WHY DO CITIZENS PROTEST IN NEW DEMOCRACIES?: A …

WHY DO CITIZENS PROTEST IN NEW DEMOCRACIES?:

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PROTEST POTENTIAL

IN MEXICO, SOUTH AFRICA, AND SOUTH KOREA

by

YOUNG-CHOUL KIM, B.S., M.A.

A DISSERTATION

IN

POLITICAL SCIENCE

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in

Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Approved

Chairperson of the Committee

" < • • "• ^ \

Accepted

Dean of the Graduate School

December, 2003

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT vi

LIST OF TABLES viii

LIST OF FIGURES ix

CHAPTER

L INTRODUCTION 1

Organization of the Study and Summary 6

IL THE LITERATURE 9

Unconventional Forms of Political Participation 10

Concept of Unconventional Forms of Political Participation 12

Perspectives of Unconventional Forms

of Political Participation 19

Socio-Psychological Perspective 21

Rational Choice Perspective 26

Cultural Change Perspective 30

The Other Perspective 34

Summary 35

m. CASE STUDIES 39

Mexico 40

Historical Background 40

Democratization 42

Summary and Unconventional Forms of Political Participation 44

South Africa 48


Democratization 50

Summary and Unconventional Forms of

Political Participation 52

South Korea 55


Democratization 60

Summary and Unconventional Forms of Political Participation 62

Summary 64

IV. VARIABLES, DATA, AND METHOD 75

Introduction 75

Hypotheses 77

Indicators and Variables 78

The Dependent Variable: Unconventional Forms of

Political Participation 78

The Independent Variables 80

Baseline 80

Cognitive Skills 82

Value Changes 83

Dissatisfaction 84

The Control Variable and Dummy Variables 87

Data Source 89

Method 91

Summary 92

ni

V. BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN

THE VARIABLES 95

Variations of Dependent and Independent Variables 96

Bivariate Relationships Between Independent and Dependent Variables 99

Associations Between Variables in the Three New

Democracies 100

Correlations Between Independent Variables 101

Correlation Between the Independent Variables and Dependent Variable 102

Associations Between Variables In Mexico, South Africa,

and South Korea 104

Corre lations Between Independent Variables 104

Correlation Between the Independent Variables and Dependent Variable 105

VI. DETERMINANTS OF UNCONVENTIONAL FORMS OF

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 112

Intra-Differences in the Three New Democracies 112

Baseline 115

Cognitive Skills 116

Dissatisfaction 117

Value Change 118

Dummies 118

Summary of Intra-Differences 119

Differences by the Process of Democratization 121

Inter-State Differences 123

IV

Mexico 124

South Africa 125

SouthKorea 126

Summary of Inter-State Model Differences 126

Summary 130

VL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 139

Closing Thoughts 144

REFERENCES 146

ABSTRACT

This study focuses on individual level explanations of unconventional forms

of political participation in the three new democracies: Mexico, South Africa, and

South Korea. The purpose of the study is to examine four most discussed approaches

on protest: (1) Baseline, (2) Cognitive Skills, (3) Dissatisfaction, and (4) Value

Change approaches. Various determinants from these four approaches at individual

level are hypothesized to affect unconventional forms of political participation. First,

the Baseline approach hypothesizes that younger, male, and more educated

individuals with higher incomes are more likely to participate in protest activities.

Second, the Cognitive Skills approach assumes that as individuals are more

cognitively mobilized, they are more likely to engage in protest activities. Third, the

Dissatisfaction approach hypothesizes that individuals' dissatisfaction on their

govemments and their material well-being and life increases the likelihood of

participation in protest activities. Finally, the Value Change approach assumes that

individuals' new values such as postmaterialist concerns promote their participation in

protest activities. To test those four approaches nine predictor variables are raised.

The data set employed in this study is derived from the first, second, and third

World Values Surveys in 1981-82, 1990-93, and 1995-97 for the three new

democracies. In order to test these main hypotheses and sub-hypotheses, this study

conducts OLS regression analyses pooled data set of three countries as well as data set

of each country.

The results of the study define that there exist not only intra-differences, but

also inter-state differences on the four approaches' explanatory power to protest

VI

potential in the three new democracies. For example. Cognitive Skills approach's

explanatory power is stronger than that of Dissatisfaction approach in the three new

democracies. Baseline factors and Value Change approach appear to have relatively

strong explanatory power to protest potential in the three new democracies. However,

Dissatisfaction approach's explanatory power to protest potential is very limited in the

three new democracies. In addition, among the four approaches. Cognitive Skills

approach appears to have the strongest explanatory power in relation to protest

potential in Mexico and South Africa. The second powerfiil approach in the two

nations is Baseline factors. In contrast, the strongest explanatory power in relation to

protest potential in South Korea is made by Baseline factors and followed by

Cognitive Skills and Value Change approaches.

In addition, the results of the study also find that there exist differences on the

four approaches' explanatory power to protest potential in the three new democracies

by the process of democratization. Value Change approach's explanatory power to

protest potential had increased during the process of democratization in the three new

democracies, whereas Baseline factors. Cognitive Skills, and Dissatisfaction

approaches' explanatory power to protest potential had decreased in that times.

vn

LIST OF TABLES

3-1: Comparative Cross-National Socio-Economic Indicators in Mexico, South Africa, and SouthKorea 67

3-2: World Values Surveys and Inauguration of Democracy in Mexico,

South Africa, and South Korea 68

3-3: Unconventional Forms of Political Participation in Mexico (%) 69

3-4: Unconventional Forms of Political Participation in South Africa (%) 71

3-5: Unconventional Forms of Political Participation in South Korea (%) 73

4-1: World Values Surveys in Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea 94

5-1: Variations of Unconventional Forms of Political Participation (%) 108

5-2: Statistics of Independent Variables 109

5-3: Associations Between Variables In The Three New Democracies 110

5-4: Associations Between Variables in Mexico, South Africa, and SouthKorea Il l

6-1: Multiple Regression of Protest Potential in the Three New Democracies 132

6-2: Multiple Regression of Protest Potential

in the Three New Democracies (R-square Change) 133

6-3: Multiple Regression of Protest Potential in Mexico 134

6-4: Multiple Regression of Protest Potential in South Africa 135

6-5: Multiple Regression of Protest Potential in South Korea 136

6-6: Multiple Regression of Protest Potential in Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea (R-square Change) 137

6-7: Resuhs of Multiple Regression Analyses 138

vni

LIST OF FIGURES

2-1: Conceptual Diagram of the Dimensionality of Unconventional

Political Behavior 38

3-1: Unconventional Forms of Political Participation in Mexico 70

3-2: Unconventional Forms of Political Participation in South Africa 72

3-3: Unconventional Forms of Political Participation in South Korea 74

IX

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

It was already clear by the early 1970s that mass unconventional political participation - doing things that went well beyond voting and canvassing for political parties - was spreading out and becoming part of the political resources of many ordinary people. (Marsh 1990, p. xv)

This is a study of imconventional forms of political participation in new

democracies - Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea. One important objective of this

research will be to investigate the sources of unconventional forms of political

participation. Specifically, this study tests four plausible approaches/models concerning

the sources of unconventional forms of political participation, that have been developed

in the Western democracies: Dissatisfaction, Cognitive Skills (or Resource Mobilization),

Value Change, and Baseline approaches. In this way, it will be possible to define which

approach is more applicable in one country as well as in the new democracies. In

addition, this study investigates the role of each approach in protest action at different

stages of democratization: pre-democratic fransition and post-democratic transition.

Through a cross-temporal comparison of these two critical periods, we are able to analyze

which approach is a crucial factor in determining protest action in the new democracies.

The notion of political participation is at the center of the concept of the

democratic country because democracy refers to rule by the people. Because social goals

in a democracy should be "defined and carried out through discussion, popular interest,

and involvement in politics," democracy requires "an active citizemy" (Dahon 2000, p.

927). Democracy should be a celebration of an involved public. Public participation.

sometimes, "bursts beyond the bounds of conventional politics to include demonstrations,

protests, and other forms of unconventional activity" (Dalton 1988, p. 67). Therefore, we

have two kinds of political participation: conventional and unconventional forms.

Unconventional forms of political participation (peaceful political protest) usually

exclude violent forms of protest such as sabotage, guerrilla warfare, hijacking,

assassination, bombing, revolutions, kidnapping, and war (March 1977). Like

conventional forms of participation, unconventional forms of political participation are

"an essential part of the democratic process" (Dalton 1988, p. 67).

Much scholarship had focused on conventional forms of political participation

like voting or violent forms of protest like revolution, riots, and guerrilla war. However,

since the waves of political protest swept Western Europe and North America (civil

rights demonstrations, anti-war demonstrations, enviroimiental protests, etc.) in the late

1960s, the unconventional forms of political participation were more carefiilly analyzed.

Thus, today unconventional forms of political participation are mainly measured through

five forms of actions- signing petition, attending demonstration, joining boycott, joining

unofficial strike, and occupying buildings or factories (Barnes et al , 1979).

Scholars have come at explaining unconventional forms of political participation

basically in two ways. The first looks at differences between states, while the second

looks within states. The former approach favors the identification of system-level

characteristics, usually labeled institutional, to account for variation of unconventional

participation from one state to the next. Data analysis, then, is on aggregates, and the

dependent variable is the cross-national level of unconventional participation behavior

from coimtry to country.

In contrast, when the interest is within states, researchers tend to seek individual-

level characteristics. The researchers begin with a research question: Why do citizens

protest? The data analysis, then, is on surveys, and the dependent variable conceived of

as the likelihood that an individual would participate in unconventional forms of political

participation.

Extensive prior research of individual-level on unconventional forms of political

participation is usually based on three general perspectives: socio-psychological, rational

choice, and cultural change perspectives. From the three general perspectives and

another so-called a baseline model or social structure model there exist four plausible

approaches/models concerning the sources of unconventional forms of political

participation: dissatisfaction, cognitive skills, value change, and baseline approaches.

These approaches provide various indicators for explaining unconventional forms of

political participation. Various determinants from these four approaches at individual

level are hypothesized to affect unconventional forms of political participation. First, the

dissatisfaction approach hypothesizes that an increase in political cynicism causes people

to engage for more protest action. Second, the cognitive skills approach assumes that the

higher political sophistication individuals have, the more likely they will engage in

protest behavior. Third, the value change approach assumes that if postmaterialist values

increase, then the degree of protest action tends to increase. Finally, the baseline

approach hypothesizes that younger, male, and more educated individuals with higher

incomes are more likely to participate in protest activities.

Research on unconventional participation has been confined largely to liberal or

'old' democracies. A vacuum exists in the analysis of authoritarian and semi-

authoritarian regimes. Do we find similar trends or patterns of unconventional forms of

political participation in societies with different types of state structures, especially new

democracies? Unconventional forms of political participation are a regular feature of

democratic politics in new democracies as well as in advanced democracies. Since the

early 1980s, a democratic transformation has occurred in politics of new democracies

from Eastern Europe to Latin America. Authoritarian regimes, ranging from military

dictatorships to one-party hegemonic regimes, have been replaced by democracies. The

deepening of democracy in these new democracies, in turn, has opened up new spaces for

participation, including unconventional forms of political participation. By most

accounts, unconventional forms of political participation have now become a regular

feature of politics in new democracies, as citizens voice their discontent about everything

from the failure of democratic reform or economic policies to enviroimiental protection.

Although recent scholarship on politics of new democracies has recognized the

significance of imconventional forms of political participation, the research on the topic

has, to date, been surprisingly limited. A rich case study literature has developed, but

many of these studies examine a single social movement and lack a comparative focus.

Moreover, this research has focused on only one country, and has tested only a limited

number of hypotheses about the determinants of unconventional participation (e.g.,

Candache and Kulisheck 1998).

In order to fill the gap in research on unconventional forms of political

participation in new democracies, we test competing approaches of unconventional forms

of political participation in Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea in three time periods,

1981, 1990-91, and 1995-98. By extending the analysis to a greater number of countries

and time periods than those examined in previous studies, we seek to develop a richer

understanding of what motivates citizens in new democracies to engage in

unconventional forms of political participation.

Inauguration of democracy in Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea was almost

simultaneous in the late 1980s or early 1990s although these coimtries have experienced

diverse cultural heritages and varying stages of development. Furthermore, the three new

democracies in different geographical regions have commonly experienced massive

protests by citizeruy in the 1980s, which replaced authoritarian with democratic regimes.

Demonstrations by the mass publics were a key factor contributing to the inauguration of

democracy in the three new democracies in the 1980s. In addition, elite-challenging

imconventional forms of political participation in these countries have continued during

the democratic consolidation period in the 1990s.

Could these four approaches - dissatisfaction, cognitive skills, value change, and

baseline - developed in the Western democracies be applicable for describing

unconventional forms of political participation in the 'new' democracies? The purpose of

this study is to test the applicability of the four approaches for explaining unconventional

forms of political participation in new democracies. In this way, this study shows which

approaches are most applicable to explain imconventional forms of political participation

in one country as well as the new democracies. Therefore, because this study tests the

applicability of the four approaches for explaining unconventional forms of political

participation in new democracies, it will help confirm or falsify current approaches of


This study analyzes the data relating to unconventional forms of political

participation from the first, second, and third waves of the World Values Surveys

conducted in 1981-82, 1990, and 1995-96 in Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea.

These three countries are the only new democracies in which all three World Values

Surveys were conducted. The first wave of the World Values Surveys had been

conducted before these countries began their democratic transition. The second wave of

the World Values Surveys had conducted just before inauguration of democracy in

Mexico and South Africa and after inauguration of democracy in South Korea. The third

waves of the World Values Surveys were conducted during the democratization period in

these countries.

Organization of the Study and Summarv

A vast literature on both unconventional forms of political participation and

democratization guides this study of unconventional forms of political participation in the

three new democracies. This literature is the subject of Chapters II and III. Chapter II

opens with a discussion of unconventional forms of political participation and how the

concept might be explained. It then moves on to review the argument of various

approaches to unconventional forms of political participation. Chapter III examines the

case studies of the three new democracies: Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea. It is

a general description of the democratization process and unconventional forms of

political participation in the countries. Chapter IV explores research design. It describes

data, variables, and methodology. It opens with a general description of the

operationalization of variables. It then moves on to describe the datasets employed for

this study. How various determinants from these approaches at individual level are

hypothesized to affect unconventional forms of political participation is a subject of

Chapter IV. The next section of the Chapter describes how the data are analyzed. Micro

or individual-level analyses of the relationship between various explanatory variables and

unconventional forms of political participation of citizenry are the subject of Chapter V

and VI. Chapter V shows first descriptive information on variables utilized in the study

and then bivariate relationships between the independent variables and dependent

variable (protest potential). Chapter VI presents the results of multivariate analysis of

protest potential in the new democracies. The final chapter summarizes this study and

considers possible future directions for new and related research.

This study will demonstrate that unconventional forms of political participation

by citizenry were a key factor confributing to the inauguration of democracies in the three

new democracies in 1980s. The elite-challenging forms of participation in the new

democracies have stimulated sustainable democratic reforms or liberalization on the

economy during their democratic consolidation periods in the 1990s. This study also

shows that unconventional forms of political participation become a regular feature of

politics even in the new democracies.

In addition, this study will confirm that the previous approaches concerning

unconventional forms of political participation do apply even in new democracies.

However, thus far it may appear that the variations of unconventional forms of political

participation are somewhat different in terms of different countries and time periods.

Finally, this study is expected to show that despite the divergent political cultures,

institutions, and historical backgrounds among the new democracies, there seem to be

some striking commonalities in terms of factors that prompt their citizens to engage in


CHAPTER II

THE LITERATURE

Certain social experiences lead people to form very different views of the political system and their own place within it. Social structure and different learning experiences place constraints upon the kinds of judgments people make. Mental skills combine with basic values to provide people with a basis for political judgment. The nature of these judgments cause people to make choices about their political involvement, - to favor inaction, conventional political activities, protest methods or perhaps even both. (Marsh 1990, p. 9)

Chapter II presents a review of the relevant scholarly literature on

unconventional forms of political participation. This chapter opens with a discussion

of various forms of unconventional political behavior. This section shows the

conceptual diagram of unconventional political behavior from least and most extreme

and how the concept of unconventional forms of political participation (peacefiil

political protest), the dependent variable of this study, might be operationalized and

measured. The next section of Chapter II concentrates on the theoretical background

of unconventional forms of political participation. This section consists of three

general perspectives and a baseline model to explain unconventional forms of

political participation of the mass publics. This section explains not only the

assumptions and arguments, but also the strengths and weaknesses of each perspective.

This section also discusses various approaches to unconventional forms of political

participation that are based on the four perspectives. Thus, this section provides a

theoretical background of this study.

Unconventional Forms of Political Participation

The nature of citizen behavior in the advanced industrial democracies has

shifted in fiindamental ways during the latter half of the 20th century. The past

several decades have also seen a dramatic process of social and political

modernization in much of the developing world. The democratization wave of the

past decade has transformed the political systems and the citizenry in the new

democracies of central and Eastern Europe, East Asia, and elsewhere. In addition, the

global wave of democratization in the 1980s and 1990s transformed the role of the

citizenry in many of the new democracies in Eastern Europe, East Asia, Latin

America and South Africa. These new events provide distinctive opportunities to test

our theories about the nature of citizen behavior including unconventional forms of

political participation, expand the boundaries of knowledge, and develop new theories.

By political participation is meant those actions that citizens of a democratic

country will engage in to influence political events and policy. Such actions are of

two kinds: conventional and unconventional forms of political participation.

Conventional forms of political participation occur largely within the context of party

politics with its meetings, campaigns, canvassing, and dealings with fiinctionaries and

officials. It also includes those actions that citizens more rarely take individually to

influence officials through the proper channels. Conventional forms of political

participation are the kind of political behavior that political scientists call 'elite-

directed' participation - the legitimate pathways of citizen involvement in politics that

are sanctioned and encouraged by the elites and by the rules of a democratic regime

(Marsh 1990, p. 1).

10

Unconventional forms of political behavior, the main topic of this study, are

different from conventional forms of political behavior (Marsh 1990, p. 1). Citizen

participation occasionally bursts beyond the bounds of conventional politics to

include demonstrations, protests, and other forms of unconventional activities.

Although protesters often go beyond the normal channels of democratic politics, they

are nevertheless an essential part of the democratic process. The protests that

accompanied the civil rights demonstrations in the United States during the 1960s, the

environmental protests of the past decades in Western Europe, and the people-power

protests that brought democracy to East Asia and Eastern Europe during the 1980s

and 1990s illustrate how the mass public can force political systems to respond,

change, and grow.

By the early 1960s unconventional forms of political participation were not

extensively studied by political scientists because there was so little protest. In this

period unconventional forms of political participation were thought of as a

predemocratic form of political action. It was a non-legitimate class of political

behaviors that belonged to a previous age before the electoral emancipation of the

masses and universal franchise ostensibly made mass protest unnecessary. However,

"the waves of unconventional forms of political participation that swept" the Western

democracies in the late 1950s and 1960s "startled scholars as well as politicians"

(Barnes et al., 1979, p. 13). In this period the Western democracies had faced new

phenomenon of the sudden rise in unconventional forms of politics as well as the

decline in levels of trust in government and increasing political sophistication.

Scholars were eventually called upon to explain "the new phenomenon of the sudden

11

rise" in unconventional forms of political participation in the Western democracies

(Barnes et al., 1979, p. 13).

Concept of Unconventional Forms of Political Participation

As a research topic for political scientists, the concept of political protest or

unconventional forms of political participation have been gradually changed. In the

early 1960s studies that included political protest tended to make no conceptual

distinction between protest and insurrection. Things as innocuous as lawfiil

demonstrations were viewed by political scientists only as some weaker form of riot.

A good example of this is Almond and Verba's classical study. The Civic Culture

(1963). Respondents to their surveys were asked to say what they might do to oppose

an unjust law. Those respondents who replied that they might join demonstrations,

protest meetings, and boycotts were coded together with those who said they would

resort to riot, rebellion, and internal war.

In the early 1970s, however, scholars sought to separate peaceful political

protest activities from other unorthodox political behaviors. For instance, a group of

researchers at Yale University (Taylor and Hudson 1972) built an aggregate data

profile of political behavior in 136 countries and coded three kinds of unorthodox

political behavior: protest demonstrations, riots, and armed attacks. The definitions

offered for each category are:

A protest demonstration is a non-violent gathering of people organized for the announced purpose of protesting against a regime, government, or one or more of its leaders; or against its ideology, intended policy, or lack of policy; or against its previous action or intended action, (p. 66)

A riot is a violent demonstration or disturbance involving a large number of people. 'Violent' implies the use of physical force, which is usually evinced

12

by the destruction of property, the wounding or killing of people of the authorities, the use of riot control equipment and by the rioters use of various weapons, (p. 67)

An armed attack is an act of violent political conflict carried out by (or on behalf of) an organized group with the object of weakening or destroying the power exercised by another organized group, (p. 67)

Indeed, in the Western democracies, the growth of the New Left and the rise of

orderly protest movements like the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament encouraged

the view of peaceful protest as a democratic but elite-challenging form of behavior.

In America, the Civil Rights Movement and direct action against the war in Vietnam

also appeared to fit a model of a widening political action repertory in a democratic

system. It was clear that the question was essentially one of legitimacy. To what

extent can political protest be viewed as a legitimate form of political behavior in the

same way as conventional political behavior is seen as legitimate? An important

distinction between peaceful political protest activities and unorthodox political

behavior must be drawn between legitimacy and legality. Many forms of political

protest that are not lawful may nevertheless enjoy a degree of legitimacy. In a

democracy there can be a certain nobility in going to jail for one's beliefs. It can

bring some longer-term dividends of political effectiveness too. In new democracies

such as South Africa and South Korea, for instance, during the pre-democratization

period many political leaders, students, and laborers went to jail for their protests

against authoritarian govemments. Their protests against authoritarian governments

were a key factor contributing to the inauguration of democracy. In addition, many

great democratic reforms of the past had their origins in extra-parliamentary

movements whose behavior frequently transgressed the law in the name of superior

moral force (March 1977).

13

Political protest was legitimately a topic of interest of equal significance when

placed alongside conventional forms of political behavior. Yet, like any other

emotive word in popular usage, "protest" has been wom almost featureless and is

rendered unsuitable as an object for scientific calibration. Therefore, Marsh (1977, p.

41) used "unorthodox political behavior" instead of "political protest." According to

Marsh, unorthodox political behavior is more accurate since it immediately implies a

distinction between unorthodox and orthodox political behavior. This distinction rests

on the presence or absence of normative rules which positively sanction and facilitate

the conduct of orthodox politics but which are absent in the case of unorthodox

politics. More precisely, there are actual rules and laws that facilitate the conduct of

elections and the representation of interests in orthodox party politics, but there are

none that encourage the regular occurrence of street protest, demonstrations, boycotts,

rent strikes, political strikes, the occupation of administrative premises, and so on.

There is, however, a great number of laws that restrict or forbid their use.

This key legalistic divide may be found implicit in definitions employed by

other researchers. Kaase (1972, p. 184) speaks of "unconventional political behavior

that can be defined as behavior that does not correspond to the legal and customary

regime norms regulating political participation." Likewise, Muller (1972, p. 932)

holds "unconventional political behavior" to be that which "deviates from regime

norms," but he correctly excludes essentially private deviations from norms relating to

the use of bribery, the theft of materials, or political espionage. Muller (1972, p. 934)

also adds a variable dimension in that "unconventional activities can be classified

according to whether or not they possess combinations of properties which are more

14

or less stressful to the regime," and he proposed a hierarchy of stress factors in the

coalescence of three variables:

1. the extent of deviation from regime norms

2. the extent that behavior is organized

3. the use or non-use of violence.

And Marsh (1977) added:

4. the numbers mobilized.

Muller's conceptualization is useful in that he suggests a progressive departure

from the orthodox pathways of political redress towards the use (alternatively or

additionally) of unorthodox methods, which need not immediately involve actual law-

breaking (Muller 1979).

Von Eschen, Kirk, and Pinard (1969, p. 313) coined the appealing phrase

"disorderly politics" juxtaposed to "routine politics" to describe the distinction made

above between the politics of voting and representation and the politics of protest.

Unfortunately perhaps, what they describe as "routine politics" is in many places

conducted in a distinctly disorderly manner and their own thesis goes on to

demonstrate convincingly that "disorderly politics requires and has an organizational

substructure just as does routine politics," and so, despite appearances, is often rather

an orderly or even a routine process. (Von Eschen et al., 1969, p. 313).

Many researchers (Cohen 1971; Macfariane 1971; Van den Haag 1972) often

use the terms "direct action" and "civil disobedience" interchangeably with a

generalized notion of protest behavior when these terms really describe rather

specialized forms of protest. Discussion of these terms has a strong appeal for

political philosophers and social theorists who are interested in the many facets of

15

people's relationship with the state. According to Cohen (1971, p. 41), "civil

disobedience is a deliberate unlawful protest" which can be an important factor in

unorthodox political behavior. He also added "most protest is not civil disobedience

because civil disobedience necessarily involves some deliberate infraction of the law"

(Cohen 1971, p. 41).

Macfariane (1971, p. 13) also makes a good case for the use of the term

"political disobedience" to describe protest. He provides a legally oriented definition:

Political disobedience embraces the performance of many acts prohibited by the state or the law, or as the non-performance of any act required by the State or the law, with the purpose of securing changes in the actions, policies, or laws of the State, (p. 13)

Marsh (1977) developed a model of this participation mode. As Figure 2-1 shows, he

ordered the various forms of protest behavior along a continuum from least to most

extreme. It is a kind of conceptual diagram and the dimension they form, to the

concepts discussed above.

According to McAllister's explanation (McAllister 1992, pp. 63-69), the first

threshold indicates a transitional phase between conventional and unconventional

politics. Signing petitions, painting slogans on walls, and participating in lawful

demonstrations are unorthodox political activities but are still within the bounds of

accepted democratic norms. That is, these three techniques may be used in pursuit of

both forms of behavior, although demonstration is more usually an unorthodox

technique. The second threshold is illustrated by boycotts which marks a fairly

unequivocal entry into political unorthodoxy and the first step of direct action.

McAllister (1992, pp. 63) emphasizes the importance of the second threshold because

it marks "the change to techniques that involve only semilegal." Unofficial strikes

16

and rent strikes mark a third threshold position. Activities at this level or beyond

involve illegal but nonviolent acts. Activities in the third threshold mark an entry into

political disobedience and civil disobedience, especially in the case of rent strikes.

Finally, the fourth threshold includes unlawful demonstrations, occupations, and

damage to property. Activities at this level are "violent activities such as personal

injury or physical damage for political ends" (McAllister 1992, p. 68). Therefore,

they exceed what is accepted or tolerable in a democracy. These activities are in the

province of political crime. For the relationship among the different thresholds,

Dalton (1996, p. 73) explains that "research shows that unconventional political

action is cumulative." Thus, "individuals active at any one threshold also generally

participate in milder forms of protest" (Dalton 1996, p. 73).

Historically, protest has been related with social conflict and more violent,

extreme types of social disturbance (revolution, rebellion, revolt) like the French

Revolution in 1789. Since the 1970s, when there was a rise of peaceful political

protests in Europe and North America, research has emphasized the difference

between violent and non-violent, as well as conventional and unconventional forms of

political participation (Barnes et al., 1979).

This study focuses on unconventional forms of political participation - the

dependent variable of this study. The concept that means "peaceful political protest"

includes signing petitions, joining in boycotts, attending lawful demonstrations,

joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings or factories. The concept, however,

excludes political crime - sabotage, guerrilla warfare, hijacking, assassination,

bombing, kidnapping, riot, armed attack, revolutions, and so on.

17

Signing a petition, which has never been considered as an unconventional

form of action by Inglehart (1997), and attending demonstrations are unorthodox

political activities, but these are still in the boundaries of democratic norms (Marsh

1977). Boycotts that would fall under the criteria of semi-legal need different

techniques of direct action than the two previously mentioned ones. Thus, boycotts

would also mobilize different participants from other forms. Unofficial strikes and

peaceful occupation of land or factory, which are still non-violent but usually illegal,

also are the most demanding from participants and challenging for target. Although it

could be assumed that there exist differences between participation in all these forms

of unconventional action, these five different types of political action are considered

as unconventional forms of political participation in this study. Therefore, this study

uses the same definition of unconventional forms of political participation provided

by World Values Surveys.

The following section concentrates on the theoretical background of

unconventional forms of political participation. This section looks over three general

perspectives and a baseline model to explain unconventional forms of political

participation by the mass publics. This section explains not only the assumptions and

arguments but also the strengths and weaknesses of each perspective to understand

unconventional forms of political participation. Therefore, this section is devoted to

arguments of testable theories, previous research, and design of independent variables,

which form a set of possible determinants for describing unconventional forms of

political participation with specific emphasis on important characters for the three

new democracies: Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea.

18

Perspectives of Unconventional Forms of Political Participation

Scholars have come at explaining unconventional forms of political

participation basically in two ways in terms of the usage of different units of analyses.

The first looks at differences between nations, while the second looks within nations.

The former approach favors the identification of system-level characteristics, usually

labeled institutional, to account for variation of unconventional forms of political

participation from one nation to the next. Data analysis, then, is on aggregates, and

the dependent variable is the level of unconventional forms of political participation

from country to country (e.g.. Verba et al., 1978; Glass et al., 1984; Grofman and

Lijphart et al., 1986; Powell 1986; Jackman 1987; Dalton 1988).

This system-level approach is useful for sorting out cross-national differences.

However, it is less useful in accounting for differences within a nation because the

institutional factors identified are mostly constants for any one country. For instance,

the electoral system of a nation generally applies to all citizens equally. Therefore,

when the interest is within nations, researchers tend to seek individual-level

characteristics, usually called socio-psychological. The data analysis, then, is on

surveys, and the dependent variable conceived of as the likelihood that an individual

would participate in unconventional forms of political activities. A common example

is the effect of socioeconomic status on unconventional forms of political

participation. The literature on this approach is large and long standing (Campbell et

al., 1960; Lipset 1960; Marsh 1977, 1990; Verba et al., 1978; Bames et al., 1979;

Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). In spite of these differences, both the state and

individual-level approaches contribute importantly to an understanding of


19

Extensive research on unconventional forms of political participation at the

individual level has suggested various approaches. Before this study tackles the

problems of measuring unconventional forms of political participation in three new

democracies and examining the results, it is necessary to introduce each four general

perspectives to understand unconventional forms of political participation by citizenry.

Why do citizens protest? Every protester has an individual explanation for his

or her action. Some people are stimulated by a commitment to an issue or ideology.

Other protesters are motivated by a general opposition to the govemment and political

system and search for opportunities to display their feelings. Still others are caught

up in the excitement and sense of comradeship that protests produce or simply

accompany a friend to be where the action is. Social scientists have tried to

systematize these individual motivations to explain the general sources of protest

activity.

In order to study individual differences in protest, three general perspectives

have been most common: socio-psychological perspective (dissatisfaction approach),

rational choice perspective (cognitive skills or resource mobilization approach),

cultural change perspective (value change approach). In addition to these three, there

exists another useful perspective called a baseline model or social structure model.

The first two perspectives have opposite views on protests. From these three general

perspectives and a baseline model various approaches are provided to explain


20

Socio-Psychological Perspective

The socio-psychological perspective stresses the influence of personal

resources, attitudes, and institutional structures in explaining patterns of action (e.g.

Verba et al., 1978, 1995). A dissatisfaction approach is based on this perspective.

This approach maintains that protest is primarily based on feelings of frustration and

political alienation. Dalton (1996) provides an explanation on the origin of the

approach:

Analysts since Aristotle have seen personal dissatisfaction and striving for better conditions as the root cause of political violence. For Aristotle, the principal causes of revolution were the aspirations for economic or political equality on the part of the common people who lack it or the aspirations of oligarchs for greater inequality than they had. Much later, Tocqueville linked the violence of the 1789 French Revolution to unfulfilled aspirations expanding more rapidly than objective conditions, thereby increasing dissatisfaction and the pressure for change. Karl Marx also similarly posited personal dissatisfaction and the competition between the haves and have-nots as the driving force of history and the ultimate source of political revolt, (p. 77)

The dissatisfaction approach purports to explain what drives people to commit acts of

violence, especially political violence. In the 1930s frustration-aggression theory

formalized centuries of tradition and folk psychology. According to its formulators,

the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration

and, conversely, the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression.

James C. Davies (1962, p. 6) draws upon "the psychological model of

frustration-aggression" to explain the emergence of widespread political protest.

Specifically, he argues that political violence is most likely to take place when a

prolonged period of rising expectations and rising gratifications is followed by a short

period of sharp reversal. It is the J-curve of Davies. Failure to meet these rising

expectations leads to widespread frustration, laying the groundwork for political

21

violence. Davies (1962, pp. 5-8) suggests several stages in the emergence of

collective violence and political protest from the wellspring of individual anger. First,

social, economic, or political reverses lead to widely shared frustration. Second, this

frustration manifests itself in widespread increases in interpersonal aggression. Third,

the people's anger focuses on the govemment, apparently because of the efforts of

dissident leaders and their ideologies. Finally, interpersonal violence declines while

their frustration decreases.

About the same time Davies measured system frustration and searched for

specific historical instance of political violence and revolution that fit his general

theory, Ivo and Rosalind Feierabend (1972, pp. 136-83) undertook to apply a similar

hypothesis to cross-national variations in domestic political instability. Specifically,

they identified political instability as a form of aggressive behavior. Like Davies, the

Feierabends (1972) specify a number of factors that intervene between systemic

frustration and overt political instability. For example, "constructive reform might

buy off discontent, the regime might successfully repressor deflect potential dissent,

or people may vent their anger in interpersonal rather than regime-targeted political

protest" (p. 163). Nevertheless, they conclude that in "the relative absence of these

qualifying conditions, aggressive behavior in the form of political instability is

predicted to be the consequence of systemic frustration" (Feierabend and Feierabend

1966, p. 180). Rather than identify a few historical instances that appear to fit their

hypothesis, the Feierabands (1972) collected aggregate data on socioeconomic

conditions, political repressiveness, and political instability in 84 countries between

the years 1948 and 1962.

22

Both of these early efforts by Davies and Feierabands suffer from common

shortcomings. Frustration-aggression theory is ultimately a hypothesis about

individual states of mind and consequent behavior. Yet, both Davies and Feierabands

characterize and measure frustration in terms of aggregate quantitative indicators of

prosperity. Their approach obscures the problem of how individual frustrations add

up to collective political violence. Furthermore, neither approach successfully sorts

out the relative contribution of intervening factors like leadership or the regime's

coercive capability in determining the actual levels of political protest.

In his book. Why Men Rebel (1970), Ted Robert Gurr culminated decades of

investigation into the psychological origins of political protest and lay the

groundwork for 20 years of subsequent research and debate. Despite its complexity,

the psychology of frustration-aggression remains at the heart of Gurr's explanatory

model. Gurr (1970) writes that "the primary source of the human capacity for

political protest appears to be the frustration-aggression mechanism" (p. 12).

Frustration does not necessarily lead to protest, and protest for some men may be

motivated by expectations of gain. The anger induced by frustration, however, is a

motivating force that disposes men to aggression, irrespective of its instrumentalities.

If frustrations are sufficiently prolonged or sharply felt, aggression is quite likely.

Frustration arises mainly from the expectation of relative deprivation. Relative

deprivation develops from the actor's perception of discrepancy between their value

expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and

conditions of life to which people think they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities

are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping.

23

According to Gumey and Tiemey (1982, pp. 34-39), several characteristics of

this idea deserve emphasis on the article. First, despite Gurr's tendency to speak in

terms of collectivities, relative deprivation remains rooted in individual perceptions

and self-assessments. Second, since relative deprivation depends on self-assessments

rather than objective conditions, absolutely deprived people may experience relatively

low level of relative deprivation if they fatalistically expect little from their lives.

Alternatively, people who appear well-off may still experience intense relative

deprivation if their expectations significantly exceed their capabilities. Third, both

expectations and capabilities represent an aggregate assessment on the part of

individuals. We all possess many different values and aspirations.

If we can compare aggregated value expectations with an assessment of

aggregate capabilities, then feelings of relative deprivation emerge in three basic ways.

First, in decremental deprivation, expectations remain constant, but capabilities

decline over time. Second, a gap develops when capabilities remain constant, but

expectations increase rapidly because people either acquire new values or expect to

improve their position with respect to old ones. Finally, expectations may increase at

the same time that capabilities decline, producing progressive deprivation (Grofman

and Muller 1973, pp. 517-18).

The dissatisfaction approach was widely employed in the social movement

literature of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The approach was useful to interpret the

civil rights demonstrations of the 1960s. It also carried over the study of student

activism and new social movements in advanced industrial democracies. The

dissatisfaction approach explained that students protested because they were

radicalized by their lack of social influence or their economic marginality. Certainly,

24

many individuals participated in new social movements in order to express

dissatisfaction with specific policy problems or to criticize general social norms.

Scholars also applied this model to explain the formation of women's groups in

reaction to sexual discrimination and the creation of environmental groups in reaction

to the excesses of capitalist economies (Dalton and Kuechler 1990, chapter 1).

However, despite the value of the dissatisfaction approach in explaining some

patterns of political protest, empirical evidence has provided uncertain support for the

approach. For example, Muller's research showed that the relationship between

dissatisfaction and protest for political activists in the last 1960s was weak (Muller

1972). Muller's more extensive analyses in the 1970s also failed to produce more

convincing support for the dissatisfaction approach (Muller 1979). Additionally,

Political Action (1979) edited by Bames and Kaase, found that the dissatisfaction

approach exerted only a marginal impact on the propensity to engage in protests.

Gumey and Tiemey's critical research on the relative deprivation literature also

concluded that the "dissatisfaction approach is itself affected by too many serious

conceptual, theoretical, and empirical weaknesses to be useful in accounting for the

emergence and development of social movements" (Gumey and Tiemey 1982, p. 33).

Additionally, Bames and Kaase argued that "the operationalization of dissatisfaction

approach is complicated by the subjective nature of human expectations, and hence of

deprivation" (Bames and Kaase et al., 1979, p. 16). They stated that "fhistration does

not lead inevitably to aggression," and "many personality, cultural, and situational

variables intervene, so that fhistration should be expected to lead to aggression only

under particular conditions" (Bames and Kaase et al., 1979, p. 16).

25

In sum, the dissatisfaction approach implies that political dissatisfaction and

alienation should be major predictors of protest. Indirectly, this approach suggests

that unconventional forms of political participation should be more common among

lower-status individuals, minorities, and other groups who have reasons to feel

deprived or dissatisfied.

Rational Choice Perspective

The second and opposite view to socio-psychological perspective is rational

choice perspective. This perspective framed decisions to participate in

unconventional behavior from simple cost-benefit terms, best represented in Olson's

The Logic of Collective Action (1965).

The rational choice perspective starts with relatively restricted characterization

of rationality and has three major features (Downs 1957). First, it is based on a

concept of utility maximization. Individual actors always seek to maximize utility as

reward of their activities. Second, individual actors are rational. Finally, to pursue

the maximizing action, individuals must possess perfect information about the

comparable costs and benefits of alternative choices.

According to Dalton (2000), the rational choice perspective of political protest

provides a major alternative to the deprived actor theories. Rather than trying to

explain outbreaks of political protest by isolating the frustrations that presumably

drive people to desperate acts, the rational actor approach views individual

participation in radical political activity as a product of a conscious calculation of

costs and benefits. By recognizing the particular relevance of the free rider problem

to the question of revolutionary participation, this approach offers an important

26

explanation for the relative infrequency of such events. Public goods cannot be

selectively allocated, that is, when the new order comes, all members of the society

will equally enjoy its presumed benefits. In short, if anyone in a community receives

a public good, everyone must receive it. Therefore, they will "rationally choose to

become free riders on other people's sacrifices" (Dalton 2000, p. 927).

The rational choice perspective of political protest starts with a few simple

assumptions about a value-maximizing egoist. On the basis of these assumptions the

theory specifies the conditions under which such an individual would participate in

political protest, possibly including violence. It concludes that most potential

revolutionaries will forgo violent action unless induced to participate by selective

rewards and punishments. Incipient revolutionary movements find it difficult to

assemble the resources required for such selective incentives; consequently, most

successful at explaining why radical collective action fails to occur. Indeed, the

radical choice approach may suggest some interesting research problems rather than

actually explain violent action (Olson 1971; Duch and Taylor 1993).

A cognitive skills (resource mobilization) approach is based on this

perspective. The cognitive skills approach provides alternative suggestions of who

resorts to protest behavior. This approach implies that protest activity should be

higher among the better educated and politically sophisticated, those who have the

political skills and resources to engage in these demanding forms of activity. One

also might view involvement in other social groups as providing resources and

experience that encourage activities across other participation modes (Verba et al.,

1995). In addition, a belief that protest will be effective should significantly increase

the likelihood that individuals will participate.

27

The cognitive skills (or resource mobilization) approach (Tilly 1975) does not

view protest and collective action as an outburst by a frustrated public. Instead,

protest is another political resource (like voting, campaign activity, or communal

activity) that individuals may use in pursuing their goals. Unconventional forms of

political participation are seen as a normal part of the political process as competing

groups vie for political power.

This approach begins with an assumption that people choose political actions

differently, because they think and feel about politics differently. By 'think' and

'feel' is meant the distinction that psychologists make between the cognitive aspects

of mental life and the affective or evaluative aspects: the distinction between people's

knowledge and understanding of political matters on the one hand and their political

values, desires and feelings-for-and-against on the other. Both are important in

determining the way people choose their preferred means of political action.

The cognitive skills approach focuses on the qualitative increase in the

political sophistication of the mass public. With the increase in education, as well as,

a diffusion of greater quantities of political information through the media, especially

the electronic media, the political resources and cognitive skills of large segments of

national population have significantly increased. With this new level of sophistication,

the mass publics no longer need social cues or party identification to make their

voting decisions. Cognitive mobilization (Dalton 1984; Inglehart 1990) means that

some people rely less on parties or social groups for information, therefore, those

attachments are weakening. This mobilization also means that people that usually do

not participate can be reached more effectively and brought into the political process.

Inglehart (1977) says that cognitive skills or mobilization refers to rising political

28

sophistication, knowledge, and awareness among individuals in society. This usually

accompanies urbanization, increased media, and increased associational contact.

The cognitive skills approach also holds that the increasing levels of political

sophistication and information are leading one to a more active citizens role (Inglehart

1977; Shively 1979; Dalton 1984). When citizens are more cognitively mobilized (as

measured by such things as frequency of political discussion or perceived degree of

influence over others), they tend to participate more. Further, to the extent people

experience politicization from partisan or interest group attachments, they seem more

likely to participate in political activities (Verba et al., 1978; Powell 1986).

In the Western European context, the attachments of ideological extremes and

religious organizations seem especially important (Rose and Urwin 1969;

Klingemann and Inglehart 1975). Those having an understanding of political matters

at an ideological level could function consistently in political life. In particular, an

understanding that included an appreciation of the main Left-Right, Liberal-

Conservative dimension of democratic politics was the essential equipment of any

recruit to political activity.

Some scholars are interested in the political orientations of protesters.

Unconventional forms of political participation are often seen as a tool for liberals and

progressives who want to challenge the political establishment and who feel the need

to go beyond conventional forms of political participation to have their views heard.

At the same time, protest activity has broadened across the political spectrum, and

protest may no longer be the primary domain of the Left. For every pro-choice

protest in North America there is a counter-mobilization among conservatives. Thus,

29

we should consider whether or not there remains a political bias in the use of


Dalton (2002), especially, defines that LeftTRight position an important

determinant of protest. He argues that "although protest politics has spread

throughout the political process and is used by groups on the Left and Right, the

willingness to engage in protest activities remains more common among Leftists" and

protest politics is still disproportionately the domain of the Left" in advanced

industrial democracies (p. 69). This study tests the argument by Dalton about the

relationship between Left/Right position and protest activities.

In sum, socio-psychological perspective (dissatisfaction approach) and rational

choice perspectives (cognitive skills approach) offer radically different answers to the

question of why people protest. The former focuses on the fhistration that ultimately

drives people to violent acts. The other, in contrast, portrays people as carefully

calculating the costs and benefits of alternative actions and selecting the one that

offers the greatest promise of reward. While these two approaches may explain

particular violent actions or the decision to join a political protest by focusing on the

individual, the phenomenon of revolutionary transformation involves something more.

The unit of analysis becomes a whole society, and groups, cultural, and stmctural

theories may better explain the origins of cultural crisis, stmctural strain, and

revolutionary transformation.

Cultural Change Perspective

The last general explanation of protest is termed a cultural change perspective.

One of the most powerful social science concepts to emerge in political behavior

30

research - and one central to the study of citizen attitudes and behavior - is the

concept of political culture. The value change approach is one aspect of cultural

change perspective. The approach is concerned with people's basic political values -

those needs and goals they think society should aim to achieve before all others.

Values provide the standards that guide the attitudes and behaviors of the public.

Values signify a preference for certain personal and social goals, as well as the

methods to obtain these goals. One individual may place a high priority on freedom,

equality, and social harmony - and favor policies that strengthen these values. Others

may stress independence, social recognition, and ambition in guiding their actions

(Dalton 2002, chapter 5).

Contemporary focus on cultural change relies on the value change argument,

Ronald Inglehart, a pioneer in this endeavor, has developed the most systematic

attempt to describe and explain the process of value change for advanced indusfrial

societies. Inglehart's theory of value change based on two premises (Inglehart 1977,

1981, 1990; Abramson and Inglehart 1995). First, basic value priorities are

determined by a scarcity hypothesis. Individuals "place the greatest value on those

things that are in relatively short supply" (Inglehart 1981, p. 881). That is, when

some valued object is difficult to obtain, its worth is magnified. If the supply

increases to match the demand, then the object is taken for granted and attention shifts

to other objects that are still scarce.

The second premise of Inglehart's value change approach is a socialization

hypothesis. "To a large extent, one's value priorities reflect the conditions that

prevailed during one's preadult years," (Ingehart 1981, p. 881). An individual's basic

value priorities are thus initially formed early in life in reaction to the conditions of

31

this formative period. These formative conditions include both the immediate

situation in one's own family and the broader political and economic conditions of a

society. Once these values develop, they tend to endure in the face of later changes in

social conditions (Dalton 2002, pp. 79-80).

Inglehart applied the logic of Maslow's value hierarchy to political issues

(Maslow 1954). Many political issues, such as economic security, law and order, and

national defense, tap underlying sustenance and safety needs. Inglehart describes

these goals as material values. In a time of depression or civil unrest, for example,

security and sustenance needs undoubtedly receive great attention. If a society can

make significant progress in addressing these goals, then attention can shift toward

higher-order values. These higher-order goals are reflected in issues such as

individual freedom, self-expression, and especially, participation. Inglehart labels

these goals as postmaterial values (Inglehart 1981).

According to Inglehart (1977), the postwar generations had grown up

relatively free of the urgent problems of physical and economic security that had beset

their parents. To them, the class-based economism of Westem party systems seemed

increasingly redundant (Inglehart 1977). There grew up among the younger

generations significantly larger and larger minorities of people who placed these

higher order goals before those of security and economic growth. They did so, at

least, in terms of the political goals they thought their country should aim for.

Inglehart called them Postmaterialists. They, it seems, were in the vanguard of the

new politics. The growth of political protest actions in the 1960s was traceable to

their efforts to introduce new political goals onto the national agenda.

Postmaterialists demanded things like racial and sexual equality, environmental

32

improvement and, more than anything, new democratic forms of political

participation. Accordingly Inglehart (1977) argues that "[a] postmaterialist view was

by definition elite-challenging and the means to demand such goals led naturally to

protest methods" (p. 7).

For Inglehart this material/postmaterial continuum provides a general

framework for understanding the primary value changes occurring in advanced

industrial democracies. Other researchers note the broad nature of value change and

describe the process as a transition from "Old Politics" values of economic growth,

security, and traditional lifestyles to "New Politics" values of individual freedoms,

social equality, and the quality of life (Baker et al., 1981; Flanagan 1982, 1987:

Dalton and Kuechler 1990).

Dalton (2002) defines that "the major challengers to Inglehart's theory of

value change have come in two areas" (p. 81). First, several studies question whether

socioeconomic conditions are linked to citizen values as Inglehart predicts. For

example, Clarke and Dutt (1991) demonstrate that Inglehart's simple value index is

closely related to the ebb and flow of economic conditions instead of consistently

reflecting the conditions of earlier formative environments. Duch and Taylor (1993)

similarly raise questions about whether or not formative conditions are the key

determinants of values.

A second critique asks if advanced industrial societies are changing only along

the single material/postmaterial dimension. Flanagan (1982, 1987) argued that citizen

values are shifting along at least two dimensions. One dimension involves a shift

from material to noneconomic values; a second dimension involves a shift from

authoritarian to libertarian values. Dalton (2002) also argues that "undoubtedly

33

Inglehart's framework oversimplifies the process of value change, since societies are

changing in multiple ways that tap different parts of people's value systems" (p. 82).

The Other Perspective

In addition to these three general perspectives of political protest behavior,

several personal characteristics might stimulate unconventional forms of political

participation. Research has shown a strong tendency toward higher levels of political

protest among the young. Gender also might influence unconventional forms of

political participation (Schlozman et al., 1994). The confrontational style of protest

politics may involve a disproportionate number of men, although there is evidence

that this pattern is changing with a narrowing of gender roles (Lee and Rinehart 1995).

This approach is often called a 'baseline model' or 'social stmcture model.'

Political sociology has long established that people's age, gender, income, occupation,

education, religion, marital status, and so on have a profound effect on their political

behavior. If it were to be found that political behavior was randomly distributed

among all kinds and classes of people, there would be no social background model

after all. Then, all the explanation of political behavior would have to be sought in

people's minds. Only beliefs, feelings, values and attitudes and their responses to

specific events would account for their behavior. This, however, is unlikely.

This approach, borrowed from Verba and Nie's study of political participation

in America, refers to the social location of political participation (Verba and Nie

1972). What social characteristics such as age, gender, income, education, religion,

occupational class, and so on tend to be associated with higher or lower rates of

political participation? Verba and Nie (1972) define that higher social and economic

34

status eases the entry of the more advantaged members of society into regular political

involvement. Those who have a higher social and economic status share a social

identity with existing political elites. Most important, they, rather than manual or

agricultural workers, have the education and training that lower the costs of learning

the basic skills of politics. They also have different expectations of the political

system. Furthermore, middle-class values stress individual competence. For them the

search for political redress places a premium on individual action. In contrast, manual

or agricultural workers tend to look to existing organizations like political parties and

labor unions for a collective expression of political ambitions (Marsh 1990).

In general, the finding from previous research is that older, male, middle-class,

married, more educated, and more income are more likely to participate. This is valid

at least for conventional political involvement. Is it also valid for unconventional

political participation, political protest? Scholars (Abramson and Inglehart 1986,

1987, 1992; Lee 1997) argue that people's socioeconomic status except "age" have a

similar effect on their unconventional political participation as well as conventional

participation. Previous research shows that young people, rather than older people,

are more likely to participate in protest activities (Inglehart 1977; Dalton 1984, 1996).

The demands upon time and energy imposed by demonstrations, occupations, and so

on are most easily met by the young. More than that, young people are said naturally

to be given to elite-challenging behavior.

Summarv

The global wave of democratization in the 1980s and 1990s transformed the

role of citizenry in many of the new democracies in Eastern Europe, East Asia, Latin

35

America, and South Africa. These new events provide opportunities to test our

theories about the nature of citizen behavior including unconventional forms of

political participation, expand the boundaries of knowledge, and develop new theories.

As a research topic for political scientists, the concept of political protest has

been gradually changed. Since the 1970s, while there was a rise of peaceful political

protests in Europe and North America, the researchers have emphasized the difference

between violent, and non-violent, as well as conventional and unconventional forms

of political participation. The definition of unconventional forms of political

participation (peaceful political protest) is wide, including several forms of protest

behavior. In this study, unconventional forms of political participation - the

dependent variable - includes the legal challenging, semi-legal action, and semi or

illegal challenging action such as signing petitions, attending demonstrations, joining

consumer boycotts, joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings and factories.

However, this concept excludes political crime such as sabotage, warfare, hijacking,

assassination, bombing, kidnapping, riot, armed attack, revolutions, and so on.

Scholars have come at explaining unconventional forms of political

participation basically in two ways in terms of the usage of different units of analyses:

individual level and system level. In order to study individual differences in political

protest behavior, three general perspectives have been suggested - socio-

psychological, rational choice, and cultural change perspectives. In addition to these

three general perspectives, there exists another perspective called a baseline model or

social structure model. From the three general perspectives and the baseline model

there exist four plausible approaches/models concerning the sources of

unconventional forms of political participation: dissatisfaction, cognitive skills, value

36

change, and baseline approaches. How various determinants from these approaches at

individual level are hypothesized to affect unconventional forms of political

participation is a subject of Chapter IV.

37

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CHAPTER III

CASE STUDIES

Chapter III presents a general description of the historical background,

democratization process, and unconventional political participation in the three new

democracies: Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea. Inauguration of democracy in

the three states was almost simultaneous in the late 1980s or early 1990s although

these states have experienced diverse cultural heritages and varying stages of

development. Figure 3-1 and Table 3-1 show inauguration of democracy and cross-

national socio-economic indicators of the three new democracies. The three new

democracies in different geographical regions had commonly achieved rapid

economic development during the 1980s and 1990s. For example, GNP per capita

had increased around 81 percent in Mexico, 85 percent in South Africa, and over 400

percent in South Korea during the time period. The changes in the material-

technological environment cause changing political attitudes of the citizenty that, in

time, erode the basis of authoritarian power in the three new democracies.

The three new democracies have commonly experienced massive protests by

citizenry during the democratic transition period of the 1980s, that replaced

authoritarian regimes with democratic regimes. Demonstrations by the mass publics

were a key factor contributing to the inauguration of democracy in the three new

democracies. In addition, elite-challenging unconventional forms of political

participation in these states have continued during the democratic consolidation

period in the 1990s. This chapter discusses first historical background, second

39

democratization process, and finally political participation in the three new

democracies.

Mexico

Historical Background

Mexico is a Latin American country marked by extensive poverty and highly

concentrated wealth that shares a 2,000-mile border with the United States (Lipset

1998a). The site of advanced Amerindian civilizafions, Mexico came under Spanish

mle for three centuries before achieving independence early in the 19th centuty.

Mexico's revolution - passing through phases of liberal uprising (1910-1913) to

bloody civil war (1913-1917) and religious war (1926-1929), and then to gradual

consolidation of power in the mid-1920s by groups from the northern states of Sonora

and Coahuila - ultimately claimed more than a million lives, or more than 10 percent

of the population. The revolution destroyed or severely weakened established

political actors: the Catholic Church, large landowners, the official party, army, and

foreign interests. It brought important new powers into politics: labor unions, peasant

groups, and a new middle class (Lipset 1998a, p. 131).

Mexico's president serves a single six-year term and cannot be reelected.

With uninterrupted presidencies since 1934, Mexican politics has taken on a

distinctive six-year term. The peaceful successions make for stable expectations

about behavior, policy adjustments, circulation of members of the elite through

electoral and appointed posts, and renewal of public hopes for the future. Mexico is

formally a federal system, with thirty-one states, a federal district, and more than

2,400 municipalities. The sexennial calendar is densely packed with elections of

40

governors, state assemblies, city mayors, and city councils. These elections provide

for significant mmover among the elite and policy adjustment throughout the countty

(Banks etal., 1996, pp. 616-19).

Mexico was one of the party-government systems until the Institutional

Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost its majority in the lower house in 1997 and presidential

election in 2000. Since its founding in 1929, the PRI has historically dominated the

country by means of its corporatist, authoritarian structure which is maintained

through co-optation, patronage, cormption, and repression. The formal business of

govemment has taken place mostly in secret and with little legal foundation

(Karamycky et al., 1999, p. 315).

The PRI can be divided roughly into two factions at the elite level of party

activists (Lipset 1998a). One "favors the status quo" and the other "promotes

liberalization and reform" (p. 133). The status quo faction, called dinos (dinosaurs),

is based largely in organized labor, peasant organizations, and public employee

unions. The reform faction, called renos (renovators), is a more heterogeneous group

whose leadership comes predominantly from urban, middle-class groups, especially

young professionals. An important debate within the PRI concerns the question of

relative weight to give to the organized groups of the party, where the dinos hold

sway, and to the local level organizations, where the renos have tried to organize

support. At stake is control over the PRI's nominations to elected office, as well as

other aspects of the party's programs and practices. Another debate concerns how

fast to reform the national polity and economy, with "the renos generally pushing for

rapid reform and the dinos resisting" (p. 133).

41

The breakthrough of 1994 brought a new agenda to national politics in Mexico.

The PRI and Ernesto Zedillo won in the comparatively honest elections of August

1994. Winning candidate Zedillo, who inherited the age-old tragedy of widespread

poverty and economic inequality of wealth and income, "confronted the daunting task

of consolidating the economic reforms begun in the 1980s and creating conditions for

sustainable growth" (Lipset 1998a, p. 134). The Zedillo govemment also "faced

growing pressures and dislocations caused in part by the North American Free Trade

Agreement (NAFTA), which took effect in Januaty 1994" (Lipset 1998a, p. 134).

A devaluation of thepe^o in late 1994 by the Zedillo govemment threw

Mexico into economic turmoil, friggering the worst recession in over half a centuty

(Roberts and Wibbels 1999). The govemment announced an unconvincing economic

plan and followed this with a devaluation unaccompanied by such necessary measures

as wage and price controls. Investors, already nervous about instability and Zedillo's

inexperience, hurried to protect their interests. Billions of dollars fled the country in a

matter of weeks, and Mexico was again plunged into crisis. The impact of the

devaluation was felt throughout other so-called emerging markets, as investors sought

refuge in safer havens. Mexico entered "a period of economic austerity and slow

growth" (p. 577).

Democratization

Inauguration of democracy in Mexico began in 1994. "The overriding issue in

Mexico's August 1994 election was the credibility of the electoral process" (Lipset

1998b, p. 134). The PRI regime had opened the electoral system to opposition parties

in the late 1970s. In the midst of economic crisis in the early 1980s, however, the

42

regime essentially shut down the electoral route through deliberate fraud. Throughout

the 1980s and early 1990s, enormous pressure had built up to reopen the electoral

option. Although the Salinas govemment had made some progress toward democratic

reform, the important breakthrough came in the last year of Salinas's term in the wake

of traumatic political protest and violence - first a peasant insurgency in the

southernmost state of Chiapas in early 1994 and then, in March, the assassination of

the PRI's presidential candidate, Luis Donald Colosio, in Tijuana (Banks et al., pp.

616-619). The violence and resulting public anxiety propelled the presidency and

reform elements in the govemment to ally with reform in the PRI and principal

opposition parties to produce a negotiated transition. Such a transition was possible

because the govemment retained enough power to set the terms of negotiation for

electoral reform, taking opposition demands into account (Lipset 1998a, p. 134).

In 1996, opposition parties of the left and right won important municipal

elections in three states. Post-electoral conflicts took place in several regions. In the

southern states of Guerrero, Oaxaca, Tabasco, and Chiapas - where many of

Mexico's indigenous people live - political violence continued to be a fact of life.

But the elections left the PRI govemment just two of Mexico's 12 largest cities

(Karatnycky et al., 1999).

In April 1996, the main political parties, with the exception of the National

Action Party (PAN), agreed on reforms aimed at bringing about more fair elections.

The reforms introduced direct elections for the mayoralty of Mexico City and

abolished govemment control of the Federal Electoral Commission. The govemment

pledged to increase public financing of political parties and to guarantee them fairer

access to television during elections. But unilateral changes by the president and the

43

PRI limited the scope of the law, and the main opposition parties voted against it in

November 1996 (Karataycky et al., 1999).

The climate in which Mexicans went to the polls several times in 1997 and

1998 was substantially improved from past elections. For the first time, in 1997,

voters chose the mayor of Mexico City and elected the Democratic Revolutionary

Party (PRD) opposition leader Cardenas rather than having the municipal chief

appointed by the president. That year, an opposition coalition composed of the PRD,

PAN, and two other parties not only took control over the lower house of Congress

following July elections, but also reached a consensus whereby the presidency of 61

house committees were allocated on an equitable basis. By year-end, the PAN held

six governorships (Karatnycky et al., 1999).

Finally, Vicente Fox who was the presidential candidate of an opposition party,

the National Action Party (PAN), was elected in June 2000 by popular vote. Fox took

office as president in December 2000 in the country's first transfer of power to the

opposition since the PRJ was founded in 1929.

Summarv and Unconventional Forms of Political Participation

From the previous description of the historical background and

democratization process in Mexico, several features found are important for

understanding the nature of political protests in the country. First, for a long time,

there have existed severe social and racial cleavages between rich landowner

(caudillos) and poor local farmers (campesinou), and between white immigrants and

their descendants (mestizos) and indigenous people (Amerindian) with African

44

immigrants in Mexico. These cleavages have played an important role in the nation

(Wiarda and Kline 1985; Almond et al., 2000, chapter 14; Hauss 2000, chapter 16).

Secondly, the Mexican political system is traditionally permeated with patron-

client relationships, so-called clientelism, in which the 'patrons' - persons having

higher political stature - provide benefits such as protection, support in political

struggles with rivals, and chances for upward political or economic mobility to their

'clients' - persons having lesser political status (Almond et al., 2000, chapter 14). In

exchange, the 'clients' provide loyalty, deference, and usefiil services like voter

mobilization, political control, and problem solving to their patrons within the official

party or governmental bureaucracy. "The chains of patron-client relationships are

interwoven, because patrons do not want to limit themselves to one client, and clients

avoid pinning all their hopes on a single patron" (Cornelius 2000, p. 486).

Clientelism, the exchange of favors among people of different status or

degrees of power, extends from the very top of the political system to the most remote

and poverty-stricken villages (Purcell and Purcell 1980). It is a form of participation

in the sense that "many people, even poorest, are able to interact with public officials

and get something out of the political system" (p. 207). This kind of participation

emphasizes how limited resources, such as access to health care, can be distributed in

a way that provides maximum political payoff This informal system is "a

fiindamental reason why many Mexicans continue to vote for the PRI" (p. 207).

Lastly, despite the strong and controlling role of the PRI in Mexico's political

history, the countty also has a fradition of civic organizations that operate at

community and local levels with considerable independence from politics (Kesselman

et al., 2000, chapter 9). Local village improvement societies, religious organizations,

45

sports clubs, and parents' organizations are widespread. Although many of their

activities are not explicitly political, they have political implications in that they

encourage individuals to work together to find interests (Grindle 2000, p. 416). Other

organizational experiences are more explicitly political. The student movement of

1968 provided evidence that civic society in Mexico had the potential to contest the

power of the state. The emergence of independent unionism in the 1970s was another

"indication of renewed willingness to question the right of the state to stifle the voices

of dissent and the emergency of demands for greater equity and participation"

(Grindle2000, p. 416).

The economic crisis of 1982 combined with the civic tradition to heighten

demands for assistance from the govemment. In urban areas, citizen groups

demanded land rights in squatter settlements, as well as housing, infrastmcture, and

urban services, as rights of citizenship rather than as a reward for loyalty to the PRI in

terms of various protest activities. In mral areas, peasant organizations also

demanded greater independence from govemment and the leaders of the PRI in the

1980s. Additionally, "a variety of groups organized around middle-class and urban

issues in the 1990s" (Grindle 2000, p. 418).

Traditionally, "most political participation in Mexico has been of two broad

types: (1) ritualistic, regime-supportive activities (for example, voting, attending

campaign rallies), and (2) petitioning or contacting of public officials, to influence the

allocation of some public good or service" (Cornelius 2000, p. 476). People

participated in PRI campaign rallies mostly because attending might have a specific

material payoff (a free meal, a raffle ticket, or a T-shirt), or because failure to do so

could have personal economic costs. For example, union members who failed to

46

attend such rallies could expect to lose a day's pay. As they went to the polls,

Mexicans knew that they were not selecting those who would govern but merely

ratifying the choice of candidates made earlier by the PRI govemment hierarchy.

Some voted in response to pressures from local power brokers (caciques) and PRI

sector representatives. And some, especially in mral areas, freely sold their votes in

return for handouts from local officials (Comelius 2000, pp. 476-77).

As elections have become moments of genuine political confrontation in many

parts of Mexico, however, the ritualistic quality of voting and participation in

campaign activities has diminished. Mexico today is in the midst of an explosion in

political participation, as evidenced not only by the virtually nonstop protests of

citizens' movements of all types, but also by a dramatic rise in turnout in federal and

state elections. The tumout of registered voters rose from 49 percent in the 1988

presidential election, to 78 percent in the 1994 presidential election - a 28 percentage

point increase, in six years. Some 96 percent of Mexico's voting-age population was

registered to vote in 1994 (Comelius 2000).

According to World Value Surveys data in 1981, 1990-91, and 1995-98,

protest potential in Mexico has increased during the democratic transition phase of the

1980s, but slightly decreased during the democratic consolidation phase of the early

1990s (Figure 3-2). It is a little different with advanced or 'old' democracies where

unconventional forms of political participation have continually increased during the

1980s-1990s. For example, the participants of 'signing a petition' in Mexico have

increased from 9.5 percent to 34.7 percent in the 1980s, and slightly decreased from

34.7 to 30.4 in the early 1990s. The other forms of unconventional participation

except 'joining boycotts' show the same changing trend. It shows that the protest in

47

Mexico has severely increased during the democratic transition period, but slightly

decreased during the democratic consolidation period. The participants of 'joining

boycotts' have increased during the consolidation period as well as transition period.

The reason behind the consumer boycotts increase is probably related to economic

development in Mexico, where the protest against multinational corporations has

increased lately. In sum, from these arguments related to the historical background,

democratization process, and unconventional forms of political participation in

Mexico, this study finally expects that Baseline factors and Dissatisfaction

Approaches are more applicable than Cognitive Skills and Value Change approaches

in Mexico.

South Africa


South Africa, a former white-ruled republic, is situated on Africa's southem

tip. Race had long polarized South Africa's 40 million people (30 million black, 5

million white, 3.4 million "colored" people, and 1 million Asians), and the countty

was known for its system of apartheid, a form of racial segregation and minority mle

(Lipset 1998b).

South Africa's experience with imperialism was different from that in the rest

of Africa for two reasons. First, it was colonized two centuries earlier. Second, it had

by far the largest White population on the continent, which was well established

before the European powers began their "scramble for Africa" late in the nineteenth

centuty (Hauss 2000, p. 438).

48

The Cape of Good Hope, Africa's southernmost shoreline, was colonized by

the Dutch in 1652. After conquering the indigenous Khoi and San people, the Dutch

penetrated into the interior. The Dutch descent proclaimed their attachment to their

new continent by labeling themselves Afrikaners. In 1806 Great Britain formally

established a colony at the Cape, and in 1820 the first British settlers landed on its

shores. The Dutch settlers (the Boers) clashed repeatedly with the authoritarian

colonial mlers and trekked north to found their own republics. The Boers resisted

British encroachments, but were defeated in the Boer War (1899-1902). A white-only

national convention convened in 1909, and "white mle was gradually consolidated"

(Lipset 1998b, p. 159). When four white-mled states agreed to form a union under

British colonial mle, whites (13 percent of the population) had enjoyed regular

competitive elections since 1910. Like other British colonies, "they adopted the

Westminster parliamentaty system, and until the 1990s whites enjoyed the trappings

of pluralist democracy" (Lipset 1998b, p. 157). The resuhing Union of South Africa

had operated under a policy of apartheid, the separate development of the races, until

the 1990s brought an end to apartheid politically and ushered in black majority rule

(Hauss 2000, p. 439). The colored (mixed race) and Asian minorities (together 11

percent of the population) were granted a vote for separate and subordinate

parliaments only in 1984; black Africans (79 percent of the population) were denied

the franchise until 1994 (Banks et al., 1996).

The "political aspirations of blacks has hinged on inclusion in common

representative institutions since 1912" (Lipset 1998b, p. 159). Their vehicle was the

South African Native National Congress, launched in 1912 to defend land rights and

to press for political rights. Eight years later the group became the African National

49

Congress (ANC), the chief organization of the African nationalist movement for the

rest of the centuty (Deegan 2001).

The methods and goals of the ANC initially were moderate (Hauss 2000, p.

449). Its leadership was an African intelligentsia educated in the Christian liberal

tradition brought by British missionaries. For the next three decades the moral appeal

was the ANC's primaty weapon. The ANC elite did not seek the overthrow of the

union but incorporation within its democratic institutions. However, the ANC

moderates were ignored because the British Crovm was concemed with developing

the British Westminster model of democracy among the white settlers (Lipset 1998b).

The failure of ANC moderation was discredited among young African

intellectuals by the 1940s. Control of the ANC's Youth League passed to militant

nationalists such as Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela (both later to become

presidents of the ANC). These nationalists were convinced that white goodwill was a

scarce or fictional commodity. Their goal was not incorporation into the white-mled

policy but national liberations; their preferred method was mass mobilization. After

the 1948 election, their argument became compelling to the older generation of ANC

leaders (Lipset 1998b).

Democratization

After more than forty years of coerced racial segregation, "the leaders of the

apartheid regime began to realize that the price they had to pay to maintain apartheid

was becoming unacceptably high" (Deegan 2001, p. 81). The continued repression of

the African National Congress (ANC), the South African Communist Party (SACP),

the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and other political organizations, as well as the

50

detention or exile of their leaders by the South African apartheid govemment, caused

increasing international criticism and disinvestment, and an escalating economic crisis.

Political liberalization could not take place in the context of a continued ban on these

organizations (Karamycky et al., 1999).

By 1990 apartheid, and economic sanctions imposed by most Westem

govemments in reaction to it, had weakened South Africa's economy. Reform and

repression had failed to produce a compliant majority leadership willing to negotiate

on the govemment's terms (Lipset 1998b)'. In Febmaty 1990 South Africa's white

govemment, headed by Frederik W. de Klerk, had signaled its intention to negotiate a

democracy with the hitherto outlawed black nationalist opposition. Additionally, all

black political movements and apartheid laws were to be banned with a view to

finding a political solution to the impasse that had built up in South Africa (Lipset

1998b). In 1991, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) brought

together 26 political parties of all persuasions from far right to far left and lengthy

deliberations began about the way forward and the nature of a new constitution

(Deegan 2001).

Throughout 1991, the ANC and the NP attempted to find common ground for

the South African transition. The NP wanted a grand consensus on democratic mle

through power sharing, while the ANC wanted majority mle through a popular

mandate from the population, settled through a constiment assembly and not the

govemment's multiparty conference. Compromise was found in CODESA. The

agreement led to the first free elections in South Africa in 1994 (Banks et al., 1996, pp.

868-71).

51

In 1992, de Klerk held a referendum of white voters to test their sentiments

about his reforms and was rewarded with a 68.6 percent 'yes' vote. There was a 'yes'

majority in evety voting region except for Pietersburg, in the traditionally

conservative and Afrikaner-dominated region (Fox, 1991, p. 88).

The first democratic election held in South Africa took place on 27 and 28

April 1994. November registration took place and all permanent residents of the

countty were permitted to vote, regardless of citizenship. The election marked South

Africa's transition from a state govemed by apartheid and minority mle to one based

on the democratic principle of majoritarianism and one person, one vote. As expected,

the ANC won a comfortable majority necessaty to dominate drafting of the permanent

constimtion. The NP achieved the 20 percent necessaty, according to the agreed

constitutional formula, for de Klerk to become one of two executive vice presidents;

Thabo Mbeki of the ANC was the other. It also won control of one of the nine

provinces created by the constitutional settlement. In short, the main contenders won

enough votes to ensure their commitment to the new order. On May 9, 1994 the

National Assembly elected Nelson Mandela president unanimously. That power

would be transferred peaceably was unthinkable even as late as the 1980s (Deegan

2001).


A few distinctive features from historical background and democratization

process in South Africa certainly are important for understanding the nature of

political protest in the countty. One of the distinguishing features of South African

politics is the multidimensionality and intensity of political conflict (Esterhuyse 2000;

52

Lange 2000; Gibson and Gouws 2003). South Africa is one of the most culturally

heterogeneous countries in the world, with the 'simple' divisions over race being

vastly complicated by linguistic, ethnic, and ideological differences. Many

transitional regimes are rent by strong divisions, but South Africa is typically

considered to be a 'deeply divided' society. One of the most vexing problems facing

regimes attempting democratic transformations is political intolerance as a cmcial

attribute of the political cultures of polities (Almond and Verba 1965).

The system of apartheid contributed mightily to the uneven development of a

democratic political culture in South Africa. Indeed, a principal heritage of apartheid

is the unequal evolution of South Africa's political culture. As Esterhuyse (2000)

notes, "[a]partheid left its mark on three fundamental dimensions of the South Africa

political system: its values systems, its stmcture, and its political culture" (p. 148). de

Lange (2000) agrees: "a lingering 'apartheid memoty' continues to restrict the

development of trast and allegiance in the new political dispensation and its

institutions" (p. 29). Political consciousness developed disproportionately among

South Africa's four main racial communities - Africans, whites. Colored South

Africans, and South Africans of Asian origin - with some acquiring the attitudes and

skills necessaty to playing the role of a citizen in a democratic countty, but with

others picking up few of the attributes of democratic citizens. Most South Africans

(the non-white or 'black' majority) were never taught the values necessaty to

participate in democratic politics - political efficacy, for instance, is as unequally

distributed in contemporaty South Africa as is housing - so it would not be surprising

to find that vast inequalities in democratic values characterize the countty, especially

in the early days of the transition (Gibson and Gouws, 2003, p. 43).

53

Thus, nowhere is the problem of political intolerance more pressing than in

South Africa. South Africa began its attempt at democratization in the early 1990s,

with the capstone of the initiation stage being the free elections of April 1994 that

brought Nelson Mandela and the ANC to power. By the end of the centuty, virtually

all of the institutional components of democratic govemment had been installed in

South Africa, including a strong constitutions, and effective and representative

parliamentaty, and an independent and powerful judiciaty. What has been slower to

develop are the cultural components of democracy, and especially political tolerance.

The lack of tolerance among South Africans may well be the most serious threat to

consolidating democracy in the countty.

The other distinctive feature of the South African democratic transition was

the influence of popular protests (mobilization) (Cobbett and Cohen 1988; Marx

1997). When foreign pressure in the form of disinvestments and isolation could not

dismantle the apartheid regime and the armed stmggle met with the limited success,

large-scale protest of people occurred in many different sectors of the society: in the

labor arena through the union, in the education sectors of the society, in the urban

areas through the civic organizations that imposed rent and services boycotts, and in

the mral area (Cobbett and Cohen 1988). Not only was popular protest important in

pressuring the white minority govemment to engage in negotiations, but the mass

public also constrained the decisions of the ANC negotiators in many important ways.

"Even though the final transition in South Africa was negotiated by elites, pressure

from below in terms of popular protest helped to bring those elites to the negotiating

table in the first place" (Marx 1997, p. 491). Thus, the South African transition

cannot be understood solely in terms of "pact-making" among elites (Marx 1997, p.

54

491). Ordinaty South Africans played an important role in the transition and in

politics before and after the transition. Thus, political protest of the mass public is

one of considerable factors for the future of the South African democracy.

According to World Value Surveys data in 1981, 1990-91, and 1995-8,

unconventional forms of political participation in South Africa has increased during

the democratic transition phase of the 1980s, but decreased during the democratic

consolidation phase of the eariy 1990s (Table and Figure 3-3). For example, the

participants of 'attending a demonstration' in South Africa have increased from 7.7

percent to 14.6 percent in the 1980s, and decreased from 14.6 to 10.9 in the early

1990s. The other forms of unconventional participation show the same changing

trend. It shows that the protest in South Africa has severely increased during the

democratic transition period, but has decreased during the democratic consolidation

period. In sum, from these arguments related to the historical background,

democratization process, and unconventional forms of political participation in South

Africa, this smdy finally expects that Baseline factors and Dissatisfaction approaches

are more applicable than Cognitive Skills and Value Change approaches in South

Africa.

South Korea


South Korea, officially known as the Republic of Korea, is an independent

East Asian countty established in 1948. The countty is a "model of an authoritarian

system that sponsored economic growth and development, thereby setting the stage

for a transition to democracy in the late 1980s" (Lipset 1998b, p. 163).

55

The last native Korean dynasty. Chosen, was eventually overthrown in 1910

after more than five centuries of authoritarian mle based on Confucianism. From

1910 to 1945 the Japanese mled the countty in a colonial manner. Korea was

liberated in 1945, when Japan surrendered to the Allied powers, but, almost as soon as

that occurred, it was divided and a vicious intemal war broke out.

In 1948 Rhee Syngman was elected the first president of South Korea by its

unicameral National Assembly. His govemment initially attempted to establish a

constitutional democracy but soon became increasingly authoritarian. The country

was then one of the poorest in the world; it obviously lacked a sizeable middle-class

to ensure political stability (Ahn and Jaung 1999). In 1960 Rhee Syngman and his

followers rigged the presidential election for his third term. This act led to massive

smdent demonstrations against the dictatorship, which brought down the govemment.

The parliamentaty govemment of Chang Myon followed Rhee Syngman's

"govemment considered the most democratic govemment in South Korea's histoty"

(Lipset 1998b, p. 164). At that time the govemment had to face the challenge of

economic reconstmction and of development under constant threats from the North.

The civilian mlers of the 1950s did not rise to that challenge. This led to a militaty

coup in May 1961, staged by General Park Chung-Hee, who was to lay the foundation

of the "Korean miracle" by adopting an export-led economic growth strategy

(Karatnycky et al., 1999, p. 266).

Park Chung-Hee mled South Korea with an iron fist, tuming it into a garrison

state. His rationale for such repressive mle was two fold: the need to counter the

constant threat from the communist regime in the North and the argument that South

Korea, with a per capita gross national product of $87 in 1961, could not afford the

56

luxuty of democracy. Park Chung-Hee attempted to win the support of students,

intellectuals, and champions of human rights who strongly opposed his dictatorship.

He believed that when the per capita GNP reached $2,000, a transition from

authoritarianism to democracy would be possible (Oh 1999).

The Park Chung-Hee regime "sought legitimacy on the basis of economic and

social development while denying political competition, participation, and civil and

political liberties for the people" (Lipset 1998b, p. 164). In the presidential election

of 1971 Park Chung-Hee was almost defeated by the opposition leader Kim Dae Jung,

who received 46 percent of the popular vote. The next year Park Chung-Hee

instimted the so-called Yushin (revitalizing reform) Constitution by which, in the

name of national security, all opposition political parties and democracy movements

were disbanded. The Park Chung-Hee regime not only had achieved a rapid

economic growth, but also confronted democratic protests by students, labors, and

intellectuals in the 1970s. In 1979 Park Chung-Hee was eventually assassinated by

his own security chief over disagreements about how to cope with increasing disorder

and demands for democracy in South Korea.

After the assassination of President Park Chung-Hee, general Chun Doo Hwan,

security chief in the capital city of Seoul, carried out a coup in December 1979 that

overthrew the caretaker govemment and established a militaty regime. Chun Doo

Hwan's regime became the most repressive in modem Korean histoty, in large part

because of its ruthless suppression of the 1980 Kwangju uprising (Bedeski 1994).

Although there was widespread opposition to his regime, Chun Doo Hwan's

govemment lasted until 1987.

57

Before 1987, economic development in South Korea was based on an

authoritarian approach that was fostered by the militaty leaders who had led the

countty for over two decades. The regime's goals were implemented by a highly

efficient bureaucracy in which cormption was limited; there was little interference

from the civil society, so that the state was autonomous. 'Miraculous' economic

successes justified developmental authoritarianism (O'Donnell 1973; Kim, B. 1998).

The economic development led to rapid social change. The proportion of

white-collar workers increased from 4.8 percent in 1965 to 17.1 percent in 1985,

while the working class increased between 1965 and 1983 from 32.1 percent to 49.5

percent. Surveys indicated that more than 70 percent of South Koreans identified

themselves as middle-class in the late 1980s (Ahn and Jaung 1999).

In the process, society became more pluralistic but also more contentious

(Kim, S. 2000). There were rising popular demands for political participation and

social equality, which made the continuation of authoritarian mle increasingly costly.

Nonetheless, although the middle class and the working class wanted more democracy,

the authoritarian regime was maintained for some years, thus rendering the stmcture

of the state seriously "unbalanced" (Ahn and Jaung 1999, p. 145). The polity was, in

fact, in severe political crisis as a result of its economic development. There were

mounting popular distmst of political institutions and increasing regional conflicts

over the distribution of wealth and the sharing of key power positions. Anti-regime

movements and civil disobedience reached a peak at the end of June 1987; the two

most prominent opposition politicians, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung,

mobilized the masses in close collaboration with street demonstrators. The situation

seemed to be leading to a bloody civil war. At that point, however, the mling

58

coalition lost its cool, and split between softliners and hardliners (Huntington 1991;

Shin 1999). This provided the opportunity for a democratic transition to occur, as

President Chun Doo Hwan came to accept the major demands of the opposition.

It did take a long time for socio-economic development in Korea to bring

about democracy, seemingly because of the existence of a "bureaucratic-

authoritarian" stmcture that was able to control economic development (O'Donnell

1973). Meanwhile, as the size and complexity of the economy increased, the private

sector and other social groups became more vocal about the negative aspects of the

state-centered development policy: these criticisms produced pressures for more

liberalization (McDonald 1992). Yet the political opening only occurred with the

dramatic people's uprising in 1987 that finally led the then presidential candidate Roh

Tae Woo, through his '29 June Declaration,' to initiate the transition to democracy.

The economic miracle, however, was a mixed blessing (Kim, B. 1998; Oh

1999). Rapid economic development also promoted a Korean sense of identity and

national pride and accelerated the development of a strong civil society better able to

sustain democratic political institutions. Yet these changes had uneven and

ambivalent effects on the culture and society of South Korea. Social mobility

increased, but social cohesiveness and moral standards among individuals and groups

were steadily eroded. In spite of the rapid modemization process, the majority of the

Korean people continued to feel unable to exercise control over society: self-criticism

and pessimism coexisted with a dynamic, highly mobilized, and materialistic society

strongly motivated to seek higher standards in quality of life and economic

performance (Shin 1999; Kim, S. 2000).

59

Thus, until the mid-1980s. South Korea's political dilemma was essentially

characterized by the fact that political change lagged well behind economic

development. Society was controlled by a top political elite and by govemmental

institutions which were, on the whole, highly efficient and successful, but

authoritarian, coercive, and largely illegitimate. Features of radicalism - such as the

prevalence of an extremist political rhetoric and violent political actions - were

common. Opposition politicians and other advocates of democracy tenaciously

fought for participation and social justice; student demonstrations regularly clashed

with the police; labor disputes were rampant. Thus the society appeared brittle and

chaotic to outside observers: only in 1987 did South Korea enter an era of significant

political transformation and adopt democratic pattems of behavior (Shin 1999; Kim, S.

2000).

Democratization

South Korea's democratic transition began in 1987, when violent student-led

protests rocked the countty after Chun Doo Hwan picked another army general, Roh

Tae Woo, as his successor. Roh called for direct presidential elections in December

1987, and beat the countty's best-known dissidents, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae

Jung (Banks et al., 1996; Karatnycky et al., 1999).

Kim Young Sam merged his party with the mling party to form the goveming

Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) in 1990, and won the presidential election to become

the first civilian president since 1961. Kim Young Sam curbed the intemal

surveillance powers of the security services, shook up the militaty hierarchy, and

60

launched an anti-corruption campaign. But this popularity waned as the reforms

slowed (Banks et al., 1996; Karatnycky et al., 1999).

The process of democratization that began in 1987 made South Korean society

more open, diverse, and decentralized than it had ever been before. The mass media

were freed from govemment restrictions, thousands of political prisoners were

released from prison, and long-suppressed labor unions were permitted to organize for

better wages and improved working conditions. But the process also triggered

explosions of long-suppressed issues. Social order deteriorated and crime increased.

Economic discipline was less rigorous. As a result the balance of payments began to

shift from surplus to deficit, and the rate of economic growth and development slowed

(Lipset 1998b; Oh 1999).

In 1997, an economic slowdown caused eight highly leveraged cahebol, to

collapse under heavy debts and triggered a banking crisis. For decades the

govemment had directed bank lending to chaebols in order to develop strategic

industries, and the chaebols funneled cash back to the mling party. But this

politicized lending ultimately encouraged the chaebols to diversify haphazardly and

pursue market share rather than profit. In November 1997, as corporations bought

dollars in anticipation of higher overseas borrowing costs, the value of the won

plummeted, and the countty came within weeks of a private-sector debt default

(Karatnycky et al., 1999; Kim, B. 1998).

Kim Dae Jung ran a strong campaign in the 1997 presidential election that

sought to refute his portrayal by past militaty govemments as a radical who would be

soft on Communist North Korea. As the campaign continued, on December 3, the

govemment agreed to a $57 billion dollar Intemational Monetaty Fund-led bailout

61

conditioned on corporate reform and an end to lifetime labor guarantees. As popular

anger mounted over the countty's worst economic crisis in decades, Kim Dae Jung

won the December 18, 1997 election with 40.4 percent of the vote (Kim, B. 1998).

Kim Dae Jung took office on Febmaty 25, 1998. His challenges included

dealing with an opposition-dominated National Assembly, making his alliance with

Kim Jong Pil's ULD work, reforming the chaebols, breaking the entrenched alliance

between govemment and big business, and convincing his labor allies to accept

layoffs. In negotiations that began while he was president-elect, Kim Dae Jung

opened financial markets to foreigners, ordered the chaebols to adopt intemational

accounting standards, and persuaded trade unions to accept new labor laws that ended

a tradition of lifetime employment in retum for improved social benefits and further

corporate reforms. The govemment also restmctured some $150 billion in private-

sector foreign debt (Karatnycky et al., 1999).


From the historical background and democratization process in South Korea, a

few feamres are found that are certainly important for understanding the namre of

political protest in the countty. First, the importance of economic development for

democratization should not be overlooked in South Korea. Economic development

brought about changes in the state-society relationship, which, in effect, empowered

the civil society to gain autonomy vis-a-vis the state (Oh 1999; Kim, S. 2000).

Successful economic development built the pre-democratic forces that eventually

pushed the existing regime towards more democracy. Progress in the economic

sphere gave the society the energy, so to speak, to achieve success and to move to a

62

new era of political openness, although such a social transformation does not of

course guarantee political consolidation and instimtionalization.

There cannot be a comprehensive right of the working class to organize and

form associations with other subordinate classes without the grov^h of the "civil

society": it is economic development that fosters the growth of the civil society,

through with both the middle and working classes improve their ability and skills to

organize, communicate their interests, and participate in alliance (Ruschemeyer et al.,

1992, p 81). This development counterbalances the power of a strong state and

enlarges, perhaps in a more stable way than otherwise, a political space for negotiated

pacts for democratization among opposing actors. The role of civil society in South

Korea has gradually changed from protest against political authoritarianism to policy

advocacy (Kim, S. 2000). Its purpose was to challenge, oppose, affect, monitor,

check, and control the state by articulating and promoting new visions and developing

and presenting new policy prescriptions.

The second distinctive feature, as a weakness in the process of

democratization, is the relative underdevelopment of the political parties (Ahn and

Jaung 1999). The parties were never institutionalized; instead, they were organized

and operated around political personalities with similar political ideologies and little

commitment to the programs and policies set forth by the parties themselves. Party

organizations were dissolved when their leaders lost an election or resigned from

politics, in part because campaign financing depended heavily on the party leader's

ability to bring in money, rather than on contributions from party members. In

addition, since the parties were organized on the basis of personalities and regional

63

ties, they did not really represent the views of voters. Therefore, Koreans usually

have a pessimistic view on the role of political parties (Ahn and Jaung 1999).

World Value Surveys data in 1981, 1990-91, and 1995-8 show that

unconventional forms of political participation in South Korea have increased during

the democratic transition phase of the 1980s, but slightly decreased during the

democratic consolidation phase of the early 1990s as similar as did Mexico. For

example, the participants of 'signing a petition' in South Korea have severely

increased from 19.9 percent to 42 percent in the 1980s, and slightly decreased from 42

to 39.8 in the early 1990s (Table and Figure 3-4). The other forms of unconventional

participation except 'joining boycotts' show the same changing trend. It shows that

the protest in South Korea had severely increased during the democratic transition

period, but had slightly decreased during the democratic consolidation period. The

participants of 'joining boycotts' have increased during the consolidation period as

well as transition period. The reason behind the consumer boycotts increase is

probably related to economic difficulty in South Korea in the 1990s. In sum, from

these arguments related to the historical background, democratization process, and

unconventional forms of political participation, this study finally expects that

Cognitive Skills and Value Change approaches are more applicable than Baseline

factors and Dissatisfaction approaches in South Korea.

Summarv

This chapter discusses the historical background, democratization process, and

unconventional forms of political participation in the three new democracies -

Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea. The three new democracies have commonly

64

experienced massive protests by citizenty during the democratic transition period of

the 1980s. Elite-challenging unconventional forms of political participation in these

states have continued during the democratic consolidation period in the 1990s (Table

3-2 through 3-4). For example, the participants of 'joining a boycott' have severely

increased from 1.3 to 6.9 percent (Mexico), 9.4 to 15.3 percent (South Africa), and

2.3 to 11.3 percent (South Korea) in the 1980s. In addition, the participants of

'joining a boycott' have continuously increased from 6.9 to 9.5 percent (Mexico) and

11.3 to 16 percent (South Korea) in the 1990s. Although the participants of'joining a

boycott' in South Africa have slightly decreased from 15.3 to 12.3 percent, the

participants of 'joining a boycott' in 1995-97 are far more than that in the 1981 in the

nation. The other forms of unconventional participation show a similar changing

trend. It explains that the protest in South Korea had severely increased during the

democratic transition period in the 1980s and continued during the democratic

consolidation period in the 1990s.

Although inauguration of democracy in the three states was almost

simultaneous, these states have experienced diverse cultural heritages and vatying

stages of development. From these differences on the three nations, this study finally

expects that Cognitive Skills and Value Change approaches are more applicable than

Baseline factors and Dissatisfaction approaches in South Korea whereas Baseline

factors and Dissatisfaction approaches are more applicable than Cognitive Skills and

Value Change approaches in Mexico and South Africa.

The following chapter explores research design. It describes variables, data,

and method of the study. It opens with a general description of the operationalization

of variables. It then moves on to describe the datasets employed for this smdy. How

65

various determinants at individual level are hypothesized to affect unconventional

forms of political participation is a subject of Chapter IV. The next section of the

Chapter describes how the data are analyzed.

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11981 11990 D1995-96

Figure 3-1: Unconventional Forms of Political Participation in Mexico

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Figure 3-2: Unconventional Forms of Political Participation in South Africa

72

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74

CHAPTER IV

VARIABLES, DATA, AND METHOD

This chapter describes the study data, variables, and methodology. Following

a short introduction, the chapter opens with a general description of the data sets

employed for the study. It moves on to describe the individual-level indicators for

explaining unconventional forms of political participation and hypotheses of the study.

The next section briefly describes how the data are analyzed. The chapter closes with

a very brief description of the technique, pooled or cumulated survey analysis.

Introduction

Three new democracies in different regions, Mexico, South Africa, and South

Korea, are the setting for this study. These three countries are not as different in the

process of democratization as many have supposed ahhough they are very different in

cultural heritages, history, and regions. Indeed, they are often grouped together as

new democracies because inauguration of democracy in the countries was almost

simultaneous in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

For instance, inauguration of democracy in Mexico began in 1994 when it had

comparatively honest elections. Then, in the 1997 congressional elections, the

dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost its majority in the lower house

for the first time since the party was founded in 1929. Finally, Vicente Fox who was

the presidential candidate of an opposite party, the National Action Party (PAN), was

elected in June 2000 by popular vote. Fox took office as president in December 2000

in the country's first transfer of power to the opposition since 1929.

75

Similarly, inauguration of democracy in South Africa also began in 1994 when

every race streamed to the polls to register their choices in the first all-race election

ever conducted in the country. The voting in the country's first democratic election

was the culmination of a long and brutal struggle by the majority of South Africans to

share in their own governance. The opening of the political process to all the citizens

of the country marked the end of authoritarian rule in South Africa by the white

minority. As expected, the African National Congress (ANC), the chief organization

of the African nationalist movement since 1920, won a comfortable majority. On

May 9, 1994, the National Assembly elected Nelson Mandela president unanimously.

That power would be transferred peaceably was unthinkable even as late as the 1980s.

One the other hand, inauguration of democracy in South Korea began in 1987.

Anti-regime movements and civil disobedience reached a peak at the end of June

1987, when president Chun Doo Hwan announced a campaign pledge: his successor,

Roh Tae Woo, would be elected by popular vote in a free election under a democratic

constitution. The consequent constitutional amendment, approved by the National

Assembly on October 1987, changed the method of election from indirect to popular

vote, balanced the executive and legislative powers, and provided for decentralization

of govemment. Thus, the political opening occurred with the dramatic people's

uprising in 1987 finally led to initiate the fransition to democracy. Then, the

parliamentary elections of 1988 brought an unexpected setback to the ruling

Democratic Justice Party (DJP), which failed to secure a majority in the National

Assembly. Finally, in 1992 Kim Young Sam, the DLP candidate, was elected

president; he was inaugurated in early 1993 for a five-year term and was the first non-

military officer to win the presidency since 1960. Furthermore, as popular anger

76

mounted over the country's worst economic crisis in decades, Kim Dae Jung, who

was the presidential candidate of an opposite party, the National Congress for New

Politics (NCNP), won the December 18, 1997, election. He took office as president in

February in the country's first transfer of power to the opposition.

This study is at the micro-level of analysis through survey data. World Values

Surveys. This analysis uses a pooled cross-sectional design for each country, which

pools three surveys from 1981, 1990-91, and 1995-98. The individual level data

allow for multivariate analyses such as regression (OLS).

Hypotheses

The purpose of this study is to test the four approaches (Baseline factors.

Cognitive Skills, Value Changes, and Dissatisfaction approaches) for explaining

unconventional forms of political participation in new democracies. In this way, this

study shows which approaches are most applicable to explain unconventional forms

of political participation in one country as well as the new democracies. This study

also investigates whether the determinants of unconventional forms of political

participation differ between the pre-democracy period and post-democracy period.

The data are collapsed into two sets for this purpose. For example, the pre-democracy

data set includes the first and second World Values Surveys in Mexico and South

Africa and the first World Values Surveys in South Korea. In contrast, the post-

democracy data set includes the second and third World Values Surveys in South

Korea and the third World Values Surveys in Mexico and South Africa.

77

The six sub-hypotheses to be tested at the individual level in this study are:

1. Baseline approach:

Hypothesis 1-1: The higher socio-economic status individuals have, the more

likely they will engage in protest behavior.

Hypothesis 1-2: The older individuals are, the less likely they will engage in protest

behavior.

Hypothesis 1-3: Women are less likely to participate in protest behavior than are men.

2. Cognitive Skills approach:

Hypothesis 2: The higher personal and political sophistication individuals have, the

more likely they will engage in protest behavior.

3. Value Change approach:

Hypothesis 3: Postmaterialists are more likely to engage in protest behavior than

materialists.

4. Dissatisfaction approach:

Hypothesis 4: The higher political dissatisfaction and alienation individuals have, the

more likely they will engage in protest behavior.

Indicators and Variables

The Dependent Variable: Unconventional Forms of Political Participation

This study focuses on unconventional forms of political participation - the

dependent variable of this study. The concept means "peaceful political protest" that

includes signing petitions, joining in boycotts, attending lawfiil demonstrations,

joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings or factories (March 1977, 1990;

Dalton 1988, 1996, 2002). Although it could be assumed that there exist differences

78

between all these forms of unconventional action, this study considers these five

different types of political action as unconventional forms of political participation as

World Values Surveys did.

The World Values Surveys' data allow an evaluation of public attitudes toward

unconventional forms of political participation. The unconventional forms of political

participation items in the 1981-84, 1990, and 1995-97 World Values Surveys propose

a series of protest activities ranging from mild forms to more extreme forms. The

unconventional forms of political participation are, by ascending order of involvement,

"Signing a petition"; "Joining in boycotts"; "Attending lawfiil demonsfrations";

"Joining unofficial sfrikes"; and "Occupying buildings or factories." It is assumed

that these five items reflect people's basic attitudes toward political protest action.

Respondents were asked to answer whether they did or might do each of these

things. They were given a choice of responses from 1 to 3: (1) "have done"; (2)

"might do"; and (3) "would never do." Tables 3-2 and Figures 3-2 through 3-4 show

comparative, cross-national, percentages of unconventional forms of political

participation in Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea in the 1980s and 1990s.

Referring to the Tables and Figures, there appear to be no noteworthy cross-national

differences in unconventional forms of political participation among these three

countries. Respondents are more likely to engage in the milder and lawful forms of

protest action (e.g., signing a petition), whereas they rarely participate in the more

illegitimate and militant types of protest. It is, however, interesting to note that the

percentages of unconventional forms of political participation are commonly

increased in the 1980s, but decreased in the 1990s, especially for the most extreme

forms of protest.

79

The replies that people gave to these survey questions created quite a lot of

information: three categories by five different forms of political participation. These

are too cumbersome to examine effectively. However, there is a very handy way of

summarizing them without losing too much information (Marsh 1990, pp. 20-21).

First of all, we collapsed respondents' replies to each item into only two categories:

'yes' or 'no' on the simple basis of whether or not they ever do each item. That is, the

answer of (2) "might do" is included in the answer (1) "have done". Because of the

low frequencies often found for those who have done a particular protest behavior,

protest potential is often more a measure of a propensity to protest than an actual

protest experience (Lee 2003). Secondly, using simple additive procedures, we

created the protest potential scale that is composed of these five items. Each item is

given an equal weight in the scale. The scale of the dependent variable is thus

constructed by standardizing, equally weighing, and combining these five items. The

range of the scale is from 0 (would never do any of the five items) to 5 (have done or

might do all five items).

The Independent Variables

Baseline

Protest activities are obviously much more difficult forms of political

participation than simply voting or attending a meeting. Thus, an engagement in

protest activities requires higher levels of political interest and commitment than are

found in the average citizen. Therefore, one might expect to find that education and

social class are important factors in the formation of attitudes toward unconventional

fonms of political participation (Inglehart 1977; Dalton 1988, 2002). At the same time.

80

one might also expect that the young male groups tend to be more inclined to indulge

themselves in the pursuit of protest activities than their older female counterparts

(Dalton 1988, 2002; Schlozman, Bums, and Verba 1994). One possible explanation

might be that youths and males have more physical energy and leisure time for the

pursuit of causes, are more vulnerable to the ideological sources of motivation

associated with protest, are more prone to risk taking, and have less to lose although

there is evidence that this pattem is changing with a narrowing of gender roles (Lee

and Rinehart 1995). Research has shown a strong tendency toward higher levels of

political protest among the young (Marsh 1977; Bames et al. 1979).

From these arguments this study chooses three measurements to test the

hypothesis of socio-economic status approach.

Age. Respondents were asked to give their age at the time of the survey.

Gender. Respondents were asked to identify themselves as male or female. The

gender variable is rescaled from 0 (male) to 1 (female) for interpretative purposes.

Income. Respondents were asked to identify their family income. The income

variable is scaled from 1 (lowest income level) to 10 (highest income level).

Education. The education level of respondents was measured based on their response

to the following two questions: "What is the highest education level that you have

attended?" and "At what age did you or will you complete your full time education,

either at school or at an institution of higher education?" While, the former question

was employed for the first wave of World Value Surveys in the three new democracies,

and the second wave in Mexico, the latter question was for the second wave in South

Africa and South Korea, and third wave in all three nations. The higher the score, the

higher education.

81

Cognitive Skills

The cognitive skills approach also holds that the increasing levels of political

sophistication and information are leading one to a more active citizens role (Inglehart

1977; Shively 1979; Dalton 1984). When citizens are more cognitively mobilized (as

measured by such things as frequency of political discussion or perceived degree of

influence over others), they tend to participate more. Indeed, the frequency of

political discussion has long been thought to presage strong political cognitions and

participatory orientation (Almond and Verba 1965; Hagner and Pierce 1982; Verba,

Nie, and Kim 1978). Further, to the extent people experience politicization from

partisan or interest group attachments, they seem more likely to participate in political

activities (Verba et al. 1978; Powell 1986). In addition, scholars (Rose and Urwin

1969; Klingemann and Ingleahrt 1975; Lewis-Beck 1983; Dalton 2002) define that

the attachments of ideological extremes and religious organizations are important for

people's political behavior. Those having an understanding of political matters at an

ideological level could function consistently in political life. In particular, an

understanding that included an appreciation of the main Left-Right or Liberal-

Conservative dimension of democratic politics was the essential equipment of any

recruit of political activity. Strong evidence from survey research tends to support

this view. Dalton, especially, defines that Left/Right position is an important

determinant of unconventional forms of political participation. Dalton (2002, p. 69)

argues that "although protest politics has spread throughout the political process and

is used by groups on the Left and Right, the willingness to engage in these activities

82

remains more common among leftists" and "protest politics is still disproportionately

the domain of the Left" in advanced industrial democracies.

From these arguments this study chooses two different measurements to test

the hypothesis of cognitive skills approach.

Left-Right self-placement. A self-placement scale was used to measure

respondents' political orientation. Respondents were asked the following question:

"In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place

your views on this scale, generally speaking?" The possible responses ranged from

(1) Left to (10) Right on the 10-point scale.

Psychological Involvement in Politics. The level of psychological

involvement in politics of respondents was measured based on their response to the

following two questions: "When you get together with your friends, would you say

you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never?" and "How interested

would you say you are in politics?" Using additive procedures, the scale of

psychological involvement in politics is created. The scale is composed of these two

items. The possible responses for this variable are (1) "not at all"; (2) "not very"; (3)

somewhat; and (4) "very." Thus, the higher score, the higher psychological

involvement in politics.

Value Changes

According to value change approach, values provide the standards that guide

the attitudes and behaviors of the public. Values signify a preference for certain

personal and social goals, as well as the methods to obtain these goals. One

individual may place a high priority on freedom, equality, and social harmony - and

83

favor policies that strengthen these values. Others may stress independence, social

recognition, and ambition in guiding their actions. Thus, many personal and political

decisions involve a choice between several valued goals. Value systems should

include the salient goals that guide human behavior. Inglehart (1977), especially,

emphasized the shifts from materialist values to postmaterialist values as a

characteristic of advanced indusfrial societies, and empirical studies define that the

new values of postmaterialist or libertarian lead to the growth of unconventional

forms of political participation.

Materialist-Postmaterialist self-placement. This study employs Inglehart's

materialist-postmaterialist value scale (4-item index), because the 12-item index was

not available for the first wave of World Values Surveys. This index is based on the

respondent's first and second choice in the original four-item materialist-

postmaterialist values battery. If both materialist items are given high priority, the

score is "1" ; if both postmaterialist items are given high priority, the score is "3." If

the respondent makes only one or no choices, the result is treated as missing data.

The materialist-postmaterialist value change variable is scaled from 1 (materialist) to

3 (postmaterialist).

Dissatisfaction

The dissatisfaction approach implies that political dissatisfaction and

alienation should be major predictors of protest. Scholars have proposed various

indicators of relative deprivation in empirical research. As used in the literature,

relative deprivation is a very abstract concept, which could have many dimensions

and any number of attitudinal and behavioral referents, including cognitions, beliefs.

84

and attitudes with past, present, and future time orientations. In contrast with

theoretical treatments, operationalization of the concept in research tends to be narrow

and unidimensional, with researchers adhering to a "one concept-one indicator"

strategy (Gumey and Tiemey 1982, p. 40).

Muller (1972) employs "welfare gratification-deprivation" as an operational

indicator of relative deprivation (p. 936). It is based on four categories of value

concerns that are selected as referents for the measures of relative deprivation: career

satisfaction, economic well-being, satisfactoriness of living conditions, and children's

welfare. His empirical research shows that there is only a weak relationship between

dissafisfaction and protest for political activists in the last 1960s (Muller 1972).

Norris's indicator of relative deprivation is somewhat similar with Muller's in a sense

that both employ citizens' attitudes toward govemment policies. Indeed, Norris

(1999) uses policy dissatisfaction as an indicator of relative deprivation: policy

dissatisfaction increases the likelihood of participation in protest activities.

Bames and Kaase (1979) employ "personal dissatisfaction" (p. 399) and

"political dissatisfaction" (p. 410) as the operational indicators of relative deprivation.

For the measurements of personal dissatisfaction they use people's material

dissatisfaction and life dissatisfaction. On the other hand, for the indicators of

political dissatisfaction they measure people's evaluation of govemment performance

and policy dissatisfaction. Their empirical research shows that there are relatively

weak relationships between dissatisfaction and protest for political activists in the

advanced industrial democracies: Netherlands, Britain, United States, Germany, and

Austria (Bames and Kaase 1979).

85

Dalton (2002) employs "political satisfaction" (satisfaction with the

govemment's performance) as an indicator of relative deprivation. He states that the

relative deprivation approach "implies that political dissatisfaction and alienation

should be major predictors of protesf (p. 66). The results of his empirical analyses of

unconventional forms of political participation in the advanced industrial democracies

show that "dissatisfied citizens are only slightly more willing to protest than those

who are satisfied with the govemment's performance" (Dalton 2002, p. 67). Yet,

Dahon (2002) concludes that "unconventional political activity should be more

common among lower-status individuals, minorities, and other groups who have

reasons to feel deprived or dissatisfied" (p. 66).

From these arguments above this study chooses two different measurements to

test the hypothesis of relative deprivation approach.

Personal Dissatisfaction. This variable consists of the respondents'

satisfaction level in material and life which was measured based on their response to

the following two questions: "how satisfied are you with the financial situation of

your household?" And "All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as

a whole these days?" Using additive procedures, the scale of personal dissatisfaction

is created. The possible responses for the variable are from (1) "satisfied" to (10)

"dissatisfied." Thus, the higher score, the higher personal dissatisfaction.

Political Dissatisfaction. This variable is based on respondents' confidence in

political institutions and satisfaction in govemment policies. The respondents

confidence level in political systems and institutions was measured based on their

response to the following questions: " . . . could you tell me how much confidence you

have in the [legal system, police, govemment, political parties, and parliament]: is it a

86

great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none

at all?" The scale is composed of these five items. The possible responses ranged

from (1) 'great deal' to (4) 'not at all'. On the other hand, the satisfaction in

govemment of respondents was measured based on their response to the following

question: "How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are

handling the country's affairs?" Respondents were given a choice of responses from

(1) very satisfied to (4) very dissatisfied. Using simple additive procedures for the

two variables - respondents' confidence in political institutions and satisfaction in

govemment policies, the scale of political dissatisfaction is created. Thus, the higher

score, the higher political dissatisfaction.

The Control Variable and Dummy Variables

There have existed severe social and racial cleavages between rich landovwier

(caudillos) and poor local farmers (campesinou), and between white immigrants and

their descendants (mestizos) and indigenous people (Amerindian) with African

immigrants in Mexico (Wiarda and Kline 1985; Almond et al. 2000, chapter 14;

Hauss 2000, chapter 16). These cleavages have played an important role in the nation.

Similarly, South Africa is one of the most culturally heterogeneous counfries in the

world with the divisions over race. South Africa is typically considered to be a deeply

divided society by race. Therefore, for the analyses of these two countries - Mexico

and South Africa, this study includes race of respondents as a control variable.

The first, second, and third World Values Surveys ask the same series of

questions year after year in these three new democracies. Hence, the individual data

sets for the different years and for the different countries have been pooled. Pooling

87

repeated surveys facilitates the study of change or trends in individual-level

relationship (Firebaugh 1997). Hence, the OLS regression analyses allow us to track

not only change in the dependent variable over time, but also difference in the

dependent variable among the countries. In order to exploit this feature of pooled

data sets 'year' and 'country' dummy variables are added to the data sets indicating

the year and country of each survey. Consequently, a significant coefficient on any or

all of these 'year' dummy variables indicates significant change occurred in the

dependent variable for the specific data set indicated by the dummy. For instance, if a

1990 dummy is significant, significant change occurred in the dependent variable

since the first wave of World Value Surveys included in the pooled data set. The sign

of the dummy coefficient identified the direction of change on the dependent variable.

However, the 'year' dummy independent variables must not be interested as causal

variables: "time per se is not causal" (Firebaugh 1997, p. 64).

A significant coefficient on the 'country' dummy variables also indicates

whether there is a statistically significant difference in the dependent variables of

these three new democracies.

Ethnic Groups. Respondents were asked to identify themselves. The possible

responses are originally "White" (01), "Black" (02), "Medium brown skin (Moreno)"

(03), "Yellow skinned (Amarillo)" (04), "Light brown skin (Moreno dare)" (05),

"Indian skin (Moreno obscure)" (06), and "Undocumented code" (08) in Mexico and

"White" (01), "Black" (02), "Asian" (03), and "Colored (mixed white and black)"

(04) in South Africa. However, this study dichotomizes the values as "White" (1) and

"Non-white" (2) because non-White people in these two countries share relatively

similar attitudes on politics (Hauss 2000, chapter 15 and 16).

88

'Year' dummy. The wave code of the World Values Surveys is included as

control variables. For exEimple, before pooling the 1981 survey a 1981 dummy

variable sets to a value of one (1) and dummy variables set to the value zero (0) for

1990 and 1996 surveys, and so on.

'Country' dummy. The country code of respondents is included as a control

variable.

Data Source

The data set employed in this study is derived from the first, second, and third

waves of World Values Surveys in 1981-82; 1990-1993; and 1995-1997. World

Values Surveys were coordinated, assembled, and documented by Inglehart. The

surveys were conducted to compare cross-national values and norms on a wide variety

of topics and monitor changes in values and attitudes across the globe. World Values

Surveys included 22 independent counfries for the 1981-84 surveys, 42 independent

countries for the 1990-93 surveys, and 53 independent counfries for the 1995-97

surveys. In all, 64 independent counfries have been surveyed in at least one wave of

this investigation. These counfries include almost 80 percent of the world's

population.

However, only three new democracies (Mexico, South Africa, and South

Korea) were covered by all the three waves of World Values Surveys. The first wave

of World Values Surveys was conducted in Mexico in 1981 and South Africa in 1982,

and South Korea in 1982. The second wave of World Values Surveys were conducted

in Mexico in May-June 1990, South Africa in October-November 1990, and South

Korea in June-July 1990. The third wave of World Values Surveys were also

89

conducted in Mexico in Fall 1995-Spring 1996, South Africa in Spring 1996, and

South Korea in Spring 1996 (Table 4-1). Therefore, the first wave of the World

Values Surveys had been conducted before these three countries began their

democratic transition. The second wave of the World Values Surveys had been

conducted just before inauguration of democracy in Mexico and South Africa and just

after inauguration of democracy in South Korea. In contrast, the third waves of the

World Values Surveys were conducted during the democratization period in these

nations.

The World Values Surveys project explores the hypothesis that mass belief

systems are changing in ways that have important economic, political and social

consequences. Thus, broad topics covered were work, personal finances, the

economy, politics, allocation of resources, contemporary social issues, technology and

its impact on society, and traditional values. Respondents' opinions of various forms

of political action, the most important aims for their countries, and confidence in

various civil and govemmental institutions were also solicited. In addition,

demographic information includes family income, number of people residing in the

home, size of locality, home ownership, region of residence, occupation of the head of

household, and the respondent's age, gender, occupation, income, education, religion,

political party and union membership, and left-right political self-placement. In each

of the counfries surveyed, approximately 1,000 persons aged 18 and over in mass

publics were interviewed. All interviews were carried out face-to-face at homes in

each country.

90

Method

Descriptive analysis is first at the individual level by comparing the levels of

the several indicators of unconventional forms of political participation in the new

democracies. The survey data allow for correlation and regression on the dependent

variable, unconventional forms of political participation, at the individual level. Here,

OLS regression seems the most appropriate statistical technique. Therefore, in order

to see the causal relations between explanatory variables and unconventional forms of

political participation in the three new democracies, this study constmcts OLS

regression analyses for the three nations for three different points of data. This study

also investigates if the determinants of unconventional forms of political participation

differ between the pre-democracy period and post-democracy period. For this

purpose the data are collapsed into two sets.

Indeed, some scholars (e.g., Inglehart 1979; Bames and Kaase 1979; Flanagan

1984; Lee 1993; Opp 2000; Flanagan and Lee 2000, Lee and Norris 2000, etc.)

conduct two-step models for understanding protest activities, whereas the others (e.g.,

Dalton 1988; Norris 1999; Canche and Kulisheck 2002; Kim 2002, etc.) use one-step

models to test various approaches/models conceming the sources of protest activities.

This study follows the latter. Thus in this study, we take an empirically grounded first

step toward analyzing or identifying the range of possible ways in which protest

action has changed in new democracies and the different factors responsible for

instigating those change.

Accordingly, the subject of Chapter V is the description of bivariate

relationships between independent variables and unconventional forms of political

91

participation. The subject of Chapter VI is the results of OLS regression analyses to

explain unconventional forms of political participation in the new democracies.

Summary

This study encompasses a series of individual levels of analysis. This study

intends to investigate the determinants of unconventional forms of political

participation in new democracies. The determinants are from the four approaches -

base-line, cognitive skills, value change and relative deprivation. Therefore, to test

these four approaches, this study has four individual level hypotheses:

Hl-1: The higher socio-economic status individuals have, the more likely they will

protest.

HI-2: The older individuals are the less likely they will participate in protest.

HI-3: Women are less likely to participate in protest than are men.

H2: The higher political sophistication individuals have, the more likely they will

engage in protest behavior.

H3: Postmaterialists are more likely to engage in protest behavior than materialists.

H4: The higher personal and political dissatisfaction and alienation individuals have,

the more likely they will engage in protest behavior.

In addition to testing these six sub-hypotheses, this study also investigates if the

determinants of unconventional forms of political participation differ between the pre-

democracy period and post-democracy period by analyzing two groups of data sets

separately.

92

The predicted functional equation for the empirical test is:

Y/ (Protest Potential) = a + |31 " (Age) + p2 * (Gender) + (33* (Income) + p4 *

(Education) + ^5* (Left-Right Self-Placement) + ^6* (Psychological

Involvement in PoHtics) + p7 * (Materialist-Postmaterialist Value) + pS *

(Personal Dissatisfaction) + P9 * (Political Dissatisfaction) + + piO * (Ethnic

Groups) -I- ei.

The following chapter presents descriptive information on variables utilized in

the study and bivariate relationship between independent variables and dependent

variable of unconventional forms of political participation in the new democracies.

93

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CHAPTER V

BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE VARIABLES

This chapter and the following chapter examine how well or how poorly the

four approaches (Baseline, Cognitive Skill, Dissatisfaction (RD), and Value Change

approaches) explain protest potential in the three new democracies: Mexico, South

Africa, and South Korea. Therefore, this chapter opens with an examination of

variations of the dependent and independent variables over the three waves of the

World Values Surveys. The main section of the chapter examines the bivariate

relationships between all of the independent variables and dependent variable. The

bivariate relationships between the variables will be investigated to examine both the

direction and sfrength.

The study basically expects that the determinants based on the four approaches

are related to protest behaviors of the mass public in the new democracies. Baseline

approach would expect sfrong positive associations between the dependent variable

(unconventional forms of political participation: UFPP) and Income and Education

and negative associations between the dependent variable and Age and Gender (male

= 0; female = 1). Cognitive Skills approach also would expect sfrong positive

association between the dependent variable and Psychological Involvement in Politics

(PI) and negative association between the dependent variable and Left-Right Self-

Placement (LR). Dissatisfaction (RD) approach also would expect strong positive

associations between the dependent variable and Political Dissatisfaction (PODS) and

Personal Dissatisfaction (PEDS). Value Change approach would expect strong

positive association between the dependent variable and materialist-postmaterialist

95

value (M-PM). Thus, this chapter and the following chapter will test those

relationships between the variables.

Variations of Dependent and Independent Variables

Descriptive information, including means and standard deviations, of the

dependent variable, UFPP, in the new democracies is summarized in Table 5-1.

The average number of UFPP in the three new democracies is 1.94. It means

that people in the three new democracies had engaged or were willing to engage in

almost two different types of protest activities in the 1980s and 1990s. The Table also

shows that the average numbers of UFPP are different by times. For example, the

average number of UFPP in post-democracy period (2.22) is higher than the average

number of UFPP in the pre-democracy period (1.75) in the three new democracies. It

explains that people had more participated or were more willing to participate in

protest behavior in the post-democracy period than in the pre-democracy period.

Indeed, the three new democracies had commonly experienced massive protests by

citizenry in the 1980s, democratic transition period, which contributed to replace

authoritarian with democratic regimes. And, elite-challenging protest for continuing

political reform and economic liberalization in those countries have increased in the

1990s, democratic consolidation period.

The average numbers of UFPP are also different by nations. The average of

UFPP in South Korea (2.33) is higher than the averages of UFPP in Mexico (1.94)

and South Africa (1.80). It denotes that South Koreans had more engaged or were

more willing to engage in protest behavior than Mexicans and South Africans in the

1980s and 1990s. In addition, the average number of UFPP had increased in Mexico

96

(1.75 to 2.48) and South Korea (1.47 to 2.52) in the 1980s and 1990s, but changed

little in South Africa (1.81 to 1.79) in that period. It explains that protest potential

had increased in Mexico and South Korea in the 1980s and 1990s, where as it had not

increased in South Africa in that period.

Although inauguration of democracy in the three new democracies was almost

simultaneous in the late 1980s or early 1990s, these countries have experienced

diverse cultural heritages and varying stages of development. In addition, there exist

differences of socio-economic background in the three new democracies (Table 3-1).

South Korea, especially, is far ahead from the other two countries on the process of

economic development (e.g. GNP per capita, literacy rate, urbanization rate, and so

on). Therefore, from those differences this study expects that there exist inter-state

differences on the people's attitudes toward protest behavior in the three new

democracies.

The reason why protest potential did not increase in South Africa in the 1990s

may probably be related to development of political tolerance in the county. Since

South Africa had the first all-race democratic election in April 1994 and a new

president. Nelson Mandela, in May 1994, the political tolerance has developed among

South Africans, especially non-White. These political developments might have

made South Africans resfrain themselves from protesting against the new democratic

govemment in the late 1990s (Deegan 2001, chapter 5).

From the variations of the dependent variable by times and nations, this study

expects that the direction and/or strength of the relationships between the dependent

variable and independent variables would be different between the three nations as

well as between the pre-democracy period and the post-democracy period.

97

Table 5-2 exhibits the average numbers of the independent variables are

different by times. The average numbers of Income (4.45 to 5.99), Education (4.48 to

4.55), Psychological Involvement in Politics (2.26 to 2.66), and Political

Dissatisfaction (2.31 to 2.82) had slightly increased in the three new democracies in

the 1980s and 1990s. It means that people's income and education had increased in

the three new democracies in the 1980s and 1990s. Contrarily, people's confidence in

political institutions and satisfaction in govemment policies had decreased in the three

new democracies in the 1980s and 1990s. In addition, individuals were more

interested in politics and more willing to participate in political discussion in the post-

democracy period than in the pre-democracy period. Therefore, the variations of the

independent variables' average numbers (e.g. Psychological Involvement in Politics

and Political Dissatisfaction) by times exhibit that the expectation and concem toward

the new democratic govemments had gradually increased since inauguration of

democracy in the three new democracies.

The average numbers of Left-Right Self-Placement (6.20 to 5.69), Personal

Dissatisfaction (5.83 to 5.28), and Materialist-Postmaterialist Value (1.75 to 1.69) had

slightly decreased in the new democracies since their inauguration of democracy. It

means that the individuals in the new democracies were more Left rather than Right,

more materialists rather than postmaterialists, and more satisfied in material and life

in the 1980s than in the 1990s. It explains that the rates of materialists in the new

democracies had increased in the 1980s and 1990s in spite of their rapid economic

development (e.g., income and education) in that period. It is somewhat different

with the trends of materialists/postmaterialists value change in advanced indusfrial

democracies. According to Inglehart's studies (1987), the rates of postmaterialists in

98

the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and France had commonly increased

in the 1970s through 1990s. The reason behind the rates of postmaterialists had not

increased in the three new democracies in the 1980s and 1990s is probably related to

the stage of economic development in the countries. Because Mexico, South Africa,

and South Korea are newly developing countries and still pose a highly traditional and

authoritarian culture, their value changes might be different with those in the

advanced industrial democracies (for value changes in non-Westem democracies see

Flanagan 1991; Flanagan and Richardson 1980; Flanagan and Lee 2000).

The average numbers of the independent variables are also somewhat different

by nations. For example, Mexicans are less satisfied in their political institutions and

govemment policies and more willing to participate in politics than South Africans

and South Koreans. In contrast. South Africans are less satisfied in their material and

life than Mexicans and South Koreans. Although inauguration of democracy was

almost simultaneous in the three new democracies, diverse cultural heritages and

varying stages of political and economic development in the countries lead to inter

state differences on people' attitudes and values toward politics and ideology.

From the variations of the independent variable by times and nations, this

study expects that the direction and/or sfrength of the relationships between the

dependent variable and independent variables would be different between these three

nations as well as between the pre-democracy period and the post-democracy period.

Bivariate Relationships Between Independent and Dependent Variable

In this section, bivariate analysis of all of the independent variables and the

dependent variable are presented. The Pearson's correlations are computed and

99

presented for all of the variables involved in the analysis. The underlying purpose for

which the bivariate relationships are analyzed is to provide a picture of association

between the variables. The observed Pearson's correlations should be useful in

gaining insight into the nature of association between the independent variables as

well as the dependent variable and independent variables.

Here we are looking at the independent variables to establish the way in which

the dependent variable is statistically associated and also to make us aware of

interactions among a large set of attitudinal variables in the next chapter. On the other

hand, entering other variables into the multivariate regression equation might render

spurious the significant coefficients reported in this chapter.

Table 5-3 reports the findings for the three new democracies (All) and two

different time periods (Pre and Post). Table 5-4 also reports the findings for each of

three nations: Mexico (ME), South Africa (SA), and South Korea (SK). Each of the

Tables displays correlations between the independent variables as well as between the

independent variables and the dependent variables (the bottom line on the each of the

Tables). Therefore, first, a short discussion of the results of bivariate analysis

involving the independent variables will be presented. Discussion of the results of the

bivariate analysis involving the independent variables and dependent variable follows.

The interpretation of these bivariate analyses primarily focus on correlations between

the independent variables and the dependent variable.

Associations Between Variables in the Three New Democracies

Table 5-3 reports the correlation matrix for the eleven variables in the three

new democracies and two different time periods.

100

Correlations Between Independent Variables

All those correlations between the independent variables in the Table 5-3 are

ranging from .383 to .001 for (All), from .397 to .005 for (Pre), and from .335 to .002

for (Post). Of the 45 correlations between the independent variables, 34 for (All), 34

for (Pre), and 31 for (Post) are statistically significant (p < .05). Ideally, these

independent variables would not be related to each other, in order to maximize their

contribution to the prediction of the dependent variable. Any high correlations (r >

+1- .80) among the independent variables were not expected (Shannon and Davenport

2001). Using this criterion, this study is safe in that the highest correlation is .397.

These correlations between the independent variables generally exhibit that

women are less psychologically involved in politics and are more likely to be

materialists rather than postmaterialists. Older people are more likely to be Right and

materialists rather than Left and postmaterialists and are more likely to have

confidence in political institutions and satisfaction in govemment policies. The

higher socio-economic status individuals by income and education are more likely to

be postmaterialists. White people in Mexico and South Africa are more likely to have

confidence in political institutions and satisfaction in govemment policies and are

more likely to have satisfaction in material well-being and life. Individuals who are

more Right rather than Left, are more likely to be materialists rather than

postmaterialists. Postmaterialists are more psychologically involved in politics.

Table 5-3 also reports that there is the relative weakness of the correlations

among independent variables because no correlations among the independent

variables are observed to exceed .40. The strongest statistically significant

101

relationships are observed between EG and Income [.335** for (Pre) and .334** for

(Post)] and between Education and Income [.397** for (Pre)]. Therefore, the study

would include all of the independent variables to multivariate regression equation

presented in the following chapter. In general, if there exists a very strong correlation

among independent variables, we cannot include all of the independent variables to

multivariate regression equation together (Shannon and Davenport 2001).

Correlation Between the Independent Variables and Dependent Variable

Table 5-3, especially (All), displays all zero-order correlations except Income

are statistically significant at the .01 level (the bottom line on the Table), suggesting

that there are statistically significant associations between the independent variables

and UFPP in the three new democracies. Moreover, all correlations report the

expected direction. The strongest of these is between PI and UFPP, reported

as .388**. This correlation indicates that people who are more psychologically

involved in politics tend to engage more in protest behavior as this study would

expect. The second strongest relationship is with M-PM, reported as .191**. This

correlation indicates that postmaterialists are more likely to participate in protest than

materialists. Again, this is what the study would expect. The correlation between LR

and UFPP is reported as -.189**, indicating that Left are more likely to participate in

protest than Right. This is also what the study would expect. The correlation

between Age and UFPP is reported as -.163**, indicating that older people are less

likely to engage in protest. The correlations between UFPP and Gender (r = -.096**),

Education (r = .082**), EG (r = .045**), PODS (r = .056**), and PEDS (r = .055**)

are rather very weak, but still statistically significant.

102

Table 5-3, especially (Pre), also displays there are statistically significant

associations between all of the independent variables and UFPP during the pre-

democracy period in the three new democracies. Moreover, all correlations report the

expected direction. The strongest of these is between PI and UFPP, reported

as .409**. The second strongest relationship is with LR, reported as -.284**. The

correlations between UFPP and M-PM and Age are reported as .180** and -.155**.

In addition, the correlations between UFPP and Income (r = .023*), EG (r = .037**),

PODS (r = .071**), PEDS (r = .083**), and Education (r = .098**) are relatively

rather weak, but still statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 5-3, especially (Post) also displays all zero-order correlations between

the independent variables and UFPP are statistically significant during the post-

democracy period in the three new democracies. The strongest of these is between PI

and UFPP, reported as .334** again. The second strongest relationship is with M-PM,

reported as .226**. The correlation between UFPP and PEDS and Gender are

reported as .224** and -.205**. In addition, the correlafions between UFPP and

Income (r = -.097**), Education (r = .056**), EG (r = .064**), LR (r = -.064**), and

PODS (r = .031**) are relatively weak, but still statistically significant at the .01 level.

From the Table 5-3 we find that the directions of correlations between UFPP

and Income and Education are inconsistent by the times. For example. Income and

Education, respectively, is a statistically significant and positive correlation with

UFPP (r = .023* and .179**) in the pre-democracy period, but negative (r = -.097**

and -.056**) in the post-democracy period. It means that the higher socio-economic

status individuals had, the more likely they engaged in protest behavior in the pre-

103

democracy period, but the less likely they engage in protest behaviors the post-

democracy period.

In sum, the resuhs of the bivariate analysis between the dependent variable

and independent variables exhibit that a significant relationship exists between UFPP

and Age, Gender, Education, EG, LR, PI, M-PM, PODS, and PEDS. All correlations

except Income and Education report the expected direction regardless of different

stages of democratization in the three new democracies. The most significant

relationship exists between PI and UFPP regardless of times. M-PM is the next

sfrongest one. However, correlations between UFPP and EG and UFPP and PODS

are relatively weak.

Associations Between Variables In Mexico. South Africa, and South Korea

Correlations Between Independent Variables

Table 5-4 exhibits the association between the independent variables in

Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea. All those correlations among independent

variables are ranging from -.382 to .007 for (ME), from .353 to .004 for (SA),

from .294 to .007 (SK). It means that there is the relative weakness of the correlations

among independent variables because no correlations among the independent

variables are observed to exceed .40. If we find a sfrong correlation between two

independent variables, we need to exclude one of the independent variables.

Therefore, the study would include all of the independent variables to multivariate

regression equation to predict protest potential in each of the three new democracies.

104

Correlation Between the Independent Variables and Dependent Variable

Table 5-4 also shows the association between the independent variables and

UFPP in Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea (the bottom line on the table). The

results of the bivariate analyses between the independent variables and dependent

variable show that a significant relationship commonly exists between UFPP and Age,

Education, EG, LR, PI, M-PM, and PEDS in all three nations. All correlations

between UFPP and Age, Education, LR, PI, and M-MP are the expected direction in

all three nations. The most significant relationship exists between PI and UFPP in all

three nations. M-PM is the next sfrongest. Age, EG, and PEDS are commonly rather

weak, but still statistically significant in all three nations.

Nevertheless, there are a few unexpected findings from the bivariate analyses

of the three new democracies. First, the direction of correlations between UFPP and

EG are inconsistent in Mexico and South Africa. For example, EG has a statistically

significant positive correlation with UFPP in South Africa (r = .082**), whereas the

variable has a negative correlation with UFPP in Mexico (r = -.098**). The results of

EG exhibit that White are less likely to participate in protest behavior than are non-

White in South Africa, but more likely to participate in protest than non-White in

Mexico. Why is that White in Mexico are more likely to participate in protest than

non-White? This raises an intriguing question. Our data analysis suggests that we

may have a measurement problem. There fraditionally existed severe cleavages

between rich landowner and poor local farmers in Mexico. The cleavages, however,

changed during the indusfrialization process to conflict between elites (church,

military, oligarch), middle class (skilled workers), and unorganized peasants. Thus,

the politically significant cleavages in Mexico are perhaps based on different social

105

class, occupation, or residence rather than ethnicity (Camp 1993). Furthermore, the

fact that white is less than 10 percent of the whole population in Mexico suggests that

the present study has not successfully measured that dimension of social cleavage.

Secondly, the directions of correlations between UFPP and PEDS are not

consistent by the nations. Indeed, PEDS, respectively, is a statistically significant and

positive direction with UFPP in Mexico (.092**) and South Africa (.085**), but

negative direction with UFPP in South Korea (-.062**). The results of PEDS reveal

that individuals who are more satisfied in their material well-being and life, are less

likely to engage in protest behavior in Mexico and South Africa, but more likely to

engage in protest behavior in South Korea. Thus, the results of PEDS in Mexico and

South Africa confirm the dissatisfaction approach.

Thirdly, the correlations between UFPP and Income are inconsistent by the

nations: statistically significant and positive in South Korea (.195**); statistically

significant, but negative in South Africa (-.034**); statistically in significant in

Mexico (.007). The results of Income exhibit that the rich, compared to their poor

counterparts, are more likely in South Korea, but less likely in South Africa to engage

in protest behavior. Income does not even matter to protest potential in Mexico.

Accordingly, the results of Income for South Korea support the deprivation argument

on 'poor-radical revolutionaries' rather than 'baseline approach.'

Finally, Gender and PODS are also inconsistent by the nations. The

correlation between UFPP and Gender is not statistically significant in South Korea

(-.014), where as the correlations between these two variables are statistically

significant in Mexico (-.130**) and South Africa (-.134**). The resuh of Gender

confirms what Lee and Rinehart (1995) showed for South Korea, as there is evidence

106

of changing with a narrowing of gender roles in South Korea. In confrast, the

correlations between UFPP and PODS are not statistically significant in Mexico

(-.025) and South Africa (-.011), where as the correlation between the two variables is

statistically significant in South Korea (.225**).

The following chapter explores multivariate regression analyses between the

independent variables and dependent variable of UFPP in the new democracies. The

chapter consists of nine different multivariate regression analyses by times and by

nations.

107

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Table 5-2: Statistics of Independent Variables

Variables

Age

Income

Education

Left-Right self-placement

Psychological Involvement in

Politics

Political Dissatisfaction

Personal Dissatisfaction

M-PM Value

Statistics

Minimum

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Std. Dev.

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Std. Dev.

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Std. Dev.

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CHAPTER VI

DETERMINANTS OF UNCONVENTIONAL FORMS OF

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

This chapter examines how well or how poorly the four approaches predict

protest potential in the three new democracies using nine multivariate regression

analyses. With this purpose six sub-hypotheses were raised and are now tested

through statistical analyses of multivariate regression analyses. The chapter consists

of three parts of analyses. The first part focuses on intra-differences of the individual

level determinants of UFPP in the three new democracies. This part is based on a

multivariate regression analysis of the three new democracies included in the three

waves of World Values Surveys. The second part focuses on the differences of

determinants' contributing to the prediction of UFPP by the process of

democratization. The comparisons of two muhivariate regression analyses of the pre-

democracy period and the post-democracy period are the subject of this part. The last

part tests the inter-state differences of determinants' contributing to the prediction of

UFPP by the comparing three multivariate regression analyses of Mexico, South

Africa, and South Korea.

Intra-Differences in the Three New Democracies

Table 6-1, especially (All), summarizes information pertaining to the overall

relationship (R) between the independent variables and the dependent variable, the

amount of variance explained by these independent variables (R^), and the results of

the significance used to test the regression model (F Change).

112

The overall relationship between the thirteen predictable variables and UFPP

is reported as .446. When the multiple correlation (R) is squared, the study finds that

21.8 percent of the variances in UFPP can be explained using these independent

variables. The adjusted R is .216, which is not that much different from the study's

sample R of .218. The adjusted R is an estimate that exists in the population. When

the adjusted R is close to the R reported for the sample, the fit between the sample

and population is good. When the adjusted R differs substantially from the R

reported in the sample, the fit is worse. The adjustment is made primarily on the basis

of the ratio of sample size to number of independent variable. In the situation, this

study has 8996 cases and 13 predictors, or a ratio of 692 subjects per predictors. An

acceptable rule of thumb is to have approximately 15 subjects per predictor (Shannon

and Davenport 2001). Therefore, the model fit is good.

The results of the F-test reveal a statistically significant F value of 192.145 (p

< .001). The value of Durbin-Watson statistic is also reported as 1.772. This statistic

describes the serial correlation among residuals. This test value will range from 0 to 4,

with value close to 0 indicating a positive correlation among residuals and those close

to 4 identifying a negative relationship. Values between 1.5 and 2.5 are expected

(Shannon and Davenport 2001). The study's value of 1.772 falls in this range so the

study should not worry about the residuals being correlated.

Table 6-1, especially (All), summarizes the information pertaining to the

regression coefficients. This information is necessary for making predictions about

the dependent variable. Whereas the unstandardized coefficients (b) are dependent

upon the scales used to measure each independent variable and can rarely be

compared directly, the standardized coefficients (P) are based on the same scale.

113

Comparisons can be made to assess the relative contributions of each independent

variable.

The unstandardized coefficients (b) of Age, Gender, Income, LR, and

dummySO are negative, indicating that these independent variables are negatively

related to the dependent variable, UFPP. In contrast, the unstandardized coefficients

(b) of Education, PI, PODS, PEDS, M-PM, dummy 90, dummyME, and dummySK

are positive, indicating that these independent variables are positively related to the

dependent variable, UFPP. Thus, those except Income are what the study would

expect.

Twelve of the thirteen t-tests are statistically significant (p < .05). Only the t-

test for Income is not statistically significance. It shows that all of the eight

significant associations between the independent variables and the dependent variable

found in bivariate analysis (Pearson's r) presented in the previous chapter (Table 5-3)

are still significant in multivariate regression analysis of the three new democracies

(Table 6-1). These t-tests basically performed to determine whether the obtained

unstandardized coefficients (b) differ from zero, as a coefficient of zero would

indicate the lack of relationship. Based on the results of these t-tests, the study

reveals that the variables Age, Gender, Education, LR PI, PODS, PEDS, M-PM, and

four dummy variables are contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP, but the

contributions of Income are no more than the study would expect. A possible

explanation for this anomaly will be discussed below. The following are the results of

step-by-step analyses of previously raised sub-hypotheses.

114

Baseline

The first set of independent variables refers to socio-economic background of

participants, which has been perhaps the most analyzed character of political

participation research (Verba et al. 1995). The first hypothesis (Age) for the baseline

approach is that the older individuals are, the less likely they will engage in protest

behavior. Age (t-value = -15.652) is contributing significantly to the predicfion of

UFPP. The second hypothesis (Gender) for the approach is that women are less likely

to participate in protest behavior than are men. Gender (t-value = -5.773) is also

contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP. This confirms previous

researches showed by Butts (1997) in Europe, Norris (2002) in the world general.

Consequently, the Age and Gender variables contribute to explain UFPP in new

democracies. The third hypothesis (Income) for the approach is that the higher

income individuals are, the more likely they will engage in protest behavior. The

findings show that the contributions of Income (t-value = -1.094) are no more than the

study would expect. The last hypothesis (Education) for the approach that the more

education individuals are, the more likely they will engage in protest behavior.

Education (t-value = 1.772) is a little contributing to the prediction of UFPP.

The P weights in the equation indicate the amount of variation associated with

each of the predictor factors, controlling for all the others. The greatest contributions

to predicting protest potential in the three new democracies are made by Age (P = -

.153).

In short. Age contributes to predict UFPP in the three new democracies.

Education also has a little explanatory power to protest potential in the three new

democracies. However, like the results from bivariate analysis presented the previous

115

chapter (Table 5-3), Income still fails to predict protest potential in the three new

democracies. It exhibits that individuals' protest potential are not very different by

their socio-economic status in the three new democracies during the democratization

process.

One explanation for the unexpected findings of Income might be a

measurement error of survey research. When respondents are asked about their

income level, they would usually identify themselves to middle-class or high-class

regardless of their real family income, especially in the less developed nations. We

might have this kind of error in all or some of the three new democracies. For

example, 39.3 percent of respondents in South Africa identify themselves to high

family income (8 through 10 categories), whereas only 8.1 percent of respondents in

Mexico identify themselves to high family income (data not shown). Therefore,

Income distributions of the three new democracies are severely different.

Consequently, the relationships between Income and UFPP are inconsistent by

nations as well as times (Table 6-7). For example. Income always fails to predict

protest potential in Mexico regardless of the times, whereas the variable is statistically

significant in South Africa, yet in the reverse relationship.

Cognitive Skills

The second set of independent variables is related with Cognitive Skills

approach based on the Rational Choice perspective. The first hypothesis for the

approach is that the willingness to engage in protest behavior remains more common

among Leftists rather than Rightists in the new democracies. The second hypothesis

for the Cognitive Skills approach is that individuals, who are more interested in

116

politics or see politics as something important, are more likely to engage in protest

behavior. The findings support these two sub-hypotheses for the Cognitive skills

approach. The multivariate regression analysis indicates that LR (t-value = -9.956) is

contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP in the new democracies. This

confirms what Dalton (2002) showed for Westem democracies. Dalton (2002, p. 69)

argues that "protest politics is still disproportionately the dominate of the Left in

Westem democracies." PI (t-value = 27.262) is also contributing significantly to the

prediction of UFPP in the new democracies, as what we expect from the literature

(Bums et al. 2001; Verba et al. 1995; and Norris 2002). Furthermore, according to

the P weights of LR and PI, the greatest contributions to predicting protest potential in

the three new democracies are made by PI (P = .273).

Dissatisfaction

The third set of independent variables is related with Dissatisfaction (RD)

approach based on the Socio-Psychological perspective. This approach assumes that

the political and economic dissatisfaction and alienation are major predictors of

protest (White 1981; Sigelman and Feldman 1983; and DiFanceisco and Gitelman

1984). Hence, the first hypothesis for the Dissatisfaction approach is that the higher

political dissatisfaction individuals have, the more likely they will engage in protest

behavior. As PODS (t value = 5.281) is contributing significantly to the prediction of

UFPP, the hypothesis is proven to be statistically significant. Thus, the results of

PODS confirm what Mishler and Rose (2001) and Tarrow (2000) showed. The

second hypothesis for the Dissatisfaction (RD) approach is that the more dissatisfied

in material well-being and life are, the more likely they will engage in protest

117

behavior. The results of PEDS (t value = 5.844) reveal that the variable contributes to

the prediction of UFPP. Thus, the resuh of PEDS also confirms what Lau and Sears

(1981) and Feldman (1982) showed. The p weights of PODS (p = .051) and PEDS (P

= .057) reveals that these two independent variables contribute to predicting protest

potential in the three new democracies. Thus, it can be said that the dissatisfaction

approach on protest behavior could be used for predicting protest potential in the three

new democracies. Yet, it is very weak.

Value Change

The next variable refers to Value Change approach based on the Cultural

Change perspective. The approach assumes that postmaterialists are more likely to

engage in protest behavior than materialists. The result of M-MP shows that the

variable (t-value = 14.709) is also contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP

in the three new democracies. This finding seems consistent with the existing

findings in the Westem democracies. According to the P weights of M-PM, the

contributions made by M-PM (P = .143) to predicting protest potential in the three

new democracies are relatively great. In short, based on the findings, it can be said

that the Value Change approach on protest behavior could be successflilly used for

predicting protest potential in the three new democracies.

Dummies

The last set of variables refers to year and country dummy variables. The

study assumes that people' protest potential are different by times and nations. The

findings show that of all the dummies - dummy80, dummy90, dummyME, and

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dummySK (t-value = -31.022, 1.840, 4.674, and 11.951) - are contributing

significantly to the prediction of UFPP in the three new democracies.

The findings support the assumption that the means of protest potential are

different by nations and times. For example, when other variables are controlled for,

the mean of protest potential in the three new democracies is the largest in 1990 (the

second World Values Surveys) and smallest in 1995 (the third World Values Surveys).

In addition, when other variables are controlled for, the mean of protest potential is

the largest in South Korea and smallest in South Africa.

Summarv of Intra-Differences

The results of the regression analysis in the three new democracies reveal that

Age, Gender, Education, LR, PI, PODS, PEDS, and M-PM are contributing

significantly to the prediction of UFPP in the three new democracies. Therefore, the

resuhs support the sub-hypotheses from baseline, cognitive skills, dissatisfaction, and

value change approaches and confirm what previous researches showed for Westem

democracies.

The findings also show that of all the independent variables, PI (p = .273)

emerges as the strongest predictor of UFPP. When other variables are controlled for.

Age (P = -.153) and M-PM (p = .143) are also relatively strong predictors of UFPP.

To see which approach works better to explain protest potential in the three

new democracies the study investigates changes in R (see Table 6-2). As Table 6-2,

especially (All), shows, in terms of the percentage of variation explained. Baseline

factors (Age, Gender, Income, and Education) appears to have little explanatory

power in relation to protest potential in the three new democracies. The Baseline

119

factors alone explain only 3.8 percent (R = .195) of the variance in UFPP. When

Cognitive Skills factors (LR and PI) are added to the equation, the total amount of

variation considerably increases to 16.3 percent (R = .404). Adding Dissatisfaction

factors (PODS and PEDS) into the protest potential equation increases very little the

amount of explained variation to 17.2 percent (R = .416). In addition, when Value

Change factor (M-PM) is added to the equation, the total amount of variation

increases to 19.6 percent (R = .443).

In sum, Cognitive Skills approach based on Rational Choice perspective

predicts protest potential much better than does dissatisfaction approach in the three

new democracies. Additionally, Baseline factors and Value Change approach appear

to have relatively strong explanatory power to protest potential in the three new

democracies. However, Dissatisfaction approach's explanatory power to protest

potential is very limited in the three new democracies.

The results show that dissatisfied citizens are only slightly more willing to

protest than those who are satisfied with the govemment performance and their life.

Furthermore, the pattem of other predictors, especially baseline factors, tends to

undercut the dissatisfaction approach. For example, the willingness to protest is more

common among males and the better educated than among women and the less

educated. Thus, protest in new democracies is not simply an outlet for the alienated

and deprived; just the opposite often appears. The general pattem of protest activity

in new democracies is better described by the Cognitive Skills approach. Protesters

are individuals who have the interest and ability to participate in political activities of

all forms, including protest. The clearest evidence of this is the strong tendency for

the better educated to engaged in protest in all three nations. Therefore, the results

120

confirm what Dalton (2002) showed for advanced industrial democracies, as "protest

activity is better described by the resource model rather than dissatisfaction model" (p.

67). That is, this study exhibits that the trends or pattems of unconventional forms of

political participation in new democracies are as similar as are advance industrial

democracies.

Differences by the Process of Democratization

The differences of the determinants' contributions to the prediction of UFPP

by the process of democratization in the three new democracies are tested through

comparing two multivariate regression analyses of the pre-democracy and the post-

democracy in the three new democracies.

The resuhs of the two regression analyses of pre-democracy period (Pre) and

post-democracy period (Post) in the new democracies shows that Age, Gender, LR PI,

PEDS, and M-PM are contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP in the three

new democracies regardless of times. Therefore, the findings from the two

multivariate regression analyses support the sub-hypotheses from the four approaches.

There, however, exists some inconsistence of the variables by the times. For example.

Education and PODS are contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP in the

pre-democracy period, but the contributions of the variables are no more than the

study would expect in the post-democracy period. That is, the contributions of

Education and PODS to the prediction of UFPP had decreased during democratization

process in the three new democracies. In addition. Income is contributing

significantly to the prediction of UFPP both in the pre-democracy period and the post-

democracy period. However, the signs of Income have changed by the times.

121

The findings also show that of all the independent variables, PI (p = .279 in

pre-democracy period and P = .250 in post-democracy period) emerges as the

strongest predictor of UFPP in the pre-democracy period as well as in the post-

democracy period. When other variables are controlled for, LR (P = .146) emerges as

the second most important predictor of UFPP in the pre-democracy period. Age (P =

.203) also emerges as the second most important predictor of UFPP in the post-

democracy period. Thus, there exist differences of the determinants' contributions to

the prediction of UFPP by the process of democratization in the three new

democracies although the results of the three multivariate regression analyses

generally support all of the four approaches.

To see which model works better to explain protest potential in the pre-

democracy period and in the post-democracy period the study examines changes in R

(Table 6-2). As Table 6-2, especially (Pre-Democracy and Post-Democracy periods),

shows, in terms of the percentage of variation explained. Baseline factors (Age,

Gender, Income, and Education) appears to have little explanatory power in relation

to protest potential regardless of times. The Baseline factors alone explain only 8.5

percent (R = .292) of the variance in UFPP in the pre-democracy period and only 6.8

percent (R = .261) of the variance in UFPP in the post-democracy period. When

Cognitive Skills factors (LR and PI) are added to the equation, the total amount of

variation considerably increases from 8.5 to 21.4 percent (R = .463) in the pre-

democracy period and from 6.8 to 15.1 percent (R = .390) in the post-democracy

period. Adding Dissatisfaction factors (PODS and PEDS) into the protest potential

equation hardly changes the amount of explained variation from 21.4 to 22.8 percent

(R = .475) in the pre-democracy period and from 15.1 to 15.4 percent (R = .394) in

122

the post-democracy period. In addition, when Value Change factor (M-PM) is added

to the equation, the total amount of variation increases from 22.8 to 27.6 percent (R

= .513) in the pre-democracy period and from 15.4 to 18.5 percent (R = .430) in the

post-democracy period.

In sum. Baseline factors, Cognitive Skills, and Dissatisfaction approaches'

explanatory power to protest potential had decreased during the process of

democratization in the three new democracies. In contrast, the explanatory power of

Value Change approach had slightly increased in the 1980s and 1990s in the three

new democracies. The reason behind that is probably related to economic

development in the new democracies in that period. The three new democracies in

different geographical regions had commonly achieved rapid economic development

during the 1980s and 1990s. For example, GNP per capita had increased around 81

percent in Mexico, 85 percent in South Africa, and over 400 percent in South Korea

during the time period (Table 3-1). The changes in the material-technological

environment cause changing values of the citizenry that, in time, change the political

attitudes toward protest activities in the three new democracies. Nevertheless, the

materialists-postmaterialists value changes in the three new democracies are slight.

Inter-State Differences

The inter-state differences of determinants on UFPP in the new democracies

are tested through comparing multivariate regression analyses of the three new

democracies. Comparison of this part is based on multivariate regression analyses of

Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea. Each nation has three multivariate

regression analyses; All, Pre-Democracy, and Post-Democracy.

123

Mexico


relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable in Mexico.

The overall relationship between the twelve predictable variables and UFPP is

reported as .487 in Mexico. The study finds that 23.5 percent of the variance in UFPP

can be explained using these independent variables.

Table 6-3, especially (All), also summarizes the information pertaining to the

regression coefficients. The unstandardized coefficients (b) of Age, Gender, Income,

LR, PODS, and EG are negative. In contrast, those of Education, PI, PEDS, M-PM,

dummy90, and dummy95 are positive. The resuhs of the t-tests reveal that Age,

Gender, Education, LR, PI, PEDS, M-PM, and two dummy variables are contributing

significantly to the prediction of UFPP, but the contributions of Income, PODS, and

EG are no more than the study would expect.

Unlike South Africa (see Table 6-4), EG is not statistically significant to

predict protest potential in Mexico. There traditionally existed severe cleavages

between rich landowner and poor local farmers in Mexico. The cleavages changed

during the industrialization process to conflict between elites (church, military,

oligarch), middle class (skilled workers), and unorganized peasants. Thus, the

cleavages in Mexico are based on different social class, occupation, or residence

rather than ethnicity (Camp 1993). The p weights of the variables (All) reveal that the

greatest contributions to predicting protest potential in Mexico are made by PI (P

= .239) followed by LR (p = -.114), dummy95 (p = .107), and Education (p = .104).

124

South Africa

Table 6-4, especially (All), summarizes the resuhs of multivariate regression

analyses for South Africa. The overall relationship between the twelve predictable

variables included four dummy variables and UFPP is reported as .467 in South

Africa. This study finds that 21.8 percent of the variance in UFPP can be explained

using these independent variables. The unstandardized coefficients (b) of Age,

Gender, Income, Education, LR, dummy80, and dummy95 are negative. In contrast,

the unstandardized coefficients (b) of PI, PODS, PEDS, M-PM, and EG are positive.

The results of Income and Education reveal that the higher socio-economic

status individuals have, the less likely they will engage in protest behavior in South

Africa. Therefore, the South African case supports deprivation approach's argument

about 'poor-radical revolutionaries' rather than 'baseline approach's assumption about

Income. Additionally, as a control variable, EG (t-value = 9.395) is also statistically

significant in South Africa and is in the hypothesized directions. It means that non-

Whites are more likely to participate in protest behavior than are Whites. The result

of EG confirms what previous researches showed for South Africa (Deegan 2001;

Gibson and Gouws 2003).

The resuhs of the t-tests exhibit that the Age, Gender, Income, Education, LR,

PI, PODS, PEDS, M-PM, EG, and two dummy variables are contributing

significantly to the prediction of UFPP. According to the p weights of the variables

(All), the greatest contributions to predicting protest potential in South Africa are

made by PI (p = .322) followed by EG (P = .138), and Age (P = -.126).

125

South Korea


relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable. The

overall relationship between the twelve predictable variables and UFPP is reported

as .471 in South Korea. The study finds that 22.2 percent of the variance in UFPP can

be explained using these independent variables.

Table 6-5, especially (All), also summarizes the information pertaining to the

regression coefficients. The unstandardized coefficients (b) of Age and LR are

negative. In contrast, the unstandardized coefficients (b) of Gender, Income,

Education, PI, PODS, PEDS, and M-PM are positive.

The results of the t-tests shows that Age, Income, Education, LR, PI, PODS,

M-PM, dummySO, and dummy95 are contributing significantly to the prediction of

UFPP, but the confributions of Gender and PEDS are no more than the study would

expect. Thus, the resuh of Gender confirms what Lee and Rinehart (1995) showed for

South Korea, as there is evidence of changing with a narrowing of gender roles in

South Korea. The P weights of the variables (All) reveals that the greatest

contributions to predicting protest potential in South Korea are made by Age (P =

-.257) followed by PI (P = .194), dummy80 (p = -.165), and M-PM (P = .127).

Summarv of Inter-State Model Differences

The resuhs of the three regression analyses (All) in Mexico, South Africa, and

South Korea shows that Age, Education, LR, PI, and M-PM are contributing

significantly to the prediction of UFPP regardless nations. However, Gender and

PEDS fail to contribute significantly to the prediction of UFPP in South Korea,

126

whereas they are contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP in Mexico and

South Africa. Similarly, PODS and Income are not statistically significant variables

for predicting UFPP in Mexico, whereas those variables are contributing significantly

to the prediction of UFPP in South Africa and South Korea.

The findings of the three regression analyses (All) in Mexico, South Africa,

and South Korea also show that of all the independent variables, PI (P = .239 in

Mexico; coefficient b = .547** and p = .322 in South Africa) emerges as the strongest

predictor of UFPP in Mexico and South Africa, whereas Age (P = -.257) emerges as

the strongest predictor of UFPP in South Korea. Indeed, when other variables are

controlled for, PI (p = .194), LR (P = -.114), and EG (p = .138) emerge as the second

most important predictor of UFPP in Korea, Mexico, and South Africa, respectively.

Thus, there exist differences of the determinants' contributions to the prediction of

UFPP by nations ahhough the resuhs of the three regression analyses generally

support all of the four approaches.

To see which model works better to explain protest potential in each of the

three new democracies the study examines changes in R (Table 6-6). As Table 6-6

shows, in terms of the percentage of variation explained. Baseline factors (Age,

Gender, Income, and Education) appears to have little explanatory power in relation

to protest potential in Mexico and South Africa, but considerably explanatory power

in South Korea. The Baseline factors alone explain only 4.3 percent (R = .210) and

5.0 percent (R = .224) of the variance in UFPP in Mexico and in South Africa. In

contrast, the factors alone explain 10.7 percent (R = .328) in South Korea. In addition,

when Cognhive Skills factors (LR and PI) are added to the equation, the total amount

of variation considerably increases from 4.3 to 18.5 percent (R = .432) in Mexico,

127

from 5.0 to 17.9 percent (R = .425) in South Africa, from 10.7 to 16.8 percent (R

= .412) in South Korea. However, adding Dissatisfaction factors (PODS and PEDS)

into the protest potential equation fail to increase considerably the amount of

explained variation in the three new democracies. When Value Change factor (M-

PM) is added to the equation, the total amount of variation increases a little from 18.5

to 19.5 percent (R = .421) in Mexico and from 18.9 to 19.7 percent (R = .444) in

South Africa, but increases considerably from 18.9 to 22.4 percent (R = .473) in

South Korea.

In sum. Baseline factors' and Value Change approach's explanatory power to

protest potential is a little in Mexico and South Africa, but considerable in South

Korea. In addition. Cognitive Skills approach's explanatory power to protest

potential is commonly considerable in the three new democracies. However,

Dissatisfaction approach's explanatory power to protest potential is very limited in all

of the three new democracies. Therefore, the resuhs of the study are not what we

expected.

Based on a vast literature on both protest and democratization in the three new

democracies, this study expected that Cognhive Skills and Value Change approaches

would be more applicable than Baseline factors and Dissatisfaction approaches in

South Korea whereas Baseline factors and Dissatisfaction approaches are more

applicable than Cognhive Skills and Value Change approaches in Mexico and South

Africa.

Unlike the expectation of this study Cognitive Skills approach predicts protest

potential well in Mexico and South Africa as well as South Korea. Although the three

new democracies have experienced diverse cultural heritages and varying stages of

128

development, protesters in the countries are individuals who have the interest and

ability to engage in political activhies of all forms, including protest. It confirms what

Dahon (2002) showed for advanced industrial democracies, as protest activity is

better described by the Cognitive Skills model rather than Dissatisfaction model. One

possible reason behind sharing similar trends or pattems of unconventional forms of

political participation in the three new democracies is related that the three countries

have commonly experienced democratic transhion and consolidation processes in the

1980s and 1990s.

In addition, unlike the expectation of this study. Baseline factors predict

protest potential well in Korea, but not very well in Mexico, and South Africa. In

general, personal characteristics might stimulate unconventional action. Dalton's

research hafs shown a strong tendency toward higher levels of protest among the

young (Dalton 2002). Gender also might influence unconventional pohtical

participation (Schlozman et al., 1994). The confrontational style of protest polhics

may involve a disproportionate number of men, although there is evidence that this

pattem is changing with a narrowing of gender roles (Lee and Rinehart 1995). One

reason behind limitation of Baseline factors to predict protest potential in Mexico and

South Africa is possibly related to a measurement error of survey research, especially

Income variable. Income always fails to predict protest potential in Mexico

regardless of the times. In addhion, Income is statistically significant in South Africa,

yet in the reverse relationship with protest potential.

129

Summarv

Table 6-7 shows a summary of significances and directions of the

relationships between the independent variables and UFPP in all cases. Age, PI, and

M-PM are always contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP regardless of

times as well as nations.

Although Table 6-7 shows that some of the independent variables fail to

contribute to the prediction of UFPP in some cases, the resuhs of the regression

analyses generally support all of the four approaches on UFPP. However, there exist

not only intra-differences, but also inter-state differences on the four approaches'

explanatory power to protest potential in the three new democracies. For example,

Cognhive Skills approach based Rational Choice perspective predicts protest potential

much better than does dissatisfaction approach in the three new democracies (Table

6-2). Additionally, Baseline factors and Value Change approach appear to have

relatively strong explanatory power to protest potential in the three new democracies.

However, Dissatisfaction approach's explanatory power to protest potential is very

limited in the three new democracies.

Furthermore, among the four approaches, Cognitive Skills approach appears to

have the strongest explanatory power in relation to protest potential in Mexico and

South Africa (Table 6-6). The second powerful approach in the two nations is

Baseline factors. In contrast, the strongest explanatory power in relation to protest

potential in South Korea is made by Baseline factors and followed by Cognhive Skills

and Value Change approaches.

This study also finds that there exist differences on the four approaches'

explanatory power to protest potential by the process of democratization. For

130

example, Value Change approaches explanatory power to protest potential had

increased during the process of democratization in the three new democracies,

whereas Baseline factors. Cognitive Skills, and Dissatisfaction approaches'

explanatory power to protest potential had considerably decreased in that times (Table

6-2).

The following chapter summarizes this study and considers possible future

directions for new and related research.

131

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138

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study has mainly focused on individual level explanations of

unconventional forms of political participation in the three new democracies -

Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea. The unconventional forms of political

participation, which refers to peaceful political protest, differs from not only

conventional forms of political participation like voting and campaign activism, but

also political crime (sabotage, guerrilla warfare, hijacking, assassination, bombing,

kidnapping, riot, armed attack, revolutions, and so on. The concept traditionally

consists of five types of action: signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending

lawful demonstration, joining unofficial strike, and occupying buildings or factories.

The purpose of the study was to test four most discussed approaches on protest

(Baseline, Cognitive Skills, Dissatisfaction, and Value Change approaches), using

cases of the three new democracies. Dissatisfaction (RD) approach supports the

irrational psychological arguments behind decisions to protest and sees protestors as

poor, frustrated, alienated from politics and radically minded. On the other hand.

Cognitive Skills (or Resource Mobilization) approach, which is a part of rational

choice perspective, assumes that more affluent and educated people would more

likely join protest activities. The wider theoretical reasoning emphasizes here the

participant, who is rational, conducts costs-benefits calculations, and whose decisions

also depend on motivation and mobilization.

Former empirical studies about individual level political participation (both

conventional and unconventional ones) have mostly used variables deduced from

139

baseline factors and concenfrated on analyses of protesters' demographic and socio

economic background. Their results have emphasized the importance of age, gender,

income, education, ethnicity and so on. Additionally, the Value Change approach,

which is part of the cultural change perspective, argues that values provide the

standards that guide the attitudes and behaviors of the public. People's new values

such as postmaterialist concerns promote citizens participation in protest behavior.

The study expected that there would exist not only intra and inter-state

differences on the four approaches' explanatory power to protest potential in the three

new democracies, but also differences on the four approaches' explanatory power to

protest potential by the process of democratization.

In order to test those four approaches nine predictor variables are raised. All

of the variables referred to relevant theoretical arguments. The data for the study are

based on the first, second, and third World Values Surveys in 1981-82, 1990-93, and

1995-97 for the three new democracies. This analysis uses a pooled cross-sectional

design for each country, which pools three surveys. The individual level data allow

for multivariate analyses such as regression (OLS). Thus, the major stimulus behind

this study was the wish to contribute the statistical comparative studies of protest by

introducing integrated model of variables and implementing the analyses in a context

which has not been done before in the new democracies.

The results of the bivariate and multivariate regression analyses generally

support all of the hypotheses of the study. The results also define that there exist not

only intra-differences, but also inter-state differences on the four approaches'

explanatory power to protest potential in the three new democracies. In addition, the

results reveal that there exist differences on the four approaches' explanatory power to

140

protest potential by the process of democratization. Therefore, the results of the

bivariate and multivariate regression analyses can be summarized like followings:

First, Cognitive Skills approach's explanatory power is stronger than that of

Dissatisfaction approach in all three new democracies. That is, Cognitive Skills

approach based on rational choice perspective predicts protest potential much better

than does dissatisfaction approach based on socio-psychological perspective in new

democracies. The results show that dissatisfied citizens in new democracies are only

slightly more willing to protest than those who are satisfied with the govemment

performance and their life. Furthermore, the pattem of other predictors, especially

baseline factors, tends to undercut the dissatisfaction approach. For example, the

willingness to protest is more common among males and the better educated than

among women and the less educated. Thus, protest in new democracies is not simply

an outlet for the alienated and deprived, just the opposite often appears.

The general pattem of protest activity in new democracies is then better

described by the Cognitive Skills approach. It explains that protesters in new

democracies are individuals who have the interest and ability to participate in political

activities of all forms, including protest. The clearest evidence of this is the strong

tendency for the better educated to engaged in protest in Mexico and South Korea.

Therefore, the results confirm what Dalton (2002) showed for advanced industrial

democracies, as "protest activity is better described by the resource model rather than

dissatisfaction model" (p. 67). Accordingly this study exhibits that the trends or

pattems of unconventional forms of political participation in new democracies are as

similar as are advance industrial democracies.

141

Secondly, Baseline factors and Value Change approach's explanatory power

to protest potential is considerable in South Korea, but a little in Mexico and South

Africa. Based on a vast literature on both protest and democratization in the three

new democracies, this study expected that Cognitive Skills and Value Change

approaches would be more applicable than Baseline factors and Dissatisfaction

approaches in South Korea whereas the latte would be than the former in Mexico and

South Africa.

Unlike the expectation of this study Cognitive Skills approach predicts protest

potential well in Mexico and South Africa as well as South Korea. Although the three

new democracies have experienced diverse cultural heritages and varying stages of

development, protesters in the nations are individuals who have the interest and

ability to engage in political activities of all forms, including protest. One possible

reason behind sharing similar trends or pattems of protest among the three new

democracies is related to democratization process in the nations. Inauguration of

democracy in the three nations was almost simultaneous. That is, the three new

democracies have commonly experienced democratic transition and consolidation

processes in the 1980s and 1990s. Protest by citizenry was a key factor contributing

to the inauguration of democracies in the three new democracies in 1980s. The elite-

challenging forms of participation in the nations have stimulated sustainable

democratic reforms or liberalization on the economy during their democratic

consolidation periods in the 1990s. Unconventional forms of political participation

become a regular feature of politics for the individuals who have the interest and

ability to participate in political activities.

142

In addition, unlike the expectation of this study. Baseline factors predict

protest potential well in Korea, but not very well in Mexico, and South Africa.

Especially, socio-economic factors, especially Income, fail to predict protest potential

in Mexico and have the reverse relationship with protest potential in South Africa.

One reason behind limitation of socio-economic factors to predict protest potential in

Mexico and South Africa is possibly related to a measurement error of survey

research as we discussed on previous chapter. Especially, Income distributions of the

three new democracies are severely different. Consequently, Income always fails to

predict protest potential in Mexico regardless of the times. Income is statistically

significant in South Africa, yet in the reverse relationship with protest potential.

Finally, Value Change approach's explanatory power to protest potential had

slightly increased during the process of democratization in the three new democracies,

whereas Baseline factors. Cognitive Skills, and Dissatisfaction approaches'

explanatory power to protest potential had commonly decreased a little in that times.

The reason behind increasing explanatory power by Value Change approach is

probably related to economic development in the new democracies in the 1980s and

1990s. The three new democracies in different geographical regions had commonly

achieved rapid economic development during the 1980s and 1990s. For example,

GNP per capita had increased around 81 percent in Mexico, 85 percent in South

Africa, and over 400 percent in South Korea during the time period. The changes in

the material-technological environment in the new democracies cause changing

values of the citizenry that, in time, change the political attitudes toward protest

activities in the three new democracies although the materialists-postmaterialists

value changes in the three new democracies are slight during the time period.

143

Closing Thoughts

The purpose of this study has been to examine the determinants of political

protest in Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea. The findings suggest that Age,

Psychological Involvement in Politics, and M-PM value change have a consistent

effect on protest. We also find an effect for Gender, Income, Education, Left-Right

Self-Placement, Political Dissatisfaction, Personal Dissatisfaction, and Ethnic Groups,

although the impact of these variables was not consistent in all cases. Nevertheless,

this study naturally calls to be continued and considers possible future directions for

related research.

One implication of the findings has to do with using a combined or two-step

model to study protest potential in new democracies. Future researchers might

therefore benefit from using a single "eclectic" model that combines features from the

Baseline factors. Cognitive Skills, Dissatisfaction, and Value Change approaches.

Indeed, value change, for instance, may be an intervening variable in the baseline

factors and protest linkage: socio-economic factors affect values, which in tum leads

to cognitive mobilization and the likelihood of protest. A two-step model can

describe both indirect and direct effects of the explanatory variables on our dependent

variables, protest. The other implication concems the validity of'dissatisfaction' or

'relative deprivation' measures. Like other previous studies, the present has not

successfully measured that dimension of relative deprivation. The two measures of

dissatisfaction employed in the study are just proxy measures for the existence of

relative deprivation. Thus, the future research would hope for survey questions that

are better suited to the task. We might need a series of questions that specifically

capture aspects of relative deprivation or dissatisfaction.

144

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