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WILL THE EU GET A REAL PRESIDENT?
Teija Tiilikainen BRIEFING PAPER 65, 7 October 2010
65
THE EU’S POLITICAL SYSTEM AS ANOTHER EXAMPLE
OF SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM IN EUROPE
• The EU’s political system comes very close to a semi-presidential systemwhich represents acombinationofpresidentialpowerandparliamentaryaccountability.
• Thecontoursofsemi-presidentialismhavebecomeaccentuatedboththroughthedeepeningandextension of parliamentary rule and through the simultaneous reinforcement of the EuropeanCouncil.
• For the time being the lack of party government forms a special characteristic of the Union’sparliamentarydimension.
• TwomainoptionsdominatewhatcomestothefuturedevelopmentoftheUnion’spoliticalsystem:either theUnionwilldeepen itssemi-presidential rulebymoving intoarealpartygovernment.Developmenttowardsatruepresidentialregimerepresentsthesecondoption,withthesubordinationoftheCommissiontoonesingleheadofexecutive,thepresident.ThismodelwouldmergethecurrentpresidenciesoftheCommissionandtheEuropeanCouncilintoonesingleEUpresidency.
WILL THE EU GET A REAL PRESIDENT?
Teija Tiilikainen
Director
The Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Briefing Paper 65
7 October 2010
THE EU’S POLITICAL SYSTEM AS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM IN EUROPE
THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 3
AtfirstglancetheEU’spoliticalsystemdoesn’tseemtocorrespondtoanycontemporarytypeofregime.ThereisadirectlyelectedEuropeanParliament(EP),butthewayofconstructingrelationsofpowerandaccountabilitybetweentheparliamentandthethreebodieswithexecutivepowers,theCommission,theEuropeanCouncil or theCouncil, complicates thepicture. The Commission’s accountability to theEuropean Parliament has been confirmed in thefounding treaties ever since their conclusion. Butwhat is thevalueof sucharulewhenthereseemsto be a muchmore powerful executive emergingbeyond the reach of any EU-level accountability,namelytheEuropeanCouncil?
Thekeyargumentofthisbriefingpaper isthattheEU’spoliticalsystemcomessurprisinglyclosetooneparticulartypeofregime.Itisaquestionofasemi-presidentialsystemwhichrepresentsacombinationof presidential power and parliamentary account-ability.TheUnion’s dual executive is formedby aparliamentarycabinet,theCommission,ontheonehandandapresidentialbody, theEuropeanCoun-cil,ontheother.ThecontoursofthissystemwereessentiallystrengthenedthroughthechangestakingplaceintheLisbonTreaty.
How is the division of labour usually arrangedbetweenthetwopartsofsuchadualexecutiveandwhatkindsoffactorsmightshaketheirco-existence?WhatkindsofpressurestomodifytheEUsystemarelikelytooccurnext?
Semi-presidentialism between
parliamentarism and presidential rule
Political systems are usually divided into parlia-mentarysystems,parliament-centredsystemsandsystems characterized by a separation of powersbetweenthekeypoliticalbodies.1Thethirdcategorycoincides with presidentialism, while semi-presi-dentialismisaformfallingbetweenparliamentarismontheonehandandaseparationofpowerssystemontheother.
Asemi-presidential systemcombinesaparliamen-tarysystemformedbyaprimeministerandacabinetaccountabletotheparliamentwithapresidentgain-inghisorher legitimacy fromasourceotherthanthe parliament. According to theman behind theoriginal concept, Maurice Duverger (1980), semi-presidentialismimpliesthatthepresidentiselectedbyuniversalsuffrage,hasquiteconsiderablepowersandfacesaprimeministerandministerswhopos-sessexecutiveandgovernmentalpowerandcanstayinofficeonlyiftheparliamentdoesn’tshowopposi-
1 For an analysis ofmajor political systems, seeDUvErgEr,
M (1980). A new political system model: Semi-presidential
government. European Journal of Political Research 8: 165-
187; Lijphart, A. (ed.), Parliamentary versus presidential
government. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1992; Sartori,
G. Comparative constitutional engineering: An inquiry
into structures, incentives and outcomes. Basingstoke:
Macmillan,1994.Siaroff,A.(2003),Comparativepresidencies:
The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and
parliamentarydistinction.European Journal of Political Research
42,288-289.
A meeting of the European Council. Photo: Council of the European Union
THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 4
wereabletodo.TheformulationoftheEC’spowersasthefunctionto“providetheUnionwiththenec-essary impetus for itsdevelopmentanddefine thegeneral political directions and priorities thereof”gives it a strong executive mandate, particularlywhencomplementedwiththepowersithasintheappointmentoftheCommissionandintheCfSp.
Oneessentialquestionhere,ofcourse,iswhetheracollectivebody liketheECcanbe identifiedastheholderofpresidentialpowersorwhether this roleshouldbelinkedinsteadtothePresidentoftheEC.ItisimmediatelyobviousthatingeneraltermstheEC’sroleseemstobesurprisinglycompatiblewiththegeneralcharacteristicsofsemi-presidentialism.3
TheEC isverymuch independentof theEP in thesensethatitcandefinetheguidelinesfortheUnion’spolicieswithouttakingintoaccounttheEP’sviewsorpoliticalconstellations.Inmostpolicyfieldstheimplementation of these guidelines is, however,firmlydependentontheparliamentarymachinerythatresidesintheCommissionandtheEP.Theotherside of the coin consists of the fact that theCom-missionisaccountabletotheEPandtotheEPonly.Insemi-presidential systemsthepresidentusuallyacquireshisorher legitimacy froma sourceotherthan the parliament, meaning that the presidentisdirectlyor indirectlyelectedbythepeople forafixed termofoffice.TheEC essentiallyacquires itslegitimacy from the member states, and politicalconsiderationsaboutwhether itspermanentpresi-dentshouldbeelectedthroughdirectvotemustbeunderstoodagainstthisbackground.
3 AccordingtoSartori(1994,132),thecharacteristicsofasemi-
presidentialsystemareasfollows:theheadofstateiselectedby
popularvoteeitherdirectlyorindirectlyforafixedtermofoffice.
Heor she shares executivepowerwithaprimeminister, thus
enteringadualauthoritystructurewhosethreedefiningcriteria
are:thepresidentisindependentofparliament,butcannotgovern
aloneordirectlyandthereforehisorherwillmustbeconveyed
andprocessedviahisorhergovernment;conversely,theprime
minister and his or her cabinet are president-independent in
thattheyareparliament-dependent: theyaresubjecteitherto
parliamentary confidence or no-confidence (or both), and in
eithercaseneedthesupportofaparliamentarymajority;thedual
authoritystructureofsemi-presidentialismallowsfordifferent
balancesandalsoforshiftingtheprevalenceofpowerwithinthe
executive,underthestrictconditionthatthe‘autonomypotential’
ofeachcomponentunitoftheexecutivedoessubsist.
tion to them. In contemporary thinking, all threecriteriahaveprovedflexible:differentwaysofelect-ingthepresidentcomeintoquestion,thecontentof‘considerable’ powers varies a great deal and evensystems like the Russian onewhere the presidentcanalsodismissthecabinethavebeenincludedinthesemi-presidentialistcategory.
Semi-presidentialismwhich, in earlier times,wasembodiedaboveall intheFrenchandFinnishcon-stitutions,hassuddenlybecomethemostcommonformofregimeinEuropeasmostoftheCentralandEastEuropeancountrieshaveadoptedthis typeofpoliticalsystemaftertheirrecentdemocratization.Whethersemi-presidentialismturnsintoaforceforstabilityorinstabilityinaregimeseemstodependonconditionsexternaltoit,suchasthepartyback-groundsof the twoheadsof executives (presidentandprimeminister)or thegeneral stabilityof theparty system. In the latter case, a semi-presiden-tialist rulemightbringmorestability to turbulentpoliticalconditions,whereasthefirstisexemplifiedintheFrenchsystemwhereasituationof‘cohabita-tion’typicallydecreasesthestabilityoftheregime.
A third alternative to a parliamentary or semi-presidential rulecanbe found, for instance, in theUStypeofpresidentialsystemwherethestatebodiesfunctionrelativelyindependentlyintheirownfieldoftheseparationofpowers.Insuchasystemthepar-liamentisexpresslyalegislatorandthefunctionsofcontrollingandsupervisingtheexecutivedon’texist.
The EU as a model of semi-presidentialism?
The EU’s political system consists firstly of a par-liamentarygovernmentwhere the cabinet, that isthe Commission, is accountable to the EuropeanParliament (EP). While the Council has generallybeen treatedas theotherpartof theUnion’sdualexecutive2, here Iwould suggest that this role beoffered to the newly institutionalized EuropeanCouncil(EC).DuetotheinstitutionalizationoftheEuropeanCouncilandthecreationofapermanentpresidency,thisbodyhastakenamuchfirmergripontheUnion’sexecutivepowersthanwhatthefor-mersummitmeetingsundertherotatingpresidency
2 Hix,S.The Political System of the European Union.London:
Palgrave,2005,31.
THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 5
Thecontoursofsemi-presidentialismhavebecomeaccentuated both through the deepening andextension of parliamentary rule and through thesimultaneousreinforcementoftheEC.ThetwopartsoftheexecutivecometogetherintheEC,ofwhichthePresidentoftheCommissionisamember.TheEC’spresidentialistcharacteristicsarefurthermorestressedthroughitsroleintheappointmentofthelatter.InspiteofthefactthattheECcanneitherdis-misstheCommissionnoritspresident,itsproposalisstillkeyintheappointmentprocedure.4
There are, however, distortions in the EU’s semi-presidentialist system as the Council still hasimportantexecutivefunctionsaswell.Itwon’tlosethemall,butithastoberecognizedthattheLisbonTreatyactuallychangesthesituationintworespects.First,itstressestheCouncil’sroleastheEP’ssecondchamberbyspreadingtheordinarylegislativeproce-durewherebytheCouncilandtheEPactasthetwochambersofabicameralParliament.5Inotherfieldsof the Council’s executive competences, changes
4 An interesting combination of parliamentarism and
presidentialism characterizes the rules of nomination as the
EC,takingintoaccounttheEPelections(tEU,art.9D,7),shall
proposeacandidate forPresidentof theCommissionwhowill
thenbeelectedbytheEP(intheeventthatasufficientmajority
doesn’texist,theECmustcomeupwithanewproposal).
5 tEU art.9 C, 8 divides the Council’s competences into
legislativecompetencesandothersanddemandsthateachcouncil
meetingshallbedividedintotwopartsaccordingly.Asthetreaty
subordinatedanumberofnewlegislativefieldstotheordinary
legislativeprocedureit,defacto,decreasedtheCouncil’spower
overtheseissues.
havetakenplaceinfavouroftheEContheonehandandthenewHighRepresentativeforForeignAffairsandSecurityPolicyontheother.ItshouldbenotedthatbothintheEU’sexternalrelationsandtheareaoffreedom,securityandjusticetheECshalldefinethestrategicguidelines(tEU,art10bandtfEUart.61A) and, consequently, also provide the politicalframework for the Council’s action.The pluralityoffunctionsgiventotheHighRepresentativeagainemphasizeshisorherrole inthe leadershipof theCfSp.
TheEuropeanParliamentfunctionslikeaparliamentin the conditions of semi-presidentialism whereonlyonepartoftheexecutivefunctionsundertheruleofparliamentary accountability.TheEP facessome remarkable constraints evenwhen it comestothefulfilmentofthisrole.Theseconstraintsandthe challenges of the parliamentary anglewill bediscussednext.
Parliamentarism lacking political content?
FromtheEP’spointofview,theexistenceofadualexecutive implies that only one part of the execu-tive,namelytheCommission,isaccountabletotheEP.TheEC’srolevis-à-vistheEPfollowsmoretheseparationofpowerslogicastheEChas,ontheonehand, functionswhere it is independentof theEP(powerstoamendpartsofthetreatiesandpowersintheCfSp)and,ontheotherhand,powerswhereitishighlydependentontheEP’slegislativecapacity(generalleadershipofmajorpolicies).ThePresidentoftheECisobligedtoreporttotheEPaftereachECmeeting.
José Manuel Barroso, the President of the Commission and Herman van Rompuy, the President of the European Council. Photo: European People’s Party
THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 6
TheparliamentarypartoftheEU’sregimefulfilsthenormalcriteriaofparliamentarismwith,however,a couple of significant exceptions. The principleof parliamentarismwas already confirmed in theinitialtreaties,whichentitledtheEPtodismisstheCommissioninavoteofcensure.Thevalidityoftheprinciplehasnotbeenseriouslyquestioned,butitsapplicabilityhasbeenseentobechallengedbythedemandaccordingtowhich itcanonlybeappliedto the entire Commission and not to individualmembers of it. In the recent treaty changes, anindirectpossibilityhasbeencreatedfortheEPto,ifnecessary,pushindividualcommissionerstoresign.ThisismadepossiblethroughaprovisionoriginallyincludedintheNiceTreaty(tEC,art.217),accordingtowhichthePresidentof theCommissioncanaskanindividualmemberoftheCommissiontoresign.The possibilities included in this provision werefinallymadevisibleintheinter-institutionalagree-mentbetween theBarroso iiCommissionand theEP(FrameworkagreementonrelationsbetweentheEuropeanParliamentandtheCommission.9.2.2010).ItwasconfirmedthatshouldtheEPdemandit,thePresidentoftheCommissionwillaskanindividualcommissionertoresign.
ConstantamendmentsinfavouroftheEP’sroleinthe process of appointing the Commission haveequally underlined the value of the principle ofparliamentarism.TheEP’sroleintheappointmentprocedure has been systematically strengthenedwith the Lisbon Treaty taking it still one crucialstepforward.InthistreatytheEPisgiventherighttoelecttheCommissionpresidentonthebasisofaproposalbytheEuropeanCouncil(tEU,art.9D.7).Thisproposalshallagaintakeintoaccounttheresults
ofEPelections.TheappointmentoftherestoftheCollegeshallbesubordinatedintoavoteofapprovalintheEuropeanParliament.
The EU’s government comprises many legal andinstitutional preconditions of parliamentary rule.Themajorconstraintwithanaturalpoliticalback-ground relates to the lack of a party government.The Commission owns the critical functions of apoliticalexecutiveandactsinlegalandinstitutionaltermsundertheformalaccountabilityoftheEP.Thepoliticalcontentofthisaccountability is,however,seriouslyhamperedbytheCommission’scharacterasanindependentbodywithoutthenormalcharac-teristicsofapartygovernment.6
In full-fledged terms of parliamentarism, parlia-mentaryruleat theEU levelwouldmeantheEP’scontrolof theCommission’spolitical agenda fromthepointofviewofthepoliticalprogrammebasedontheelectoralcampaignsoftherulingparties.Asthenormalpartypoliticalconnection is lacking inthe relationshipbetween theCommissionand theEP, this relationship canonlybeof a quasi-parlia-mentarynature.However,inthisrespecttoo,somemoveshavebeentakenawayfromtheCommission
6 Thecriticaltreatyprovisionshavemoreorlessremainedinthe
sameformsincetheMaastrichtTreaty.TheLisbonTreatydefined
theCommission’sindependenceinthefollowingway(tEU,art.
9D,3):“IncarryingoutitsresponsibilitiestheCommissionshall
be completely independent. Without prejudice to Article 9E
(2),themembersoftheCommissionshallneitherseeknortake
instructionsfromanyGovernmentorotherinstitution,bodyor
entity.”
The European Parliament approved the new European Commission by 488 votes to 137 in February 2010. Photo: European Parliament
THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 7
asanindependentbodyinfurtheranceofitsroleasapartypoliticalexecutive.Thesechangeshave,aboveall,beendirectedattheroleoftheCommissionpresi-dent,whose chair becamehighlypartisan throughtheLisbonTreaty(tEU,art.9D,7),whichinpracticedemands that he or she should originate from thepartygroupthatwinstheelections.Thisrole,togetherwiththedutyofthepresidenttoaskacommissionertoresignatthebehestoftheEP,stresseshisorherroleasapoliticalguarantoroftheCommission.
Thispractice,amongothers,isdesignedtobalancethe lack of party government and derive the bestfromparliamentarismintheseconditions.TheEP’sapprovaloftheCommissionisprecededbyhearingsof the individual commissioners.This practice, aswellastheapprovalitself,ishighlycompatiblewiththe logicofparliamentaryaccountability.The lackofpoliticalprogrammes—eitherelectoralorforthecabinet—nevertheless leads to the parliamentaryapprovalbeingdirectedatthepersonalqualificationsand backgrounds of the candidate commissionersratherthanattheirpoliticalviews.ThisalsoremainsthemajorperspectiveoftheEP’scontroloftheCom-missionthroughouttheelectoralperiod.
What next?
Atagenerallevel,thecontoursofasemi-presidentialsystemseemtoprovideanalmostidealframeworkfor an analysis of the EU’s political system.Thissystemclearlyhaselementsofparliamentaryaswellaspresidentialrule,andtherelationsbetweentheEU institutionscorrespondsurprisinglywelltothepoliticallogicofsemi-presidentialism.
Inmoretraditionalsemi-presidentialsystems,thetwoheadsofexecutivescomingfromdifferentpoliti-calpartieshasbeenapttoincreasetensionsbetweenthe two executives. In the EU’s case, this risk islessenedduetothelackofpartygovernmentontheonehand,andthecollectivecharacteroftheUnionpresidencyontheother.ThePresidentoftheECis,
afterall,supposedtorepresenttheconsensualviewoftheEC.Tensionsoriginatinginanambiguousdivi-sionofpowersaremuchmorelikely,particularlyinissuesofoverlappingcompetencessuchasinitiatingpoliciesorrepresentingtheEUinexternalrelations.
TheEUcurrentlyrepresentsahybrid,evenofsemi-presidentialism,andifoneattemptedtoanticipatethedirectionofitsinstitutionaldevelopmentinthelongrun,onewouldhavetohazardaguessbetweentwomajoroptions.ThefirstoftheseisthattheUnionwill deepen its semi-presidential rule by movingintoa realpartygovernment.Thepartieswinningthe European electionswould form the ‘Commis-sion’,whichwouldbecomeapoliticalbody,whilearealoppositionwouldemergeintheEP.ThisoptionmightormightnotcoincidewiththesimultaneousdevelopmentoftheEuropeanCouncil inthedirec-tion of a normal presidency through the furtheraccentuationoftheroleofthepermanentpresident.
Development towards a true presidential regimewould represent the second option,with the sub-ordinationoftheCommissiontoonesingleheadofexecutive, thepresident.ThismodelwouldmergethecurrentpresidenciesoftheCommissionandtheEuropean Council into one single EU presidency.Theparliamentaryprinciplewoulddissipate as farasrelationsbetweentheEuropeanParliamentandtheCommissionareconcerned,andbothwouldplaytheirownroleintheEU’sseparationofpowers.
Teija Tiilikainen
Director
The Finnish Institute of International Affairs
ISBN 978-951-769-278-6
ISSN 1795-8059
Cover photo: Council of the European Union
Layout: Tuomas Kortteinen
Language editing: Lynn Nikkanen
The Finnish Institute of International Affairs 2010
www.upi-fiia.fi