Why I Am Not a Christian - Bertrand Russell (1927 Lecture)

8/13/2019 Why I Am Not a Christian - Bertrand Russell (1927 Lecture)

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by Bertrand Russell (1927 Lecture)

As your Chairman has told you, the subject about which I am going to speak

to you tonight is "Why I Am Not a Christian." Perhaps it would be as well, irst

o all, to try to make out what one means by the word Christian. It is used

these days in a !ery loose sense by a great many people. ome people mean

no more by it than a person who attempts to li!e a good lie. In that sense I

suppose there would be Christians in all sects and creeds# but I do not think

that that is the proper sense o the word, i only because it would imply that all

the people who are not Christians# all the $uddhists, Conucians,

%ohammedans, and so on, are not trying to li!e a good lie. I do not mean by

a Christian any person who tries to li!e decently according to his lights. I think

that you must ha!e a certain amount o deinite belie beore you ha!e a right

to call yoursel a Christian. &he word does not ha!e 'uite such a ull(blooded

meaning now as it had in the times o t. Augustine and t. &homas A'uinas.

In those days, i a man said that he was a Christian it was known what he

meant. )ou accepted a whole collection o creeds which were set out with

great precision, and e!ery single syllable o those creeds you belie!ed with

the whole strength o your con!ictions.



Nowadays it is not 'uite that. We ha!e to be a little more !ague in our

meaning o Christianity. I think, howe!er, that there are two dierent items

which are 'uite essential to anybody calling himsel a Christian. &he irst is

one o a dogmatic nature# namely, that you must belie!e in *od and

immortality. I you do not belie!e in those two things, I do not think that you

can properly call yoursel a Christian. &hen, urther than that, as the name

implies, you must ha!e some kind o belie about Christ. &he %ohammedans,

or instance, also belie!e in *od and in immortality, and yet they would not call

themsel!es Christians. I think you must ha!e at the !ery lowest the belie that

Christ was, i not di!ine, at least the best and wisest o men. I you are not

going to belie!e that much about Christ, I do not think you ha!e any right to

call yoursel a Christian. + course, there is another sense, which you ind

in Whitaker's Almanack and in geography books, where the population o the

world is said to be di!ided into Christians, %ohammedans, $uddhists, etish

worshipers, and so on# and in that sense we are all Christians. &he geography

books count us all in, but that is a purely geographical sense, which I suppose

we can ignore.&hereore I take it that when I tell you why I am not a Christian I

ha!e to tell you two dierent things irst, why I do not belie!e in *od and in



immortality# and, secondly, why I do not think that Christ was the best and

wisest o men, although I grant him a !ery high degree o moral goodness.

$ut or the successul eorts o unbelie!ers in the past, I could not take so

elastic a deinition o Christianity as that. As I said beore, in olden days it had

a much more ull(blooded sense. -or instance, it included the belie in hell.

$elie in eternal hell(ire was an essential item o Christian belie until pretty

recent times. In this country, as you know, it ceased to be an essential item

because o a decision o the Pri!y Council, and rom that decision the

Archbishop o Canterbury and the Archbishop o )ork dissented# but in this

country our religion is settled by Act o Parliament, and thereore the Pri!y

Council was able to o!erride their *races and hell was no longer necessary to

a Christian. Conse'uently I shall not insist that a Christian must belie!e in hell.

&o come to this 'uestion o the eistence o *od it is a large and serious

'uestion, and i I were to attempt to deal with it in any ade'uate manner I

should ha!e to keep you here until /ingdom Come, so that you will ha!e to

ecuse me i I deal with it in a somewhat summary ashion. )ou know, o

course, that the Catholic Church has laid it down as a dogma that the

eistence o *od can be pro!ed by the unaided reason. &hat is a somewhat



curious dogma, but it is one o their dogmas. &hey had to introduce it because

at one time the reethinkers adopted the habit o saying that there were such

and such arguments which mere reason might urge against the eistence o

*od, but o course they knew as a matter o aith that *od did eist. &he

arguments and the reasons were set out at great length, and the Catholic

Church elt that they must stop it. &hereore they laid it down that the

eistence o *od can be pro!ed by the unaided reason and they had to set up

what they considered were arguments to pro!e it. &here are, o course, a

number o them, but I shall take only a ew.

Perhaps the simplest and easiest to understand is the argument o the -irst

Cause. 0It is maintained that e!erything we see in this world has a cause, and

as you go back in the chain o causes urther and urther you must come to a

-irst Cause, and to that -irst Cause you gi!e the name o *od.1 &hat

argument, I suppose, does not carry !ery much weight nowadays, because, in

the irst place, cause is not 'uite what it used to be. &he philosophers and the

men o science ha!e got going on cause, and it has not anything like the

!itality it used to ha!e# but, apart rom that, you can see that the argument that

there must be a -irst Cause is one that cannot ha!e any !alidity. I may say

that when I was a young man and was debating these 'uestions !ery



seriously in my mind, I or a long time accepted the argument o the -irst

Cause, until one day, at the age o eighteen, I read 2ohn tuart %ill3s

Autobiography, and I there ound this sentence "%y ather taught me that the

'uestion 3Who made me43 cannot be answered, since it immediately suggests

the urther 'uestion 5Who made god43" &hat !ery simple sentence showed

me, as I still think, the allacy in the argument o the -irst Cause. I e!erything

must ha!e a cause, then *od must ha!e a cause. I there can be anything

without a cause, it may just as well be the world as *od, so that there cannot

be any !alidity in that argument. It is eactly o the same nature as the 6indu3s

!iew, that the world rested upon an elephant and the elephant rested upon a

tortoise# and when they said, "6ow about the tortoise4" the Indian said,

"uppose we change the subject." &he argument is really no better than that.

&here is no reason why the world could not ha!e come into being without a

cause# nor, on the other hand, is there any reason why it should not ha!e

always eisted. &here is no reason to suppose that the world had a beginning

at all. &he idea that things must ha!e a beginning is really due to the po!erty

o our imagination. &hereore, perhaps, I need not waste any more time upon

the argument about the -irst Cause.



&hen there is a !ery common argument rom natural law. &hat was a a!orite

argument all through the eighteenth century, especially under the inluence o

ir Isaac Newton and his cosmogony. People obser!ed the planets going

around the sun according to the law o gra!itation, and they thought that *od

had gi!en a behest to these planets to mo!e in that particular ashion, and

that was why they did so. &hat was, o course, a con!enient and simple

eplanation that sa!ed them the trouble o looking any urther or eplanations

o the law o gra!itation. Nowadays we eplain the law o gra!itation in a

somewhat complicated ashion that 7instein has introduced. I do not propose

to gi!e you a lecture on the law o gra!itation, as interpreted by 7instein,

because that again would take some time# at any rate, you no longer ha!e the

sort o natural law that you had in the Newtonian system, where, or some

reason that nobody could understand, nature beha!ed in a uniorm ashion.

We now ind that a great many things we thought were natural laws are really

human con!entions. )ou know that e!en in the remotest depths o stellar

space there are still three eet to a yard. &hat is, no doubt, a !ery remarkable

act, but you would hardly call it a law o nature. And a great many things that

ha!e been regarded as laws o nature are o that kind. +n the other hand,

where you can get down to any knowledge o what atoms actually do, you will



ind they are much less subject to law than people thought, and that the laws

at which you arri!e are statistical a!erages o just the sort that would emerge

rom chance. &here is, as we all know, a law that i you throw dice you will get

double sies only about once in thirty(si times, and we do not regard that as

e!idence that the all o the dice is regulated by design# on the contrary, i the

double sies came e!ery time we should think that there was design. &he laws

o nature are o that sort as regards a great many o them. &hey are statistical

a!erages such as would emerge rom the laws o chance# and that makes this

whole business o natural law much less impressi!e than it ormerly was.

8uite apart rom that, which represents the momentary state o science that

may change tomorrow, the whole idea that natural laws imply a lawgi!er is

due to a conusion between natural and human laws. 6uman laws are

behests commanding you to beha!e a certain way, in which you may choose

to beha!e, or you may choose not to beha!e# but natural laws are a

description o how things do in act beha!e, and being a mere description o

what they in act do, you cannot argue that there must be somebody who told

them to do that, because e!en supposing that there were, you are then aced

with the 'uestion "Why did *od issue just those natural laws and no others4"

I you say that he did it simply rom his own good pleasure, and without any

reason, you then ind that there is something which is not subject to law, and

so your train o natural law is interrupted. I you say, as more orthodo



theologians do, that in all the laws which *od issues he had a reason or

gi!ing those laws rather than others (( the reason, o course, being to create

the best uni!erse, although you would ne!er think it to look at it (( i there were

a reason or the laws which *od ga!e, then *od himsel was subject to law,

and thereore you do not get any ad!antage by introducing *od as an

intermediary. )ou really ha!e a law outside and anterior to the di!ine edicts,

and *od does not ser!e your purpose, because he is not the ultimate

lawgi!er. In short, this whole argument about natural law no longer has

anything like the strength that it used to ha!e. I am tra!eling on in time in my

re!iew o the arguments. &he arguments that are used or the eistence o

*od change their character as time goes on. &hey were at irst hard

intellectual arguments embodying certain 'uite deinite allacies. As we come

to modern times they become less respectable intellectually and more and

more aected by a kind o morali9ing !agueness.

&he net step in the process brings us to the argument rom design. )ou all

know the argument rom design e!erything in the world is made just so that

we can manage to li!e in the world, and i the world was e!er so little dierent,

we could not manage to li!e in it. &hat is the argument rom design. It

sometimes takes a rather curious orm# or instance, it is argued that rabbits



ha!e white tails in order to be easy to shoot. I do not know how rabbits would

!iew that application. It is an easy argument to parody. )ou all know :oltaire3s

remark, that ob!iously the nose was designed to be such as to it spectacles.

&hat sort o parody has turned out to be not nearly so wide o the mark as it

might ha!e seemed in the eighteenth century, because since the time o

;arwin we understand much better why li!ing creatures are adapted to their

en!ironment. It is not that their en!ironment was made to be suitable to them

but that they grew to be suitable to it, and that is the basis o adaptation.

&here is no e!idence o design about it.

When you come to look into this argument rom design, it is a most

astonishing thing that people can belie!e that this world, with all the things

that are in it, with all its deects, should be the best that omnipotence and

omniscience ha!e been able to produce in millions o years. I really cannot

belie!e it. ;o you think that, i you were granted omnipotence and

omniscience and millions o years in which to perect your world, you could

produce nothing better than the /u /lu /lan or the -ascists4 %oreo!er, i you

accept the ordinary laws o science, you ha!e to suppose that human lie and

lie in general on this planet will die out in due course it is a stage in the

decay o the solar system# at a certain stage o decay you get the sort o

conditions o temperature and so orth which are suitable to protoplasm, and



there is lie or a short time in the lie o the whole solar system. )ou see in the

moon the sort o thing to which the earth is tending (( something dead, cold,

and lieless.

I am told that that sort o !iew is depressing, and people will sometimes tell

you that i they belie!ed that, they would not be able to go on li!ing. ;o not

belie!e it# it is all nonsense. Nobody really worries about much about what is

going to happen millions o years hence. 7!en i they think they are worrying

much about that, they are really decei!ing themsel!es. &hey are worried about

something much more mundane, or it may merely be a bad digestion# but

nobody is really seriously rendered unhappy by the thought o something that

is going to happen to this world millions and millions o years hence.

&hereore, although it is o course a gloomy !iew to suppose that lie will die

out (( at least I suppose we may say so, although sometimes when I

contemplate the things that people do with their li!es I think it is almost a

consolation (( it is not such as to render lie miserable. It merely makes you

turn your attention to other things.

Now we reach one stage urther in what I shall call the intellectual descent

that the &heists ha!e made in their argumentations, and we come to what are



called the moral arguments or the eistence o *od. )ou all know, o course,

that there used to be in the old days three intellectual arguments or the

eistence o *od, all o which were disposed o by Immanuel /ant in

the Critique of Pure Reason# but no sooner had he disposed o those

arguments than he in!ented a new one, a moral argument, and that 'uite

con!inced him. 6e was like many people in intellectual matters he was

skeptical, but in moral matters he belie!ed implicitly in the maims that he had

imbibed at his mother3s knee. &hat illustrates what the psychoanalysts so

much emphasi9e# the immensely stronger hold upon us that our !ery early

associations ha!e than those o later times.

/ant, as I say, in!ented a new moral argument or the eistence o *od, and

that in !arying orms was etremely popular during the nineteenth century. It

has all sorts o orms. +ne orm is to say there would be no right or wrong

unless *od eisted. I am not or the moment concerned with whether there is

a dierence between right and wrong, or whether there is not that is another

'uestion. &he point I am concerned with is that, i you are 'uite sure there is a

dierence between right and wrong, then you are in this situation Is that

dierence due to *od3s iat or is it not4 I it is due to *od3s iat, then or *od

himsel there is no dierence between right and wrong, and it is no longer a

signiicant statement to say that *od is good. I you are going to say, as



theologians do, that *od is good, you must then say that right and wrong ha!e

some meaning which is independent o *od3s iat, because *od3s iats are

good and not bad independently o the mere act that he made them. I you

are going to say that, you will then ha!e to say that it is not only through *od

that right and wrong came into being, but that they are in their essence

logically anterior to *od. )ou could, o course, i you liked, say that there was

a superior deity who ga!e orders to the *od that made this world, or could

take up the line that some o the gnostics took up (( a line which I oten

thought was a !ery plausible one (( that as a matter o act this world that we

know was made by the de!il at a moment when *od was not looking. &here is

a good deal to be said or that, and I am not concerned to reute it.

&hen there is another !ery curious orm o moral argument, which is this they

say that the eistence o *od is re'uired in order to bring justice into the

world. In the part o this uni!erse that we know there is great injustice, and

oten the good suer, and oten the wicked prosper, and one hardly knows

which o those is the more annoying# but i you are going to ha!e justice in the

uni!erse as a whole you ha!e to suppose a uture lie to redress the balance

o lie here on earth. o they say that there must be a *od, and there must be

6ea!en and 6ell in order that in the long run there may be justice. &hat is a



!ery curious argument. I you looked at the matter rom a scientiic point o

!iew, you would say, "Ater all, I only know this world. I do not know about the

rest o the uni!erse, but so ar as one can argue at all on probabilities one

would say that probably this world is a air sample, and i there is injustice

here the odds are that there is injustice elsewhere also." upposing you got a

crate o oranges that you opened, and you ound all the top layer o oranges

bad, you would not argue, "&he underneath ones must be good, so as to

redress the balance." )ou would say, "Probably the whole lot is a bad

consignment"# and that is really what a scientiic person would argue about

the uni!erse. 6e would say, "6ere we ind in this world a great deal o

injustice, and so ar as that goes that is a reason or supposing that justice

does not rule in the world# and thereore so ar as it goes it aords a moral

argument against deity and not in a!or o one." + course I know that the sort

o intellectual arguments that I ha!e been talking to you about are not what

really mo!es people. What really mo!es people to belie!e in *od is not any

intellectual argument at all. %ost people belie!e in *od because they ha!e

been taught rom early inancy to do it, and that is the main reason.

&hen I think that the net most powerul reason is the wish or saety, a sort o

eeling that there is a big brother who will look ater you. &hat plays a !ery

proound part in inluencing people3s desire or a belie in *od.



I now want to say a ew words upon a topic which I oten think is not 'uite

suiciently dealt with by <ationalists, and that is the 'uestion whether Christ

was the best and the wisest o men. It is generally taken or granted that we

should all agree that that was so. I do not mysel. I think that there are a good

many points upon which I agree with Christ a great deal more than the

proessing Christians do. I do not know that I could go with 6im all the way,

but I could go with 6im much urther than most proessing Christians can. )ou

will remember that 6e said, "<esist not e!il but whosoe!er shall smite thee on

thy right cheek, turn to him the other also." &hat is not a new precept or a new

principle. It was used by =ao(tse and $uddha some >?? or @?? years beore

Christ, but it is not a principle which as a matter o act Christians accept. I

ha!e no doubt that the present prime minister tanley $aldwinB, or instance,

is a most sincere Christian, but I should not ad!ise any o you to go and smite

him on one cheek. I think you might ind that he thought this tet was intended

in a igurati!e sense.

&hen there is another point which I consider ecellent. )ou will remember that

Christ said, "2udge not lest ye be judged." &hat principle I do not think you

would ind was popular in the law courts o Christian countries. I ha!e known

in my time 'uite a number o judges who were !ery earnest Christians, and





superlati!e goodness o Christ as depicted in the *ospels# and here I may say

that one is not concerned with the historical 'uestion. 6istorically it is 'uite

doubtul whether Christ e!er eisted at all, and i 6e did we do not know

anything about him, so that I am not concerned with the historical 'uestion,

which is a !ery diicult one. I am concerned with Christ as 6e appears in the

*ospels, taking the *ospel narrati!e as it stands, and there one does ind

some things that do not seem to be !ery wise. -or one thing, he certainly

thought that 6is second coming would occur in clouds o glory beore the

death o all the people who were li!ing at that time. &here are a great many

tets that pro!e that. 6e says, or instance, ")e shall not ha!e gone o!er the

cities o Israel till the on o %an be come." &hen he says, "&here are some

standing here which shall not taste death till the on o %an comes into 6is

kingdom"# and there are a lot o places where it is 'uite clear that 6e belie!ed

that 6is second coming would happen during the lietime o many then li!ing.

&hat was the belie o 6is earlier ollowers, and it was the basis o a good deal

o 6is moral teaching. When 6e said, "&ake no thought or the morrow," and

things o that sort, it was !ery largely because 6e thought that the second

coming was going to be !ery soon, and that all ordinary mundane aairs did

not count. I ha!e, as a matter o act, known some Christians who did belie!e

that the second coming was imminent. I knew a parson who rightened his

congregation terribly by telling them that the second coming was !ery



imminent indeed, but they were much consoled when they ound that he was

planting trees in his garden. &he early Christians did really belie!e it, and they

did abstain rom such things as planting trees in their gardens, because they

did accept rom Christ the belie that the second coming was imminent. In that

respect, clearly 6e was not so wise as some other people ha!e been, and 6e

was certainly not superlati!ely wise.

&hen you come to moral 'uestions. &here is one !ery serious deect to my

mind in Christ3s moral character, and that is that 6e belie!ed in hell. I do not

mysel eel that any person who is really prooundly humane can belie!e in

e!erlasting punishment. Christ certainly as depicted in the *ospels did belie!e

in e!erlasting punishment, and one does ind repeatedly a !indicti!e ury

against those people who would not listen to 6is preaching# an attitude which

is not uncommon with preachers, but which does somewhat detract rom

superlati!e ecellence. )ou do not, or instance ind that attitude in ocrates.

)ou ind him 'uite bland and urbane toward the people who would not listen to

him# and it is, to my mind, ar more worthy o a sage to take that line than to

take the line o indignation. )ou probably all remember the sorts o things that

ocrates was saying when he was dying, and the sort o things that he

generally did say to people who did not agree with him.



)ou will ind that in the *ospels Christ said, ")e serpents, ye generation o

!ipers, how can ye escape the damnation o 6ell." &hat was said to people

who did not like 6is preaching. It is not really to my mind 'uite the best tone,

and there are a great many o these things about 6ell. &here is, o course, the

amiliar tet about the sin against the 6oly *host "Whosoe!er speaketh

against the 6oly *host it shall not be orgi!en him neither in this World nor in

the world to come." &hat tet has caused an unspeakable amount o misery in

the world, or all sorts o people ha!e imagined that they ha!e committed the

sin against the 6oly *host, and thought that it would not be orgi!en them

either in this world or in the world to come. I really do not think that a person

with a proper degree o kindliness in his nature would ha!e put ears and

terrors o that sort into the world.

&hen Christ says, "&he on o %an shall send orth his 6is angels, and they

shall gather out o 6is kingdom all things that oend, and them which do

ini'uity, and shall cast them into a urnace o ire# there shall be wailing and

gnashing o teeth"# and 6e goes on about the wailing and gnashing o teeth. It

comes in one !erse ater another, and it is 'uite maniest to the reader that

there is a certain pleasure in contemplating wailing and gnashing o teeth, or

else it would not occur so oten. &hen you all, o course, remember about the

sheep and the goats# how at the second coming 6e is going to di!ide the



sheep rom the goats, and 6e is going to say to the goats, ";epart rom me,

ye cursed, into e!erlasting ire." 6e continues, "And these shall go away into

e!erlasting ire." &hen 6e says again, "I thy hand oend thee, cut it o# it is

better or thee to enter into lie maimed, than ha!ing two hands to go into 6ell,

into the ire that ne!er shall be 'uenched# where the worm dieth not and the

ire is not 'uenched." 6e repeats that again and again also. I must say that I

think all this doctrine, that hell(ire is a punishment or sin, is a doctrine o

cruelty. It is a doctrine that put cruelty into the world and ga!e the world

generations o cruel torture# and the Christ o the *ospels, i you could take

6im as 6is chroniclers represent 6im, would certainly ha!e to be considered

partly responsible or that.

&here are other things o less importance. &here is the instance o the

*adarene swine, where it certainly was not !ery kind to the pigs to put the

de!ils into them and make them rush down the hill into the sea. )ou must

remember that 6e was omnipotent, and 6e could ha!e made the de!ils simply

go away# but 6e chose to send them into the pigs. &hen there is the curious

story o the ig tree, which always rather pu99led me. )ou remember what

happened about the ig tree. "6e was hungry# and seeing a ig tree aar o

ha!ing lea!es, 6e came i haply 6e might ind anything thereon# and when 6e

came to it 6e ound nothing but lea!es, or the time o igs was not yet. And



2esus answered and said unto it 3No man eat ruit o thee hereater or

e!er3 . . . and Peter . . . saith unto 6im 3%aster, behold the ig tree which thou

cursedst is withered away.3" &his is a !ery curious story, because it was not

the right time o year or igs, and you really could not blame the tree. I cannot

mysel eel that either in the matter o wisdom or in the matter o !irtue Christ

stands 'uite as high as some other people known to history. I think I should

put $uddha and ocrates abo!e 6im in those respects.

As I said beore, I do not think that the real reason why people accept religion

has anything to do with argumentation. &hey accept religion on emotional

grounds. +ne is oten told that it is a !ery wrong thing to attack religion,

because religion makes men !irtuous. o I am told# I ha!e not noticed it. )ou

know, o course, the parody o that argument in amuel $utler3s

book, Erewhon Revisited . )ou will remember that in Erewhon there is a

certain 6iggs who arri!es in a remote country, and ater spending some time

there he escapes rom that country in a balloon. &wenty years later he comes

back to that country and inds a new religion in which he is worshiped under

the name o the "un Child," and it is said that he ascended into hea!en. 6e

inds that the -east o the Ascension is about to be celebrated, and he hears

Proessors 6anky and Panky say to each other that they ne!er set eyes on



the man 6iggs, and they hope they ne!er will# but they are the high priests o

the religion o the un Child. 6e is !ery indignant, and he comes up to them,

and he says, "I am going to epose all this humbug and tell the people o

7rewhon that it was only I, the man 6iggs, and I went up in a balloon." 6e was

told, ")ou must not do that, because all the morals o this country are bound

round this myth, and i they once know that you did not ascend into 6ea!en

they will all become wicked"# and so he is persuaded o that and he goes

'uietly away.

&hat is the idea, that we should all be wicked i we did not hold to the Christian

religion. It seems to me that the people who ha!e held to it ha!e been or the

most part etremely wicked. )ou ind this curious act, that the more intense

has been the religion o any period and the more proound has been the

dogmatic belie, the greater has been the cruelty and the worse has been the

state o aairs. In the so(called ages o aith, when men really did belie!e the

Christian religion in all its completeness, there was the In'uisition, with all its

tortures# there were millions o unortunate women burned as witches# and

there was e!ery kind o cruelty practiced upon all sorts o people in the name

o religion.

)ou ind as you look around the world that e!ery single bit o progress in

humane eeling, e!ery impro!ement in the criminal law, e!ery step toward the



diminution o war, e!ery step toward better treatment o the colored races, or

e!ery mitigation o sla!ery, e!ery moral progress that there has been in the

world, has been consistently opposed by the organi9ed churches o the world.

I say 'uite deliberately that the Christian religion, as organi9ed in its churches,

has been and still is the principal enemy o moral progress in the world.

)ou may think that I am going too ar when I say that that is still so. I do not

think that I am. &ake one act. )ou will bear with me i I mention it. It is not a

pleasant act, but the churches compel one to mention acts that are not

pleasant. upposing that in this world that we li!e in today an ineperienced

girl is married to a syphilitic man# in that case the Catholic Church says, "&his

is an indissoluble sacrament. )ou must endure celibacy or stay together. And

i you stay together, you must not use birth control to pre!ent the birth o

syphilitic children." Nobody whose natural sympathies ha!e not been warped

by dogma, or whose moral nature was not absolutely dead to all sense o

suering, could maintain that it is right and proper that that state o things

should continue.

&hat is only an eample. &here are a great many ways in which, at the present

moment, the church, by its insistence upon what it chooses to call morality,



inlicts upon all sorts o people undeser!ed and unnecessary suering. And o

course, as we know, it is in its major part an opponent still o progress and

impro!ement in all the ways that diminish suering in the world, because it

has chosen to label as morality a certain narrow set o rules o conduct which

ha!e nothing to do with human happiness# and when you say that this or that

ought to be done because it would make or human happiness, they think that

has nothing to do with the matter at all. "What has human happiness to do

with morals4 &he object o morals is not to make people happy."

<eligion is based, I think, primarily and mainly upon ear. It is partly the terror

o the unknown and partly, as I ha!e said, the wish to eel that you ha!e a kind

o elder brother who will stand by you in all your troubles and disputes. -ear is

the basis o the whole thing# ear o the mysterious, ear o deeat, ear o

death. -ear is the parent o cruelty, and thereore it is no wonder i cruelty and

religion ha!e gone hand in hand. It is because ear is at the basis o those two

things. In this world we can now begin a little to understand things, and a little

to master them by help o science, which has orced its way step by step

against the Christian religion, against the churches, and against the opposition

o all the old precepts. cience can help us to get o!er this cra!en ear in

which mankind has li!ed or so many generations. cience can teach us, and



I think our own hearts can teach us, no longer to look around or imaginary

supports, no longer to in!ent allies in the sky, but rather to look to our own

eorts here below to make this world a better place to li!e in, instead o the

sort o place that the churches in all these centuries ha!e made it.

We want to stand upon our own eet and look air and s'uare at the world# its

good acts, its bad acts, its beauties, and its ugliness# see the world as it is

and be not araid o it. Con'uer the world by intelligence and not merely by

being sla!ishly subdued by the terror that comes rom it. &he whole

conception o *od is a conception deri!ed rom the ancient +riental

despotisms. It is a conception 'uite unworthy o ree men. When you hear

people in church debasing themsel!es and saying that they are miserable

sinners, and all the rest o it, it seems contemptible and not worthy o sel(

respecting human beings. We ought to stand up and look the world rankly in

the ace. We ought to make the best we can o the world, and i it is not so

good as we wish, ater all it will still be better than what these others ha!e

made o it in all these ages. A good world needs knowledge, kindliness, and

courage# it does not need a regretul hankering ater the past or a ettering o

the ree intelligence by the words uttered long ago by ignorant men. It needs a

earless outlook and a ree intelligence. It needs hope or the uture, not



looking back all the time toward a past that is dead, which we trust will be ar

surpassed by the uture that our intelligence can create.

Documents

Why I Am Not a Christian - Bertrand Russell (1927 Lecture)