'WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

A CONVERSATION ABOUTAMERICA, EUROPE & THE WEST TODAY'

The American-European transatlantic relationship is experiencing itsworst crisis since the end of World War II. In light of the outcome of thepresidential elections, what is the likely future shape of US relations withEurope and the world? How do Europeans see these questions? Is the USfacing an unprecedented challenge from an emerging European Union? Isthere an emerging 'European model' for addressing contemporaryinternational dilemmas and crises, or is the United States still the world's'indispensable nation'? These and other topics will form the subject of anopen conversation in which audience participation is welcomed and willbe encouraged.

Monday, November 29, 2004 at 6:00 pm

NYU Jurow Auditorium, 100 Washington Square East (entrance on Waverly Place)

Participants:PROFESSOR MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, Christian A. Herter Professor of AmericanForeign Policy, Director of the American Foreign Policy Program, The Johns HopkinsUniversity, School of Advanced International Studies

PROFESSOR ANDREW MORAVCSIK, Professor of Politics, Director, European UnionProgram, Princeton University

AMBASSADOR PETER VAN WALSUM, Former Permanent Representative of theNetherlands to the United Nations

Moderator:PROFESSOR TONY JUDT, Director, Remarque Institute, New York University

Co-sponsors:The Remarque Institute and the Office of the Provost, New York UniversityInternational School for Humanities and Social Sciences, Universiteit van AmsterdamMinistry of Foreign Affairs, the NetherlandsFriends of the Universiteit van Amsterdam, New YorkMichiel Vos (initiator), International School for Humanities and Social Sciences, Universiteit vanAmsterdam

"What is to be done?A conversation aboutAmerica, Europe & theWest today"

Monday, November 29, 2004 JurowAuditorium New York University2

Professor Tony Judt, director of theRemarque Institute of New YorkUniversity put forth three ways ofthinking about the state of the American- European relations today:1. The state of the relations is desperate,

but the problem is not serious.There are significant immediate politicalquestions - over the future of NATO,the situation in Iraq, and what to do inthe Middle East, but they don't representa serious long-term, strategic crisis in thehistory of European American relations.2. The state of the relations is serious

but not desperate.All the political questions mentioned arenot desperate but what is serious is thatthe US and Europe are drifting apart instructurally profound ways. They arebecoming different societies, polities, andcultures - in respect to their public policy,people's private preferences, people'svoting patterns and their religiousallegiances. This is what matters inunderstanding the future of relationsacross the Atlantic.3. The state of the relations between the

two is both serious and desperate, orneither serious nor desperate.

US - European relations do not reallyfigure in an important way into thecoming history of the 21" century,relative to other questions concerning

South Asia, China or the environment.On all of these questions the West -North America and Europe - seem tohave far more in common when seenfrom the outside than seen from a"parochial internal perspective". One ofthe biggest dividers between the US andEurope is simple geography: Americasees its problems in faraway places whileEurope must deal with them up close.

Or, as Judt put it in the New YorkReview of Books: "To the Bushadministration "Islam" is an abstraction,the politically serviceable object of whatWashington insiders now call the GWOT:the Global War on Terror. For the US,the Middle East is a faraway land, aconvenient place to export America'stroubles so that they won't have to beaddressed in the "homeland." But theMiddle East is Europe's "near abroad,"as well as a major trading partner. FromTangier to Tabriz, Europe is surroundedby the "Middle East." A growing numberof Europeans come from this MiddleEast. When the EU begins accessiontalks with Turkey, it will be anticipatingits own insertion into the Middle East.America's strategy of global confrontationwith Islam is not an option for Europe.It is a catastrophe."3

: The Chatham House Rule did not apply to this debate.

g l Tony Judt, "Europe vs. America" New York Review ofBooks, Volume 52, Number 2 - February 10, 2005

Professor Michael Mandelbaum,Christian A. Herter Professor ofAmerican Foreign Policy, Director of theAmerican Foreign Policy Program, theJohns Hopkins University, School ofAdvanced International Studies: Whiletransatlantic relations are in a crisis theyare at the lowest point of crisis in years.There have been a great number of crisesin the US - European relationship in thepast. The threat by President Truman in1950 to use nuclear weapons in Koreawas one of them, with the British PrimeMinister Clement Attlee rushing toWashington to avert the use of nuclearweapons. The Suez crisis and the VietnamWar are other examples of low points intransatlantic relations. Even the Reaganadministration with its plans for missilesto be placed in Europe and its Star Warsproject can be described as a state of crisis.

An alliance can be described as an exercisein mutual recrimination, in that bestfriends can tell each other the truth. TheAtlantic alliance has fit that descriptionover the past decades. Note that inprecisely this period - the late 1940s tothe 1980s, there was an ideological unionof the 'West', which makes it the goldenage of transatlantic relations. A commonthreat bound both sides together: theSoviet threat imposed discipline andplaced limits on differences. That threat

is gone now and Americans and Europeansare now freer to disagree and to driftapart - and that is exactly what they do.

It is not surprising that the drift has beenparticularly pronounced over the lastfour years. This is due to the notion ofAmerican exceptionahsm: the ways thatthe US differs - and has always differed -from Europe. Differences between thetwo are significantly less now than whenthey were first written about in the 19*century. But some differences remain,like the role of religion in society, therole of the state and the use of force.

American views that differ significantlyfrom European views are concentratedon the right side of the political spectrum,that is: in the Republican Party. Thismajority party in the US has no majorcounterpart in Europe. When Republicansare in power their views are naturallyascendant in the US, estranging Europeans.See in this respect: The Right Nation byJohn Micklethwait and AdrianWooldridge.

After the end of the Cold War, there hasbeen a lack of common projects forEuropeans and Americans to getinvolved in. Add to this the ideologicalnature of the US of the past four yearsand the four years to come. The Europeans

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are focused on constructing Europe andthere is no role for the US to play in thisprocess. Europe is not actively involvedin matters beyond Europe, includingthose matters that are the focus ofAmerican foreign policy. In that respectthe United States is a global actor andEurope is a regional actor. Europeans donot lack opinions but they lack themeans to do something outside Europe.

The specter for the future is not apowerful Europe in opposition to theUS, but a weak Europe incapable ofsupporting the US. They will be neithergreat partners or friends, nor greatenemies. The verdict on the relationshipis therefore the same as was routinelynoted on the Habsburg Empire at theend of the 19* century: The situation ishopeless but not serious.

Professor Andrew Moravcsik, Professorof Politics, Director, European UnionProgram, Princeton University:Nowadays people think that the declineand eventual collapse of the US -European relationship is inevitable. Thesituation is perceived as worse thanduring certain periods during the ColdWar when relations were actuallystrained. People are pessimistic forcultural reasons. With the decline ofanti-Communism it became clear that

the US and Europe have very differentpolitical cultures. The absence ofsocialism in the American politicalculture has affected American values:Americans tend to think about politics ina less egalitarian and more libertarianway, whereas Europeans envision a moreactive role for their governments.

Political cultures on both continentshave always been very different but theyhave never played a big role ininternational issues. The lack of multi-lateralism on the part of the US forexample is to a great extent attnbtable toits political system, in which a 2/3Congressional majority is required topass international treaties. Therefore theUnited States will move forward eitherunilaterally or informally but notproperly multilaterally. But this is notthe source of the Atlantic rift.

The strongest argument for why theAmericans and Europeans cannotcooperate any longer is strategic. Withthe end of the Cold War there is nolonger a common threat. The real GoldenAge of US- European politics was notduring the Cold War, it was afterwards,in the nineties, because even without athreat both agreed time and again on theinternational use of force - the mostdifficult issue (see: Lebanon, Somalia,

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Balkans, Haiti). America and Europe didthat out of commonality of interests.

That commonality is gone. On that noteMoravcsik takes it "as a given that theUS policy in Iraq is a failed policy andI take it as given that the policy of theUS in Iraq is primarily responsible forthe decline of this Golden Age oftransatlantic relations in the 1990's. Fromthe First Gulf War to the Second GulfWar there was substantial cooperation.Only with Iraq did it change not becauseIraq was pursued without multilateralsupport - that didn't happen with regardto Kosovo either - but because it wasbad policy."

Europeans need to realize: You don't getsomething for nothing in internationalrelations. Europeans need to convincethe US that it needs them. The consensusis that the Europeans should do thisthrough building up their force, or likeRobert Kagan says: Europe needs to gettough or back off."

Moravcsik thinks this approach of theuse of military force is neither useful noreffective for the Europeans. Europeansshould try to stop Americans fromacting unilaterally, not oppose them.They will gain geopolitical influence byworking on their comparative advantage,

4 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power, America andEurope m the New World Order (Alfred A. Knopf, 2003)

5 Idem

which is the deployment of any otherpower except high intensity militaryforce. That means:1. Enlargement of the European Union:

there is no single policy by anygovernment since 1989 that hascontributed more to global peace (thatis: no wars) than the enlargement ofthe European Union. Therefore,Turkey should be included.

2. Trade: EU is a larger trading partnerthan the US with any country in theMiddle-East as well as with China.Europeans can use trade as a lever forinternal reform.

3. Foreign aid: the EU provides 70% ofthe foreign aid in the world today.

4. Peacekeepers: the EU provides 10times as many peacekeepers as the USthroughout the world.

5. Monitoring and inspections.These contributions by Europe areimportant because it is harder to win thepeace than it is to win the war andwinning the peace is where theEuropeans come in.

Ambassador Peter van Walsum, FormerPermanent Representative of theNetherlands to the United Nations:Robert Kagans rightly asserts that strongpowers view the world differently thanweak powers. After the Second WorldWar, Europeans have rejected war.

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During the Cold War they were under asecurity umbrella provided by the US.The post-Cold War wake up call for theEuropean Union - the realization thatthere was a price to be paid for militaryweakness - was the break-up of Yugoslaviain 1991. Europe failed in the formerYugoslavia because of its incapacity toproject military power. The US wasneeded to solve the situation.

In the future, Europe will remain theweaker power. Let us return to Kagan"sobservation that due to their differencein strength Europe and America view theworld differently. In the former YugoslaviaEurope detected the perils of weaknessand Europe now wonders whether theUS has discovered the perils of superiorstrength in Iraq. The (American) fear ofyielding to the temptation of appeasementmay be just as dangerous as the (European)fear of war. Strong powers such as theUS may be unable to appreciate theconcrete benefits of legitimacy. Militaryaction without legitimacy will provokegreater resistance and therefore requiremore force. Strong powers will also(mis)underestimate the benefits ofmultilateral engagement. To actmultilaterally when you can andunilaterally when you must seems to bethe more sensible strategy than the

A powerful country can be so mesmerizedby its superior military strength that itforgets to plan for the postwar phase.The question is not one of morality, butof efficiency - what are the results of ouractions? Robert Kagan says that"Americans are from Mars and Europeansare from Venus. They agree on little andunderstand one another less and less."Europeans and Americans don't sharequite the same view of the utility andlegitimacy of military force." "It's time",he says "to stop kidding ourselves thatEurope and the US share a commonview of the world or even that theyoccupy the same world." Morality isneither the preserve of Mars nor of Venus.

The notion of being from Mars maygenerate toughness that prevents acountry from carefully considering itsoptions and therefore drag a nation intoan unnecessary war. In an interviewthree months before the war in Iraq,Andrew Moravcsik said that lookingback in 25 years from now it will beclear that quiet European instrumentslike trade and peacekeeping will havebeen more effective than Americanbombs. That means that transatlanticrelations should be based on the divisionof labor: hard power supplied by the USand soft power by Europe.

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But the multilateral approach was nolonger attainable with respect to Iraq.Iraq is undoubtedly the main cause ofthe current friction between the twocontinents. The obstructionist Frenchattitude from 1997 onwards in the runup of the tough UN resolution 1441 wasa reason for the failure of a common US-European Iraq policy. This resolution,which was adopted by the SecurityCouncil of the UN on Nov. 8, 2002,gave Iraq a final opportunity to complywith its disarmament obligations(notably to reveal its programs todevelop weapons of mass destruction).Non compliance would result in "seriousconsequences". It was interpreteddifferently by France on the one handand the US and the United Kingdom onthe other hand. The choice of unilateralaction by the latter two was justified inVan Walsum's opinion.The final decision to go to war drewsome support amongst Europeancountries (including the Netherlands)and amongst 29 Democratic Senators(including John Kerry) but none of themcould have imagined that the Bushadministration would start the warwithout adequate preparation for thepostwar phase. If Bush wants Europe tohelp in Iraq all he needs to do is to makea clear distinction between the decisionto go to war in Iraq and the way this

decision was carried out. For thedecision itself Bush will still get somesupport in Europe but not for the bungledoccupation phase. Bush will have toadmit that launching the war withoutadequate troop levels was in the wordsof John Kerry "a colossal error ofjudgment". Now that he has beenreelected such an admission should notbe too difficult.

Q and A:

In the Q and A, Tony Judt put forththese thoughts: When we talk aboutcommon (transatlantic) values such aspeace, democracy and free markets; canpeace really be seen as an Americanvalue? With regard to Iraq: there wasnever any question that it would be won,but the likelihood that it would screwedup afterwards was quite high. A lot ofAmerican and European critics of thewar pointed out that because of the wayit was justified it was highly unlikelythat it would be well managed during theaftermath.

Aren't all three of the speakers elidingcrucial differences between presenttransatlantic ill feeling and pasttransatlantic squabbles? Past differencesseem to have been political and werekept behind closed doors and dealt with

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politically. The current intensity ofAmerican anti-European - specificallyanti-French - sentiments go way beyondthe past political dissent and reveal amarket and a willingness to be moreantagonistic towards Europe than in thepast. That change of attitude cannot onlyresult from the dissolution of the SovietUnion. Something else must be going on.

Mandelbaum points out that the war inIraq was in spirit a preventive war - toavoid Iraq from getting nuclear weapons.Nobody wanted to live with the prospectof a nuclear armed Saddam. If it wasn'tfor 9/11 the US could not have beenpersuaded to go to war against Iraq.Contrary to popular belief it is ratherdifficult to take Americans to war. Everywar seems to be a political trial of thepresident. In that respect America couldbe regarded as a peaceful nation.Regarding the spread of democracy, thedifference between America and Europebecomes clearer. Europeans are moreskeptical towards the possibility ofspreading democracy throughout theworld than the Americans.

The worry about the situation in Iraq isthat it may not be a real country butrather a territory where three groups,Shiites, Sunnites and Kurds have beenliving together involuntarily for 80 years

under force - British at first and Sunnitelater. It is possible that when you takethat force away the country will fall apart.

Moravcsik: On public opinion andwhether or not the current rift is worsethan past squabbles: politicians are notjust looking at the possible solutions to apolicy problem (for example how tosolve the current transatlantic problems).Europeans need to realize that publicopinion of the issues playing a role in thetransatlantic relations - at least in the US -is managed. Politicians are not onlylooking out to the optimal policy thatcan be reached - they are also looking in -towards public opinion. Americans donot wake up one day and decide thatthey do not like the French. Instead,politicians wake up one day and decidethat they do not like the French and thenthey talk about it and encourage thepublic to think the same.

The most resonant criticism of the Bushadministration during the 2004 electionswas that somehow Bush left theAmericans without any help from therest of the world to solve problems.When asked Americans are usuallypretty nervous about unilateral action.

Van Walsum: On the justification of thewar in Iraq: By the end of 2000 we knew

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that the sanction regime was crumblingand we all knew that the follow upwould be war. There was no other nextphase possible but war. "You cannot say:the sanctions did not work we will justforget about it." Bush and Blair made themistake to justify the war in Iraq bymaking the assertion that there was animmediate threat of chemical weapons(of which they were not sure) instead ofpointing towards the potential danger ofa nuclear build up in Iraq.

Moravcsik: the model that explains thatthe real institutional fabric of globalgovernance is made of horizontalrelations between national officials andtheir contacts (as seen in institutions likethe UN or the EU), rather than ahierarchical, vertical model is correct.The horizontal model in his eyes is acorrect description of the way mostinternational organizations function.A symptom of the current transatlanticdifficulties is the fact that those networkshave diminished: nowadays fewerhorizontal transatlantic contacts take place.

Judt says that given the structure ofdecision making in the Senate it is highlyunlikely that the US is going to sign upfor the International Criminal Court, theKyoto Treaty or other internationaltreaties. And since these internationally

agreed norms of behavior are becomingmore important the United States willbecome a more isolated actor.

Moravcsik points out that internationallythe US may be viewed as the solesuperpower. When you look at itsdomestic political structure however,America is the least suited country toengage in international politics. The onlyreason it is somehow manageable at all isthe fact that it is a presidential systemwhere one guy can ultimately takedecisions. The moment anything has togo through Congress it becomesproblematic. This is the reason why theUS is ineffective at deploying civilianpower in contrast to its ability to deploymilitary power. Kagan points out thatfor domestic reasons America is designedto deal with military force moreeffectively than civilian power - themoment it comes to spending money,signing treaties, foreign aid it becomesdifficult to take decisions.

With regard to Iraq politicians in Europemissed a chance. They played to domesticpublic opinion not American publicopinion. The effect of French diplomacy- which was entirely directed at Frenchpublic opinion - was to leave Francewith less than no influence in theAmerican political system. French

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politicians should have acknowledgedthe desires of the American public aswell, instead of only those of the Frenchpublic. If you want to influence the USyou have to do it in a way so you can beheard in the US.

Mandelbaum makes the point thatAmerican sovereignty - embodied in theConstitution - is another reason forAmerican's resistance to enterinternational treaties.

He finishes with a clear example of aEuropean unsuccessful if not counter-productive attempt to intervene inAmerican politics: the attempt by theBritish left wing newspaper The Guardianto influence the outcome of the 2004Presidential Elections. Its readers werecalled on to write letters to the people ofthe important Clark County in swingstate Ohio in order to persuade them tovote for Kerry (Operation Clark County).On Election Day John Kerry carriedevery county in Ohio that Al Gorecarried in 2000 except Clark County.

Conclusion

"The survival of liberty in our landincreasingly depends on the success ofliberty in other lands. The best hope forpeace in our world is the expansion offreedom in all the world," said presidentBush during his second inaugural addresson January 20, 2005. It is this Wilsoniandrive for universal freedom with a sharpneocon edge that divides America andEurope. This quest for freedom was notthe purported reason for the Americansto go to Iraq, but the simmering ofdemocratic change in the Middle Eastmay eventually be the happy outcome.

Iraq is the current focus of divisionbetween the two continents, but the futureof the relationship will be determined bybroader issues of balancing responsibilityand roles. Success depends on divisionsof soft and hard power to regulateinternational conflicts. America mustrevive its willingness to listen and takeadvice from Old Friends. And Europemust expand its focus from inwardexpansion to visible internationalresponsibility. Despite the currentfriction over approach, Europe and theUS still share profoundly commoninterests. The debate whether the unilateralAmerican approach - with its historicalroots - is outdated on the international

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stage and will be replaced by themultilateral European approach will haveto wait for a future debate.

In the next four years every bit of progressmade in the Middle East will be sold bythe American administration as aconfirmation of their Iraq policy.Although resolution of the Cold Warleaves the United States as the solesuperpower, her dependence on Europemay be even greater in facing its newenemy. It is crucial that Europe, ProfessorAndrew Moravcsik stated, convince theUS of this fact. Europe's geopoliticalinfluence will be powered by their use ofsoft power: through trade, foreign aid,and peacekeeping. The so-called hardpower of military force will be left to theUS. Many panelists agree that this divisionof labor rather than division of policy isthe formula for trans-Atlantic success.

The media's current focus on differencesbetween America and Europe must bebalanced by a university based, publiclybacked forum to explore transatlanticrelations on a more profound level thatreveal enduring common interests. Wemust look beyond Iraq into economic,cultural and historical reasons for the"current intensity" of American anti-European and European anti-American"sentiments."

In order to achieve this it is importantfor all cooperating partners to continuecontributing to debates and exchanges inthe context of the US-European PublicForum.

Michiel Vos

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