When it Rains, Use an Umbrella: Lessons in High-Risk Infrastructure Communications (February 2011)

8/6/2019 When it Rains, Use an Umbrella: Lessons in High-Risk Infrastructure Communications (February 2011)

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

CHRISTOPHER WALSHis the Communications O cer

or the Water and SanitationProgram ( www.wsp.org ), aglobal partnership adminis-tered by the World Bank. Hewas ormerly the communica-tions specialist or the energyunit in the A rica Regional VicePresidency o the World Bank,where he was the leadcommunications specialist orthe Bujagali hydropowerproject.

APPROVING MANAGERSJae So, Manager, Water andSanitation Program (TWIWP) S. Vijay Iyer, Sector Manager,Energy (AFTEG)

When it Rains, Use an Umbrella: Lessons inHigh-Risk In rastructure Communications rom

the Bujagali Hydropower Project

When Ugandas Bujagali Hydropower Project was revived in preparation or a December 2007 Board approval, the World Bank, IFC, and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) were aced with a new potential wave o criticism rom civil society, the media, and even member governments,in spite o the act that the project had meticulously ollowed World Bank Group economic, environmental, and social sa eguard policies. ThisSmartlesson describes how active communications, openness, inclusion, and confdence helped address critics o the project and spark the beginning o the end o the East A rican countrys chronic blackouts.

Background

Uganda has seen signi icant growth sincethe early 1990s, with its gross domesticproduct (GDP) increasing rom 3.4 percentin 1992 to 9 percent in 2008. With thisgrowth came new challenges, includingrapidly increasing demand or electricityup against a dwindling supply. Thegovernment took steps to generate morepower, including approaching the WorldBank Group in the late 1990s to support a250 megawatt hydropower project near aseries o whitewater rapids called Bujagaliin the town o Jinja. The project wouldhelp stabilize Ugandas energy supply,making room or new household andbusiness connections, while also helpingto prevent blackouts. The Bank, IFC, andMIGA gave their support or the run-o -river dam in December 2001, working withthe projects private sector sponsor, theU.S.-based AES Corporation.

The project aced signi icant oppositionrom two civil society organizations, which

claimed that the multimillion-dollarproject would help large industries ratherthan poor people and that it wouldcontribute signi icantly to climate change.These organizations launched a campaignpressuring the Bank Group and itsexecutive directors to stop the project,

despite voices rom Ugandans like EdithSsempala, then-ambassador to the UnitedStates, who said, Power is at the core oevery aspect o development. Weneeded a big power project to really moveour development orward. Some peoplethink that or A rica its enough to simplysurvive, and we are saying, no, we want todevelop. We want to move orward as aras we can go. 1

The anti-Bujagali campaign succeeded ingarnering signi icant negative mediaattention and prompted a World BankInspection Panel review o the project.Meanwhile, AES pulled out because o

inancial troubles, causing the project tostall inde initely just months a ter Boardapproval. Ugandas power de icit grew,and the country was orced to useexpensive diesel- ired power generatorsto close the gap. Roughly six years later,Bujagali had ound a new private sponsorin Bujagali Energy Limited (BEL), apartnership between Blackstones SitheGlobal and the Aga Khans Kenya-basedIndustrial Promotion Services. The projectwas revived, and the Bank Group showedits support or the project through aproposed $360 million in loans andguarantees, which included $130 millionin IFC loans to the private project company,BEL; a partial risk guarantee o up to1 The Monitor (Uganda; 2001).

FEBRUARY 2011
http://www.wsp.org/http://www.wsp.org/


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$115 million rom the International DevelopmentAssociation or the projects commercial lenders; andan investment guarantee o up to $115 million romMIGA.

The project team took special care to ensuresustainability and thoroughly ollowed and trackedadherence to the Bank Groups economic, environmental,and social sa eguard policies.

With the projects resurrection, the team knew there was ahigh likelihood o similar action rom the same civil societyorganizations. To manage the potential impact rom astorm o negative campaigning, the project team decided acomprehensive and active communications strategy wouldhave to be developed and executed or the project to atleast reach the Board approval stage. They were right.Following an intense several months o implementing thecommunications strategy and regular meetings o therespective managers o the three teamsIFC, MIGA, andthe World Bankto ensure smooth coordinationthroughout the process, the project was not onlyunanimously approved but was also commended by theBoard as a good-practice demonstration o the Bank Groupsadded value and commitment to sound developmentpractice. Here are some critical communications lessonsacquired during the storm.

Lessons Learned

1) When a storm is coming, prepare to get a little wet.Focus on managing rather than preventing attack campaigns.

The words high-risk project o ten conjure thoughts onegative campaigns, biting news headlines, pointing

ngers, and rolling heads, striking ear in the heart o thecommunications pro essional. High-risk projects areintended to bene t thousands or millions o people overlong periods, and they come with increased attentionbecause they o ten pose signi cant economic,environmental, and social risks. Many civil societyorganizations have as their mandate to question andinvestigate such projects on behal o various interests.

An important component o the projects success ulcommunications strategy was that the team accepted atthe outset that certain organizations would launch acommunications campaign against the project. Trying toavoid, prevent, or negotiate away such a campaign wasunrealistic. It made more sense to concentrate on strategiesthat would help mitigate the campaigns impact. The stormwas coming, whether we liked it or not. So the teamprepared to get wet.

Early in project identi cation, the team collaborativelydeveloped a communications strategy ocusing onexhaustive and active transparency and messaging thatunderscored the countrys need or, and potential bene ts

rom, the project. The government and other stakeholderso the project were sensitized to the need or the strategyand ully involved in its ormulation.

Another major ocus was on minimizing the politicalpressure on the Board caused by the campaign to allowexecutive directors to make in ormed and objectivedecisions based on acts. Not only was strong communicationsabout the project good business practice, it enabled theproject team to turn challenges, such as potentially negativemedia articles, into opportunities, using that spotlight towidely share messages about the projects bene ts anddevelopment objectives.

2) Know, recognize, and communicate a projectstechnical attributes to help manage risk.

Bujagali was to be a run-o -river dam, which obtains energyrom available stream fow and some short-term storage,

compared to larger storage reservoir dams, which inundatea much wider area and have a larger environmental impact.Also, the project incorporated an environmental o set sitedownstream rom Bujagali that would be preserved romdevelopment by the government to o set the Bujagalidams environmental ootprint. Furthermore, hydropowerwas a much more environmentally riendly, less carbon-intensive solution than the diesel- red power the countrywas orced to use because it was so lacking in energy.

With a high-risk project acing a negative campaign basedon various development suppositions, it is important toknow, recognize, and communicate that a project hasheeded principles o sustainability and demonstrated itscompliance with Bank Group economic, environmental,and social sa eguard policies. These sa eguards, based onthe principle that Bank Group projects should do noharm, are among the most sophisticated, according to theWorld Commission on Dams.

It was also important to know, recognize, and communicatepositively the projects development objective. The biggestreason behind the need or the Bujagali project was thatthe country desperately needed electricity: Only about 5percent o people there had access to electricity. Children

The relatively balanced news coverage o the project leading upto and ollowing Board approval indicated the communicationsstrategy was e ective.


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couldnt do homework a ter dark, clinics and hospitalscouldnt re rigerate vaccines, and businesses could notgrow. In act, without the Bujagali dam, the country endedup su ering signi cant power shortages, which in 2006contributed to a 5 percent decline in GDP.

These are shocking as stand-alone acts and thus werepower ul communications messages to counter those romthe campaign opposing the project.

Vocalizing these messages in all project communications,including print and online materials, as well as bymembers o the task team during interviews with thenews media, and supporting them with economic,environmental, and social impact assessments andproject documentation enervated much o the potencyo the negative campaign, which was based on weakerarguments about negative environmental and socialimpacts. A media analysis ollowing the Board approvalin 2007 showed that over 90 percent o news articleswere neutral or positive about the project and carried atleast one o the positive elements or actoids put outabout the project.

3) Use active transparency to manage risk; it removesbarriers, builds credibility, and osters dialogue.

In high-risk, high-pro le projects, it is important to identi yand use available project in ormation to its maximumpotential, to develop technological tools that help providethat in ormation to the public in real time, and to use thatopenness in achieving communications objectives. Opennessis not only Bank Group policy and good business practice; inthis instance it also helped the project team overcome alseperceptions created by critics.

The team captured, organized, and shared as much projectin ormation and related documentation as possible via aneasy-to- nd Web site ( www.worldbank.org/bujagali ) andother multimedia, 2 both or the sake o transparency anddialogue and to preemptively disarm critics accusations

2 Although not widely used at that time, social media such as Facebook and Twittercould now be used to actively provide new in ormation and oster ongoing dialogue.

o opaqueness. Everything rom the Project ConceptNote, to the projects economic analysis andEnvironmental Impact Assessments, to the strategicassessment o power development options served asevidence in the court o public opinion, since thesedocuments were publicly available or review. Even thePower Purchase Agreement, which is usually acon dential document, was shared by BEL throughUgandas Electricity Regulatory Agency.

A related lesson on transparency was or the task teamnot only to identi y a select ew project spokespeople,but to budget time or them to answer incoming queries.By budgeting around 5 percent o their time or thatpurpose, they were able to regularly and thoroughlyaddress di cult questions about the project rom newsmedia and other sources, thereby demonstratingopenness and willingness to engage.

4) Require that communications e orts be guided by sta based in the project country to signifcantly reduce risk.

Because the Bank Group is headquartered in Washington,with that come many activities and plans that aredeveloped and led outside o the project country. Evenmany o Bujagalis global communications activitieswere directed rom Washington, although the Bujagaliteam developed and implemented its communicationsstrategy in regular collaboration with country o cesta .

Having country presence throughout the process isespecially critical in a high-risk, high-pro le project. ForBujagali, this meant identi cation o , and two-wayin ormation fow to, project decision makers and otherstakeholders, including parliamentarians and othero cials. That communication was vital in ensuring thatmessages about the Bujagali dam reached intendedaudiences.

An in-country presence also acilitated rapid response toactions by project critics. For example, with only 24hours notice, local Bank Group sta were able to attenda surprise public event hosted by anti-Bujagali projectcampaigners. This allowed the team to present publicevidence in support o the project, thereby disarming anevent originally intended by its hosts to thwart it.

Conclusion

In April 2007, the Board showed solid support in itsapproval o the Bujagali dam project. The anti-Bujagalicampaign continued, and in December 2008, the Boardwelcomed an Inspection Panel report and approved therange o actions set orth in the management response.The Board noted that the Bank Group should remainengaged in Ugandas energy sector. Some Boardmembers expressed the view that the Bujagali projectwas an example o an improved World Bank Groupapproach to in rastructure projects and its commitmentto address associated economic, environmental, andsocial dimensions o development projects.

The Bujagali Hydropower project in Uganda will help reduce theneed or the more polluting, diesel-fred power plants, such asthis one in Jinja.
http://www.worldbank.org/bujagalihttp://www.worldbank.org/bujagali


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Although the project continues to evolve,the storm seems to have passed or now.Some lessons rom Bujagali were and continueto be applied to other projects in the A ricaenergy sector, such as the Bumbunahydroelectric plant in Sierra Leone.

As or Bujagali, the project won EuromoneysPower Deal o the Year in 2007. Constructionbegan in June 2007, and is set to startproducing electricity in late 2011. For now, thecountry is still orced to rely on diesel- redpower generators to meet the energy gap.

The author wishes to acknowledge theBujagali project team, whose work formed the basis of this Smartlesson.

DISCLAIMERIFC SmartLessons is an awardsprogram to share lessons learnedin development-oriented advisoryservices and investmentoperations. The ndings,interpretations, and conclusionsexpressed in this paper are thoseo the author(s) and do notnecessarily refect the views o IFCor its partner organizations, theExecutive Directors o The WorldBank or the governments theyrepresent. IFC does not assumeany responsibility or thecompleteness or accuracy o thein ormation contained in thisdocument. Please see the termsand conditions at www.i c.org/smartlessons or contact theprogram at smartlessons@i c.org.

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When it Rains, Use an Umbrella: Lessons in High-Risk Infrastructure Communications (February 2011)