Who represents whom? Who represents what? · (Carrieri/Tatarelli 1997) Trade union fragmentation (sindacati autonomi classici o “di prima generazione”) (sindacati professionali

Who represents whom?Who represents what?

Trade union fragmentation and industrial relations in Italy

Prof. Bruno Catte roFacoltà di Scie nze Politiche

Dipartime nto d i Rice rca So ciale

I n t e rn at ion al w o rk s h op“Eu ro p e an Un io n is m in Tra n s it io n ?”at t h e W ZB, Be rlinS e p t e m b e r 9 t h – 1 0 t h , 2 0 0 8

Prof. Bruno CatteroUniversità del Piemonte OrientaleDipartimento di Ricerca sociale

Beyond , and : The numbers anda typology of other trade unions

Where does the fragmentation come from? The causes

The effects on industrial relations:- the of the conflict- the conservatism of the trade union confederations

The question of representativeness: attempts to “rationalise” in the public sector

Looking ahead: The open questions

Contents

CGIL CIS L UIL

“terziarizzaz ione”


pensioners make up more than 50% of membership

strong presence in the public sector

significant membership losses in the private sector

sudden emergence of “other” unions andfragmentation of the representation of interests

Stable unions in the context of stable industrial relations?

Rate of unionisation ( , and ): 32 - 38%CGIL CISL UIL

b u t :

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the traditional “autonomous” unions

the new “autonomous” unions

the radical left wing ( )

(Carrieri/Tatarelli 1997)

Trade union fragmentation

(s indacati autonomi class ici o “di prima generazione ”)

(s indacati profess ionali o di mes tie re )

“comitati di base ” Cobas

The “o the r” trade unions : a typo log y


a-political, moderate und consensus-oriented

mainly present in the public sector (exception: at Fiat)

Representation of particulate, corporative interests ofindividual professional groups (teachers, executive staff in thebanking sector); apart from this, rather a marginalphenomenon

from the 70ies on competition with the expanding andhegemonic trade union confederations with a view to securing niches of representation


The o ld “autono mous ” unions (1 )

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FIS MIC


: marginal phenomenon with neo-fascist corporativeideology (founded in 1950)

: confederation of autonomous unions (founded in 1957)

Two additional confederations:

: founded in 1996,allegedly 2,4 mio. members (?)

: founded in 1990/1996,no data available about membership


The o ld “autono mous ” unions (2 )

Today:

CISNAL

CISAL

Unione Generale de l Lavoro (UGL)

Sindacato Padano (S in.Pa)


a-political

representation of particulate, corporative interests ofindividual professional groups (e.g.: air traffic controllers,engine drivers)

strong presence in the public sector, in particular thetransport sector

offensive strategies with deliberate use of extrememeasures during conflicts


The ne w “autono mous ” unions(professional associations)

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origins in the confederate unionism (in particular , but also )

combine militant left wing radicalism with professionalidentities (in particular engine drivers and workers in localtransport; teachers; )

loose organisation (assemblies and coordination);conflict as the peak moment of organisation

schisms (e.g. in the education sector)


The radical le ft w ing Co m it at i d i Bas e(Cob as )

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CGIL CIS L

Alfa Romeo

GILDA



To s ummaris e :

new “auto no mous ” unio ns Cobas

old “auto no mous ” unio ns



With the exception of and : common features are much more significant than the respective differences

To s ummaris e:

new “autono mo us ” unio ns Cobas

old “autono mo us ” unio ns

UGL Sin.Pa


Representation of specific and homogenousinterests of small groups of employees

“corporative” solidarity in order to protect or ensure status-oriented differences

no need to try and reconcile heterogeneous interests

small size leads to reduced “accountability”,i.e. the “autonomous” unions are not sensitiveto the systematic effects of their behaviour


The com mon de nominator: s p e cial in t e re s t g rou p s

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(Ichino 2006)


1 Stand: .31.12.2007

Source: und

“concentrated fragmentation” AZ FLY AZ SERVIZI

2.178 4.818 4.176

AZ

PILOTS FLIGHT ASSISTANTS OTHERS(check in etc.)

GROUND SERVICES(maintenance, call center,

adminis tration, etc .)11.172Employees :1 ca. 7.400 18.500

UNIONSFILT-CGIL 50 150 400 1.600 2.200FIT-CISL 100 400 350 1.200 2.050

UIL TRASPORTI 300 300 300 1.000 1.900SDL – 900 250 600 1.750UGL 100 300 80 550 1.030ANPAC 900 – – – 900

AVIA – 700 – – 700ANPAV – 450 – – 450

UP 300 – – – 300Union Members

Rate of unionis ation1.750 3.200 1.380 4.950 11.280

(2,3) (3,1) (9,6) (21,6) (11,9)

(4,6) (8,3) (8,4) (16,2) (11,1)

(13,8) (6,2) (7,2) (13,5) (10.2)

(18,7) (6,0) (8,1) (9,5)

(4,6) (6,2) (1,9) (7,4) (5,6)

(41,3) (4,9)

(14,5) (3,8)

(9,3) (2,4)

(13,8) (1,6)

(80,4) (66,4) (33.0) (66,9) (61,0)

La S tampa (25.1.2008) Il Sole 24 Ore (2.9.2008)


crisis of trade union confederations

low level of institutionalisation of industrial relations(incl. the right to strike)

politically motivated support

Trade union fragmentation: the causes

Combination o f g e ne ral and country s pe cific caus e s and trig g e rs :


General factors:

differentiation of interests in a heterogeneous working environment

dissolution of collective normative identities

unfavorable conditions for collective bargaining and strict incomepolicy (1990ies: Italy’s accession to the Euro-Zone)

Country-specific factors:

failure of the unification process of confederate unionism (1984)

striking parallels (even though not simultaneous) in thefragmentation of economic and political representation


Cris is o f trade union confe de rations

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no regulation of collective bargaining

interest representation at the company level is first paralysed(1980s), later (from 1993) self-regulated by trade unions, butonly among , und

right to strike as an individual right

partial regulation of strikes only since the 1990s


Low le ve l o f ins titutionalis ationof indus trial re lations

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CGIL CIS L UIL


Multiplication of “autonomous” trade unions aswelcome weakening of confederate unionism

(Ichino 2006)


Politically motivate d s upport

the “political R ecognition” of S ULTA (late r S ULT) at Alitalia (1994 / 2005)

intentional “las sez faire ” during s trikes in the transport s ector (e .g.: Milano 2003)


of the conflict, which becomes pathologic

effects on the logic of action of , and

Trade union fragmentation: the effects

What impact on the s ys te m o f indus trial re lations ?

“terziarizzazione ”

CGIL CIS L UIL


as it is common in the sector

as it includes and affects third ( ) actors

profits due to strategic position (monopolistic services)

strike does not cause losses,but reduces costs (protracted negotiations)

announcement of a strike is sufficient(


“te rziarizzazione ” o f the conflict

te rtiary

“te rzi”

the play with the rule s of the game)

The vic ious c irc le in the public trans port s ec tor:

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conservative collective bargaining strategies in thepublic sector und transport sector

self-regulation of the conflict but tolerance of or evenunderstanding extreme forms of collective action

strict opposition towards any form of legal regulationof the right to strike (such as commitments to “peace”between negotiation rounds)


Effe cts o f the log ic o f actionof , and CGI L CI S L UI L

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Approximately 715-750 unions, with the following structure:

ca. 52% do not surpass the threshold of 0,1% of theentire trade union membership in the respective sector

ca. 30% have no more then 10 members

11,5% only have one member ( )

Overall: ca. 1,3 mio trade union members = ca. 50% rate of unionisation (among these 80% , and )

Source: ARAN

Trade union fragmentation: the public sector

Trade union frag m e ntation in the Italian public s e ctor

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Ñ “one man union”…

CGIL CIS L UIL


Criteria for measuring representativeness: combined average rate of membership and election results

Certification through joint committee(ARAN + representative unions)

Threshold of representativeness more than 5% (average rate in all subsectors); precondition for union members to get special leave ( and )


Re pre s e ntative ne s s and co lle ctive barg ainingin the public s e ctors (1 9 9 7 )

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dis tacchi permess i s indacali


The collective bargaining parties have to jointly surpass thethreshold of 50% (combined average rate of membership andelection results) or 60% (membership only ) in the respectivesector (e.g: school sector)

Passing the 5% representativeness threshold is necessary in at least two sectors in order to participate in cross-sectorcollective bargaining (where the rules are negotiated, such as special leave etc.)


Re pre s e ntative ne s s and co lle ctive barg ainingin the public s e ctors (1 9 9 7 )

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regular election (every three years) of the union representatives(RSU), which is different from the private sector

consistency in the election results, with ca. 80% of votes going to , and

contradictory decrease of fragmentation: smaller sectors allowminor unions to pass the double 5% threshold. Therefore:

individual sectors: as a rule, 5-6 collective bargaining partiescross-sector level: 9-10 collective bargaining parties


Re pre s e ntative ne s s and co lle ctive barg ainingin the public s e ctors (1 9 9 7 - 2 0 0 8 )

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CGIL CIS L UIL

óó


for trade unions to unite in confederation structures federal associa-

tion of smaller, autonomous trade unions ( , , ), in order to achieve the threshold of representativeness in at least two sectors and to ensure participa-tion in cross-sector collective bargaining


Re pre s e ntative ne s s and co lle ctive barg ainingin the public s e ctors (1 9 9 7 - 2 0 0 8 )

Legal ince ntives

Opportunis tic be havior: versus

CONFS AL CGU RdB


from “competitive” to “structured pluralism”(Carrieri 1997/2008)?

can the model of the public sector (measurement ofrepresentativeness and selective recognition ofcollective bargaining actors) be transferred to thetransport sector and the private sector?

or do we need a law (Ichino 2006)?

Trade union fragmentation: looking ahead

The ope n que s tions (1 )


Are “structured pluralism” and the claims of , and “general trade unions” compatible?

Two critical comments:

certification of the data regarding membership and RSU

the claim presupposes innovative policies in the publicsector and a different collective bargaining behaviorthan the one often observed in the past 15 years(example Alitalia)

Trade union fragmentation: looking ahead

The ope n que s tions (2 )

CGIL CIS LUIL to be

Documents

Who represents whom? Who represents what? · (Carrieri/Tatarelli 1997) Trade union fragmentation (sindacati autonomi classici o “di prima generazione”) (sindacati professionali