William James - The Dilemma of Determinism

8/6/2019 William James - The Dilemma of Determinism

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THE DILEMMA OF DETERMINISM

By William James

Acommonopinionprevails that thejuicehasagesagobeenpressedoutof thefreewill controversy, and that no new champion candomore thanwarmup

staleargumentswhicheveryonehasheard.This isaradicalmistake.Iknowof

no subject lessworn out, or inwhich inventive genius has abetter chance of

breakingopennewgroundnot,perhaps,offorcingaconclusionorofcoercing

assent,but ofdeepening our sense ofwhat the issuebetween the twoparties

reallyis,ofwhattheideasoffateandoffreewillimply.Atourverysidealmost,

in thepast fewyears,wehave seen falling in rapid succession from thepress

works thatpresent the alternative in entirelynovel lights.Not to speakof the

EnglishdisciplesofHegel, suchasGreenandBradley;not to speakofHinton

andHodgson,norofHazardhere weseeinthewritingsofRenouvier,Fouille,

andDelbufhowcompletelychangedand refreshed is the formofall theold

disputes. I cannotpretend tovie inoriginalitywith anyof themasters Ihave

named,andmyambitionlimitsitselftojustonelittlepoint.IfIcanmaketwoof

thenecessarilyimpliedcorollariesofdeterminismclearertoyouthantheyhave

beenmadebefore,Ishallhavemade itpossibleforyoutodecidefororagainst

thatdoctrinewith abetterunderstanding ofwhat you are about.And if you

prefernot todecide at all,but to remaindoubters,youwill at least seemore

plainlywhat the subject of your hesitation is. I thus disclaim openly on the

thresholdallpretensiontoprovetoyouthatthefreedomofthewillistrue.ThemostIhopeistoinducesomeofyoutofollowmyownexampleinassumingit

true,andactingasifitweretrue.Ifitbetrue,itseemstomethatthisisinvolved

inthestrictlogicofthecase.Itstruthoughtnottobeforcedwillynillydownour

indifferentthroats.Itoughttobefreelyespousedbymenwhocanequallywell

turntheirbacksupon it.Inotherwords,ourfirstactoffreedom, ifwearefree,

oughtinallinwardproprietytobetoaffirmthatwearefree.Thisshouldexclude,

it seems tome, from the freewill side of the question all hope of a coercive

demonstrations, ademonstrationwhichI,forone,amperfectlycontentedtogo

without.

Withthusmuchunderstoodattheoutset,wecanadvance.Butnotwithoutone

morepointunderstoodaswell.TheargumentsIamabouttourgeallproceedon

two suppositions: first,whenwemake theories about theworld and discuss

themwithoneanother,wedosoinordertoattainaconceptionofthingswhich

shallgiveussubjectivesatisfaction;and,second,iftherebetwoconceptions,and

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theoneseemstous,onthewhole,morerationalthantheother,weareentitledto

supposethatthemorerationaloneisthetruerofthetwo.Ihopethatyouareall

willingtomakethesesuppositionswithme;forIamafraidthatiftherebeanyof

youherewhoarenot,theywillfindlittleedificationintherestofwhatIhaveto

say.Icannotstoptoarguethepoint;butImyselfbelievethatallthemagnificent

achievementsofmathematicalandphysicalscienceourdoctrinesofevolution,

ofuniformityof law,and therestproceed fromour indomitabledesire tocast

theworldintoamorerationalshapeinourmindsthantheshapeintowhichitis

throwntherebythecrudeorderofourexperience.Theworldhasshownitself,to

agreatextent,plastictothisdemandofoursforrationality.Howmuchfartherit

willshow itselfplasticnoonecansay.Ouronlymeansoffindingout is to try;

and I, for one, feel as free to try conceptions ofmoral as ofmechanical or of

logical rationality. If a certain formula for expressing the nature of theworld

violatesmymoraldemand,Ishallfeelasfreetothrowitoverboard,oratleastto

doubt it, as if it disappointed my demand for uniformity of sequence, forexample; the one demandbeing, so far as I can see, quite as subjective and

emotionalastheotheris.Theprincipleofcausality,forexamplewhatisitbuta

postulate,anemptynamecoveringsimplyademandthatthesequenceofevents

shall somedaymanifestadeeperkindofbelongingofone thingwithanother

thanthemerearbitraryjuxtapositionwhichnowphenomenallyappears?Itisas

muchanaltartoanunknowngodastheonethatSaintPaulfoundatAthens.All

ourscientificandphilosophicidealsarealtarstounknowngods.Uniformityisas

muchsoasisfreewill.Ifthisbeadmitted,wecandebateoneventerms.But if

anyonepretends

that

while

freedom

and

variety

are,

in

the

first

instance,

subjectivedemands,necessityanduniformityaresomethingaltogetherdifferent,

Idonotseehowwecandebateatall.

Tobegin,then,Imustsupposeyouacquaintedwithalltheusualargumentson

thesubject.Icannotstoptotakeuptheoldproofsfromcausation,fromstatistics,

from the certaintywithwhichwe can foretelloneanothers conduct, from the

fixity of character, and all the rest. But there are two words which usually

encumbertheseclassicalarguments,andwhichwemustimmediatelydisposeof

ifwearetomakeanyprogress.Oneistheeulogisticwordfreedom,andtheother

istheopprobriouswordchance.Theword chance Iwishtokeep,butIwishtoget rid of the word freedom. Its eulogistic associations have so far

overshadowedalltherestofitsmeaningthatbothpartiesclaimthesolerightto

use it, anddeterminists today insist that they alone are freedoms champions.

Oldfashioneddeterminismwaswhatwemaycallharddeterminism.Itdidnot

shrink from suchwordsas fatality,bondageof thewill,necessitation,and the

like.Nowadays,we have a softdeterminismwhich abhors harshwords, and,

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repudiatingfatality,necessity,andevenpredetermination,saysthatitsrealname

isfreedom;forfreedomisonlynecessityunderstood,andbondagetothehighest

isidenticalwithtruefreedom.Evenawriteraslittleusedtomakingcapitalout

of soft words as Mr. Hodgson hesitates not to call himself a freewill

determinist.

Now,allthisisaquagmireofevasionunderwhichtherealissueoffacthasbeen

entirelysmothered.Freedominallthesesensespresentssimplynoproblematall.

Nomatterwhat thesoftdeterministmeansby it,whetherhemeanstheacting

withoutexternalconstraint;whetherhemeanstheactingrightly,orwhetherhe

means the acquiescing in the law of thewhole,who cannot answer him that

sometimeswe are free and sometimeswe are not?But there isaproblem, an

issue of fact and not ofwords, an issue of themostmomentous importance,

whichisoftendecidedwithoutdiscussioninonesentence,nay,inoneclauseof

asentence,bythoseverywriterswhospinoutwholechaptersintheireffortstoshowwhat true freedom is; and that is the question of determinism, about

whichwearetotalktonight.

Fortunately, no ambiguities hang about this word or about its opposite,

indeterminism.Bothdesignate an outwardway inwhich thingsmay happen,

andtheircoldandmathematicalsoundhasnosentimentalassociationsthatcan

bribeourpartialityeitherwayinadvance.Now,evidenceofanexternalkindto

decidebetweendeterminismand indeterminismis,asIintimatedawhileback,

strictlyimpossibletofind.Letuslookatthedifferencebetweenthemandseefor

ourselves.Whatdoesdeterminismprofess?

Itprofessesthatthosepartsoftheuniversealreadylaiddownabsolutelyappoint

and decree what the other parts shall be. The future has no ambiguous

possibilitiesbiddenin itswomb;thepartwecallthepresent iscompatiblewith

onlyonetotality.Anyotherfuturecomplementthantheonefixedfrometernity

isimpossible.Thewholeisineachandeverypart,andweldsitwiththerestinto

an absolute unity, an iron block, in which there can be no equivocation or

shadowofturning.

Withearthsfirstclaytheydidthelastmanknead,

Andthereofthelastharvestsowedtheseed.

Andthefirstmorningofcreationwrote

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Whatthelastdawnofreckoningshallread.

Indeterminism, on the contrary, says that the parts have a certain amount of

loose play on one another, so that the laying down of one of them does not

necessarilydeterminewhattheothersshallbe.Itadmitsthatpossibilitiesmaybe

inexcessofactualities,and that thingsnotyetrevealed toourknowledgemay

reallyinthemselvesbeambiguous.Oftwoalternativefutureswhichweconceive,

bothmaynowbe reallypossible; and theonebecomes impossibleonly at the

verymomentwhentheotherexcludesitbybecomingrealitself.Indeterminism

thusdeniestheworldtobeoneunbendingunitoffact.Itsaysthereisacertain

ultimate pluralism in it; and, so saying, it corroborates our ordinary

unsophisticatedviewofthings.Tothatview,actualitiesseemtofloatinawider

sea of possibilities from out of which they are chosen; and, somewhere,

indeterminismsays,suchpossibilitiesexist,andformapartoftruth.

Determinism,onthecontrary,saystheyexistnowhere,andthatnecessityonthe

one hand and impossibility on the other are the sole categories of the real.

Possibilities that fail to get realized are, for determinism, pure illusions: they

never were possibilities at all. There is nothing inchoate, it says, about this

universe of ours, all thatwas or is or shallbe actual in it havingbeen from

eternityvirtually there.Thecloudofalternativesourmindsescort thismassof

actualitywithal isacloudof sheerdeceptions, towhich impossibilities is the

onlynamethatrightfullybelongs.

The issue, it will be seen, is a perfectly sharp one, which no eulogistic

terminologycansmearoverorwipeout.Thetruthmustliewithonesideorthe

other,anditslyingwithonesidemakestheotherfalse.

Thequestionrelatessolely to theexistenceofpossibilities, in thestrictsenseof

the term,as thingsthatmay,butneednot,be.Bothsidesadmit thatavolition,

for instance,hasoccurred.The indeterminists say anothervolitionmighthave

occurred in itsplace: thedeterminists swear thatnothing couldpossiblyhave

occurredinitsplace.Now,cansciencebecalledintotelluswhichofthesetwo

pointblank

contradicters

of

each

other

is

right?

Science

professes

to

draw

no

conclusionsbut suchasarebasedonmattersof fact, things thathaveactually

happened; but how can any amount of assurance that something actually

happened give us the least grain of information as towhether another thing

might ormight not have happened in itsplace?Only facts canbeprovedby

otherfacts.Withthingsthatarepossibilitiesandnotfacts,factshavenoconcern.

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Ifwehavenootherevidencethantheevidenceofexistingfacts,thepossibility

questionmustremainamysterynevertobeclearedup.

Andthetruthisthatfactspracticallyhavehardlyanythingtodowithmakingus

either determinists or indeterminists. Sure enough, we make a flourish of

quoting facts thisway or that; and ifwe are determinists,we talk about the

infallibilitywithwhichwe canpredict one anothers conduct;while ifwe are

indeterminists,we laygreat stresson the fact that it isjustbecausewecannot

foretelloneanothersconduct,either inwarorstatecraftor inanyof thegreat

andsmall intriguesandbusinessesofmen, that life isso intenselyanxiousand

hazardousagame.Butwhodoesnotsee thewretched insufficiencyof thisso

calledobjectivetestimonyonbothsides?Whatfillsupthegapsinourmindsis

somethingnotobjective,notexternal.Whatdividesus intopossibilitymenand

antipossibilitymen isdifferent faithsorpostulates,postulatesofrationality.To

thismantheworldseemsmorerationalwithpossibilitiesinit,tothatmanmorerationalwithpossibilitiesexcluded;andtalkaswewillabouthavingtoyieldto

evidence,whatmakesusmonistsorpluralists,deterministsorindeterminists,is

atbottomalwayssomesentimentlikethis.

The stronghold of the deterministic sentiment is the antipathy to the idea of

chance.As soon aswebegin to talk indeterminism to our friends,we find a

numberofthemshakingtheirheads.Thisnotionofalternativepossibilities,they

say,thisadmissionthatanyoneofseveralthingsmaycometopass,is,afterall,

onlyaroundaboutnameforchance;andchanceissomethingthenotionofwhich

nosanemindcan foran instant tolerate in theworld.What is it, theyask,but

barefaced crazy unreason, the negation of intelligibility and law? And if the

slightestparticleofitexistsanywhere,what istopreventthewholefabricfrom

falling together, the stars from going out, and chaos from recommencing her

topsyturvyreign?

Remarksof this sort about chancewillput an end todiscussion asquicklyas

anythingonecanfind.Ihavealreadytoldyouthat chance wasawordIwished

tokeepanduse.Letusthenexamineexactlywhat itmeans,andseewhetherit

oughttobesuchaterriblebugbeartous.Ifancythatsqueezingthethistleboldlywillrobitofitssting.

The sting of theword chance seems to lie in the assumption that itmeans

somethingpositive, and that if anythinghappensby chance, itmustneedsbe

something of an intrinsically irrational and preposterous sort. Now, chance

meansnothingofthekind.Itisapurelynegativeandrelativeterm,givingusno

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information about that ofwhich it ispredicated, except that it happens tobe

disconnected with something elsenot controlled, secured, or necessitated by

other things in advance of its own actual presence.As this point is themost

subtileoneofthewholelecture,andatthesametimethepointonwhichallthe

resthinges,Ibegyoutopayparticularattentiontoit.WhatIsayisthatittellsus

nothingaboutwhata thingmaybe in itself tocall it chance. Itmaybeabad

thing,itmaybeagoodthing.Itmaybelucidity,transparency,fitnessincarnate,

matching thewhole system of other things,when it has oncebefallen, in an

unimaginablyperfectway.Allyoumeanbycallingit chance isthatthisisnot

guaranteed,thatitmayalsofalloutotherwise.Forthesystemofotherthingshas

nopositiveholdonthechancething.Itsoriginisinacertainfashionnegative:it

escapes,andsays,Handsoff!coming,whenitcomes,asafreegift,ornotatall.

This negativeness, however, and this opacity of the chancething when thus

consideredabextra,orfromthepointofviewofpreviousthingsordistantthings,do not preclude its having any amount of positiveness and luminosity from

within,andat itsownplace andmoment.All that its chancecharacterasserts

aboutitisthatthereissomethinginitreallyofitsown,somethingthatisnotthe

unconditionalpropertyofthewhole.Ifthewholewantsthisproperty,thewhole

mustwait till it can get it, if itbe amatter of chance.That theuniversemay

actuallybeasortofjointstocksocietyofthissort,inwhichthesharershaveboth

limited liabilities and limited powers, is of course a simple and conceivable

notion.

Nevertheless,manypersons talkas if theminutestdoseofdisconnectednessof

one part with another, the smallest modicum of independence, the faintest

tremorofambiguityabout thefuture,forexample,wouldruineverything,and

turn this goodly universe into a sort of insane sandheap or nulliverse, no

universe at all. Since future human volitions are as amatter of fact the only

ambiguousthingswearetemptedtobelievein,letusstopforamomenttomake

ourselves sure whether their independent and accidental character need be

fraughtwithsuchdirefulconsequencestotheuniverseasthese.

What ismeantby saying thatmychoiceofwhichway towalkhomeafter thelecture is ambiguous and matter of chance as far as the present moment is

concerned?ItmeansthatbothDivinityAvenueandOxfordStreetarecalled;but

thatonlyone,andthatoneeitherone,shallbechosen.Now,Iaskyouseriously

to suppose that this ambiguity of my choice is real; and then to make the

impossiblehypothesisthatthechoiceismadetwiceover,andeachtimefallsona

different street. In other words, imagine that I first walk through Divinity

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Avenue,andthenimaginethatthepowersgoverningtheuniverseannihilateten

minutesoftimewithallthatitcontained,andsetmebackatthedoorofthishall

just as Iwasbefore the choicewasmade. Imagine then that, everything else

beingthesame,InowmakeadifferentchoiceandtraverseOxfordStreet.You,as

passivespectators, lookonandsee the twoalternativeuniverses,oneof them

withmewalking throughDivinityAvenue in it, the otherwith the sameme

walkingthroughOxfordStreet.Now,ifyouaredeterministsyoubelieveoneof

these universes to havebeen from eternity impossible: youbelieve it to have

beenimpossiblebecauseoftheintrinsicirrationalityoraccidentalitysomewhere

involvedinit.Butlookingoutwardlyattheseuniverses,canyousaywhichisthe

impossible and accidental one, and which the rational and necessary one? I

doubt if the most ironclad determinist among you could have the slightest

glimmerof lighton thispoint. Inotherwords,eitheruniverseafterthefactand

oncetherewould,toourmeansofobservationandunderstanding,appearjustas

rationalastheother.Therewouldbeabsolutelynocriterionbywhichwemightjudgeonenecessaryandtheothermatterofchance.Supposenowwerelievethe

godsof theirhypothetical taskandassumemychoice,oncemade, tobemade

forever.IgothroughDivinityAvenueforgoodandall.If,asgooddeterminists,

younowbegintoaffirm,whatallgooddeterministspunctuallydoaffirm,thatin

thenatureofthingsIcouldnthavegonethroughOxfordStreet,hadIdonesoit

wouldhavebeenchance,irrationality,insanity,ahorridgapinnature,Isimply

call your attention to this, that your affirmation is what the Germans call a

Machtspruch,amereconceptionfulminatedasadogmaandbasedonnoinsight

intodetails.

Before

my

choice,

either

street

seemed

as

natural

to

you

as

to

me.

Had Ihappened to takeOxfordStreet,DivinityAvenuewouldhavefigured in

yourphilosophyasthegapinnature;andyouwouldhavesoproclaimeditwith

thebestdeterministicconscienceintheworld.

But what a hollow outcry, then, is this against a chance which, if it werepresentedtous,wecouldbynocharacterwhateverdistinguishfromarational

necessity! I have taken themost trivial of examples,but no possible example

couldleadtoanydifferentresult.Forwhatarethealternativeswhich,inpointof

fact,offer themselves tohumanvolition?Whatare those futures thatno seem

mattersofchance?AretheynotoneandallliketheDivinityAvenueandOxfordStreetofourexample?Aretheynotallofthemkindsofthingsalreadyhereand

based in the existing frame of nature? Is anyone ever tempted to produce an

absoluteaccident,somethingutterlyirrelevanttotherestoftheworld?Donotan

themotives that assail us, all the futures that offer themselves to our choice,

spring equally from the soil of the past; andwould not either one of them,

whether realized through chance or through necessity, the moment it was

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realized,seem toustofitthatpast,and in thecompletestandmostcontinuous

mannertointerdigitatewiththephenomenaalreadythere?

Themore one thinks of thematter, themore onewonders that so empty and

gratuitousahubbubasthisoutcryagainstchanceshouldhavefoundsogreatan

echo in theheartsofmen. It isawordwhich tellsusabsolutelynothingabout

whatchances,oraboutthemodusoperandiofthechancing;andtheuseofitasa

warcryshowsonlyatemperofintellectualabsolutism,ademandthattheworld

shallbeasolidblock,subjecttoonecontrol,whichtemper,whichdemand,the

worldmay notbe found to gratify at all. In every outwardly verifiable and

practicalrespect,aworldinwhichthealternativesthatnowactuallydistractyour

choiceweredecidedbypurechancewouldbebymeabsolutelyundistinguished

fromtheworldinwhichInowlive.Iam,therefore,entirelywillingtocallit,so

farasyourchoicesgo,aworldofchance forme.Toyourselves,it is true, those

very acts of choice,which tome are soblind, opaque, and external, are theoppositesofthis,foryouarewithinthemandeffectthem.Toyoutheyappearas

decisions; and decisions, for him who makes them, are altogether peculiar

psychic facts. Selfluminous and selfjustifying at the livingmoment atwhich

they occur, they appeal tonooutsidemoment toput its stampupon them or

makethemcontinuouswiththerestofnature.Themselvesitisratherwhoseem

tomakenaturecontinuous;andintheirstrangeandintensefunctionofgranting

consent to one possibility and withholding it from another, to transform an

equivocalanddoublefutureintoanunalterableandsimplepast.

Butwith thepsychology of thematterwe have no concern this evening. The

quarrelwhichdeterminismhaswithchancefortunatelyhasnothing todowith

this or that psychological detail. It is a quarrel altogether metaphysical.

Determinism denies the ambiguity of future volitions,because it affirms that

nothing future canbeambiguous.Butwehave saidenough tomeet the issue.

Indeterminatefuturevolitionsdomeanchance.Letusnotfeartoshout itfrom

thehousetopsifneedbe;forwenowknowthattheideaofchanceis,atbottom,

exactly thesame thingas the ideaofgift,theonesimplybeingadisparaging,

and the other a eulogistic, name for anything onwhichwe have no effective

claim. And whether the world be the better or the worse for having eitherchances or gifts in it will depend altogether on what these uncertain and

unclaimablethingsturnouttobe.

And this at last brings us within sight of our subject. We have seen what

determinismmeans:we have seen that indeterminism is rightly described as

meaningchance;andwehaveseenthatchance,theverynameofwhichweare

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urgedtoshrinkfromasfromametaphysicalpestilence,meansonlythenegative

fact thatnopartof theworld,howeverbig,canclaim tocontrolabsolutely the

destiniesof thewhole.Butalthough, indiscussing theword chance, Imayat

momentshaveseemedtobearguingforitsrealexistence,Ihavenotmeanttodo

soyet.Wehavenotyetascertainedwhetherthisbeaworldofchanceorno;at

most,wehaveagreedthatitseemsso.AndInowrepeatwhatIsaidattheoutset,

that, from any strict theoretical point of view, the question is insoluble. To

deepenour theoretic senseof thedifferencebetweenaworldwithchances in it

andadeterministicworldisthemostIcanhopetodo;andthisImaynowatlast

beginupon,afterallourtediousclearingoftheway.

Iwish firstofall to showyoujustwhat thenotion that this isadeterministic

worldimplies.TheimplicationsIcallyourattentiontoareallboundupwiththe

fact that it isaworld inwhichwe constantlyhave tomakewhat I shall,with

yourpermission,calljudgmentsofregret.Hardlyanhourpassesinwhichwedonotwish thatsomethingmightbeotherwise;andhappy indeedare thoseofus

whoseheartshaveneverechoedthewishofOmarKhayam

Thatwemightclasp,ereclosed,thebookoffate,

Andmakethewriteronafairerleaf

Inscribeournames,orquiteobliterate.

Ah!Love,couldyouandIwithfateconspire

Tomendthissorryschemeofthingsentire,

Wouldwenotshatterittobits,andthen

Remolditnearertotheheartsdesire?

Now,itisundeniablethatmostoftheseregretsarefoolish,andquiteonaparin

pointofphilosophicvaluewith thecriticismson theuniverseof that friendof

ourinfancy,theheroofthefable TheAtheistandtheAcorn,

Fool!hadthatboughapumpkinbore,

Thywhimsieswouldhaveworkednomore,etc.

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Evenfromthepointofviewofourownends,weshouldprobablymakeabotch

ofremodelingtheuniverse.Howmuchmorethenfromthepointofviewofends

we cannot see!Wisemen therefore regret as little as they can. But still some

regretsareprettyobstinateandhardtostifle,regretsforactsofwantoncruelty

ortreachery,forexample,whetherperformedbyothersorbyourselves.Hardly

any one can remain entirely optimistic after reading the confession of the

murdereratBrocktontheotherday:how,togetridofthewifewhosecontinued

existenceboredhim,heinveigledherintoadesertspot,shotherfourtimes,and

then,asshelayonthegroundandsaidtohim, Youdidntdoitonpurpose,did

you, dear? replied, No, I didnt do it on purpose, as he raised a rock and

smashed her skull. Such an occurrence, with the mild sentence and self

satisfactionof theprisoner, isa field foracropof regrets,whichoneneednot

takeupindetail.Wefeelthat,althoughaperfectmechanicalfittotherestofthe

universe, it isabadmoral fit,and that somethingelsewould reallyhavebeen

betterinitsplace.

Butforthedeterministicphilosophythemurder,thesentence,andtheprisoners

optimismwereallnecessaryfrometernity;andnothingelseforamomenthada

ghost of a chance of being put in their place. To admit such a chance, the

deterministstellus,wouldbetomakeasuicideofreason;sowemuststeelour

hearts against the thought.Andhere ourplot thickens, forwe see the first of

thosedifficultimplicationsofdeterminismandmonism,whichitismypurpose

to make you feel. If this Brockton murder was called forby the rest of the

universe, if ithad tocomeat itspreappointedhour,and ifnothingelsewould

havebeenconsistentwith the senseof thewhole,whatarewe to thinkof the

universe?Arewestubbornlytosticktoourjudgmentofregret,andsay,though

itcouldntbe,yet itwouldhavebeenabetteruniversewithsomethingdifferent

from this Brockton murder in it? That, of course, seems the natural and

spontaneous thing for us to do; and yet it is nothing short of deliberately

espousing a kind ofpessimism.Thejudgment of regret calls themurderbad.

Callingathingbadmeans,ifitmeansanythingatall,thatthethingoughtnotto

be, that something else ought tobe in its stead.Determinism, indenying that

anything else canbe in its stead, virtually defines the universe as a place in

whichwhatought tobe is impossible,inotherwords, asanorganismwhoseconstitution is afflicted with an incurable taint, an irremediable flaw. The

pessimism of a Schopenhauer says no more than this,that the murder is a

symptom;andthatitisavicioussymptombecauseitbelongstoaviciouswhole,

which can express its nature no otherwise thanbybringing forthjust such a

symptomas thatat thisparticular spot.Regret for themurdermust transform

itself, ifwearedeterministsandwise, intoa largerregret.It isabsurdtoregret

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themurder alone.Other thingsbeingwhat they are, itcouldnotbedifferent.

Whatweshouldregretisthatwholeframeofthingsofwhichthemurderisone

member. I see no escapewhatever from this pessimistic conclusion if,being

determinists,ourjudgmentofregretistobeallowedtostandatall.

The only deterministic escape from pessimism is everywhere to abandon the

judgmentof regret.That this canbedone,history shows tobenot impossible.

Thedevil,quoadexistentiam,maybegood.That is,althoughhebeaprincipleof

evil, yet the universe,with such a principle in it,may practicallybe abetter

universe than it couldhavebeenwithout.On everyhand, ina smallway,we

findthatacertainamountofevilisaconditionbywhichahigherformofgoodis

brought.There isnothing topreventanybodyfromgeneralizing thisview,and

trusting that ifwe couldbut see things in the largest of allways, even such

mattersas thisBrocktonmurderwouldappear tobepaid forby theuses that

follow in their train. An optimism quand mme, a systematic and infatuatedoptimismlikethatridiculedbyVoltaireinhisCandide,isoneofthepossibleideal

ways in which a man may train himself to look on life. Bereft of dogmatic

hardnessand litupwith theexpressionofa tenderandpathetichope,suchan

optimismhasbeen thegraceofsomeof themostreligiouscharacters thatever

lived.

ThrobthinewithNaturesthrobbingbreast,

Andallisclearfromeasttowest.

Evencrueltyandtreacherymaybeamongtheabsolutelyblessedfruitsoftime,

and to quarrel with any of their details may be blasphemy. The only real

blasphemy,inshort,maybethatpessimistictemperofthesoulwhichletsitgive

waytosuchthingsasregrets,remorse,andgrief.

Thus,ourdeterministicpessimismmaybecomeadeterministicoptimismatthe

priceofextinguishingourjudgmentsofregret.

Butdoesnotthis immediatelybringus intoacurious logicalpredicament?Our

determinism leadsus to callourjudgmentsof regretwrong,because they are

pessimistic in implying thatwhat is impossibleyetought tobe.Buthow then

about thejudgmentsofregret themselves? If theyarewrong,otherjudgments,

judgmentsofapprovalpresumably,ought tobe in theirplace.Butas theyare

necessitated,nothingelsecanbe in theirplace;and theuniverse isjustwhat it

wasbefore,namely,aplaceinwhichwhatoughttobeappearsimpossible.We

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have got one foot out of the pessimisticbog,but the other one sinks all the

deeper.Wehaverescuedouractionsfromthebondsofevil,butourjudgments

arenowheld fast.Whenmurders and treacheries cease tobe sins, regrets are

theoreticabsurditiesanderrors.Thetheoreticandtheactivelifethusplayakind

of seesawwith eachotheron thegroundof evil.The riseof either sends the

other down.Murder and treachery cannotbe goodwithout regretbeingbad:

regretcannotbegoodwithouttreacheryandmurderbeingbad.Both,however,

are supposed to have been foredoomed; so something must be fatally

unreasonable,absurd,andwrongintheworld.Itmustbeaplaceofwhicheither

sinorerrorformsanecessarypart.Fromthisdilemmathereseemsatfirstsight

noescape.Arewe thensosoon tofallback into thepessimismfromwhichwe

thoughtwehademerged?Andistherenopossiblewaybywhichwemay,with

good intellectual consciences, call the cruelties and treacheries, the reluctances

andtheregrets,allgoodtogether?

Certainly there is such a way, and you are probably most of you ready to

formulateityourselves.But,beforedoingso,remarkhowinevitablythequestion

ofdeterminismand indeterminismslidesus into thequestionofoptimismand

pessimism,or,asourfatherscalledit, thequestionofevil. Thetheologicalform

ofallthesedisputesisthesimplestandthedeepest,theformfromwhichthereis

theleastescapenotbecause,assomehavesarcasticallysaid,remorseandregret

areclungtouswithamorbidfondnessbythetheologiansasspiritualluxuries,

butbecausetheyareexistingfactsoftheworld,andassuchmustbetakeninto

account in thedeterministic interpretationofall that is fated tobe. If they are

fatedtobeerror,doesnotthebatswingofirrationalitystillcastitsshadowover

theworld?

Therefuge from thequandary lies,as Isaid,not faroff.Thenecessaryactswe

erroneouslyregretmaybegood,andyetourerrorinsoregrettingthemmaybe

alsogood,ononesimplecondition;and thatcondition is this:Theworldmust

notbe regarded as amachinewhose final purpose is themaking real of any

outward good, but rather as a contrivance for deepening the theoretic

consciousnessofwhatgoodnessandevil in their intrinsicnaturesare.Not the

doingeitherofgoodorevil iswhatnaturecares for,but theknowingof them.Life isone longeatingof thefruitof the treeofknowledge.Iam in thehabit, in

thinking to myself, of calling this point of view the gnostical point of view.

According to it, the world is neither an optimism nor a pessimism, but a

gnosticism.Butasthistermmayperhapsleadtosomemisunderstandings,Iwill

use it as little as possible here, and speak rather of subjectivism, and the

subjectivisticpointofview.

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Subjectivism has three great branches,we may call them scientificism,

sentimentalism,andsensualism,respectively.Theyallagreeessentiallyaboutthe

universe,indeemingthatwhathappensthereissubsidiarytowhatwethinkor

feelaboutit.Crimejustifiesitscriminalitybyawakeningourintelligenceofthat

criminalityandeventuallyour remorsesand regrets;and theerror included in

remorses and regrets, the error of supposing that the past could havebeen

different,justifies itselfby itsuse. Its use is to quicken our sense ofwhat the

irretrievably lost is.Whenwe think of it as thatwhichmighthavebeen (the

saddestwordsof tongueorpen), thequalityof itsworth speaks touswitha

wilder sweetness; and, conversely, the dissatisfaction wherewith we think of

what seems tohavedriven it from itsnaturalplacegivesus the severerpang.

Admirableartificeofnature!wemightbe tempted toexclaim,deceivingus in

orderthebettertoenlightenus,andleavingnothingundonetoaccentuatetoour

consciousness the yawning distance of those opposite poles of good and evil

betweenwhichcreationswings.

Wehave thusclearlyrevealed toourviewwhatmaybecalled thedilemmaof

determinism,sofarasdeterminismpretendstothinkthingsoutatall.Amerely

mechanicaldeterminism,it istrue,ratherrejoicesinnotthinkingthemout.Itis

verysurethattheuniversemustsatisfyitspostulateofaphysicalcontinuityand

coherence,butitsmilesatanyonewhocomesforwardwithapostulateofmoral

coherence as well. I may suppose, however, that the number of purely

mechanical or hard determinists among you this evening is small. The

determinismtowhoseseductionsyouaremostexposediswhatIhavecalledsoft

determinism,thedeterminismwhichallowsconsiderationsofgoodandbadto

minglewith thoseof cause and effect indecidingwhat sortofauniverse this

mayrationallybeheldtobe.Thedilemmaofthisdeterminismisonewhoseleft

horn is pessimism and whose right horn is subjectivism. In other words, if

determinism is toescapepessimism, itmust leaveoff lookingat thegoodsand

illsoflifeinasimpleobjectiveway,andregardthemasmaterials,indifferentin

themselves,fortheproductionofconsciousness,scientificandethical,inus.

To escapepessimism is,asweallknow,no easy task.Yourown studieshave

sufficientlyshownyouthealmostdesperatedifficultyofmakingthenotionthatthereisasingleprincipleofthings,andthatprincipleabsoluteperfection,rhyme

togetherwithourdailyvisionof the factsof life. Ifperfectionbe theprinciple,

howcomesthereanyimperfectionhere?IfGodbegood,howcamehetocreate

or,ifhedidnotcreate,howcomeshetopermitthedevil?Theevilfactsmustbe

explained as seeming: the devilmustbewhitewashed, the universemustbe

disinfected, ifneitherGods goodnessnorHisunity andpower are to remain

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impugned.Andofallthevariouswaysofoperatingthedisinfection,andmaking

badseemlessbad,thewayofsubjectivismappearsbyfarthebest.

For, after all, is there not something rather absurd in our ordinary notion of

external thingsbeinggoodorbad in themselves?Canmurdersand treacheries,

consideredasmereoutwardhappenings,ormotionsofmatter,bebadwithout

anyone to feel their badness? And could paradise properly be good in the

absenceofasentientprinciplebywhichthegoodnesswasperceived?Outward

goodsandevilsseempracticallyindistinguishableexceptinsofarastheyresult

in gettingmoraljudgmentsmade about them. But then themoraljudgments

seemthemainthing,andtheoutwardfactsmereperishinginstrumentsfortheir

production.Thisissubjectivism.Everyonemustatsometimehavewonderedat

that strangeparadoxofourmoralnature, that, though thepursuitofoutward

goodisthebreathofitsnostrils,theattainmentofoutwardgoodwouldseemto

beitssuffocationanddeath.Whydoesthepaintingofanyparadiseorutopia,inheavenoronearth,awakensuchyawningsfornirvanaandescape?Thewhite

robed harpplaying heaven of our sabbathschools, and the ladylike teatable

elysiumrepresentedinMr.SpencersDataofEthics,asthefinalconsummationof

progress,areexactlyonaparinthisrespect,lubberlands,pureandsimple,one

andall.We lookuponthemfromthisdeliciousmessof insanitiesandrealities,

strivingsanddeadnesses,hopesandfears,agoniesandexultations,whichforms

our present state, and tedium vitae is the only sentiment they awaken in our

breasts.Toour crepuscularnatures,born for the conflict, theRembrandtesque

moral chiaroscuro, the shifting struggle of the sunbeam in the gloom, such

pictures of lightupon light arevacuous and expressionless, andneither tobe

enjoyednorunderstood. If thisbe thewhole fruitof thevictory,wesay; if the

generationsofmankindsufferedandlaiddowntheirlives;ifprophetsconfessed

andmartyrssanginthefire,andallthesacredtearswereshedfornootherend

thanthata.raceofcreaturesofsuchunexampledinsipidityshouldsucceed,and

protractinsaeculasaeculorumtheircontentedandinoffensivelives,why,atsuch

arate,betterlosethanwinthebattle,oratalleventsbetterringdownthecurtain

beforethelastactoftheplay,sothatabusinessthatbegansoimportantlymay

besavedfromsosingularlyflatawindingup.

All this iswhatIshould instantlysay,wereIcalledon topleadforgnosticism;

anditsrealfriends,ofwhomyouwillpresentlyperceiveIamnotone,wouldsay

withoutdifficultyagreatdealmore.Regardedasastablefinality,everyoutward

goodbecomesamerewearinesstotheflesh.Itmustbemenaced,beoccasionally

lost,foritsgoodnesstobefullyfeltassuch.Nay,morethanoccasionallylost.No

one knows theworth of innocence till he knows it is gone forever, and that

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moneycannotbuy itback.Not thesaint,but thesinner thatrepenteth, ishe to

whom the full length andbreadth, and height anddepth, of lifesmeaning is

revealed.Not theabsenceofvice,butvice there,andvirtueholdingherby the

throat,seemstheidealhumanstate.Andthereseemsnoreasontosupposeitnot

a permanent human state. There is a deep truth in what the school of

Schopenhauer insists on,the illusorinessof thenotionofmoralprogress.The

morebrutal formsofevil thatgoarereplacedbyothersmoresubtleandmore

poisonous.Ourmoral horizonmoveswith us aswemove, and never dowe

drawnearer to the faroff linewhere theblackwavesand theazuremeet.The

finalpurpose ofour creation seemsmostplausibly tobe thegreatestpossible

enrichmentofourethicalconsciousness, throughthe intensestplayofcontrasts

and thewidestdiversityofcharacters.Thisofcourseobliges someofus tobe

vesselsofwrath,whileitcallsotherstobevesselsofhonor.Butthesubjectivist

pointofviewreducesalltheseoutwarddistinctionstoacommondenominator.

Thewretchlanguishinginthefelonscellmaybedrinkingdraughtsofthewineoftruththatwillneverpassthelipsofthesocalledfavoriteoffortune.Andthe

peculiar consciousness of each of them is an indispensable note in the great

ethicalconcertwhichthecenturiesastheyrollaregrindingoutofthelivingheart

ofman.

Somuchforsubjectivism!Ifthedilemmaofdeterminismbetochoosebetweenit

andpessimism,Iseelittleroomforhesitationfromthestrictlytheoreticalpoint

of view. Subjectivism seems the more rational scheme. And the world may

possibly,foraught Iknow,benothingelse.When thehealthy loveof life ison

one,andallitsformsanditsappetitesseemsounutterablyreal;whenthemost

brutal and themost spiritual things are litby the same sun, and each is an

integralpartofthetotalrichness,why,thenitseemsagrudgingandsicklyway

ofmeetingsorobustauniversetoshrinkfromanyofitsfactsandwishthemnot

tobe.Rathertakethestrictlydramaticpointofview,andtreatthewholethingas

agreatunendingromancewhichthespiritoftheuniverse,strivingtorealizeits

owncontent,iseternallythinkingoutandrepresentingtoitself.

No one, I hope,will accuseme, after I have said all this, of underrating the

reasons in favor of subjectivism. And now that I proceed to say why thosereasons, strong as they are, fail to convince my own mind, I trust the

presumptionmaybethatmyobjectionsarestrongerstill.

I frankly confess that they are of a practical order. Ifwe practically take up

subjectivism in a sincere and radicalmanner and follow its consequences,we

meetwithsomethatmakeuspause.Letasubjectivismbegininneversosevere

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andintellectualaway,itisforcedbythelawofitsnaturetodevelopanotherside

of itself and end with the corruptest curiosity.Once dismiss the notion that

certaindutiesaregoodinthemselves,andthatweareheretodothem,nomatter

how we feel about them; once consecrate the opposite notion that our

performances and our violations of duty are for a common purpose, the

attainmentofsubjectiveknowledgeandfeeling,andthatthedeepeningofthese

isthechiefendofourlives,andatwhatpointonthedownwardslopeareweto

stop? In theology, subjectivism develops as its leftwing antinomianism. In

literature,itsleftwingisromanticism.Andinpracticallifeitiseitheranerveless

sentimentalityorasensualismwithoutbounds.

Everywhereitfostersthefatalisticmoodofmind.Itmakesthosewhoarealready

too inertmore passive still; it renderswholly reckless thosewhose energy is

alreadyinexcess.Allthroughhistorywefindhowsubjectivism,assoonasithas

afreecareer,exhaustsitselfineverysortofspiritual,moral,andpracticallicense.Itsoptimism turnstoanethical indifference,which infalliblybringsdissolution

initstrain.ItisperfectlysafetosaynowthatiftheHegeliangnosticism,which

hasbegun to show itselfhereand inGreatBritain,were tobecomeapopular

philosophy,as itoncewas inGermany, itwouldcertainlydevelop its leftwing

hereasthere,andproduceareactionofdisgust.AlreadyIhaveheardagraduate

ofthisveryschoolexpressinthepulpithiswillingnesstosinlikeDavid,ifonly

hemight repent likeDavid.Youmay tellmehewasonly sowinghiswild,or

rather his tame, oats; and perhaps he was. But the point is that in the

subjectivistic or gnostical philosophy oatsowing, wild or tame, becomes a

systematic necessity and the chief function of life.After the pure and classic

truths, the exciting and rancid ones must be experienced; and if the stupid

virtues of the philistine herd do not then come in and save society from the

influence of the children of light, a sort of inward putrefaction becomes its

inevitabledoom.

Lookatthelastrunningsoftheromanticschool,asweseetheminthatstrange

contemporaryParisian literature,withwhichweofthe lessclevercountriesare

sooftendriventorinseoutourmindsaftertheyhavebecomecloggedwiththe

dullnessandheavinessofournativepursuits.Theromanticschoolbeganwiththe worship of subjective sensibility and the revolt against legality ofwhich

Rousseauwas the firstgreatprophet:and throughvarious fluxesand refluxes,

rightwingsand leftwings, itstands todaywith twomenofgenius,M.Renan

andM.Zola,as itsprincipalexponents,one speakingwith itsmasculine,and

theotherwithwhatmightbecalleditsfeminine,voice.Iprefernottothinknow

of lessnoblemembersof theschool,andtheRenanIhave inmind isofcourse

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theRenanoflatestdates.AsIhaveusedthetermgnostic,bothheandZolaare

gnosticsof themostpronounced sort.Bothareathirst for the factsof life,and

both think the factsofhuman sensibility tobe of all facts themostworthyof

attention.Bothagree,moreover,thatsensibilityseemstobe therefornohigher

purpose,certainly not, as the Philistines say, for the sake of bringing mere

outward rights to pass and frustrating outward wrongs. One dwells on the

sensibilities for their energy, the other for their sweetness; one speakswith a

voiceofbronze,theotherwiththatofanAeolianharp;oneruggedlyignoresthe

distinction of good and evil, the other plays the coquettebetween the craven

unmanliness of his Philosophic Dialogues and the butterfly optimism of his

SouvenirsdeJeunesse.Butunder thepagesofboth there sounds incessantly the

hoarse bass of vanitas vanitatum, omnia vanitas, which the reader may hear,

wheneverhewill,between the lines.Nowriterof thisFrench romantic school

hasawordofrescuefromthehourofsatietywiththethingsoflife,thehourin

whichwe say, I takenopleasure in them ,or from thehour of terror at theworlds vastmeaningless grinding, if perchance such hours should come. For

terrorandsatietyare factsofsensibility likeanyothers,andat theirownhour

they reign in their own right. The heart of the romantic utterances,whether

poetical, critical,orhistorical, is this inward remedilessness,whatCarlylecalls

thisfaroffwhimperingofwailandwoe.Andfrom thisromanticstateofmind

there is absolutely no possible theoretic escape.Whether, like Renan,we look

uponlife inamorerefinedway,asaromanceofthespirit;orwhether,likethe

friendsofM.Zola,wepiqueourselvesonour scientific and analytic character,

andprefer

to

be

cynical,

and

call

the

world

aroman

exprimental

on

an

infinite

scale,ineithercasetheworldappearstouspotentiallyaswhatthesameCarlyle

oncecalledit,avast,gloomy,solitaryGolgothaandmillofdeath.

The only escape is by the practical way. And since I have mentioned the

nowadaysmuchrevilednameofCarlyle,letmementionitoncemore,andsayit

isthewayofhisteaching.NomatterforCarlyleslife,nomatterforagreatdeal

ofhiswriting.Whatwasthemostimportantthinghesaidtous?Hesaid: Hang

your sensibilities!Stopyour snivellingcomplaints,andyourequally snivelling

raptures!Leaveoffyourgeneral emotional tomfoolery,andget toWORK like

men! But thismeans a complete rupturewith the subjectivist philosophy ofthings.Itsaysconduct,andnotsensibility,istheultimatefactforourrecognition.

With thevisionof certainworks tobedone,of certainoutward changes tobe

wroughtorresisted, itsaysour intellectualhorizon terminates.Nomatterhow

wesucceedindoingtheseoutwardduties,whethergladlyandspontaneously,or

heavily andunwillingly,do themwe somehowmust; for the leaving of them

undone is perdition. No matter how we feel; if we are only faithful in the

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outwardactandrefusetodowrong,theworldwillinsofarbesafe,andwequit

ofourdebt toward it.Take, then, theyokeuponourshoulders;bendourneck

beneaththeheavy legalityof itsweight;regardsomethingelsethanourfeeling

asour limit,ourmaster,andour law;bewilling to liveanddie in itsservice,

and,atastroke,wehavepassedfromthesubjectiveintotheobjectivephilosophy

ofthings,muchasoneawakensfromsomefeverishdream,fullofbadlightsand

noises,tofindonesselfbathedinthesacredcoolnessandquietoftheairofthe

night.

Butwhatistheessenceofthisphilosophyofobjectiveconductsooldfashioned

andfinite,butsochasteandsaneandstrong,whencomparedwithitsromantic

rival?Itistherecognitionoflimits,foreignandopaquetoourunderstanding.It

is thewillingness,afterbringingaboutsomeexternalgood, tofeelatpeace;for

ourresponsibilityendswiththeperformanceofthatduty,andtheburdenofthe

restwemaylayonhigherpowers.

Looktothyself,OUniverse,

Thouarebetterandnotworse,

wemaysayinthatphilosophy,themomentwehavedoneourstrokeofconduct,

however small. For in the view of that philosophy the universebelongs to a

pluralityofsemiindependentforces,eachoneofwhichmayhelporhinder,and

behelpedorhinderedby,theoperationsoftherest.

But this brings us right back, after such a long detour, to the question of

indeterminismand to the conclusionofall I camehere to say tonight.For the

onlyconsistentwayof representingapluralismandaworldwhosepartsmay

affect one another through their conduct being either good or bad is the

indeterministicway.Whatinterest,zest,orexcitementcantherebeinachieving

therightway,unlessweareenabledtofeelthatthewrongwayisalsoapossible

and anaturalway,nay,more, amenacing and an imminentway?Andwhat

sensecantherebeincondemningourselvesfortakingthewrongway,unlesswe

need

have

done

nothing

of

the

sort,

unless

the

right

way

was

open

to

us

as

well?

Icannotunderstand thewillingness toact,nomatterhowwe feel,without the

beliefthatactsarereallygoodandbad.Icannotunderstandthebeliefthatanact

isbad,withoutregretat itshappening. Icannotunderstandregretwithout the

admissionofreal,genuinepossibilitiesintheworld.Onlythenisitotherthana

mockery to feel, after we have failed to do our best, that an irreparable

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opportunity isgone from theuniverse, the lossofwhich itmust forever after

mourn.

Ifyouinsistthatthisisallsuperstition,thatpossibilityisintheeyeofscienceand

reasonimpossibility,andthatifIactbadly tisthattheuniversewasforedoomed

to suffer this defect, you fall right back into the dilemma, the labyrinth, of

pessimismandsubjectivism,fromoutofwhosetoilswehavejustfoundourway.

Now,weareofcoursefreetofallback, ifweplease.Formyownpart,though,

whateverdifficultiesmaybesetthephilosophyofobjectiverightandwrong,and

the indeterminism it seems to imply, determinism, with its alternative of

pessimismorromanticism,containsdifficultiesthataregreaterstill.Butyouwill

remember that I expressly repudiated awhile ago thepretension to offer any

argumentswhichcouldbecoerciveinasocalledscientificfashioninthismatter.

AndIconsequentlyfindmyself,attheendofthislongtalk,obligedtostatemyconclusions in an altogether personal way. This personal method of appeal

seemstobeamongtheveryconditionsoftheproblem;andthemostanyonecan

doistoconfessascandidlyashecanthegroundsforthefaiththatisinhim,and

leavehisexampletoworkonothersasitmay.

Letme, then,without circumlocution sayjust this. Theworld is enigmatical

enough in all conscience, whatever theory we may take up toward it. The

indeterminism I defend, the freewill theory of popular sense based on the

judgmentofregret,representsthatworldasvulnerable,andliabletobeinjured

bycertainofitspartsiftheyactwrong.Anditrepresentstheiractingwrongasa

matterofpossibilityoraccident,neitherinevitablenoryettobeinfalliblywarded

off.Inallthis,itisatheorydevoideitheroftransparencyorofstability.Itgives

usapluralistic,restlessuniverse,inwhichnosinglepointofviewcanevertake

in thewholescene;and toamindpossessedof the loveofunityatanycost, it

will,nodoubt,remainforeverunacceptable.Afriendwithsuchamindoncetold

methatthethoughtofmyuniversemadehimsick,likethesightofthehorrible

motionofamassofmaggotsintheircarrionbed.

Butwhile

Ifreely

admit

that

the

pluralism

and

the

restlessness

are

repugnant

andirrationalinacertainway,Ifindthateveryalternativetothemisirrational

inadeeperway.Theindeterminismwithitsmaggots,ifyoupleasetospeakso

aboutit,offendsonlythenativeabsolutismofmyintellect,anabsolutismwhich,

afterall,perhaps,deservestobesnubbedandkeptincheck.Butthedeterminism

withitsnecessarycarrion,tocontinuethefigureofspeech,andwithnopossible

maggots to eat the latter up, violatesmy sense ofmoral reality through and

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through.When, forexample, I imagine suchcarrionas theBrocktonmurder, I

cannot conceive it as an actbywhich the universe, as awhole, logically and

necessarilyexpresses itsnaturewithoutshrinking fromcomplicitywithsucha

whole.AndIdeliberatelyrefusetokeepontermsofloyaltywiththeuniverseby

sayingblanklythatthemurder,sinceitdoesflowfromthenatureofthewhole,

is not carrion. There are some instinctive reactionswhich I, for one,will not

tamper with. The only remaining alternative, the attitude of gnostical

romanticism,wrenchesmypersonalinstinctsinquiteasviolentaway.Itfalsifies

thesimpleobjectivityof theirdeliverance. Itmakes thegoose flesh themurder

excites inmeasufficientreasonfor theperpetrationof thecrime.It transforms

lifefromatragicreality intoan insinceremelodramaticexhibition,asfouloras

tawdry as anyones diseased curiosity pleases to carry it out. And with its

consecrationof the romannaturalistsstateofmind,and itsenthronementof the

baser crewofParisian littrateursamong the eternally indispensableorgansby

whichtheinfinitespiritofthingsattainstothatsubjectiveilluminationwhichisthe task of its life, it leaves me in presence of a sort of subjective carrion

considerablymorenoisomethantheobjectivecarrionIcalleditintotakeaway.

No!betterathousandtimes,thansuchsystematiccorruptionofourmoralsanity,

theplainestpessimism,sothatitbestraightforward;butbetterfarthanthatthe

worldofchance.Makeasgreatanuproaraboutchanceasyouplease, Iknow

thatchancemeanspluralismandnothingmore. Ifsomeof themembersof the

pluralism arebad, thephilosophy ofpluralism,whateverbroad views itmay

denyme,permitsme,atleast,toturntotheothermemberswithacleanbreastof

affectionandanunsophisticatedmoralsense.And ifIstillwish to thinkof the

world as a totality, it lets me feel that a world with a chance in it ofbeing

altogethergood, even if the chancenever come topass, isbetter thanaworld

withnosuchchanceatall.That chance whoseverynotionIamexhortedand

conjured to banish from my view of the future as the suicide of reason

concerningit,that chance iswhat?Justthis,thechancethatinmoralrespects

thefuturemaybeotherandbetterthanthepasthasbeen.Thisistheonlychance

wehaveanymotiveforsupposingtoexist.Shame,rather,onitsrepudiationand

itsdenial!Foritspresenceisthevitalairwhichletstheworldlive,thesaltwhich

keepsitsweet.

AndhereImightlegitimatelystop,havingexpressedallIcaretoseeadmittedby

otherstonight.ButIknowthatifIdostophere,misapprehensionswillremainin

themindsofsomeofyou,andkeepall Ihavesaid fromhaving itseffect;so I

judgeitbesttoaddafewmorewords.

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Inthefirstplace, inspiteofallmyexplanations, theword chance willstillbe

giving trouble. Though you may yourselves be adverse to the deterministic

doctrine, you wish a pleasanter word than chance to name the opposite

doctrineby; and you very likely consider my preference for such a word a

perverse sort of a partiality on my part. It certainly is abadword to make

convertswith; andyouwish Ihadnot thrust it sobuttforemost atyou,you

wishtouseamilderterm.

Well,Iadmittheremaybejustadashofperversityinitschoice.Thespectacleof

the mere wordgrabbing game played by the soft determinists has perhaps

drivenmetooviolentlytheotherway;and,ratherthanbefoundwranglingwith

them for thegoodwords, I amwilling to take the firstbad onewhich comes

along,provided itbeunequivocal.The question is of things, not of eulogistic

names for them; and thebestword is the one that enablesmen to know the

quickestwhether theydisagreeornotabout the things.But theword chance,with its singularnegativity, isjust theword for thispurpose.Whoeveruses it

insteadof freedom, squarelyandresolutelygivesupallpretensetocontrolthe

thingshesaysare free.Forhim,heconfesses that theyarenobetter thanmere

chancewouldbe.Itisawordofimpotence,andisthereforetheonlysincereword

wecanuse, if, ingranting freedom tocertain things,wegrant ithonestly,and

really risk thegame. Whochoosesmemustgiveand forfeitallhehath. Any

other word permits of quibbling, and lets us, after the fashion of the soft

determinists,make a pretense of restoring the cagedbird to libertywith one

hand,whilewiththeotherweanxiouslytieastringtoitlegtomakesureitdoes

notgetbeyondoursight.

Butnowyouwillbringupyourfinaldoubt.Doesnottheadmissionofsuchan

unguaranteed chance or freedom preclude utterly the notion of a Providence

governing theworld?Does itnot leave the fateof theuniverseat themercyof

the chancepossibilities, and so far insecure? Does it not, in short, deny the

cravingofournatureforanultimatepeacebehindalltempests,forabluezenith

aboveallclouds?

To thismyanswermustbeverybrief.Thebelief in freewill isnot in the leastincompatible with thebelief in Providence, provided you do not restrict the

Providencetofulminatingnothingbutfataldegrees.Ifyouallowhimtoprovide

possibilities as well as actualities to the universe, and to carry on his own

thinking in those two categories just as we do ours, chances maybe there,

uncontrolledevenbyhim,and thecourseof theuniversebereallyambiguous;

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and yet the end of all thingsmaybejustwhat he intended it tobe from all

eternity.

An analogywillmake themeaning of this clear. Suppose twomenbefore a

chessboard,theoneanovice,theotheranexpertplayerofthegame.Theexpert

intends tobeat.Buthecannot foreseeexactlywhatanyoneactualmoveofhis

adversarymaybe.Heknows,however,allthepossiblemovesofthelatter;andhe

knowsinadvancehowtomeeteachofthembyamoveofhisownwhichleads

inthedirectionofvictory.Andthevictoryinfalliblyarrives,afternomatterhow

deviousacourse,intheonepredestinedformofcheckmatetothenovicesking.

Letnowthenovicestandforusfinitefreeagents,andtheexpertfortheinfinite

mind in which the universe lies. Suppose the latter to be thinking out his

universebeforeheactuallycreatesit.Supposehimtosay,Iwillleadthingstoa

certainend,butIwillnotnowdecideonallthestepsthereto.Atvariouspoints,ambiguouspossibilitiesshallbeleftopen,eitherofwhich,atagiveninstant,may

becomeactual.Butwhicheverbranchofthesebifurcationsbecomesreal,Iknow

whatIshalldoatthenextbifurcationtokeepthingsfromdriftingawayfromthe

finalresultIintend.

The creators plan of theuniversewould thusbe leftblank as tomany of its

actual details,but all possibilitieswouldbemarked down. The realization of

some of these would be left absolutely to chance; that is, would only be

determinedwhenthemomentsofrealizationcame.Otherpossibilitieswouldbe

contingentlydetermined;thatis,theirdecisionwouldhavetowaittillitwasseen

howthemattersofabsolutechancefellout.Buttherestoftheplan,includingits

finalupshot,wouldberigorouslydeterminedonceforall.Sothecreatorhimself

wouldnotneed toknowall thedetailsofactualityuntil theycame;andatany

timehisownviewof theworldwouldbeaviewpartlyof factsandpartlyof

possibilities,exactlyasoursisnow.Ofonething,however,hemightbecertain;

and that is thathisworldwas safe,and thatnomatterhowmuchof itmight

zigzaghecouldsurelybringithomeatlast.

Now,it

is

entirely

immaterial,

in

this

scheme,

whether

the

creator

leave

the

absolute chancepossibilities tobe decidedby himself, each when its proper

momentarrives,orwhether,onthecontrary,healienatethispowerfromhimself,

and leave thedecisionoutandout to finitecreaturessuchaswemenare.The

greatpoint is that thepossibilitiesare reallyhere.Whether itbewewho solve

them,orheworkingthroughus,atthosesoultryingmomentswhenfatesscales

seem to quiver, and good snatches the victory from evil or shrinks nerveless

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fromthefight,isofsmallaccount,solongasweadmitthattheissueisdecided

nowhereelsethanhereandnow.Thatiswhatgivesthepalpitatingrealitytoour

morallifeandmakesittingle,asMr.Mallocksays,withsostrangeandelaborate

anexcitement.Thisreality,thisexcitement,arewhatthedeterminisms,hardand

softalike, suppressby theirdenial thatanything isdecidedhereandnow,and

theirdogma that all thingswere foredoomed and settled longago. If itbe so,

mayyouandIthenhavebeenforedoomedtotheerrorofcontinuingtobelieve

in liberty. It is fortunate for the winding up of controversy that in every

discussionwithdeterminism thisargumentumadhominemcanbe itsadversarys

lastword.

Documents

William James - The Dilemma of Determinism