What is the SOA

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What is the SOA?

History

The School of the Americas (SOA) is a combat

training school for Latin American soldiers, located

at Fort Benning, Georgia. In 2001 renamed the

Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC).

It was initially established in Panama in 1946 however it was expelled from Panama in

1984 under the terms of thePanama Canal Treaty (article iv) and reinforced under the

Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal (article

v).

Former Panamanian President, Jorge Illueca, stated that the School of the Americas was

the biggest base for destabilization in Latin America. The SOA have left a trail of blood

and suffering in every country where its graduates have returned. For this reason the

School of the Americas has been historically dubbed the School of Assassins.

Since 1946, the SOA has trained over 64,000 Latin American soldiers in

counterinsurgency techniques, sniper training, commando and psychological warfare,

military intelligence and interrogation tactics. These graduates have consistently used their

skills to wage a war against their own people. Among those targeted by SOA graduates are

educators, union organizers, religious workers, student leaders, and others who work for

the rights of the poor. Hundreds of thousands of Latin Americans have been tortured,

raped, assassinated, disappeared, massacred, and forced into refugee by those trained at

the School of Assassins.

SOA Changes its Name to Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
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On January 17, 2001 the School of the

Americas was replaced by the Western

Hemisphere Institute for Security

Cooperation. This was the result of a

Department of Defense proposal included

in the Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal 2001. The measure passed when

the House of Representatives defeated a bi-partisan amendment to close

the school and conduct a congressional investigation by a narrow ten vote

margin. The amendment was sponsored by Representatives Moakley (D-

MA), Scarborough (R-FL), Campbell (R-CA) and McGovern (D-MA) . The

following is a summary comparison of the "new" school with the School of

the Americas.

In a media interview last year, Georgia Senator and SOA supporter, the late

Paul Coverdell, characterized the DOD proposal as "cosmetic" changes that

would ensure that the SOA could continue its mission and operation. Critics

of the SOA concur. The new military training school is the continuation of

the SOA under a new name. It is a new name, but the same shame.

The approach taken by the DOD is not grounded in any critical assessment

of the training, procedures, performance, or results (consequences) of the

training program it copies. Further, it ignores congressional concern and

public outcry over the SOAs past and present link to human rights

atrocities.

COMPARISON OF THE SOA AND THE NEW SCHOOL

AUTHORITY:


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School of the Americas:

"The Secretary of the Army may operate the military education and training

facility known as the United States Army School of the Americas." U.S Code:

Title 10, Section 4415

Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation:

Secretary of Defense authorized to "operate an education and training

facility..."

Secretary of a department of the military designated as the executive agent

to run school

U.S. Code: Title 10, Section 2166.

Concerns and Comparison of Authority: Currently the Secretary of the

Army, who is under the direction of the Secretary of Defense, operates the

SOA. With the new proposal, the Secretary of the Army, or another

department of the military, will still operate the school as an agent of the

Secretary of Defense. The proposal offers no substantive change to the

SOA.

PURPOSE and MISSION:


provide "military education and training to military personnel of Central and

South American countries and Caribbean countries." US Code: Title 10,

Section 4415

provide "military education and training to the nations of Latin America",

"promote democratic values and respect for human rights; and foster


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cooperation among multinational military forces." SOA Course Catalogue,

1998/99


provide "professional education and training to eligible personnel of nations

of the Western Hemisphere," defined as military, law enforcement, and

civilian personnel "while fostering mutual knowledge,[ ...] and promoting

democratic values, respect for human rights". U.S. Code Title 10, Section

2166. Pentagon officials state this will include counter-drug operations,

peace support, and disaster relief.

Concerns and Comparison of the Purpose and Mission: The purpose

for the proposed new school as described varies in scope and detail from

the original language that authorized the SOA. However, the current

"working" mission of the SOA as reflected in the 1998/99 SOA coursecatalogue together with the actual day to day practice at the SOA is

consistent with what is being proposed. In short there is no change in

purpose between the new school and the SOA as its mission has evolved.

As with the "working" mission of the SOA, the purpose stated for the new

school downplays the militaristic aspects of the training offered and focuses

instead on "leadership development, counter-drug operations, peacesupport, and disaster relief." These courses existed at the SOA but have

never been well attended. The 2000 SOA Certification Report to Congress

shows that in 1999 a scant 14% of SOA soldiers took the peace operations,

civil/military relations and the like. Over 85% took the standard SOA fare:

commando tactics, military intelligence, psychological operations, and

combat training. A recent newspaper headline sums it up: "Bombs andBullets Most Popular Classes at the US Army School of the Americas."


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Nothing in the Defense Authorization Bill changes that at the new

replacement school

The new school allows for the training of police and civilian personnel. That

practice already was in place at the SOA. Further, the new authorization

allows any and all military training that has been core to the SOA, including

advanced combat arms, psychological operations, military intelligence, and

commando tactics.

The consequence of this kind of training has been at the heart of the public

and congressional controversy surrounding the SOA. It hones the skills ofLatin American soldiers who then can use what they learned against their

own people. For example, some of the Salvadoran soldiers cited in the UN

Truth Commission report for the massacre of six Jesuit priests and their

women co-workers had just returned from taking the SOA commando

operations course. The Jesuit massacre by all accounts was a commando-

type operation.

CURRICULA


No specific detail in original congressional authorization

Practice: 8 hours human rights instruction tacked on

Western Hemishpere Institute for Security Cooperation:

Includes "mandatory instruction for each student, for at least 8 hours on

human rights the rule of law, due process, civilian control of the military,

role of the military in a democratic society" U.S. Code Title 10, Section 2166

No restrictions on type or amount of military training


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Concerns and Comparison of the Curricula: The new school includes

human rights instruction, but that is not new. As the public outcry grew and

congressional censure mounted, the SOA instituted first a four-hour human

rights component and then upped it to eight hours in an effort to quellcritics.

While the eight hours of human rights training is not harmful, it is minimal

and inadequate for a school that touts its mission mandate as "promoting

democratic values, respect for human rights." There is no requirement that

the new school seek input from noted outside human rights specialists and

no provision to modify the content to address specific human rights issues

in particular countries (for example, paramilitaries in Colombia). In addition,

there is no attempt to evaluate or to measure the effectiveness of the

training through long-term monitoring of graduates or by any other means.

Although the bill is careful to minimize any mention of military training, the

fact remains that, like the SOA it replaces, this is a military institution and

Latin American troops will be sent there to learn military skills. The clearest

proof of this is to ask how many soldiers would come to the school if it

removed ALL combat-related training? We must also ask, if the primary

purpose of the institution is to teach democracy and human rights, as

claimed, isn't this more appropriately done in a civilian setting?

BOARD OF VISITORS:


No mention of a Board of Visitors (BOV) in the original congressional

authorization.

6-member BOV

Not independent oversight board


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BOV membership: 2 military officers; 1 person selected by Secretary fo

State; 6 people selected by Secretary of Defense including "to the extent

practicable" members of the academic, religious and human rights

communities; chairs and ranking minority members of House and Senate

Armed Services Committees included on BOV

meets at least annually to "inquire into the curriculum, instruction, physical

equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters"

Reports its actions and recommendations to Secretary of Defense

U.S. Code Title 10, Section 2166

Concerns and Comparisons of the Board of Visitors: In response to

congressional and public criticism, the SOA instituted a six-member Board of

Visitors (BOV) that was reconstituted in 1999. The BOV has been a

handpicked group of SOA proponents that, according to the 1998 SOA

Certification Report to Congress, focused significant energy on PR

campaigns in the media and Congress to polish the SOAs image. Despite

the illusion, the SOAs BOV does not provide independent, outside critical

review or oversight of the SOA.

The authorization calls for a BOV, but gives the Secretary of Defense the

broad authority to determine the composition and actual members of Board.

Though provision is made for the possible inclusion of members of the

human rights, religious and academic communities, these communities are

not defined, nor is any selection criteria established. Furthermore, nothing

mandates the inclusion of independent human rights experts, religious

leaders, and other potential critics. It is up to the discretion of the Secretary

of Defense to determine whether or not it is "practicable" to include them.


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The Congressional make up of the Board of Visitors, limited as it is to

members of the Armed Services Committees would exclude many of the

school's congressional critics. The Board of Visitors proposed would like

the SOA BOV -- be primarily a handpicked group of SOA proponents.

The problem persists: The new BOV does not provide for independent,

outside oversight or critical review of the school.

ANNUAL REPORT


No provision in the original congressional authorization

In recent years, Appropriations Committees have required report on school

and "general assessment" of graduates


Within 60 days of meeting the BOV must submit to the Secretary of Defense

a "written report of its action and of its views and recommendations

pertaining" the new school.

By March 15 the Secretary of Defense must submit a report on the

"activities of the Institute during the preceding year" to Congress U.S. Code

Title 10, Section 2166

Concerns and Comparisons of Annual Report: While the SOA

authorization did not mandate an annual report, in practice, the SOA has

been required recently to make a report to the Foreign Operations

Committee. The new provision simply codifies the current practice, but

weakens even the minimal reporting requirements that have stood for the

last few years.


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The Annual Report unlike the SOA Certification Report does not require

even the minimal tracking or monitoring of recent graduates that was called

for in the SOA Certification Report. The proposed Annual Report is not an

analysis, critique, assessment, evaluation, appraisal or examination withrecommendations from an outside, independent source. It is simply "a

report" of the "activities" of the school.

TRANSITION FROM US ARMY SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS:


Secretary of Defense ensures that the Secretary of the Army provides for

transition from SOA into new school

The proposal calls for the repeal of original congressional authorization of

the School of the Americas.

Questions and Recommendation: By repealing the original

congressional authorization for the SOA, the bill closes the School of the

Americas on paper. Inexplicably, however, it does so with no word of

analysis. Why close a school that is without fault? Why open another that is,

for all intents and purposes, identical except for name?

The DOD proposal to close the SOA and replace it with an SOA

clone skipped over one vital step: Evaluation of the SOA model

upon which it is based. The opening of the new school is not grounded in

any critical assessment of the training, procedures, performance, or results

(consequences) of the training program it copies. Further, it ignores

congressional concern and public outcry over the SOAs past and present

link to human rights atrocities.

At the very least, a thorough independent investigation and report


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on the SOA are warranted before Congress can adequately

consider the merits of any new proposal for an SOA-like training

facility. A rigorous outside investigation of charges against the SOA is a

reasonable approach to resolve the controversy over the School of theAmericas or its replacement. The new school is substantially the same as

the SOA it purports to replace. The issues raised by critics of the SOA are

not addressed by the recently enacted changes. As the United States is

pouring money, military hardware and military training into Colombia and

SOA human rights abusers continue to operate with impunity in Colombia,

Guatemala and elsewhere, these issues remain as crucial and immediate asever.

COLOMBIA

Name: Colonel Alvaro Quijano

Country: Colombia

Dates/courses: Instructor of Peacekeeping Operations and DemocraticSustainment courses at the school from 2003 to 2004

Info: Col. Alvaro Quijano led a special counterinsurgency unit in western

Colombia a drug cartel stronghold and he and other soldiers who attended

the SOA were arrested in 2007. They were arrested for allegedly providing

security for the Norte del Valle cartel's leader and most-wanted drug lord, Diego

Montoya, is on the FBIs 10 most-wanted list.

Name: General Luis Bernardo Urbina Sanchez

Country: Colombia

Dates/courses: Command and General Staff Course, 1985

Info: Paramilitary death squad activity, 1988-89 -- Fellow SOA graduate Meneses

Baez confessed to Urbina Sanchez' involvement in paramilitary death squads,

which he referred to as "self-defense' groups; Disappearance, assassination, 1989

-- Implicated in the assassination of Amparo Tordecilla. Assassination, 1987 --


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Implicated in the assassination of Union Patriotica member Alvaro Garces Parra.

Disappearance, torture, assassination, 1987 -- Ordered the detention, torture and

assassination of Mario Alexander Granados Plazas. Disappearance, 1986 --

Intellectual author of the detention/disappearance of William Camacho Barajasand Orlando Garcia Gonzalez. Torture, disappearance, 1977 -- Implicated in the

torture of Omaira Montoya Henao and Mauricio Trujillo, and the subsequent

disappearance of Omaira Montoya. (TERRORISMO DE ESTADO EN COLOMBIA,

1992)

Name: General Luis Alfonso Zapata Uribe

Country: ColombiaDates/courses: Counter-insurgency, Small-Unit Infantry Tactics C-7, 1976

Info: San Jose Killings: Has commanded the 17th Brigade of the Colombian Army

since May 2005., whom were involved in the November 17th, 2005, killing of Arlen

Salas David, a leader of the Peace Community of San Jose de Apartado, Antioquia.

The soldiers accused, along with members of the self-defense forces

[paramilitaries], of the slaughter are Colonel Orlando Espinosa Beltrn, Major JosFernando Castao Lpez, Luitenant Alejandro Jaramillo Giraldo, Captian Sabarain

Cruz Reina, Sargent ngel Mara Padilla Petro, Sargent Jorge Humberto Milans

Vega, Sargent Henry Agudelo Guasmayan Ortega, Sargent dgar Garci

Estupin, Sargent Daro Brango Agamez, and Captain Ricardo Bastidas Candia.

Criminal proceedings against the soldiers were brought on February 26, 2009 for

murder of protected persons, acts of extreme cruelty, and conspiracy as part of

their participation in the February 21, 2005 massacre in which eight people,

including four children, were murdered..(El Tiempo, Jan. 2010)

Name: General Harold Bedoya Pizarro

Country: Colombia

Dates/courses: 1978-79, SOA Guest Instructor;1965, Military Intelligence

Course

Info: Paramilitary death squad activity, 1965 - present: "Throughout Bedoya's


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entire career, he has been Implicated with the sponsorship and organization of a

network of paramilitary organizations. Bedoya, who has never undergone any

investigation for his involvement in the massacres of non-combatants or other

dirty-war crimes, is an articulate proponent of the continued "legal" involvement oflocal populations in counterinsurgency operations." (Ana Carrigan, NACLA Report

on the Americas, March/April 1995)

Paramilitary death squad activity ("AAA"), 1978: Believed to be thefounder and chief of the paramilitary death squad known as "AAA" (American Anti-communist Alliance). (TERRORISMO DE ESTADO EN COLOMBIA,1992)

Other prominent members of the AAA Paramilitary group graduated from the SOAinclude: Tte. Cnel. Mario Montoya Uribe (1993, SOA Guest Instructor; 1983,Tactical Officer, Cadet Arms) Maj Jorge Flores Suarez (1972, Military IntelligenceOfficer Course)

Name: Major Alejandro de Jesus Alvarez HenaoCountry: ColombiaDates/courses: 1984, Joint OperationsInfo: Paramilitary death squad activity (MAS), 1982: Principal member of"Muerte a Secuestradores" (MAS), a paramilitary death squad responsiblefor numerous assassinations and disappearances. (TERRORISMO DE ESTADO ENCOLOMBIA, 1992)

Other prominent members of MAS Paramilitary group graduated from the SOAinclude: LTC Virgilio Anzola Montero (1967, Cadet Orientation Course), GEN CarlosJulio Gil Colorado (1969, 0-6), GEN Farouk Yanine Diaz (1990, Guest speaker;1991, Guest speaker; 1969, Maintenance Orientation Course)

Name: First Lieutenant Luis Enrique Andrade OrtizCountry: ColombiaDates/courses: 1983, Cadet Arms Orientation CourseInfo: Massacre of a judicial commission, 1989: Believed to be the intellectualauthor of the paramilitary massacre of 12 officials, including 2 judges, who wereinvestigating military/paramilitary cooperation.Assassination, 1988: Ordered the assassination of farmer Jorge Ramirez, carried

out by a military/paramilitary patrol under his command.Assassination, 1988: Ordered the assassination of Jose Sanchez, also carried out


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by military/paramilitary soldiers under his command. Then he had the corpse puton display for the benefit of the public.Ramirez family massacre, 1986: Andrade Ortiz was one of officers in charge ofmilitary/paramilitary soldiers who broke into the home of the Ramirez family, killed

two members outright; and captured 4 others whose bodies were found later withsigns of torture. (TERRORISMO DE ESTADO ENCOLOMBIA, 1992)

Name: General Hernan Jose Guzman RodriguezCountry: ColombiaDates/courses: 1993, SOA "Hall of Fame"; 1969, Maintenance OrientationInfo: Former Commander, Colombian Army, dismissed: With five other topmilitary officers, Guzman Rodriguez was dismissed on November 22, 1994 by

President Ernesto Samper. Samper overhauled the military leadership in the hopesof decreasing corruption and drug trafficking in the armedforces, and Improving the human rights record of the military. (Reuters, 11/22/94)Paramilitary activity (MAS), 1987-90: Guzman Rodriguez protected andaided paramilitary death squad MAS between 1987 and 1990, when it wasresponsible for the deaths of at least 149 people. (TERRORISMO DE ESTADOEN COLOMBIA, 1992)Illegal detention, torture, extrajudicial execution, 1986: Guzman Rodriguezcommanded the soldiers who detained, tortured, gang raped and executed

Yolanda Acevedo Carvajal - then concocted the story that she committed suicideby shooting herself in the nape of her neck. (TERRORISMO DE ESTADO ENCOLOMBIA, 1992)

Name: Colonel Roberto Hernandez HernandezCountry: ColombiaDates/courses: 1970, Automotive Maintenance Officer;1976, Tactical Officer, Small Unit Infantry TacticsInfo: Paramilitary activity, 1980-90: Consistently implicated in paramilitary

activities in association with members of the extreme right.Torture, 1990: Supervised the illegal detention and torture of 42people, most of whom were union members and human rights workers.Trujillo massacre, 1990: Implicated in the gruesome killings inTrujillo, in which many victims were dismembered with chain saws.(TERRORISMO DE ESTADO EN COLOMBIA, 1992)

Name: Major Carlos Enrique Martinez OrozcoCountry: Colombia

Dates/courses: 1975, Guerrilla Warfare OperationsInfo: Massacre, 1988: Implicated in the massacre of 18 miners in Antioquia,


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Assassination, 1987: Implicated in the assassination of the mayor of Sabana deTorres, Alvaro Garces Parra.Paramilitary activities (MAS), 1984-85: Implicated in paramilitary activitiesassociated with the death squad MAS. (TERRORISMO DE ESTADO EN COLOMBIA,

1992)Massacre of 19 businessmen, 1987: After an investigation that linked Yanine tothis 1987 massacre, the public prosecutors office issued an arrest warrant for

Yanine, who was at that time giving classes at the Inter-American Defense Collegein Washington. Upon return to Colombia, Yanine was detained, but, in a decisioncriticized by the U.S. State Department, among others, his case was quicklypassed to a military court where he was absolved. (Colombia: Derechos humanosy derechoshumanitarios, Comision Colombiana de Juristas, 1997) According to the 1998 State

Department Report on Human Rights in Colombia, Despite the governmentsattempts to bring him to justice in the civilian court system, the military prevailed,continuing the tradition of impunity for all but the lowest-ranking members of thesecurity forces. According to former SOA instructor Maj. Joseph Blair, Yanine

visited the SOA as a guest speaker from 1986 to 1989 on an annual basis and wasa close personal friend of US Army Col. Miguel Garcia, who was the commandantof the SOA at the time.

Name: Cadete Ritoalejo del Rio Rojas

Country: ColombiaDates/courses: 1967, Cadet Orientation CourseInfo: Paramilitary activity, 1985: Implicated in paramilitary activities, including thetheft of an Army weapons shipment. (TERRORISMO DE ESTADO EN COLOMBIA,1992) In 1999, President Pastrana sent Del Rio into retirement withoutexplanation, at a time when he was under investigation by the federal ProsecutorsOffice for alleged human rights abuses and could face criminal charges. (MiamiHerald 4/10/99)

The Risks of U.S. Aid

By Ignacio G?mez G.

Members of the U.S. Congress are concerned that military aid to

Colombia could be used to violate human rights, and they cite a

recent incident as a case in point.
http://www.soaw.org/about-the-soawhinsec/victims-and-survivors/colombia/1715http://www.soaw.org/about-the-soawhinsec/victims-and-survivors/colombia/1715http://www.soaw.org/component/mailto/?tmpl=component&link=aHR0cDovL3d3dy5zb2F3Lm9yZy9hYm91dC10aGUtc29hd2hpbnNlYy92aWN0aW1zLWFuZC1zdXJ2aXZvcnMvY29sb21iaWEvMTcxNQ==http://www.soaw.org/about-the-soawhinsec/victims-and-survivors/colombia/1715?tmpl=component&print=1&page=http://www.soaw.org/about-the-soawhinsec/victims-and-survivors/colombia/1715?format=pdfhttp://www.soaw.org/component/mailto/?tmpl=component&link=aHR0cDovL3d3dy5zb2F3Lm9yZy9hYm91dC10aGUtc29hd2hpbnNlYy92aWN0aW1zLWFuZC1zdXJ2aXZvcnMvY29sb21iaWEvMTcxNQ==http://www.soaw.org/about-the-soawhinsec/victims-and-survivors/colombia/1715?tmpl=component&print=1&page=http://www.soaw.org/about-the-soawhinsec/victims-and-survivors/colombia/1715?format=pdfhttp://www.soaw.org/component/mailto/?tmpl=component&link=aHR0cDovL3d3dy5zb2F3Lm9yZy9hYm91dC10aGUtc29hd2hpbnNlYy92aWN0aW1zLWFuZC1zdXJ2aXZvcnMvY29sb21iaWEvMTcxNQ==http://www.soaw.org/about-the-soawhinsec/victims-and-survivors/colombia/1715?tmpl=component&print=1&page=http://www.soaw.org/about-the-soawhinsec/victims-and-survivors/colombia/1715?format=pdfhttp://www.soaw.org/about-the-soawhinsec/victims-and-survivors/colombia/1715


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Senator Patrick Leahy, author of an amendment that bans the

United States from providing aid to human rights violators, has

obtained information that Colombian Col. Lino S?nchez was

working on a military planning exercise with American GreenBerets at the same time that he was involved in planning the

Mapirip?n Massacre. That information was developed by the

Colombian federal prosecutors office.

Leahys office began an inquiry into the matter last year, following

an interview session with El Espectador. Information resulting fromthat inquiry is the origin for this report, which shows S?nchezs

relationship with U.S. special forces in 1997.

This week, a discussion on a Colombia aid package was to be held

at the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee. Leahy, a member of

the Committee, is also sponsor of a law that bans U.S. military from

training human rights violators. Leahy requested a rigorous

investigation of military forces to be trained, lest the Pentagon end

up assisting the authors of crimes against humanity. This report,

assembled by the Investigative Journalism Team of El Espectador,

details a case in which such a violation has already taken place--

during the Mapirip?n Massacre, on July 20, 1997.

Such investigations are authorized under three agreements which

force the Colombian government to maintain a human rights record

on military forces eligible for training, and which at the same time

allow the State Department to veto units in which even one

member is suspected of a human rights violation.


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The first agreement was signed in July 1997, when Colombia-U.S.

relations were at their lowest point.

Then Ambassador Juan Carlos Esguerra and Undersecretary ofState Barbara Larkin agreed on the final text in Washington on July

20, 1997, while in Bogot? Ernesto Samper presided over an

Independence Day military parade marked by the absence of any

military commander with him on the reviewing stand and by his

own lack of a visa stamp in his passport to visit the United States.

General Commander Harold Bedoya Pizarro, an opponent of civilian

oversight of human rights violations in the military, did not attend

the parade; on July 22 he declared himself in rebellion and on July

25 he was replaced by Manuel Jos? Bonett. The Inspector General

of the Armed Forces and other members of the military high

command had celebrated National Independence Day instead at the

Army Special Forces School, built by U.S. Special Forces at

Barranc?n Island on the Guaviare River.

Two hours up the river, Mapirip?n was empty. Forty-nine residents

of Mapirip?n had been massacred. The surviving residents of the

village of 1,000 were still homeless on August 1, when the official

announcement came that U.S military aid for the Colombian armywas being unfrozen.

The Green Berets had at least three years of experience in

Barranc?n and had been conducting military planning exercises

there during the two months leading up to the release of aid,

announced in an agreement signed in Washington. The Colombian


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forces with them for the exercises were under the command of

Col. Lino S?nchezaccused today by the Colombian Federal

prosecutors office with planning the Mapirip?n massacre with

Carlos Casta?o [the leader of paramilitary forces in Colombia].

With support provided by Senator Patrick Leahy, who requested

and obtained information on the case, and the International

Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) in Washington, the

Investigative Journalism Team from El Espectador, PIE, compiled

and analyzed more than 4,500 pages of official documents inEnglish and Spanish about the diplomatic, military and humanitarian

events that took place during that Independence Day in San Jos?

del Guaviare, Mapirip?n, Bogot? and Washington.

Based on this information, it can be concluded that the U.S. Army

Special Operations 7th Group (Green Berets) carried out military

planning training with Colonel Lino S?nchezs troops, while he

was planning a massive murder of civilians in Mapirip?n. The goal

was to eradicate the FARC [Colombian Armed Revolutionary

Forces guerrillas] and to allow Colombias United Self-Defense

Forces [the paramilitary forces] to seize control of the illegal

economy in the southern region of the Guaviare province which,

according to the State Department, produced 30 percent of theworlds coca supply.

With no control

U.S. Special Operation Forces, under the command of the assistant

secretary of defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity


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Conflict (whose English acronym is Solic), trained in Colombia a

long time before it was decided their operations should be

examined in terms of human rights. Carlos Salinas, a specialist on

the subject who works for Amnesty International in Washington,asserts that training was taking place since 1962.

In 1996, when the Leahy Amendment (which bans aid to military

units involved in human rights violations) took effect, the State

Department ruled that the record of abuses by Colombian Army

personnel made most units ineligible to receive aid.

Solic continued sending trainers because, according to its legal

interpretation, joint combined exchange training (JCET) must be

considered training for US forces rather than aid for the country in

which it takes place.

Such exchanges (or JCET), which take place every year in more

than 123 countries, was the subject of media and congressional

scrutiny in 1997, when the General Accounting Office (GAO) was

ordered to audit its accounts and clarify whether the training was

or was not military aid. In mid 1999, the GAO published a report

that concurred with the Solic legal interpretation. It also quoted an

embassy report (by Curtis Kamman) which said the few JCETsthat have taken place have been consistent with the foreign policy

goals in the country (fighting drugs), but since only one or two are

carried out annually, they do not have major impact in achieving

those goals.

The official 1997 report, sent to the U.S. Congress in April 1998,


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included in its list six special forces deployments in Colombia.

However, on December 22, 1999, in a letter sent to Senator Leahy,

Solic admitted that just between June and August of that year nine

deployments had taken place in the country, only one of whichwas included in those previously reported. In sum, there may have

been more than fourteen deployments during that year, that is, 24

percent of the total amount reported by the South Command in its

area of responsibility.

Except for two of them, all visits were conducted by the sametraining team: the Army Special Operations 7th Group, based at Ft.

Bragg, North Carolina. Members of the unit speak Spanish without

an accent and have been combat trained in the Amazon in a wide

range of special skills--with or without technological support--

including organization of public opinion campaigns as well as night

jungle combat training. Their most recent training was for the

[Colombian] 1st Counternarcotics Battalion, and future sessions

will be carried out with other battalions included in the Colombia

Plan.

Two Plans

For eight months starting in May 1997 the Green Berets center ofoperations was the Army Special Forces School, five minutes

away by boat or car from the Counternarcotics Base at San Jos?

del Guaviare and headquarters for the State Department

programs for the eradication of coca plantations. The name of the

locale is Barranc?n; it is an island formed around a rock in the bed

of the Guaviare River; from its heights the river and the Sabanas


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de la Fuga, a historic sanctuary for the Farc, can be seen.

When Senator Leahy requested information on those activities,

Solics director, Brian Sheridan, explained that the course thatbegan on May 14 in Barranc?n dealt with mission planning and

military decision making and other specific matters related to light

infantry.

Colombian reports indicate that the unit being trained was

commanded by Colonel Lino S?nchez. The Counternarcotics PoliceIntelligence Office gave the State Department and the federal

prosecutors office a report according to which, in those days,

S?nchez pioneered a plan to introduce paramilitary forces in the

sprayed areas, within the framework of U.S. programs and

announced that some aid had arrived that would enable him to

teach the guerrillas a lesson.

The federal prosecutors office discovered that on July 12, 1997, a

group of fifteen men personally chosen by Carlos Casta?o Gil,

flew in two planes from Urab? to San Jos? del Guaviare Airport,

which is shared by the Counternarcotics Police and the garrison in

which S?nchez had his office. On the Barranc?n road, Casta?os

group joined the paramilitary forces of Casanare and Meta, andfrom there they went by truck to Charras, on the opposite bank of

the Guaviare River, across from Mapirip?n.

The boats on which they all crossed the river encounter no

problem when they passed the Marine Infantry post in Barranc?n,

built by the Americans and in which river combat training took


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place. The paramilitary forces, more than 100 men, remained in

Mapirip?n from July 15 to 20, and were at no point challenged

either by civilian or military authorities.

These dates coincide with three Special Forces deployment dates

mentioned in the report to the U.S. Congress, but none of those

listed by Sheridan occurred during the massacre days. However,

the federal prosecutors office and other officials say they

crossed paths with U.S. military in San Jos?, when they traveled to

Mapirip?n to aid the massacre survivors and open theirinvestigation.

Government files include five reports from five military commands,

including General Bonetts, mentioning the maneuvers that took

place at that time in Barranc?n to celebrate the closing of a special

forces course.

But they only indicate the presence as guest of honor of General

Jos? Mar?a Balza, Commander of the Argentinian Military Forces.

El Espectadors investigative team requested information on this

point from the Colombian Army Command on December 2, 1999, but

has received no response.

Strategic point

Five years before the massacre, the current setting for the war

along the Guaviare River was only starting to take shape. In the

early 90s, Mapirip?n had become one of the main coca cities,


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because of its easy access by road from Villavicencio, its airport,

and its access through jungle paths. It was also accessible to the

southern part of the river that connected with the jungle region by

that time already considered the worlds largest coca cultivationzone-- Miraflores and Calamar (Guaviare).

In May 1992, the 5th Front of the Farc attacked Mapirip?n and

burned down the local police station, which was never rebuilt. A

FARC leader known as Comandante Alex arrived to solve the

conflicts among the raspachines (coca leaf growers), chichipatos(cocaine basic paste buyers), prostitutes, gasoline dealers,

carriers, merchants, and others. In exchange for security, the

guerrillas established a 10 percent protection tax, calculated

according to the amount of gasoline sold to process coca base

and paste.

Antonio Mar?a Barrera Calle (el compadre Cotumare, one of the

village founders four decades earlier), Sina? Blanco and other

gasoline sellers were forced to become tax collectors for the

guerrillas.

Two hours up the river, the Counternarcotics Police base in San

Jos? del Guavire had already become the main site for StateDepartment programs against coca cultivation. First the spraying

and later the Marine Infantry patrols had discouraged farmers from

growing coca close to the river. The cultivated plots encroached

into the jungle. Sometimes the troops went there (to Mapirip?n),

but as the guerrillas didnt show up, they got bored and returned,

explained Colonel Eduardo Avila, who was assigned to the area.


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Later on, the Barranc?n training camp was in full activity.

According to the Defense Department annex office at the US

Embassy in Colombia, the Army Special Forces Training Schoolwas built in 1996(and) theres also a small Colombian Marine

(Infantry) detachment at the baseapparently built by Navy

Seabees in 1994, as part of a training exercise, Sheridan told

Leahy. In Bogot?, however, National Planning Department found

out about the school only in mid 1999, when for the first time it

needed money from the Colombian government.

Months before the massacre, the Municipal Unit for Technical

Agriculture (Umata) director, Anselmo Trigos, had started to gather

information on the farmers to carry out a plan prepared for the

town by the National Plan for Alternative Development (Plante),

with a budget of 800 million pesos[about $1 million]. Trigos became

the target of threats and was forced to leave after the 5th and

44th Fronts of the Farc subjected him to a trial by the people on

May 18, 1997.

In June, the paramilitary group led by Ren? in Aguabonita (located

between San Jos? and Barranc?n) had started operations, killing

seven chichipatos because they had paid taxes to the Farc.

Combined Forces

On May 14, according to Sheridan, the Green Berets began a JCET

whose goal was mission planning and military decision making

with the personnel assigned to the Special Forces School in


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Barranc?n.

Colonel S?nchez told the federal prosecutors office that towards

the end of May or beginning of June an order came down to masstroops of the 2nd Mobile Brigade in the vicinity of Barranc?n;

around that time, the Division Command decided to cancel all leave

and the entire effort was directed to retraining in Barranc?n.

The colonel (now accused of being the intellectual author of the

massacre and awaiting trial) asserts he divided his time betweenBarranc?n and his office in the Par?s Battalion, in the southern

airport zone.

According to intelligence reports, confirmed in a judicial statement

by Major Juan Carlos L?pez and Colonel Arturo Beltr?n (from the

Counternarcotics base, in the northern part of the airport) DEA,

Marine Infantry and Counternarcotics representatives visited the

Mobile Brigade Commander (S?nchez) to request his collaboration

in Operation Sapphire 2. S?nchez did not agree to collaborate

because he had other plans.

On the night of June 21, the colonel himself visited the policemen,

apologized for his absence and asked about the results.Immediately he described the plan: He saidaccording to the

reportthat anyway, the paramilitary fought against a very strong

enemy in the region, and that at that moment, he had support to

teach the guerrillas a lesson, and that the idea was to take

advantage of the operation developed by Counternarcotics to

introduce self-defense forces in the area, but in the last minute


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some problems had turned up. The policemen refused to

participate in the plan and later provided details about the plan to

the federal prosecutors office and the State Department.

Two days later, on June 23, according to information provided by

Sheridan, the training program for S?nchezs troops ended. On

July 24 (four days after the massacre), the American trainers

contingent returned [to Barrancon]; in August two other U.S. Navy

special forces units, the 4th Group of Navy Seals and the 8th

Naval Unit for Special Warfare joined them, initiating an anti-drugtraining course with Sanchezs troops, policemen and marines.

Plan B

On Saturday, July 12, at 3:05 p.m. and 3:20 p.m. respectively, an

Antonov flying in from Necocl? and a a DC-3 from Los Cedros

(Apartad?) landed at San Jos?. According to the federal

prosecutors office Investigation, the 15 men selected by Casta?o,

under the command of a.k.a El Percher?n, Mochacabezas [the

beheader] or El Diablo, arrived on the Antonov. Their only

weapons were machetes and knives. They carried with them on

the DC-3 several tons of supplies and the first edition of the

magazine Colombia Libre with an insert titled To the People of theGuaviare. The insert was signed by the Guaviare Front of the

United Self-Defense Forces, and threatened to kill anybody who

dared to pay taxes to the Farc.

According to a report sent to Senatory Leahy by Undersecretary

of State Barbara Larkin, the American personnel involved in the


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28/30

Cort?s Novoa. The judge went to his office to report what was

going on. The paramilitary blocked his entry.

The judge, taking necessary precautions, went off in search of aworking telephone. At around 2:30 p.m. he found a phone in

service at the Hotel Moserrate; he called the commander of the

Joaqu?n Par?s Battalion, describing the

situation in the village and the possible presence of Carlos Casta?o

in Mapirip?n.

The Colonel wrote an urgent information memorandum to

General Jaime Humberto Usc?tegui, Commander of the 7th Brigade

in Villavicencio. He recommended a quick and immediate airlift to

Mapirip?n with personnel and equipment from the Mobile Brigade

Number 2 (three battalions in Barranc?n and 3 helicopters).

Usc?tegui, also charged in the legal proceedings, says he did not

receive such a report.

According to the judge, 27 people were captured on the morning of

the 15th. They were all taken to see Mochacabezas, who had

settled in the butcher yard of the municipal slaughterhouse. Among

the first victims was Cotumare. He was tortured all day long and

his screams froze the jungle air throughout that first night. Dont letme die in such a miserable way, witnesses recalled hearing him

shout amid his cries.

These were the first victims of the 49 people (4.9 percent of the

estimated population of Mapirip?n) who Carlos Casta?o

acknowledged being killed in the operation.


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The paramilitary siege lasted until July 20, when the International

Committee of the Red Cross, also alerted by the judge, sent a plane

to Mapirip?n to rescue the judge and his neighbors. As the RedCross personnel raced to the airport, Mochacabezas added a

parting touchhe tossed a dead dog into the crowd. It was the

local teachers dog and Mochabezas had strangled it in his own

hands.

Tension between civilians and the military

The office of the President received news of the massacre on July

22. The report arrived shortly after Gen. Bedoyas revolt, followed

by his appeal for other members of the armed forces to join him.

Amid the tense situation, the presidents adviser on human rights,

Luis Manuel Lasso, organized a trip from Bogot? to Mapirip?n with

the members of the federal prosecutors office. Their plan was to

go to San Jos? on a Police aircraft and from there a military

helicopter, which would carry them to the massacre site.

They completed the San Jos? leg of the journey, but the military

helicopter didnt arrive. The two available helicopters were busy

during ceremonies at Barranc?n, where officials were on hand forthe end of the U.S. Special Forces training course and the visit of

the Argentinian Army Chief of Staff, explained General Bonett on

July 24, the same day he replaced Bedoya.

Although Sheridans letter does not mention any U.S. military

presence in Barranc?n during the massacre days, the federal


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prosecutors office investigation chief believed the opposite.

According to the lead federal prosecutors report, the military said

the helicopters were being used in a social gathering with military

personnel from the U.S. Embassy. The incident escalated when,at the presidential advisers request, the Army IV Division

commander, General Agust?n Ardila Duarte was summoned, and

he ridiculed the presidential advisor and paid more attention to the

American guests than to the investigative mission.

All week long, according to military flight reports at San Jos?Airport, Army Command and Inspection representatives and

Brigade and Division Commanders with their entourage visited

Barranc?n.

According to the JCET reports to the U.S. Congress, three courses

ended between July 20 and 28 in Colombia, but the Solic does not

acknowledge any of them ended during the National Independence

Day commemoration.

Documents

What is the SOA