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Why did Thailand's middle classturn against a democraticallyelected government? Theinformation-gap hypothesisKai Jäger aa Department of Political Science, Duke University,Durham, NC, USA
Available online: 24 Jan 2012
To cite this article: Kai Jäger (2012): Why did Thailand's middle class turn against ademocratically elected government? The information-gap hypothesis, Democratization,DOI:10.1080/13510347.2011.623353
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Why did Thailand’s middle class turn against a democraticallyelected government? The information-gap hypothesis1
Kai Jager∗
Department of Political Science, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA
(Received October 2010; final version received April 2011)
In 2006, Bangkok’s middle-class residents overwhelmingly supported themilitary coup that displaced the elected government of Thaksin Shinawatra.Survey research shows that opponents of Thaksin had a strongercommitment to liberal democracy and possibly to royalist values while ruralvoters supported Thaksin because he fulfilled their social demands.Opposition to Thaksin was not motivated by economic interests, but rather,there is some evidence that urban middle- and upper-class voters dislikedThaksin because they heard negative reporting about him, which were lessavailable in the countryside. These findings are compatible with a newtheory of democratic consolidation, in which the upper classes have themeans that would enable and encourage them to pay sufficient attention topolitics to discover that what they viewed as ‘good government’ wasviolated by the ruling party, which could have led to demands for moredemocracy historically. More recently, however, in Thailand and perhapsother instances in Southeast Asia and Latin America, those with the moneyand leisure to follow politics closely have heard reports about the ‘badgovernment’ of populist, democratically elected leaders, and thus haveturned against them.
Keywords: Thailand; democratic consolidation; information-gap hypothesis;social movements; middle class; media and public opinion; ThaksinShinawatra; PAD; military coup
Introduction
During the 1990s, Thailand made some promising steps on the path toward democ-racy. The support that democratic reforms enjoyed among the middle classes andstudents was consistent with the empirical finding that economic development con-solidates democracy. But just one decade later, the rise and popularity of PrimeMinister Thaksin Shinawatra changed the attitudes of the middle class radically:the urban bourgeoisie openly accepted a military coup d’etat against the elected
ISSN 1351-0347 print/ISSN 1743-890X online# 2012 Taylor & Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.623353
http://www.tandfonline.com
∗Email: [email protected]
Democratization2012, iFirst, 1–28
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Thaksin government, and even called for electoral reforms to restrict politicalparticipation.
Thailand is not the only developing country in which urban middle-classgroups initiated massive demonstrations against an elected populist government;this has also happened in the Philippines, Bolivia and Venezuela.2 The recent mili-tary coup in Honduras against the elected Zelaya administration also shares simi-larities with the political situation in Thailand, as mostly Honduran middle-classactivists celebrated the coup on the streets of Tegucigalpa. And in China, the ascen-sion of the middle class might similarly foil any moves toward democratization,since the urban elite fears a loss in status if the peasant majority would decidewho rules.3
Why might the urban bourgeoisie in a developing country turn against majorityrule, even though social scientists have argued that this class is the precursor ofdemocracy? Comparative analyses cry out to be done, but in this paper I will restrictmyself to trying to explain the case of Thailand to lay the groundwork for futurestudies. I will begin with a brief discussion of why economic development isassociated with sustained democracy. In the following section, I will describe thepolitical development of Thailand and evaluate how economic developmentaffected democratization. Subsequently, the paper discusses four hypotheses thatmight explain the middle class protest in Thailand. The first two hypotheses aremotivational: the materialistic hypothesis maintains that the opponents ofThaksin are trying to preserve their economic privileges while the liberal-procedur-alist hypothesis emphasizes the allegedly irresponsible voting behaviour of therural masses, in the light of which the anti-Thaksin People’s Alliance for Democ-racy (PAD) movement becomes the protector of liberal democracy. A third, royalisthypothesis is based on cultural interpretations and holds that urban dwellers feel astronger attachment to the traditional elite and that they opposed Thaksin becausehe challenged the hierarchical political system of the monarchy. Finally, the infor-mation-gap hypothesis is derived from empirical findings of public opinionresearch and argues that rather than there being a fundamental difference in the pol-itical interests or values of rural and urban voters, rural voters supported Thaksinbecause they did not receive enough critical news about Thaksin.
I test these hypotheses by using empirical data from the Asian BarometerProject. The results are analysed and summarized in the conclusion.
Economic development and democracy in theory
The link between prosperity and democracy was proposed by Seymour Lipset andcan be summarized in his formula: ‘the more well-to-do a nation, the greater thechances that it will sustain democracy’.4 This modernization hypothesis provokedresearch affirming the positive effect of economic development on sustaineddemocracy; it also provoked a vibrant academic debate about the intervening vari-ables that might cause this relationship. Lipset himself emphasized urbanizationand education as side-effects of prosperity, which encouraged not only the
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attenuation of extremist views, but middle-class demands for political participationthrough democratic political parties.5
In the seminal work of Barrington Moore, the middle class becomes the deci-sive factor in democratization: ‘no bourgeoisie, no democracy’.6 Moore argues thatthe path to liberal democracy is determined by the ability of the bourgeoisie toweaken the power of the landed upper classes and the feudal economic system.If the bourgeois revolution succeeds, the result will be a capitalistic democraticstate that absorbs the nobility and peasantry as social forces.
Several scholars have extended this debate by adding other explanatory factors,such as the strength of civil society, the severity of economic inequality and the roleof an egalitarian political culture.7 While the debate about the factors that linkeconomic development and democratic consolidation continues, the existing cor-relation was confirmed in several large-N studies. Probably the most comprehen-sive study was undertaken by Przeworski et al., who argue that even thougheconomic development does not lead to democratization, it increases the sustain-ability of existing democracies.8 This is the finding that has been called into ques-tion by recent developments in such countries as Thailand.
However, academic literature is not unfamiliar with upper-class resistanceagainst elected governments. Moore and also Rueschemeyer et al. point out thatthe role of the middle class depends on the balance of class structure. In the caseof a strong working class, the middle class feel threatened about losing theirstatus and align with the traditional elites or the military against democracy.9 Onthe other hand, political scientists have long been concerned about the quality ofdemocracy in some developing countries.10 O’Donnell argues that ‘delegativedemocracies’ have emerged, in which the elected government has fulfilled amandate from the people but ignores or even restricts liberal procedures or civilliberties.11 This worry is congruent with some of the complaints of the anti-Thaksin forces in Thailand.
Besides these motivational explanations, hierarchical political values are oftenseen as cultural obstacles for democracy. Since they appear to be stronglyembedded in Thai political culture, the middle class could have opposedThaksin because he challenged the hierarchical system of the palace.
Thailand’s democratic development
Similar to Japan, a revolution from above accomplished Thailand’s transition tomodernity under the centralized power of the monarchy. The institutions of themodern Thai national state were designed during the reign of King Chulalongkorn(1868–1910) as a consequence of the dual pressures of international threats andwestern political ideas.12 In 1932, a coup d’etat led by a group of western-educatedmilitary officers transformed the country into a constitutional but undemocraticmonarchy. The new regime was labelled a ‘bureaucratic polity’ by Fred Riggs,13
as politics had ‘become a matter of competition between bureaucratic cliques forthe benefits of the government’.14 The bureaucracy (including the military) had
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a high level of autonomy, which allowed it to ignore pressure from outside groupsand satisfy the interests and designs of those who staffed state agencies.15 Since theeconomy was run by state-owned monopolies, access to economic resources wassolely mediated by the bureaucracy, often to the disadvantage of the Chinese min-ority. As a consequence, entrepreneurs were dependent on the state elite, withwhich they developed close personal relationships.16
Until the end of the 1950s, Thailand was still an agrarian country with stagnanteconomic growth rates. This changed under the military rule of Generals Sarit(1959–1963) and Thanom/Praphas (1963–1973), who abandoned economicnationalism and introduced a market liberalization and industrialization pro-gramme supported by US military and economic aid.17 These military regimeswere prototypes of developmental dictatorships, as human rights were violatedand opposition parties and newspapers were banned.18 This era also marked therevival of the monarchy in Thai politics. Described as a network monarchy,King Bhumibol and his Privy councillors (most notably Prem) actively interferedin the political process in order to place the right people in the right places in poli-tics and in state agencies. Even though this network was ‘essentially conservative’,it supported several liberal reforms as well.19
The rapid transformation of the Thai economy, which achieved unprecedentedgrowth rates in the 1960s and 70s, altered the power structure of the society signifi-cantly, as the emerging middle class attained the economic resources that could infuture be used to engage in politics.20 The middle and working classes grew signifi-cantly and the number of university students reached 100,000 in 1972 – a more thanfivefold increase from 18,000 in 1961.21 Their political role became apparent in thepolitical revolution of 1973: students and urban classes successfully demandeddemocratic reforms and the abdication of the military in bloody demonstrations.Nonetheless, the crucial forces for this social revolution to materialize were KingBhumibol, who convinced Thanom and Praphas to resign, and General Krit, whorefused the command to deploy more troops against the demonstrators.22
Even though the democratic period was only ephemeral, as the militaryregained power in 1976, the old ‘bureaucratic polity’ had been weakened by a‘civil society revolution’.23 In the 1980s, under the administration of GeneralPrem Tinsulanonda, intellectuals and social movements became convinced ofthe desirability of democratization and political liberalization, leading to the peace-ful replacement of Prem in the election of 1988.24
Economic development also had two more ambiguous effects on democratiza-tion. First, the economic gains of development were distributed unequally.Bangkok and the immediately surrounding area reaped the benefits of industrializ-ation, while the rural north and northeast had to bear the cost of the sectoral declineof agriculture. Policy-makers were mostly unwilling to respond to the needs ofrural regions and the exclusion of these populations from economic developmentcreated a situation of potential social conflict.25
Second, the economic transformation offered business new opportunitiesoutside the old patronage system, and this increased the importance of business
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in politics. Business interest groups gained entry to the political process as theycould offer technical expertise for regulatory policies. According to Anek, the pol-itical influence of business associations grew accordingly whenever a democraticreform took place.26 Consequently, the number of businesspeople in parliamenthad already become three times as high as the number of state bureaucratsbetween 1983 and 1988.27 A further indicator of this shift in power is the decliningnumber of ministers with bureaucratic backgrounds. While 184 out of 232 minis-ters were former bureaucrats between 1932 and 1958, entrepreneurs accounted for159 of 196 ministers during 1992 and 1996.28
In order to be successful in an election campaign, a candidate needs an exten-sive network with other powerful elites, because the crucial factors for voters in theThai political system are the candidates, not their short-lived party platforms.29
Businesspeople started to be more successful in forming these alliances becausethey had more economic resources to effectively trade wealth for power.30 Theseeconomic networks also dominated the election process, as they distributedmoney to local leaders and canvassers who mobilized voters, especially in ruralareas, based on traditional patronage relationships. Politics attracted these localbusinessmen because they could use the state to gain economic privileges.31
Vote-buying and money politics reached a new ‘national culmination’ under theelected Chatichai administration from 1988 to 1991, as the networks expectedeconomic returns for their investment in vote-buying.32
The military, under General Suchinda, used this widespread corruption tojustify a coup d’etat in 1991. Thai intellectuals, non-governmental organizations(NGOs), and urban classes initially showed little resistance to this putsch, and atleast one scholar argues that without their severe criticism of the Chatichai govern-ment, the coup would not have been possible.33 In 1992, however, mass protestsagainst the junta erupted, due to ‘the impression of selfishness and double-dealing by Suchinda’, who had reneged on his promise not to become prime min-ister. As a consequence, many middle-class Bangkokians now viewed the coup as‘greedy, self-interested, and corrupt’.34 But Suchinda suppressed these demon-strations by force, causing the death of hundreds of protestors. These ‘BlackMay’ events prompted King Bhumibol to intervene directly, leading to the resig-nation of Suchinda and eventually to the restoration of democracy.
After this upheaval, a loose alliance of members of the urban middle class, civilservants, academics, and NGOs continued to push for further democratic reforms.These heterogeneous groups were united in their belief that the country needed astronger parliament based on a new constitution in order to restrict the undemo-cratic excesses of money politics and vote-buying.35 This effort faced strong oppo-sition but eventually succeeded in 1997, as democratic reformers blamedcorruption and patronage for the unprecedented economic depression that wasprecipitated in Thailand by the Asian Financial Crisis.36
The constitution of 1997 was often called the ‘People’s Constitution’, as itcodified human rights and democratic participation, strengthened politicalparties, and reformed the electoral system to provide functioning checks and
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balances against money politics.37 After this institutional success, political ‘liberal-ism was becoming the new commonsense among strategic elites’ and it seemed to‘notably advance’ under the second Democrat government of Chuan Leekpai(1997–2001).38
The rise of Thaksin Shinawatra
But with the rise of Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai (Thais love Thais;TRT) ‘almost all hopes that once rested with the political reform project seem[ed]to have been lost’.39 Thaksin’s governing style reminded many Thai liberals ofdevelopmental authoritarianism: he used the executive power to support hisbusiness interests and those of his allies and denounced the check and balancesystem of the new constitution as constraining the will of the people. Sub-sequently, Thaksin effectively eliminated these checks by placing relatives inhigh positions. He also tried to restrict freedom of the press through intimidationand by building up his own biased media empire, even using the Anti-MoneyLaundering Office to threaten critical journalists.40 Furthermore, Thaksin waswidely criticized for human rights violations in the majority Muslim southernprovinces and in his war on drugs and ‘dark influences’, that is, the extra-judicialkilling of alleged insurgents and drug dealers.41 On the other hand, the Thaksinadministration achieved a ‘record of responsiveness’. TRT advocated populareconomic policies for the rural poor in their campaigns (like debt relief, fundsfor villages, affordable general health care) which were a novelty in Thai politics,as parties usually do not compete on policy terms.42 The government quickly ful-filled these promises and the new social programmes were open to all. This gavepeople – especially the rural poor – the feeling of empowerment, as Thaksinresponded to their needs with tangible projects.43
Nonetheless, this policy responsiveness cannot explain Thaksin’s successexclusively. Thaksin – one of the richest tycoons in Thailand – had enoughmoney to lure a significant number of former Members of Parliament (MPs)from traditional political networks into TRT.44 Although TRT members engagedin vote-buying, it did not seem to be a decisive factor for their election, becausethe new Election Commission vigorously ordered re-elections in proven cases ofelectoral fraud, and because these cases probably did not exceed the vote-buyingin past elections.45
Since Thaksin also tried to break the royal influence in state agencies byemploying his allies in top positions there, he directly challenged the power ofthe network monarchy.46 And although questioning the monarchy is illegal inThailand, Thaksin and his supporters verbally attacked the Privy Council andits president, Prem, which was taboo before.47 This conflict eventually led tothe military coup d’etat of 2006, in which the Head of the Privy Council Premwas a key player.48 The ideological legitimization for this putsch was decisivelyfacilitated by anti-Thaksin demonstrations of the PAD which called for Thaksin’sdismissal.49
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After the pro-Thaksin People’s Power Party (PPP) party won the first electionheld after the coup, in December 2007, the PAD started to rally again, culminatingin the illegal seizure of Bangkok’s international airport. Eventually, the consti-tutional court banned the PPP over a case of vote fraud, and the PAD-friendlyDemocrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva gained power. The violent quarrelbetween pro- and anti-Thaksin movements solidified, with the pro-Thaksinforces wearing red and their opponents, yellow. This is the background to the vio-lence in Thailand in 2010, prompted by red-shirt demands for new elections.
Explaining middle-class attitudes towards Thai democracy
Initially, economic development had a positive effect on democratization inThailand. The urban middle class expanded relentlessly and was a major drivingforce in pro-democratic demonstrations. But the rise of the Thaksin movementseems to have changed the attitude of the urban middle classes, which strivenow for elite rule and restricting democratic participation. This section willdiscuss some of the available hypotheses for explaining this radical change inthe political consciousness of the Thai middle class.
The materialist hypothesis
Newspaper reports as well as several scholars have argued that the middle andupper classes are mostly concerned about their financial well-being. Theycontend that the middle class feared that it would have to pay for Thaksin’s redis-tributive policies, and that it had supported democracy only as long as it was con-ducive to ‘their own freedom and the freedom of the market’.50 Giles Ungpakornasserts that the military revolt was a ‘coup for the rich’ supported by the middleclass in order to preserve their wealth and social status.51
However, this argument rests on several unproven assumptions and appears tomisrepresent the driving force of the PAD movement. First, it cannot simply betaken for granted that the middle class votes selfishly rather than sociotropically.Public opinion research in Europe and the United States suggest that at least inwestern democracies, people do not follow their economic interest at the ballot-box but rather vote for what they perceive to be the common good.52
Second, an examination of the PAD suggests that Thaksin’s pro-business pol-icies were actually one of the main objects of the yellows’ criticism. PAD leadersargue that these economic measures served Thaksin’s corporate interests at theexpense of the country: their speeches have an explicit anti-capitalist characterin which they hail the ‘sufficiency economy’ philosophy of King Bhumibol.53
These attacks on capitalism seem to be rooted in religion and pre-modern conser-vative thought as one of the five main leaders of the PAD, Chamlong Srimuang, isalso the leader of the Buddhist sect Santi Asoke which preaches austerity and moralawareness and opposes egoism and consumerism.54
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It is possible, however, that there is a gap between leaders and followers. Publicopinion research shows that even the most politically active members of the elec-torate may not be receiving the messages of party leaders,55 and may, in general,have no idea of the meaning of the terms of discourse among political leaders,journalists, and scholars of politics.56 Some yellow leaders may therefore haveanti-capitalist reasons for opposing Thaksin,57 even while their followers aredefending their economic privileges.
The liberal-proceduralist hypothesis
Several Thai academics and PAD supporters argue that Thaksin has turned the Thaipolitical system into something more like populist authoritarianism than a liberal,constitutional democracy, and that the military coup was actually the only way tosave the latter.58 The political scientist Anek Laothamatas argues that Thailand is ‘atale of two democracies’, in which the rural voters tend to be self-interested, local-ist, and prone to vote-selling. The educated urban classes, however, tend to be con-cerned about transparency and legal democratic procedures. They are frustrated bythe rural voters’ support for corrupt and populist politicians like Thaksin and theirdisregard for human rights violations.59 The PAD movement presented itself as asafeguard for liberal democracy rather than representing a break from the pro-democratic past of the middle class.60 Consequently, the liberal-proceduralisthypothesis implies that the upper urban classes supported the removal of thedemocratically elected Thaksin in order to protect liberal proceduralism from apopulist, authoritarian leader.
Indeed, field research confirms that there is a fundamental difference betweenurban and rural political culture. Walker argues that the susceptibility of ruralvoters to vote-buying has to be seen in the broader framework of rural politicalvalues. Rural dwellers generally prefer local politicians, with the expectationthat a politician will support the local village and keep his campaign promises.For many rural voters, TRT was the most attractive party because it met these cri-teria, but TRT supporters did not cast their votes blindly: several TRT candidateswere not re-elected when they failed to satisfy the criteria.61 This analysis doesallow that rural voters mostly ignore human rights questions and broader nationalissues. Meanwhile, survey research shows that city dwellers use more legalistic cri-teria in voting, as Bangkokians put relatively more emphasis on the qualificationsand integrity of a candidate, while localism does not play a significant role.62
The proceduralist view of the yellow shirts is challenged by their tolerance forthe illiberal policies of the military junta after it took power. The junta initiatedmassive media and internet censorship and established a special operations forceto restrict anti-coup political activities and any opposition voices before the refer-endum on its new constitution.63 Most of the urban bourgeoisie tended to staysilent about these authoritarian measures and PAD leaders even openly supportedthe policies of the military on their TV shows.64 Moreover, PAD proposed a par-liamentary reform of 30 elected representatives to every 70 representatives
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appointed by independent institutions.65 But there could be many explanations forthis behaviour. For instance, they could be still liberals who thought that their prin-ciples were more likely to survive under the military or a restricted democracy thanunder Thaksin.
The royalist hypothesisThe first two hypotheses are challenged by cultural interpretations that emphasizethe hierarchical character of Thailand’s political culture. PAD activists swathethemselves in yellow – the colour of the monarchy – to demonstrate theirsupport for the king. Michael Connors has called the Thai version of liberalism‘royal liberalism’ to emphasize its elitist characteristics. Royal liberalism is‘shaped by fear’ that a ‘tyranny of the majority’ will reign if an uneducated popu-lace is manipulated by demagogues.66 Consequently, democracy should be cur-tailed by the traditional elite of aristocrats allied with the monarchy, and thistutelage has to continue until the lower classes are economically self-reliantenough not to be available for vote-buying, and politically educated enough toresist demagogues.67
Other scholars have focused on the role played by traditional Thai values ofhierarchy and paternalism as well, which remain strongly embedded in Thai pol-itical culture. Modern Thai nationalism demands loyalty to the three basic insti-tutions of nation, religion and kingdom. This belief system takes inspirationfrom sakdhina, a centuries-old hierarchical system in which everyone knows his‘place’ based on birthright, occupation, age and education, and each respects hissuperiors, with the king superior to all. Industrialization, urbanization, and theemergence of a middle class may well have failed to erode this concept ofunequal social structures because sakdhina is routinely reinforced in the media,by intellectuals, and by the primary education system.68 In a study of Thaiculture, the anthropologist Niels Mulder argues that Thais are early socializedinto viewing Thai identity as fundamentally hierarchical: ‘Inequality is not onlynatural; it is moral too. This type of thinking is subsequently applied to all sortsof relationships.’69
This hierarchical system which treats people by different moral standards couldexplain why PAD activists blame Thaksin for his wealth while supporting thesufficiency economy approach of King Bhumibol who is said to be the world’srichest monarch. Unlike the materialistic interpretation, which argues that theupper classes resist Thaksin due to their financial self-interest, the royalist hypoth-esis maintains that they sincerely believe in the superiority of the traditionalroyal hierarchy and that their attitude toward democracy is shaped by thiscommitment.
But if all Thais are taught this value system, how could it explain the sharp div-ision between the mostly urban yellows and the mostly rural reds? Although ruralcitizens love the king, they focus on localism as shown above while Bangkokdwellers pay greater attention to legalistic criteria which – in Thailand’s uniquepolitical culture – includes the royal hierarchy. This disparity in values might
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explain why Thaksin became popular in the countryside while urban dwellersviewed the national popularity of a politician as a threat to the traditional order.70
The information-gap hypothesis
It is possible that all of the previous explanations are too ‘deep’, and that the rural–urban political division that seems definitive of the pro- and anti-Thaksin forces ismerely a consequence of different levels of political information among Bangkokresidents versus Thais living in the countryside. The uneven economic develop-ment of Thailand may have produced an urban middle class that has access to,the means to purchase, and the leisure to follow politically oriented mediasources such as newspapers that simply are not available or affordable in most vil-lages. University education may also encourage the consumption of political infor-mation. If this results in different levels of political knowledge, then there is ampleevidence from public opinion research that it could result in different political pre-ferences. Scott Althaus has shown that highly informed voters make differentchoices than those who are less highly informed, controlling for other variables,as has John Zaller.71
Even if urban voters and rural voters share the same liberal-proceduralist orroyalist values, they would have to be exposed to political news reporting that iscritical of Thaksin to realize that Thaksin is supposedly violating these values.According to Thongchai, even the urban Thai bourgeoisie tends to be uninformedand ignorant72; an observation which is congruent with the general finding thatThais show little interest in reading political news.73
Given this high level of public ignorance of the Thai electorate, it is unlikelythat especially rural voters had much exposure to critical information aboutThaksin, as the audio-visual media were heavily controlled by Thaksin’snetwork before the coup. Major television and radio channels were owned byfamilies of high-ranked TRT members; symptomatic is the case of iTV, a formerlyindependent news channel that was bought by Thaksin and turned into a popularentertainment channel full of soap operas but devoid of critical news coverage.74
The remaining TV and radio news coverage was strongly biased in favour ofThaksin and his party, both in what was reported and in what was not.75
Thaksin not only dominated radio and TV coverage in quantitative terms – hismethod of communication was unprecedented in Thailand. In his weekly televisionand radio shows, Thaksin talked in detail about what he was doing for the people inthe countryside. He organized mobile cabinet meetings in rural areas in which vil-lagers had the opportunity to talk with Thaksin about their needs. These eventswere presented live on television ‘as a form of reality show’, which ‘dramatisedThaksin bringing government to the people, and were rewarded by increasedpopularity’.76
The largest market share in the newspaper market is held by Thai Rath andDaily News, two boulevard newspapers which tended to be in favour of Thaksinbut have been keeping a distance since the anti-Thaksin movement started to
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grow.77 In addition, however, there were several sources of critical news coveragethat were available in the city but not in the countryside. First, there are Thaksin-critical magazines and newspapers such as Khao Sod and Matichon, whose politi-cal language is pitched to those with higher education. These Bangkok-basedpapers cannot be obtained in every village or only reach the countryside withdelay. Local newspapers are available in the provinces but they are infrequentlypublished, mostly concerned with low-quality affairs and local news, and wereoften owned by local politicians who tended to be part of the TRT-network inthe North and Northeast.78 Second, many operators of community radiosopposed the Thaksin government, most notably Democrat Wave CommunityRadio in Bangkok.79 But these stations have only a small range of coverage,and many operators in the north and northeastern regions are biased towardThaksin, so any anti-Thaksin effects of community radio were probably confinedto Bangkok. Third, critical information about Thaksin was available on the inter-net. However, a media survey reveals that only a small proportion of rural dwellers(6%) use the internet for political information.80
The information-gap hypothesis does not imply that urban Thaksin opponentsare better informed than rural Thaksin supporters in the sense that their knowledgealso approximates the truth. Rather it suggests that they have a greater exposure topolitical information as conveyed by their cultural surroundings.
An empirical assessment of the hypotheses
A survey by the Asian Barometer Project months before the coup d’etat allowsthe testing of the hypotheses for the general public. Since this is a representativesurvey of the population, it is still possible that red and yellow activists differfrom the electorate in their motivation to support or oppose Thaksin.81 The1546 respondents for this survey were chosen in April/May 2006 through athree-stage cluster sampling of eligible voters from the whole country, whichallows for a minimum confidence interval of + 2.5% at the 95% confidentlevel. This survey was conducted in face-to-face interviews and it drew onone of the most elaborate opinion samples ever taken in Thailand, but it containsno direct data about yellow or red voters because the survey asks about votingbehaviour in the national election of April 2006 – a snap election called byThaksin to deflect yellow protests. This election was boycotted by all oppositionparties and since the only alternative to Thaksin’s TRT was to cast a ‘no’ vote orabstain from voting, it is impossible to determine the extent to which no-votersor abstentions were sympathizers of PAD or were outside the red-yellow clea-vage. Instead, the survey item ‘satisfaction with the Thaksin administration’is used to measure the support for Thaksin. Factor analysis of the relevantsurvey questions is used to compose a measure of support for liberal democracy(eight questions) to test the liberal-proceduralist hypothesis and an index for theperception of functioning democracy (nine questions) which is relevant for theinformation-gap hypothesis.
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An examination of the missing values of these two indexes reveals that non-respondents are significantly more likely to be satisfied with Thaksin at the 99%confident level. This group might be more reluctant to answer these kinds of ques-tions, but it could also mean that these Thaksin supporters are unfamiliar with theconcepts of democracy and good governance and thus the meaning of the ques-tions, which would be evidence for Anek’s tale of the unsophisticated Thaksinsupporters.82
If observations with missing data would be eliminated from the indexes, thetotal number of observations available for this analysis would drop by about 35to 50%. Since these missing values also seem to be systematically biased, thisstudy applies multiple imputation to deal with the missing data.83 In the firststep, the valid observations of the respective indexes are used as algorithms toimpute the missing values for m ¼ 5 datasets. Subsequently, these datasets arepooled together to obtain combined parameter estimates which also takes the vari-ation across the five datasets into account.
All other dependent and explanatory variables are also particular survey items.Since survey items are technically ordinal scales, this analysis is based on logitregression models. In this model specification, the coefficient estimators showthe direction of change and the qualitative effects of the explanatory variables.However, these findings do not directly display the substantial significance ofthe explanatory variables. Therefore, an estimation procedure is required toshow how strongly the explanatory variables affect the probability of variationof the dependent variable. These probabilities are obtained in the following way:To account for estimation uncertainty, the Stata programme Clarify is used to gen-erate 1000 sets of simulated parameters from the variables of a particular logitregression model. Additionally, first differences of significant explanatory vari-ables are generated. While holding all other variables constant at their mean, anestimate of the substantial impact on the dependent variable is obtained by increas-ing a particular explanatory variable from its minimum to its maximum.84 For abetter comparison of the probabilities, all dependent variables are transformedinto dichotomous variables.
The results of Table 1 are relevant for the materialist hypothesis. The firstcolumn shows that those with higher incomes were significantly less satisfiedwith Thaksin. Measured in probability, the highest income quintile is about 11%less likely to be very or somewhat satisfied with Thaksin relatively to the lowestquintile while controlling for other socio-economic factors. But the secondcolumn undermines the materialist hypothesis, as there is no substantial differencebetween the income classes in supporting economic equality.
Nonetheless, the materialistic interpretation might still have some value in theanalysis of how the benefits of economic development were distributed among theincome classes. The next three models (columns 4–6) show how the economicsituation has improved in the last four years for all respondents, villagers andcity dwellers alike. While there are not any differences for the whole sample,there is a significant divergent development within the country. Poorer villagers
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have significantly improved their economic conditions relative to higher-incomevillagers. For urban residents, the results are reversed, as higher income classeshave significantly benefited relative to poorer city dwellers. These findingsmight show that economic self-interest could explain why Thaksin enjoys strongsupport among impoverished rural dwellers, but it fails to explain the behaviourof the urban bourgeoisie, which has strongly opposed Thaksin even though it bene-fited economically under his government.
Table 2 is relevant for the liberal-proceduralist hypothesis. Support for liberaldemocracy correlates very negatively with satisfaction with Thaksin, lendingevidence to the liberal-proceduralist hypothesis: Increasing support for liberaldemocracy from its minimum to its maximum reduces the probability of beingvery or somewhat satisfied with Thaksin by 42.7%. However, two survey itemswere removed from the liberal democracy index due to lack of intercorrelationwith the other items, namely whether the respondent would support a government
Table 1. Logit regression analyses for the materialistic hypothesis.
Change of own economic situation
Satisfied withThaksin
Support for greaterincome equality
Wholesample
Ruralresidency
Urbanresidency
Income 20.22∗∗
(0.10)20.01
(0.12)20.05
(0.05)20.28∗∗∗
(0.07)0.22∗∗∗
(0.08)D Income
min(0) � max(4)211.2% 229.2% 17.4%
N 1268 1281 1355 870 489Pseudo R2 0.29 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.04
Notes: ∗p , 0.10; ∗∗p , 0.05; ∗∗∗p , 0.01 (two-tailed tests). The first row shows the regressioncoefficient of income, the second row the change in probability when income increases from itsminimum to its maximum while keeping all other variables constant at their mean. Standard errorsare in parentheses. Control variables for Age, Gender, Education, and Religiosity are included in allmodels, for urban residency and regions in the first two models.
Table 2. Logit regression analyses for the liberal-proceduralist hypotheses.
Satisfied with Thaksin N Pseudo R2DXi
min(1) � max(4)
Support for liberaldemocracy
21.05∗∗∗
(0.16)1405 0.06 242.7%
Support majoritarianism 0.49∗∗∗
(0.09)1299 0.04 23.1%
Oppose stronger politicalrole of the educated
0.21∗∗∗
(0.08)1368 0.01 10.4%
Subjective support fordemocracy
0.01(0.05)
1284 0.00
Notes: ∗p , 0.10; ∗∗p , 0.05; ∗∗∗p , 0.01 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors are in parentheses. Thelast column shows the change in probability when a particular explanatory variable increases from itsminimum to its maximum.
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that serves the interest of the majority and whether they would oppose a strongerpolitical role of the educated. Respondents who answered ‘no’ on both questionswere significantly more often dissatisfied with Thaksin, which may either under-mine the liberal-proceduralist hypothesis or strengthen it, depending on how therespondents thought of democratic procedures. Under ordinary circumstances,liberal proceduralists might have responded affirmatively to these questions, yetthe particular context in which the survey was conducted might have made themoppose democratic service of majority interests and equal political influence forthe uneducated because the majority supported Thaksin who undermined liberalprocedures.
An alternative explanation for these attitudes among Thaksin opponents is theroyalist hypothesis. Unfortunately, no survey items are available that addresssupport for the monarchy. Table 2 also shows that those who were dissatisfiedwith Thaksin did not differ in their subjective support for ‘democracy’ (row 4),indicating that they did not reject democracy but might have had a differentconcept of democracy that includes hierarchical components.
Hence, these empirical results do not show yet whether liberal-proceduralistconvictions, or other factors, influenced the decision to oppose Thaksin. Table 3tries to answer this question by evaluating which explanatory variables have thestrongest substantial impact on satisfaction with Thaksin in a multivariate frame-work. This analysis answers whether the Thaksin opponents feared the uneducatedmajority for liberal-procedural reasons, by controlling the model for variables thatimply the perception of good governance. If the significance of the two items thatwere removed from the liberal democracy index remains in these models, itsuggests that opponents of Thaksin feared rule by the uneducated majority evenif they did not perceive any violations of good governance by Thaksin. Hence,this fear could not be explained by concerns about liberal proceduralism. Thisframework also allows for an evaluation of how access to information directlydetermines satisfaction with Thaksin.
The first model of Table 3 shows that the significantly negative relationshipbetween support for liberal democracy and satisfaction with Thaksin disappearsthrough the inclusion of the perception variables of good governance, suggestingthat liberal-proceduralist values did not automatically lead to opposition toThaksin. Instead, the perception that democracy was not functioning well, thatthe government was not responsive toward voters’ demands, that corruption wasrampant, and that the economy was doing poorly determined dissatisfaction withThaksin.
The next model includes the variables that could be of importance for the roy-alist hypothesis. The remaining significance of support for majoritarianism showsthat dissatisfaction with Thaksin cannot be completely captured by concerns aboutliberal democracy, although this item has only a slight substantial impact of below1% on the probability of being satisfied with Thaksin.
The third model provides some evidence for the information-gap hypothesis asthe combined effect of greater media access directly affects the probability of
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Table 3. Logit regression analyses for determining satisfaction with Thaksin.
Satisfaction with Thaksin
1 2 3 4 Model 4: DXi min � max
X1: Support for liberal democracy 20.19(0.22)
20.15(0.24)
20.14(0.25)
Perception variablesX2: Perception of functioning democracy 1.07∗∗∗
(0.26)1.04∗∗∗
(0.30)0.81∗∗
(0.33)29.7%
X3: Perception of gov. responsiveness 0.37∗∗
(0.15)0.42∗∗
(0.17)0.42∗∗
(0.18)14.6%
X4: Perception of gov. honesty 0.33∗∗∗
(0.13)0.20
(0.14)0.24∗
(0.15)8.1%
X5: Perception of national economy 0.53∗∗∗
(0.09)0.49∗∗∗
(0.11)0.50∗∗∗
(0.12)26.1%
Value and status variablesX6: Support majoritarianism 0.22∗
(0.13)0.23∗
(0.14)7.6%
X7: Oppose stronger political role of the educated 0.09(0.13)
0.08(0.13)
X8: TRT partisanship 1.54∗∗∗
(0.34)1.41∗∗∗
(0.31)1.47∗∗∗
(0.35)11.7%
X9: Opposition (democrat) partisanship 20.72∗∗
(0.33)20.73∗∗
(0.30)20.57∗
(0.35)27.4%
X10: Social status 20.32∗∗∗
(0.08)20.22∗∗∗
(0.07)20.26∗∗∗
(0.09)228.1%
(Continued )
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Table 3. Continued.
Satisfaction with Thaksin
1 2 3 4 Model 4: DXi min � max
Information variablesX11: Trust in TV 0.20
(0.13)0.06
(0.16)X12: Newspaper 20.48∗∗
(0.22)20.52∗∗
(0.25)25.5%
X13: Internet frequency 20.13∗∗
(0.05)20.08
(0.06)X14: Radio 0.17
(0.19)0.00
(0.23)X15: Witnessed corruption 20.40∗∗
(0.19)20.33
(0.23)X16: Change own econ. situation 0.47∗∗∗
(0.11)0.12
(0.14)N 1126 988 1143 884Pseudo R2 0.41 0.47 0.40 0.49
1. Model: DX2 – 5 min � max 90.8 86.1 83.02. Model: DX2 – 5 min � max 25.8 27.43. Model: DX11 – 15 min � max 219.1 25.54. Model: DX6 min � max 20.6 20.1
Notes: ∗p , 0.10; ∗∗p , 0.05; ∗∗∗p , 0.01 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors are in parentheses. The last column shows the change in probability when a particularexplanatory variable increases from its minimum to its maximum while keeping all other variables constant at their mean in model 4. Control variables for urbanresidency and region are included in all models.1. Model: Combined change of all perception variables from their minimum to maximum while all other variables are kept constant at their mean. 2. Model: X6 and X8
are kept at their minimum, and X9 and X10 are kept at their maximum. 3. Model: Combined change of all significant information variables from their minimum tomaximum while all other variables are kept constant at their mean. 4. Model: Change of X6 from its minimum to maximum while all significant perceptionvariables are kept at their maximum.
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disapproval of Thaksin by 19% while controlling for partisanship, social status andgeographical factors. The last model which incorporates all variables shows thatthe perception variables explain most of the variation in satisfaction withThaksin. A combined shift from the minimum to the maximum in the perceptionof good governance increases the probability of being very or somewhat satisfiedwith Thaksin by nearly 83%. Even in a scenario of opposition partisanship, highestsocial status and hierarchical conviction, this shift in good governance accounts fora 27% higher probability to feel satisfied with Thaksin. Furthermore, newspaperstend to convey additional negative information about Thaksin beside the percep-tion of bad governance. However, the substantial impact of opposition partisanship(7%) and higher social status (28%) on opposition to Thaksin indicates that theserespondents had reasons to oppose Thaksin that were not captured by the percep-tion of good governance and media access. The royalist hypothesis suggests thepossibility that these Thaksin opponents felt a stronger loyalty to the monarchy,but other explanations are possible as well and lack of data renders a final interpret-ation impossible.85
Table 4 examines the extent to which these perceptions were determined bylevel by different media sources. The regression analyses show that some mediasources are significantly associated with changes in the perception of good govern-ance while controlling for partisanship, social status and regional variables.Newspaper readers had negative perceptions of functioning democracy and gov-ernment responsiveness whereas the former applied to internet users. Thoserespondents who had witnessed corruption by a politician or government official(or had heard about it from family members or friends) tended to think that theThaksin administration was performing poorly on responsiveness. The substantialsignificance of these media access variables is rather modest and ranges from5 to 11%.
Apparently, television broadcasts had the opposite effect, as shown by the sub-stantial impact of trust in television (ranging from 17 to 38%) on positive percep-tions of good governance and radio users were significantly more likely to perceivenational economic improvement. In addition, respondents of high social statustended to have a less favourable view about the national economy. Remarkably,an individual’s economic situation had the strongest explanatory power for all per-ception variables, especially, for the perception of the national economy. Keepingall other variables at their mean, survey respondents who stated that their individualeconomic situation had improved in recent years were substantially more likely tothink that democracy was functioning well, that the government was responsiveand honest and that the national economy was improving compared to otherrespondents. This suggests that Thaksin enjoyed unprecedented popularity for aThai politician because the disadvantaged felt that their situation had improvedunder his administration and used this as a heuristic to evaluate Thaksin’s demo-cratic performance.
At the same time, access to various media sources was crucial in acquiringnegative information about Thaksin. Table 5 reveals that a combined shift in
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Table 4. Logit regression analyses for the information-gap hypothesis.
Perception of functioningdemocracy
Perception of governmentresponsiveness
Perception of governmenthonesty
Perception of nationaleconomy
bi
DXi
min � max bi
DXi
min � max bi
DXi
min � max bi
DXi
min � max
Trust in TV 0.35∗∗∗
(0.11)17.4% 0.53∗∗∗
(0.10)37.5% 0.28∗∗∗
(0.10)17.1% 0.03
(0.10)Newspaper 20.32∗
(0.19)25.0% 20.30∗∗
(0.15)27.2% 20.23
(0.17)0.01
(0.15)Internet frequency 20.13∗∗
(0.05)211.1% 20.07
(0.04)20.00
(0.05)20.01
(0.04)Radio 0.27
(0.16)20.09
(0.13)20.19
(0.15)0.30∗∗
(0.13)6.9%
Witnessed corruption 0.015(0.171)
20.287∗∗
(0.143)27.2% 0.065
(0.159)0.223
(0.144)Change own econ. situation 0.53∗∗∗
(0.09)36.4% 0.35∗∗∗
(0.08)34.0% 0.32∗∗∗
(0.09)26.1% 0.84∗∗∗
(0.08)68.3%
TRT party feeling 20.04(0.22)
0.40∗∗
(0.18)9.4% 0.28
(0.19)0.17
(0.17)Opposition party feeling 20.43
(0.28)20.01
(0.28)20.52∗
(0.28)211.4% 20.24
(0.28)Social status 0.10
(0.07)0.03
(0.05)20.06
(0.06)20.12∗∗
(0.05)224.3%
N 1216 1107 1091 1200Pseudo R2 0.25 0.14 0.25 0.18
Notes: ∗p , 0.10; ∗∗p , 0.05; ∗∗∗p , 0.01 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors are in parentheses. The column DXi shows the change in probability when a particularexplanatory variable increases from its minimum to its maximum while keeping all other variables constant at their mean. Control variables for urban residence andregion are included in all models.
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Table 5. Logit regression analyses of access to and processing of information.
Newspaper Internet frequency Radio Witnessed corruption
bi DXi min � max bi DXi min � max bi DXi min � max bi DXi min � max
X1: Income 0.42∗∗∗
(0.06)38.0% 0.36∗∗∗
(0.07)23.2% 0.20∗∗∗
(0.06)19.8% 0.39∗∗∗
(0.06)35.6%
X2: Education 0.24∗∗∗
(0.03)49.5% 0.59∗∗∗
(0.04)78.9% 0.10∗∗∗
(0.03)20.8% 0.08∗∗
(0.03)15.2%
X3: Urban residency 0.71∗∗∗
(0.13)17.3% 0.32∗∗
(0.15)37.8% 0.18
(0.13)20.19
(0.14)DX1 – 3 min � max 78.6% 91.1% 38.9% 49.2%N 1374 1368 1374 1204Pseudo R2 0.25 0.40 0.06 0.08
Notes: ∗p , 0.10; ∗∗p , 0.05; ∗∗∗p , 0.01 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors are in parentheses. The column DXi shows the change in probability when a particularexplanatory variable increases from its minimum to its maximum.
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urban residency, higher income and education level from the minimum to themaximum increases the probability to use newspapers by 79%, the internet by91% and the radio by 39% to acquire information.
There is also a significant positive association of higher income and educationwith those who stated that they (or their friends or family members) have person-ally witnessed corruption. Possible explanations for this finding might be thatupper classes had a narrower concept of corruption, or that they had significantlymore contacts with other people and government officials, which in turn affectedthe possibility of becoming aware of cases of corruption.
Conclusion
Thailand’s economic development diminished the power of the traditional bureau-cratic elite, but what arose in its place was not a western-style party system but net-works of businessmen who engage in politics for the sake of economic gain.Moreover, the benefits of economic development were distributed very unevenly,leading to a growing income gap between Bangkok and the rural periphery thatseems to correspond to a possible information gap. These two outcomes of Thaicapitalism are crucial to understanding the rise of Thaksin’s TRT Party. First,Thaksin had the economic resources to dominate the political system, and heemployed state power to support his business interests in an authoritarianmanner. Second, he gained unprecedented popularity by fulfilling the socialdemands of the economically disadvantaged. And third, he used his wealth togain control of the television broadcasts that would provide the main sources ofpolitical news accessible in the countryside.
The empirical analysis has shown that the opposition to Thaksin cannot beexplained by economic self-interest. Upper income classes did not substantiallydiffer in their concerns about economic inequality. There was also no differencein subjective support for democracy between Thaksin supporters and opponents,but there was a disparity in their conceptions of democracy: Thaksin supporterstended to identify democracy as majority rule and believe that good governanceprevails if the government is responsive to popular demands. On the otherhand, opponents of Thaksin seem to have been liberal elitists: they tended tobe supportive of liberal democratic values but they were also more likely tofear the political power of the uneducated majority and their disapproval ofThaksin might grow out of Thailand’s unique political culture of royalhierarchicalism.
The empirical analysis has shown that attitudes about Thaksin were mostlydetermined by the perception of his performance: those who thought that democ-racy was functioning poorly under Thaksin, that his government was unresponsiveand corrupt and that the national economy was stagnating strongly opposed hisadministration. But if Thaksin’s voters did not get enough negative informationabout him, they would have no reason to oppose a prime minister who respondedto their localist demands. Several sources of critical news existed but they were
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significantly less available in the northern and northeastern countryside wherenearly all Thais receive their political information from the television broadcaststhat were dominated by Thaksin before the coup.
The empirical data only consists of absolute information whether a certainmedia was used to acquire political information. Not all media sources conveyednegative information about Thaksin and this makes it difficult to evaluate the val-idity of the information-gap hypothesis because of the potential cancel-out effect ofpro- and anti-Thaksin news receptions on the macro level. Clearly, pursuit of theinformation-gap hypothesis would require that one more closely investigate the cir-culation numbers of different media, perform content analysis of their messagesand measure whether the messages influence the recipients or, instead, whetherthe recipients choose to read, watch, or listen to outlets purveying the contentthey already favour.
Despite these difficulties, the hypothesis has broader interest and thereforemight be worth pursuing comparatively, because it is compatible with a newtheory of democratic consolidation, in which the upper classes tend to have themeans, and in some cases the prompting from their higher education, that wouldenable and encourage them to pay enough attention to politics to discoverthrough media reports that ‘good government’ – defined in whatever way thesociety’s culture defines ‘good’ – is being violated by the corrupt practices ofthe regime in place. This information might historically have led to demands formore democratic participation. In Thailand, however, as in the Philippines,Bolivia, Venezuela and Honduras, the rebellion against corruption and other viola-tions of local political norms has taken the form of repudiating a democraticallyelected government. Indeed, in Thailand the basis for this repudiation may havebeen the clash between the democratically elected government and the monarchy.There is, of course, no reason to assume that the same factor is at work in all ofthese cases. But Thailand does not seem to be the only country in which amiddle-class rebellion against democracy and in favour of ‘good governance’may draw on cultural values in defining the latter. The Philippine middle-classprotest that successfully demanded the dismissal of Joseph Estrada in 2001 forcharges of corruption was led by church activists who despised Estrada for his vio-lations of Catholic norms.86 In Malaysia and Indonesia, Islamic parties did wellamong the urban middle class in the last national election by campaigningagainst corruption and for transparency implemented through Islamic law. Thepossibility that there is some general phenomenon at work in Asia and LatinAmerica would have to be investigated case by case. But there are enough ofthese cases that the comparative method might be fruitful in analysing them.
Notes1. Data analysed in this article were collected by the Asian Barometer Project (2005–
2008), which was co-directed by Professors Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu and receivedmajor funding support from Taiwan’s Ministry of Education, Academia Sinica and
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National Taiwan University. The Asian Barometer Project Office is solely responsiblefor the data distribution. The author appreciates the assistance in providing data by theinstitutes and individuals aforementioned. He also thanks Jeffrey Friedman, TomScotto, Jens Meiners, Sophie Jiseon Lee, and two anonymous referees for helpfulcomments and Phimpnhapha Permsirisansook and Piyakan Jittanonda for excellentresearch assistance. The views expressed herein are the author’s own.
2. Kurlantzick, ‘The Bourgeois Revolution’.3. Unger, ‘China’s Conservative Middle Class’.4. Lipset, Political Man, 31.5. Ibid., 51.6. Moore, Social Origins, 418.7. See, for example, Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, Capitalist Development;
Putnam, Making Democracy Work; Boix, Democracy and Redistribution; Inglehartand Welzel, Modernization.
8. Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development. For a further discussion, see alsoBoix and Stokes, ‘Endogenous Democratization’; Acemoglu et al., ‘Income andDemocracy’.
9. Moore, Social Origins; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, Capitalist Develop-ment; see also Nun, ‘Middle-class Military Coup’.
10. See, for example, Gills, Rocamora, and Wilson, Low Intensity Democracy; Ottaway,Democracy Challenged; Merkel, ‘Embedded and Defective Democracies’.
11. O’Donnell, ‘Delegative Democracy’.12. Murashima, ‘The Origin’, 83–9.13. Riggs, Thailand.14. Wilson, Politics in Thailand, 277.15. Painter, ‘Thaksinisation or Managerialism?’, 28.16. Ockey, ‘State, Bureaucracy and Polity’, 144.17. Thailand received about $1 billion in economic aid and $2 billion in military aid from
the USA between 1950 and 1988, of which $2 billion of the total amount was receivedbetween 1965 and 1975 alone (see Glassman, Thailand at the Margins, 37; Fineman,A Special Relationship).
18. Thak, The Politics of Despotic Paternalism.19. McCargo, ‘Network Monarchy’.20. The Chinese capitalist class played a crucial role in this transformation. See Sidel,
‘Social Origins of Dictatorship’, 129–33, 135–7.21. Anderson, ‘Withdrawal Symptoms’, 16–17.22. Handley, The King Never Smiles, 209–1323. Girling, Interpreting Development, 20; Ockey, ‘State, Bureaucracy and Polity’, 144–5.24. Connors, Democracy and National Identity, 219.25. Motonishi, ‘Why Has Income Inequality’.26. Anek, Business Associations, 33.27. Girling, Interpreting Development, 32.28. Riggs, Thailand, 312–3; Bidhya, ‘Thailand’, 286.29. Nelson, ‘Institutional Incentives’, 132.30. Ockey, ‘Business Leaders’, 96.31. Sidel, ‘Siam and its Twin’, 36–52.32. Girling, Interpreting Development, 38.33. Anek, The Mobile Phone Mob.34. Englehart, ‘Democracy and the Thai Middle Class’, 261.35. Connors, ‘Goodbye to the Security State’, 432.36. Baker and Pasuk, A History of Thailand, 255.37. Ibid., 253.
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38. Connors, ‘Goodbye to the Security State’, 433. However, Privy Council member Premplayed a crucial role in the elite bargaining that led to the formation of this coalitiongovernment and the military never lost its political influence during this period(McCargo and Ukrist, The Thaksinization, 133–4).
39. Nelson, ‘Thaksin’s 2005 Electoral Triumph’, 6.40. See, for instance, Chambers, ‘Evolving Toward What?’, 513–4; Nelson, ‘Thailand
and Thaksin Shinawatra’, 2–3. Mutebi, ‘Political Consolidation’, 105.41. Albritton, ‘Thailand in 2004’, 169–71.42. Nelson, ‘Thaksin’s 2005 Electoral Triumph’, 15.43. Case, ‘Democracy’s Quality’, 630–2. See also Pasuk and Baker, ‘Thaksin’s Popu-
lism’, 68.44. Somchai, ‘The Thai Rak Thai Party’, 108–12.45. Case, ‘Democracy’s Quality’, 629.46. Ukrist, ‘A Different Coup d’Etat’, 127.47. Bell, ‘Thai Protesters’.48. Hewison, ‘A Book, the King and the 2006 Coup’; Ukrist, ‘A Different Coup d’Etat’;
Thongchai, ‘Toppling Democracy’.49. While the PAD is often portrayed as an upper-class urban movement, it is worth men-
tioning that it initially also consisted of several political groups who emphasized differ-ent social and political issues (Pye and Schaffar, ‘The 2006 Anti-Thaksin Movement’).
50. Chai-Anan and Parichart, ‘Beyond Transition in Thailand’, 156. See also Pasuk andBaker, ‘Thaksin’s Populism’, 78; Kurlantzick, ‘The Bourgeois Revolution’.
51. Giles, A Coup For the Rich.52. Lewin, Self-Interest and Public Interest, 29–60.53. Pye and Schaffar, ‘The 2006 Anti-Thaksin Movement’, 55; Thongchai, ‘Nationalism’.54. Chamlong also founded the Phalang Dharma party in 1988 to strive for Thai values
and against corruption. Notably, this party performed especially well in Bangkok,winning 32 of 35 seats there in the national election of 1992. The party collapsedafter a conflict between Chamlong’s ‘temple faction’ and the ‘political faction’ –which was, ironically, led by Thaksin.
55. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.56. Converse, ‘Attitudes and Non-Attitudes’.57. At least in the case of Sondhi Limthongkul, it seems that selfish economic reasons
caused the opposition to Thaksin. Initially, Sondhi was a business partner ofThaksin but falling out with him, Sondhi turned against Thaksin (Ukrist, ‘A DifferentCoup d’Etat’, 131).
58. Thongchai, ‘Toppling Democracy’, 30–1.59. Anek, ‘A Tale of Two Democracies’; Anek, Thaksin-style Populism.60. Chang, ‘The Persistent Myth’; Chang, ‘Giving Up On Democracy’.61. Walker, ‘The Rural Constitution’; Somchai, ‘The Thai Rak Thai Party’.62. Albritton and Thawilwadee, ‘Developing Democracy’. The distinction in this particu-
lar sample between urban and rural is obtained by analysing responses from differentprovinces (changwat).
63. See, for instance, RSF, Reporters Without Borders; The Nation, ‘Secret Military Div-ision Deployed’; The Nation, ‘Politicking’.
64. Bangkok Post, ‘Goings on at Channel 9’.65. Supalak, ‘New Politics’. PAD has never specified the independent institutions and
announced later that the fixed formula was just an example of how money politicsshould be replaced and is still open for discussion.
66. Connors, ‘Article of Faith’, 144–5.67. Anek, Thaksin-style Populism, 177–83.68. Albritton and Thawilwadee, ‘The State of Democracy’.
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69. Mulder, Thai Images, 308.70. Ockey, Making Democracy, 183. However, not all rural provinces supported Thaksin
and especially the south was a stronghold of the anti-Thaksin movement. For adetailed discussion of Thaksin’s unpopularity in the southern provinces, see Askew,Performing Political Identity.
71. Althaus, Collective Preferences; Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.72. Thongchai, ‘Toppling Democracy’, 26.73. McCargo, Politics, 29: On days other than the publication of the bi-monthly lottery
results, only one out of 30 Thais bought a newspaper during the mid-1990s. Thisratio was considerably lower than comparable data from Malaysia, Singapore,Japan and the USA.
74. Ubonrat, Close your Ears.75. The Nation, ‘Poll Finds TRT Gets Quantity and Quality in Live News Time’.76. Pasuk and Baker, ‘Thaksin’s Populism’, 67.77. Medhi, ‘Political Crisis’.78. McCargo, Politics, 23–4.79. Francese and Needham, ‘Community Radio’.80. IRI, Thailand National Public Opinion Survey.81. Less than 5% of this sample have ever engaged in any political activism like signing a
petition or participating in a demonstration.82. Anek, Thaksin-style Populism, 177–83.83. For an overview, see King et al., ‘Analyzing Incomplete’.84. For an explanation of Clarify, see Tomz, Wittenberg, and King, ‘Clarify’; see also
King, Tomz, and Wittenberg, ‘Making the Most’.85. The continuous significant impact of the party variables might be a confirmation that
partisan conviction was a form of ideological constraint as shown in public opinionresearch. See, for instance, Taber and Lodge, ‘Motivated Skepticism’; Shapiro andBloch-Elkon, ‘Do the Facts’.
86. Some scholars argue that the events in the Philippines should be rather seen as a softmilitary coup for which the middle-class activists provide an ideological legitimiza-tion. See Abinales, ‘Philippines in 2009’.
Notes on contributorKai Jager is a PhD student in the Department of Political Science at Duke University.
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