subject lot is part of a parcel of land situatedon the corner of Mabini and Plaridel Streets in Mandaue City, and originally owned by the latespouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme. In 1947, an extra-judicialpartition,[3]written in the Spanish language was executed, describing said parcel of land as

2. otra parcela de terreno urbano en el barrio de Look, Mandawe, Cebu, que linda al N. con la

Calle Mabini y propiodades de F. Jayme; al E. linda con propiodades de Fernando Antigua; al S.

linda con propiodades de Lucas y Victoriano Jayme, y al O. linda con la Calle Plaridel. La

propiodad descrita esta avaluada, con todas sus mejoras, en la cantidad de MIL Y CINCUENTA

PESOS ------------------------------------------------ P1,050.00.[4]

and disposing, inter alia,the same parcel of land as follows:

1) 1/3 in favor of - (a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouse of private respondent

Candida Flores and the father of private respondents Emmanuel, Dina, Evelia and Gesila, allsurnamed Jayme; and (b) their grandchild Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, whose heirs are private

respondents Angelo Baclay, Elnora Baclay and Carmen Jayme-Daclan;

2) 1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of petitioner Teresita P. Bordalba; and

3) 1/3 to an unidentified party.

Built on the land adjudicated to the heirs of the spouses is Nicanor Jaymes house, which hisfamily occupied since 1945.


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Sometime in July 1964, Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, petitioners mother, filed with the RegionalTrial Court of Cebu, Branch IV, an amended application for the registration [5]of the lot described withthe following boundaries:

N - Fruelana Jayme & Road

S - Felicitas de Latonio

E - Agustin de Jayme

W - Porfirio Jayme, Lot No. 1 and Vivencio Abellana

Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez alleged that the lot sought to be registered was originally a part of aland owned by her late parents, the spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme; andthat 1/3 of said land was adjudicated to her in an extra-judicial partition. She further stated that aportion of the lot for which title is applied for is occupied by Nicanor Jayme with her permission.

Consequently, Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay filed their opposition [6]contending thatsaid application included the 1/3 portion inherited by them in the 1947 extra-judicial partition. Thecase was, however, dismissed for lack of interest of the parties.

Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Lands of Cebu City an application [7]datedJanuary 10, 1979, seeking the issuance of a Free Patent over the same lot subject of the abortedapplication of her mother, Elena Jayme, now known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C), described as follows:

North: Froilan Jayme and Road

East: Agustin Jayme

South: Alfredo Alivio and Spouses Hilario GandecilaWest: Hilario Gandecila Porferio Jayme and Heirs of Vevencio Abellanosa[8]

On April 16, 1980, petitioner was successfully granted Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and OriginalCertificate of Title No. 0-571 (FP) over said lot.[9] Thereafter, petitioner caused the subdivision andtitling of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), into 6 lots,[10]as well as the disposition of two parcels thereof, thus:

1) Lot No. 1242-A with an area of 581 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of TitleNo. 22771 (FP) in the name of spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala, to whom petitioner

sold said lot;

2) Lot No. 1242-B with an area of 420 square meters covered by TCT No. 22772 in the name ofTeresita P. Bordalba, and which the latter mortgaged with the Rural Bank of Mandaue;

3) Lot No. 1242-C with an area of 210 square meters covered by TCT 22773 in the name of

Teresita P. Bordalba;

4) Lot No. 1242-D with an area of 210 square meters covered by TCT 22774 in the name of

Teresita Bordalba;

5) Lot No. 1242-E with an area of 216 square meters covered by TCT 22775 in the name of

Teresita P. Bordalba;


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6) Lot No. 1242-F with an area of 216 square meters and covered by TCT No. 22776 in the

name of Teresita P. Bordalba.

Upon learning of the issuance in favor of petitioner of the aforesaid Free Patent and OriginalCertificate of Title over Lot No. 1242, as well as the conveyances made by petitioner involving the lot

subject of the controversy, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City,Branch 28, the instant complaint against petitioner Teresita Bordalba, spouses Genaro U. Cabahug,and Rita Capala, Rural Bank of Mandaue and the Director of the Bureau of Lands.

In the said complaint, private respondents prayed that Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and OCT No.0-571 (FP), as well as TCT Nos. 22771-22776 be declared void and ordered cancelled. Privaterespondents also prayed that they be adjudged owners of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), and that spousesGenaro V. Cabahug and Rita Capala as well as the Rural Bank of Mandaue be declared buyers andmortgagee in bad faith, respectively. In addition, they asked the court to award them actual,compensatory, and moral damages plus attorneys fees in the amount of P20,000.00.

Petitioner, on the other hand, averred that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was acquired by her through

purchase from her mother,[11] who was in possession of the lot in the concept of an owner since1947. In her answer, petitioner traced her mothers ownership of the lot partly from the 1947 deed ofextra-judicial partition presented by private respondents,[12]and claimed that Nicanor Jayme, andCandida Flores occupied a portion of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) by mere tolerance of her mother. Oncross-examination, petitioner admitted that the properties of the late Carmeno Jayme and MargaritaEspina de Jayme were partitioned by their heirs in 1947, but claimed that she was not aware of theexistence of said Deed of Extra-judicial Partition. She, however, identified one of the signatures inthe said Deed to be the signature of her mother.[13]

On May 28, 1990, the trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining FreePatent No. (VII-I) 11421 and OCT No. 0-571 (FP), declared said patent and title void and ordered itscancellation. However, it declared that spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as well as theRural Bank of Mandaue are purchasers and mortgagee in good faith, respectively; and consequentlyupheld as valid the sale of Lot No. 1242-A covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22771 (FP) tospouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala, and the mortgage of Lot No. 1242-B covered by TCTNo. 22772 in favor of the Rural Bank of Mandaue. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiffs by:

1) declaring Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 as well as the Original Certificate of Title No. 0-57

(FP) and all subsequent certificates of title as a result of the subdivision of Lot No. 1242 except

TCT NO. 22771 (FP) as null and void and ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City tocancel them;

2) declaring spouses defendants Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as buyers in good faith and

are the legal and rightful owners of Lot No. 1242-A as described in TCT No. 22771 (FP);

3) declaring the Rural Bank of Mandaue, Inc. as mortgagee in good faith and the mortgage lien

in its favor be carried over to and be annotated in the new certificate of title to be issued under the

names of the plaintiffs;

4) declaring the plaintiffs as the legal and rightful owners of Lot 1242 and ordering the issuanceof the certificate of title in their names;


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5) dismissing the claims of the defendant spouses Cabahug and Capala and the defendant Rural

Bank of Mandaue, Inc. for lack of merit;

6) ordering the defendant Teresita Bordalba to pay plaintiffs the following amounts:

(a) P5,000.00 as actual and litigation expenses;(b) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, and,

7) ordering defendant Bordalba to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Both petitioner Teresita Bordalba and private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals,which affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. It ruled that since private respondentsare entitled only to 1/3 portion of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), petitioner should be ordered to reconvey 1/3

of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) to private respondents. The decretal portion of the respondent court'sdecision states:

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is MODIFIED to order the reconveyance of one-third of

the subject land in favor of the plaintiff-appellees in lieu of the cancellation of the Certificates of

Title issued and their declaration as the owners of Lot No. 1242 in its entirety. The rest is

AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.[15]

Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner

contends that the testimonies given by the witnesses for private respondents which touched onmatters occurring prior to the death of her mother should not have been admitted by the trial court, asthe same violated the dead mans statute. Likewise, petitioner questions the right of privaterespondents to inherit from the late Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, as well as theidentity between the disputed lot and the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed of Extra-judicialPartition.

The contentions are without merit. It is doctrinal that findings of facts of the Court of Appealsupholding those of the trial court are binding upon this Court. While there are exceptions to this rule,petitioner has not convinced us that this case falls under one of them. [16]

The Court sees no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court that petitioner resorted to

fraud and misrepresentation in obtaining a free patent and title over the lot under scrutiny. The Courtof Appeals correctly pointed out that misrepresentation tainted petitioners application, insofar as herdeclaration that the land applied for was not occupied or claimed by any other person. Her declarationis belied by the extra-judicial partition which she acknowledged, her mothers aborted attempt to havethe lot registered, private respondents predecessors-in-interests opposition thereto, and by theoccupancy of a portion of the said lot by Nicanor Jayme and his family since 1945.

It is a settled rule that the Land Registration Act protects only holders of title in good faith, anddoes not permit its provision to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or as a means toenrich oneself at the expense of others.[17]

As to the alleged violation of the dead mans statute,[18]suffice it to state that said rule finds no

application in the present case. The dead mans statute does not operate to close the mouth of a


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witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than through personaldealings with the deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness. [19]

Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the present case isbased, inter alia,on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and other documents, and not ondealings and communications with the deceased, the questioned testimonies were properly admitted

by the trial court.

Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents are not legal heirs ofNicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay. Other than their bare allegations to dispute theirheirship, no hard evidence was presented by them to substantiate their allegations. Besides, in orderthat an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial declaration ofheirship is necessary.[20]

Anent the issue of identity, the disparity in the boundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) vis--vistheboundaries of the lot referred to in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition can be explained by thefact that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is only a portion of the entire parcel of land described in the Deed, a1/3 pro-indiviso portion of which was adjudicated each to, first, petitioners mother, second, to the

predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, and third, to an unidentified party. Logicallytherefore, their boundaries will not be similar. At any rate, the records show that the parcel of landadjudicated to the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein was the lot found on the corner ofPlaridel and Mabini Streets in Looc, Mandaue City. As admitted further by both parties, Lot No. 1242(799-C) was part of the land allotted to their predecessors-in-interest in the 1947 Deed of Extra-

judicial Partition. Moreover, petitioners mother acknowledged in her application for registration of LotNo. 1242 that the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition was the source of her claim over the lot sought to beregistered. She further admitted that the lot now known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was part of theparcel of land inherited by her and her co-heirs, to the extent of 1/3 share each. Under Section 31,Rule 130, of the Revised Rules on Evidence, where one derives title to property from another, the act,declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence

against the former.

Considering that Lot No.1242 (799-C) is part of the parcel of land over which private respondentspredecessors-in-interest is entitled to 1/3 pro-indiviso share, which was disregarded by petitionerwhen she secured a Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title in her name, to the exclusion ofprivate respondents predecessors-in-interest, the trial court and the Court of Appeals, therefore, didnot err in upholding the right of private respondents as co-owners, and ordering the petitioner toreconvey 1/3 of the lot in question to them.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, the Court is unable to determine what part of Lot No.1242 (799-C) is within the boundaries of the parcel of land inherited in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicialPartition by the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein. This is so because private respondents

did not show the extent of the said land mentioned in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition inrelation to Lot No. 1242 (799-C). While they presented the boundaries of the parcel of landadjudicated in the Deed, to wit:

North:Calle Mabini y propiodades de F. JaymeEast: Propiodades de Fernando Antigua

South:Propiodades de Lucas y Victoriano JaymeWest:Calle Plaridel

they did not, however, show where these boundaries are found in relation to the boundaries of Lot

No. 1242 (799-C). Absent a fixed boundary of the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed, which theyclaim Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is a part of, the Court cannot determine the extent to which the lot nowknown as Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is included. Admittedly, the north boundary of Lot No. 1242 (799-C)


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(Property of Froilan Jaime and Mabini Street) is similar to the north boundary of the land mentioned inthe Deed. With only one reference point, however, the south, east and west boundaries of Lot No.1242 (799-C) cannot be established with certainty to be within the parcel of land described in theDeed of Extra-judicial Partition.

In Beo v. Court of Appeals,[21]the Court held that in order that an action for recovery of possession

may prosper, it is indispensable that he who brings the action must fully prove not only his ownershipbut also the identity of the property claimed by describing the location, area and boundariesthereof. So that when the record does not show that the land subject matter of the action has beenexactly determined, the action cannot prosper, inasmuch as the plaintiff's ownership rights in the landclaimed do not appear satisfactorily and conclusively proven at the trial.

In the present case, while it is true that private respondents were not able to show the extent oftheir 1/3 pro indivisoright over Lot No. 1242 (799-C), they have nevertheless established their claimover the said lot. Hence, in line with our ruling in the case of Laluan v. Malpaya,[22]the prudentrecourse would be to remand the case to the lower court for a new trial.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the October 20, 1992 Decision of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. CV No. 27419, and the May 28, 1990 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of MandaueCity, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. MAN-386, insofar as it relates to the recognition of the 1/3 share ofprivate respondents over Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the trial courtin order to determine what part of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is included in the parcel of land adjudicated inthe 1947 Deed of Extrajudicial Partition to the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.


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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 118464. December 21, 1998]

HEIRS OF IGNACIO CONTI and ROSARIO CUARIO,petitioners, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and LYDIA S. REYES as Attorney-in-Fact of JOSEFINA S. REYES,

BERNARDITA S. PALILIO, HERMINIA S. PALILIO, REMEDIOS A.

SAMPAYO, ILUMINADA A. SAMPAYO, ENRICO A. SAMPAYO, CARLOS A.

SAMPAYO, GENEROSO C. SAMPAYO, MYRNA C. SAMPAYO, ROSALINO

C. SAMPAYO, MANUEL C. SAMPAYO, DELIA A. SAMPAYO, CORAZON C.

SAMPAYO, NILO C. SAMPAYO, and LOLITA A. SAMPAYO in her own behalf

and as Attorney-in-Fact of NORMA A. SAMPAYO,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorariseeks to reverse the 30 March 1994 Decision and 21 December 1994Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals which upheld the right of private respondents as heirs of

Lourdes Sampayo to demand partition under Art. 494 of the Civil Code.

Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuario, were the co-owners of the property in

litigation consisting of a 539-square meter lot at the corner of Zamora and Abellanosa Streets, Lucena City,

covered by TCT No. T15374, with a house erected thereon.[1] On 17 March 1986 Lourdes Sampayo died

intestate without issue.[2] Subsequently, on 1 April 1987 private respondents Josefina S. Reyes, Bernardita S.Palilio, Herminia S. Palilio, Remedios A. Sampayo, Iluminada A. Sampayo, Enrico A. Sampayo, Carlos A.

Sampayo, Generoso C. Sampayo, Myrna C. Sampayo, Rosalina C. Sampayo, Manuel C. Sampayo, Delia A.

Sampayo, Corazon C. Sampayo, Nilo C. Sampayo, Lolita A. Sampayo and Norma A. Sampayo, all represented

by their Attorney-in-Fact Lydia S. Reyes, with Lolita A. Sampayo acting also in her own behalf and as

Attorney-in-Fact of Norma A. Sampayo, all claiming to be collateral relatives of the deceased Lourdes

Sampayo, filed an action for partition and damages before RTCBr. 54, Lucena City.[3]

The spouses Ignacio Conti and Rosario Cuario refused the partition on the ground that private respondents

failed to produce any document to prove that they were the rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. [4]On 30 August

1987 Ignacio Conti died and was substituted as party-defendant by his children Asuncion, Francisco, Milagros,

Joselito, Luisito, Diego and Teresita, all surnamed Conti.[5]

At the trial, private respondents presented Lydia Sampayo Reyes and Adelaida Sampayo to prove that they

were the collateral heirs of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo and therefore entitled to her rights as co-owner ofthe subject lot. Bringing with her the original

copy of her certificate of live birth showing that her father was Inocentes Reyes and her mother was

Josefina Sampayo,[6]Lydia Sampayo Reyes testified that she was one of the nieces of Lourdes Sampayo, being

the daughter of Josefina Sampayo, the only living sibling of Lourdes. Lydia also testified that Lourdes had

another sister named Remedios J. Sampayo who died in 1948, and two brothers, Manuel J. Sampayo and Luis J.

Sampayo who died in 1983 and 1960, respectively. To prove that Josefina, Remedios, Luis and Manuel were

siblings of Lourdes, their baptismal certificates together with a photocopy of the birth certificate of Manuel

Sampayo were offered in evidence. These documents showed that their father and mother, like LourdesSampayo, were Antonio Sampayo and Brigida Jaraza.


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The certificates of baptism presented as part of the testimony of Lydia Sampayo Reyes were prepared by

Rev. Franklin C. Rivero who duly certified that all data therein written were in accordance with the churchrecords, hence, the lower left portion of the documents bearing the seal of the church with the notation as to

where the documents were logged in particular.[7]The baptismal certificates were presented in lieu of the birth

certificates because the repository of those documents, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Lucena City,

had been razed by fire on two separate occasions, 27 November 1974 and 30 August 1983, thus all civilregistration records were totally burned.[8]On the other hand, a photocopy of Manuel's birth certificate dated25 October 1919 (Exh. "I")[9]showed that it was issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Lucena, Tayabas (now

Lucena City).

Adelaida Sampayo, widow of Manuel Sampayo, testified that her husband Manuel was the brother of the

deceased Lourdes, and with the death of Manuel, Luis and Remedios, the only living sibling of Lourdes was

Josefina.[10]

To rebut whatever rights the alleged heirs of Lourdes had over the subject lot, petitioners presented Rosario

Cuario Conti, Rosa Ladines Malundas and Rodolfo Espineli. Rosario testified that the subject property was co-owned in equal shares by her husband Ignacio Conti and Lourdes Sampayo and that her family (Rosario) had

been staying in the subject property since 1937.[11]

In fact, she said that her late husband Ignacio Conti paid forthe real estate taxes[12] and spent for the necessary repairs and improvements thereon[13]because by agreement

Lourdes would leave her share of the property to them. [14]

However, as correctly found by the trial court, no will, either testamentary or holographic, was presented

by petitioners to substantiate this claim.[15]Rosario also disclosed that when Lourdes died her remainswere taken by her relatives from their house.[16]When cross examined on who those relatives were, she replied

that the only one she remembered was Josefina since there were many relatives who came. When asked who

Josefina's parents were, she said she could not recall. Likewise, when asked who the parents of Lourdes were,

Rosario denied having ever known them.[17]

Another witness, Rosa Ladines Malundas, narrated that she used to be the neighbor and hairdresser of the

deceased Lourdes Sampayo who told her that upon her death her share would go to Ignacio Conti whom sheconsidered as her brother since both of them were "adopted" by their foster parents Gabriel Cord and Anastacia

Allarey Cord,[18]although she admitted that she did not know whether Lourdes had other relatives.[19]

According to another witness, Rodolfo Espineli, he took pictures of the tombs bearing the tombstones ofGabriel Cord and Anastacia Allarey Cord and Ignacio Conti as well as that of Lourdes Sampayo who was

supposed to have been interred beside her "adoptive" parents. However, as revealed by Rosario during her

direct examination, Lourdes was not in fact interred there because her relatives took her remains.[20]

On 4 April 1991 the trial court declared private respondents as the rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. It

further ordered private respondents and petitioners to submit a project of partition of the residential house

and lot for confirmation by the court.[21]

Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in finding thatprivate respondents were the heirs of Lourdes Sampayo and that they were entitled to the partition of the lot and

the improvements thereon.[22]

On 30 March 1994 the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed RTC decision and held[23]-

In the instant case, plaintiffs [now private respondents] were able to prove and establish by

preponderance of evidence that they are the collateral heirs of deceased Lourdes Sampayo and

therefore the lower court did not err in ordering herein plaintiffs [now private respondents] and

defendants [now petitioners] to submit a project of partition of the residential house and lot owned

in common by the deceased Lourdes Sampayo and defendant spouses Conti for confirmation by the

court x x x x Considering our earlier finding that the lower court did not err in declaring hereinplaintiffs [now private respondents] as heirs of deceased Sampayo and therefore entitled to inherit


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her property, the argument of the appellants [now petitioners] that the plaintiffs [now private

respondents] are not entitled to partition is devoid of merit (insertions in [ ] supplied).

Respondent court also ruled, citing Hernandez v. Padua[24] and Marabilles v. Quito[25], that a prior and

separate judicial declaration of heirship was not necessary[26]and that private respondents became the co-owners

of the portion of the property owned and registered in the name of Lourdes Sampayo upon her death and,consequently, entitled to the immediate possession thereof and all other incidents/rights of ownership as

provided for by law including the right to demand partition under Art. 777 of the Civil Code,[27]and

Ilustre v. Alaras Frondosa[28]holding that the property belongs to the heirs at the moment of death of the

decedent, as completely as if he had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death.

The appellate court subsequently denying a motion for reconsideration upheld the probative value of thedocumentary and testimonial evidence of private respondents and faulted petitioners for not having subpoenaed

Josefina if they believed that she was a vital witness in the case.[29]Hence, petitioners pursued this case arguing

that a complaint for partition to claim a supposed share of the deceased co-owner cannot prosper without prior

settlement of the latter's estate and compliance with all legal requirements, especially publication, and private

respondents were not able to prove by competent evidence their relationship with the deceased. [30]

There is no merit in the petition. A prior settlement of the estate is not essential before the heirs cancommence any action originally pertaining to the deceased as we explained in Quison v. Salud [31]-

Claro Quison died in 1902. It was proven at the trial that the present plaintiffs are next of kin and heirs, but it

is said by the appellants that they are not entitled to maintain this action because there is no evidence that anyproceedings have been taken in court for the settlement of the estate of Claro Quison, and that without such

settlement, the heirs cannot maintain this action. There is nothing in this point. As well by the Civil Code as

by the Code of Civil Procedure, the title to the property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once to

his heirs. Such transmission is, under the present law, subject

to the claims of administration and the property may be taken from the heirs for the purpose of paying debts

and expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate, fromhimself to his heirs. Without some showing that a judicial administrator had been appointed in

proceedings to settle the estate of Claro Quison, the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action is established.

Conformably with the foregoing and taken in conjunction with Arts. 777 and 494[32]of the Civil Code, fromthe death of Lourdes Sampayo her rights as a co-owner, incidental to which is the right to ask for partition at

any time or to terminate the co-ownership, were transmitted to her rightful heirs. In so demanding partition

private respondents merely exercised the right originally pertaining to the decedent, their predecessor-in-

interest.

Petitioners' theory as to the requirement of publication would have been correct had the action been for the

partition of the estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if we were dealing with extrajudicial settlement by agreementbetween heirs and the summary settlement of estates of small value.[33]But what private respondents

are pursuing is the mere segregation of Lourdes' one-half share which they inherited from her through intestate

succession. This is a simple case of ordinary partition between co-owners. The applicable law in point is Sec.

1 of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court -

Sec. 1. Complaint in an action for partition of real estate. - A person having the right to

compel the partition of real estate may do so as in this rule prescribed, setting forth in his complaint

the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition isdemanded and joining as defendants all the other persons interested in the property.

A cursory reading of the aforecited rule shows that publication is not required as erroneously maintained bypetitioners. There are two (2) simultaneous issues in an action for partition. First,


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whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned, and second, if answered

in the affirmative, the manner of the division of the property, i.e., what portion should go to which co-owner.[34] Thus, in this case, we must determine whether private respondents, by preponderance of evidence,

have been able to establish that they are co-owners by way of succession as collateral heirs of the late Lourdes

Sampayo as they claim to be, either a sister, a nephew or a niece. These, private respondents were able to

prove in the trial court as well as before respondent Court of Appeals.

Petitioners however insist that there was no such proof of

filiation because: (a) mere photocopies of birth certificates do not prove filiation; (b) certifications on non-availability of records of birth do not prove filiation; (c) baptismal certificates do not prove filiation of alleged

collateral relatives of the deceased; and, (d) the testimonies of Lydia S. Reyes, alleged daughter of Josefina

Reyes, and Adelaida Sampayo, alleged sister-in-law of Josefina and Lourdes, were incompetent as Lydia was

made to testify on events which happened before her birth while Adelaida testified on matters merely narrated

to her.[35]

We are not persuaded. Altogether, the documentary and testimonial evidence submitted are competent andadequate proofs that private respondents are collateral heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. Private respondents assert

that they are co-owners of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share of the subject property by way of legal or intestatesuccession.

Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of

the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will

or by operation of law.[36]Legal or intestate succession takes place if a person dies without a will, or with a voidwill, or one which has subsequently lost its validity.[37] If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate

children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent. [38]It was

established during the trial that Lourdes died intestate and without issue. Private respondents as sister,

nephews and nieces now claim to be the collateral relatives of Lourdes.

Under Art. 172 of the Family Code,[39] the filiation of legitimate children shall be proved by any other

means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, in the absence of a record of birth or a parentsadmission of such legitimate filiation in a public or private document duly signed by the parent. Such other

proof of ones filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name

has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses

and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule

130 of the Rules of Court.[40]By analogy, this method of proving filiation may also be utilized in theinstant case.

Public documents are the written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,

official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country. [41]The

baptismal certificates presented in evidence by private respondents are public documents. Parish priests

continue to be the legal custodians of the parish records and are authorized to issue true copies, in the form of

certificates, of the entries contained therein.[42]

The admissibility of baptismal certificates offered by Lydia S.Reyes, absent the testimony of the officiating priest or the official recorder, was settled in People v. Ritter,

citing U.S. v. de Vera (28 Phil. 105 [1914]),[43]thus -

x x x the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made in the course of thebusiness under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. The baptisms

administered by the church are one of its transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and

recorded in the book of the church during the course of its business.

It may be argued that baptismal certificates are evidence only of the administration of the sacrament, but inthis case, there were four (4) baptismal certificates which, when taken together, uniformly show that Lourdes,


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Josefina, Remedios and Luis had the same set of parents, as indicated therein. Corroborated by the undisputed

testimony of Adelaida Sampayo that with the demise of Lourdes and her brothers Manuel, Luis and sisterRemedios, the only sibling left was Josefina Sampayo Reyes, such baptismal certificates have acquired

evidentiary weight to prove filiation.

Petitioners' objection to the photocopy of the certificate of birth of Manuel Sampayo was properly

discarded by the court a quo and respondent Court of Appeals. According to Sec. 3, par. (1), Rule 130, of theRules of Court, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other

than the original document itself except when the original has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced incourt, without bad faith on the part of the offeror. The loss or destruction of the original certificate of birth of

Manuel J. Sampayo was duly established by the certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of

Lucena City to the effect that its office was completely destroyed by fire on 27 November 1974 and 30 August

1983, respectively, and as a consequence thereof, all civil registration records were totally burned.

Apparently, there seems to be some merit in petitioners contention that the testimony of Adelaida

Sampayo cannot prove filiation for being hearsay considering that there was no declaration ante litem motamasrequired by the rules, i.e., that the declaration relating to pedigree was made before the controversy

occurred. Nonetheless, petitioners made no move to dispute her testimony in open court when she wasmentioning who the brothers and sisters of Lourdes were. As correctly observed by the trial court in explicit

terms, "the documentary and testimonial evidence were not disputed by defendants" (now

petitioners).[44]Notably, when Rosario Cuario Conti took the witness stand, she admitted that she was not awareof the identities of the parents of the deceased. Clearly, this runs counter to the relationship akin to filial

bonding which she professed she had enjoyed with the decedent. As wife of Ignacio Conti, she was

supposedly a "sister-in-law" of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo who regarded Ignacio as a brother. However,

in sum, we rule that all the pieces of evidence adduced, taken together, clearly preponderate to the right of

private respondents to maintain the action for partition. Absent any reversible error in the assailed Decision

and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, this petition for review on certiorari will not lie.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 30 March 1994 and Resolution

dated 21 December 1994 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Mendoza, andMartinez JJ., concur.

Documents

Wills Cases Full Text 840