Whiteman Air Force Base, Minuteman M0-88 Missile Launch

Whiteman Air Force Base, Minuteman HAER No. Missile Launch Facility Trainer T-12

(Whiteman Air Force Base, Facility 1100) Northeast of Oscar-01 Missile Alert Facility '~&m.,,..A,,L;r_J'3? r c. e .. ~.B as e Johnson County Vicinity of Knob Noster Missouri

PHOTOGRAPHS

WRITTEN HISTORICAL AND DESCRIPTIVE DATA

REDUCED COPIES OF MEASURED DRAWINGS

HISTORIC AMERICAN ENGINEERING RECORD Rocky Mountain System Support Office

National Park Service P.O. Box 25287

Denver, Colorado 80225-0287

M0-88

HISTORIC AMERICAN ENGINEERING RECORD

Whiteman Air Force Base, Minuteman Missile Launch Facility Trainer T-12 (Whiteman Air Force Base, Facility 1100)

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HAER No. M0-88

Northeast of Oscar-01 Missile Alert Facility Whiteman Air Force Base Vicinity of Knob Noster Johnson County Missouri

1967

U;S. Air Force

Minuteman Missile Launch Facility Trainer

Abandoned

Cold War missile development in the United States led to the necessity for a more rapid, yet economic system of retaliation than provided in the earlier Atlas and Titan systems. The Air Force found the solution in the Minuteman series, a solid-fuel missile that could be launched from a remote center having control over a network of silos spread over a wide geographical area. The Launch Facility Trainer (LFT), replicating a silo in the field, provided a full-scale model where some 400 missile maintenance personnel honed their skills in both routine and emergency procedures vital to the readiness of the system.

Douglas McChristian Historian, Fort Laramie National Historic Site, Wyoming

December 1996

Introduction

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For nearly half a century the United States and the Soviet Union were poised in a deadly contest that risked the very future of the human race. From the end of World War II until the collapse of communism in 1991, the so-called superpowers stood at the brink of nuclear holocaust. Knowing full-well the consequences of such a conflict, the opponents confronted each other in a test of wills, each side combining technological advancements with the economic muscle to implement increasingly complex and effective weapons in the hope of gaining superiority. The era witnessed the creation of nuclear weapons with unparalleled capability for mass destruction. More than an arms rac_e, it was a "cold war" of political and geographical maneuvering, of espionage and the threat of the use of arms. Hanging in this delicate balance was the pervading fear of nuclear Armageddon.

Almost from its inception in the wake of the 1917 Russian Revolution, the Soviet communistic system posed a subtle ideological and economic threat to the Western world. Yet it went widely unrecognized among political leaders in the West, and even less so among the general populace. For a time prior to World War II, the newly-created Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) witnessed almost continual internal power struggles during the formative period of societal restructuring. Thus preoccupied at home, the Soviets were in no position to actively extend their doctrine beyond their own borders for nearly two decades. Nevertheless, the essential differences between the philosophies represented in capitalistic and communistic systems polarized Eastern and Western nations, thereby setting the stage for an inevitable collision. While an armed conflict might have resulted in any event, German chancellor Adolph Hitler hastened war from another quarter with his own quest for global supremacy in the late 1930s. Germany's military alliances with Italy and Japan accelerated a collective plan for world conquest with alarming rapidity. An overly-confident Hitler violated his earlier non-aggression treaty with Russia and in so doing created for himself a two-front war. This proved to be a fatal strategic error. By taking on both the free world and the communists simultaneously, and especially by underestimating the strength and resolve of the Soviets, Hitler all but sealed his own fate.

The Cold War that developed after 1945 had its origins in the so-called Grand Alliance among Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. With both the Russians and the western allies threatened by a common enemy, the two sides combined resources in a partnership that was as tenuous as it was unnatural. Nevertheless, Hitler's lust for world domination was perceived among many in the West as an evil infmitely greater than that posed by the communists at the time. The Allies were therefore willing to risk entering into what all of the leaders recognized was merely a marriage of convenience for the purpose of prosecuting an exhaustive war against Germany. Sometimes stormy, always mutually mistrustful, the relationship barely survived the duration of the war.

Cooling of U.S.- Soviet Relations

The smoldering mistrust between the western powers and the Soviet Union became openly evident shortly after the Allied victory in 1945. Although the Americans had embarked upon a nuclear research program on the eve of the war, they had avoided sharing this information with the Russians, whereas the British were kept fully apprised of U.S. progress in this field. When in July 1945, American scientists


secretly reported to President Harry S. Truman that they had developed an atomic bomb - one that worked - Truman chose not to inform the Soviets. Hedging his bets for the post-war era, Truman confided, "I'll certainly have a hammer on those boys."1

Truman's secrecy was based on the premise that a confrontation with the Soviets was only a matter of time, and that sole possession of the bomb would be a trump card in the hands of the British and Americans. Truman and his close advisors reasoned that the Soviets could be controlled by the knowledge that the Americans not only possessed such a weapon, but also had the fortitude to use it. Although it was not revealed at the time, this was key to Truman's decision to use the nuclear device against Japan. Dropping the bomb would at once end the war, saving many American lives - and it would send an unequivocal message to the Russians.

Within a month after the successful detonation of a test device, a lone B-29 bomber winged its way over Hiroshima, Japan to drop the first of two atomic bombs. Nagasaki shared a similar fate a few days later. Predictably, the awesome power of the bombs, coupled with a latent Russian declaration of war against Japan, finally convinced the Japanese that further resistance was pointless. The Russians were dumbfounded that their allies possessed such unheard-of power. The Soviets, now extremely vulnerable, considered themselves betrayed by the United States for having withheld such critical information. The lines were clearly drawn for future relations. Following the formal surrender of Japan just weeks later, the wartime alliance quickly dissolved. Fearing for the security of his own nation, Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin directed his scientists to, "Provide us with atomic weapons in the shortest possible time ... The balance has been destroyed. Provide the bomb ... it will remove a great danger from us. "2

Chilling as Stalin's announcement may have been, United States military and political advisors scoffed at his ability to actually produce an atomic bomb. Some American scientists joked that, "the Russians could not surreptitiously introduce nuclear bombs into the United States because they had not yet been able to perfect a suitcase. "3 Many American scientists predicted that the Russians were still five to fifteen years away from developing an atomic bomb of their own.

There was concern early on in the West that atomic weapons should be controlled lest they fall into the wrong hands, namely those of the Soviet Union. The newly-formed United Nations briefly considered a U.S.-backed plan, known as the Acheson-Lilienthal proposal, calling for a measured transition to international control of nuclear technology and weapons production. While the theory may have been sound enough, the practicality of the plan was questioned by Bernard Baruch, American delegate to the

1 John F. Lauber and Jeffrey A. Hess, Glenn L. Martin Company Titan Test Facilities, Denver, Colorado. (Minneapolis: Hess, Roise, and Co., 1993), p. 10 (hereafter cited as Martin Test Facilities).

2 Karen Lewis, Katherine J. Roxlau, et. al., "Historic Context and Methodology for Assessment." A Systemic Study of Air Combat Command Cold War Material Culture. (Fort Worth: U.S. Air Force: 1995), Vol. I, p. 27 (hereinafter cited as, Systemic Study of ACC Material Culture with volume number).

3 Lauber and Hess, Martin Test Facilitie~ pp. 15-16.


U.N. Atomic Energy Commission. Baruch feared that the Soviets, who possessed an all-powerful veto on the Security Council, would nullify any attempts to inspect their facilities. Too, Baruch was concerned that the Soviets had far more to gain initially by such an agreement, since the United States would be obligated to share its hard-earned classified research. Influenced by Baruch's convincing arguments against the plan, President Truman finally responded that, "We should not under any circumstances give away our gun until we are sure the rest of the world can't arm against us. "4

Baruch subsequently offered an alternative proposal founded upon the same premise of international control. But, there would be no vetoes, thus ensuring openness by both sides. Predictably, the Russians rejected the plan and pressed forward in their program to develop an atomic bomb of their own. Meantime, the Americans secretly began work on an even more powerful hydrogen bomb that Truman calculated would be in place to negate the Soviet's atom bomb. The stage was thus set for an escalating arms race.

Fueling the post-war military situation was the vacuum of a collapsed European economy left temporarily void of international investment. This was particularly evident among the Eastern European nations, a region now dominated by the Soviet Union. This condition resulted from the 1945 Yalta Conference in which Russia, Great Britain, and the United States laid a framework for the post-war world. Although America had been a strong advocate of a "Liberated Europe" founded on selfdetermination, Stalin obviously considered Eastern Europe to be his rightful, if not exclusive, spoils of war.

At the same time that the West struggled to underpin the economy of Western Europe with infusions of capital and industrial technology, the Soviet Union quickly placed Eastern Europe behind an "Iron Curtain" of Soviet domination stretching from Poland to the Adriatic.5 The Russians likewise rejuvenated heavy industry in Eastern Europe, both to aid in economically re-building those nations and to supply goods to a war-torn Soviet Union that had suffered heavily under Nazi invasions and wartime deprivation. The installation of puppet governments thus secured the allegiance of those countries to the communists.

The communists became openly dedicated to overwhelming capitalism by whatever means necessary, including war, to achieve their goal of indefinite expansion. In 1946 Stalin announced that there could be no peace so long as capitalism existed in the world. He preached that the inequitable development of capitalist countries would inevitably lead to war, and that the Soviet people should be prepared for it. The United States and Great Britain immediately adopted a policy of just as actively resisting communist aggression wherever it might appear.6

4 Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-1984. (New York: 1985), pp. 41-42. {hereinafter cited as America, Russia, and the Cold War).

5 Ibid, pp. 14-15, 38-39.

6 Ibid, p. 38, 46; Lewis and Roxlau, Systemic Study of ACC Material Cultur~ I, pp. 25, 27-28.

U.S. Military Realignment

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President Harry Truman found himself facing a dilemma that called simultaneously for decisive action to combat the threat of world Communism and, co~versely, a drastic reduction in the huge U.S. military machine. Playing to both needs, Truman relied upon his monopoly of the atomic bomb to compensate for a reduction of conventional forces. By 194 7 the level of military personnel shrank from a high of 10 million just two years earlier, to a mere 1.4 million.7 In the months immediately following the war, it was apparent that the Army Air Forces, so successful in conducting long-range bombing missions over occupied Europe and to far-flung targets in the Pacific theater, should be made an organization independent of Army Ground Forces. The war had clearly demonstrated that air power was not only a significant tactical weapon on the modem battlefield, but domination of the skies was absolutely necessary to ensure strategic victory. The advent of nuclear weapons, with their awesome power contained in a single device, made the role of bomber aircraft even more essential than during World War II. With the missile age still in its infancy, manned aircraft remained the only practical choice as a delivery system for atomic weapons.

Severing the air arm from the army had been recognized as desirable even during World War Two, but such a massive reorganization had not been considered advisable during the exigencies of the war. The goal was revived after the Japanese surrender. President Truman's signature on the National Security Act of 1947 gave birth to the United States Air Force, a status coequal with the Army and the Navy. Concurrently, a new Department of Defense was created to oversee and coordinate the efforts of all three arms.8

The Second World War changed the U.S. perspective of military strategy from national and continental dimensions to one of global proportions. Accordingly, the old Army Air Force had recognized the need for an organization that could plan and conduct air operations worldwide, either independently or in conjunction with the ground and sea forces. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) was created in 1946 to meet this challenge and was of such importance in postwar operations that it was merged into the new Air Force. The Strategic Air Command was destined to become identified as the leading symbol of U.S. preparedness during the Cold War.

Dawn of the Missile Age

Paralleling the design of new, improved airplanes during World War II were several programs aimed at developing guided missiles. The Germans, seeing the military potential for missiles, had undertaken rocket research years earlier. By the beginning of the war the Germans possessed the technology to build such rockets. The primitive guidance system, however, would permit their use only against large,

7 LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, p. 50.

8 SAC Missile Chronology 1939-1988. (Offutt Air Force Base: Strategic Air Command, 1990), p. 5 (hereinfafter cited as SAC Missile Chronology).


stationary targets, namely cities. Such blindly indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations were something that gave pause even to the Germans. It was not until 1942, after the commencement of Allied bombing raids on German cities, that the German high command authorized the further development and tactical deployment of the V-1. "Flying bomb" attacks on London were first launched in June 1944.9

The V-1, carrying a 2,000-lb. high-explosive warhead at a speed of 400 - 500 miles per hour, became the world's first practical guided missile. However, the "buzz bomb," as the V-1 was dubbed for the distinctive sound of its pulse-jet engine, was vulnerable to anti-aircraft artillery fire. It could also be shot down by the highly-developed fighters of the late war years. Relatively few of the V-ls, only about nine per cent of the 8,000 launched, ever struck London, making it more an indiscriminate weapon of terror than an effective military tool. 10

The Germans also developed the more sophisticated and somewhat more accurate V-2 rocket, which reached supersonic speeds of 3,500 miles per hour during the plunge to its target. 11 No fighter aircraft, even a jet, could possibly engage it. The V-2 reached a maximum altitude of sixty miles above the earth and could range two hundred miles with its one-ton payload of high explosive. From its inception to the end of the war, some 1100 V-2s were directed at strategic targets in England, Belgium, and Holland. Had it been possible to increase the range and accuracy of the German V-2, along with adding a nuclear warhead as the Germans intended, the potential would have been staggering. There can be little doubt that course of the war would have been drastically altered in favor of the Axis powers. Fortunately for the Allies, the war ended before German scientists could develop a nuclear weapon.

The V-1 and V-2 rockets, for all their primitiveness, had demonstrated to the Allies that rocket technology was not to be dismissed. The concept of "pilotless aircraft" had been proven successful. Wartime German advancements, coupled with the acquisition of German rocket scientists at war's end, invigorated the infant U.S. missile program. The Americans also captured a number ofV-1 and V-2 rockets, which they studied, tested, and used as models for their own initial designs. As one Yale professor and nuclear war analyst put it, "The power of the new bomb completely alters the consideration which previously governed the choice of vehicles ... A rocket is an exceptionally cheap means of bombarding a country if it can carry ... an atomic bomb." 12 Obviously, the great radius of destructive effect posed by a nuclear device lessened the need for a precision guidance system, putting it "in the ballpark" would be close enough.

Both the Army Service Forces and the Army Air Forces had begun missile research programs as early as 1943. By late the following year a workable rocket had been devised, and General Henry H. "Hap"

9 J. L. Naylerand E. Owen, Aviation: Its Technical Development (Philadelphia:Dufour Editions, 1965), p. 206.

10 Ibid.

11 Lauber and Hess, Martin Test Facilitie!ll, p. 8.

12 Ibid., pp. 19-20.

HAER No. M0-88 Page?

Arnold, Chief of the Anny Air Forces, ordered that enough be produced to provide for a launch rate of one thousand per month. No doubt Arnold intended to use these in the European theater of operations to offset a commensurate reduction in costly daylight bombing missions. However, the War Department staff squelched the plan in favor of what were considered to be higher priorities for the production of essential war material. 13

Consequently, U.S. ballistic missile development languished until the end of the war. Work resumed on the wartime JB-2 missile, essentially a replica of the German V-2, during the latter part of 1945. In the following year the Air Force let a number of research and development contracts to produce tactical and strategic missiles. Despite their importance, which was yet to be realized by Congress, these programs fell victim to the tremendous reductions in post-war military budgets. Some of the more promising projects, fortunately, were permitted to survive the fmancial conservatism of the late 1940s.

All of the military services had become convinced of the future of un-manned aircraft in modem warfare. With both the air and ground forces pursuing missile programs, though, the lines of responsibility and authority quickly became entangled. This issue was of such magnitude that it was addressed in the same National Defense Act that had given birth to. the U.S. Air Force in 1947. In a clean break, the act assigned tactical missile development to the Anny, while the Air Force would be responsible for strategic missile development. 14

The high profile given the ICBM program by the Air Force was not reflected in Congress. Low national emphasis, a consequent lack of funding, and numerous technological problems caused the effort to stagnate. The greatest design challenge to be overcome related to the heavy atomic warheads then available and the problem of how to transport them to distant targets. This was the principal reason that long-range bombers were still relied upon as the primary delivery system for nuclear weapons. However, a breakthrough came late in 1952 when the Atomic Energy Commission developed a comparatively

_ lightweight "thermonuclear" hydrogen device having greater destructive force than that of the atomic bomb.15

This development was a decided boon to President Dwight D. Eisenhower's economic and defense policies. As a West Point graduate and former top Allied commander during World War II, Eisenhower had a keen appreciation for military needs. He likewise believed in curbing government expenditures through reductions in defense spending to achieve a balanced budget. Following the lead of his secretary of state, John F. Dulles, Eisenhower adopted the doctrine of thwarting communist aggression through the overwhelming superiority of nuclear weapons and the implied threat of massive retaliation. Conventional forces were correspondingly decreased. 16 Meantime, the Soviets were busy working on their own

13 SAC Missile Chronology, pp. 1-2.

14 SAC MissileChronology1939-1988. (OffuttAFB, Neb.: StrategicAirCommand, 1990), p. 5.

15 Ibid, p. 8; Lauber and Hess, Martin Missile Test Facilitie~ pp.17-18.

16 Lewis and Roxlau, Systemic Study of ACC Material Culture, I, p. 30.


hydrogen bomb, which they successfully detonated in 1953. They, too, appreciated the advantages posed by the ICBM and had their scientists hard at work to develop a practical nuclear delivery system.

Early Cold War Defense Strategies

As sole possessor of the atomic bomb in 1945, the United States saw little reason to maintain the enormous military force established during the war. No one, not even the powerful conventional forces of the Soviet Union, would dare attack a nation with so formidable a weapon as the atomic bomb. The devastating effects of the bomb had been amply demonstrated in Japan. World governments appeared to be in agreement on the point of rejecting the future use of nuclear weapons because of their potential for ultimately destroying civilization. The United States, secure in the assumption that the Communists did not have the ability to develop an atom bomb, took full advantage of its position of supreme strength by electing not to share its n11clear technology.17

Depressed economic conditions in Europe after World War Two left a number of nations vulnerable to communist influence, especially those Eastern European countries immediately adjacent to the Soviet Union. The United States at that time was looking to the rebuilding of Europe to provide an export market vital to stimulating America's own post-war economy. The infusion of financial investment and other aid in Europe was considered insurance for stability in the region. Great Britain was considered to be a major player in this effort. But, in a surprise move calculated to stimulate their own flagging economy, the British were compelled to abandon Greece and Turkey in 1947. Both countries relied heavily upon economic and military support from the British.

One of the factions involved in the civil war underway in Greece at that time was backed by the communists and bolstered by Yugoslavian leader Tito. Truman became convinced that if Greece fell to a communist takeover, it might trigger a chain reaction leading to a complete collapse of the European economy. He was well aware, however, that Congress would balk at pumping large amounts of aid into the Balkans for purely economic reasons. A more convincing argument was framed by members of the State Department. Secretary George Marshall and Under Secretary Dean Acheson persuaded Truman to publicly make his own declaration of a non-shooting war to resist the spread of communism.

Truman acted decisively in a time when the nation was disinterested in more foreign entanglements, especially one that might portend war. Knowing that the economic argument would be a tough sale to both a spendthrift Congress and a war-weary populace, Truman "scared hell" out of the American people with the revelation that the free world faced a new and immediate crisis. The reaction was exactly what he intended. The resulting "Truman Doctrine" defined America's stance in opposition to communism whenever and wherever it occurred in the world. The goal was to contain it in the Soviet Union. Further, it provided a foundation for American intervention in foreign conflicts on the basis of anti-communism, a guiding factor in U.S. policy for more than a quarter of a century thereafter.

17 Lauber and Hess, Martin Missile Test Facilities, pp. 15-17.


The last year of the decade witnessed two momentous events that immediately altered the balance of power in the Cold War. On August 29, 1949 the Russians detonated an atomic bomb. The reality that the communists possessed nuclear weapons shook America's sense of security, prompting President Truman to re-evaluate the entire U.S. defense strategy. Moreover, China's Mao Tse-tung announced the establishment of a Communist regime controlling one of the world's largest populations. This was a particularly hard blow considering the close relationship shared by the United States and China during World War Two, one that shattered the American belief that world communism was centered in Moscow.

The Truman Doctrine had to be modified to conform to the realities of U.S. military and economic resources. One of the top authorities on Soviet affairs, George Kennan, advised that the United States should not attempt to limit the spread of Communism everywhere it might appear, rather only in those areas of strategic importance to American interests. With both sides in possession of atomic bombs, each fearing military domination by the other, a deadly game of poker ensued in which the stakes eventually soared to staggering proportions. The ante, measured in strategic nuclear weapons, increased as one player, then the other, maneuvered for military advantage. Meantime, the world lived in the shadow of an unthinkable final showdown. Because the ability of each of the superpowers was relatively small in the early 1950s, it was unlikely that either could inflict enough damage in a first strike to prevent nuclear retaliation. Deterrence, then, was based on a theory that the aggressor would suffer massive counter-attack. Changing events, however, caused a major shift in U.S. doctrine.

In 1950 The National Security Council (NSC) determined that Soviet possession of the atom bomb and their projected gains in long-range bombers over the next few years would soon overcome the advantage held by the Americans. The NSC recommended the immediate development of the thermonuclear hydrogen bomb, to outclass the Russian atomic device, along with a significant increase in conventional forces. President Eisenhower charted a course toward the acquisition of a potent nuclear triad that would afford the United States with maximum protection. At about the same time, the United States shifted from a policy of strong point defense in North America to one of symmetrical defense throughout the world. This called for the distribution of U.S. military forces around the globe to be able to respond to any threat that might arise, and to make it more difficult for the Soviets to retaliate.

Long Range Bomber Development

With the reality of an ICBM still several years in the future, bombers remained the first means of strategic offensive operations for both the Americans and the Soviets well into the 1950s. It had been proven that large piston-engine bombers, like the B-50 and the later B-36, could fly almost anywhere in the world when supported by airborne fuel tankers. They could accurately deliver a heavy payload of conventional bombs, or a single nuclear bomb. Still, the bombers remained vulnerable to attack by fighters, especially the new jets.

The concept oflong-range bombers had its genesis prior to World War Two. As early as 1941 the United States had perceived a potential need to defend itself in both Europe and Asia, where air bases might not be available. The Army Air Forces issued a research and design specification for a bomber that could

HAER No. M0-88 Page 10

carry a 10,000-pound payload a minimum of 5,000 miles. These were unheard-of requirements for that day. Nevertheless, a project was soon launched to develop such a bomber. Work had hardly begun, however, when wartime priorities for mass-producing other types of aircraft shelved the experimental bomber.

After the war, full attention was given to what would become the B-36, an enormous plane having a 230-foot wingspan, a fifteen-man crew, and, initially, six propeller engines (on the trailing edges of the wings), later to be augmented by four jet engines. Its operational altitude of over 40,000 feet exceeded the combat capabilities of contemporary fighters, even the early jets, largely negating the need for its anti-aircraft armament. The first B-36 flew in 1947 and was adopted the following year.18 The B-50 and B-36 bombers served as intermediate designs that provided the United States with global bombing capability until a new all-jet bomber could be perfected. This goal was achieved early in 1950 with the production of the Boeing B-47, a revolutionary swept-wing design, propelled by six engines, and served by a crew of only three. Cruising at an unheard-of speed of six hundred miles per hour with a five-ton bomb-load, the B-47 immediately outclassed everything used by the Soviets at the time.

The Korean War created the need for more bomber bases to enable SAC to carry out its mission of global deterrence. Newly-renamed Sedalia Air Force Base was selected as one of these, under the command of the Second Air Force. Orders were issued immediately to rehabilitate and modernize the old army air field to adapt it for use by a wing of thirty B-47s and their supporting KC-97 tankers. While the construction was underway, the personnel of the 340th Bombardment Wing received training in handling the new aircraft. Finally, in the spring, 1954 the first bombers arrived at Sedalia. They were to remain as the mainstay of the base until their eventual replacement by Minuteman missiles in 1963. 19 The B-50, the B-36, and B-47 were instruments of the U.S. policy to maintain deterrence through a position of strength and retaliatory ability. But, the Russians were rapidly closing that bomber "gap."

The Cold War well underway by this time, efforts to improve strategic bombers continued toward an even better design than that offered by the B-47. The Convair firm had been striving to develop a bomber to meet SAC's mission of global range, while flying at high altitude and supersonic speed. The result was the B-58, known as the "Hustler" for its capability of reaching speeds in excess of Mach 2, and being able to maintain such speeds for more than an hour. The B-58 could reach a range ofup to 1,750 miles very quickly if necessary. It could also fly longer missions of over 5,000 miles at a cruising speed of approximately 600 miles per hour, without refueling. Even at its normal speed, the B-58 was all but impossible to catch by the most advanced fighters of the day.

The Air Force had been developing another long-range jet bomber as early as the Korean War. Although no one initially saw the Model 464 as the ultimate aircraft for both strategic and well as tactical bombing,

18 Robinson, ed., American Aircraft, pp. 133-35.

19 Patience Elizabeth Patterson, David P. Staley, and Katherine J. Roxlau, "A Baseline Inventory of Cold War Material Culture at Whiteman Air Force Base." A Systemic Study of Air Combat Command Cold War Material Culture. (Albuquerque: Mariah Associates, 1994), Vol. 11-27, pp. 15-16.


it soon eclipsed all other models. The 464, later redesignated as the B-52, was a swept-wing design with eight engines and an initial bomb capacity of27,000 pounds. The B-52 Stratofortress was placed in service in the summer of 1955. It proved to be a near-perfect design for the global bombing mission, so much so in fact, that the B-47 medium bomber was phased out by 1966, followed by the B-58 in 1969. The Stratofortress, modified and upgraded many times, remained the only U.S. first-line strategic bomber until the advent of the B-lB and B-2 in the 1980s. Many B-52s remain in service today, over forty years after their introduction. 20

Push-Button Warfare: ICBM Development

In 1951 the Air Material Command was directed to undertake a program for the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The specifications required that it have the ability to deliver a thermonuclear warhead over a range of at least 5,500 miles at a minimum speed of Mach 6 over the target. This was a tall order, and a costly one, that became the top Air Force priority. Nevertheless, by the end of 1954 the United States was still years away from having an operational ICBM.

Early in the following year the American ICBM program was stimulated by the preparation of the socalled "Killian Report," a research finding prepared by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee in the Office of Defense Management. The report, an evaluation of the nation's defense preparedness, stressed the need to place the ICBM program at the top of national priorities, lest the Russians take the lead. Congressional pressure for an ICBM system added further impetus to the program, thus spurring President Eisenhower to authorize a maximum effort to achieve that goal.21 Since solid fuel technology had not advanced to the point that it could either be ignited reliably or thatit would propel a missile to the ranges necessary, American engineers were limited to liquid fuel. Such propellants had the disadvantage of being highly corrosive and therefore could not be loaded on-board until just prior to a launch.

One ICBM of this type was already on the drawing board. The Air Force immediately stepped up work on the Atlas, a system utilizing liquid-fueled rocket engines and a soft-skinned missile body for fuel storage. The body itself had to be pressurized with liquid nitrogen to make it rigid. Three types of launchers were developed for the Atlas. The first two of these, and the most primitive, stored the missile horizontally in above-ground facilities. The crew had to raise the missile to a vertical launch position. Both of these, however, could be damaged or destroyed by nuclear strikes in the vicinity. The third model, the F series, employed hardened below-grade silos, with the missiles stored vertically to be raised on elevators to their ground-surface launch positions. The first Atlas series missiles were ready for deployment on 1 April 1958.22

20 Robinson, ed., American Aircraft, pp. 71-73; Nayler and Owens, Aviation, p. 95; Lewis, Roxlau, et al.,Systemic Study of AAC Material Culture, I, pp. 78-80.

21 From Snark to Peacekeeper: A Pictorial History of Strategic Air Command Missiles. (Offutt AFB, Neb.: Strategic Air Command, 1990), p. 11.

22 Ibid, pp. 7, 11, 13.


Concurrent with work on the Atlas, the Air Force developed a second liquid fuel ICBM, the Titan I. This improved missile had a somewhat shorter range of 5,500 miles and featured both radio and inertial guidance systems to maintain its course and trajectory. The main advantage offered by the Titan was the incorporation of two stages, the first contained the enormous main rockets and their fuel supply necessary to lifting the missile through the earth's gravitational pull. This booster stage, measuring fiftyseven feet long, would then be jettisoned automatically, after which the smaller second stage engine would ignite to propel the four megaton warhead through the remainder of its journey. Unlike the Atlas, which took its entire mass, less the disposable booster engines, all the way to target, the Titan shed its dead weight during the flight. 23 By fall 1961, there were thirteen Atlas and six Titan squadrons, a total of 123 missiles, on alert in the continental United States. Work on both the Atlas and Titan missiles coincided with an additional program to develop an intermediate range missile for deployment in Western Europe with members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Such missiles, which were not required to have super-long range capability, still were able to reach many key targets within the Soviet Union. 24

Advent of the Minuteman System

As good as the Atlas and Titan I missiles were, several shortcomings became evident in these systems. Heading the list was their vulnerability to first strikes by nuclear weapons. The early Atlas D, stored in the open on a launch tower, was particularly susceptible to any kind of air or missile attack. An improved "coffin-type" launcher, housing the Atlas E horizontally in a shallow sub-surface concrete shelter, was somewhat more resistant, but could still be disabled by nuclear attack.

Even after the more advanced Atlas F model, as well as Titan I, were housed vertically in hardened silos, they retained an element of vulnerability in that the missiles had to be raised on elevators to firing position above ground. This still handicapped them with a slower response time than the Air Force wanted. Further compounding this situation, the launchers were clustered in groups of three at each complex, which placed more of them at risk from a single enemy bomb or missile. Beyond these deficiencies, the liquid-fueled rockets were inherently dangerous. The mere storage and handling of liquid propellants greatly increased the chances of accidents. Fires at Titan and Atlas facilities were not uncommon. Such conflagrations were so bad, in fact, that the Air Force dealt with them by simply letting them burn out to avoid further loss of personnel.25

The Air Force realized it needed a strategic missile system that was more cost effective, easier to maintain, and more reliable than either the Atlas or the Titan. Above all, it had to be highly survivable from nuclear attack. The result was the Minuteman, a comparatively small solid-fuel missile capable of

23 Lauber and Hess, Martin Test Facilities, pp. 26-28, 34-35; Snark to Peacekeeper, pp. 7.

24 Ibid, pp. 51-59.

25 Lewis and Roxlau, et. al., Systemic Study of ACC Material Culture, p. 81.


being mass-produced and launched from hardened silos. Like its larger brethren, Minuteman could destroy targets with a thermonuclear warhead at ranges up to 5,500 miles, and with greater reliability.

The chief advantage of this new system lay in the method of its deployment. Rather than having a launch facility for each silo, the Minuteman could be arrayed in fields and launched remotely from control centers. This feature of central control over un-manned silos reduced not only the cost of the system, but more efficiently utilized personnel. One launch control facility had responsibility over a flight often missiles, each of which was separated by several miles.

The Minuteman Comes to Whiteman

This new generation of missiles began taking its place on the front lines of the Cold War in December 1961 with the assignment of the 10th Strategic Missile Squadron to Malmstrom Air Force Base near Great Falls, Montana. Two more squadrons were activated at Malmstom the next year. The Air Force eventually organized thirteen additional Minuteman squadrons. By 1967 1,000 Minuteman ICBMs were on alert.26 While most of the Minutemen missiles were installed at bases on the Northern Plains of the Dakotas, Montana, and Wyoming, one was to be more centrally located in either Arkansas or Missouri. Geological evaluations indicated that the subsurface conditions in the vicinity of Whiteman AFB, Missouri favored the needs of silo construction.27

This base, first named Sedalia Army Air Field because of its proximity to that central Missouri town, was established in 1942 as a training site for the Troop Carrier Command. Pilots destined to fly C-47 cargo planes and their towed gliders received basic instruction at Sedalia, followed by advance training elsewhere prior to their transfer to combat areas overseas. During the last year of World War II Sedalia was used for specialty training of air combat crews, as well as their replacements, in communications, weather, navigation, and mechanics.28

At war's end, the base was left with no mission beyond serving as a stopover point for B-29 bombers and their crews returning from the Pacific theater of operations. It was therefore classed as an inactive auxiliary field, staffed by only a few essential military personnel. Concluding its active life in 194 7, the base was placed under the Air Material Command to be maintained by a small force of civilians in the event that they might be needed in the future.29

26 Snark to Peacekeeper, pp. 29, 31.

27 Snark to Peacekeeper, p. 37; Sergeant Richard Rice, A History of the 351st Missile Wing 1963 -1995: Mission Complete. undated, p. 2. (hereafter cited as History of 351st Missile Wing).

28 Patterson, Staley, and Roxlau, Systemic Study of ACC Material Culture, 11-27, p. 14.

29 Staff Sergeant Roger D. Hooker, The History of Whiteman AFB, Missouri 1942 - 1993: From Gliders to Stealth. (Whiteman AFB: U.S. Air Force, undated), p. 7 (hereafter cited as History of Whiteman AFB).


That time came sooner than expected when the Soviets developed their own atomic bomb. When the Strategic Air Command suddenly needed more bases, rehabilitating existing facilities offered a more economical alternative to constructing new ones. The old glider training field was redesignated as Sedalia Air Force Base in 1951. Beginning in 1954 and continuing throughout the decade, it was to serve as a long-range bomber base for the B-47s and the supporting KC-97 tankers of the 340th Bombardment Wing. Shortly after the first jet bombers touched down at Sedalia, the Air Force began re-naming its bases after distinguished U.S. airmen. In September 1955, Sedalia AFB became known as Whiteman Air Force Base, in honor of Lieutenant George A. Whiteman. The young pilot, a native of Sedalia, had been killed when his P-40 W arhawk was shot down by Japanese fighters during the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941.30

The deployment of the Minuteman system happened to coincide with the phasing out of the B-47 as SAC's primary medium bomber. The more sophisticated and powerful B-52 was destined to become the standard U.S. long-range bomber for the next several decades. However, to adapt the runways and other facilities to the larger, heavier B-52 was a costly proposition. Most of the bomber force was in fact distributed among bases along the northern tier of states, thereby shortening the flying distance to the Soviet Union via the Arctic. A decision was made not to assign the new aircraft to Whiteman. It would be re-designated as a Minuteman missile installation to become a member of the so-called "underground Air Force."

Construction on the enormous project began in April, 1964. Contracts for 150 silos, 15 missile alert facilities, and associated communications networks were awarded to Morrison-Hardeman-Perin-Levell of Kansas City, Missouri. When completed, the facilities for three missile squadrons, headquartered at Whiteman, spanned nearly 10,000 square miles and encompassed all or portions of fourteen counties in west central Missouri. Additionally, the interconnecting Hardened Intersite Communications System (HICS) required the laying of nearly 1,800 miles of cable among the component sites. At that, Whiteman was to remain the smallest in total area of all Air Force missile bases.31

The unit assigned to operate and maintain the new system was the 3 51 st Missile Wing, formerly the 351st Bombardment Wing, composed of the 508th, 509th, and 510th Missile Squadrons. Each operations squadron was responsible for the fifty missiles (five flights of ten each) located in its designated area. Two additional maintenance squadrons were charged with the upkeep and repair of the highly complex electronic and mechanical systems for all fifty missiles and their silos, as well as the fifteen missile alert facilities. The squadrons of the 351st were activated and took station at Whiteman in May, June, and July 1963, respectively. The 351st assumed control over the missiles as they were installed and turned over to the Air Force. By mid-summer, 1964 all of the Minuteman I squadrons at Whiteman were armed and on full alert with the Strategic Air Command. 32

30 Patterson, Staley, and Roxlau, Systemic Study of ACC Material Culture. 11-27, p. 16.

31 Snark to Peacekeeper, p.121; Patterson, Staley, and Roxlau, Systemic Study of ACC Material Culture, 11-27, p. 17.

32 Rice, History of 351 st Missile Wing.

Victory By Attrition: The End of the Cold War Era


By the end of the 1960s the superpowers had amassed enough nuclear weapons to destroy mankind several times over. In the 1970s the United States concentrated on the development of a new bomber, the B-1, in addition to expanding its fleet of nuclear missile submarines and smaller solid-fuel missiles carrying multiple warheads. Meantime, the Soviets continued their efforts to produce a large arsenal of liquid-fuel ICBMs with the intent of outgunning the United States by shear volume.

Despite unceasing escalation, the leaders of both nations began to recognize the futility of an arms race. This was evident when President Lyndon B. Johnson engaged the Soviets in the first dialogue concerning strategic arms limitations late in his administration. Although Johnson was unable to make any headway with the Russians in limiting ICBMs and antiballistic missiles (ABM), a minor victory was achieved in the signing of the Nuclear Arms Nonproliferation Treaty. This agreement restricted nuclear weapons to the three superpowers, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, and further prohibited the transfer of nuclear technology and weapons to other nations not already in possession of them. This, at least, helped to stabilize the balance of power by ensuring that only the superpowers retained possession of the ultimate weapon. This was small consolation to the rest of the world, however.

The Soviets acceded to further arms limitation talks in 1969, but only after they had achieved nuclear parity with the United States. It was critical to their bargaining position that they come to the table in a posture of equal strength with the United States. The resulting Salt I Treaty, ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1972, fixed the number of strategic missiles and launchers that could be held by each of the two nations. Since the Americans possessed more advanced technology, the Russians were allowed to deploy a slightly larger number of missiles. There were also restrictions placed on ABM development and deployment.

The SALT I Treaty became the cornerstone of detente, or peaceful coexistence, a policy enthusiastically adopted by President Richard M. Nixon and his able secretary of state, Henry Kissinger. The nuclear buildup undertaken by the Soviet Union had left in its wake an anemic domestic economy. Russian industry and agriculture suffered under a lack of non-defense technology and business management skills. Agricultural programs fell woefully short of meeting the demands of a large population. Both Kissinger and Nixon thus promoted favorable trade relationships with the Soviets in an attempt to integrate them into the world economy and, moreover, to reduce tensions between the two adversaries. Even though both nations continued nuclear development, the atmosphere of detente continued to encourage cautious negotiation on arms reductions.33

33 By the mid-1970s, detente produced the Helsinki Accords, binding the superpowers to recognize human rights and existing European boundaries, while the Nuclear Test Treaty limited the size of underground tests. The Vladivostok Accords imposed certain limitations on the respective ICBM arsenals. Lewis, Roxlau, et. al., Systemic Study of ACC Material Culture, I, p. 45.


In 1979 the superpower leaders finally signed the SALT IT Treaty, an agreement designed to balance and cap the numbers of nuclear weapons possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union. The treaty, however, failed to win immediate ratification by the U.S. Senate. During the time the treaty languished in the Senate, the-Russians invaded Afghanistan, an event prompting President Jimmy Carter to retract the stillborn treaty early in 1980. Both nations nevertheless eventually salvaged something by agreeing informally to abide by the treaty provisions until 1986.

President Ronald Reagan's election that same year created a major policy shift in U.S.-Soviet relations. Reagan, suspecting that the Russians were gaining nuclear advantage by not abiding by the various treaty stipulations, adopted a more aggressive attitude than had his immediate predecessors. He began by nullifying the SALT II accord, thereby abolishing nuclear parity in favor of developing what he termed "a margin of safety" for the United States.

The abandonment of parity was cause for grave concern, if not alarm, among those foreign policy factions convinced that detente was the only viable condition to forestall nuclear war. Undaunted by his critics, Reagan revived the development program for the B-1 (now Bl-B) bomber, program President Carter had cancelled in 1977 in favor of cruise tactical missile development. Reagan also embraced the concept of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), dubbed "Star Wars," an ultra-high tech system credited as having the ability to destroy incoming enemy missiles in the upper atmosphere, before they could· reach the United States. A study to examine the policy implications of SDI found that such a system probably would deter nuclear war by making any attack futile. But, the study also concluded that the United States should continue to maintain an intimidating nuclear force of its own as a further deterrent.

Along with these developments, Reagan pushed forward the MX missile, a program that had gained momentum under President Carter back in 1979. This new generation missile, three times larger than a Minuteman III, was composed of four stages and carried ten independently targetable warheads. It also incorporated a unique "cold" launching system. The missile was contained within a metal canister that was then inserted into a modified Minuteman silo. Upon launching, high-pressure steam propelled the canister out of the silo to a height of 150 to 300 feet. The canister then fell away as the first stage of the missile ignited.

Congress eventually provided funding for the production and deployment of fifty missiles, re-named "Peacekeepers." However, a 1989 presidential decision abolished the fixed-silo concept in favor of a mobile "rail garrison." This plan provided for two missiles to be placed aboard specially-designed launcher trains so that in a national emergencythe missiles could be transported away from their bases for launching. Accordingly, they would make difficult targets for pre-programmed enemy missiles. Seven bases were designated to host the Peacekeeper rail garrisons once they were activated. 34

Concurrent with the upgrading of U.S. weapons systems, the Reagan administration attempted to maintain an open door to arms reductions talks with the Russians. A 1982 shift in emphasis from arms

34 Snark to Peacekeeper, pp. 41-49.


limitations to proposals for arms reductions was significant. However, negotiations stalemated almost at the outset by a mutual inability to agree on exactly which nuclear weapons would be eliminated. When Reagan increased the pressure by deploying medium-ranged missiles in western Europe, the Soviets abandoned the talks.

In the mid-1980s the politics of the U.S. and the Soviet Union resulted in a combination of personalities that boded well for an unprecedented relaxation of international tensions. Reagan and the new Soviet general secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, meshed well personally and they shared compatible visions for the future. The Soviet secretary proved to be a realist who recognized the failings of the communist economic system. Gorl,aehev rejected the traditional anti-western stance of previous Soviet leaders by demonstrating a truly revolutionary willingness to move his nation toward a democratic system of government based on a market economy. In their first year of negotiations, the two leaders reached a solid agreement to reduce nuclear weapons by fifty percent.

The improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations signaled a distinct thawing of the Cold War. Treaties followed in rapid succession that further promoted communications and cooperation between the two countries. One even eliminated all medium-range missiles, which was extremely important for reducing tensions in western Europe. While Reagan and Gorbachev revived the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva, the Soviet general secretary challenged established tenets of communist doctrine on the domestic front. All but the most dedicated Communists had to concede that the Soviet Union could no longer compete with the United States, either militarily or economically.

Plagued with his own economic concerns at home, Reagan had followed a well-balanced strategy of arms advancements and muscle flexing in response to communist threats around the world. These were tempered by a genuine willingness to support political transformation in Russia. The combination was effective. By the end of the decade, the crumbling of the communist world was unmistakable. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was a manifestation of communist defeat.

The international situation changed radically. Only a few months after the destruction of the Berlin Wall, the Soviets began withdrawing their forces from Eastern Europe. The Soviet block fragmented into independent republics soon thereafter. In recognition of the sudden and almost non-existent danger of surprise nuclear attack, SAC terminated the thirty-year airborne alert operation on July 24, 1990. Within a year the Soviets dissolved the Warsaw Pact, heralding the signing of the START treaty by Gorbachev and President George Bush a month later. Following quickly on the heels of the treaty, the U.S.S.R recognized the independence of its Baltic Republics.

Despite a failed coup attempt by hard line communists to unseat Gorbachev, the reform movement in Russia gained momentum. The Cold War had truly been a war of attrition - economic attrition. The U.S. decisions to proceed with development of the B-lB bomber and the Peacekeeper missile, not to mention the interest in the Reagan's SDI proved decisive. With government coffers all but empty, their economy in shambles, and burdened by a poorly functioning political system, the Russians turned to the Allies for help.


President Bush announced in a televised broadcast on September 17, 1991 that the Soviet Union no longer posed a realistic threat to world peace. In recognition of this, he ordered the immediate standdown of all U.S. strategic bombers. The ICBMs, including the Minuteman IIs, covered in START were also taken off alert. The presidential order was executed throughout SAC the following day. The LCC crews at Whiteman AFB and elsewhere pulled their launch enable control panels and removed the launch codes to effectively disarm their missiles. By 2:59 PM all SAC units had reported to CINCSAC General George L. Butler that the stand down was complete. After forty-five years, the Cold War vigil had ended. It was, in Butler's words, "clearly one of the singular events of our time. "35

SITE DESCRIPTION

The Launch Facility Trainer (LFT), replicating a silo in the field, was built at Whiteman AFB as part of the Force Modernization Program. This project was aimed at upgrading the Minuteman I facilities to accommodate the more sophisticated Minuteman II ICBM. The "T-12" at Whiteman, completed and accepted by the 351st SMW on September 21, 1967, was the first of its type to be completed for the Air Force inventory.36 Typical of most of the LFTs, the one at Whiteman AFB was located on the base where it was convenient to both personnel and other support facilities.

The trainer consisted of a blast-resistant underground silo 80 feet deep. The launch tube was constructed ofreinforced concrete with a steel plate liner. Surrounding the upper portion of the launch tube were equipment areas forming two superposed annular levels suspended on platforms. These platforms supported a variety of racks of electronic equipment for launching and monitoring the missile, plus generators, environmental controls, electric junction boxes, and storage batteries.

The octagonal Launcher Closure Door sealing the silo weighed 110 tons and was locked with a four-inch diameter steel pin. It opened by rolling laterally on steel tracks. During a practice terminal launch command, ballistic gas generators containing four charges drove a piston, which in tum activated a system of one-inch cables and pulleys to instantly propel the Closure Door horizontally from Oto 35 miles per hour. Only two charges were actually needed to open the door; the two additional charges served as backup to ensure a successful launch.37

Within the silo was a dummy missile filled with enough concrete, rather than fuel, to simulate the weight of a real Minuteman II. It had an inert guidance system and a mock-up re-entry vehicle lacking a warhead. In exterior appearance, the practice missile was identical to a real one, even to the paint scheme

35 Alert Operations, pp. 49-50.

36 Patterson, Staley, and Roxlau, Systemic Study of ACC Material Culture, 11-27, p. 18.

37 Much of the information about the LFT was provided by Colonel Frank Ruggiero (USAF, RET), who served as vice-commander of the 351 st Missile Wing. Personal communication with the author, November 8, 1996.


and insignia. The simulator was used for installation and removal practice in conjunction with the mobile Transporter-Erector Vehicle (TE).

The LFT was nearly identical to a field silo, with one principal difference. The reinforced concrete Launcher Equipment Room (LER), consisting of two levels, was constructed above-grade on the west side of the silo. Normal access was through a steel door at ground level on the west side. A few feet to the right of this door was a set of double-hung doors which provided for equipment installation and removal. The LER had a concrete stairway of three flights to provide instructors and trainees with easy access down to the silo, via a steel door at the lower landing. In a field silo this room, housing electronic monitoring and activation gear, was underground and was accessible only through the small Primary Door adjacent to the Launcher Closure Door. The would-be location of the LER at the T-12 was delineated by an outline of concrete curbing a few feet southeast of the Launcher Closure Door.

Training Operations

The trainer was used periodically by members of the 351st Organizational Missile Maintenance Squadron (OMMS) and the Field Missile Maintenance Squadron (FMMS) to hone technical skills in both routine and emergency procedures vital to the readiness of the Minuteman II system. New airmen fresh out of basic technical schools received in-depth training to upgrade their skills for certification in various ~aintenance operations. Additionally, a recurring training program was designed to routinely recertify more experienced personnel and to correct identified performance deficiencies.

Teams composed of two to six members of a particular specialty, such as electronics, mechanical, communications, or environmental controls, along with instructor staff, were assigned to the LFT at various times for training exercises. Instruction included trouble-shooting, rapid replacement of equipment, orientation and installation of new equipment, as well as routine inspection procedures. Instruction included both classroom work with simulators and hands-on experience at the LFT, coupled with further practice at the field sites.

When they were not actively training, the 351 st maintenance personnel were busy inspecting, upgrading systems, or performing needed work at the 1 SO field silos and the 1 S MAFS located in the vicinity of Whiteman. Considering the sophisticated electrical and mechanical systems involved, not to mention the widely dispersed facilities, the maintenance units faced enormous challenges. Moreover, shifts of maintainers were on call continually to respond to emergencies at any of the silos or MAFs.

For over twenty years, the two units shared an old World War II building, dubbed the "pink elephant," until it was eventually replaced by an 80,000 square foot complex in 1987. While the FMMS worked in both the shops and at the field sites, the OMMS primarily performed shop and laboratory functions, as well as being charged with responsibility for replacing and transporting the missiles. The excellent performance of these squadrons was reflected in the numerous awards conferred on them during their years at Whiteman. Included were the Eighth Air Force Outstanding ICBM Missile Maintenance Squadron Award (8 times) and the Outstanding Missile Maintenance Squadron Award for the entire

Strategic Air Command.38


38 351st Stategic Missile Wing: 25 Years of Deterrence, 1964 - 1989. (Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo.: U.S. Air Force, 1989), p. 76 (hereafter cited as 25 Years of Deterrence).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Published Works


Alert Operations and the Strategic Air Command 1957-1991. Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.: Strategic Air Command, 1991.

Coming in From the Cold: Military Heritage in the Cold War. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Center for Air Force History, 1994.

From Snark to Peacekeeper: A Pictorial History of Strategic Air Command Missiles. Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.: Strategic Air Command, 1990.

Hooker, Tech. Sgt. Roger D., From the Superfortress to the Spirit: The 50th Anniversary History of the 509th Bomb Wing 1944 -1994. Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo.: U.S. Air Force, n.d.

Hooker, Tech. Sgt. Roger D., The History of Whiteman AFB, Missouri 1942 - 1993: From Gliders to Stealth. Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo.: U.S. Air Force, n. d.

ICBM Abbreviations and Acronyms. Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.: Strategic Air Command, 1991.

Lauber, John F., and Hess, Jeflrey A., Glenn L. Martin Company Titan Missile Test Facilities. Minneapolis: Hess, Roise, and Co., 1993.

Lewis, Karen; Roxlau, Katherine J.; Rhodes, Lori E.; Boyer, Paul; and Murphey, Joseph S., Historic Context and Methodology for Assessment. A Systemic Study of Air Combat Command Cold War Material Culture, Vol. I. Albuquerque: Mariah Associates, 1995

Minuteman Missile Sites, Ellsworth Air Force Base: Management Alternatives/Environmental Assessment. Denver: National Park Service, 1995.

Mueller, Robert, Active Air Force Bases Within the United States of America on 17 September 1982. Air Force Bases, Vol. I. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Air Force, 1989.

Nayler, J. L. and Owen, E., Aviation: Its Technical Development. Philidelphia: Dufour Editions, 1965.

Oscar-01 Missile Alert Facility: Squadron Command Post. Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo.: U.S. Air Force, 1994.

Patterson, Patience Elizabeth; Staley, David P.; and Roxlau, Katherine J., A Baseline Inventory of Cold War Material Culture at Whiteman Air Force Base. A Systemic Study of Air Combat Command Cold War Material Culture, Vol. 11-27. Albuquerque: Mariah Associates, 1994.

Rice, Sergeant Richard, A History of the 351st Missile Wing 1963 - 1995: Mission Complete. Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo.: U.S. Air Force, 1995.

SAC Missile Chronology 1939 -1988. Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.: Strategic Air Command, 1988.


Strategic Air Command and the Alert Program: A Brief History. Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.: Strategic Air Command, 1988.

351st Strategic Missile Wing: 25 Years of Deterrence 1964 - 1989. Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo.: U.S. Air Force, 1989.

Welcome to Oscar-01 Missile Alert Facility: A Tribute to the Victors of the Cold War. Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo.: U.S. Air Force, n.d.

Unp11blished Materials

Donovan, John L., "The Integration of Women Onto Minuteman Missile Crews." Master's thesis, Central Missouri State University, 1991. Mimeographed.

"Oscar-01 Missile Alert Facility: Tour Guide." Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo.: U.S. Air Force, n.d. Mimeographed.

Interviews

Koury, Michael J. Telephone interview with the author. October 10, 1996.

Ruggiero, Frank. Telephone interview with the author. November 15, 1996.

Documents

Whiteman Air Force Base, Minuteman M0-88 Missile Launch