Why is the Search for the Foundations of Ethics So Frustrating

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Why Is the Search for the Foundations of Ethics So Frustrating?

Author(s): Alasdair MacIntyreSource: The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Aug., 1979), pp. 16-22Published by: The Hastings CenterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3560905 .

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A CRISIS NMORAL HILOSOPHY

W h y I s t h e S e a r c h f o r t h e Foundationso f E t h i c s S o Frustrating?

by ALASDAIRMaclNTYRE

T he need to inquire bout he foundations f ethicsarisesintermittently;henit doesarise,it generallyrepre-sents a pointof crisis for a culture.In differentperiods nthe past of our own culture he oracles thathave been re-sorted to in such situationshave been of various kinds:Hellenisticcults,theimperium f Augustus,andthe rule ofSt. Benedictall represent esponses o such crises. But atleast three times it has been the moralphilosopherswhohave been summoned:n the twelfthcenturywhen "Eth-ica"took on themeaning ransmittedo ourword"ethics";in the eighteenth nd nineteenth enturieswhen a shared,secularrational ormof moral ustificationwas requiredofill the place left empty by the diminutionof religiousauthority; nd now.The abilityto respondadequatelyo this kind of culturalneed dependsof course on whether hose summonedpos-sess intellectual ndmoralresources hat ranscend he im-mediatecrisis,whichenable hem o sayto the culturewhattheculturecannot-or can no longer-say to itself. For ifthe crisis is so pervasive hat t has invadedeveryaspectofour intellectualand moral ives, then what we take to beresources or the treatment f our conditionmay turn outthemselves to be infectedareas. Karl Kraus's amousre-mark hatpsychoanalysiss a symptomof the verydiseaseof which it professesto be the cure may tur out to haveapplication o otherdisciplines.I am goingto argue hatKraus's emark pplies o a gooddeal of work in recent and contemporaryEnglish andAmericanmoralphilosophy. NotethatI amnot at all sug-gestingthatoutside heAnglo-Saxonworld heyorder hesethingsbetter; u contraire.)I shallproceedn thefollowingway:firstI shalldescribewhatI take o be thesymptomsofmoral crisis in our cultureand their historicalroots;sec-ondly, I shalldescribewhatI take o be thekey featuresofrecentmoralphilosophy;hirdly, shall conclude rommydescription hat such moralphilosophy s essentiallya re-flectionof our cultural onditionand acks the resources o

ALASDAIR ACINTYREs UniversityProfessor of Philosophyand Political Scienceat BostonUniversity.This article will ap-pear in Volume Vof theseries, "TheFoundationsof Ethics andIts Relationship o Science," editedbyH. TristramEngelhardt,Jr. and Daniel Callahan,to bepublishedbyTheHastingsCen-ter. The series is supported ya grant romthe National Endow-ment or the Humanities.

correct ts disorders;inally,I shall nquirewhy this is so.Symptoms of Moral Crisis

The superficial ymptomsof moral disorderare not diffi-cult to identify:what can be going on when the New YorkTimes announces hat ethics is now fashionable?Whatcanbe saidof a culture n which morality s periodically"re-discovered"?Why is instantbut short-livedmoralindigna-tionendemicamongus? Whatare we to make of a societyinwhose liberal iconography few years agothe diabolicalface of RichardNixon was counterbalancedy the angelicbenignityof a Sam Ervin,it beingfor thatpurposeobliter-ated from consciousness that Senator Ervin had votedagainsteverypiece of civil rights egislationeverproposedin the Congress?Whatarewe to make of those politiciansand academicswho have alreadyso successfully forgottenwhattheydid during he VietnamWar?Who now remem-bers hepresentPresident's esponse o LieutenantCalley'scourt-martialonviction?What he answers o suchquestionsestablish s thatovertmoral tances n ourculture endto havea temporary ndafragilenature.Thesecharacteristicsre,I suggest,rooted nthecharacter f contemporarymoraldebateandcontempo-rarymoralconviction. It is a central eatureof contempo-rary moral debates that they are unsettlable andinterminable.For when rival conclusions are deployedagainst one another-such as "All modem wars arewrong," "Onlyanti-imperialist arsof liberationarejusti-fied," "Sometimesa greatpower must go to war to pre-serve hatbalanceof powerwhichpeacerequires," r "Allabortions murder,""Everypregnantwoman has a right oanabortion,""Some abortionsarejustified,others not"-they are rationallydefendedby derivation rom premisesthat urnoutto be incommensurable ith eachother.Prem-ises thatinvokea notion of a just war derivedfrom medi-evaltheologyare matchedagainstpremisesabout iberationand war derivedpartly romFichteandpartlyfrom Marx,and both are in conflict with conceptionsthat count Ma-chiavellias ancestor.Premisesabout the moral law with aThomistic and biblical backgroundare matched againstpremisesabout individualrightsthatowe a good deal toTom Paine, Mary Wollstonecraft,and John Locke; andboth arein conflict withpost-Benthamite otionsof utility.I call such premisesincommensurablewith each otherpreciselybecause the metaphor f weighingclaimsthat n-

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vokerightsagainstclaims that nvokeutility,or claimsthatinvoke usticeagainstclaimsthat invokefreedom,in somesort of moral scale is empty of application.There are noscales,or at least this culturedoes notpossess any. Hencemoralargumentsn one way terminateveryquicklyandinanotherway areinterminable.Becausenoargument anbecarriedhrough o a victoriousconclusion,argument har-acteristically ives way to the mereandincreasingly hrillbattle of assertion with counterassertion.This is badenough,but it is not all.For if I have no adequatelygood reasons to give you toconvinceyou thatyou shouldexchange yourpremisesformine, then it follows thatI should haveadoptedmy prem-ises ratherhanyours, when I originallyadoptedmy posi-tion. Theabsenceof a sharedrational riterion urnsout toimply an initialarbitrarinessn each one of us-or so itseems.This conjunction f aninability o convinceothersand asense of arbitrarinessn ourselves is a distinctivechar-acteristicof theAmerican resent. tprovidesa backgroundagainstwhichrapidshiftsof feelingbecome an intelligiblephenomenon,againstwhich it is less surprisingo find somuch moral self-consciousnesscombined with so littlemoralstability. t is unsurprisinglsothata need to inquireabout he foundationsf ethicsarises, ndependentlyf anyspecial concernswith particular reasof the moral life.Whatproducedhiscondition?Partof theanswer s clear,even if only part:oursocietystandsat themeeting-pointf a numberof differenthisto-ries, each of them thebearer f a highlyparticular indofmoraltradition, ach of those traditionso some largede-gree mutilatedand fragmentedby its encounterwith theothers.The institutions f the Americanpolity, with theirappeal o abstract niversality,nd to consensus,are n facta place of encounter or rival andincompatible utlookstoa degree that the consensus tself requiresshould not beacknowledged.Theimageof the American s a maskthat,because it mustbe wornby blacks,Indians,JapaneseandSwedes, by IrishCatholics,New EnglandPuritans,Ger-manLutherans ndrootlesssecularists, an fit no face verywell. It is smallwonder hat heconfusionsof pluralism rearticulated t the level of moralargumentn the formof amishmashof conceptual ragments.

KeyFeatures f ModernMoralPhilosophyTherearethreecentraleatures f modemmoralphiloso-phy: its appeal o intuitions,ts handlingof the notionofreason, and its inability o settle questionsof prioritybe-tweenrival moralclaims.I shallonlybe able to give a fewexamplesto illustratemy claims,butI shall therefore akecareto use exampleshathave a certain ypicalityandthatenjoy a certainprestige. My final suggestionwill be thatmodem analyticalmoralphilosophy s essentiallya ghostdiscipline; ts contemporary ractitionersrepale shadows

of eighteenth-and nineteenth-century redecessorsandtheir failuressimplyreiteratehe prior ailures.One of thekey ancestors f modemmoralphilosophy sof courseHenrySidgwick.It is Sidgwickwhose use of theword "intuition" ridges he gap from its nineteenth-cen-tury to its twentieth-centurysage. And it was Sidgwickwho took it to be the taskof moralphilosophy o articulate,to systematize,andto bring nto a coherentrationalwholeourprephilosophicalmoral ntuitions,as does JohnRawlsnowadays-and as doesJ. O. Urmsonand asdid SirDavidRoss. What s surprisings that,even when such authorsacknowledgea debt o Sidgwick, heynevernotice his ownconclusion:where he had hopedto find Cosmos, he hadfoundChaos.That s, theydo not face the possibilitythatourprephilosophicalntuitionsdo not form a coherentandconsistent set and thereforecannotbe systematicallyandrationallyarticulated s a whole. Yet the evidence is closeathand.Rawlsconstructswhathetakes o bethe conceptofjusticein termsof a set of principles f patterns f distribu-tion;Nozickretortswithargumentstarting rompremisesthat arecertainly swidelyheld as are Rawls's. From hishe then is able to show that f his premisesareconceded,the conceptof justicecannotbe elucidated n termsof anypatternof distribution. he structure f thedebatebetweenthemis thus for all itsphilosophical ophistication t oncereminiscentof the modes of everydaymoral argument.Why shouldI acceptNozick'spremises?He furnishesmewithno reasons,but with a promissory ote. WhyshouldIacceptRawls'spremises?Theyare,so he argues, hosethatwould be acceptedby hypothetical ationalbeings whoseignoranceof their actualposition in any social hierarchyenables them to plan a type of social order n which thelibertyof each is maximized, n whichinequalities re tol-eratedonly insofarastheyhave the effectof improving helot of the leastwell-off,and n which hegoodof libertyhaspriorityoverthatof equality.Butwhy should inmy actual ocial conditionchoose toaccept what those hypotheticalrational beings wouldchoose, rather hanfor exampleNozick'spremisesaboutnaturalrights?And why shouldI acceptwhatRawls saysabout thepriority f libertyoverequality?Manycommen-tatorshaveidentified weakness n Rawls's answerto thislatterquestion;buttheweaknessof Rawls'spositionis asclear whenwe consider he formerquestion.Rawlsmight uggest hat f I do notaccepthispremises,Imyselfwill failasa rational erson.Thistypeof considera-tionhas beencentralo theworkof a number f othermoralphilosophersandnotably o thatof R. M. Hare,who hasdeploredRawls'sappeal o intuitionsandhasurgedthat nthe conceptionof moralreasoningalone can we find ade-quate means for discriminatinghose principlesthat weoughtto accept rom hose hatwe ought oreject.ButHareis only able to carry hroughhis project-which turns onthe fact thatI cannot onsistently pplyuniversalprinciplesto othersthatI am not preparedo applyin like circum-

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stancesto myself-by excluding rom it a class of agentswhomhe calls"fanatics," class thatincludesNazis whoarepreparedo embraceuchprinciplesas "Let all Jews beputto deathand et thisbe doneeven if it is discovered hatI am a Jew."It follows thatwe do not discriminatemoralprinciples,even on Hare'sview, bylogicor reasonalone,butonly-atbest-by conjoining he requirements f logic or reasonwiththe nonlogical equirementhatmoralagentsshall notbe, in Hare'sspecialsense, fanatics.And thereseem nogood argumentsor accepting his latterpoint and at leastone good argumentgainst t; surelywe wantpoliticalof-fice-holders o holdsuchprinciples s "Letall incompetentpoliticaloffice-holders e deprived f office and let this bedone even if it is discovered hatI am incompetent." t isdifficult not to see in thispartof Hare'spositiona covert,even if mistaken,appealto intuitionsas clear as any inRawls.The moral thatI want to draw is simple and twofold;intuitions reno safeguide, andtheconceptionof reason-usuallya conception f consistency,sometimeseked outbydecision theory-employed in moral philosophy is tooweak a notion to yield any contentto moral principles.What s wrongwithbeing morallyunprincipleds not pri-marily hatoneis being nconsistentand t is not even clearthat heunprincipledre inconsistent, or it seems to be thecase that in order to be practically nconsistentone firstneedsto haveprinciples. (Otherwisewhatis it aboutonethat s inconsistent?)Consider hose two charmingscoun-drelswho lounge insolentlyat the entrance o modernity,Diderot'sLui in Le Neveu de Rameau and Kierkegaard's

'A' inEnten-Eller.Both boast thattheyabideby no rules.Whathave RawlsandHare o sayto them?Rawls andHaremightwell answer-and I sympathizewiththeiranswer-that t is not requiredof a moraltheorythatit be able toconvincescoundrels,no matterhow intelligent.A certainseriousnessn the hearers alsorequired.Butif this was tobetheirreply-and I mustnotputwordsin theirmouths-it doessuggest hat heirargumentswill onlyfinda starting-pointwithhearerswho arealreadyconvinced hat t isrightto lead a principledife-for whatelse is it to be serious-whereby "principled"we mean something much morethananynotionof rationalityansupply.And indeedI takeit thatjust this is generallypresupposedn moder moralphilosophy.One outcomeof this weakness n the centralconceptionsof such moralphilosophy s that t presentsus withno wayof dealingwithconflictsof rulesorprinciples.Methodsofjustificationor individual ulesorprinciplesareoverabun-dant:we haveutilitarianustifications,contractarianustifi-cations,universalizabilityustification,ntuitionistustifica-tions,andeach of thesein more thanone variety.But fromRossto Rawlsthe treatment f priorityquestions s notori-ouslyweak.For t always presupposes omepriorunarguedpositionabouthow our values are to be organized.Here

arbitrarinessecomes visible.These failureshave historical oots.Analyticalmoralphi-losophers,who have oftentreated hehistoryof philosophyas an optionalextra for philosophers much like dancinglessons at a privateschool, they lend a touchof elegance,butarescarcelyessential),have oftenrecognized heirpar-ticulardebts to Kant, who is clearly the ancestorof theconceptof reason in Hare, or to Hume or to Mill or towhomever.What heyhavenotrecognized s that heyhavebeensystematicallyetreadinghegroundof thegreateight-eenth- and nineteenth-century ebates and now emergewithno greater uccessthan theirpredecessors.Kant'sno-torious ailure o derive substantialmoralprinciples rom apurely ormalconceptof practicalreason has simplybeenrepeatedby his successors;and Hume and Mill have hadtheirghoststoo.Onefeatureof the eighteenth-centuryebatethathasre-appeareds the superiority f negativeover positive argu-ment.What we owe to Hume, Smith, Diderot, Kant, andMill are good argumentsagainst the positions of theirrivals;each destroysthe pretentionsof the others, whilefailingto establishhis own position. Similarlywith recentmoralphilosophy-instead of myself'advertingo its weak-nesses, I might simply have quoted each authoragainstsome other;Hare againstRawls, Warock against Hare,Harman gainstNagel, andso on. There s indeeda strikingconsensusagainstmoder analyticalmoralphilosophycon-cealedwithin t:everymoder moralphilosophers againstall moder moralphilosophers xcept himself andhis im-mediate allies. Thereis scarcely a need for any externalattack.

Moral Philosophy and Modern CultureWhat s striking hen is the concordancebetween the or-dinary contemporarymoral consciousnessand the condi-tion of analyticalmoral philosophy. Precisely at thosepointsat which the ordinarymoral consciousnessrevealsarbitrarinessnd nstability nalyticalmoralphilosophydis-covers problemsinsoluble by it with any of the meansavailableto it. It is difficult to resist the conclusionthatsuchmoralphilosophy s a mirror-imagef its age; and thisconclusion s reinforcedby attention o detail. Just as theinability of the adherentsof each contemporarymoralstandpointo convince heprotagonists f otherstandpointsis reflected n the inabilityof moralphilosophy o provideagreedrationalcriteriaby whichto judge moralargument,so a numberof particularmoralpositionsare mirrored nsome moralphilosopher'saccount.Not all, for moralphi-losophersarecharacteristicallymiddle-class iberals,anditis unsurprisingherefore hat the moralstancepresented nphilosophical uise is normally hat of such liberalism.Buteventhat liberalismhas its varietiesandso the contempo-rarypoliticalliberalsof Timecan inspecttheirportraitsnRawls's theory of justice, while the contemporaryeco-



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nomic liberalsof Newsweek can inspecttheir portrait nNozick'stheory.Thereis thereforea case to be made thatanalyticalmoralphilosophy s one of the manyideologicalmaskswornby modern iberalism.But to pursue hat casewouldbe to overemphasize merely negativepolemic. In-steadI want to try to gain a new perspectiveboth on thepredicament f contemporarymoralityand on the relatedpredicament f contemporarymoralphilosophy. One waytodo this is to alienateoneselffromthepresentby adoptingsome externalstandpoint:what standpointmore externalthan thatof Polynesia n the late eighteenthcentury?

Taboos in PolynesiaIn the journalof CaptainJames Cook's thirdvoyage,Cookrecords he firstdiscoveryby English speakersof thePolynesianword taboo. The Englishseamenhad been as-tonishedat whattheytook to be the lax sexualhabitsof the

Polynesiansandwere even more astonished o discoverthesharpcontrastwiththerigorousprohibition lacedon suchconductas thatof men and womeneating together.Whenthey enquiredwhy men and women wereprohibited romeating ogether, hey were told that hatpracticewastaboo.But when they enquiredfurtherwhat taboo meant, theycouldget little further nformation.Clearlytaboo did notsimplymeanprohibited; orto say thatsomething-personor practiceor theory-is taboo is to give some particularsortof reasonforitsprohibition.But whatsortof reason? thas not only been Cook's seamen who have had troublewiththatquestion; romJamesFrazerandEdwardTylortoFranzSteinerandMary Douglasthe anthropologists avehadto strugglewith it. Fromthatstruggle wo keys to theproblem merge.The first s the significanceof the factthatCook's seamenwereunable to get any intelligiblereplytotheirqueriesfrom their native informants.Whatthis sug-gests (andany hypothesis s somewhatspeculative) s thatthenative informantshemselvesdid not reallyunderstandthe wordthey wereusing, andthis suggestion s reinforcedbythe ease with whichandthelack of socialconsequenceswhenKamehameha I abolished he taboos n Hawaiifortyyearslaterin 1819.But how could the Polynesianscome to be usinga wordwhich they themselves did not really understand?HereSteinerandDouglasare lluminating.Fortheybothsuggestthattaboo rulesoften andperhapscharacteristicallyave atwo-stage history. In the first stage taboo rules are em-bedded n a context thatconfers intelligibilityuponthem.So Mary Douglashas argued hat the taboorulesof Deu-teronomypresupposea cosmology and a taxonomyof acertainkind. Deprivethe taboo rules of theiroriginalcon-text andtheyat once areapt to appearas a set of arbitraryprohibitions,as indeed they characteristically o appearwhenthe initialcontext s lost, when thosebackground e-liefs in thelightof which the tabooruleshadoriginallybeenunderstoodhave not only been abandonedbut forgotten.

In such a situation he rules have been deprivedof anystatus that can secure theirauthorityand, if they do notacquiresome new statusquickly, both theirinterpretationand their justificationbecome debatable. When the re-sourcesof aculturearetoo meager o carry hrough he taskof reinterpretation,hen the task of justificationbecomesimpossible. Hence the relatively easy, althoughto somecontemporaryobservers astonishing, victory of Ka-mehamehaI over the taboos(andthecreation herebyof amoralvacuum n which thebanalitiesof the New EnglandProtestantmissionarieswere received all too quickly). ButhadPolynesiancultureenjoyedthe blessingsof analyticalphilosophy t is all too clear that the questionof the mean-ingof taboo couldhavebeen resolved n a numberof ways.Taboo,it would havebeen saidby one party, s clearlythenameof a non-naturalroperty; ndprecisely he samerea-soningwhichled Moore to see good as the nameof such aproperty ndPrichard nd Ross to see obligatoryandrightas the namesof suchpropertieswould have been availabletoshow that aboo is thenameof such a property.Anotherpartywould doubtlesshave arguedthat "This is taboo"meansroughlythe same as "I disapproveof this;do so aswell";andpreciselythe samereasoningwhich led Steven-son andAyerto see "good"as havingprimarily nemotiveuse would have been availableto support heemotive the-oryof taboo. A thirdpartywouldpresumablyhave arisen,which would have arguedthat the grammatical orm of'This is taboo"disguisesa universalizablemperativepre-scription.Thepointlessnessof this imaginarydebate arisesfrom asharedpresupposition f the contending parties, namelythat he set of rules whose status andjustification hey areinvestigatingprovide an adequatelydemarcatedsubject-matter orinvestigation,provide he material or an autono-mous field of study. We from our standpoint n the realworldknow thatthis is not the case, that here s no way tounderstandhecharacter f thetaboorules,exceptas a sur-vival from some previous, more elaboratecultural back-ground. We know also and as a consequence that anytheory hatmakes he taboorulesof the lateeighteenth en-tury n Polynesia ntelligiblewithoutreference o their his-tory s necessarilya falsetheory; heonlytrue heorycan beonethat exhibits theirunintelligibilityas theystand at thatmoment n time. Moreover he only adequate ruetheorywill be onethat will both enable us to distinguishbetweenwhat t is for a set of taboorules andpractices o be in goodorderandwhat t is for a set of suchrules andpractices ohave beenfragmented nd thrown nto disorder nd enableus tounderstandhe historical ransitions y whichthe latterstateemerged romthe former.Onlythewritingof a certainkind of historywill supplywhatwe need.And now thequestion nexorablyarises n thelightof myearlier rgument:whyshould we thinkaboutrealanalyticalmoralphilosophersuch as Moore,Ross, Prichard,Steven-son, Hare, and the rest in any way different rom thatin

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which we were thinking just now about their imaginaryPolynesian ounterparts?Whyshould we thinkaboutgood,right and obligatory in any different way from that inwhich we thinkabout taboo? The attempt o answerthisquestionwill at once raiseanother:why shouldwe not treatthe moralutterances f our own culturesas survivals?Butfromwhat thendid they survive?The answer s in surprisingly arge partthat the patternsof commonmoralutterancen ourcultureare thegraveyardfor fragmentsof culturallydead large-scalephilosophicalsystems.In everydaymoralargumentsn bars and board-rooms, nnewspapers ndon television,in whichrivalcon-clusions about war are canvassed, we find, as I alreadynoted, remnantsof the medievaldoctrineof the just warcontending gainstcut-down,secondhandversionsof util-itarianism, othbeingconfronted n turnby amateurMach-iavellianism.Andin a preciselysimilarway debatesaboutabortion,about death and dying, aboutmarriageand thefamily,about heplaceof law in societyandabout herela-tionshipof justiceto equality,to desert,and to charitybe-come encounters between a wide range of variouslytruncatedonceptsand theories out of ourdifferentpasts.It is because of this that the proceduresof piecemealphilosophical nalysisare so inadequate.They become inpracticea kind of unsystematicconceptualarchaeologywhosepractitionersossess no means of distinguishinghedifferent spectsof ourpastof whichourpresent s so verylargelycomposed.So it produces,piece by piece, as whatwewouldsay or as theconcept ofx or as our commonsensebeliefs what are in fact survivals from large-scale philo-sophicalandtheological ystemsthathave beendeprivedoftheiroriginalcontext.It is unsurprisings a result hatthecontemporarymoralphilosopher asso littleto sayto thecrises of contemporarymorality.For he fails to understand ither himself or thatmoralityhistorically; nd n so failinghe condemnshimselfto handlingsystematically ivalpositionswithout hatcon-text of systematic hought hat was andis required ven todefinethe natureof such rivalries, et alone to decide be-tween thecontendingpositions.Considerust one such ux-taposition:hatof moder consequentialismo its absolutistrivalsandcritics.

Modern Consequentialismand its Absolutist CriticsEverymoral scheme containsa set of injunctions o andprohibitions f particularypesof actionon the one hand("Do not murder,""Do not bear false witness," "Honorthyfatherandthymother")and a general njunctiono dogood and to avoid and frustrate vil on the other. But thedifferent elationship etween thesetwo elements s one ofthe principal differences between rival and alternativemoralschemes. Forontheone handThomistsand Kantiansmakewhatthey take to be the injunctionsandprohibitions

of themoral aw absoluteandexceptionless; t follows thatourdutiesto promote he good of othersand of ourselvesandto preventharm o othersandto ourselvesare boundedand imitedby the injunctions ndprohibitions f the morallaw. On no occasionwhatsoevermayI disobeya preceptofthe moral law in orderto promotethe generalgood or toavoidany degreeof ruin whatsoever;and there can be noquestionof weighing or balancingthe beneficial conse-quencesthatmightbe reasonablypredicted o resultfromsuch a breach on a particular ccasion againstthe impor-tance of obeyingthe precept.A utilitarian y contrast ees any injunction o orprohibi-tion of any particular ype of action as having only provi-sional and conditionalorce. Rulesof conduct,wroteMill,"pointout the manner n whichit will be leastperiloustoact, where time and means do not exist for analyzingtheactualcircumstances f the case," butwhen circumstancespermitus to carrythroughsuch an analysis, any rulemaybe suspendedor modifiedor replacedin the interests ofpromotinghe greatesthappinessor the leastpain. Thus thepreceptsof moralityare bounded and limitedby our cal-culationof the general good.Betweenthe Kantianpositionandtheactutilitarian osi-tiona numberof othersareranged.At theutilitarian nd ofthe spectruma rule utilitarianmay treatrules with a lessconditionaland provisionalrespectthan does the act util-itarian,althoughhe will holdthattherulesthemselvesmustbe subjectto an evaluation of the consequencesof theirbeing generally followed; and, since contingentcircum-stanceschange, even the rules that seem to offer the bestpossiblereason to respectmayhave to be reevaluatedromtime to time. Consequently he rule utilitarian an neverassertof any specifictypeof actionthat t is forbiddenrre-spectiveof circumstances ny more than the actutilitariancan;andthiswouldremain rue,even if DavidLyon's argu-ment hatruleutilitarianismollapsesinto actutilitarianismwere not as successfulas I take it to be.Nearerthe Kantianend of the spectrum-although stillabhorrento Kant-would be any moralistwho holds thatin some situations ll choices of action nvolve thedoingofsomeevil, butthatsome evils are lesserthanothers. Suchamoralist would resemble the utilitarians n holding thatsometimes t is necessary o do evil, but unlike a utilitarianwould still see the best possibleactionopento him as evil.Nonethelessalthough hese intermediate ositionsareim-portant, believethatwe can evaluate heirclaimsuponourallegianceonly if we first considerthe conflict betweenthose who hold thatcertain ypesof actionoughtto be doneornotdone irrespective f circumstances ndconsequencesandthose who deny this. I wish for the moment,althoughonlyforthemoment,to consider hesecontentions n formsin whichthey are leastentangledwith the varietyof philo-sophicalcontextsin whichthey have been at home. Afterall, moralistsas differentas Aristotle,St. Paul, and Aqui-nas hold the former absolutistposition as stringentlyas



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do Kantians; ndconsequentialists,o borrowG.E.M. An-scombe'stermfor them, are of manyvarietiesalso. It isenoughto remember he contrastbetween the Benthamitesandthe followers of G.E. Moore.What s striking s the way in whichthe stauncher dher-ents of both views find their own position apparentlyob-viouslytrueandtheiropponents quallyobviously alse. SoAnscombe once wrote that "if someone really thinks, inadvance, that t is opento questionwhether uchan actionas procuring he judicialexecution of the innocent shouldbe quite excluded from consideration-I do not want toargue with him; he shows a corruptmind." ("ModemMoralPhilosophy,"Philosophy, Vol. XXXIII,No. 126, p.17). Whereas JonathanBennettthinksit equally obviousthat f predicted onsequencesof harmarerecognizedas areason or not acting n certain ypesof cases, thenno pro-hibition of any type of action whatsoever rrespectiveofconsequencescan be rationallydefensible and to upholdtogether uch a recognitionandsuch a prohibition anonlybe the consequenceof "muddle"("Whatever he Conse-quences,"Analysis, 26, p. 102) or, even perhapsworse,"conservatism."

Causality,Evil and IdentityBut what is it about which the rival protagonistsare infactdisagreeing?Thereare at least, so I suspect,threema-jorareasof disagreementnvolved. One centersaround heconceptsof causality, predictability, ndintentionality ndinvolvestherelationship f consciousness o the world.An-other s concernedwiththe conceptsof law, evil, emotion,andthe integrityof the self. A third ocusesupontherela-tionshipof individualidentity to social identity and in-volves the questionof the relationof ethics to politics. Letme consider each in turnbriefly.What s an action?What s the connectionbetween,whatis thedistinctionbetweenanactionand tseffects,resultsorconsequences?Can causalconnectionsbe establishedwith-out a knowledge of law-like generalizations?Can causalrelationships e establishedwhere one term of therelation-ship has to be characterized onextensionally, hat is, intermsof an agent'sbeliefs and intentions?This groupofquestions s conventionallyallocatedto the philosophyofaction or to the philosophy of mind; but an answer tothem-or at thevery least some theoriesaboutwhy we donot need an answer to them-is presupposedby any ac-count of morality.For whatan agentis or can be dependsuponwhatthe answersare.The force of this considerationcan be broughtout byconsideringthe answerspresupposedby some novelists.Dickens'sworld s one of briskpractical ffects wheresen-timents can become deeds the moment the materialinwhich the deedscan be embodied,moneyandpersons,be-comes availableandin which harmandbenefit are mattersof immediatehumanagency.Proust'sworldby contrast s

one in which the inaccessibilityof each consciousnesstoothers-that rangeof illusions thatconstitutesa hallof dis-tortingmirrors-makes the character f our actions in theexternalworld("in what?" one is sometimesdisposedtosayin Proustianmoments)essentiallyambiguous.The irre-fragable realities are pain, disillusionment and art. InTolstoy'sworldart s one of the illusions andthe notion oflarge-scalecontrivances equallyillusory:victories in warandthe rise and fall of empiresarenot made or unmade,they happen. All that is to hand is the immediate moraldeed.It is crucial to recognizethatin answering he questionsor evaluatingthe answers of an Anscombe, a Quine, aDavidson,or a Wisdomon thephilosophyof causality,ac-tion, andmind, we aredecidingthecase betweenDickens,Tolstoy,andProust,deciding t perhaps gainstallof them.What s notopentous is to leave the case undecided. n ouractions,even if we choose not to acknowledge t, we haveto inhabit omesuch world. Thusethicsrequiresasystema-tic connectionwiththe philosophyof causality,mind andaction.A second set of questionsconcernlaw, evil, emotion,andtheintegrityof the self. Stoics, Thomists,and Kantiansperceivethe self as situated n a cosmic order n which itcan receive fatal or near-fatalwounds. Utilitarians erceivethe self as alwaysableto choose the mostbeneficialor leastharmful ourse of actionopen to it, whatever thatmay in-volve the self in doing. No deed is morallybeyondtheself;there are no limits. But from this standpoint,as BernardWilliams has noted, the traditionalnotion of a virtue ofintegritydisappears;or integrityconsistspreciselyin set-ting unbreakable imits to what one will do. For Stoics,Thomists,andKantianshereforemy passionsmustbe edu-catedby reason,lest they betraymy integrity;and this re-quiresa thesis aboutthe relationof reason to the passionsand of both to law and to breachesof law. For a centraldistinctiveemotion n the ThomistandKantianschemes atleast has to become that of remorse, the embodiment nfeeling of repentance.Whereasa Utilitarian cheme mayhave some roomfor emotionsof regret,butnonesurelyforemotionsof remorseorrepentance.MoreoverStoics, Tho-mists, and Kantiansbelieve that they confronta timelessmoralorder,whatever he variationsn humanpsychology,while for Benthamandhis successors the moralordercanvaryonly within the limits imposedby a timelesspsychol-ogy. Here once againit is clearthatsystematicanswerstometaphysical uestionsarepresupposed y rivalmoralout-looks. And so it is also withthe thirdgroupof questions.Who amI? In whatrole do I act? Whom do I representnacting?Who is answerable or what I do?If Iam a Germannow, how can I stand n relationshipo a Jew now? If myfatherburnthis grandparents?f my fatherstayedhome anddidnothingwhile his grandparents ere burnt?Liberalpo-liticaltheoryhas envisagedall the politicaland social, fa-milial and ethnic characteristicsof a moral agent as

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contingent ndinessentialexceptinsofar as he chose themhimself.Abstract,autonomoushumanityhas been its sub-jectmatter.Butthe deedsof individuals reoftencorporatedeeds: ammy family, my country,my party,my corpora-tion,as itpresents tselfto the world.Theirpastis my past.Hencethe questionarises: how is moral dentityrelated opolitical dentity?Aristotle,Kant,Hegel, and Marxall givedifferentanswers. Each answer presupposesa particularviewof thestateandof the relationship f stateandcitizen.So thatI cannotsolve the problemsof ethics withoutmak-ing a systematicconnectionwithpoliticaltheory.Theimplications f my earlier hesis arenow clear. Ourswasoncea culture n which thesystematic nterrelationshipof thesequestionswas recognizedbothby philosophersatthe level of theoryand in the presuppositions f everydaypractice.But whenwe left behindus the ancient,medieval,andearlymodemworlds, we entereda culture argelyandincreasingly eprivedof the vision of the whole, exceptattheaestheticevel. Eachpartof ourexperience s detachedfrom herestin quitea new way;and the activitiesof intel-lectual enquiry become divided and compartmentalizedalongwith the rest. The intellectualdivision of laborallo-catesproblemsn apiecemealandpartialway;and the con-sequent modes of thought answer very well to theexperienceof everyday ife.The consequences or moralphilosophyare clear; it re-flects n itsmodesthesocietyandthe cultureof which t is apart.It becomes a symptomrather han a means of diag-nosis.Andit is unable o solve its ownproblemsbecause thas beenisolatedas a separateanddistinct ormof enquiryand so has been deprivedof the systematiccontext thatthoseproblemsrequire or their solution.

The Fate of the MoralSciencesThehistoryof how moralphilosophyunderwentts tran-sition from large-scale systematic enquiryto piecemealanalysis-and therefore he explanationof why the searchfor the foundationsof ethicsis so frustrating-needsto be

supplementedn at leastthreeways, if it is to be adequatelycharacterized. irstof coursetherearetheparallel ntellec-tual ransformationsithinadjacent nquiries.Not onlyhasphilosophybeen subdivided,but the rest of the moralsci-ences have been similarlyreapportioned.Hencearisesthatpeculiarlymodem phenomenon,the intellectualboundarystonejealouslyguardedby professionalsand signalledbysuch cries as "But that's not philosophy!"or "You arereallydoing sociology."AdamSmithby contrast,whenhepublished he secondpartof his courseat Glasgowas TheTheoryof theMoral Sentimentsandthe fourthpartas TheWealthof Nations, was not aware hathe was contributingto morethanone discipline.So moralphilosophysince theeighteenthenturyhas becomepartiallydefined n termsofwhat it is not or ratherwhat it is no longer. And conse-quently hehistoryof the changesin moralphilosophywill

be partiallyunintelligible,unless it is accompaniedby ahistoryof what usedto be themoralsciencesandtheirsub-sequent ate. This fateis symbolized-by he fact thatwhenMill's translatorameto translatehe expression"themoralsciences," he had to invent the Germanword Geistes-wissenshaften,a word takenoverby Diltheyandothersfortheirownpurposes;whenin thiscenturyEnglishmencameto translatesuch German writers, they proclaimedthatGeisteswissenschaftenis a word without any Englishequivalent.Secondthere aresignificantquestionsof genre. It is farfromunimportanthatup to the early nineteenthcenturymoralphilosophywas writtenalmostexclusivelyin books,whereasnow it is writtenprimarilyn articles.The length,andtherefore, he possible scope of an arguments partofwhat s affectedby thischange;butit also reflectsa changein the continuitiesof readingof the public to which thephilosophicalwriteraddresseshimself. Hume, Smith, andMill still presupposea generally educatedpublic whosemindsare nformedby a sharedstockof readingwhichpro-videsbothpointsof referenceand touchstones.They seekinpart,sometimesn largepart, o addto the stockandalterthesepointsof referenceand touchstones.This is a verydifferent ndeavor romthe contemporary rofessionalizedcontributionso a dialogue o be sharedonly by professors.Philosophy ecomesnotonly piecemeal,butoccasional.(Itis perhapsworthnotingherethatpartof the destruction fthe generallyeducatedmindis the sheer multiplication fprofessionalphilosophical iterature.From this point ofviewtheincrease nthenumberof philosophicalourals-andthe pressure o write thatproducesthatincrease-arealmostunmitigatedvils. The case formakingnonpublica-tion aprerequisiteortenureorpromotions becomingverystrong.)Finally t wouldbe necessary o reflectupontheideologi-cal functions ervedby recentmoralphilosophy'sreflectionof the liberal tatusquo. What is clearat the very least isthata moralphilosophywhichaspiresto put ourintuitionsin order s going to be protectiveof thoseintuitions n oneway, while a moralphilosophy hatclaimsto deriveitsten-ets fromananalysisof whatit is to be rational, butthat nfact has a large unadmittedcomponentwhose roots arequiteother, is likely to be protectiveof them in anotherway. Thatrecentmoralphilosophyshouldfunction n thisprotectiveway is scarcelysurprisingf I amright n identi-fyingthatphilosophyas the heirof the eighteenthcentury;for themorality hatit protects s the heirof the eighteenthcenturyoo. But theeighteenth enturyclaimedforits liber-alismepistemologicaloundationsof a kindphilosophyhassincehad to repudiate;we hold no nontrivial ruths o beself-evident,we cannotaccept Bentham'spsychology orKant'sview of thepowersof reason.Thusliberalism tselfbecame oundationless; ndsince themoralityof ourage isliberalwe haveone morereason o expectthe search or thefoundations f ethics to be unrewarded.

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Why is the Search for the Foundations of Ethics So Frustrating