Wills 7th Assignment

67. Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties Inc vs Rodriguez

Facts:

The respondents filed a complaint against petitioner Ramon Ching and certain corporations. The complaint sought to nullify an extrajudicial settlement of estate which adjudicated solely to Ramon the entire estate of the deceased Antonio Ching, as well as other remedies. The respondents claimed that Ramon murdered Antonio Ching (A criminal case against Ramon was pending, with Ramon at large. His wife was the one managing Antonio’s estate.), hence, he should be deemed legally disinherited and prohibited from receiving any share from the estate of Antonio.

The respondents prayed for the following:

a) Declaring that the defendant RAMON CHING who murdered his father ANTONIO CHING disqualified as heir and from inheriting to (sic) the estate of his father;

b) Declaring the nullity of the defendant RAMON CHING transfer (sic) of the six [6] parcels of land from the name of his father ANTONIO CHING to his name covered by TCT No. x x x;

c) Declaring the nullity of the AGREEMENT and WAIVER executed by plaintiffs x x x in favor of x x x RAMON CHING for being patently immoral, invalid, illegal, simulated and (sic) sham;

d) Declaring the nullity of the transfer of the shares of stocks at (sic) PO WING from the names of ANTONIO CHING and LUCINA SANTOS to the defendant ANTONIOCHING's name for having been illegally procured through the falsification of their signatures in the document purporting the transfer thereof;

e) Declaring the nullity and to have no force and effect the AFFIDAVIT OF SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE executed by x x x RAMON CHING for being contrary to law and existing jurisprudence;

f) Declaring the nullity of the DEED OF SALES (sic) executed by x x x RAMON CHING (i) over two (2) parcels of land x x x to defendant ASIA ATLANTIC BUSINESS VENTURES, Inc.; and (ii) one (1) parcel of land x x x sold to x x x ELENA TIU DEL PILAR for having illegally procured the ownership and titles of the above properties;

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the respondents’ cause of action should be a subject of a special proceeding since the case involved the alleged disinheritance of Ramon among others.

The RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondents. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction.

Held: Yes. Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while the respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does not partake of the nature.

68. Pecson vs Mediavillo (1914)

Facts:

In 1910, the will of Florencio Pecson was presented to the CFI of Albay for probate. On the 18th day of September, 1910, the said Tomas Lorayes, representing Basiliso Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, presented a motion alleging that Rosario Mediavillo is and Joaquin Mediavillo was a legitimate child of the deceased Teresa Pecson. Teresa was a daughter of the testator; that the said granddaughter, Rosario Mediavillo y Pecson, was disinherited by her grandfather, the testator Florencio Pecson, according to clause 3 of the will, because she failed to show him due respect and on a certain occasion raised her hand against him.

In his will, Florencio Pecson stated that he disinherited Rosario Mediavillo "because she was grossly disrespectful to me and because on one occasion, when it was I do not remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore it is my will that she, the said Rosario Mediavillo, shall have no share in my property." Lorayes contended that Rosario should not have been disinherited, because she did not commit such an act of disrespect, and if perhaps she did, it was due to the derangement of her mental faculties.

The trial court ruled that the clause disinheriting Rosario was void for being contrary to law.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the court may inquire to the cause of the disinheritance and decide whether disinheritance is proper; (2) Whether or not Basiliso Mediavillo, the father of Joaquin Mediavillo, is the latter’s heir by representation.

Held: Yes, the Civil Code (art. 848) provides that disinheritance shall only take place for one of the causes expressly fixed by law. In accordance with the provisions of that article (848) we find that articles 756 and 853 provide the cases or causes for disinheritance; or, in other words, the cases or causes in which the ancestors may by will disinherit their heirs.

Article 849 of the Civil Code provides that the disinheritance can only be effected by the testament, in which shall be mentioned the legal grounds or causes for such disinheritance. If it is true that heirs can be disinherited only by will, and for causes mentioned in the Civil Code, it would seen to follow that the courts might properly inquire whether the disinheritance has been made properly and for the causes provided for by law.

The right of the courts to inquire into the causes and whether there was sufficient cause for the disinheritance or not, seems to be supported by express provisions of the Civil Code. Article 850 provides that "the proof of the truthfulness of the reason for disinheritance shall be established by the heirs of the testator, should the disinherited person deny it." It would appear then that if the person disinherited should deny the truthfulness of the cause of disinheritance, he might be permitted to support his allegation by proof. The right of the court to inquire whether or not the disinheritance was made for just cause is also sustained by the provisions of article 851, which in part provides that: Disinheritance made without statement of the reason, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, should not be proven . . . shall annul the designation of heirship, in so far as it prejudices the person disinherited.

With reference to the second assignment of error, The Supreme Court held that the right of representation shall always take place in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending. In collateral lines, it shall take place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the whole or half blood. It will be remembered that the whole argument of the appellants with reference to the first assignment of error was that Rosario Mediavillo had been disinherited and the court evidently believed that there were no "legitimate children, descendants of the deceased, surviving," and that therefore the father or mother of said legitimate children would inherit as ascendants. Inasmuch,

however, as there was a descendant in the direct line, surviving, the inheritance could not ascend, and for the reason the lower court committed an error in declaring that Basiliso Mediavillo was entitled to inherit that share of the estate that would have belonged to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been living. Therefore, and for all the foregoing, that part of the judgment of the lower court nullifying and setting aside paragraph 3 of the will is hereby affirmed, and that art of said judgment which decrees to Basiliso Mediavillo one-half of the estate of Florencio Pecson, belonging to Teresa Pecson and which would have been given to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been surviving, is hereby revoked.

69. Testate Estate of Vicente Singson Pablo vs De Lim (1943)

Facts:

Don Vicente Singson Pablo died, leaving a will which contained a clause, which provides: “All of my properties not disposed of otherwise in this testament shall be distributed in equal parts to all who are entitled thereto.” The widow, as administratrix, presented a project of partition in which the properties not disposed of were adjudicated to Vicente’s four brothers and four nieces. The brothers objected, saying that pursuant to the aforesaid clause above, the nieces are not entitled to anything. They invoked Art. 751 of the Old Civil Code, which provides that “a disposition made in general terms in favor of the testator’s relatives shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree.” The trial court ruled against the brothers.

Issue: Whether or not the brothers’ contention is meritorious.

Held: No. The testator, by referring to “all who are entitled thereto” instead of “relatives” precisely meant to avoid the uncertainty of the interpretation of Art. 751 and to indicate his wish that the residue of his estate be distributed in equal parts to all who would have been entitled to inherit from him had he dies intestate. (Note: Perhaps the Court considered the fact that Don Vicente was a lawyer who probably knew what he was doing when he made the will.)

70. Dorotheo vs CA (1999)

Facts:

Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Petitioner Lourdes Dorotheo filed a petition for the provate of Alejandro’s will. Private respondents then filed a motion to declare the will intrinsically void, which the trial court granted on Jan. 30, 1986. The trial court declared in that order that petitioner is not the legal wife of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his three legitimate children (petitioners herein). Lourdes appealed to the CA, which dismissed the appeal. The dismissal became final and executory on Feb. 3, 1989.

A writ of execution was issued by the trial court to implement the CA order. However, Lourdes refused to surrender to private respondents the TCTs covering the properties of the late Alejandro. Thus, private respondents filed a motion for cancellation of the titles and for the issuance of new titles in their names. An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the final and executory Order dated January 30, 1986, as well as the Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground that the order was merely interlocutory, hence not final in character (According to petitioner, an order merely declaring who are heirs and the shares to which set of heirs is entitled can’t be the basis of execution). The court added that the dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the distribution of the estate of the deceased spouses. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated February 1, 1991. Thus, private respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals, which nullified the two assailed Orders dated November 29, 1990 and February 1, 1991.

Petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case filed by private respondents before the Court of Appeals was a petition under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that in issuing the two assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot be said to have no jurisdiction because he was particularly designated to hear the case. Petitioner likewise assails the Order of the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of the January 30, 1986 Order which declared the intrinsic invalidity of Alejandros will that was earlier admitted to probate.

Issue: Whether or not a will that was admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has become final and executory still be given effect.

Held: No. It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or order of the trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order allowing the will became final and the question determined by the court in such order can no longer be raised anew, either in the same proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of due execution of the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the character of res judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all juridical questions in connection therewith being for once and forever closed. Such final order makes the will conclusive against the whole world as to its extrinsic validity and due execution.

It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated, particularly on three aspects: (1) whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedents last will and testament; (2) compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills; (3) the testamentary capacity of the testator; and the due execution of the last will and testament.

The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding on this Court which will no longer be disturbed.

It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional rights that testacy is preferred to intestacy. But before there could be testate distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law considering that the deceased testator is no longer available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to give - Nemo praesumitur donare. No intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity

thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity that is whether the provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court. Furthermore, Alejandros disposition in his will of the alleged share in the conjugal properties of his late spouse, whom he described as his only beloved wife, is not a valid reason to reverse a final and executory order. Testamentary dispositions of properties not belonging exclusively to the testator or properties which are part of the conjugal regime cannot be given effect. Matters with respect to who owns the properties that were disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly ventilated and determined in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late spouse’s estate.

71. Dorotheo vs CA (1999)

Facts:

Agatonica Arreza is the offspring of Pedro Arreza and Ursula Tubil. The Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica. Upon the death of Pedro Arreza, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo by whom she had another daughter, the decedent Justa. Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is thus the nephew of Justa by her half sister Agatonica. Domingo Arnaldo is the brother of Juan Arnaldo. Domingo and his wife Catalina Azarcon had a daughter, Primitiva Arnaldo. Primitiva then married Conrado Uriarte who had children, one of whom was Pascasio Uriarte. The widow and daughters of Pascasio are the petitioners in his case. Petitioners are thus grandchildren, the relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity, of Justa by her cousin Primitiva Arnaldo Uriarte. The other petitioners are the children of Primitiva and those of her brother Gregorio. The children of Primitiva by Conrado Uriarte, aside from Pascasio, are Josefina, Gaudencio, Simplicio, Domingo and Virgilio, all surnamed Uriarte. The children of Gregorio Arnaldo, Primitiva's brother, by Julieta Ilogon, are Jorencio, Enecia, Nicolas, Lupecino and Felisa. These other petitioners are thus grandchildren and relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity of Justa by her cousins Gregorio Arnaldo and Primitiva Arnaldo. Private respondent Benedicto Estrada brought this case in the Regional Trial Court for the partition of the land left by Justa Arnaldo-Sering. The

land, consisting of 2.7 hectares, had been acquired by Justa as follows: 0.5 hectare by inheritance from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, and 2.2 hectares by purchase. Private respondent claimed to be the sole surviving heir of Justa, on the ground that the latter died without issue. He complained that Pascasio Uriarte who, he claimed, worked the land as Justa's tenant, refused to give him (private respondent) his share of the harvest. He contended that Pascasio had no right to the entire land of Justa but could claim only one-half of the 0.5 hectare land which Justa had inherited from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil. Pascasio died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by his heirs. In their answer, the heirs denied they were mere tenants of Justa but the latter's heirs entitled to her entire land. They claimed that the entire land, subject of the case, was originally owned by Ambrocio Arnaldo, their great granduncle. It was allegedly bequeathed to Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, Ambrocio's nephews, in a holographic will executed by Ambrocio in 1908. Domingo was to receive two-thirds of the land and Juan, one-third. The heirs claimed that the land had always been in their possession and that in her lifetime Justa never asserted exclusive right over the property but only received her share of the harvest from it. They alleged that private respondent did not have any right to the property because he was not an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo, the original owner of the property.

The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners, whereas the CA reversed and ruled in favor of respondents. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not a nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant or spouse survive the decedent.

Held: Yes. Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and private respondent. As already stated, private respondent is the son of Justa's half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa's nephew. A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent. That private respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him from being his aunt's heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, "The determination of whether the relationship is of

the full or half blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors.

72. Sayson vs CA (1992)

Facts:

Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died in 1952, and Rafaela in 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died in 1972. His wife died nine years later in 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children. On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedent's lawful descendants.

Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. The complainants asserted the defense that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.

The RTC ruled that Delia, Edmundo and Doribel are entitled to inherit, and the CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the adopted children of Teodoro (Delia and Edmundo) are entitled to inherit Teodoro’s share by right of representation.

Held: No. There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children.

But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.

73. Bagunu vs Piedad (1987)

Facts:

On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay City. Asserting entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities, including an incomplete publications of the notice of hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate.

Issue: WON petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, can inherit alongside respondent, a collateral relative of the third civil degree? Elsewise stated does the rule of proximity in intestate succession find application among collateral relatives?

Held: No. Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a fifthdegree relative of the decedent. The right of representation does not apply to "others collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, fourth decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent

concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction. Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding an intestato to the estate of the decedent.

74. Castro vs CA (1989)

Facts:

Petitioners Juan and Feliciana Castro are the siblings of the deceased Eustaquio Castro, while private respondent Benita Castro-Naval is the only child of Eustaquio. The petitioners filed an action for partition of properties against Beinta, alleging that they are the compulsory heirs of Pedro Castro (the father of Eustaquio Castro). This complaint was amended into an action for quieting of title. In the pre-trial, the parties agreed that the sole issue to resolve is whether or not Benita is the acknowledged natural child of Eustaquio.

It was revealed that Pricola Maregment, the natural mother of Benita, was wedded to Felix de Maya against her wishes. While the wedding celebration was ongoing, she escaped and went to her true sweetheart, Eustaquio. The two of them eventually lived as husbands and wives. As a result of their cohabitation, Benita was born. After the death of Pricola, Benita continued to live with Eustaquio. And when Benita got married, it was Eustaquio who gaver her away in marriage. Even after Benita’s marriage, Eustaquio still took care of her. :’)

The RTC and the CA both ruled that Benita is the acknowledged and recognized child of Eustaquio and is therefore entitled to participate in the partition of the properties left by him.

Issue: Whether or not Benita is the acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio.

Held: Yes. There is no question that the private respondent is an illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro. Her father Eustaquio was a widower when Pricola Maregmen, her mother, went to live with him. The two could not validly enter into a marriage because when Pricola fled from her own wedding party on May 23, 1913, the wedding rites to Felix de Maya had already been solemnized. In other words, the

marriage was celebrated although it could not be consummated because the bride hurriedly ran away to join the man she really loved. Since Eustaquio Castro was a widower when Benita was conceived, Benita is a natural child.

Under the Civil Code, there are two kinds of acknowledgment — voluntary and compulsory. The provisions on acknowledgement are applied to natural as well as spurious children.

We apply the more liberal provisions of the new Family Code considering the facts and equities of this case.1

First, Benita Castro Naval is unquestionably the daughter of the late Eustaquio Castro who was qualified to legally marry when she was conceived and born. From her birth on March 27, 1919 until the father's death on August 22, 1961 or for 42 years, Benita lived with her father and enjoyed the love and care that a parent bestows on an only child. The private respondents, themselves, admitted in their complaint in Civil Case No. 3762 that Benita is a forced heir of Eustaquio Castro. Second, the rule on separating the legitimate from the illegitimate family is of no special relevance here because Benita and her mother Pricola Maregmen were the only immediate family of Eustaquio. There are no legitimate children born of a legitimate wife contesting the inheritance of Benita. Third, it was Eustaquio himself who had the birth of Benita reported and registered. There is no indication in the records that Eustaquio should have known in 1919 that apart from reporting the birth of a child, he should also have signed the certificate and seen to it that it was preserved for 60 years. Or that he should have taken all legal steps including judicial action to establish her status as his recognized natural child during the reglementary period to do so. Fourth, it was Eustaquio who gave away Benita during her wedding to Cipriano Naval. The couple continued to live with the father even after the wedding and until the latter's death. Fifth, the certificate of baptism and the picture of the Castro family during the wake for Eustaquio may not be sufficient proof of recognition under the Civil Code.

1 This is a special case, because under normal circumstances, the retroactive application of the Family Code would have been improper (considering that there are those whose rights would be prejudiced). But the Court nevertheless allowed a retroactive application, considering the peculiar facts in this case and for equity considerations.

Under the Code's Title VI on Paternity and Filiation there are only two classes of children — legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinctions among various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated. Article 175 provides that "Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children."

There can be no dispute that Benita Castro enjoyed the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro and that the action of Benita in defending her status in this case is similar to an "action to claim legitimacy" brought during her lifetime.

75. Gonzales vs CA (1998)

Facts:

Petitioners are the siblings of Ricardo de Mesa. Claiming they were the only heirs of Ricardo, they sought the settlement of his intestate estate with the CFI of Manila. Meanwhile, private respondents Honoria, Cecilia and Marian (all surnamed Empaynado) filed a motion to set aside the proceedings and for leave to file opposition. They claim that Honoria had been the common-law wife of Ricardo, while Cecilia and Marian are their children. Private respondents also disclosed the existence of Rosemarie, a child allegedly fathered by Ricardo with another woman.

The CFI declared Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie as acknowledged natural children of Ricardo entitled to succeed to the entire estate of Ricardo. The CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.

The petitioners contended that Jose Libuanao, the deceased husband of Honoria, was actually alive when Cecilia and Marian were born in 1948 and 1954 respectively. Petitioners presented an enrolment form of Angelita Libunao accomplished in 1956 which states that his father was Jose Libunao. According to petitioners, if it were true that Jose was already dead in 1943, then it would have said so in that enrolment form. Lastly, petitioners presented the affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas, Ricardo Abads physician, declaring that in 1935, he had examined Ricardo Abad and found him to be infected with gonorrhea, and

that the latter had become sterile as a consequence thereof.

Issue: Whether or not C, M and R are acknowledged natural children of Ricardo and thus entitled to succeed to the entire estate of Ricardo.

Held: Yup. The Supreme Court did not believe petitioners’ insane theories and proceeded to apply Art. 988 of the Civil Code, which provides that “In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.”

76. Diaz, the Guardian vs IAC (1990)

Facts:

Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the CFI of Cavite in a special proceeding "In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero," praying among other things, that the corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her favor and that she be appointed as special Administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion. Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy. Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero. Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

Pascual Santero died in 1970, while Pablo Santero died in 1973 and Simona Santero died in 1976. Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.

In 1976, the court declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit: Petition for the Letters of Administration of the intestate Estate of Pablo Santero; Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of

Pascual Santero; Petition for Guardianship over the properties of an incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; and Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene was allowed to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero by Order of the Court in 1977. Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her "Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero. Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children.

In 1980, the court issued an order excluding Felisa Jardin "from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her to be, not an heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero."

Felisa Jardin filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and it was denied by the trial court. On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial court and declaring the Felisa Jardin as the sole heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere in the proceeding for the declaration of heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

Issue: Whether petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero.

Held: No. Since the hereditary conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows: “An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.”

Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the

oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. The record shows that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

77. Corpuz vs Administrator (1978)

Di ko maintindihan. Basahain na lang full text.

78. De la Puerta vs CA (1990)

Facts:

The testator, Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92, leaving her properties to her three surviving children, Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel. Isabel was given the free portion in addition to her legitime and was appointed executrix of the will. Vicente and Alfredo opposed the petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel. The two claimed that their mother was already senile at the time of the execution of the will and did not fully comprehend its meaning, that the properties listed in the inventory of her estate belonged to them exclusively. Alfredo subsequently died, leaving Vicente the lone oppositor. Vicente de la Puerta filed with the CFI of Quezon, a petition to adopt Carmelita de la Puerta, which was thereafter granted. Isabel appealed the said decision to the CA. Vicente died during the pendency of the appeal, prompting her to move for the dismissal of the case. Carmelita filed a motion for the payment to her of a monthly allowance as the acknowledged natural child of Vicente de la Puerta. The said motion was granted by the probate court granted the motion, declaring that Carmelita was a natural child of Vicente de la Puerta and was entitled to the amounts claimed for her support. CA affirmed this order of the lower court. Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner's main argument is that Carmelita was not the natural child of Vicente de la Puerta, who was married to Genoveva de la Puerta in 1938 and remained his wife until his death in 1978. Carmelita's real parents are Juanito Austrial and Gloria Jordan.

RTC and CA ruled in favor of Carmelita. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON respondent Carmelita de la Puerta, can claim successional rights to the estate of her alleged grandmother.

Held: The Court held that Vicente de la Puerta did not predecease his mother and Carmelita is a spurious child. It is settled that in testamentary succession, the right of representation can take place only in the following cases: first, when the person represented dies before the testator; second, when the person represented is incapable of succeeding the testator; and third, when the person represented is disinherited by the testator. In all of these cases, since there is a vacancy in the inheritance, the law calls the children or descendants of thefiliation of private respondent Carmelita de la Puerta, who claims successional rights to the estate of her

alleged grandmother. person represented to succeed by right of representation.

The law is clear that there is representation only when relatives of a deceased person try to succeed him in his rights which he would have had if still living.

Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son Vicente had the right to inherit from her directly or in his own right. No right of representation was involved, nor could it be invoked by Carmelita upon her father's death, which came after his own mother's death. It would have been different if Vicente was already dead when Dominga Revuelta died. Carmelita could then have inherited from her in representation of her father Vicente, assuming the private respondent was a lawful heir. As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from inheriting from Dominga because of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down the barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families. This article provides quite clearly: Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.

Even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be barred from inheriting from Dominga Revuelta for there would be no natural kindred ties between them and consequently, no legal ties to bind them either. Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente de la Puerta, has successional rights to the intestate estate of her father but not to the estate of Dominga Revuelta. Her claims for support and inheritance should therefore be filed in the proceedings for the settlement of her own father's estate and cannot be considered in the probate of Dominga Revuelta's will.

79. Pascual vs Pascual (1992)

Facts:

Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual. Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children. Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a Special Proceeding for administration

of the intestate estate of her late husband. On October 16, 1985, all the heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual The Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle. On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights. Both the RTC and CA dismissed the submitted Motions as well as Motions for reconsideration reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not Art. 992 excludes recognized natural children from inheritance of the deceased.

Held: The Court dismissed the instant petition for lack of merit and affirmed the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals. It cited the previous decided case of Diaz v. IAC, where such Court ruled that Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children. Applying the doctrine, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.

80. Manuel vs Ferrer (1995)

Facts:

The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left by an illegitimate child who died intestate without any surviving descendant or ascendant. Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, filed this suit. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with Ursula Bautista. From this relationship, a child named Juan Manuel was born. Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with an area of 2,700 sqm was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two other parcels of land, were later bought by Juan and registered in his name. The couple were not blessed with a child that is why they took private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own "daughter." On June 3, 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land. Juan Manuel died intestate on February 21, 1990. Two years later, Esperanza Gamba also passed away. A month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of SelfAdjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land. Following the registration of the document of adjudication with the Office of the Register of Deeds, the three titles in the name of Juan Manuel were canceled and new titles, were issued in the name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar. Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. The petitioners filed a complaint filed before the RTC Lingayen, Pangasinan, seeking the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments. The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit. The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the trial court. Hence, this Petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: WON the petitioners are entitled to inherit in the intestate estate of their illegitimate brother, Juan Manuel.

Held: The Court ruled that the petitioners are not entitled to inherit from the intestate estate of their illegitimate brother, Juan Manuel under ARTICLE 992, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. The principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family wherein such doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions. A barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family wherein the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the illegitimate child. Admittedly in her answer, Modesta is not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. A ward, without the benefit of formal/judicial adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. Nevertheless, the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court.