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What Russia really wants

What Russia really wants. Russia’s foreign policy Euphoria of Great Power and special mission ◦Global competition for resources ◦Greatness is existential

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Page 1: What Russia really wants. Russia’s foreign policy Euphoria of Great Power and special mission ◦Global competition for resources ◦Greatness is existential

What Russia really wants

Page 2: What Russia really wants. Russia’s foreign policy Euphoria of Great Power and special mission ◦Global competition for resources ◦Greatness is existential

Russia’s foreign policy Euphoria of Great Power and special mission

◦ Global competition for resources◦ Greatness is existential◦ Spiritual citadel of conservative values and fighter against hegemonies

Consolidation of elites ◦ Wave of true patriotism◦ High approval ratings ◦ Enemy-seeking and competition to be “the most patriotic”

Attitudes towards the West ◦ Lack of trust and breach of rules (everyone lies, values’ talks are a disguise)◦ Clear shift towards Eurasia and Asian-Pacific region

Fighting media wars ◦ Image of corrupt, aggressive, authoritarian regime vs. Soviet propaganda clichés (poor promotion for foreigners)◦ Media wagging the dog (climate of animosity)

Page 3: What Russia really wants. Russia’s foreign policy Euphoria of Great Power and special mission ◦Global competition for resources ◦Greatness is existential

What does Russia really want? Stability in the country (regime; till 2024)

Stability in the neighborhood (neutrality)

Concerns to be listened to (respect, take seriously, only threats are taken seriously)

Stick to the commitments (no deception, Putin does not lie)

No hegemony of any kind (status, not waiting for “good things” from the U.S.)

New rules of the game (stop chaos)

Page 4: What Russia really wants. Russia’s foreign policy Euphoria of Great Power and special mission ◦Global competition for resources ◦Greatness is existential

Myths about Russia Empire of evil run by crazy Dr. Evil (different rationality, militarism as pragmatism)

Aggressive irredentism (no need for new territories, reactivity and defense)

Sanctions are not emotional and will work (we don’t care)

Crimea is reversible (not even a bargaining chip)

Symbolic steps have positive effect (rhetoric response, fuel for domestic propaganda)

Russia can be forced to change (resistance to pressure)