CARLETON

Why did Sir Guy Carleton choose not toattack Patriots retreating from Canada

and upper New York in late 1776 andearly 1777?

Viewpoint: Carleton failed to be as aggressive as he should have beenbecause he overestimated Loyalist support in the colonies and was commit-ted to a policy of conciliation toward the enemy that had little possibility ofsuccess.

Viewpoint: Carleton chose not to attack the retreating Patriots because ofunfavorable weather, the poor state of reinforcements, limited intelligence,and logistical problems.

Early in the Revolutionary War the American Patriots made a deter-mined, yet unsuccessful, effort to conquer Canada (August 1775 to October1776). Several factors encouraged them to launch an invasion of their North-ern neighbor: the hope that Canadians would join the American cause andtransform themselves into the "fourteenth colony"; the legitimate fear that theBritish would use Canada as a base from which to launch military strikes intoNew England and New York; and the knowledge that Canada was lightlydefended with fewer than 1,000 British regulars. However, the poorly plannedinvasion of Canada was carried out by undisciplined and inexperiencedtroops and officers and led to a costly military disaster. The great expeditionitself was riddled with military and logistical setbacks that greatly weakenedand demoralized the American troops. During the failed assault on the capitalof Quebec (31 December 1775), the Americans lost more than 450 men,including General Richard Montgomery; the British dead and wounded num-bered fewer than 20. The subsequent unsuccessful American siege onlyserved to further weaken and demoralize the Patriot forces. When Americanofficers received news in early May 1776 of the arrival of fifteen British war-ships to Canada, they lifted the siege and ordered a withdrawal.

At this point Guy Carleton, the reserved and dignified governor-generalof Canada who had made an admirable and tenacious defense of Quebec(for which he received a knighthood), had the opportunity and the manpowerto turn the tables on the retreating Americans and drive down the Hudson tocut off New England and end the war. Why he failed to do this is one of themost debated questions of the American Revolution. His critics have chargedhim with implementing an inept and overly cautious strategy that preventedhim from achieving resounding victories that were within his grasp. His apolo-gists, on the other hand, have attributed his defeats to incompetence in Lon-don and various circumstances that were beyond his control. This debate isnot a mere academic exercise, for Carleton's failure to defeat the haplessAmericans when they were most vulnerable ultimately resulted in disastrousconsequences for the British military. As such, it raises the related question ofwhether the invasion of Canada was actually a failure for the Americans. Italso forces one to confront the logic of Britain's early mixed strategy of endingthe rebellion through diplomacy (conciliation) and military action, a policyreflected in Carleton's conduct during the American invasion of Canada. 43

Viewpoint:Carleton failed to be as aggressiveas he should have been because heoverestimated Loyalist support inthe colonies and was committedto a policy of conciliation towardthe enemy that had little possibilityof success.

On 21 September 1775, as he attempted torepel an American invasion of the province,Canadian governor-general Guy Carleton wroteto the British ministry: "I think that this war cannot be carried on more advantageously, thanfrom hence, and that a body of ten or twelvethousand men here, early next spring, completelyequipped, with some frigates might greatlychange the face of things on this Continent."The ministry heeded Carleton's advice and senthim thirteen thousand troops the followingspring. Rather than "greatly changing the face ofthings on this Continent," however, Carletonallowed the ragged, smallpox-infested Rebels toescape from Canada. He then failed to aggres-sively pursue them to Ticonderoga and cooper-ate with General William Howe's army in thelower Hudson River valley. This situation gavethe colonists a chance to regroup and struggleon for another year, the result of which was thedisastrous Saratoga campaign of 1777. Through-out the Northern campaign in 1776, Carletonfaced serious logistical obstacles and uncoopera-tive weather. Still, these were not the reasons helet an opportunity to deliver a severe blow to therebellion slip through his fingers. Instead, Carle-ton lacked the will to destroy the Americanforces, mistakenly believing that most colonistsremained loyal and that a policy of reconciliationcould succeed.

Carleton manifested his conciliatory beliefsin several different ways. The first involved theuse of Native Americans. Throughout the springand summer of 1775, the situation between Brit-ain and its American colonists deteriorated fol-lowing the Battles of Lexington and Concord on19 April. An army of American militia laid siegeto Boston, and Ethan Allen and BenedictArnold captured Fort Ticonderoga in NorthernNew York on 10 May. That same day, the SecondContinental Congress met in Philadelphia tobegin coordinating the colonists' actions. Fiveweeks later British and American troops fought abloody battle at Bunker Hill in Boston. Againstthis background of escalating war, Major Gen-eral Thomas Gage, the besieged commander ofBritish forces in America, urged Carleton to cre-ate a diversion by sending the Native Americansagainst the colonists' frontier. Carleton, how-

ever, consistently refused to utilize the Indians,finally explaining that "cruelties might have beencommitted, & for fear the innocent might havesuffered with the Guilty." While such humanitar-ian sentiments were commendable, they alsoindicate that Carleton was unwilling to resort todrastic means to suppress the rebellion.

Further evidence of Carleton's conciliatoryattitude is found when examining his conductduring the American invasion and his subse-quent counterattack. In June 1775 Congressauthorized American forces to seize Canada,hoping to induce its inhabitants to join their fel-low colonists and to remove the province as aBritish staging area. In early September, GeneralRichard Montgomery advanced down LakeChamplain toward Montreal, while ColonelBenedict Arnold led a second force through theMaine wilderness toward Quebec. Carleton wasunable to stop the incursions, and by earlyDecember the Americans had overrun the entireprovince except for Quebec City. Carleton did amasterful job of defending the walled city andrepelling the bloody New Year's Eve assault thatleft Montgomery dead, Arnold wounded, andfour hundred enemy soldiers in his custody. Sur-prisingly, Carleton allowed ninety of the Ameri-can prisoners of war to enlist in the BritishArmy, thus demonstrating his great faith that theAmerican colonists could be reconciled withBritain. Many of the new enlistees apparentlyjoined in the hope of escaping, however, becausesix quickly deserted back to the American lines.Only then did Carleton order the remainingAmericans confined.

The governor-general acted in a similar man-ner toward prisoners several other times duringthe northern campaign. On 6 May 1776 the firstdetachments of British reinforcements arrived atQuebec. Carleton, who had not sallied forthfrom Quebec since repelling the assault, immedi-ately led them on a sortie. The Americans,wracked by smallpox and low morale, fled ingreat haste, abandoning what little supplies theyhad. They did not halt until they reached Des-chambault, forty-five miles west of Quebec, thenext day. They remained there for a week beforeretiring to Sorel, east of Montreal. Rather thanvigorously pursuing the Americans, however,Carleton ordered his men to search for sick andwounded Rebels whom the Americans had leftbehind and to give them medical treatment. Fur-thermore, over the course of the summer, Carle-ton released all the American prisoners and sentthem back to the colonies with provisions. Hecontinued to do this throughout the remainderof the campaign with the hope that such kind-ness would "convince all His unhappy Subjectsthat the King's Mercy and Benevolence were stillopen to them."

44 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Carleton's lackadaisical pursuit of theretreating Americans further suggests his incli-nation to reconcile with the colonists ratherthan inflict military defeat upon them. On twoseparate occasions in June, he missed opportuni-ties to capture large portions of the Americanarmy in Canada. Immediately following theRebels' retreat from Quebec, some of the gover-nor's advisers urged him not to let the Ameri-cans escape. Carleton did not heed their advice,partly because the full detachment of Britishreinforcements had not yet arrived. Whenanother eight thousand British and Germantroops under Major General John Burgoynearrived in June, bringing Carleton's strength toten thousand, he ordered a mere eight hundredmen to Trois Rivieres, about halfway betweenMontreal and Quebec.

Meanwhile, the Americans had received twothousand fresh troops at Sorel, encouragingthem to attack Trois Rivieres. They landed nearthe town on the morning of 8 June but quicklybecame lost in an impenetrable swamp. Whenthey finally emerged hours later, the soldierscame under fire from British warships in the St.Lawrence. Even worse, most of Carleton's armyhad arrived, and it had little difficulty repellingthe disorganized American attack on the town.As the Rebels retreated back into the forest,Carleton landed troops above them to cut offtheir escape. Other British troops blocked abridge across the Riviere du Loup, the lastremaining escape route. Amazingly, Carletonrecalled this detachment at the last minute,allowing the Americans to get away. He alsofailed to send ships up the St. Lawrence to pre-vent them from recrossing to Sorel on the Southshore. Some historians speculate that Carletonlet these troops escape because he lacked provi-sions to feed them and would have been forcedto release them anyway. While there is sometruth to this argument, Carleton missed anopportunity to, at the least, capture and disarmthe Rebels, thereby preventing their future resis-tance and badly shaking American morale.

Following the Battle of Trois Rivieres, thegovernor-general made plans to trap the Rebelarmy, but again he did not actively implementthe plan. Carleton ordered Burgoyne and fourthousand soldiers to drive the Americans southfrom Sorel toward Chambly and St. Johns. Carle-ton, in the meantime, intended to sail up the St.Lawrence with the rest of the army, land nearMontreal and Longueuil, and rapidly marchsoutheast to St. Johns. Carleton ordered Bur-goyne not to push the Rebels too hard so that hewould have time to envelop them from the rear.By 14 June Burgoyne moved against the Rebels,but the winds delayed Carleton. On 16 June hefinally landed his command and had them march

toward the American rear at St. Johns. Unfortu-nately for the British, this delay had far-reachingconsequences. The Americans abandoned St.Johns on 19 June after burning several vesselsand all other military supplies that they couldnot take with them. As the last Rebels left, Bur-goyne's men arrived at St. Johns. Carleton'stroops arrived there the next morning.

In his defense, Carleton's plan was soundand might well have worked had the wind notfailed him. Still, he waited two days before land-ing his men and then did not rapidly march tocut the American line of retreat. Furthermore, hedid not order Burgoyne to press the Rebelsharder to force them to stand and fight. As aresult, the American army escaped from Canadawith four small warships, giving them control ofLake Champlain.

Having allowed the Americans to escape,Carleton spent the rest of the summer buildingships at St. Johns to challenge them on the lake.This task was extremely difficult and time-consuming,as warships on the St. Lawrence had to be disas-sembled, transported by land around the Cham-bly Rapids to St. Johns, and then reassembled.Carleton also had to construct barges to sail hisarmy to Ticonderoga, because the rugged terrainmade movement by land nearly impossible. Thegovernor had requested that barges be sent fromBritain, but he only received ten of them.Instead, most had been diverted to WilliamHowe's army for the attack on New York City.

While this construction program inevitablydelayed his advance against Ticonderoga, Carle-ton was again guilty of not moving as quickly asthe situation warranted. While it was necessaryto counter the American ships on the lake, thegovernor overdid it. His extensive constructionactivity caused Arnold, the American second-in-command at Ticonderoga, to begin buildingadditional warships on 12 July. Carleton, how-ever, failed to send any detachments to raid theAmerican position and disrupt their work. Evenworse, he allowed Arnold to outbuild him and,on 1 September, reluctantly ordered that theeighteen-gun Inflexible be transported from theSt. Lawrence to St. Johns. While this ultimatelygave the British undisputed supremacy on LakeChamplain, it took another twenty-eight crucialdays to complete the task. Furthermore, as hisfleet was being built, Carleton returned to Que-bec to help reinstitute civil government in thecolony. Such activities were undoubtedly impor-tant, but Britain would have been better served ifCarleton focused more on his duties as generaland less as governor.

Finally, on 4 October, more than threemonths after he arrived at St. Johns, Carletonsailed south with twice the firepower of theAmerican squadron. Despite Burgoyne's recom-

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 45

The fallowing account & from a fetter written by an American soldier,Charles Gushing, to his brother on 13 June 1776, describing the misera-ble state of the American forces and their retreat from Montreal to CrownPoint near Fort Ticonderoga in New York:

Our army, consisting of about six thousand men,were now all retreated safely to St. John's, and theenemy at Montreal and Ghambly. We then sent the sickand some of the stores to the isle-aux-Noix, thefsle~au-Motte and Point-au-Fer, not having boats to carrythe whole army and stores at once; and as soon as theboats came back, the whole army embarked and went tothe lsle~aux~Noix. Here, what boats could be sparedwere sent to Crown Point with sick and stores, as a greatpart of the army were sick, many with the small-pox, andmany of those who had it were sick with the flux. Herewe were obliged to wait for boats eight days, where wecould get nothing but pork and flour. The island beingsmall, not more than one mile in length and a quarter of amile In width, the land low, the days hot, and at nightgreat dews, and such a number of men on so small aspot, and many of them sick—the place stunk enough tobreed an infection,.,.

About noon we marched for Point-au-Fer, and sooncame where there was only an Indian path and a wetswamp, which was for a great distance almost up to ourknees in mud and water. Besides this, it rained very hardall the afternoon. At dark we came out against a bay inthe lake, within about six miles of Point-au-Fer. We hadnow nothing but the ground to lie on and the heavens tocover us; and what with the rain, sweat and mud, we hadbut little about us that was dry. We soon built fires anddried ourselves as well as we could, and then lay down torest with our feet in the fire, I slept very well and got up inthe morning refreshed. The weather cleared off pleasant;we got some breakfast; and about nine o'clock therecame boats enough to take us all off. The remainder ofthe army came in batteaus from the Isle-aux-Noix, and ailarrived at the lste~au~Motte that night. We soon had boatsenough to carry the whole army to Grown Point, and, Ithink, nothing remarkable happened till we arrived here.

Source: Henry Steele Commagerand Richard B, Morris, eds,t TheSpirit of *S0v@nty~Six: The Story of the American Revolution as Toldby Participants (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), pp. 218-219.

mendation, the governor-general failed to bringalong the army so that it could quickly attackTiconderoga after he gained control of the lake.Additionally, Carleton moved as slowly anddeliberately as he had earlier in the campaign. Ittook him another full week to find Arnold'sfleet, even though it was deployed at the North-ern end of Lake Champlain near Valcour Island.Between 11 and 14 October the British fleetsank or forced the scuttling of thirteen of six-

teen American vessels, gaining clear superiorityon the lake. Carleton then transported his armyto Crown Point, about twenty miles north ofthe main American position at Fort Ticon-deroga. The cautious Carleton waited an addi-tional two weeks before finally sending a probeon 27 October to test the fort's defenses. Herejected Burgoyne's proposal to besiege the fortbecause of the oncoming winter. Learning thatthe Americans had been heavily reinforced,Carleton withdrew to Crown Point. Hereturned to Canada a week later with his entirecommand. Significantly, he did not leave troopsat Crown Point as a forward staging area for thenext year's operations, despite Burgoyne's sug-gestion that he do so. Carleton believed that helacked adequate time, provisions, and transpor-tation to supply such an exposed and distantlocation during the winter.

That Carleton returned to Canada soquickly is not surprising, considering his actionsthroughout the campaign. Moreover, as early as28 September he had informed the British warminister that it was too late in the season toachieve any major successes, despite havingreceived an additional 3,000 troops. Instead, hemerely hoped his actions would prevent theAmericans from detaching troops to fight Howein the lower Hudson River valley. Carleton evenfailed to accomplish this goal, however. In lateNovember, with the British back in Canada,Major General Horatio Gates marched 1,200American troops from Ticonderoga to GeorgeWashington's army in Pennsylvania. Gatesarrived in time to assist Washington's counter-attacks at Trenton and Princeton in December1776 and January 1777.

Throughout the Northern campaign, Carle-ton repeatedly released American prisoners,missed opportunities to capture large portions ofthe Rebel forces, and generally did not vigorouslypursue a military solution to end the rebellion.Instead, he favored a policy of reconciliation.Carleton maintained his conciliatory beliefdespite an abundance of evidence that the Ameri-cans were not interested in reconciling with theBritish but were, instead, determined to fight.For example, many American prisoners, despitehumane treatment from Carleton, escaped at thefirst opportunity. Furthermore, the ragged Amer-ican Army, plagued by disease and a serious short-age of provisions, counterattacked at TroisRivieres just weeks after fleeing from Quebec.The colonists also demonstrated their resolvewhen, in late July, one of their patrols ambushedand killed a British brigadier general near St.Johns. In August 1776 Carleton learned of theContinental Congress's Declaration of Indepen-dence and its vote not to return British prisonerscaptured in Canada. In the face of all these devel-

46 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

RAIN, SWEAT, AND MUD

opments, Carleton still maintained his hope forreconciliation. In fact, on 4 August he issued ageneral order to his army instructing it not toblame "the Provincials at large, but a few wickedand designing Men" for the current state ofaffairs. Six days later he wrote that these menwere precipitating "a revengeful War in order todeprive all moderate men in the Colonies of theleast Hope or Thought of a Reconciliation." Car-leton consistently tried to counter this behaviorthroughout the Northern campaign.

Carleton's belief in reconciliation was notunlike that of other high-ranking British officersin America, such as William Howe and HenryClinton. Still, his actions, based on this idea, had aserious negative impact on the British war effort.By not vigorously pursuing the Americans, heallowed thousands of troops to escape from Can-ada and fight again. Additionally, his methodicalnaval buildup on Lake Champlain allowed theAmericans time to strengthen their fleet. Moreimportant, it consumed so much time that Carle-ton was unable to capture Fort Ticonderoga andcooperate with Howe's army near New York City.His failure to overrun Northern New York in1776 led to Burgoyne's disastrous attempt to doso the following year. Finally, by returning to Can-ada when he did, Carleton freed American troopswho later helped Washington undo much of whatHowe had achieved earlier in the year. Overall,Carleton's belief in reconciliation bore bitter fruitfor the British.

-MICHAEL P. GABRIEL,KUTZTOWN UNIVERSITY

Viewpoint:Carleton chose not to attack theretreating Patriots because ofunfavorable weather, the poorstate of reinforcements, limitedintelligence, and logisticalproblems.

One of the more persistent misconceptionsto come out of Revolutionary War history is thatSir Guy Carleton missed a golden opportunity inlate 1776-early 1777 to crush the Americanarmy in Canada: as governor-general and com-mander in chief of all Crown forces in the region,he should have acted more decisively in cuttingoff the retreating Rebel forces and in seizing con-trol of the Lake Champlain-Lake George corri-dor in Upstate New York. On the surface suchan assumption seems to be correct; after all,Carleton had the reputation of being a cautiousmilitary commander. In reality, a lack of oppor-

tunity and means conspired to curtail Carleton'sability to achieve a decisive victory.

The unfair criticism surrounding Carleton'sconduct early in the war was first made by Lieu-tenant Colonel Gabriel Christie, who had a per-sonal grudge against the Canadian governor-general. Christie arrived in Canada in early June1776 with a commission as quartermaster gen-eral from Lord George Germain, the secretary ofstate for the colonies. However, Carleton hadalready appointed his brother, Major ThomasCarleton, to the post of chief supply officer andhad no intention of using Christie, who had areputation of mixing public and private business.In retaliation, Christie lambasted Carleton in let-ters to Germain, accusing him of being a poormilitary commander and mismanaging his sup-ply system. These letters triggered an ongoingquarrel between Germain and Carleton thatgrew more bitter with time. Lord Germain, a keyplanner of British strategy, believed Carleton wastoo haughty and methodical. On the other hand,Carleton thought Germain's plans were unrealis-tic and questioned the secretary of state's abilityto formulate a viable strategy three thousandmiles away from the theater of operations. Carle-ton also lacked respect for Germain because thelatter had been court-martialed for cowardice atthe Battle of Minden (1759).

Regardless of the personal animositiesbetween the governor-general and the secretaryof state, the complaints against Carleton must betaken in context: they originated with Christie, adisappointed, angry, and vindictive man. Asidefrom Christie and Major General John Bur-goyne, who conspired against Carleton in orderto receive the command of the British Northernoffensive of 1777, no one else in Canada foundserious fault with the governor-general's conductof the campaign. The official correspondence,personal letters, and journals of his officers donot exhibit any significant criticism. Major Gen-eral Wilhelm, Baron von Riedesel, in particularnoted that the "competent" Carleton "knew thearmy thoroughly and enjoyed the confidence ofthe officers and men." Moreover, King GeorgeIII and his prime minister, Lord FrederickNorth, thought highly of Carleton's abilities.

With the arrival of eight thousand rein-forcements from England in May and June1776, it certainly seemed that Carleton had thenecessary manpower to effect a stunning reversalof British misfortunes in Canada. The Rebelsimmediately lifted the siege of Quebec andbegan a hasty retreat down the St. LawrenceRiver. However, uncooperative weather plaguedCarleton's pursuit from the beginning. Forexample, Carleton determined to disembarksome of his troops at La Prairie, but the windfailed on 15 June, denying him the opportunity

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 47

to cut off a large portion of the enemy army.Even after the British and German troops finallylanded, they made little progress, marching onlyfifty miles in three days. This poor performancewas caused by most of the soldiers being con-fined to crowded transport vessels for severalmonths; they needed time to regain their "landlegs" and to toughen up their feet. In addition,dysentery quickly debilitated the rank and file asmany of the men, after weeks of subsisting onnothing but salt provisions, ate unripened fruitstolen from roadside orchards.

Meanwhile, Rebel forces fled southwarddown Lake Champlain to Crown Point andTiconderoga on 19 June, leaving the British incommand of the St. Lawrence waterway. How-ever, Carleton had to postpone his pursuit inorder to prepare an adequate naval force tocounter the four enemy warships on the lake.Over the course of the next three months histroops painstakingly dismantled the British warvessels on the St. Lawrence, hauled them aroundten miles of shallow rapids on the RichelieuRiver below Chambly, and then reassembledthem. Meanwhile he had the dockyards rebuilt atSt. Jean, which the retreating Americans haddestroyed, in order to construct barges for thetransportation of men and supplies. (He hadwisely anticipated this problem in November1775 and requested that London send him thenecessary watercraft, but they were diverted to

Sir William Howe's army in New York.)Although his men worked diligently, Carletonwarned Germain on 28 September that "the sea-son is so far advanced that I dare not flattermyself we shall be able to do much this summer."

At the Battle of Valcour Island on 11 Octo-ber, inconsistent winds prevented the Britishships from fully engaging the enemy flotilla andlater pursuing it down Lake Champlain. Follow-ing his naval victory, Carleton sailed south toCrown Point but did not move farther tothreaten Fort Ticonderoga because the windsshifted against him again and immobilized hisvessels. Also, his army was scattered all along thelake and needed to regroup. By that time the sea-son was too far advanced to conduct any furthermilitary operations. With his magazines manymiles away and his troops lacking the necessaryclothing and accoutrements for harsh winterweather, Carleton abandoned Crown Point on 2November and retired to Canada.

Limited intelligence also influenced Carle-ton's decisions. His dislike of using NativeAmerican warriors allied to the King restrictedhis ability to obtain accurate information aboutenemy troop numbers and movements. Through-out the campaign Carleton had only a vaguenotion of enemy strength. At one point the Brit-ish general estimated the American army at closeto eight thousand men, but he had no way ofknowing that it was actually well below that fig-ure. In fact, not until Brigadier General SimonFraser conducted a reconnaissance did Carletonhave a clear picture of Rebel dispositions at FortTiconderoga. By that time it was too late in theseason to act upon this information.

Logistical problems represent the greatestfactor behind the limited progress of Carleton'spursuit. The Rebel army had stripped bare thefoodstuff throughout the St. Lawrence River val-ley. As a result, Carleton could not pursue theretreating Americans until he received the neces-sary supplies. Additional circumstances devel-oped that caused him even more delays. InMarch 1776 the Swift, one of four victuallersladen with provisions for the Quebec garrison,caught fire and sank in the English Channel, andseveral weeks passed before another supply shipcould be loaded with cargo and dispatched toCanada. Adding to the provision problem wasthe newly appointed commissary generalNathaniel Day, who lacked the necessary experi-ence and reliable assistants. He quickly becameoverwhelmed by his responsibilities. When thefirst large shipments of supplies did begin toarrive in Canada, they were landed in a haphaz-ard fashion along the shores of the St. LawrenceRiver from Deschambault to Montreal. The sup-plies were also placed in the open without thebenefit of tarpaulins, exposing them to both the

48 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

elements and pilfering civilians. By the end ofJune these stores were nearly exhausted. In addi-tion, the British government had contracted tosupply provisions for only twelve thousand regu-lar troops, failing to take into account the manyCanadian militiamen, Native American allies,teamsters, and camp followers that brought thetotal need for the British Army in Canada totwenty thousand men and women. Conse-quently, the provisions in no way kept up withthe demand. In September, the men manningthe magazines had enough provisions for onlytwelve days. By December, when there was afour-month reserve of provisions on hand, thecampaign season was already over.

Although he did not fulfill Germain's visionof an assault on Northern New York and west-ern Massachusetts, Carleton successfully expelledan invading army, destroyed the enemy's abilityto control the Lake Champlain waterway, and setthe stage for a spring offensive. Germain'sattempts to find fault with these accomplish-ments seem almost petty. For instance, he wouldlater assert that Carleton's withdrawal fromCrown Point made it possible for the Rebels todivert troops for the attack on Trenton, New Jer-sey, but the correlation between these two eventsis tenuous at best.

As the leading military and political figurein Canada, Carleton did well given his circum-stances. When fate intervened in the form ofpoor winds, there was little that he could do. Hispursuit of the retiring American army repre-sented a good balance between caution andspeed. The weight of responsibility for defendingall of Canada weighed heavily on his shoulders:he had more to lose than to gain in an immediateoffensive against the retreating Rebels. Suchaction would have been foolish until he hadaddressed his logistical problems. Consequently,time-consuming preparations prevented himfrom delivering a fatal blow to the Americans. Byabandoning Crown Point, Carleton did indeedrelinquish recent military gains that he wouldhave to regain in the spring. Yet, in the end, hehad acted prudently. While a more inexperiencedcommander would have been concerned withtactics, Carleton demonstrated his professional-ism by wisely focusing on logistics.

-ANTHONY J. SCOTTI JR.,MIDLANDS TECHNICAL COLLEGE

References

R. Arthur Bowler, Logistics and the Failure of theBritish Army in America, 1775-1783 (Prince-ton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

Bowler, "Sir Guy Carleton and the Campaign of1776 in Canada," Canadian HistoricalReview, 55 (June 1974): 131-140.

A. L. Burt, "The Quarrel Between Germain andCarleton: An Invented Story," CanadianHistorical Review, 11 (September 1930):202-222.

Stephen Conway, "To Subdue America: BritishArmy Officers and the Conduct of the Rev-olutionary War," William and Mary Quar-terly, 43 (July 1986): 381-407.

History Section of the General Staff, ed., A His-tory of the Organization, Development and Ser-vices of the Military and Naval Forces ofCanada From the Peace of Paris in 1763, to thePresent Time, 3 volumes (Ottawa: HistorySection of the General Staff, 1919-1920).

Eldon L. Jones, "Sir Guy Carleton and the Closeof the American War of Independence,1782-1783," dissertation, Duke University,1968.

Gustave Lanctot, Canada and the American Revo-lution, 1774-1783, translated by MargaretM. Cameron (Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press, 1967).

Perry E. Leroy, "Sir Guy Carleton as a MilitaryLeader During the American Invasion andRepulse in Canada, 1775-1776," 2 volumes,dissertation, Ohio State University, 1960.

Paul David Nelson, General Sir Guy Carleton,Lord Dorchester: Soldier-Statesman of EarlyBritish Canada (Madison & Teaneck, N.J.:Fairleigh Dickinson University Press,2000).

Nelson, "Guy Carleton versus Benedict Arnold:The Campaign of 1776 in Canada and onLake Champlain," New Tork History, 57(July 1976): 339-366.

Kenneth Roberts, ed., March to Quebec: Journalsof the Members of Arnold's Expedition (GardenCity, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1945).

Justin H. Smith, Our Struggle for the FourteenthColony: Canada and the American Revolu-tion, 2 volumes (New York: Putnam, 1907).

Paul H. Smith, "Sir Guy Carleton: Soldier-Statesman," in George Washington's Oppo-nents, edited by George A. Billias (NewYork: Morrow, 1969), pp. 103-141.

George F. G. Stanley, Canada Invaded, 1775-1776(Toronto: Hakkert, 1977).

Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution, 2volumes (New York: Macmillan, 1952).

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 49