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Whither the Median Voter in Taiwan By

Pei-ting Lin Ph.D. Student Szu-yin Ho Professor

Department of Political Science National Chengchi University

Taipei, Taiwan Since the presidential election of 2000 Taiwan politics has been increasingly polarized. Rhetoric by politicians, polemics by commentators, and narratives of many events—be them political, social, economic—all point to the polarization in Taiwan politics. The poles are represented by the two main political parties, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the opposition Kuomintang (KMT), and their official ideologies. Though various polls have consistently shown that people are most concerned with issues that would have strong bearing on their daily lives (e.g., economy, education, street safety, etc.), it only seems that partisanship and ideology are the main engines that drive Taiwan politics. To be sure, efforts have been made by many a politician to move Taiwan politics toward the center, but these efforts have not been successful. If there a wide middle ground exists between the DPP and KMT, Taiwan might be able to metamorphose its cut-throat partisan rivalry into a more constructive political style. The subject matter of this paper is Taiwan’s median voter. The paper will first review past findings on this subject, followed by the conceptualization and measurement of the median voter. Then it will describe the various traits of the median voters in Taiwan followed by a conclusion.

1. Review of Political Events and Literature When the KMT was firm in power before the lifting of the martial law in 1987, there wasn’t much of a unification-independence spectrum in Taiwan’s public opinion, for the official ideology of the KMT was reunification only and anything smacking of Taiwan independence was illegal. But with the establishment of the DPP in 1986 and the ensuing repeal of martial law, free election became a reality in Taiwan politics. The DPP employed a Creole ideology, Taiwan Independence, which proved to be an effective electoral weapon in arousing the general electorate. The DPP had done well in all the elections from 1987 to 2000, with the exception of 1996 presidential election, in which the KMT’s incumbent President Lee Teng-hui prevailed. But the

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1996 presidential election turned out to be the inflection point of KMT’s ideological power. Several contextual factors made the 1996 presidential election unique in Taiwan’s Creole ideology. For one thing, the election was the first free election that a native Taiwanese won out. For another, the PRC’s saber-rattling galvanized a sense of belonging and uniqueness among people on Taiwan. For yet another thing, the US gave firm support to Taiwan’s fledgling democracy by sending carriers to the Taiwan Strait during the high point of PRC’s threat. This move had boosted the self-confidence of Taiwan people in facing the threat from across the Strait. As the best Taiwanese/Chinese identity time series indicates, 1996 was the starting point of the rise of the Taiwanese Only Identity.

（Figure 1 goes here.） It is quite fair to say that though Taiwanese-only identity is only partially correlated with Taiwan Independence, the rise of Taiwanese-only identity paved the way for the Creole independence ideology to become the official ideology, hence the formation of the independence—reunification ideological spectrum in Taiwan politics. The potential of the Taiwanese-only identity and its concomitant Taiwan Independence had not been lost to President Lee. He began to move the KMT’s official ideology to the center of the spectrum. His 1998 “Two States Theory,” which claims that there is one state on each side of the Taiwan Strait, was an obvious case in point. The DPP achieved its own master stroke in moving its party ideology toward the center. Keenly aware that the de jure Taiwan Independence article in its party platform might scare off voters who were concerned with ruffling the PRC’s military strength, thus posing a serious barrier to winning future presidential election, the DPP adopted a resolution on Taiwan’s future in 1999. The resolution states that “Taiwan is already a sovereign state…whose title is the Republic of China according to its current constitution.” Based on this demarche Mr. Chen Shui-bien used the slogan of “New Middle Way” for its 2000 successful presidential campaign. In the wake of Chen’s “New Middle Way,” many attempts had been made to move Taiwan politics toward the center by Taiwan’s politicians or opinion leaders. The politician-initiated attempts include the formation of a “Pan Purple Coalition” by DPP splinter politician Jen Xi-jie in 2003, the call for “Mutualism (or Conciliation and Coexistence)” by top DPP politician Frank Hsieh in 2006, the formation of “Society for Taiwan’s Outlook” by former Premier Tang Fei in 2007, and the repeal of a “Unification” clause in its party platform by the KMT in 2007. The opinion

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leader-initiated attempts included “Cast an Invalid Ballot Movement,” “Coalition for Democratic Action,” “Coalition for Ethnic Equality,” “Civic Frontier,” “United Conference for Civic Society,” and so on. Not much progress toward the center has been made by these attempts. Actually, all these attempts are just signs of the severity of Taiwan’s polarized politics. Clearly all these attempts assume that there is a bulk of median voters other than DPP-supporters and KMT-supporters. But the miserable record of these attempts forces one to ask the question “Whither the median voter.” While literature on Taiwan’s electoral politics, which inevitably employs the concept of median voter, is rich, the literature on median voter per se is somewhat scant. By applying Downsian spatial theory to the 2000 presidential election in Taiwan, Wang finds that Chen Shui-bien’s “New Middle Way” enabled him to attract more median voters than could his rivals (Wang, 2005). Wang’s work is basically about the voting behavior of the median voter in the three-way race in the 2000 presidential election. In examining the median voters in the 2004 presidential election, Shi argues that median voter is not just mechanically standing in the center of the Independence—Reunification spectrum. Rather, the median voter can have one of the three mind frames: he is truly neutral regarding Independence/Reunification, or he is for both at the same time, or he is against both at the same time, the latter two due to the median voter’s cognitive dissonance and identity (Shi, 2005).1 Shi finds that the proportion of median voter was disappearing in the 2004 presidential election. Chuan provides a comprehensive study of the median voter (Chuan uses the term “independent voter.”) from 1989 to 1999 (Chuan, 2001). While the study is quite extensive, its time frame is limited to the era of KMT rule, thus unable to catch the dynamics of Taiwan’s political development since 2000. Still, general election studies in Taiwan, the works cited here in particular, have provided a fertile ground for the probe of median voters.

2. Conceptualizing and Measuring Median Voter in Taiwan There are two conceptualizations of median voters in Taiwan: those who stand in the center of the Independence/Reunification scale, or those who show no preference toward the two main political parties (and their small allies). In the works aforementioned, both Wang and Shi use the first conceptualization, while Chuan the second.2 Conceptualizing the median voter in light of Independence/Reunification

1 Shi actually argues that the issue of independence/reunification is not uni-dimensional but two-dimensional. His argument bears resemblance to Weisberg’s multidimensional conceptualization of party Identification (Weisberg, 1980). 2 To be sure, there are some other scholars who conceptualize the median voter in ways different from

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spectrum makes intuitive sense, as Taiwan politics since 2000 perennially revolves around this issue. A particular stance on the issue presumes a particular ideology prescribing Taiwan’s relationship with China. This issue/ideology would have direct bearing not only on Taiwan’s defense, foreign relations, cross-strait relations, but also on economic development (e.g., should Taiwan increase its commercial relationship with China), education, language status, Diaspora Taiwanese community, retirement pension, and so on. Political parties select this issue to mobilize their voters and their party images are closely associated with the issue. It is only proper to say that Independence/Reunification is the issue in Taiwan. Then again, couching median voter in party preferences also makes great sense, as political parties are the centerpiece of Taiwan’s fledgling democracy. Political parties not just embody the Independence/Reunification issue, but also recruit candidates, organize campaigns, cast images, and socialize younger generations. Thus, though political parties are closely associated with the Independence/Reunification issue, they are more than the issue. And it is quite conceivable that some voters might gain their positions on the Independence/Reunification issue through their party preferences (and, of course, the reverse causal link is equally possible). We therefore conceptualize the median voter in terms of both the Independence/Reunification issue and party preference. It should be noted that while median voter remains the focus of this paper, the very concept of median voter is inevitably couched in voters of other streaks. We can study median voters only by comparing and contrasting them with other voters.

(Table 1 goes here.) The measurement of the median voter so conceptualized is readily available in data sets provided by the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University.* We

what is mentioned here. For example, Wang Yeh-li, professor at Tung Hai University, conceptualizes the median voter as the undecided voter in any survey, that is, median voter is defined by the voting intention (Jiang, China Times, Page A13 , August 4, 2003). Hung Yung-tai, professor at National Taiwan University, conceptualizes the median voter as someone who doesn’t have any inclination toward political parties, candidates, independence-reunification issue, and self-identity (Jiang, China Times, Page A13, August 4, 2003) . Wang’s conceptualization, we believe, is too broad to offer much insight into the concept of median voter. Hung’s conceptualization, on the other hand, is too restricting and runs the risk of incorporating attributes of the median voter into the concept’s core definition, that is, being tautological. We skip further discussion on these two conceptualizations for these two versions have not been formally developed into academic presentations. * Data analyzed in this article were from “Taiwan's Election and Democratization Studies, 2004: The President Election (TEDS2004P)” (NSC 92-2420-H-031-004-) and “Taiwan's Election and Democratization Studies, 2004: Legislative Election (TEDS2004L)” (NSC 93-2420-H-004-005-SSS). The coordinator of multi-year project TEDS is Professor Chi Huang (National Chengchi University). TEDS2004P and TEDS2004L are yearly projects on election of President and legislator in 2004. The principal investigator are Professor I-chou Liu and Professor Shiow-Duan Hwang. There is more information on http://www.tedsnet.org. The authors appreciate the assistance in providing data by the institute and individuals aforementioned. The authors are alone responsible for views expressed herein.

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choose the survey data of the 2004 Presidential Election and 2004 Legislative Election, for these two elections—being the hitherto most intensive ideological and partisan rivalries in Taiwan—should provide us a unique opportunity to delve into the middle ground. Combining the three-point party—preference variable with the three-point Independence—Reunification variable gives us nine categories of voters (as shown in Table 1) which can be collapsed into six categories. Of the six categories the gadfly is most interesting, as people in this category have a very conflicting mix of psychological profile. But because the category is small in number (less than five percent in both elections), we collapse gadfly voters into either “Light Blue” or “Light Green” according to the Gadfly respondents’ vote choices. Table 2 shows the frequency of these five categories of voters.

(Table 2 goes here.) It can be noted that none of the categories shows much of variation across the two elections, with median voters account for slightly over one-fifths of the total voters.

3. Demographic and Political Attributes of the Median Voter Table 3 to Table 8 depict the demographic profile of the median voter in 2004 Presidential Election, and Table 9 to Table 14 that of 2004 Legislative Election. Table 15 is a summary of the findings in Tables 3 to 14. A logit regression (Table 16) that employs the statistically significant demographic variables shown in Table 15 follows.

(Tables 3 to 16 go here.)

Based on these bi-variate tables, we find that ethnicity and residential area have consistent impact on median voter distribution across the two elections under examination, while gender and occupation consistently show no impact, with age and education showing inconsistent impact (significant in the presidential election but insignificant in the legislative election). In a nutshell, those aged between 20 and 29 years-old, with educational attainment below junior high school, and live in central Taiwan tend to be median voter in the presidential election. In the legislative election, only Hakka have a tendency toward the median position. The logit model (Table 16) gives a slightly different picture than the summary table does: residence in central Taiwan is no longer an attribute of a median voter position. By and large, our findings are quite different from those by Chuan (2001) which state that female,

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younger generation, less educated, Minnan Taiwanese, farmers/labor workers, students, and housewives tend to be median voters in elections held between 1989 and 1999 (p.94). Our differences with Chuan may be attributed either to the differences in conceptualizations and measurements of the median voter between our study and Chuan’s study, or to the changing electoral context since 2000. A replication based on our definition of the median voter and Chuan’s data will provide a firmer judgment regarding any change in Taiwan’s median voter since the late eighties. Figures 2 to 4 sketch the level of political Information, position on economic development/environmental protection issue, and position on reform/stability issue of the median voter in 2004 Legislative Election. The F-tests for the distributions on which these figures are based are all significant. The F-test for the social welfare issue is insignificant, thus no figure shown. Unfortunately the 2004 Presidential Election dataset does not contain variables of this sort, thus making a comparison unavailable.

(Figures 2 to 4 go here.) Figure 2 shows that median voters tend to have less political information than non-median voters. Figure 3 reveals that Green supporters tend to favor environmental protection over economic development, with Blue supporters favoring the opposite position, and median voters standing in between. Figure 4 demonstrates that Green and Blue supports take vastly different positions on Reform/Stability issue with the median voters sitting in the middle. Figures 3 and 4 generally fit the stereotype of the issue positions the main political parties take. Table 17 depicts the turnout rate by each category in both elections. As can be expected, the two Green categories and their Blue counterparts have about the same turnout rate, while the turnout rate of the median category is significantly lower.

(Table 17 goes here.) Figure 5 portrays ethnic identity by the five categories in the 2004 Presidential Election, and Figure 6 that in the 2004 Legislative Election. Three patterns emerge from these two figures. First, for both elections, there is a clear transitivity in ethnic identity across the five categories, with the Deep Green category being most identified with Taiwanese-only, and the Deep Blue least so. Secondly, in the Presidential Election, the distribution of ethnic identity is heavily skewed toward

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Taiwanese-only, much more so than it is in the Legislative Election. This might be because the presidential campaign run by the DPP was much more focused on the identity issue than the legislative campaign ever was. Thirdly, the median category is more oriented toward Taiwanese-only than toward the other two categories combined.

(Figures 5 and 6 go here.) Figures 7 and 8 delineate the vote choices by the five categories in both 2004 elections. Like the two previous figures, transitivity in vote choices exists for both elections. And the Median Category is more in favor of the DPP than the KMT, though a significant portion of the median voters choose to support third-party candidates or remain no response to their vote choices. (Figures 7 and 8 go here.)

4. Conclusion: Whither the Median Voter in Taiwan In the above analysis, we have conceptualized and measured Taiwan voters’ political orientation according to their party preferences and stance on the Independence/Reunification issue spectrum. We have also delineated the demographic and political attributes of the median voter. Some questions still remain. First, is the relative proportion of median voters somewhat “fixed” in the neighborhood of twenty percent of all voters? While in the short run this might be the case, the proportion of median voter may vary in the longer run. The proportion of median voter has to do with the two defining variables in our conceptualization: party preference and Independence/Reunification stance. If more people have party preferences, then by definition there will be fewer median voters. Given the time series of these two variables collected by the Election Study Center, it is probably safe to say that party preference is more likely to cause variation of the proportion of median voter than Independence/Reunification stance, because party preference varies more than Independence/Reunification stance does since the beginning of the time series.

(Figures 9 and 10 go here.) By inserting the newest figures from these two time series as parameter percentages for Table 1, we can project the proportion of median voter for upcoming elections. This simulation shows that the proportion of median voter does vary.

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(Table 18 goes here.)

Secondly, while we know that median voter is less politically informed than either the Blue voters or the Green voters (Figure 1), we do not know the in-group difference in the median voter category. Table 19 compares the sophistication level, as measured by political information, of non-median voters, median voters, and missing-value respondents. Within the group of median voters, 54.13 % is more sophisticated, and 45.87 % is less so.

(Table 19 goes here.) Lastly, we see no reason why the median voters will play any important role in Taiwan’s electoral politics. First of all, there is no realignment issue in Taiwan politics now. Without such an issue, it would be difficult for political entrepreneurs to galvanize median voters into any significant political force. Second, the median voters are relatively small in number, have less political information, by definition have no partisan and ideological commitments (thus lacking strong incentives for political participation), and turn out less. In short, median voters are difficult to mobilize. And, lastly, given the relative large size of non-median voters and their voting consistency, median voter is more of a residual category than a truly independent category, a la Downsian median voter, in Taiwan’s electorate.

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Bibliography

Chuang, Tien Lien. 2001. "The Developing and Changing Situation of Independent Voters in Taiwan from 1989 through 1999." in Journal of Electoral Studies 8(1): 71-115.

Jiang, Hui-Zhen. 2003. Please Take Stance in Presidential Election, Median Voters! China Times, August 4, Page A13.

Shih, Chih-yu. 2005. "The Disappering Median Voter in the 2004 President Campaign: The Spatial Theory of Voting Revised. " in Issues & Studies 44(4): 1-24.

Wang, Ding-Ming. 2005. "The Influence of Third-Way Policy in 2000 Taiwan Presidential Election: An Application of Median Voter Theorem." in Taiwan Political Science Review 9(1): 39-81.

Weisberg, Herbert F. 1984. "A Multidimensional Conceptualization of Party Identification." in Controversies in Voting Behavior, 2nd Edtion, ed. by Richard Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, pp. 456-478.

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Figure 1. Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity

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Year

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n

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Taiwanese Both Taiwanese and Chinese Chinese Non response

Sources: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University.http://esc.nccu.edu.tw

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Table 1. Definition of Median Voter Independence/

Reunification Party Identification

Unification Status Quo Independence

Blue Deep Blue Light Blue Gadfly None Light Blue Median Voter Light Green Green Gadfly Light Green Deep Green

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Table 2. Five Categories of Voters in Taiwan

Presidential Election，2004 Legislative Election，2004

Frequency All cases, % Valid cases, % Frequency All cases, % Valid cases, %

Deep Blue 167 9.14％ 11.00％ 129 10.27％ 12.44％

Light Blue 386 21.18％ 25.48％ 277 22.01％ 26.66％

Median 358 19.63％ 23.62％ 218 17.35％ 21.02％

Light Green 308 16.88％ 20.31％ 235 18.70％ 22.66％

Deep Green 296 16.28％ 19.59％ 179 14.22％ 17.23％

Total 1515 83.11％ 100.00％ 1039 82.56％ 100.00％

Missing Value 308 16.89％ 219 17.44％

Total 1823 100.00％ 1258 100.00％

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Table 3. Political Orientation and Gender, 2004 Presidential Election Deep Blue Light Blue Median Light Green Deep Green Total

Man N 93 184 171 162 163 773

Row% 12.03 23.80 22.12 20.96 21.09 100.00

Column% 56.02 47.67 47.77 52.60 54.88 51.02

Woman N 73 202 187 146 134 742

Row% 9.84 27.22 25.20 19.68 18.06 100.00

Column% 43.98 52.33 52.23 47.40 45.12 48.98

Total N 166 386 358 308 297 166

Row% 10.96 25.48 23.63 20.33 19.60 10.96

Column% 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 χ2=6.996 d.f.=4 p =.136

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Table 4. Political Orientation and Age, 2004 Presidential Election Deep Blue Light Blue Median Light Green Deep Green Total

20-29 N 22 80 101 75 77 355

Row% 6.20 22.54 28.45 21.13 21.69 100.00

Column% 13.17 20.78 28.13 24.43 26.01 23.45

30-39 N 48 97 72 71 69 357

Row% 13.45 27.17 20.17 19.89 19.33 100.00

Column% 28.74 25.19 20.06 23.13 23.31 23.58

40-49 N 46 101 72 70 60 349

Row% 13.18 28.94 20.63 20.06 17.19 100.00

Column% 27.54 26.23 20.06 22.80 20.27 23.05

50-59 N 16 52 60 48 42 218

Row% 7.34 23.85 27.52 22.02 19.27 100.00

Column% 9.58 13.51 16.71 15.64 14.19 14.40

60 or above N 35 55 54 43 48 235

Row% 14.89 23.40 22.98 18.30 20.43 100.00

Column% 20.96 14.29 15.04 14.01 16.22 15.52

Total N 167 385 359 307 296 1514

Row% 11.03 25.43 23.71 20.28 19.55 100.00

Column% 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

χ2=31.533 d.f.=16 p =.011

Note: Shaded p means the probability is statistically significant.

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Table 5. Political Orientation and Education, 2004 Presidential Election Deep Blue Light Blue Median Light Green Deep Green Total

N 41 113 147 114 108 523 Junior High or

under Row% 7.84 21.61 28.11 21.80 20.65 100.00

Column% 24.85 29.27 41.29 37.13 36.36 34.61

N 95 198 148 140 138 719

Row% 13.21 27.54 20.58 19.47 19.19 100.00

High School,

Vocational School,

or 2-year College Column% 57.58 51.30 41.57 45.60 46.46 47.58

N 29 75 61 53 51 269 University or

above Row% 10.78 27.88 22.68 19.70 18.96 100.00

Column% 17.58 19.43 17.13 17.26 17.17 17.80

Total N 165 386 356 307 297 1511

Row% 10.92 25.55 23.56 20.32 19.66 100.00

Column% 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

χ2=21.537 d.f.=8 p =.006

Note: Shaded p means the probability is statistically significant.

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Table 6. Political Orientation and Ethnic Background, 2004 Presidential Election Deep Blue Light Blue Median Light Green Deep Green Total

Hakka N 15 54 44 37 26 176

Row% 8.52 30.68 25.00 21.02 14.77 100.00

Column% 9.26 14.56 12.94 12.37 8.78 11.99

Min-nan N 82 236 264 253 261 1096

Row% 7.48 21.53 24.09 23.08 23.81 100.00

Column% 50.62 63.61 77.65 84.62 88.18 74.66

Mainlander N 65 81 32 9 9 196

Row% 33.16 41.33 16.33 4.59 4.59 100.00

Column% 40.12 21.83 9.41 3.01 3.04 13.35

Total N 162 371 340 299 296 1468

Row% 11.04 25.27 23.16 20.37 20.16 100.00

Column% 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

χ2=194.528 d.f.=8 p <.001

Note: Shaded p means the probability is statistically significant.

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Table 7. Political Orientation and Occupation, 2004 Presidential Election Deep Blue Light Blue Median Light Green Deep Green Total

N 13 32 21 20 15 101

Row% 12.87 31.68 20.79 19.80 14.85 100.00 Government

employees Column% 7.83 8.31 5.87 6.49 5.05 6.67

N 37 75 56 51 53 272

Row% 13.60 27.57 20.59 18.75 19.49 100.00

Private enterprise

manager or

professional Column% 22.29 19.48 15.64 16.56 17.85 17.97

N 46 130 136 108 110 530

Row% 8.68 24.53 25.66 20.38 20.75 100.00 Laborer

Column% 27.71 33.77 37.99 35.06 37.04 35.01

N 3 13 25 23 18 82 Farmer/fisherman/

rancher Row% 3.66 15.85 30.49 28.05 21.95 100.00

Column% 1.81 3.38 6.98 7.47 6.06 5.42

Others N 67 135 120 106 101 529

Row% 12.67 25.52 22.68 20.04 19.09 100.00

Column% 40.36 35.06 33.52 34.42 34.01 34.94

Total N 166 385 358 308 297 1514

Row% 10.96 25.43 23.65 20.34 19.62 100.00

Column% 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

χ2=23.905 d.f.=16 p =.092

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Table 8. Political Orientation and Residential Area, 2004 Presidential Election Deep Blue Light Blue Median Light Green Deep Green Total

Northern Taiwan N 89 196 170 132 132 719

Row% 12.38 27.26 23.64 18.36 18.36 100.00

Column% 53.29 50.78 47.49 42.86 44.59 47.46

Central Taiwan N 21 73 79 57 46 276

Row% 7.61 26.45 28.62 20.65 16.67 100.00

Column% 12.57 18.91 22.07 18.51 15.54 18.22

Southern Taiwan N 52 103 103 116 114 488

Row% 10.66 21.11 21.11 23.77 23.36 100.00

Column% 31.14 26.68 28.77 37.66 38.51 32.21

Eastern Taiwan N 5 14 6 3 4 32

Row% 15.63 43.75 18.75 9.38 12.50 100.00

Column% 2.99 3.63 1.68 0.97 1.35 2.11

Total N 167 386 358 308 296 1515

Row% 11.02 25.48 23.63 20.33 19.54 100.00

Column% 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

χ2=30.449 d.f.=12 p =.002

Note: Shaded p means the probability is statistically significant.

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Table 9. Political Orientation and Gender, 2004 Legislative Election Deep Blue Light Blue Median Light Green Deep Green Total

Man N 79 132 110 116 98 535

Row% 14.77 24.67 20.56 21.68 18.32 100.00

Column% 61.24 47.65 50.46 49.36 54.75 51.54

Woman N 50 145 108 119 81 503

Row% 9.94 28.83 21.47 23.66 16.10 100.00

Column% 38.76 52.35 49.54 50.64 45.25 48.46

Total N 129 277 218 235 179 1038

Row% 12.43 26.69 21.00 22.64 17.24 100.00

Column% 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

χ2=7.822 d.f.=4 p =.098

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Table 10. Political Orientation and Age, 2004 Legislative Election Deep Blue Light Blue Median Light Green Deep Green Total

20-29 N 27 67 60 50 40 244

Row% 11.07 27.46 24.59 20.49 16.39 100.00

Column% 21.09 24.19 27.52 21.28 22.35 23.53

30-39 N 32 62 45 63 40 242

Row% 13.22 25.62 18.60 26.03 16.53 100.00

Column% 25.00 22.38 20.64 26.81 22.35 23.34

40-49 N 35 69 44 63 37 248

Row% 14.11 27.82 17.74 25.40 14.92 100.00

Column% 27.34 24.91 20.18 26.81 20.67 23.92

50-59 N 13 48 39 32 26 158

Row% 8.23 30.38 24.68 20.25 16.46 100.00

Column% 10.16 17.33 17.89 13.62 14.53 15.24

60 or above N 21 31 30 27 36 145

Row% 14.48 21.38 20.69 18.62 24.83 100.00

Column% 16.41 11.19 13.76 11.49 20.11 13.98

Total N 128 277 218 235 179 1037

Row% 12.34 26.71 21.02 22.66 17.26 100.00

Column% 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

χ2=20.693 d.f.=16 p =.191

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Table 11. Political Orientation and Education, 2004 Legislative Election Deep Blue Light Blue Median Light Green Deep Green Total

N 32 83 79 81 68 343 Junior High or

under Row% 9.33 24.20 23.03 23.62 19.83 100.00

Column% 24.62 30.18 36.07 34.32 37.99 33.01

N 62 139 103 120 77 501

Row% 12.38 27.74 20.56 23.95 15.37 100.00

High School,

Vocational School,

or 2-year College Column% 47.69 50.55 47.03 50.85 43.02 48.22

N 36 53 37 35 34 195 University or

above Row% 18.46 27.18 18.97 17.95 17.44 100.00

Column% 27.69 19.27 16.89 14.83 18.99 18.77

Total N 128 277 218 235 179 1037

Row% 12.34 26.71 21.02 22.66 17.26 100.00

Column% 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

χ2=15.172 d.f.=8 p =.056

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Table 12. Political Orientation and Ethnic Background, 2004 Legislative Election Deep Blue Light Blue Median Light Green Deep Green Total

Hakka N 24 40 45 26 21 156

Row% 15.38 25.64 28.85 16.67 13.46 100.00

Column% 19.35 15.27 21.23 11.16 11.86 15.48

Min-nan N 59 175 153 200 149 736

Row% 8.02 23.78 20.79 27.17 20.24 100.00

Column% 47.58 66.79 72.17 85.84 84.18 73.02

Mainlander N 41 47 14 7 7 116

Row% 35.34 40.52 12.07 6.03 6.03 100.00

Column% 33.06 17.94 6.60 3.00 3.95 11.51

Total N 128 277 218 235 179 1037

Row% 12.34 26.71 21.02 22.66 17.26 100.00

Column% 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

χ2=118.037 d.f.=8 p <.001

Note: Shaded p means the probability is statistically significant.

23

Table 13. Political Orientation and Occupation, 2004 Legislative Election Deep Blue Light Blue Median Light Green Deep Green Total

N 17 26 24 13 13 93

Row% 18.28 27.96 25.81 13.98 13.98 100.00 Government

employees Column% 13.08 9.39 10.96 5.53 7.22 8.93

N 33 51 36 51 32 203

Row% 16.26 25.12 17.73 25.12 15.76 100.00

Private enterprise

manager or

professional Column% 25.38 18.41 16.44 21.70 17.78 19.50

N 36 89 74 94 64 357

Row% 10.08 24.93 20.73 26.33 17.93 100.00 Laborer

Column% 27.69 32.13 33.79 40.00 35.56 34.29

N 1 10 13 8 10 42 Farmer/fisherman/

rancher Row% 2.38 23.81 30.95 19.05 23.81 100.00

Column% 0.77 3.61 5.94 3.40 5.56 4.03

Others N 43 101 72 69 61 346

Row% 12.43 29.19 20.81 19.94 17.63 100.00

Column% 33.08 36.46 32.88 29.36 33.89 33.24

Total N 130 277 219 235 180 1041

Row% 12.49 26.61 21.04 22.57 17.29 100.00

Column% 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

χ2=24.697 d.f.=16 p =.075

24

Table 14. Political Orientation and Residential Area, 2004 Legislative Election Deep Blue Light Blue Median Light Green Deep Green Total

Northern Taiwan N 66 154 95 104 74 493

Row% 13.39 31.24 19.27 21.10 15.01 100.00

Column% 50.77 55.60 43.38 44.44 41.34 47.45

Central Taiwan N 19 49 44 44 30 186

Row% 10.22 26.34 23.66 23.66 16.13 100.00

Column% 15 18 20 18.80 16.76 17.90

Southern Taiwan N 35 64 79 85 73 336

Row% 10.42 19.05 23.51 25.30 21.73 100.00

Column% 26.92 23.10 36.07 36.32 40.78 32.34

Eastern Taiwan N 10 10 1 1 2 24

Row% 41.67 41.67 4.17 4.17 8.33 100.00

Column% 7.69 3.61 0.46 0.43 1.12 2.31

Total N 130 277 219 234 179 1039

Row% 12.51 26.66 21.08 22.52 17.23 100.00

Column% 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

χ2=49.211 d.f.=12 p <.001

Note: Shaded p means the probability is statistically significant.

25

Table 15. Demographic Attributes of the Median Voter: a Summary Presidential Election，2004 Legislative Election，2004

Gender -- -- Age * 20-29(↑) -- Education * Junior High or under (↑)

High School, Vocational

School, or 2-year College (↓)

--

Ethnic Background * Mainlander(↓) * Hakka(↑) Mainlander(↓)

Occupation -- -- Residential Area * Central Taiwan(↑) * Eastern Taiwan(↓) ↑: More Likely to Be Median Voter. ↓: More Unlikely to Be Median Voter.

Note: * means the probability is statistically significant.

26

Table 16. A Logit Model of Median-Voter Orientation Presidential Election，2004 Legislative Election，2004

B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B)

Age(0=60 or above)

20-29 0.637** 0.231 1.890

30-39 0.161 0.224 1.174

40-49 0.056 0.211 1.057

50-59 0.315 0.217 1.370

Education(0= University or above)

Junior High or under 0.464* 0.205 1.591

High School, Vocational

School, or 2-year

College

-0.028 0.174 0.972

Ethnic Background(0=Min-nan)

Hakka 0.001 0.188 1.001 0.444* 0.201 1.559

Mainlander -0.349 0.208 0.706 -0.541 0.295 0.582

Residential Area(0=Northern Taiwan)

Central Taiwan 0.167 0.159 1.182 0.177 0.206 1.193

Southern Taiwan -0.189 0.143 0.827 0.293 0.176 1.341

Eastern Taiwan -0.622 0.467 0.537 -2.003 1.114 0.135

Constant -1.662*** 0.256 0.190 -1.599*** 0.129 0.202

N=1699; χ2=30.902; d.f.=11;

p=.001;

pseudo R2=.018

N=1154; χ2=19.864; d.f.=5;

p=.001;

pseudo R2=.017

Note 1: ***p<.001; ** p <.01; * p <.05. Shaded p means the probability is statistically significant.

2: Median Voter=1; Non-Median Voter=0.

27

Figure 2. Political Orientation and Political Information, 2004 Legislative Election

2.91

2.61

2.47

2.82

2.9

2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3

Deep Green

Light Green

Median

Light Blue

Deep Blue

28

Figure 3. Political Orientation and Economic Issue Position, 2004 Legislative Election

5.03

5.89

5.57

6.08

6.01

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Deep Green

Light Green

Median

Light Blue

Deep Blue

Note: On a scale from 0 to 10, 10 represents economic development and 0 environmental protection.

29

Figure 4. Political Orientation and Reform / Stability Issue Position, 2004 Legislative Election

5.66

7.08

7.64

8.19

8.05

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Deep Green

Light Green

Median

Light Blue

Deep Blue

Note: On a scale from 0 to 10, 10 represents social stability and 0 social reform.

30

Table 17. Political Orientation and Turnout Presidential Election, 2004 Legislative Election, 2004

Voted or not

Voter Yes No Total Yes No Total

Deep Blue 96.39(160) 3.61(6) 100.00(166) 78.46(102) 21.54(28) 100.00(130)

Light Blue 95.34(368) 4.66(18) 100.00(386) 80.51(223) 19.49(54) 100.00(277)

Median 83.99(299) 16.01(57) 100.00(356) 66.36(142) 33.64(72) 100.00(214)

Light Green 94.79(291) 5.21(16) 100.00(307) 80.60(187) 19.40(45) 100.00(232)

Deep Green 97.97(290) 2.03(6) 100.00(296) 82.68(148) 17.32(31) 100.00(179)

Total 93.18(1408) 6.82(103) 100.00(1511) 77.71(802) 22.29(230) 100.00(1032)

χ2=64.814 d.f.=4 p<.001 χ2=20.899 d.f.=4 p<.001

Note1: Shaded p means the probability is statistically significant.

Note2: Number is row percentage only.

31

Figure 5. Political Orientation and Identity, 2004 Presidential Election

33.33

54.09

64.43

79.08

93.94

27.16

27.44

27.7

13.4

4.71

1.35

7.52

7.87

18.47

39.51

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Deep Green

Light Green

Median

Light Blue

Deep Blue

Taiwanese Only Both Chinese Only

32

Figure 6. Political Orientation and Identity, 2004 Legislative Election

92.7

74.79

52.58

40.43

24.41

6.74

20.51

39.44

48.01

50.39 25.2

11.55

7.98

4.7

0.56

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Deep Green

Light Green

Median

Light Blue

Deep Blue

Taiwanese Only Both Chinese Only

33

Figure 7. Political Orientation and Vote Choices, 2004 Presidential Election

2.07

0.34

27.76

95.38

97.5 1.88

2.17

97.59

32.11

98.28

40.13

0.63

2.45

1.37

0.34

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Deep Green

Light Green

Median

Light Blue

Deep Blue

Pan-Blue Pan-Green Others or non-response

34

Figure 8. Political Orientation and Vote Choices, 2004 Legislative Election

87.78

25.53

6.95

4.05

92.08

92.57

87.17

30.5

4.98

4.95

3.38

5.88

43.97

7.24

2.97

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Deep Green

Light Green

Median

Light Blue

Deep Blue

Pan-Blue Pan-Green Others or non-response

35

Figure 9.Changes in the Party Identification of Taiwanese

34.6 33.834.6

42.7

39.0

41.1

33.3

30.2

32.633.9

36.9

33.1 32.6

30.0 29.6

33.1

37.0

33.532.3

29.5

34.4

36.7

39.437.5

62.860.8

53.3

46.848.1

45.347.2

53.3

46.144.3

41.5 41.740.2

41.5

44.243.0

40.438.7 39.3

40.9 41.5

38.539.8 40.5 40.6

2.7

5.4

12.110.5

13.0 13.612.5

19.6

16.5

21.3 21.8 21.6

23.7

26.1 26.725.8 25.7

27.526.5

24.3

27.2 26.8

29.027.1

23.5

20.221.9

38.6

32.3

43.837.7

43.6

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

92.06 92.12 93.06 93.12 94.06 94.12 95.06 95.12 96.06 96.12 97.06 97.12 98.06 98.12 99.06 99.12 00.06 00.12 01.06 01.12 02.06 02.12 03.06 03.12 04.06 04.12 05.06 05.12 06.06 06.12

Year

P

e

r

c

e

n

t

a

g

e

Blue None Green

Note: Figure readjusted on the basis of “Changes in the Party Identification of Taiwanese as Tracked in

Surveys” E.S.C., N.C.C.U. website, http://esc.nccu.edu.tw.

36

Figure 10.Changes in the Unification - Independence Stances of Taiwanese

20.018.6

22.020.2

25.6

20.6

18.317.5

16.4

20.419.0

21.020.0 20.8

18.1 18.6

48.3

45.0

40.0

46.0 45.8

48.1

45.846.7

49.7 48.8 49.247.0

53.051.0 51.8

50.2

53.852.6

57.855.9

57.4 57.059.1 58.4

11.210.3

11.712.9

15.0

17.216.0

17.8

15.5

10.3

13.5

15.5

18.0 18.2

21.319.4 19.8 20.1 20.3

14.413.414.114.012.711.8

13.2

16.1

19.618.719.9

18.8

18.9

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

94.12 95.06 95.12 96.06 96.12 97.06 97.12 98.06 98.12 99.06 99.12 00.06 00.12 01.06 01.12 02.06 02.12 03.06 03.12 04.06 04.12 05.06 05.12 06.06 06.12

Year

P

e

r

c

e

n

t

a

g

e

Unification Status quo Independence

Note1: No response is not to presented in the Figure.

Note2: Figure readjusted on the basis of “Changes in the Unification - Independence Stances of

Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys” E.S.C., N.C.C.U. website, http://esc.nccu.edu.tw.

37

Table18. Simulation of Political Orientation, Based on Dec.2006 Data Presidential Election，2004 Legislative Election，2004 Simulation (2006.12)

All cases, % All cases, % All cases, %

Deep Blue 9.14％ 10.27％ 5.4％

Light Blue 21.18％ 22.01％ 29.9％

Median 19.63％ 17.35％ 23.7％

Light Green 16.88％ 18.70％ 21.5％

Deep Green 16.28％ 14.22％ 4.3％

Total 83.11％ 82.56％ 84.8％

Missing Value 16.89％ 17.44％ 15.2％

Total 100.00％ 100.00％ 100.0％

Note: In the simulation, gadfly is reassigned to either Light Blue or Light Green in accordance with

their assignment proportion in 2004 Presidential Election. Columns 1 and 2 are duplication from

Table 2.

38

Table 19. Sophistication of Median and Non-Median Voters, 2004 Legislative Election

Non-Median

Voter

Median

Voter

Missing-Value

Respondent Total

Less Sophisticated N 449 118 86 653

(Political Information=0~2) Row% 68.76 18.07 13.17 100.00

Column% 47.61 54.13 88.66 51.91

Adjusted

residual -5.27 0.72 7.54

More Sophisticated N 494 100 11 605

(Political Information=3~5) Row% 81.65 16.53 1.82 100.00

Column% 52.39 45.87 11.34 48.09

Adjusted

residual 5.27 -0.72 -7.54

Total N 943 218 97 1258

Row% 74.96 17.33 7.71 100.00

Column% 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

χ2=59.879 d.f.=2 p <.001

Note: Shaded p means the probability is statistically significant.