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Journal of Philosophy Inc.
Will and Reason in Descartes's Theory of ErrorAuthor(s): Hiram CatonSource: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 4 (Feb. 27, 1975), pp. 87-104Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025241 .
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8/11/2019 Will and Reason in Descartes' theory of error.pdf
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THE JOURNALOF PHILOSOPHY
VOLUME
LXXII, NO. 4, FEBRUARY 27, 1975
WILL
AND REASON IN
DESCARTES'S THEORY OF
ERROR
I
the Fourth
Meditation
Descartes eveloped theory f
error
whose
elusiveness s extreme ven by the
standards f his
writings. ut there s a consensus
egarding ts broad
outline.
He argues, t is
agreed, that truth nd falsity esultfrom
he oint
operation
f
understanding nd will.
He
seems o say that
udgments
consist f an idea of
understanding
ffirmed
r
denied byan act
of
will. When the will
affirms hat
which
understandingcompre-
hends, the udgment s true; when it affirmsr denies an idea not
clearly understood,
the
judgment is false. (The
possibility
of
hitting he
truth
by chance s
a blind
man's
bluff
hat plays
no
role
in the theory.)Error
can be avoided
by refraining rom udging
anybut clear deas.'
The
theory s,
to
say the least,
eccentric,
nd
coming
from
an
ostensiblerationalist,
aradoxical; for to nominate the will as
the
faculty
f
judgment
r
choice is
to introduce oluntarism
nto
the
veryredoubt of
certitude nd to render trutharbitrary.
an this
really be Cartesiandoctrine?The theory s not onlyeccentricbut
baffling ecause, as most
recent
nterpreters
ave
observed,
t
also
appears to state the opposite of the
precedingdoctrine.Descartes
writes
hat
the will
is
impelled
to assent
to clear deas when
they
re-
beheld by understanding nd errorarises when
the
will is
not so
determined nd
must
choose
among
confused ideas.
There
is
then an
asymmetry
etween truth
nd
error uch
that,
when
Des-
cartes believes truly,
his will
is
passive
to
understanding,
hereas
' Anthony Kenny, Descartes on the Will, in R.
J.
Butler, ed., Cartesian
Studies (New
York: Oxford, 1972),
pp.
1/2 parenthetical
page
references o Kenny
are to this article); S. V.
Keeling,
Descartes,
2nd ed. (New York: Oxford,
1968),
pp. 171/2;
L. J. eck,
The
Metaphysics
of Descartes (New
York: Oxford, 1965),
pp. 207/8, 210;
J.
.
Evans,
Error and the Will,
Philosophy,
xxxviii,
144
(April
1963): 138.
This interpretation
mplies that hitting the truth by chance is
not
a
true udgment.
See fn 10 below
for a discussionof this disputed
point.
87
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88
THE
JOURNAL
OF
PHILOSOPHY
he believes
falselywhen
he
chooses to
affirm
n idea.
We
shall
argue
that
this
asymmetry,
hen
adequately
analyzed,
exonerates
Descartes from several confusionssometimesattributed to him.
To
anticipate
one of
our
conclusions,he does
not
inconsistently
advocate
both a
voluntarist nd a
necessitarian
heoryof
judg-
ment;
instead
he
complements
a
necessitarian
theory of
truth,
consonant
with a
rationalist nd
mathematically
riented
philoso-
phy,
with a
voluntarist
heory
of error.
We
shall argue that
the
asymmetry
entioned
s
entailedby
the
manner n
which
Descartes
poses
the
problem of
the role
of
will in
judgment.
The
neces-
sitariantheory f truth orresponds o themethodological evel of
the
inquiry
and the
investigation
f its
leading
rule that
clear
and
distinct deas
are
true. The
voluntarist heory
of error cor-
responds to the
theological
level of
inquiry,
in
which context
alone
Descartes,for
reasons to be
considered,
dentifies
udgment
with
a
choice
by free will.
The systematic
ink
between
the
two
levels s
the
connection
between
epistemology nd
ethics,
r
theory
and
practice,
expressed by
the
traditional
formula: virtue is
knowledge.
In a significanttudy of the presentproblem,Anthony
Kenny,
following
he
precedent f
French
scholars,
tressed
hat
thetheory
of
the
Fourth
Meditation
appears
suddenly
in
the
Meditations
without
ny
discernible
preparation
n
prior
writings nd
without
any easily
ssignablereason.
He
writes hat
some
time .
.
between
1628 and
1640
Descartes
changed
his
mind
about
the nature
of
judgment. t
is not
easy
to discover
when
or
why
he
did so. The
Discourse
on
Method is not
helpful: t
hardly
mentions he
will
(2).
Later we shall argue that Descartes did not change his views on
judgmentbetween
the Regulae
and
the
Meditations,
nd shall
ex-
plain the
bearing
of
the
contrary
elief,
which
s common o
French,
German,and
English
commentary,
n
fundamental
questions
of
interpretation. ut at
present et us
considerthe Discourse.
Prima
facie,
Kenny's
description s
correct. No
writingprior
to the
Meditations
treatswill as the
faculty
f
judgment.
The
Discourse
assigns that function
o
reason,2
nd
mentions
will
only
in
a few
passingremarks. t has not been noticed,however,that the Dis-
course
nevertheless ssigns
a
fundamental
methodological
role
to
volition
cloaked
under
the
term
resolution'.The
conduct
of
reason
is
made to depend
upon a series
of
resolutions DM
10,
15,
18,
41,
60),
especially
the resolution that
constitutes he
first
ule of
the
2
Discours de
la
mdthode
(hereafter ited
as
DM ),
edited
by E.
Gilson,
3rd
ed. (Paris:
Vrin,
1962), p. 2.
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WILL
AND REASON IN DESCARTES'S
THEORY
OF ERROR 89
method,
which is the resolve
to receive
nothing as true,
which
I
did not
know evidently
o be such;
that s to
say,carefully o avoid
haste and prejudice, nd to include nothingmore n my udgment,
than that
which
presented tself o clearly
nd
distinctly o mymind,
that
I would never have
occasion
to doubt it (DM
18). In this
passage
we find
distinctionwhich
will prove
to be characteristic
f
Descartes's
theory
f judgment and
central
to the doctrineof
the
Fourth Meditation. t is
one thing
for an idea to be
true, nother
to
receive it
as such. Ideas are
received
by formingudgments
upon them. When
unguided by method,
the mind tends
to
re-
ceive ideas indiscriminatelynd with prejudice, by receiving deas
that
are not clear
and distinct.
The first
ule of the method
is
designed
to eliminate
this source
of error
by resolvingto receive
only
ideas that
are
clear and distinct
nd
hence
true. The
puzzle
here
is
that,by
one
kind
of
mental act,
deas are
known
to
be
true;
by
another, udgment,
they
are
received or
assented to,
whereas
ordinarily
ne would
not wish
to
distinguish
hese
acts.
The reason
for
the
distinction ecomes
clearer
f
we
consider
ts
methodological
unction.
Aristotelian
nd
scholastic
ogical analysis
assess the propositionthat,forexample, the earthmoves,and its
denial,
as
judgmental
acts
of
understanding.
Cartesian
analysis,
however,
onsiders he first
clear
idea,
and the latter prejudice.3
For
Descartes
the
two
udgments
re not
logically ymmetrical,
e-
cause his
analysis
approaches
them
methodologically
ather
than
formally.
is
analysis
tends to
identify
eason
with clear
ideas,
with
the result
hat
confused
deas
and false
udgments
must
be
assigned
to
a nonrational faculty.
We
call this but
a
tendency,
ince the
Discourse states, f looselyand in passing,that the judgmentsof
reasonable
men contradict
ne
another;
and in
the
Meditations
the
perception
of
all
ideas,
whetherclear
or
obscure,
is
assigned
to
understanding.
But
upon
more
exact
analysis, especially
in
the
Sixth
Meditation,
Descartes
tracesobscure
and confused
udgments
to
appetites
and
passions,
i.e.,
to
the
will;
and these
modes
of
volition
are
the source
of
prejudice.4
When
all false
udgments
re
traced
to
these
sources,
reason
or
understanding
s treated as
the
faculty orclear ideas and hence tout courtas an infalliblefaculty
of
truth hanks
o which
t is
possible
to avoid error
lways.5
n
the
Discourse,
the
will,
as
resolution,
oes
not
udge
of
truth,
ut
func-
3
DM 60;
Principles of
Philosophy I,
??71,
72.
4
Oeuvres
de Descartes
(hereafter
ited
as
AT ),
VII, 82-83,
37-439.
5
[Ijt
is a
flat contradiction
that
understanding
should apprehend
the
false
as
true
(AT VII,
378).
When
the
mind confines
tself to
clear
cognitions,
t
can
scarcely
err except
by
inadvertence
(AT X,
365, 368,
420,
425).
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90
THE JOURNAL OF
PHILOSOPHY
tionsrather s
a sergeant-at-arms
hich enforces eason's udgments
by causing them to be received
as true despite
prejudiced in-
credulity.The functionof will as resolution s to subdue will as
prejudice. Such are the anticipations
n the
Discourse of Medi-
tationsdoctrine.
New in the Meditations s the
treatment f
judgment as a free
choice. Examination
of the structureof the
argument suggests
that
this nnovation
s dictated
by the novel theological ontext nto
which theanalysisof truth nd
error s woven.
The argumentative
strategys this. Descartesconsidered
he possibility
hat God might
have so createdhim that he is deceived n all things, ven his clear
ideas. The question then arises
whether uch a
God is good, since
to err and to
be
deceived
are evil. This doubt is
incorporated nto
the notion of a malign genius,
or
a deus deceptor,
which becomes
the focus of the theological argument
of Meditations
I-IV. The
doubt poses
the traditionalproblem
of providence n a peculiarly
philosophic
way,
for
on
his
path
to
certainty
he
only
evil
Descartes
considers s
error
and
deception.
From
this
initial
mingling
of
philosophy
nd
theology,
escartes
proceeds
to solutions
similarly
mingled;
that is, the structure f his solutions flows fromthe
initial
amalgamation
f
the
philosophic
ask
of
securing
he founda-
tions of science
with the
theological
task
of
vindicating
divine
providence.
Thus
Descartes undertakes
to
prove
that God
is a
perfect eing,
ncapable
of
deception,
nd to
prove
that his
errors
arise
from
himself.
n order to
bring
the
problem
of errorwithin
the
scope
of
theological rgumentation
bout
providence,
Descartes
construes
rror
s
sin;
but since
theology
ttributes
in to the
will,
the argumentative trategyonspires o generate n explanationof
error
hat
attributes
t to the will. The
mingling
f
the
theological
and
philosophical
points
of view
produces
he result
hat,
s Rtienne
Gilson
put it,
the
problem
of sin
is the
theological
form
of
the
problem
of
error,
nd
the
problem
of
error s the
philosophical
form
of the
problem
of sin. To
satisfy
hese
requirements,
es-
cartes
must
dentifyudgment
withchoice and attribute oth
to
the
will.
The characterization
f
judgment
as a choice of free
will
appears suddenly in the metaphysicalwritings, nd only there,
because
it
is
demanded
by
the intentionof his
theological argu-
mentation.
The
eccentricityppears
already
n the titleof the Fourth
Medita-
tion,
Of
Truth
and
Error,
which
seems to
promise
an
analysis
f
both.
Yet
the
questions
Descartes
actually pursues
presuppose
the
6
La Libertd chez Descartes et la
Thdologie (Paris:
Alcan,1913), .
266.
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WILL AND REASON IN
DESCARTES S THEORY OF ERROR
91
result of the Third Meditation.
There certaintywas characterized
as clear and distinctperceptionof that which I affirm AT VII,
35). Descartes then makes it a general rule that everythings
true which I perceiveveryclearly
and distinctly. e has reverted
to the first ule of the method
which the doubt called into question.
Almost as an afterthought e
remembers he deus deceptor,who
now occasionsdefense f the rule
via a proof that God is veracious.
Only after ll thesepreparations oes Descartesdeem it appropriate
to take up the question of truth
nd error.He takesup the subject,
therefore, ot to explain to
himself he nature of truth-he knows
that it consists ntirely f clear
and distinct deas-but to explain
to himself he nature of error: No
doubt [concerning ruth]would
remain, xcept that t seems to follow that am never able to err
(AT VII, 54). Since he beginswiththe premise haterror risesfrom
the wronguse of the faculty f udgment, he Meditation s con-
ducted with
a
view
to
discovering
he
right nd wronguse
of
it; and
indeed he concludeswith the
pronouncement hathe knows
how
to
conduct
his thoughts o as never
to
err.
The
analysis
of
the
relation
between
understanding
nd
will
is
based on thedivisionof thoughtsnto twoprincipal modes, which
are understanding
nd will.
In
the Third
Meditation
Descartes
assigned
to
understanding ideas,
which
might
be
sensible, magi-
native, or supersensible.
tems
assigned
to
will are classed as voli-
tions
or
passions,
nd others
udgments
AT VII, 37). Anticipating
the
Fourth
Meditation,
he remarks
hat
there
s errorneither
n
ideas (or perceptions)
taken
by
themselves
nor
in
volitions
or
passions,
so that
judgments
alone remain
as
the
source
of
error.
The Fourth Meditationdivergesfromthis schemaby suppressing
the distinction
between
volitions and
judgments,
but
persists
n
maintaining
hat the relation
between
n
idea
and
a volition
s one
in which the
will
affirms
or
denies)
an
idea
or
assentsto an
idea.
The
broad, vague pronouncements
bout
this
relationship
re
more
or
less restatements
f what was said
in the
Discourse.
Descartes
believes
that
he errs
when
he
extends his will
beyond
understand-
ing, .e.,
when he
affirms
r denies
something
hat
he does not
clearly
perceive.
But if we
press
for a more
precise formulation,nquiry
s
broughtto a rude halt, sinceneitherherenor elsewhere s such a
formulation
ffered.What
appears
to be his best statement
ppears
in Notae
in
Programma,
wherehe wrote:
. .
. I saw
that,
ver and above
perception,
hich s
requisite
or
judgment,
heremust e affirmationr
negation
o constituteheform
of
the
udgment,
nd that t is
frequentlypen
to us to withholdur
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92
THE
JOURNAL
OF
PHILOSOPHY
assent,
ven f we
perceive thing.
referredhe
udgmental
ct
itself, hich
s nothing
ut assent, .e.,
affirmationr
negation,
ot
to the perceptionf understandingut to thedeterminationf the
will
(AT
VIII-2,
363; Principles
, ?34).
The
equation of
assentwith
affirmationnd
negation seems to
provide
the key to
Descartes's
thought on
judgment;
he
has ap-
parently
onfused
belief
(assent)with
predication affirmation
nd
negation).
The confusion
eems
to explain
some
of
Descartes'smore
baffling
ssertions. hus
he
stipulates
basically
two mental
attitudes
toward
ideas-mere
contemplation, r
suspension
of belief,
and
assent.But it is not to be understoodwhatone believes when one
assents
o
the dea of a
man
or
a
chimera.
What is
requisite
to
belief
is
predication,
which the
scholastics,
n the
wake of
Aristotle,
on-
sidered
the form of
judgment,
but which
is distinct
from
assent.
It is not
surprising, hen,
to
find Descartes
careless about
the dis-
tinction
etween
oncept nd
judgment,withthe
result
hat
he
takes
ideas as
propositions,
concepts,
or images, as it
suits his turn.
Owing
to his
conflation f
predication and
belief,
he
can
give
no
general
description-cannot
state the form -of judgment. For
example,
when
he
speaks
of
his assent to
nonpredicative
deas,
he
means
that
he believes in the
existence of
objects
corresponding
to
them.
ndeed his discussion
f
assent
nd
judgment s
thoroughly
mingledwith the material
problems
f
his
doubt.
To
manywho
have
written
ecently
n
Descartes's
notion of ideas
and
upon
the
theme
presently nder
discussion, ome
such
analysis
has seemed
obviously required.7
But
this
approach
assumes
that
truth nd
falsity
re
symmetrical alues in
a
binarymatrix,
whereas
thewholethrust fDescartes's heorys to deny thatsymmetry.or
the purpose
of
understandinghis
theory,
s
distinguishedfrom
evaluating t,
it
is
necessary
o
accept
his
premise
that truth
s
un-
problematicbecause clear
and
distinct deas
are
known
to
be
true
per
se. His
analysis
therefore
bstracts
from
the
formal
question
about the
logical
properties
f
true
ideas-to an
unknown
corre-
spondent
who raised
this
question,
he
wrote
hat
t
does not
matter,
for
his
purposes,
whether
deas
are
taken
to
be
propositions
r con-
7
Alan Gewirthwrites: For if it is simply y the act ofwilling n idea or
perception
hat he
udgment omes
nto
being,mustnot
the dea or
perception
have
previouslyeena
propositionr
group
f propositions?
Clearness nd Dis-
tinctnessn
Descartes,
hilosophy,
viii,69 (April
1943):
26. After
nalyzing
Cartesianudgmentsnto
phrasticsnd
neustics, enny oncluded:
Descartes,
n
lumping
together
ffirmationnd
desire,
negationand
aversion,
onfounds
the different
nus of
match involved
n
the two different
inds of assent
and
dissent.
his,
it
seems o
me,
is
the
fundamental
efect
n
his
theory
f
judgement
s
an act
of the
will
op.
cit.,p. 17).
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WILL AND
REASON
IN DESCARTES'S THEORY OF ERROR
93
cepts AT
III, 395). To
say that his analysis
abstracts rom
formal
questions
about judgment s
equivalent to saying
that it is not a
logicaltheory t all; it is a psychological, r, better, methodological
theory
which replaces
formal ogic by the logic
of ideas. The
re-
placement
s part of
Descartes's critique of
scholasticism.
ormal
logic, he
thought, s
sterilebecause it is not an ars
inviniendi;
his
logic of
ideas is
intended to remedythis
deficiency y
anchoring
reasoning directly n
what he took
to be the natural illation
of
ideas which
reflects he
natural articulation of
things.Since
the
logic of ideas is a
material ogic, t
can be characterized nly
with
reference o, and is unintelligible ndependently f the subject
matter, e it
mathematics
rmetaphysics,o which
t is in a
particu-
lar case
addressed.8 et
us see how itworksout in
the present
ase.
Owing to Descartes's
malgamation
f scholasticism ith his
own
views,
t
is difficult
o
see the
endurance of the standpointof
the
Regulae
in
the Fourth Meditation.
Let us specify
he difficulties.
In
setting p his analysis, escartes
ays
that
the understanding
nly
apprehends deas, clear
and
obscure,
while the will affirmsr
denies
them,
hereby nviting
he inference
hat
clear
ideas are
recognized
and assentedto as true owing to a willful act. The correctness f
the
inference ppears
to be
endorsed
by
the conclusion
of
the
analysis,
where
Descartes
speaks
of
two
types
of
libertywhereby
he affirms
lear or
obscure
ideas.
But
these are
appearances.
The
question
under
investigation
s:
given
that
truth
s
unproblematic,
how
is
error
possible
and avoidable? It
is
possible
because of his
tendency o
judge some
unclear
ideas;
it
is
avoidable
by abstaining
from
udging things
whose
truth
s
not
apparent.' )9
he truth
f
things r ideas can be knownpriorto judging them because clear
ideas are
known
to be
true
per se;
it follows
then that
udgment
plays
no role in
knowledge
f
truth, xactly
s was the case
in
the
Discourse.
At no
point
in
the
Meditations
does
Descartes
say
that
knowledge
f
truth
equires
udgment,
whereashe
affirms
hrough-
out that
the
commission
f
error
does.
Just
this
asymmetry
f
udg-
ment
in
the
two
cases
marks the
asymmetry
f truth and
error.
Having
defined
udgment
eccentrically
s
a choice of free
will,
Descartesmakes t the cause of errorbut not of truth.The reason
for
this
eccentricity
s not a
logical
confusion,
ut
the
requirements
of his
theological rgument.
8
On the
relation
between
Descartes's
logic
of ideas
and
formal
ogic,
ee
L. J. Beck,
The Method f
Descartes
New
York:
Oxford,
952),
hs.
6
&
7.
9
[Q]uoties
de
rei
veritate
on liquet,
a judicio
ferendo
sse
abstinendum
(AT VII,
62);
also
AT X,
396: veritatum
roprie
el
falsitatum
on
visi solo
intellectu
sse
posse ;
lso
Principles
, ?37.
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94
THE JOURNAL
OF
PHILOSOPHY
The
asymmetry
f
truth and
error s
built
into the asymmetry
of the
action
of thewill
when
confronted
with
clear and
unclear
ideas, respectively. s we mentioned,whenclear ideas supervene n
the
understanding
he will
is
passive
toward
them;
the
will
submits
by
assenting,
s it
must according
o the
necessity
f its nature
AT
VII, 58;
Principles
1, ?43).
Echoing
the doctrine
f the Oratory,
es-
cartes alls this
choice
the
liberty
f spontaneity.
ut when
clear
ideas are
wanting,
the
will
is
left undetermined
n the liberty
f
indifference,
s
he
calls
it,
echoing
the Molinist doctrine
of
the
Jesuits.
n this
case there
are two options.
The will can
assent
to the idea, despite the lack of evidence; and when it does so it
falls
nto
error nd
sin.
10
Or it can
act
virtuously
y
refraining
from hoosing
or
judging.
The
liberty
f
indifference e calls
the
lowestgrade
of
freedom.
The Jesuits
and Oratorians
were
at
loggerheads
over
the
doc-
trineof
free
will
because
they
believed
that
the liberty f
sponta-
neity and
of indifference
were
incompatible.
Therefore,
when
Descartes
alled them
both acts of
free
will, he presented
is readers
with
an
equivocation
which
pursued
him for
years
afterward.
e-
viewingthe contradictionsn Descartes'scorrespondence egarding
the two liberties,
nd
the politics
that
Descartes was
playing with
the theological
powers
that
were,
Boyce Gibson
wrote:
It would
thus
appear
that
on the
main
issue
in
the controversy
etween
Jesuit
nd Jansenist
e
held no definite
oint
of
view, and,
what
is
more,
that he
did
not regard
a solution
of
the problem
as
vital to
his philosophy.
1
Gibson,
and
more
emphatically
Gilson,
detected
10
The argumentative tructure of the text (AT VII, 60) shows that chance
hittingon the truth
s not
a true udgment, .e.,
that any affirmation
f unclear
ideas is a false judgment.
After asserting that
the right
use of his will consists
in affirming lear
ideas as
true while abstaining
from udging
others, he con-
siders
the
alternatives
o nonabstention:
either he
affirms hatwhich is not
true,
in which
case
he plainly errs, or
he embraces
(amplectar) the
truth
by
chance,
n which
case he has again used
his will badly, i.e., judged
falsely.
This
outcome
is noted
by Alquie
in his
gloss:
Truth found
by
chance
is
thus
assimilable to error Oeuvres philosophiques,
I, 464,
n.
2).
The Latin
brings
out
this
point
more
clearly
than
the
French
translation,
which the
HR
translation
follows.
For
in the
Latin Descartes
avoids
the
technical
term
judicio,
writing
inistead hemetaphorical amplectar'.'
The Philosophy
of Descartes (London: Methuen, 1932), p. 334.
Gilson has minutely
documented
both the theologico-politics
of
Descartes's
initial
treatment f the two liberties
and
the
ways
in which he later shifted
his
exposition
of
it to accommodate the rapidly changing
events
in
France (La
Libert6,
268-269, 292-332).
Noting the
inconsistency etween
Descartes's
assur-
ance
that the Meditations
do not discuss practical questions
of faith
and the
manifest practical
bearing
of the equation
of sin with error,Gilson
dismissed
the
assurance as
only
a
feint (ibid.,
268).
The
assurance
is
also incompatible
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WILL AND REASON
IN
DESCARTES'S THEORY OF ERROR
95
in
Descartes'suse
of
Jesuit-Oratorianargon
an expedientfor
ecur-
ing the
receptionof his
philosophy
n
a
theologically verheated
environment, s Descartes himselfon a number of occasionsindi-
cated was
the partial objective
of
the
Meditations. It
is
thus
no
wonder that
recent
commentary,
hich almost
without
exception
ignores this
context of
meaning, finds
Descartes's
meaning
so
ob-
scure. n the
present
ase,
that
contextenables us
to
identify
non-
arbitrarily he mismatch
etweenhis
terminology
nd
his
concept.
He
calls assent to clear
ideas
the
liberty
of
spontaneity;
but
the
mental act
described
nvolves
no
choice,
but
rather
xcludes t pre-
cisely as the arbitrary lement that corruptsknowledge.The pre-
destinarian
tendency
f Oratorian
theologymerelyprovided
Des-
cartes n opportune
way
of
speaking
of
rational
necessitarianisms
though t were
dependent
upon the
will.
The difference etween
Descartes
and the Oratory
s easily
ndicated.
The
apparent
volun-
tarismof the
Fourth
Meditation, lready diluted
by
necessitarian-
ism, is
followed
by
the undiluted
necessitarianism f the
Fifth.
Speaking of mathematical
ruth, escartes
tates
n
many
and vari-
ous
formulasthe
necessity
f the mind
to
assent,whether
t will
or no, to clear and distinctdeas; just because they re independent
of
the
will,
mathematical ruths
re
necessary.
And of
course
the
Augustinian
Oratory
would have no
part
of
Descartes's
laim
to be
able to avoid
error
always,
if
that
claim carried with
it,
as
for
Descartes t
does,
the implication that
sin is
avoidable. As
for the
Jesuitdoctrine of
indifference,
escartes
actuallytaught
that the
most mportant
rrors,
alled
in
the Sixth
Meditation
the teachings
of nature,
rise
not
by choice but
by
a
natural mpulsion
that can
be set aside onlyby the mostvigorous elf-criticism,nd even then
theymustbe
followed n
practical ife.
The
notion of
judgment
as choice
functions
xclusively
n the
theological plane
of the Meditations. An
adequate account of it
presupposes lengthy
reparation
which
cannot
be given
here; a
sketch of
the
argument
tselfmust
therefore
uffice.
he
relation
between
philosophy
nd
theology
n
the
MVIeditations
s
determined
by the fact
that
theology
nters
the
argument n
the form
of the
deus deceptor,
.e.,
as an
objection
to
the certain
and demonstra-
tive science
which
Descartes
has
undertaken
to
found. The deus
deceptor s
destructive f
foundations
ecause
it
calls into question
mathematical
truths,
mplying
that
clear
and
distinct
deas are
with
Descartes's
declared intention
to
refute the
atheists
in
defense of faith,
and
with his admission
that the
doubt
endangers the
faith of
the
weak-
minded (AT
VII,
7, 247, 346;
AT
I,
558;
AT
V,
153,
560).
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96
THE
JOURNAL
OF
PHILOSOPHY
not true.
While
admitting
that
his doubts were
hyperbolic
or
exaggerated,
escartes
yet nsisted
hat
they
were
serious and well-
considered.The serious sense of this doubt depends upon dis-
covering
in
the
theological
tradition
the
dogma
to
which
the
doubt
refers.The
relevant
dogma
must be
one
concerning the
relation
between
reason
and
revelation,
r
between
philosophy
nd
theology,
which s,
according o
its classic
formulation,
hat
philoso-
phy
s
the
handmaidento
theology.
he
subordination
f
reasonand
nature to
faith and
gracemeant
that, n the
event
of a
clash be-
tween
them,
faith
was to
take
precedence,
s being
more certain
and authoritative. ut since thedogmasoffaith urpass hecapacity
of
understanding, ssent to
them
s
by grace,
and
grace is
directed
to
the
will
rather han to
understanding; ence
Descartes,
ollowing
Augustine, ays
that
assent to
grace
is
by the will.
The
theological
plane
of
the
doubt
renews he old
struggle
etweenfaith
nd
reason
by
representing he inner tension of
the mind torn
between
these
poles. The
tortured
iction
f
the
malign
demon, who
embodies
a
willful
negation
of
reason's clear and
distinct
deas,
is the
image
of
the
quite real
capacity
o
forsake
ational
truth or
faith.12
The theologicalargument f theMeditations-or to be precise,
its
argument
with
theology-is
meant
to
restore
he
autonomyof
reason.
The Cogito
discovers
necessary ruth
bout
the
subject of
the doubt which
not
even an
omnipotent
God
can
alter.
The
alter-
native,
deceiving
God/veracious
God,
seizes
the
initiativefrom
he
theologians
by
posing
a
dilemma:
either God
ordains truth
con-
trary o
reason,
n
which
case the
energy
f
faith,
kepticism, eigns
supreme;
or he
is
veracious,
n which
case
God
is
on
the
side
of the
philosophers. The Fourth Meditation completes the process of
auto-emancipation
y
assimilating
in
to
error,thus
arming
the
mind
against
the
vain
fears
t
the root
of
its
subjugation.18
or this
reason
Descartes
posits
the
dependence of
error
upon
free
will;
on the other
hand,
for
conscience's ake
and in
deference
o
the
truth, e
must
assert
he
necessity
f
assent
to clear
ideas. It
follows
then that
virtue s
knowledge
nd
sin is
rebellion
against reason.'4
The
Jesuit-Oratorian
ontroversy
ffered
escartesthe
equivocation
12 For a
detailed
treatment f
this
interpretation, ee
my
The
Origin
of Sub-
jectivity:
An
Essay
on Descartes
(New
Haven,
Conn.:
Yale,
1973), pp.
115-130.
13
The
vulnerability
of
the
doubter to
bad
conscience
is
most
visible in the
Discourse,
where Descartes
equips
himself
with
a
provisional
morality
to sub-
stitute for the
faith
and conventional
opinions
he
has
stripped
away.
Gen-
erosity,
he
key
to all the
virtues,
s
a
teaching
about
good
and
bad
conscience
in
regard
to the use of the
will
(AT
IV,
266;
Passions
of
the
Soul, ?190).
14
DM
28; Passions,
??144,
160,
212;
AT
I,
367.
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WILL AND
REASON IN DESCARTES'STHEORY
OF ERROR
97
he needed
to carry
ff his piece of legerdemain.
he conclusion
of
his analysis,
however, s neither
Jesuitnor
Oratorian,but
Pelagian,
for he has learnedhow to employhis own resources o avoid error
and sin
always.
These
results re sufficiently
emotefrom
urrent
xpectations
o
warrantcomment
on the present
conditionof Cartesian
studies.
There is
a pronouncedtendency
o divide
Descartes's hought
nto
two phases,
with science
and methodpredominating
n
the
earlier,
metaphysics nd religion
n the
later phase. It is widely believed
that the
Meditationsreviseor abrogate
the
basically
nonmetaphysi-
cal thoughtof the
Regulae by
founding scientific ertainty
pon
an
elaborate
cholastic
difice.'5 his characterization
tands
or
falls
with the premise that
the theological
argumentation
f the
work
represents
ts genuine
intention. n the
scope of this
article we
can only indicate
the grave objections to
which this interpreta-
tion is open.'6 What
we can show
is that the theological
rgument
has not
yet been correctly
ssessed.For if
our reading
is
correct,
Descartes
uses traditional
theologicometaphysics
o
undermine he
very beliefs
that traditionally
t had been
used
to defend.
This fact has been detected with varyingdegreesof clarityby
modernThomists,
not to mention
he manydetractors ontemporary
with
Descartes. Gilson's
study of the sources
of the
Meditations
led
him
to conclude
that the work,particularly
he
Fourth Medi-
tation,
was a tissue of borrowings
from
theologians ancient
and
contemporary;nd he attributed
his
eclecticism
o
Descartes's
anxiety
to ensure acceptance of
his physics
n a
world
dominated
by theology.'-
hese admissions
re significant
ecause
Gilson,
more
than any other ndividual, s responsibleforestablishing he view
that Descartes's
metaphysical
hought s
heavily dependent
upon
scholasticism.
lthough todaysuch an assertion
passes
as a
truism,
Gilson
had to establish
t in the teeth of
a
contrary
iew, whose
last significant
dvocate was
Charles Adam,
that
the
scholastic
edifice
of the Meditations is
but a
flag
to
cover
the
goods,
namely,Cartesian
physics.Gilson
thus agreed
with
his
opponents
15
This
interpretation,
n one form r
another,
as been upheld by every
significant
omprehensivetudy
f Descartes
ince Louis Liard's
pathbreaking
study n 1882,which mphasized fundamentalreakbetween hemetaphysics-
less
Regulae and the
scholasticMeditations.
1e
For an account
f thesedifficulties,
ee Caton,
op. cit., pp. 10-20, 6-73,
101-108.
17
Gilson,
a
Liberte, p.
160, 174-76,
4142. Maritain
wrote hat
Descartes
knew
the profound
ncompatibilityf
his
philosophy
ith
the whole uthentic
tradition
f Christian isdom ; ee
The Dream of
Descartes
New
York: Philo-
sophical
ibrary,
944), . 44.
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WILL AND REASON IN DESCARTES'S THEORY OF
ERROR
99
ligious. It is typical of Descartes's procedure that
he provides
his
readerswith both premises, ut denies the
conclusion; thus he says
that we should have no difficulty elieving religious mysteries
because the immensepower of God can createmany
thingsbeyond
human understanding. ut Descartes also
explained how this con-
tradiction s to be understood.He wrote that
anyone who teaches
that Scripture ontradicts
atural
reason does so
only to show in-
directly hat he has no faith in Scripture.For as
we were born
men beforewe were made Christians, t is beyond belief that any
man
should seriously mbrace opinions which he thinks
contrary
to right reason that constitutes man, in order that he may
adhere to the faithby whichhe is a Christian AT
VIII-2,
353-54).
Descartes'sdenial of the conclusion hatfollows romhis premisess
a
way of showing indirectly hat the resolve to
achieve clarity,
and to accept nothingbut clear ideas, is already
mplicitly rejec-
tion of faith and authority. he first ule of the method
is first
because it states what Descartes believed to be the
necessary
on-
dition for rational inquiry.But because his renewal of philosophy
was
destructive
f
the regnantbelief of his time,
Descartes
found
it necessaryodissemblehis position n orderto avertpersecution.2'
The
theory
of Meditation Four
is part
of
this
program.
As
an
apparent assimilation
of current
heological nterpretations
f the
will,
it
is a weapon of
defense.
But
when its
logic
is
more
exactly
studied,
ne sees
that
t
is not
merely
efensive.
The
interpretation
e offer
mplies that Descartes
had but one
philosophy
and
that
continuity
with
pre-Meditations
doctrine
should lie
just
beneath its scholastic
surface.
Because its
origins
have been so thoroughly tudied,the theory f error s well suited
to testing f this claim. Gilson declared that Descartes derived the
theory
rom St.
Thomas by generalizingThomas's
analysis
of
the
relation between reason and will in practical
udgments.Anthony
Kenny recently ejected
that
explanation
as
textuallyunfounded
and
declared
that,
o
his
knowledge,
herewas no
antecedent or the
notion of the
will
as judgmental power. We shall attempt o show
that the
theory
f
the
Fourth Meditation, n our
adjusted
form,
embodiesfundamentalmethodological deas present lready n the
Regulae and that Descartes took his theory f
judgment without
the
light of grace,
would
commit a sin
in not
using his reason
rightly
AT
VII,
148).
21
For a study of this
question, and the
problems it
presentsfor
correct
nter-
pretation,
see Caton, op.
cit., pp.
10-20; and my
The
Problem of
Descartes's
Sincerity,
hilosophical
Forum, ii,
3
(Spring
1971): 355-369.
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IOO
THE JOURNAL OF
PHILOSOPHY
change
fromStoic doctrine,
probably as it was expounded
by
the
primary
ource
of Latin Stoicism,
Cicero.
The divisionofthought ntothe modesof understandingnd will
is
based
upon the cardinal
premise that
perceptions
s such
con-
tain no error,
nd
that error
stems from
faulty
treatment f
per-
ceptions.
Thus
Descartes
remarks
that his
perceptions
of sensed
objects
are sufficiently
lear and distinct
aken
bythemselves;
ut
he
has
a habit of udging
that there re
objects
outsidehimself
imilar
to
his sense impressions,
lthough
he has
never perceived
such
a
relationship.
This
extension
of judgment
beyond
understanding
involves
more than bare
assent;
it adds
positive
content to
the
perception,
r
mingles,
as the Sixth Meditation has it, an un-
perceived
ontent
with
a perception.
Error
s accordingly
haracter-
ized as a
faulty
ttempt o
make good
a lack of
some
knowledge
which t seems ought
to possess
AT VII,
55). Error
arises
from
a refusalto be
content
with clear
ideas
as the sole
criterion
of
truth.The refusal
stems
fromtwo
distinct
ources-the
practical
needsof
life,which
engender
natural
prejudice,
and a
tendency o
prefer
lofty and obscure
metaphysical
and
religious reasons
tothe simpleclarity fmathematicsAT X, 371-72,405; DM 8, 30).
A
critique of
reason,
one may
say, is
already implicit
in
the
restriction
f truth
o clear and
distinct
deas.
In Rule
XII
of the Regulae,
which
summarizes
all
that went
before,
very imilar
teaching
s set forth:
Thirdly, e say
hat ll
these imple
atures
re known y
themselves
(per
se
notas)and contain
no falsity.
his is easily
hown,
f we
distinguishhe
faculty f understanding
intellectus)
y
which
hings
are known nd intuited,rom hatbywhich t judges n affirming
and
denying.
or we
may
think
urselves
gnorant
f
things
which
we
really now,
s
whenwe
believe hat
n
such
hings
here s
some-
thing
idden rom
s,
beyond
whatwe
intuit
r attain
by
reflection,
and
this
elief
f
ours
s false.
Whence
t
is
evident
hatwe err f
we
judge
that
ny
of
these
imple
aturess not
completely
nown
y
us.
For f the
mind
ttains
he east
cquaintance
ith
t,
which s
neces-
sary, ssuming
hat
we
make ome
udgment
ponit,
from
his
fact
itselfwe
know
t completely
AT X,
37).
The second
sentence
of this
passage
is
usually
cited as evidence
of
the
change
in Descartes's
hought
rom he
Regulae
to the
Medita-
tions,
ince
it
assigns
perception
nd
judgment
to
understanding.22
22
Kenny,
p. cit.,
p. 1;
J.-M.
Gabaude,
Libertd
t
raison
Toulouse:
Associa-
tion
des
publications
e
la Faculte
des
lettres
t
sciences
umaines
e
Toulouse,
1970),
ol.
, p.
113.
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WILL AND REASON IN
DESCARTES S THEORY OF ERROR
IOI
This observation s
not
so significant
s it is thought o be. Judg-
ment and perception are assigned
to differentmodes of
under-
standing, reating n equivocation n the meaning of the term. n-
deed the Regulae use 'understanding'
n three senses.
It may
designate the mind with all
its powers; or the power of percep-
tion; or pure understanding,
s distinguished romsensation and
imagination.23n the present ase the term s used in the first nd
second senses; that s, understanding as two functions, erception
and judgment, nd perception s also called understanding.
his
equivocation is continued
in the Meditations,
where the
modes,
understanding nd will, are said to be modes of that comprehensive
powerwhichmaybe called understanding,
eason,mind, r soul (AT
VII, 27; Principles , ?32).
At the root of the equivocation
is Des-
cartes'sreplacement f the
Aristotelian oncept of the soul as an
orderedhierarchy f faculties y the conceptof mind as a thinking
thing,which is nothingelse than its respectivemodes
of thought:
The facultiesof willing,
sensing,understanding, tc.,
cannot be
called its parts,for t is one and the same thing
which
wills,
senses,
and
understands (AT VII, 86). The faculty terminology,
ike
the soul terminology escartes ontinues o employ, s anachronistic
with respectto his own philosophic
nnovations.The correct erm
is 'mode'; the will is a mode .
.
. of thought, .e., of understanding,
reason, mind, or soul. Hence
it is correct o say within the frame-
workof Descartes's equivocationsthat understanding udges.
His
'voluntarization f judgment
goes hand
in hand with an
intel-
lectualization of volition.
We find, therefore,
he
following correspondence etween
the
Regulae and the Meditations. Clear ideas or simple natures are
known to be true by their own sign, and this truth s perceived,
although the
mind
also
levies a
judgmental
assessment
f these
perceptions.
he
only
difference
s
thatthe
Regulae
do not call
mind
in
the mode of judgment
will.
But
they
do
anticipate
the
later
terminology.
t
is
by
the will,
he
says,
that
the
mind
assents
to
revealed faith AT X, 370).
In a more significant assage,Descartes
speaks of the liberty by which we make conjectural udgments,
which do not deceive us
so
long
as
they
re not affirmed
o be
true
(AT X, 424). Speaking
in
the same
context of
deduction as
a
compounding of simple natures, i.e.,
an
activity by
which
the
mind
puts together llations,
he notes
that
t
is withinour
power
23
AT X, 395,
411, 415-16. The
Regulae also use 'cognition' nd
'mind' as
synonymous ith the general
meaningof understanding;
ikewise he later
wvorks,.g., AT
X, 360,
362,
395,
411.
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I02
THE JOURNAL
OF
PHILOSOPHY
to
avoid
errorhere,
provided
that the
compounding
s intuitively
necessary AT X,
424-25).
Similarly, n
the
Meditationsthe
distinc-
tion between what is and is not withinour power operatesas the
criterionwhich
distinguishesnecessary,
nd
therefore rue
judg-
ments,from
rbitrary hoice,
for it is
impossible not to
assent
to
clear
ideas.24
We conclude
that
the difference
etween
the Regulae
and the
Meditations
regarding
he role of will in
judgment
s
not
a
difference
f
principle, as is
widely
believed, but a
difference f
stress nd
terminology,ue less
to a
maturation f
thought
han to
the
differencen
the
problems he two
works
ddress.
The continuity etweentheRegulae and the Meditationsmaybe
attributed
n part to
Descartes's
early, asting,
nd
profound
debt
to
Stoic
doctrine.This
indebtedness s usually
thought o be con-
fined
to
ethical
questions. But
Descartes
follows
the Stoics also
in his
conception
that ethics s
anchored n logic,
and
conversely.
The
Stoics
teach that
udgment
judicio) is the
fundamental
ct
of
sentience
thinking ) s
such and
comprises he
groundupon
which
the whole
of
philosophy s built.25
It
consists f two
components,
a
perception or
conception (visum
=
phantasia) and
assent
(ad-
sensio).Whereasperceptions re adventitious,he one thing within
our
power,
whichwe can
will
to do or not to
do, is
assent
to
per-
ceptions II,
xii, 38; I, xi,
40-41).
Philosophy
therefore onsists n
dealing
well with
perceptions
with a view to
attaining
firm
nd
constant
judgments
that cannot be
overthrown by
contrary
evidence or
by
the
inconstancy f
the
passions;
in
this
way,
firm
and
constant
udgments
re the
key alike to
scienceand
to conduct.
Steadfast
udgments are
attained
by
distinguishing
mong per-
ceptionsthose which are unstable and inconstant,nd those which
are
strictly
peaking
comprehensible
katalPpton). The latter are
recognized
by their
clarity
declaratio) (I, xi,
41).
Perceptionsof
this kind
give rise
to
an
assent or
judgment
called
synkatathesis,
i.e., a
union of
perception
nd assent
uch that
the mind
necessarily
assents o
what t
clearlyperceives
II,
xii, 38).
Notwithstandinghis
necessity,he
Stoics
assign udgment to
the
will because
assent is
within
our
power: to
perception
[Zeno] joins
the act of
assent
24
AT
VII,
38, 64, 65, 66,
67, 69,
75. As for
the
letter
to
Mesland
(?) in
which
Descartes seems to
deny
this doctrine,
see
the judicious
remarks of Kenny,
op. cit.,
pp.
25/6. In
general,
Descartes's
correspondence
n this as
well as
other
theological
subjects
is almost
always
written d
hominem, as
Gilson has
shown.
In
evaluating such
correspondence, t is
necessary
o
bear in
mind that
Descartes
said that
his letters were
usually
written with too
little
care
to
warrant
reading
by others
than
those to whom
they
are written
(AT I,
178).
25
Cicero, Academica
II,
ix, 29; x,
31; xii,
37-39.
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WILL
AND REASON IN DESCARTES S
THEORY OF ERROR
I03
which
he says
s
in
us and voluntary I, xi, 40; De Finibus III, v,
17).
In
this way the Stoics arrived
at
their conception of
the
unityof theory nd practice: Error,rashness, gnorance, pinion,
suspicion,
and
in
a
word
all
things
alien to firm nd
constant
judgmentZeno
set apart from irtue nd
wisdom I, xi, 42).
Virtue
is knowledge.
The seeming inconsistency n the
Stoic position between the
assertions hat
assent to clear ideas is
necessary nd that assent to
it
is within
our power is duplicated by Descartes.The explication
in the two
cases s the same. Although he
mind is so constituted y
naturethat tmustassentto what s clearly erceived, t may,owing
to passions
and erroneousbeliefs,
ttemptto resist that necessity,
thereby
ngendering condition of vacillating self-estrangement
which
theStoicsdiagnosed as the stateof the unwise.
The diagnosis
points to the cure: it is withinour power
to
will what
is necessary,
in
this way achieving that harmonia
between conduct
and
convic-
tion which s
the fruit f wisdom that not
even
Zeus
can disturb.
Assent as an
act
of
volition occurs
exclusively
on the
secondary
level of
reflection,fter he first evel of
necessitated ssent
to clear
ideas has been understood.This double meaning of 'assent' runs
throughout
escartes'swritings. he problem
of
understanding
he
role of will in
judgment therefore educes
to the
question why,
n
the
Meditations,Descartes makes it appear that
it
is
by
an
act of
free will or choice that we assent to
clear ideas on
the
first
evel.
And
thisquestion has,
I
believe, been
adequately
answered.
In the third
ule of his provisional
morality escartes ommended
the Stoic
wisdom. His
implementation
f
it in
the doubt
of
the
Meditationswas meantto freephilosophy romvacillationbetween
revelation and
reason, by affirming is
nature
(reason)
as more
certain than
any other
claim. Persistence
n
this
evidence,
he
says
in
the Fourth Meditation, depends on
the constancy f his will
in refusing o yield to counterclaims. ut
Descartes departed from
the Stoics on one decisive point-his
project
for the
mastery f
nature.His
attempt
o combinereliance
upon
nature
as
a
standard,
with
intellectual
and
practical opposition
to
nature, produced al-
ready
in
his
philosophy
new vacillation.
ts working ut
in
sub-
sequent philosophy has eroded every
possibilityof retaining the
natural basis of Cartesianrationalism. he
result s thatphilosophy
finds tself nce more n the lap of faith,
ven if a secular faith, s
Karl
Popper, among others,
ndicates
when
he
admits
that his
rationalism rests
on
an
irrationalfaith
n
the attitude of reason-
ableness. The
willfulness
of
Descartes's
self-assertion f reason.
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104
THE
JOURNAL
OF PHILOSOPHY
deprived of its natural basis,
now
seems, and is, completely
rbi-
trary. erhaps studyof thehistory f philosophy an
help us find
our way out of this wilderness y showingus how we got into it.
HIRAM
CATON
The AustralianNational University
BOOK REVIEWS
Education
and theDevelopment
fReason, edited by R. F.
Dearden,
P. H.
Hirst, and R. S.
Peters.
London and Boston:
Routledge
&
KeganPaul, 1972.xiv,536p. $18.25.
This book is
a collection
of articles which
is, I
think, stronger
in its conception
than
in its execution.
Unfortunately,
moveover,
its usefulness
s
a text s somewhat
vitiated
by its price. The
point
of the
collection
s to raise and
illustrate
he thesisthat education
aims
at the development
f reason.
ts authors'
method s to
bring
together hilosophical
papers on educational
aims
with papers on
the nature of
reason that
ack any specifically
ducational
focus. t
is an excellentand usefulidea to designan anthology o develop
a
particular
thesis, nd
it is clearly
mportant o
show the
connec-
tionsbetween
questions
raisedwithin the
philosophy
f education
and
questions
thathave been of
broader
philosophicalconcern.
But
I
have
qualms
about the way the
thesis s
developed by the
authors
of the
anthology nd
about the
sorts of papers
selected
to show
the relevance
of general
philosophy
to philosophy
of education.
The
first
ection
s designed o
be largely
negative,
nd
is,
n
many
ways,the strongestn the book. It consists f
a number
of
papers
that consider
critically
variety of aims
for education,
most
of
which
derive
from the child-centered
heory
of education.
Al-
though
ll the
articles
n this ection re
well
worth
eading,
hose
by
R.
F.
Dearden on
needs,
on
education
as
a
process
of
growth,
nd
on
happiness
are especially
nteresting,
s is
J.
P. White's
paper
on
creativity.
aken
together,
he
papers
n this ection onvincingly
show the
inadequacies
of theories
hat
try
to derive aims of edu-
cation
solely
from heories
bout
the natureand
propensities
f chil-
dren,and theirgoals, aims, likes,and dislikes.The authorsargue
that
education,
on theseaccounts,
will be
unable to
equip
children
to
give
acceptable
reasons
for what
they
decide
to
do,
or to enable
them to
understand
and
participate
in
knowledge
as
a
public
enterprise.
From
these sorts
of
argument
he conclusion s
supposed
to
be
drawn
that education
should
aim
instead
at
the
development
of