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This article was downloaded by: [University of California Santa Cruz]On: 26 October 2014, At: 22:08Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Oxford Development StudiesPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cods20
Which Order? Whose Order? Balinese IrrigationManagement in Sulawesi, IndonesiaDik Roth aa Department of Social Sciences, Law & Governance , Wageningen University , Postbus 17,6700 AA, Wageningen, The NetherlandsPublished online: 23 Aug 2006.
To cite this article: Dik Roth (2006) Which Order? Whose Order? Balinese Irrigation Management in Sulawesi, Indonesia,Oxford Development Studies, 34:1, 31-46, DOI: 10.1080/13600810500495956
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13600810500495956
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Which Order? Whose Order? BalineseIrrigation Management in Sulawesi,Indonesia
DIK ROTH*
ABSTRACT This paper deals with irrigation management among Balinese migrant settlers inSulawesi, Indonesia. As settlers in the command area of a state-built irrigation system, they havebecome part of its blueprinted managerial structure. However, many settlers derived theirexperience from subak, the Balinese irrigators’ institution. This paper explores the technical,organizational and normative complexity hidden behind claims of order, manageability and controlof a “modern” irrigation system, examining three issues that illustrate the tension between order anddisjuncture. First, it criticizes conceptualizations of local management as cycles of degradation byfarmer neglect and rehabilitation by government attention. Second, it traces the local history ofirrigation development by putting into perspective the assumption of normative, technical andorganizational uniformity on which the management structure is based. Third, differences arediscussed between engineering approaches to management and Balinese conceptualizations ofmanagement, and their consequences for management practices.
1. Introduction
This paper deals with irrigation management among Balinese migrants in Luwu, Sulawesi.
The point of departure is the dual character of state-established water users’ associations
(WUAs): anchored in participatory ideology, but legally enforced and bureaucratically
imposed. As settlers in the command area of a state-built irrigation system, the Balinese
rice farmers in this study have become part of the blueprinted structure of a system built by
the state agency Public Works. However, many settlers were experienced irrigators who
already had knowledge of irrigation management associated with subak, the “traditional”
Balinese irrigators’ institution.
I explore the diversity and complexity hidden behind the seemingly uniform structure of
a “modern” irrigation system, focusing on the articulations between technical, normative-
legal and organizational arrangements and irrigation practices associated with the tertiary
unit (TU)/WUA structure and with subak. Rather than assuming that certain state-
engineered relationships exist between people, water and technology, I have made the
character and quality of those relationships—of local forms of resource use and
management—the object of critical inquiry.
ISSN 1360-0818 print/ISSN 1469-9966 online/06/010031-16
q 2006 International Development Centre, Oxford
DOI: 10.1080/13600810500495956
*Dik Roth, Department of Social Sciences, Law & Governance, Wageningen University, Postbus 17, 6700 AA,
Wageningen, The Netherlands.
Oxford Development Studies,Vol. 34, No. 1, March 2006
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Three issues are discussed that are relevant for understanding “order” and “disjuncture”
in irrigation development. First, I put into perspective the prevailing image of local
irrigation management in terms of cycles of degradation (by farmer neglect) and
rehabilitation (by government attention). The historical, socio-cultural and otherwise
embedded character of irrigation management tends to be completely elided from
accounts by external experts and officials (Boelens, 1998; Mosse, 1997). Second, I trace
the local history of irrigation development by taking a critical look at the assumption of
normative, technical, organizational uniformity. More specifically, I shall analyse the role
of subak and TU/WUA, and the history of their interaction in local irrigation management.
Third, I discuss different conceptualizations of “management” between external,
engineering-based forms of irrigation development and Balinese irrigated agriculture,
and their consequences for management practices.
An irrigation system requires compatibility between rules, infrastructural technology
and organizational arrangements.1 Ideally, norms of water distribution and water rights
based on them form the foundation of, and are physically reproduced by, material
technology like division works. Similarly, norms and principles pertaining to rights,
responsibilities and conceptions of equity form the basis of organizational elements like
local irrigators’ organizations. These, in turn, reproduce such norms and principles but
are also co-determined by technical properties and requirements of the system.
The normative-legal dimensions of irrigation, then, are important connecting elements in
irrigation systems. Therefore, they should not be analytically isolated from the other
dimensions of irrigation and water control mentioned above.
A distinction can be made between endogenous and external irrigation design and
development (Boelens, 1998). In the former, technical, normative and organizational
design principles originate from system users and their socio-cultural environment. In the
latter, users are not the designers. Irrigation design and development are based on external
inputs and interventions. In situations of introduction of external design principles,
cultural identity and the socio-culturally embedded character of irrigation management
practices are crucial but often neglected. Irrigation settings cannot be reduced to their
technical and economic properties, but should be analysed as socially, culturally and
historically situated (Gelles, 1998; Mosse, 1997).
2. The Setting
2.1 Transmigration in Luwu
Luwu is a largely mountain-covered area in South Sulawesi (Figure 1). North Luwu
became a major centre of exploitation of land and water resources. The rivers flowing into
the North Luwu Plain make the area very suitable for irrigation development. From the
1930s, it became a destination for the Dutch “colonization” programme through which
Javanese (and, on other islands, Balinese) were resettled.2 The main objectives were
poverty alleviation, reduction of population density on Java and Bali, and economic
development of the “outer regions” of the Dutch colony. A key element was the creation of
rural settlements based on irrigated agriculture, using the experience of Javanese and
Balinese farmers. After independence, the Indonesian transmigration programme
(transmigrasi) continued this policy. From the late 1960s thousands of farmer families,
especially from Java and Bali, were resettled in Luwu.3
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2.2 Irrigation Development and Water Users’ Associations
In the 1960s, foreign donor funding for transmigration, irrigation and infrastructure
development became available. Indonesian irrigation development under the Suharto
regime was a project of modernization, the exclusive business of engineers. Preoccupation
with centralized control, suppression of local initiatives, and construction interests have
Figure 1. Luwu and the Kalaena irrigation system
Balinese Irrigation Management 33
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not been conducive to the development of strong local organizations and initiatives outside
the technical and organizational frameworks of the irrigation bureaucracy. Low performance,
operation and maintenance problems, degrading infrastructure, and dependence on
rehabilitation projects characterize most systems (Booth, 1977a, b; Bruns, 2004).
Systems built, rehabilitated or expanded under the responsibility of the Ministry of
Public Works and based on engineering technology have a similar physical-technical,
organizational and operational set-up.4 They typically consist of a weir and a hierarchy of
primary, secondary, tertiary and quaternary canals. Off-take structures and devices for
measurement and control form the division points between primary and secondary, and
between secondary and tertiary canals. The system section below the division gate to the
tertiary canal is called the TU. Inside the TU, water division boxes with flap gates regulate
water flows to quaternary canals, from which water is divided to the individual plots.
From the 1970s, water users were organized in WUAs responsible for operation and
maintenance of the TU.5 Later, training projects for “participatory irrigation management”
were introduced. A 1984 presidential decree made WUAs in the TUs of Public Works
systems compulsory. While the main system (weir, primary and secondary canals,
including the tertiary gate) remained under the responsibility of Public Works, the WUA
was given a key role in tertiary irrigation management. Ideally, the WUAs created through
such policies become legal entities.6 TUs cover between 50 and 150 ha, and are defined by
principles for design and use, internal organization, and formal procedures. After the
introduction of WUAs, problems remained with system performance. In 1987, the
Irrigation Operation and Maintenance Policy (IOMP) was formulated in response to donor
concerns. This included the introduction of cost recovery principles and an irrigation
service fee (ISF). In the late 1990s, political changes and the growing awareness of
problems in the irrigation sector led to new reforms to enable further devolution of rights
and responsibilities for irrigation management, and to empower WUAs to become viable
and autonomous institutions (Bruns, 2004; Oad, 2001).
The Indonesian WUA model has been criticized for its focus on formal organizational
arrangements, routines and procedures rather than local decision-making and management
capacities and effectiveness in coping with management problems. It has created formal
organizations that are often incapable of mobilizing water users for management needs.
By stressing formal structures and creating bureaucratic procedures for even the smallest
problems, WUAs mainly raise transaction costs for water users (Bruns, 2004).
Another criticism concerns the scope of WUA rights and responsibilities. These are
usually presented as (near) “total” rights, giving farmers a “sense of ownership”.
In practice, few rights are delegated to WUAs. Turnover was a top-down devolution of
management tasks and responsibilities to farmers rather than a participatory process
involving the establishment of strong local rights. Water and irrigation infrastructure are
exclusively owned by the state. WUAs have the right to use a state-owned natural resource
delivered to the TUs through a public irrigation system.
By this lack of attention to property rights, the complex character of jointly managed
irrigation systems and their property dimensions was disregarded. Hardly any attention
was paid to the interface between the main system and its public property characteristics,
and the WUAs with their common property characteristics; nor to the interface between
the latter and the private property dimensions of the resource as it enters individual fields.
In addition, in many irrigation systems in Indonesia, the transfer part of the establishment
of TUs as legal entities has not or has only partly been realized. Even under the reform,
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WUA development remained a target-driven transfer of responsibilities to WUAs rather
than their empowerment with a more complete bundle of responsibilities and rights
(Bruns, 2004; Oad, 2001).
2.3 Kertoraharjo: A Balinese Village
The Balinese village of Kertoraharjo forms the northern part of the former transmigration
settlement Kertoraharjo I. It is located in the command area of the Kalaena irrigation
system in North Luwu (Figures 1 and 2). In 1972–73, 500 transmigrant families from Bali
and Java were resettled here. They received 2 ha of forest-covered land, to be developed
into home yards, irrigated fields and rain-fed land. From the 1980s, when the system
reached Kertoraharjo, it became a relatively thriving village. Almost all the land, including
the land initially planned for rain-fed agriculture, can be irrigated, and yields two rice
harvests a year. Many Balinese now also cultivate cocoa on land bought from the local
population.
Balinese migration and settlement entailed a recreation and reinvention of Balinese
culture, identity and social organization. Alongside the state administrative arrangements
at village level, a domain of Balinese customary institutional and administrative
arrangements was established. Key Balinese institutions are the customary village, the
customary hamlet, temple groups and various voluntary associations. In Kertoraharjo,
the gods are still “real social partners” (Guermonprez, 1990, p. 62; Warren, 1993).
Last but not least, there is the subak, the irrigators’ association. The gods are real social
partners not only in the village but also in the rice fields. For the Balinese, the initially
forested land was not just a resource to be economically exploited by transforming the
forest into agricultural land. These processes are deeply embedded in cultural meaning.
The forest had to be physically and ritually transformed into irrigated fields. Sawahs
(irrigated rice fields) are managed ritually and ceremonially to maintain the balance
between the godly world, human beings and the resources involved (field, water and
crops). For Balinese, turning forest into agricultural land is more than a mere application
of human labour to a neutral natural environment. Other “stakeholders” are involved, in
particular the various spirits which, if not treated with awe and care, may become a threat
to people and crops. Forest clearing, then, is accompanied by ceremonies, rituals and
offerings (Charras, 1982).
The relationship between the spiritual world, humans and resources does not stop once
the forest has become agricultural land. In Bali, the rice cycle, from preparatory activities
to post-harvest offerings, forms a chain of highly ordered and interrelated activities.
The Balinese conceive of agriculture as a human activity intimately bound up with the
godly world. Sari, the essence of rice, originates from the body of the rice goddess, Devi
Sri, and should be returned to her after harvest to ensure the continuation of the cycle.
Gods subsist on the essence of rice and are the ultimate source of its substance in the
human world. Hence, its cultivation is susceptible to threats of transgression of ceremonial
rules, pollution and disturbance of the delicate relationship between humans and the rice
goddess. Therefore, the cultivation cycle is accompanied by a ritual–ceremonial cycle,
which suggests an analogy to the human life cycle (Howe, 1991).
In Bali, the subak performs many functions related to irrigated agriculture in the
broadest sense, including construction, repairs, operation and maintenance, agricultural
planning and pest control, conflict resolution, the organization of ritual and ceremony,
Balinese Irrigation Management 35
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temple construction and maintenance, maintenance of religious purity, collection of tax
and fines, creation and enforcement of subak legal regulations, and application of
sanctions. A subak typically includes a complex of between tens and hundreds of hectares
of (mainly) irrigated fields. Physical boundaries, and hydrological and socio-political
Figure 2. Kertoraharjo village, tertiary units and approximate subak areas
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factors play an important role in determining the subak area. Subaks may be subdivided
into smaller units or be part of larger complexes. The subak head (klian subak, pekaseh) is
assisted by other functionaries.7 Membership is associated with rights and duties with
regard to water, ritual, agricultural planning, organization and management. Subak
technology for water division is based on fixed proportional division of continuous flows
through wooden or stone overflow weirs (temuku). An advantage is that the water flow is
divided in a direction parallel to the current. The only variable being the width of the
proportional openings in the structure, water division is relatively transparent and easily
controllable by farmers (Geertz, 1980; Jha, 2002; Horst, 1996; Sutawan, 1987).
3 Two Short Histories of Irrigation Development
3.1 Cycles of Degradation and Rehabilitation
Many TUs in Kertoraharjo look rather degraded. Water control is low, there are serious
maintenance problems, and traces of tampering with infrastructure. Locks have been
destroyed, quaternary gates fixed with wire, sawn off or removed, thresholds broken
away, gate openings filled, and division boxes smashed to pieces. Eighty per cent of the
boxes can no longer perform their function: rotational water division in the TUs. For
officials, the issue is simple: apart from infrastructure, all you need is a hierarchical
command structure, a top-down decision-making routine for determining opening and
closure dates of the system, and WUAs for the TUs to take over formal management
responsibilities and enforce rule-conformity upon their members. If working things
deteriorate, degradation is attributed to the farmers’ “unruliness” or “stupidity”. As an
official put it:
Farmers are not yet aware of the need for a more active attitude. The government has
pampered them. They have been given land and an irrigation system, so that they can
have two rice harvests in a year. They have their WUAs, through which the
government has tried to give them a sense of ownership. We organize WUA courses
to make farmers aware of their duties and to teach them how to run their WUAs.
What else can we do? But still, they do not turn up at WUA meetings or perform
collective labour, and let their WUAs degrade until another rehabilitation
programme for their tertiary units is necessary.
Wayan, a Balinese farmer and WUA chairman, knows the problems mentioned by the
official. However, the course he attended was more about formal rules and procedures than
about the daily reality of irrigation management:
Wayan has just returned from a course on tertiary water management for WUA staff,
organized by Public Works. The main objective is the revitalization or
re-establishment of WUAs. The construction section of Public Works organized
the course; the Irrigation Service provided lists with the names of the trainees. For
some years, Wayan has wanted to step back down from his function. After ten years
he is fed up with it. His TU is among the most degraded, and its WUA largely
inactive. Members usually do not join collective labour or meetings, and do not pay
fines. Formally, a new board is elected or the sitting one re-elected every three years,
Balinese Irrigation Management 37
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but every time elections were planned, Wayan and his staff were forced to continue
for lack of any other candidate, or because there were not enough members present
to elect a new head. Therefore, he had to attend this course. Wayan: “we learned
about WUA organization, about government regulations pertaining to TUs, about
rice cultivation, post-harvest practices, and plans to reach three harvests per year.
We also learned how to operate the tertiary system using the division boxes for water
rotation.” “But”, I ask him, “you don’t use those boxes at all, do you? Most boxes
have decayed or been smashed to pieces, haven’t they? And water isn’t rotated at all,
is it?” “Well”, Wayan replied, “that is what I tried to ask them about, our TUs,
during the course. But they don’t want to hear all that. They told me that we have to
learn how to use them. “One day”, they said, “all division boxes will be rehabilitated
so you can rotate the water as you should”.’
Is it possible to write another history of irrigation development in these TUs? A history
that is not exclusively based on a mono-causal and external view of farmers’
behaviour?
3.2 An Alternative History of Irrigation Development
In a TU with a part Balinese, part Toraja8 farming population, I met a group of Balinese
preparing for the agricultural season. They were improving the farm road, repairing
canals and working on a construction to provide tail end fields with more water. Earlier
negotiations about water had resulted in a plan for water distribution and the reuse of
drain water within this small group of 11 farmers, who were constructing a system of
canals, PVC pipes and crossings. This group had been active for 3 years. They could no
longer stand the malfunctioning water division boxes of the Public Works system, and
decided to replace the remains of their box with a Balinese temuku, a proportional
division structure, and to become more active as a group. They created a small group
fund from which members could borrow money, and legal regulations (awig-awig)
stipulating rights, obligations and fines. Further, they had introduced into their group
ways of organizing collective labour on the canal infrastructure in proportion to the area
of land owned.
These farmers do not really fit the picture sketched by the official. Though a relatively
successful group, it is certainly not exceptional. It shows that the history of local irrigation
management is more than just a cycle of degradation caused by farmers and rehabilitation
by the government. Irrigation development in Indonesia was, until the late 1990s, largely
determined by foreign donor funding. While the irrigation bureaucracy converted donor
funding into construction packages and training courses, farmers were readapting the
resulting infrastructure to their priorities, wishes and values, and developing their own
irrigation and organizing practices. This was also the case in Kalaena. Initially TUs were
the outcome of the application of standardized design criteria. According to farmers, parts
of the TUs were functioning but many were not. Most TUs required considerable
adaptation and change by the farmers. Thus, farmers have been engaged in a dual role of
adapting to the Public Works infrastructure, rule system and organizational arrangements,
and changing the physical infrastructure and social organization of irrigation management
to their needs, priorities and interests.
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4. Irrigation Management between Subak and WUA
Irrigation development has been based on a number of basic tenets of modernization
thinking: the superiority of new technology and regulatory arrangements over existing
“traditional” ones, the unproblematic “transfer” of such external elements into a “target”
population, and their untransformed acceptance and internalization by water users
“participating” in WUAs. However, the management practices that have developed—the
construction of proportional water division structures, the creation of group regulations
and forms of organization—derive primarily from subak. Any analysis of local irrigation
practices should, therefore, pay attention to the history of interaction between the subak
and the TU/WUA, and the impact of their articulation upon farmer behaviour and
irrigation practices.
Although much land was still forested and agriculture rain-fed, the first settler groups
had established a subak upon arrival. After some years, when all four Balinese settler
groups had arrived and made progress in developing their land, this subak was split into
four separate subaks. The subaks were spatially defined by the boundaries of the blocks of
land allocated to these groups, and are still known among the population by reference to
the settler groups that initially formed their membership: subak 150KK, 100KK, 50KK
and 50KK Tampaksiring.9 Each of the four subaks was headed by a klian, assisted by other
functionaries. Together, these formed a pekaseh, headed by a functionary with the same
name. Subak regulations taken from Bali were adapted to the local situation. These
included religious-ritual issues as well as those related to irrigated agriculture.
At this time, the construction to expand the Kalaena system beyond the Dutch works
had not even started. Why, then, were subaks established at all? Their early formation
points to the central importance of their religious-ritual functions, next to irrigation
management functions in a more restricted sense. Former subak functionaries and farmers
stressed the need for organizational arrangements to stage agricultural rituals. The forested
area was full of destructive forces and evil spirits, which in Balinese eyes can only
effectively be combated through the appropriate rituals. Further, the subak was essential to
determining a propitious day for planting and, thus, in disciplining cultivation practices.
It was also associated with early attempts to control small water sources.
Thus, contrary to the subaks in Bali, those in Kertoraharjo were not first defined by
physical and hydrological boundaries. The pattern of land allocation to settler groups
rather than water flows determined subak membership and boundaries. Definition of subak
in terms of land allocation by the state became an important “resource” in conflicts over
the boundaries of legitimate subak authority, especially the right to collect subak tax (sarin
tahun) and determine the day on which Balinese are allowed to start transplanting rice.
Those who define “subak” in terms of the boundaries of state-allocated land tend to reject
subak authority and subak regulation pertaining to land resources outside these areas, such
as on land bought in other villages. However, the early developments make clear that the
subaks could display the same wide variety of functions as in Bali, covering ritual,
agricultural practices and decision-making, and construction, as well as irrigation
management in the sense used by government agencies.
Irrigation water reached Kertoraharjo around 1983. Introduction of the system had
serious consequences for the subaks. As explained above, the organizational arrangements
for tertiary irrigation management—in the WUAs—were delivered as a “package” with the
physical TU infrastructure. Layout and construction of TUs and establishment of WUAs
Balinese Irrigation Management 39
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were based fully on irrigation-technical criteria. The TU boundaries (based on design
criteria) cut across the pre-existing subaks, which, based on earlier land allocation, had
never been linked to irrigation. With the completion of the infrastructure, the cross-cutting
boundaries of TUs and subak areas and the obligatorily established WUAs, the subaks lost
their potential relevance as organizations for irrigation management. Nor could the
TU/WUA complexes, with their sometimes ethnically heterogeneous farmer population,
fulfil that other important subak function: organizing and carrying out Balinese rituals for
irrigated rice cultivation.
Consequently, upon establishment of TUs and WUAs, the complex of agricultural,
irrigation-managerial and religious-ritual activities of irrigated agriculture was torn apart.
This separation arose from divergent perceptions of irrigated agriculture between the
government-administrative world and the life world of Balinese farmers. An engineering
and administrative understanding of “management” (Ind. manajemen) includes routine
operation and maintenance tasks like canal cleaning and repairs, but excludes the
agronomic and religious-ritual dimensions of irrigated agriculture. While the former is
mainly the responsibility of PERTANIAN (Agricultural Service), the latter is classified as
belonging to the domain of agama (religion). Neither of the two is associated with
irrigation management.
In Balinese irrigated agriculture, such distinctions are not relevant. Balinese do not
commonly use the term “management” to refer to this complex field, but tend to use
persubakan to refer to all activities of rice agriculture. However, it was “irrigation
management”, defined as the operation and maintenance of tertiary infrastructure, which
became the formal responsibility of the WUAs. Agricultural planning belongs to the
government domain as well (Agricultural Service and district Irrigation Committee).10
Hence, the subaks as organizations were forced to retreat to their religious-ritual function
and refrain from interference in irrigation management as defined by the government
agencies. A different story can be told for the subak as an institution—regularized patterns
of behaviour between individuals and groups (Leach et al., 1999; Meinzen-Dick &
Pradhan, 2001). Even where subak organizational authority was formally reduced to the
religious-ritual sphere, there remained many settings in which subak and pekaseh
continued to influence matters for which government agencies are formally responsible.
After WUA establishment and separation of religious-ritual and “management”
functions, the subaks continued to play a role. The Balinese had difficulties in making
WUAs function without recourse to elements of the subak. Soon, organizational
arrangements deriving from the subak emerged in the WUA domain. The Balinese created
an organizational structure in which the pekaseh became “WUA co-ordinator” of
Kertoraharjo.11 According to the interviewed farmers, subak functionaries and a Public
Works functionary involved in those days, the subak-derived regulations were applied
quite successfully. TUs and WUAs showed a rapid development. Farmers invested capital
and labour in their TUs, and the WUA co-ordinator-pekaseh maintained regular contacts
with a functionary of the Irrigation Service. The former pekaseh explains:
To make WUAs function better, I wanted to use subak regulations for all activities in
WUAs with Balinese farmers. From the transplanting ritual, farmers were given two
weeks to plant. Late planters were fined, and the fine went to the WUA. We also had
a maintenance programme for canals and drains. Every season the farmers had to
clean part of the drain. After the plan had been approved by the Kertoraharjo village
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administration, subak regulations were put on paper and applied to the TUs. We also
made improvements to the system, the water of which did not reach all farmers.
Funds were raised by collecting eight kilograms of unhulled rice from each farmer.
We have placed many culverts in the WUAs, where the constructors had not
provided crossings of canals, drains, and farm roads.
The plans were also supported by the Javanese branch head for the Kalaena right bank
branch of the Irrigation Service. Again, in the words of the former pekaseh:
I formally asked permission for all plans and changes in the TUs, for instance
placing culverts or improving a canal. He said, “it is all up to you down there what
you want to do with the TUs and the WUAs, as long as what you do makes the
organization function more smoothly without disturbing other farmers”. Indeed,
things ran smoothly in those days. There were regular contacts with the Irrigation
Service.
The branch head, who was actively involved in irrigation development and establishment
of WUAs, confirms this view:
The WUA co-ordinator was an initiative of the Kertoraharjo farmers, meant to make
the relationship between the Irrigation Service and local organizations more efficient.
The co-ordinator could create understanding about government policy among
farmers in their own language. The system functioned well under the co-ordinator.
If there was a meeting or other activity, he was always there, so that the relations with
the Irrigation Service were smooth. The WUAs in Kertoraharjo were among the
better functioning ones, with an active farmer population. If there were activities like
collective labour on canals, all Kertoraharjo farmers joined. As the WUAs were
involved, all farmers, including the Javanese, accepted the structure.
This happy marriage between subak and WUA was short-lived. After a conflict between
the WUA co-ordinator-pekaseh and the (then Javanese) administrative village head about
the financial resources controlled by the WUAs, subak regulations were confiscated and
application to the WUAs forbidden. The function of WUA co-ordinator was discontinued,
and the pekaseh-co-ordinator was summoned to the police to account for “undermining
WUA regulations”. After this incident, TUs and WUAs are said to have degraded.
Maintenance was neglected, infrastructure disappeared and regulations for water
distribution were no longer followed. Contacts between farmers (through their WUAs) and
the Irrigation Service diminished to the point where today there is no contact at all between
farmers and the agency.
Thus, the functional separation between subak and WUA was reasserted. The subak
regulations adapted for the WUAs disappeared after confiscation, and were gradually
replaced by new subak regulations specifically made for each of the four subaks and
restricted to issues for which the subaks were allowed to be responsible. The pekaseh was
no longer actively involved in tertiary irrigation management and, since then, the subaks
and the pekaseh have organized rice rituals, guarded ritual purity, collected the seasonal
subak tax (on a per hectare basis), determined the agricultural calendar (primarily the start
of transplanting) and provided cash loans to their members. However, as formal
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organizations the subaks are no longer involved in “water issues”: the latter belong to the
WUA domain.
5. Different Conceptualizations of “Management” and Water as a Sanctioning
Instrument
The rigid separation between WUA and subak was based on diverging perceptions of
irrigated agriculture between government officials and the Balinese system users. In their
perception, classification of interrelated domains in terms of a distinction between
“management” and “religion” does not make sense. The way in which qualifications for
leadership functions in the subak domain are defined conveys the impression that the
spheres of WUA and subak are regarded as one “wet” sphere, requiring the same type of
knowledge, leadership qualities and characteristics. As the former pekaseh said about the
qualities of a subak leader or pekaseh:
He must be an all-round person. He should have knowledge of the weather, position
of the stars and the Balinese calendar, but also of leadership and administration,
water distribution, agricultural inputs and the characteristics of the rice varieties
planted. He should also know subak ceremonies. He should have field knowledge
and be diligent in keeping an eye on field conditions. He has to be conscious and
patient, a person who does not do damage to other persons and is capable of
composure. If it were about planting only, being pekaseh would be easy.
What does this separation mean for irrigation practices? According to many Balinese, the
separation of subaks/pekaseh and WUAs has had important consequences for both. WUAs
are weak organizations, lacking authority to enforce rules and sanction transgressions.
The small farmers’ groups that have emerged in several WUAs are more effective, and
the authority of their leaders more respected. The subaks have not fared much better.
Since the 1980s, Balinese landownership outside the initial subak areas has rapidly
expanded. This has led to problems of definition of Subak land and boundaries, and
contestation of Subak authority.
The segmentation of crucial linkages between subak functions has influenced irrigation
management. Engineers and officials, with their instrumental perception of irrigated
agriculture, classify this Balinese “wet” world into categories such as “water management”,
“agriculture” and “religion”. Thus, crucial relationships between interrelated dimensions
of subak have been lost, as the remarks by a farmer and subak functionary comparing the
Kertoraharjo subaks with those in his place of origin illustrate:
Why has irrigation management so deteriorated? The major cause is the separation
of subaks and WUAs, of water and collective labour for repair and maintenance
from the offerings. Take, for instance, mapag toya (ceremony for welcoming the
season’s first irrigation water). What does it mean here? It has lost its meaning
and importance for irrigation. In Bali, the canals are cleaned and repaired before the
agricultural season starts. Once the canals are ready for use, the ceremony is held
and the water can be used. In Bali, these are very important occasions. Usually
people are rather massively present. Here it is different: mapag toya belongs to the
subak, and canal cleaning is a task for the WUA. Often, when mapag toya is
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held, the canals have not even been cleaned and repaired. If offerings are brought
to the places where water enters the subaks at all, hardly anybody is present. Often,
offerings are made in the temple only.12
A village elder made a similar point, with sharp observations on the situation in
Kertoraharjo:
The subak has only retained its ritual function. It does no longer have a relationship
to irrigation. The government determines the planting schedule, only slightly
adapted to the Balinese calendar by the subak. It also determines the system
schedule. WUA regulations also derive from the government. Because the TUs and
WUAs are not completely Balinese and others do not recognize subak, its
regulations cannot be applied in the WUAs. In Bali, farmers join subak on the basis
of their water source. There is a close connection between collective labour
for repairing and cleaning canals, and ritual activities accompanying each stage.
The subak regulates everything: water, planting, seed choice, labour and offerings.
As a consequence, work is always executed in time. All members are present and do
their share. Here, decision-making and tasks related to irrigation and planting have
moved to the government. What remains for the subaks is ritual. Those functions. . .
can also be executed by the customary village. If my proposal were accepted, subak
and pekaseh would actually no longer exist. An important subak task, irrigation, was
taken away from it long ago anyway. If the new system is accepted, the customary
village leader will collect tax for all irrigated land owned by Balinese, irrespective of
its location and origin. If we continue using the old subak system, the problems will
never be solved. Land outside the subak areas could never be taxed, and payment of
tax would be dependent on the willingness of owners to pay. There is another
important difference with Bali here: if somebody refuses to pay tax or perform
labour in Bali, he will be fined by the subak. If he does not pay, his sawah is given a
field mark and he will no longer receive water. Here, water cannot be used as a
sanctioning instrument. The subak has no control over water; authority over water
allocation is in the hands of the WUAs. WUAs have the right to close off people
from water, but the subak does not. Many people refuse to pay tax or do not even
want to become a subak member, but the subak cannot effectively force them to
observe all subak rules. In the banjar and customary village, people fear sanctions.
In the subak, there is no such thing. Like in the WUA, which is also not feared
because it has no effective sanctions against farmers who breach the rules.
In this view, the forced separation of “water” and “religion” has seriously weakened both
subaks and WUAs, with negative consequences for local irrigation management.
6. Which order? Whose order? Towards a Contextualized Understanding of LocalIrrigation Management
I have discussed local responses to state attempts to create managerial order in a public
irrigation system. Considerable diversity in irrigation management practices exists within
the seemingly uniform technical, legal and organizational order of this system. I have
identified specifically Balinese forms of management of irrigated agriculture, mainly with
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the subak, as the main source of such diversity. New, context-specific articulations have
emerged between “engineering” approaches, and conceptualizations of rights, norms,
forms of regulation and organization, technology and practices associated with subak.
This difficult engagement between externally imposed arrangements and locally existing
and developing forms of knowledge, norms and rule systems, and organizing practices
produces tensions, contradictions and disjunctures rather than a predetermined regulatory
and managerial order.
I have given three examples. First, I have contrasted “external” explanations of
degradation in terms of farmers’ shortcomings leading to cycles of degradation and
rehabilitation with an alternative explanation. Balinese farmers do try to manage their
TUs. However, they do so by making use of specifically Balinese subak technology, norms
and rules, and organizational arrangements. Second, I have traced this history of
articulation of elements of subak and TU/WUA in the development of local irrigation
management. “Reinvented” in a non-Balinese environment, subaks were defined in terms
of land allocated to the settlers. When irrigation reached the village, the blueprinted
structure of the system demanded that farmers organized in WUAs. Gradually, the subaks
as organizations were marginalized; their role in irrigation management diminished.
Major functions of the current subaks and pekaseh are religious-ritual. However,
important domains of interaction with the broader field of irrigated agriculture continue to
exist: subak tax collection and determination of a transplanting date. Elements deriving
from the subak as institution have entered the domain of TU and WUA. Third, I have given
examples of the disjunctures created by the differing perceptions of irrigated agriculture
among external state agency officials and Balinese farmers. I have contrasted narrow
definitions of “irrigation management” with Balinese “persubakan”, which also includes
agricultural planning and ritual. Separation of these domains along the lines of WUAs and
subaks/pekaseh has weakened both.
Recent years have seen the emergence of a development policy interest in institutions,
the “rules-in-use” that guide human behaviour in institutional domains. Largely based on
neo-institutional economics, this interest in institutions derives its appeal mainly from the
basic assumptions and promises of manageability it holds. “Efficient” institutions can be
“crafted” by keeping transaction costs low and optimizing incentive structures (Ostrom,
1992; Schlager & Ostrom, 1992).
This social engineering approach has become rather hegemonic, often at the expense
of a more critical understanding of the complexities of intervention. I have shown here
how certain developmental norms about irrigation management have been translated
into highly routinized and blueprinted forms of irrigation development, in which farmer
adaptation is simply taken for granted. Rather than assuming that farmers will behave in
accordance with the externally introduced rules, I have started “on the ground” from
irrigation management practices that have developed among Balinese (Benda-
Beckmann et al., 1996; Spiertz, 2000). I have analysed TUs and WUAs in their
normative-legal, organizational and technical dimensions of regulation. Local irrigation
management is complex in all these dimensions. There is not just one orderly system of
rules, organizational arrangements and technology “in use”. There is uncertainty,
contestation of rules, interaction and tension between state and subak regulation, and
merging into new local forms of regulation. As to the relationship between regulation
and behaviour, it can be concluded that the Balinese farmers are guided in their
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managerial practices by elements of the institution of subak rather than by those of
TU/WUA.
Understanding local irrigation management requires an analysis that takes into account
the locally specific and embedded character of resource use and management. This
requires some distancing from policy-driven agendas that treat institutions as
unproblematic and uncontested rule systems. The outcome of planned changes through
civil and socio-legal engineering is basically uncertain and contingent. It is only by
recognizing this fact of life that we can better understand the dynamics of development
interventions and the forms of order and disjuncture they create in real-life settings.
Notes
1 This chapter was inspired theoretically by two insights. First, “legal pluralism” or “legal complexity”
refers to the existence and interaction of different (often state and non-state) legal orders in the same
socio-political space (F. von Benda-Beckmann et al., 1996; Bruns, Meinzen-Dick, 2000; Meinzen-
Dick & Pradhan, 2001; Spiertz, 2000). Second, irrigation systems can be analysed as “socio-technical
systems”, complexes of physical-technical, organizational and normative-legal dimensions of water
control that develop in a wider agro-ecological, politico-economic and socio-cultural context
(Mollinga, 2003; Vincent, 2001).2 “Colonization” means pioneer land settlement, not colonial rule.3 State-sponsored transmigration resettled Javanese and Balinese farmers on islands with a relatively
low population density, such as Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi.4 In 2000, Public Works became the Ministry of Settlement and Regional Infrastructure (Oad, 2001).5 P3A (Perkumpulan Petani Pemakai Air; Water Users’ Association).6 The WUA legal framework generally contains: a national basic law (“enabling law”) authorizing
establishment of WUAs as legal entities and providing regulations pertaining to water fees, etc.;
“bylaws” for specific WUAs, containing data on these WUAs and further specifications of
organization, rights and obligations; and “transfer agreements” in which transfer is arranged in greater
detail (Salman, 1997).7 Also used for the higher level encompassing various subaks, and its head. See this case.8 Toraja: ethnic group from highland South Sulawesi. Many Toraja have migrated to Luwu in search of land.9 KK (Kepala Keluarga) means “household head”, and refers to the number of initial Balinese settler
families (totalling 350). The second group of 50 households (from Tampaksiring) is often referred to as
“Tampaksiring”, to distinguish it from the other group of 50 settler families.10 PERTANIAN and Panitia Irigasi, respectively.11 In Bali, a distinction is maintained between the “dry” (customary) village and the “wet” village (subak)
(Geertz, 1972). In government administration, the village head is responsible for WUAs.12 This is corroborated by my own observations: 1 week after the ceremony, cleaning was still going on.
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