0

Why Nuclear Weapons may not help to keep the Peace

MA International Relations and World Order

S13 Strategy in the Modern World 7591

Joé Majerus

Student Number: 129047454

Due 16 December, 2013

1

Nuclear weapons undeniably constituted a powerful deterrent against the

renewed outbreak of major international conflict in the past seven decades, yet it

would be wrong to infer from that reality that they might consequently always

serve as an unfailing source of peace, stability and mutual security. Supposing

them capable of doing so by mere virtue of their destructive potential and/or

supposed stabilizing powers1 is essentially to discount that whatever agency they

may have for underwriting peace and stability ultimately does not issue from their

physical presence alone, but rather from the distinct set of international

arrangements and conditions under which they actually exist. Any major change in

the basic fabric of that order likely stands to not only sharply decrease their

capacity at deterrence, but may likewise turn them into a dangerous mechanism for

undermining the very 'nuclear peace' which some neo-realists erroneously credit

these armaments capable of maintaining irrespective of the historical

circumstances surrounding them.2

More specifically, their assertions that nuclear weapons help stabilize state

interactions can effectively only hold true when presupposing a variety of

indispensable preconditions which, importantly, however, must not be mistaken for

integral and continuously valid attributes of interstate relations. In so analyzing the

merits and demerits of a nuclear world, significant aspects requiring critical

consideration will primarily concern the assumed rationality of political actors; the

necessity of distinguishing between weapons of deterrence and weapons of

compellence; as well as the pursuit of national objectives in alternate strategic

settings as opposed to the supposedly immutable nature of the international system.

By furthermore assessing current approaches to nuclear warfare and

proliferation while also revisiting relevant cases of potential nuclear arms

1Tom Sauer, Nuclear Inertia: US Weapons Policy after the Cold War (New York: I. B. Taurius,

2005), p.7. 2 See in particular the works of Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be

Better', Adelphi Papers, Number 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981);

Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.), The Use of Force (Lanham: University Press of America,

1983); John . Mearsheimer, 'Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe”, International Security,

Vol. 9:3 (Winter 1984/1985), pp. 25-26; John J. Mearsheimer, 'The Case for a Ukrainian Deterrent',

Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76:2 (Summer 1993), pp. 50-66; David J. Karl , 'Proliferation Pessimism and

Emerging Nuclear Powers', International Security, Vol. 21:3 (Winter 1996-1997), pp. 87-119.

2

employment in the past, the essay will seek to demonstrate that atomic weapons

can essentially only keep the peace when being handled by rational decision-

makers for exclusively defensive/deterring purposes in a conducive strategic

environment. As these vital conditions are, however, not perforce endemic to

international relations, nuclear arms can accordingly only under very specific

circumstances, and thus by no means as a general rule, help to preserve

international peace and stability.

Irrational Behaviour

The only conceivable way how nuclear weapons might strengthen

international peace and security is by presupposing that judicious reasoning will

generally form a reliable attribute of international relations.3 However, such a

presumption of strictly rational and responsible decision-makers is ultimately

untenable in real-life international politics.4 In particular, one should not take for

granted that cautious judgment will by default inform the actions and behaviour of

individual state actors.5 A multitude of disparate, yet frequently interrelated factors

might after all realistically cloud their thinking, most often as a result of such

inimical influences as, among others, flawed and sketchy intelligence;

misconceptions about the nature and intentions of a perceived adversary;

institutional pressures; and, in particular, disproportional assessment of imminent

threat risk.6

3 On rationality in international relations see: Charles L. Glaser, Rational Theory of Internal

Politics. The Logic of Competition and Cooperation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010);

Miles Kahler, 'Rationality in International Relations', International Organization, Vol. 52:4

(Autumn, 1998), pp. 919–941; D. Landa, 'Rational Choices as Social Norms', Journal of

Theoretical Politics, Vol. 18:4 (October 2006), pp. 434–453.

4 Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein., ‘Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I

Deter’, World Politics, Vol. 41: 2 (Jan, 1989), p. 224.

5 The limits of 'rational actor' models and their supplementation with psychological models

focusing on the 'human condition' in transnational interactions are addressed at length by Jacques

E.C. Hymans, 'The Arrival of Psychological Constructivism', International Theory, Vol. 2:3

(November 2010), pp. 461-467; Jonathan Mercer, 'Rationality and Psychology in International

Relations', International Organization, Vol. 59:1 (Winter, 2005), pp. 77-106.

6 Robert Jarvis, “War and Misperception”, in: Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, The

Origins and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University, Press, 1989), pp. 101-

126.

3

In that respect, a key argument in support of rational decision-finding being

the norm in states' external affairs holds that political actors are deeply worried

about the international balance of power7 and will hence not allow others to

undertake any far-reaching steps to upset that balance to their own detriment.8

However, concerns about the international distribution of power are in themselves

anything but a sure-fire guarantee for producing prudent and sensible decisions.

First of all, rational choice could always fall victim to misguided approaches to a

particular security challenge,9 especially in times of crisis management or when

subjected to overly hawkish and narrow-minded influences. Internal pressures and

rigid institutional structures may, moreover, in moments of grave national danger

severely limit the scope of action of political actors, causing them to choose such

means or strategies which may at the time appear most expedient to resolving their

present situation, yet which on closer inspection might later turn out of not

necessarily also having been the most rational ones.10

A valid case in point is in that regard the Kennedy Administration's

handling of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, notably as the deployment of nuclear

weapons after all constituted a not impossible eventuality throughout the nearly

two weeks of intense debate within the small executive circle of cabinet members,

political advisers and high-ranking military authorities working to eliminate the

threat posed to American national security by the Soviet Union's recent installation

of nuclear missile sites on Cuba.11

In retrospect, it may easily be overlooked over

7 Respectively the balance of threat. See Stephen M. Walt, 'Alliance Formation and the Balance of

World Power,' International Security, Vol. 9:4 (Spring 1985), pp. 3-43.

8 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, Illinois: Waveland Press Inc.,

Reprinted in 2010), pp. 116-128. On balance of power conceptions across different IR school of

thoughts, see in particular: Richard Little, The Balance of Power in International Relations:

Metaphors, Myths and Models (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

9 George H. Quester, 'Crises and the Unexpected', Journal of International History, Vol. 18:4

(Spring, 1988), pp . 703-704.

10 James G. Blight and David A. Welch, 'Risking “The Destruction of Nations”: Lessons of the

Cuban Missile Crisis for New and Aspiring Nuclear States’, Security Studies, Vol. 4:4 (Summer

1995), pp. 817-819.

11 On the Cuban Missile Crisis, see in particular Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of

Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (London: Longman, 1999); David R. Gibson, Talk at

the Brink: Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 2012); Norman Polmar and John D. Gresham, DEFCON-2: Standing on the Brink

of Nuclear War During the Cuban Missile Crisis (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2006).

4

the eventual denouement of that highly dangerous situation that its potential

escalation into open conflict had at times been anything but an entirely unrealistic

possibility.12

That prudence and judicious reasoning in the end helped to forestall

nuclear warfare should not detract from the fact that less prudent judgments could

ultimately just as easily have precipitated it. Above all, the fortunate circumstance

that cooler heads eventually prevailed was altogether not the result of inevitably

rational thinking alone, but rather the merit of sober circumspection by individual

minds at crucial and potentially decisive moments during their internal

deliberations, most notably in an attempt to resist the repeatedly advocated calls by

civilian and military officials for much more rigorous action-including preemptive

missile strikes against Russian defenses on Cuba and thus, by implication, the

prospect of an all-out atomic war.13

If less reasonable decision-makers had been in

charge or unable to overcome the more belligerent opinions surrounding them,14

or

had judged the intentions and motivations of their adversaries less perceptively,15

then the entire event might well have taken a much darker and less favourable

outcome.

Similarly, rational decision-making could also easily have succumbed to

impulsive overreaction when Soviet warning systems incorrectly reported on 26

October 1983 the launch of several American ICBM's headed directly towards

Russian territory.16

If only lieutenant colonel Stanislav Petrov had strictly followed

his instructions that night to advise his superiors of any critical radar activity

instead of accurately suspecting it to be a mere computer malfunction,17

it is widely

12 Barton J. Bernstein, 'Reconsidering the Cuban Missile Crisis 50 Years Later,' Arms Control

Today, Vol. 42:8 (October 2012), pp. 39.

13 Marc Trachtenberg, 'The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis',

International Security, Vol. 10:1 (Summer 1985), pp. 140-156.

14 Michael Dobbs, 'Why we should study the Cuban Missile Crisis', Special Report 205

(Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, June 2008), p. 10.

15 James G. Blight and David A. Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets reexamine the Cuban

Missile Crisis (New York: Harper and Collins, 1989), pp. 310-313.

16 Dave Webb, 'On the Edge of History: the Nuclear Dimension”, in: Mark Levene, Robert Johnson

and Penny Roberts (eds.), History at the End of the World: History, Climate Change and the

Possibility of Closure (Penrith: Humanities-Ebooks, 2010), pp. 176-177.

17 David Hoffmann, 'I had a funny feeling in my gut', The Washington Post, 10 February 1999,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/coldwar/shatter021099b.htm [accessed 9

November 2013]; Anna Libak, 'Nuclear War: Minuteman', Weekendavisen, 2 April 2004,

http://www.brightstarsound.com/world_hero/weekendavisen.html [accessed 9 November 2013].

5

agreed that Soviet leaders would in all likelihood not have adhered to standard

protocol procedures calling for confirmation of the registered threat by additional

sources first, but owing to wide-spread distrust of American intentions in general,

would instead have reacted to it in strict accordance with their predefined

contingency plans, i.e. with a strategy which envisaged nothing less than

countervailing enemy aggression with equally destructive force.18

Various individual factors such as miscommunication or internal

disagreement might thus not only compromise the finding of a sensible solution to

nuclear threats, but there can also be no certainty that they will invariably result in

a unitary reaction across all nation-states,19

regardless of which policy-makers

helped to devise it or under which distinct cultural and/or ideological environments

they operated while doing so.20

The historical record simply does not bear out the

assertion that states view matters of international import all more or less along the

same lines and thus ultimately also deal with them in roughly the same way.21

Such a realization, in turn, has significant implications for states' principal

attitude towards the international balance of power.22

For one, there may well exist

varying interpretations as to how exactly the structures of a mutually beneficial

balance would have to look like, in particular though what type of state interaction

and international norms would need to inform it.23

Accordingly, international actors

may not per se accept the purported virtues of a continuously stable balance of

18 Scott Shane, “Cold War's Riskiest Moment”, Baltimore Sun, 31 August 2003,

http://hnn.us/article/1709#bombs9-5-03 [accessed 9 November 2013].

19 Kerry Kartchner draws specific attention to the fact that what one type of society may normally

define as irrational action might at the same time very well be considered less so by another culture.

Kerry M. Kartchner, “Strategic Culture and WMD Decision Making”, in: Jeannie L. Johnson, Kerry

M. Kartchner and Jeffrey A. Larsen, Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction

(Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), p. 57, 62.

20 Caroline F. Ziemke, Philippe Loustaunau, and Amy Alrich, Strategic Personality and the

Effectiveness of Nuclear Deterrence (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2000), pp. iii-

viii. 21 Robert 0. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics", in: Robert O.

Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 14.

22 In this context, 'balance of power' refers to the even distribution of power between the major

powers of the international system. On the various definitions of the 'balance of power'-concept see:

See Vesna Danilovic, When the Stakes are high. Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers

(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), p. 73.

23 Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 28.

6

power.24

Yet if rationality and common sense can in general not be guaranteed of

unfailingly governing national decision-making processes, they may arguably be

even less so with revisionist powers bent on modifying substantial features of the

existing order from the outset,25

let alone with such elements as would willingly

dismantle it in its entirety. When such intent is central to the latter's motivations,

any means capable of helping them effect the kind of dramatic and convulsive

change they seek is by definition an acute and imminent threat to peace, security

and regional stability itself. Nuclear weapons may then be the single most

dangerous instrument for undermining peace on a global scale, and this essentially

not only on account of their obliterative force, but also since they might likewise

act as an added incentive to irrational behaviour in international politics itself by

prompting actors to take excessively bold and counter-productive action in pursuit

of their national objectives.

Again, the Cuban Missile Crisis serves as an instructive example, albeit this

time in relation to Soviet leaders' decision for bringing it about in the first place. In

so doing, nuclear weapons ultimately figured on two separate accounts as a

possibly disastrous usurper of world peace. For one, American nuclear missiles in

Turkey and thus in close proximity to Russian territory constituted an important

reason why Nikita Krushev attempted his perilous gamble on Cuba to begin with.26

Secondly, the Soviet Union's own nuclear arsenal had emboldened its leadership to

gradually adopt an ever more daring stance in international politics, notably by

instilling in them the belief that out 'existential fears', atomic weapons would

invariably act as a reliable means for discouraging American countermeasures

against Soviet enterprises.27

The overriding objective of the Soviet Union's dangerous adventure of

24 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press,

1981), pp. 185-187.

25 Schweller, Unanswered Threats, p. 29.

26 Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes (trans. and ed. by Jerrold L.

Schechter) (Boston: Little Brown, 1990), pp. 170-177; Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the

Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989), pp. 10-11.

27 Vladislav M. Zubok and Hope M. Harrison, “The Nuclear Education of Nikita Krushev”, in:

John L. Gaddis, Philip H. Gordon, Ernest R. May and Jonathan Rosenberg, Cold War Statesmen

confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.

141-170.

7

political brinksmanship evidently was to redress the international balance of power

in her favour, albeit at an exceedingly high and all but unacceptable hazard to her

own national integrity.28

Altogether, the episode clearly shows that although power

may indeed beg to be balanced,29

this ultimately doesn't mean that its pursuit

necessarily also has to occur in a strictly rational fashion. Instead power may at

times spawn itself irrational behaviour and decisions in interstate politics, notably

by deceiving its wielders into believing that any sharp increase in national power

invariably stands to outweigh the risks initially involved in its acquirement.

Undeniably, states worry deeply about their rivals military prowess, yet

those very same concerns might occasionally also induce them to embark on bold

ventures in their foreign affairs which blatantly defy any logic of sound and

judicious decision-making. This is all the more true with such actors, notably

fatalistic terrorists, which basically do not even care about balance-of-power

relations to begin with, but instead view the international order's eventual

disintegration as an explicit aim of their agenda.30

Consequently, if either of these

actors were to possess the means for inflicting wide-scale mayhem and

destruction,31

then there simply does not exist any legitimate and conclusive basis

for assuming that sensible reasoning and rational choice will without fail prevail in

their interactions with other political entities.

28 Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little Brown, 1970), pp. 493-494; „The

Malin Notes: Glimpses inside the Kremlin during the Cuban Missile Crisis“, in: James G. Hershberg

and Chrisitian F. Ostermnann, Cold War International History Porject Bulletin: The Global Cuban

Missile Crisis at 50, Vol. 17/18 (Wilson Center, Fall 2012), p. 299.

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHP_Cuban_Missile_Crisis_Bulletin_17-18.pdf

[accessed 26 Nopvember 2013].

29 Kenneth N. Waltz, 'Why Iran Should Get the Bomb', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91:4 (July/August

2012), pp. 2-5.

30 See Gregory L. Keeney and Detlof von Winterfeld, 'Identifying and Structuring the Objectives of

Terrorists' (California: CREATE Homeland Security Center, 2009), p. 10.

http://create.usc.edu/publications/KeeneyReport.pdf [accessed 27 November 2013].

31 In that regard, there can effectively be no assurance that terrorists will be barred access to

nuclear technologies indefinitely. Fissile materials might after all be acquired in a number of

different ways, most notably by engaging in black market arms trade or by filling the political

vacuum created by the civil chaos and disorder in the wake of a nuclear society's recent state

failure. See Graham Allison and Douglas Dillon, 'Nuclear Terrorism Fact Sheet' (Harvard: Belfer

Center for Science and International Affairs, 2010).

http://www.nuclearsummit.org/files/FACT_SHEET_Final.pdf [accessed 23 November 2013].

8

Nuclear Compellence

Even before imprudent judgment might threaten to exacerbate the outcome

of an already dire strategic situation, there arises, however, the seminal question as

to individual actors' general attitude and distinctive approach towards issues of

atomic warfare. For even more than the fallacy of supposing states to always make

rational calls, the arguably most prominent flaw inherent in 'nuclear peace' theory

is the erroneous assumption that nuclear weapons serve the exclusive purpose of a

powerful deterrent against external aggression.32

Strangely enough, however, such

arguments only insufficiently account for the possibility that nuclear weapons

might actually constitute themselves the mainspring and primary cause of

transnational conflict. Put differently, they thus essentially fail to distinguish

between weapons of deterrence and weapons of compellence, notably as they do

not allow enough for the alternative that the atomic bomb might not only be seen

as a defensive instrument for discouraging assaults on countries, but also as a

decidedly offensive and coercive tool of statecraft itself.33

Consequently, nuclear weapons could effectively only make for a reliable

stabilizing force in international relations on the understanding that all actors were

to consider them an implement of diplomatic deterrence. Given, however, that

there will de facto always remain some uncertainty as to whether every single

nation-state will irrevocably pledge itself to such a policy, a sudden shift from

deterrence to nuclear compellence thus represents a not immaterial hazard in a

system of frequently unpredictable actors. In such event, it is not outside the realm

of possibility that nuclear weapons might be misappropriated by individual

governments as a powerful extension of their diplomatic leverage in transnational

32 This view is in particular advanced by defensive realists such as Kenneth N. Waltz, whereas

offensive realists, notably John J. Mearsheimer, believe that nuclear weapons might not always

deter states from aggressive action. On their respective views on nuclear warfare, see in particular

Ariel Ilan Roth and Zanvyl Krieger, 'Nuclear Weapons in Neo-Realist Theory', International Studies

Review, Vol. 9:3 (2007), pp. 369-384.

33 Kyle Bearsdley and Victor Asal, 'Winning with the Bomb', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.

53:2 (April 2009), pp. 278-301; Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance

(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1987).

9

affairs,34

a scenario which could then also witness the eventual self-defeat of

nuclear weapons' quintessential purpose by no longer having them serve as a

primarily deterring force in international politics. That very ttemptation for states

to deliberately hold out the prospect of nuclear warfare as some form of influential

bargain chip in their dealings with other nations ultimately constitutes a very real

concern which it would simply be a folly to ignore or dismiss as an unfounded

objection to the idea of a 'nuclear peace.'35

The sheer gravity and scope of the issue will become even clearer when

further considering the substantial difficulty in not only assessing what states might

apply their nuclear arms in an offensive rather than defensive capacity, but

essentially even more so in establishing how, when and under what circumstances

they might do so. On that note, a central argument advanced by 'nuclear peace'-

theory maintains that atomic weapons are inherently capable of ensuring stability

by simple virtue of their employment after all entailing the unacceptable prospect

of mutually assured destruction.36

Yet need such a dismal eventuality always be the

case? Isn't it conceivable that states might still resort to nuclear warfare yet

ultimately stay just beneath the threshold of total annihilation?37

More specifically, decision-makers may well reach a point where they

might seriously consider the tactical use of their nuclear weapons in order to attain

a predefined objective.38

Here too the Cuban Missile Crisis holds as a pre-eminent

example, notably as the Soviet Union had after all not only moved nearly 100

tactical nuclear missiles to the island, but also since it was ultimately at the

discretion of local Soviet commanders alone to decide whether to make use of

them in the event of an American invasion, and this essentially without being

34 North Korea arguably being the foremost example in this regard. See Christopher Bluth, 'Norms

and International Relations: The anachronistic nature of neo-realist approaches', POLIS Working

Paper No. 12 (Leeds: School of Politics and International Studies, 2004), pp. 17.

35 Michael Horowitz, 'The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Does Experience Matter?', Journal of

Conflict Resolution, Vol. 53:2 (April 2009), pp. 251; Erik Gartzke and Matthew Kroenig, 'A

Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 53:2 (April

2009), pp. 158-159.

36 Waltz, 'Why Iran should get the bomb', pp. 2-5.

37 Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History and Theory (New York: Routledge, 1996), pp.

174-177 .

38 See Alistair Millar and Brian Alexander, Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Emergent Threats in an

Evolving Security Environment (Dulles, VA: Brassey's Inc., 2003).

10

required to wait for final approval from Moscow first.39

Had they chosen to do so,

then this would most certainly have resulted in an American response with tactical

nuclear warheads as well.40

Eleven years before during the Korean War, there had already been voiced

similar intentions for using tactical nuclear weapons by senior American military

and civilian officials.41

In that particular instance, President Truman eventually

rejected the execution of any such plans, notably out of acute concerns over the

incalculable and potentially disastrous ramifications that such an ill-advised and

utterly disproportional course of action might have, in particular the fear of

provoking a massive retaliatory response by the Soviet Union and/or Communist

China and thereby contributing to a possible escalation of the conflict well beyond

the Korean peninsula.42

Importantly, however, the fact that American policy-

makers after Hiroshima and Nagasaki always refrained from a tactical usage of

nuclear weapons even as less far-sighted minds held that option capable of

accomplishing limited short-term objectives should not detract from the possibility

that other governments might ultimately fail to display an equal measure of rational

reasoning and prudence as to the unforeseeable long-term consequences of their

employment.

They key point to retain here is that there is simply no telling whether states

will take a unitary stance to the subject of atomic warfare. How could the

international community ever guarantee that governments will invariably give

precedence to atomic weapons as an instrument of deterrence rather than of

39 Graham Allison, 'The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91:4 (July/August 2012),

p. 11.

40 See in particular: “Memorandum from Chairman JCS Maxwell Taylor from the President,

"Evaluation of the Effect on US Operational Plans of Soviet Army Equipment Introduced into

Cuba," , 2 November 1962. (National Archives, Record Group 218 (Joint Chiefs of Staff), Records

of Chairman Maxwell Taylor, box 6, October 1962). Digital Copy available at:

http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB397/

41 James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year

(Washington D.C., Center of Military History, 1992), pp. 283-284; R. Dingman, 'Atomic Diplomacy

during the Cold War', International Security, Vol. 13:3 (Winter 1988/1989), pp. 53.54, 66-67; Max

Hastings, The Korean War (London: Pan Books, 2010), pp. 257-258, 266, 272.

42 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs Vol. II (New York: Doubleday, 1955), pp. 394-395; Dingman,

'Atomic Diplomacy during the Cold War', pp. 75, 90; Schnabel, United States Army in The Korean

War, pp. 287-290, 324.

11

compellence, or that fundamentally different views over their basic purpose and

possibilities of use will not in the end rather endanger instead of bolstering

international peace and stability? After all, if tactical nuclear warfare should

threaten to become a reality in international relations, there can hardly be any

doubt that other states would not before long see their own security and vital

interests at grave risk by such an alarming and deeply worrying probability. Neither

would they simply let themselves be intimidated by fears over nuclear annihilation.

Instead they would react to such dangers in an adequate and expedient fashion;43

and although their response need not necessarily involve a nuclear retaliation, it

might nevertheless come about in the form of a comparably destructive counter-

strike with conventional weapons.44

At any rate, it stands to reason that the cause of

peace and stability would hardly be benefited by such or similarly grim

developments.

True, western powers have traditionally viewed the atomic bomb as a

device of distinctly deterring character; and going by their present national

strategies, they may reasonably be expected to continue doing so.45

In like manner,

nations such as China and the Russian Federation arguably seek to maintain a

43 Barry D. Watts, 'Nuclear Conventional Firebreaks and the Nuclear Taboo'

(Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013), pp. 71-73.

http://www.csbaonline.org/about/contact/ [accessed 26 November 2013]; Ali Ahmed, 'India,

Nuclear Weapons and “Massive-Retaliation”: The Impossibility of Limitation', IPCS Article No.

4135 (New Dehli: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2013).

http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/ipcs-debate-india

nuclear weapons-and-massive-retaliation-the-impossibility-4135.html [accessed 27 November

2013].

44 Tod Lindberg, 'Nuclear and Other Retaliation after Deterrence fails' (Pennsylavania: Strategic

Studies Institue, September 2004), http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-

Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=94828

[accesed 27 November 2013]; Tom Nichols, 'The Case for Conventional Deterrence', The National

Interest, 12 November 2013. http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-case-conventional-

deterrence-9381 [accessed 26 November 2013].

45 National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington D.C.: The White House, May 2010),

p.14, 23.

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf,[accessed

30 October 2013]; Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington: United States Department of

Defense, April 2010),

http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf [accessed

28 October 2013]; A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainity: The National Security Strategy

(London: October 2010), p. 30.

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61936/national-

security-strategy.pdf [accessed 28 October 2013].

12

nuclear striking capability for predominantly defensive purposes as well.46

Importantly, however, such professed intentions are not in themselves a perpetual

guarantee that all prospective nuclear actors will likewise abide by such a

rationale. After all, past events have shown that nuclear compellence was at times

assigned a not so inconsiderable role in the foreign policy designs of some nations;

nor is it entirely inconceivable that it might not sooner or later re(gain) currency in

the international affairs of future atomic powers.

History itself altogether substantiates the time-proven validity of these

concerns. Thus in 1999 the mere existence of a nuclear shield ultimately couldn't

prevent the resurgence of territorial conflict between India and Pakistan, and this

essentially despite the ever looming threat of their differences potentially

degenerating into nuclear warfare.47

Quite to the contrary, the atomic bomb may

actually have encouraged Pakistani generals to go through with their operations in

the Kargil-region,48

while some civilian leaders later even publicly hinted at its

potential tactical usages.49

In 1962, the Soviet Union also explicitly regarded

nuclear compellence as an appropriate strategy for challenging the United States

pre-eminent standing in international affairs by directly threatening her own

territorial integrity. Certainly, America's nuclear superiority served as a root cause

46 Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020 (Moscow: May 2009),

http://rustrans.wikidot.com/russia-s-national-security-strategy-to-2020 [accessed 28 October 2013];

David M. Finkelstein, "China's National Military Strategy: An Overview of the "Military Strategic

Guidelines", in: Kamphausen, Roy and Scobell, Andrew (eds.), Right Sizing the People's Liberation

Army: Exploring the Contours of China's Military (Pennsylavania: Strategic Studies Institue,

September 2007), p. 125, 130. Document available at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-

Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=cab359a3-9328-19cc-a1d2-8023e646b22c&lng=en&id=48439

[accessed 28 October 2013].

47 The armed forces of both countries would, moreover, again directly face each other for a second

time along the Kashmir Line of Control for nearly six months in 2002. Stanley Wolpert, India and

Pakistan: Continued Conflict or Cooperation? (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California

Press, 2010), pp. 71-76,78-79; Neil Joeck, 'The Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Confrontation: Lessons

from the past, contingencies for the future' (Center for Global Security Research. Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory (September 2008), pp. 1-41.

48 S. Paul Kapur, 'Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia', International Security, Vol.

33:2 (2008), pp. 71-94; Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Great Debate: Is Nuclear Zero

the Best Option?', The National Interest (Sept-Oct 2010), p. 94.

49 Wolpert, India and Pakistan: Continued Conflict or Cooperation?, p. 76.; “Pakistan May Use

Any Weapon,” The News (Islamabad), 31 May, 1999; Bruce Riedel, 'American Diplomacy and the

1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House', Policy Paper Series 2002 (Philadelphia, University of

Philadelphia Center for the Advanced Study of India, 2002), p. 3.

13

for why Nikita Khrushchev attempted to alter the bipolar balance of power in the

first place,50

so that an evener distribution of power may indeed have lead to a

higher degree of stability between their two nations.

Ultimately, however, it is extremely doubtful that a roughly equal nuclear

striking power could have achieved that end on its own, notably as the outbreak of

'conventional warfare' after all still represented a not implausible eventuality at the

time.51

In particular, Khrushchev didn't regard nuclear parity merely as an

assurance against American aggression, but rather also as a powerful means of

compellence for obtaining his own objectives in Western Europe.52

Altogether,

Soviet actions thus clearly illustrate the difficulty in accomplishing a true 'nuclear

peace', i.e. the idea of having the atomic bomb solely act as defensive means

against rather than an offensive implement of state aggression.

In addition, the prospect of nuclear compellence also helps to expose

another inherent weakness of the argument that national nuclear deterrents will

invariably strengthen regional stability,53

namely its failure to adequately consider

the sheer infinite cycle of nuclear rivalry likely to be set in motion by an increase

in atomic countries.54

For how else then in a climate of deep mutual distrust and

massive armament build-up is such a world populated by nuclear countries to end?

And where or when exactly would such an evolution stop? Will it really only take

one additional nuclear power to restore stability to some particularly volatile

regions?55

Will Israel really buy into the idea that a nuclear Iran might actually

reduce political tensions in the area; or China, Japan and South Korea believe the

same with regard to North Korea? And what about other regional actors? Isn't it

50 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, pp. 92-95.

51 In August of the previous year, an escalation of the Berlin Crisis into major conflict had after all

only narrowly been avoided. See Frederick Kempe, Berlin 1961. Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the

most dangerous place on earth (New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2011).

52 Notably control over West Berlin. Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, p. 105.

53 Kenneth N. Waltz, 'Peace, Stability and Nuclear Weapons', IGCC Policy Papers PP15

(Berkeley: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 1995), pp. 11-14.

http://escholarship.org/uc/item/4cj4z5g2 [accessed 27 November 2013].

54 Scott D. Sagan, 'Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three models in Search of a Bomb',

International Security, Vol. 21:3 (Winter, 1996-1997), pp. 57-59; Bearsdley and Asal, 'Winning with

the Bomb', pp. 25.

55 Waltz, 'Why Iran Should Get the Bomb', pp. 2-5.

14

legitimate to assume that some might want to launch their own nuclear programme

in response, ostensibly out of purely defensive concerns?56

In short, there will always be countries that might, rightly or wrongly, dread

the thought of having yet another state join the global club of atomic nations,

especially when it is situated in immediate range of its own borders. And the by far

most important reason for this is that it might ultimately not even matter at all

whether some countries would actually harbour thoughts of nuclear compellence.

Rather the mere fact alone that other nations may with good cause not believe them

to follow such declarations is already reason enough for why nuclear weapons

might not indefinitely preserve international peace and security.57

Irrespective of how Iran and North Korea will internally develop, it will

nevertheless be a very tough sell for most other nations to simply accept the notion

that they might yet after all be trusted to keep the Atomic Bomb solely for its

supposedly innate stabilizing powers in international relations. The fact that the

global community in general, and their regional neighbours in particular, already

perceive in both their rhetoric and actions a certain reluctance for complying with

international norms and standards ultimately makes theses states a source of

potential instability to them which likely stands to endanger peace even further if

they were to actually obtain the means for waging nuclear warfare.58

In that case, it would be all but impossible to allay fears that in spite of

assurances to the contrary, the new nuclear powers might still come to regard the

threat of nuclear warfare as a coercive tool for pursuing their own national

56 Bradley B. Bowman, 'Chain Reaction: Avoiding a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East',

(Washington D.C.: United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2008).

http://www.cfr.org/world/chain-reaction-avoiding-nuclear-arms-race-middle-east/p15721 [accessed

27 November 2013].

57 Witness in particular Israel and NATO members' anxieties regarding a nuclear Iran. Jean-Loup

Samann, 'The Day after Iran Goes Nuclear: Implications for NATO', NATO Research Paper No. 71

(Rome: NATO Defense College, 2012), pp. 1-8.

58 In particular wide-spread Israeli fears of Iranian leaders actively seeking to destroy the state of

Israel. Colin H. Kahl, Melissa G. Dalton, and Matthew Irvine, 'Risk and Rivalry: Iran, Israel and the

Bomb' (Washington: Center for a New American Security, June 2012), p. 13.

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=144190 [accessed 26

November 2013].

15

objectives.59

Such a reality, in turn, could easily result in pre-emptive counter-

measures by other nations to anticipate or outright eliminate any such threat,

regardless of whether it was imminent or not.60

All the same, profound mutual

suspicions as to the other side's 'real' intentions would likely accompany political

interactions for years to come, and as history has demonstrated time and again, it

may then well take but a minor and seemingly insignificant incident to spark large-

scale aggression and thereby effectively break up whatever superficial state of

peace and stability had hitherto existed.61

That is to say with one not

inconsequential difference, namely that nuclear weapons and not conventional

warfare might this time around bring the conflict to a sudden and possibly

catastrophic end.

Finally, nation-states might by then also no longer be the only international

actors in possession of nuclear materials. Precisely because terrorists and other

irreconcilable groupings may, however, not be dissuaded from violence and

aggression,62

they could ultimately pose an even greater challenge to international

peace and security than nuclear rogue states do, all the more so as they are after all

often entirely indifferent to the survival of any one particular country.63

Yet once

59 Roslyn Warren, 'Miscalculating Nuclear Deterrence in the Middle East: Why Kenneth Waltz gets

it wrong', Global Security Studies Review, Vol. 1:1 (December 2012), p. 36-38.

60 Colin H. Kahl, Melissa G. Dalton, and Matthew Irvine, 'Risk and Rivalry: Iran, Israel and the

Bomb', p. 24.

61World War I is in that regard perhaps only the most prominent example. Altogether, modern

history is rife with peripheral incidences ultimately ending in supra-regional territorial conflict,

arguably reaching as far back as to the origins of the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) while

furthermore including, among others, the Crimean War (1853-1856), the French-Prussian War of

1871; and also the Marco Polo Bridge Incident igniting the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945).

See in particular Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, The Origins and Prevention of Major

Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University, Press, 1989); Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major

War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); Kagan, Donald, On the Origins of War and the

Preservation of Peace (New York: Doubleday, 2009).

62 Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Great Debate: Is Nuclear Zero the Best Option?', The

National Interest (Sept-Oct 2010), p. 89; Robert Galluci, 'Averting Nuclear Catastrophe:

Contemplating Extreme Responses to U.S. Vulnerability', Annals of the American Academy of

Political and Social Science, Vol. 607 (September 2006), pp. 51–58.

63 Evidently, there exists substantial disagreement as to how or if terrorist organizations such as Al-

Qaeda could ever use nuclear weapons. Thus whereas academics like John Mueller argue that their

intent for unleashing nuclear warfare has been grossly exaggerated, relevant government agencies

and research groups routinely assess such a threat much more urgent and real. See John Mueller,

Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2010), pp. 161-216; “The U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment of Nuclear Terrorism"

16

the prospect of wide-scale devastation, regardless of self-destruction, essentially

becomes unable to deter individual actors from employing nuclear arms, but may

instead actually spur them into such action,64

then the basic concept of MAD will

simultaneously be deprived of its elementary legitimacy and general applicability

as well. Eventually, the question of nuclear deterrence vs. nuclear compellence

would then likewise no longer even present itself to begin with, given that atomic

weapons would by that point have been assigned an infinitely more sinister end,

namely as a means of wanton nuclear destruction.

Systemic Environment

By recognizing irrational behaviour and nuclear compellence as major

obstacles to an enduring 'nuclear peace', it will likewise become apparent that its

practical realization is ultimately also significantly hampered by the one central

characteristic of international relations which its proponents believe to invariably

act as an independent and immutable given of any international system, namely

anarchy itself.65

Yet in a system in which self-help and aggression are presumed to

inevitably shape the interactions of states, it is highly improbable that nuclear

weapons could ever serve as an infallible preserver of peace and stability. Such a

view might perhaps be reconciled to some extent with the ideas of defensive

realism, though certainly not with those of offensive realists.66

For if the anarchical

structure of the international system indeed forces states to continuously expand

(Harvard: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, May 2011).

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Joint-Threat-

Assessment%20ENG%2027%20May%202011.pdf [accessed 23 November 2013].

64 William Walker, “The troubled quest for international nuclear order”, in: Chandra Chari (ed.),

War, Peace and Hegemony in a Globalized World. The changing balance of power in the twenty-

first century (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 58-59.

65 'Anarchy' typically refers to the absence of a superior authority for governing the interactions of

international actors. On the central significance assigned to anarchy in IR scholarship, see: Helen

Milner, 'The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique, Review of

International Studies, Vol. 17:1 (Jan, 1991), pp. 67-85; Robert Powell, 'Anarchy in International

Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate', International Organization, Vol. 48:2 (Spring,

1994), pp. 313-344.

66 According to defensive realism, states merely aspire to obtain such power as they require for

preserving the international balance of power, whereas offensive realism sees them as power-

maximizing actors seeking to perpetually increase their own relative security at the expense of

others. See Robert Jervis, 'Realism, Neoliberalism and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate',

International Security, Vol. 24:1 (Summer 1999), pp. 48-50.

17

their relative power, then there simply is no logical basis for supposing that nuclear

compellence might not sooner or later take up a pre-eminent role in the foreign-

policy strategy of a particular power.67

If anything, the prospect of more nuclear

states existing under anarchy could only function as an accelerator of conflict, and

thus not as a perpetual safeguard against it.68

Neo-realistis would also do well in appreciating that the primary reason

why the world has been spared large-scale conflict these past few decades was

ultimately anything but the merit of nuclear deterrence alone. Rather the nuclear

age also concurred with an era in which anarchy, though still a predominant and

formative aspect of international relations, arguably came to bear upon interstate

relationships in a more restrained and slightly less aggressive fashion than in

previous decades.69

Accordingly, it may not only have been the spectre of atomic

warfare which precluded powerful nations from engaging in acts of sustained

aggression, but also the realization that under the established order they simply

didn't stand to gain quite as much as earlier powers had done by reverting to all-out

warfare. Put differently, there existed less incentive for seeking major international

change, let alone for substituting the established system with a fundamentally

different order of international organization.70

Undoubtedly, nuclear weapons played a crucial part in preventing the

recrudescence of major international strife. Importantly, however, that fact alone

cannot insure future generations against their presence potentially still expediting

such conflict, especially once the benefits for operating in conformance with

international norms and standards cease to appeal to states in sufficient measure-or

are being resented altogether.71

That international actors might then be inclined to

take more belligerent approaches in pursuit of their national interests is after all not

67 Warren, 'Miscalculating Nuclear Deterrence in the Middle East', pp. 36-40.

68 Peter R. Lavoy, 'The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: A Review Essay', Security

Studies, Vol. 4:4 (Summer 1995), pp. 695-753.

69 Bluth, 'Norms and International Relations', pp. 4-8.

70 Richard Ned Lebow, 'The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism',

International Organization, Vol. 48:2 (Spring, 1994), pp. 269-273; John D. Mueller, Retreat from

Doomsday. The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Carl Kaysen, 'Is War

Obsolete: A Review Essay', International Security, Vol. 14:4 (Spring 1990), pp. 42-64.

71 Kerry M. Kartchner, “Strategic Culture and WMD Decision Making”, pp. 58-60.

18

only predicted by offensive realism itself,72

but anyone familiar with the history of

interstate relationships may likewise discern how contrary to prevalent realist

assumptions, intra-national developments in conjunction with distinctive

ideological, culturual and/or nationalist influences may at times also leave a

profound and lasting mark upon the formulation and implementation of decidedly

less pacific foreign policies.73

Hence, there can be no telling if, when or how a state

might attempt to rectify the international distribution of power in its own favour. In

such event, however, peace and stability may only escape lasting damage with

aggressors who ultimately dispose of but limited means for effecting the change

they seek, and that explicitly excludes the possession of nuclear arms.

Nuclear weapons may thus only help to preserve peace and security in an

international environment of restricted anarchy; otherwise they might well pose an

imminent threat to these ideals themselves. Surmising them capable of preventing

large-scale conflict on their own is ultimately to ignore the distinctive character

and structure of the international system itself, in particular that it is not a stable or

unalterable feature of inter-state relations,74

but rather a “dynamic” constellation

capable of not only engendering various strategic scenarios, but also different

national responses to it.75

It is likewise to ignore the impact of nation-states

domestic make-up upon their transnational affairs;76

and, most importantly, it is to

ignore how governments perceive or 'construct' themselves the nature and

constrictions of international anarchy.77

Do they consider self-help and aggression

a necessary function of anarchy, or rather an institution developed by state

72 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton &

Company, 2001), pp. 131-133.

73 Joe D. Hagan, 'Domestic Political Systems and War Proneness', Mershon International Studies

Review, Vol. 38:2 (Oct, 1994), pp. 183-207; Michael C. Howard, 'Ideology and Internal Relations',

Review of International Studies, Vol. 15:1 (January 1989), pp. 1-10; Mark L. Haas, The Ideological

Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

74 Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is what states make of it: the Social Construction of Power Politics',

International Organization ,Vol. 46:2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425.

75 Zaheer Kazmi, Polite Anarchy in International Relations Theory (New York: Palgrave

MacMillan, 2012), pp. 51-78.

76 Jack S. Levy, 'War and Domestic Politics', Journal of Interdisciplinary Politics, Vol. 18:4 (Spring

1988), pp. 653-573.

77 Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars

(Cambridge: Cambridge University, Press, 1989), pp. 79-100.

19

processes themselves?78

Is war generally seen by states as the most profitable

vehicle for advancing national interests, or do there exist enough incentives for

doing so in more peaceable ways as well?79

Finally, do states mostly view

international politics overshadowed by the confines of an oppressive 'Hobbesian

anarchy', or do they instead believe a 'Lockean anarchy' to govern their interactions

with other nations?80

In sum, the whole concept of a 'nuclear peace' thus essentially hinges on

whether states hold the international order genuinely capable of producing

mutually beneficial gains through sustained cooperation, or, alternatively, riven by

intense security competition.81

Accordingly, peace and security are only possible

within a system in which all nuclear powers acknowledge the drawbacks of risking

relative over absolute gains through excessive military aggression. In a world in

which it can, however, not be guaranteed that states will each forgo war in

attempting to revise fundamental parts of the existing order, nor in which market

state terrorism might continue to gain in strength,82

nuclear weapons will thus

always rather pose a danger than a safeguard of international peace and stability.

Conclusion

Nuclear weapons undoubtedly acted as an important instrument of peace

and stability in the post-WWII era. Nevertheless, it would be premature to

conclude that they can inevitably do so in different strategic scenarios as well.

Rather they are contingent on a number of fundamentally indispensable

78 That is to say the actions and practices of individual nation-states in international politics. See

Maja Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations. The politics of reality (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 14.

79 Most notably through sustained economic interdependence and transnational co-operation. See

Erik Gartzke, Quan Li and Charles Boehmer, 'Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence

and International Conflict, International Organization, Vol. 55:2 (Spring 2001), pp. 391-438.

80 Alexander Wendt sees a 'Hobbesian anarchy' as predominantly characterized by inter-state

enmity and governments' frequent recourse to methods of aggressive self-help, whereas a 'Lockean

anarchy' typically generates a greater degree of mutual respect for national sovereignty and

international law. Alexander, Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 259-297.

81 Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory', Journal of Interdisciplinary

History, Vol. 18:4 (Spring 1988), p. 619.

82 Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent. The Wars for the Twenty-First Century (London: Penguin

Books, 2009), pp. 23-85.

20

preconditions without which they cannot possibly continue to help strengthen

peace and international security, but might ultimately jeopardize those ideals

themselves.

Consequently, the question is not whether nuclear arms may prevent

transnational conflict, but rather if they can be guaranteed to not potentially induce

it in the first place. Ultimately, however, such an assurance remains elusive for

three distinct yet interconnected reasons. Irrational decision-making, different

approaches to nuclear warfare (deterrence vs. compellence), and the international

system' anarchical structure all represent considerable obstacle to a true 'nulcear

peace'. Above all, nuclear weapons' effectiveness at deterrence is inextricably

bound up with the specific type of international order we live in, so that the more

that system is held to be pervaded by unrestrained anarchy, the more likely some

actors might be drawn to acts of nuclear compellence, and the less stable

international peace and security would as a result become.

In particular, one must not assume states to invariably adopt the same logic

with regard to nuclear warfare. Diverging personal, cultural and/or national

attitudes and objectives may well produce different nuclear strategies, so that

mutually assured destruction notwithstanding, nuclear weapons could ultimately

still fail to deter aggression precisely because some actors might after all be

tempted to either use them in a tactical capacity, or as a powerful means of nuclear

coercion in their interactions with other political units.

Ultimately, peace is only to prevail on the mutual understanding that resort

to nuclear warfare can never yield any truly beneficial outcomes. Neo-realists

believe such a rationale to underlie their idea of a 'nuclear peace', yet fail to

acknowledge that not all international actors may necessarily also adhere to it. The

latter might effectively only do so in a world in which, irrespective of their

domestic disposition, political actors could actually be trusted to behave as

neorealism predicts. Yet we don't live in such a world, and we arguably never will.

Irrationality and coercive foreign policies may always threaten to upset

international peace and security, and nuclear weapons might ultimately well be the

single most dangerous instrument for doing just that.

21

Bibliography

Books

Allison, Graham and Zelikow, Philip, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban

Missile Crisis (London: Longman, 1999).

Art, Robert J. and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.), The Use of Force (Lanham: University

Press of America, 1983)

Betts, Richard K., Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington D.C.:

Brookings Institution Press, 1987).

Blight, James .G. and Welch, David A., On the Brink: Americans and Soviets re-

examine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Harper and Collins, 1989).

Bobbitt, Philip, Terror and Consent. The Wars for the Twenty-First Century

(London: Penguin Books, 2009).

Brown, Seyom, The Causes and Prevention of War (New York: St. Martin's Press,

1994).

Buzan, Barry, From international to world society? English school theory and the

social structure of globalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Charo, Chandra(ed.), War, Peace and Hegemony in a Globalized World. The

changing balance of power in the twenty-first century (New York: Routledge,

2008).

Copeland, Dale C., The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University

Press, 2000).

Danilovic, Vesna, When the Stakes are high. Deterrence and Conflict among

Major Powers (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002).

Gaddis, John L., Gordon, Philip H., May, Ernest R. and Rosenberg, Jonathan, Cold

War Statesmen confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945 (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1999).

Garthoff, Raymond L., Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington, DC:

Brookings Institution, 1989).

Gibson, David R., Talk at the Brink: Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban

Missile Crisis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).

Gilpin, Robert, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge

University Press, 1981).

Glaser, Charles L., Rational Theory of Internal Politics. The Logic of Competition

and Cooperation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

Haas, Mark L., The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989

(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

Hastings, Max, The Korean War (London: Pan Books, 2010).

Hogan, Michael J. and Paterson, Thomas G., Explaining the History of American

Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

22

Huntley, Wade L., Mizumoto, Kazumi and Kurosawa, Mitsuru (ed.), Nuclear

Disarmament in the Twenty-First Century (Hiroshima: The Hiroshima Peace

Institute, 2004).

Jarvis, Robert, “War and Misperception”, in: Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K.

Rabb, The Origins and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge

University, Press, 1989), pp. 101-126.

Johnson, Jeannie L., Kartchner, Kerry M. and Larsen, Jeffrey A., Strategic Culture

and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009).

Kagan, Donald, On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace (New York:

Doubleday, 2009).

Kazmi, Zaheer, Polite Anarchy in International Relations Theory (New York:

Palgrave MacMillan, 2012).

Kempe, Frederick, Berlin 1961. Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the most dangerous

place on earth (New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2011).

Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and

Military Conflict from 1500-2000 (New York: First Vintage Books, 1989).

Keohane, Robert O., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University

Press, 1986).

Khrushchev, Nikita, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes (trans. and ed.

by Jerrold L. Schechter) (Boston: Little Brown, 1990).

Little, Richard, The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors,

Myths and Models (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

Mearsheimer, John J., The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W.

Norton & Company, 2001).

Millar, Alistair and Alexander, Brian, Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Emergent

Threats in an Evolving Security Environment (Dulles, VA: Brassey's Inc., 2003).

Mueller, John D., Retreat from Doomsday. The Obsolescence of Major War (New

York: Basic Books, 1989).

Mueller, John, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)

Njølstad, Olav, Nuclear Proliferation and International Order: Challenges to the

Non-Proliferation Treaty (London: Routledge, 2011).

Polmar, Norman and Gresham, John D., DEFCON-2: Standing on the Brink of

Nuclear War During the Cuban Missile Crisis (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2006).

Sagan, Scott D., The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear

Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

Sauer, Tom, Nuclear Inertia: US Weapons Policy after the Cold War (New York: I.

B. Taurius, 2005).

Schnabel, James F., United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction:

The First Year (Washington D.C., Center of Military History, 1992).

23

Schoenbaum, Thomas J., International Relations: The Path Not Taken. Using

International Law to Promote World Peace and Security (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2006).

Schweller, Randall L., Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance

of Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

Sheehan, Michael, The Balance of Power: History and Theory (New York:

Routledge, 1996).

Taubman, William, Khrushchev: The Man and his Era (New York: W.W. Norton

& Company, 2003).

Telò, Mario, International Relations: A European Perspective (Surrey: Ashgate

Publishing, 2009).

Thomas, R.G.C., “The shifting landscape of Indian foreign policy”. In: S.W. Hook

(ed.), Comparative foreign policy. Adaptation strategies of the great and emerging

powers. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2002).

Truman, Harry S., Memoirs Vol. II (New York: Doubleday, 1955).

Walker, William, “The troubled quest for international nuclear order”, in: Chandra

Chari (ed.), War, Peace and Hegemony in a Globalized World. The changing

balance of power in the twenty-first century (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 50-

59.

Waltz, Kenneth N., The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. (New

York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995).

Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, Illinois:

Waveland Press Inc., Reprinted in 2010).

Webb, Dave, 'On the Edge of History: the Nuclear Dimension”, in: Mark Levene,

Robert Johnson and Penny Roberts (eds.), History at the End of the World:

History, Climate Change and the Possibility of Closure (Penrith: Humanities-

Ebooks, 2010), pp. 166-187.

Weldes, Jutta, Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban

Missile Crisis (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1999).

Wenger, Andreas, Living with Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nuclear Weapons

(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997).

Wolpert, Stanley, India and Pakistan: Continued Conflict or Cooperation?

(Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2010).

Zehfuss, Maja, Constructivism in International Relations. The politics of reality

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Ziemke, Caroline F., Loustaunau, Philippe and Alrich, Amy, Strategic Personality

and the Effectiveness of Nuclear Deterrence (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense

Analyses, 2000).

Zubok, Vladislav M. and Harrison, Hope M., “The Nuclear Education of Nikita

Krushev”, in: John L. Gaddis, Philip H. Gordon, Ernest R. May and Jonathan

24

Rosenberg, Cold War Statesmen confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since

1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 141-170.

Articles

Allison, Graham, 'Surveying Nuclear Threats', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89:1

(January/February 2010), pp. 74-85.

Allison, Graham, 'The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91:4

(July/August 2012), pp. 11-16.

Bearsdley, Kyle and Asal, Victor, 'Winning with the Bomb', Journal of Conflict

Resolution, Vol. 53:2 (April 2009), pp. 278-301. .

Bernstein, Barton J., 'Reconsidering the Cuban Missile Crisis 50 Years Later,'

Arms Control Today, Vol. 42:8 (October 2012), pp. 39-40.

Blight, James G. and Welch, David A., 'Risking “The Destruction of Nations”:

Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis for New and Aspiring Nuclear States’,

Security Studies, Vol. 4:4 (Summer 1995), pp. 811-850.

Dingman, R., 'Atomic Diplomacy during the Cold War', International Security,

Vol. 13:3 (Winter 1988/1989), pp. 50-91.

Dunn, David, 'Real men want to go to Teheran': Bush, Pre-Emption and the Iranian

Nuclear Challenge”, International Affairs, Vol. 83:1 (January, 2007), pp. 1-38.

Ferguson, Charles D., 'The Long Road to Zero: Overcoming the Obstacles to a

Nuclear-Free World', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89:1 (January/February 2010), pp. 86-

94.

Freedman, L., 'Grand-Strategy in the Twentieth-First Century', Defence Studies,

Vol. 1:1 (September, 2001), pp. 11-20.

Galluci, Robert, 'Averting Nuclear Catastrophe: Contemplating Extreme

Responses to U.S. Vulnerability', Annals of the American Academy of Political

and Social Science, Vol. 607 (September 2006), pp. 51–58.

Gartzke, Erik, Li, Quan and Boehmer, Charles, 'Investing in the Peace: Economic

Interdependence and International Conflict, International Organization, Vol. 55:2

(Spring 2001), pp. 391-438.

Gartzke, Erik and Kroenig, Matthew, 'A Strategic Approach to Nuclear

Proliferation', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 53:2 (April 2009), pp. 151-160.

Glenn, John, 'Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration?',

International Studies, Vol. 11:3 (September, 2009), pp. 523-551.

Hagan, Joe D., 'Domestic Political Systems and War Proneness', Mershon

International Studies Review, Vol. 38:2 (Oct, 1994), pp. 183-207 .

Horowitz, Michael, 'The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Does Experience Matter?',

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 53:2 (April 2009), pp. 234-257.

Howard, Michael C., 'Ideology and Internal Relations', Review of International

Studies, Vol. 15:1 (January 1989), pp. 1-10

25

Howard, Michael C., 'Grand Strategy in the Twentieth Century', Defence Studies,

Vol. 1:1 (September, 2001), pp. 1-10.

Hymans, Jacques E.C., 'The Arrival of Psychological Constructivism',

International Theory, Vol. 2:3 (November 2010), pp. 461-467.

Jervis, Robert, 'Realism, Neoliberalism and Cooperation: Understanding the

Debate', International Security, Vol. 24:1 (Summer 1999), pp. 42-63.

Kahler, Miles, 'Rationality in International Relations', International Organization,

Vol. 52:4 (Autumn, 1998), pp. 919–941.

Kapur, S. Paul, 'Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia', International

Security, Vol. 33:2 (2008), pp. 71-94.

Karl, David J., 'Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers',

International Security, Vol. 21:3 (Winter 1996-1997), pp. 87-119.

Kaysen, Carl, 'Is War Obsolete: A Review Essay', International Security, Vol. 14:4

(Spring 1990), pp. 42-64.

Landa, D., 'Rational Choices as Social Norms', Journal of Theoretical Politics,

Vol. 18:4 (October 2006), pp. 434–453.

Lavoy, Peter R. , 'The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: A Review

Essay', Security Studies, Vol. 4:4 (Summer 1995), pp. 695-753.

Lebow, Richard , 'The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of

Realism', International Organization, Vol. 48:2 (Spring, 1994), pp. 249-277.

Lebow, Richard, 'Deterrence. Then and Now', Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.

28:5 (10/2005), pp. 765-773.

Lebow, Richard, and Stein, Janice, ‘Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think,

Therefore I Deter’, World Politics, Vol. 41: 2 (Jan, 1989), pp. 208-224.

Levy, Jack S., 'War and Domestic Politics', Journal of Interdisciplinary Politics,

Vol. 18:4 (Spring 1988), pp. 653-573.

Lieber, Keir A. and Press, Daryl G., 'The Nukes we Need: Preserving the American

Deterrent', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88:6 (November/December 2009), pp. 39-51.

Mearsheimer, John J., 'Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe', International

Security, Vol. 9:3 (Winter 1984/1985), pp. 25-26.

Mearsheimer, John J., 'The Case for a Ukrainian Deterrent', Foreign Affairs, Vol.

76:2 (Summer 1993), pp. 50-66.

Mercer, Jonathan, 'Rationality and Psychology in International Relations',

International Organization, Vol. 59:1 (Winter, 2005), pp. 77-106.

Milner, Helen, 'The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A

Critique, Review of International Studies, Vol. 17:1 (Jan, 1991), pp. 67-85.

Morgan, Patrick M., 'Taking the long view of deterrence', Journal of Strategic

Studies, Vol. 28:5 (10/2005), pp. 751-763.

Powell, Robert, 'Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-

Neoliberal Debate', International Organization, Vol. 48:2 (Spring, 1994), pp. 313-

344.

26

Quester, George H., 'Crises and the Unexpected', Journal of International History,

Vol. 18:4 (Spring 1988), pp. 701-719.

Roth, Ariel Ilan and Krieger, Zanvyl, 'Nuclear Weapons in Neo-Realist Theory',

International Studies Review, Vol. 9:3 (2007), pp. 369-384.

Sagan, Scott D., 'Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search

of a Bomb', International Security, Vol. 21:3 (Winter, 1996-1997), pp. 54-86.

Sagan, Scott D. and Waltz, Kenneth N., 'The Great Debate: Is Nuclear Zero the

Best Option?', The National Interest (Sept-Oct 2010), pp. 88-96.

Taylor, Fravel Evan Medeiros, 'China's Search for Assured Retaliation: The

Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure', International

Security, Vol. 35:2 (Fall 2010), pp. 48-87.

Tertrais, Bruno, 'The Illogic of Zero', The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 33:2 (April

2010), pp. 125-138.

Trachtenberg, Marc, 'The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile

Crisis', International Security, Vol. 10:1 (Summer 1985), pp. 137-163.

van Wyk, Jo-Ansie, 'The International Politics of Nuclear Weapons: A

Constructivist Analysis', South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol. 35:1

(2007), pp. 23-45.

Walt, Stephen M., 'Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power',

International Security, Vol. 9:4 (Spring 1985), pp. 3-43.

Waltz, Kenneth N., 'The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory', Journal of

Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18:4 (Spring 1988), pp. 615-628.

Waltz, Kenneth N., 'Why Iran Should Get the Bomb', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91:4

(July/August 2012), pp. 2-4.

Warren, Roslyn, 'Miscalculating Nuclear Deterrence in the Middle East: Why

Kenneth Waltz gets it wrong', Global Security Studies Review, Vol. 1:1 (December

2012), pp. 36-40.

Wendt, Alexander, 'Anarchy is what states make of it: the Social Construction of

Power Politics', International Organization ,Vol. 46:2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425.

Newspaper articles

Hoffmann, David, 'I had a funny feeling in my gut', The Washington Post, 10

February 1999, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

srv/inatl/longterm/coldwar/shatter021099b.htm [accessed 9 November 2013].

Kroenig, Matthew, “Nuclear Zero? Why Not Nuclear Infinity? The world would

not be safer if the U.S. had no nuclear weapons”, The Wall Street Journal, July

2011,

http://cisac.stanford.edu/publications/nuclear_zero_why_not_nuclear_infinity/

[accessed 28 October 2013].

Libak, Anna, 'Nuclear War: Minuteman', Weekendavisen, 2 April 2004,

http://www.brightstarsound.com/world_hero/weekendavisen.html [accessed 9

November 2013].

27

Nichols, Tom, 'The Case for Conventional Deterrence', The National Interest, 12

November 2013, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-case-conventional-

deterrence-9381 [accessed 26 November 2013].

Shane, Scott, “Cold War's Riskiest Moment”, Baltimore Sun, 31 August 2003,

http://hnn.us/article/1709#bombs9-5-03 [accessed 9 November 2013].

Weisman, Steven R., “On India's border, a huge mock war”, The New York Times,

6 March 1987, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/06/world/on-india-s-border-a-

huge-mock-war.html [accessed 28 October 2013].

Discussion Papers

Ahmed, Ali , 'India, Nuclear Weapons and “Massive-Retaliation”: The

Impossibility of Limitation', IPCS Article No. 4135 (New Delhi: Institute of Peace

and Conflict Studies, 2013). http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/ipcs-debate-india-

nuclear-weapons-and-massive-retaliation-the-impossibility-4135.html [accessed

27 November 2013].

Allison, Graham and Douglas, Dillon, “'Nuclear Terrorism Fact Sheet' (Harvard:

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2010).

http://www.nuclearsummit.org/files/FACT_SHEET_Final.pdf [accessed 23

November 2013].

Bluth, Christopher, 'Norms and International Relations: The anachronistic nature

of neo-realist approaches', POLIS Working Paper No. 12 (Leeds: School of

Politics and International Studies, 2004).

Bowman, Bradley B., 'Chain Reaction: Avoiding a Nuclear Arms Race in the

Middle East', (Washington D.C.: United States Senate Committee on Foreign

Relations, 2008). http://www.cfr.org/world/chain-reaction-avoiding-nuclear-arms-

race-middle-east/p15721 [accessed 27 November 2013].

Dobbs, Michael, 'Why we should study the Cuban Missile Crisis', USIP Special

Report 205, (Washington, United States Institute of Peace, 2008), pp. 1-12.

http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/sr205.pdf [accessed 26 November

2013].

Gowans, Stephen, 'Does North Korea Need Nuclear Weapons?' (Montreal: Centre

for Research on Globalization, 2013). http://www.globalresearch.ca/does-north-

korea-need-nuclear-weapons/5323227 [accessed 29 October 2013].

Kahl, Colin H., Dalton, Melissa G., and Irvine, Matthew, 'Risk and Rivalry: Iran,

Israel and the Bomb' (Washington: Center for a New American Security, June

2012), http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-

Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=144190 [accessed 26 November 2013].

Keeney, Gregory L. and von Winterfeld, Detlef, 'Identifying and Structuring the

Objectives of Terrorists' (California: CREATE Homeland Security Center, 2009).

http://create.usc.edu/publications/KeeneyReport.pdf [accessed 27 November

2013].

Lindberg, Tod, 'Nuclear and Other Retaliation after Deterrence fails'

(Pennsylavania: Strategic Studies Institue, September 2004),

28

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-

1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=94828 [accesed 27 November 2013].

Riedel, Bruce, 'American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House',

Policy Paper Series 2002 (Philadelphia, University of Philadelphia Center for the

Advanced Study of India, 2002).

Samannm Jean-Loup, 'The Day after Iran Goes Nuclear: Implications for NATO',

NATO Research Paper No. 71 (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2012), pp. 1-8.

Waltz, Kenneth N., 'The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better',

Adelphi Papers, Number 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies,

1981).

Waltz, Kenneth N., 'Peace, Stability and Nuclear Weapons', IGCC Policy Papers

PP15 (Berkeley: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 1995),

http://escholarship.org/uc/item/4cj4z5g2#page-11 [accessed 27 November 2013].

Watts, Barry, 'Nuclear Conventional Firebreaks and the Nuclear Taboo'

(Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013),

http://www.csbaonline.org/about/contact/ [accessed 26 November 2013].

Primary Sources

“Memorandum from Chairman JCS Maxwell Taylor from the President,

"Evaluation of the Effect on US Operational Plans of Soviet Army Equipment

Introduced into Cuba," , 2 November 1962. (National Archives, Record Group 218

(Joint Chiefs of Staff), Records of Chairman Maxwell Taylor, box 6, October

1962). Digital Copy available at:

http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB397/

„The Malin Notes: Glimpses inside the Kremlin during the Cuban Missile Crisis“,

in: James G. Hershberg and Chrisitian F. Ostermnann, Cold War International

History Porject Bulletin: The Global Cuban Missile Crisis at 50, Vol. 17/18

(Wilson Center, Fall 2012). http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHP_Cuban_Missile_Crisis_Bulletin_17-18.pdf

[accessed 26

November 2013].

National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington D.C.: The White

House, May 2010),

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strateg

y.pdf,[accessed 3 October 2013].

Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington: United States Department of

Defense, April 2010).

http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20rep

ort.pdf [accessed 28 October 2013].

Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020 (Moscow: May 2009),

http://rustrans.wikidot.com/russia-s-national-security-strategy-to-2020 [accessed

28 October 2013].

A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainity: The National Security Strategy

(London: October 2010),

29

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/619

36/national-security-strategy.pdf [accessed 28 October 2013].

Finkelstein, David M., "China's National Military Strategy: An Overview of the

"Military Strategic Guidelines", in: Kamphausen, Roy and Scobell, Andrew (eds.),

Right Sizing the People's Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China's

Military (Pennsylavania: Strategic Studies Institue, September 2007), pp. 69-140.

Document available at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-

Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=cab359a3-9328-19cc-a1d2-

8023e646b22c&lng=en&id=48439 [accessed 28 October 2013].

“The U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment of Nuclear Terrorism (Harvard: Belfer

Center for Science and International Affairs, May 2011).

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Joint-Threat-

Assessment%20ENG%2027%20May%202011.pdf [accessed 23 November 2013].