ELSEVIER Nuclear Physics B (Proc. Suppl.) 64 (1998) 509-513

PROCEEDINGS SUPPLEMENTS

What future for nuclear weapons?

J. Steinberger a

aCERN, 1211 Geneva 23, Switzerland

What have nuclear weapons to do with QCD? The temperatures in nuclear explosions are too low to generate quark-gluon plasma (but only by a factor of 10-6). Perhaps what they have in common is that they were both invented by physicists. But please don't blame me for this harangue, rather blame the conference organisers who accepted it.

Nuclear weapons are not the only grave danger facing our society, there are plenty of competitors: global population growth, anthropomorphic ecological damage such as the greenhouse effect, the rapid exhaustion of important resources such as oil and gas, etc. What is special about the nuclear weapons danger is that it could probably be eliminated without much trouble and with a consequent benefit to all, nuclear haves and nuclear have-nots alike.

1. H I S T O R Y O F N U C L E A R W E A P O N S A N D T H E I R D E P L O Y M E N T

The fission nuclear weapons used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki had explosive yields equivalent to about 15 tons of conventional explosive. The 1950s saw the development of the so-called hydro- gen bomb, composed of a fission "primary" with similar yield, which ignites a l i thium-uranium, fusion-fission "secondary" with a typical yield of several hundred kilotons, but some models have yields equivalent to several megatons of conven- tional explosive. The US developments were fol- lowed a few years later by the USSR. Britain joined the club in 1952, France in 1960, and China in 1964. It is generally believed that Israel, In- dia, and Pakistan have nuclear capabilities, but this has never been openly stated by their govern- ments. One country, South Africa, has produced nuclear weapons, but has since destroyed them.

Nuclear weapons are customarily divided into two classes: strategic weapons, generally with high yields, deliverable at large distances by in- tercontinental missile, submarine, or aircraft, and tactical weapons, generally of "small" yield and with varied delivery means: artillery shells (the US has developed a nuclear bazooka weapon weighing 55 pounds!), anti submarine depth charges, land mines, short range missiles and bombers.

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The large bulk of all nuclear weapons, 98%, are brandished by the Americans and Russians, which also gives these nations the leading role and responsibility in past or future nuclear arms control policy. The sixties and seventies saw in- tense build-ups of these arsenals, driven by the US and followed by the USSR with a few years' lag. The high point was reached in the late eight- ies with about 25,000 strategic warheads and tens of thousands of tactical weapons in each of the two arsenals (see Figure). Their 20 odd giga- tons of explosive yield correspond to 6000 World War II's! The last decade has seen significant re- ductions in these arsenals, following arms control agreements discussed below. However, although some weapons have been destroyed, the warheads themselves or their components at present are stored, not destroyed. The British, French, and Chinese arsenals are of the order of 250-500 war- heads each.

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510 J. Steinberger /Nuclear Physics B (Proc. Suppl.) 64 (1998) 509-513

2. A B R I E F H I S T O R Y OF N U C L E A R A R M S C O N T R O L

The importance of nuclear arms control was recognised immediately after Hiroshima and Na- gasaki. The first attempt, immediately after the end of the war, was the US Acheson-Lilienthal- Baruch plan for nuclear arms elimination, but this contained asymmetries unacceptable to the Sovi- ets, and so failed.

1963 saw the signing of the Atmospher ic Test Ban (ATB), but only following a public outcry against the radioactive pollution caused by about 500 atmospheric bomb tests with a combined ex- plosive yield of some 25,000 Hiroshima bombs, and a resultant human radiation exposure equiv- alent to perhaps 10 Chernobyls. Chernobyl was an accident, but these tests were the deliberate actions of the military, supported by their respec- tive governments, and under the supervision of physicists.

The ATB was a US-USSR bilateral treaty which, however, was later followed also by the other nuclear powers. The first nuclear arms control agreement reached under UN auspices was the 1968 N P T Non Prol i fera t ion Treaty, signed by 150 member states, including the five nuclear powers. This asymmetric treaty divides the world into nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. The latter agree to remain so, and the former agree (Article VI) "... to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament...".

In the light of the rapid development of mis- sile technology, the US and USSR concluded, in 1972, the very important A B M (Anti Ballis- tic Missiles) Treaty, which severely restricted the development and deployment of anti ballistic missile interceptor missiles as well as radar sites for their guidance. This treaty reflected the re- alisation that anti missile deployment could not hope to provide adequate protection, but would instead be an incentive to escalation of nuclear weapon deployment, since the latter are cheaper to produce than the former.

The 1974 US-USSR Limi ted Test Ban limits the yields of nuclear tests to 150 kilotons.

In 1979 Carter and Breznev signed the SALT II Strategic Arms L imi ta t ion Trea ty which, however, was never ratified and so did not go into effect.

The INF In t e rmed ia t e Range Nuclear Force treaty, signed by Breznev and Reagan in 1988 eliminated ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5000 kilo- metres. It is the first treaty actually reducing the numbers of weapons, and so constitutes a turning point in the nuclear arms race. It should be noted that this occurred before the "end" of the cold war. This shows that the present US-Russian ef- forts to reduce nuclear weapons deployment is not just a consequence of the changed political condi- tions, but was recognised to be an important goal long before.

The 1991 START I treaty reduced US and Russian strategic missiles to about 8000 warheads each.

The START II treaty, signed by Bush and Yeltsin in 1992, has been ratified by the US but not by Russia. It would reduce strategic warhead numbers to about 3000 each, and also require a more stable deployment, for instance by eliminat- ing land-based multiple warhead missiles.

In 1997 the Comprehens ive Test Ban Trea ty (CTBT) was signed by almost all mem- bers of the United Nations, with very few excep- tions, of which India and Pakistan are outstand- ing. It bans nuclear weapons tests of any nu- clear explosive yield, and is an important measure against proliferation as well as against the imple- mentation of new weapon designs by the nuclear powers.

The large tactical nuclear forces have not been the subject of a formal treaty. In 1979 President Bush, in a unilateral declaration, pledged the elimination of all 6000-odd US ground-based tac- tical weapons. This was followed within months by a declaration by President Gorbachev to with- draw all Soviet tactical weapons (20,000?) to cen- tral bases in Russia. Since these declarations are not legally binding, verification is not possible. It is my understanding that the bulk of the US ground-based tactical weapons have been made inoperative, but that the Russian weapons still exist in large measure.

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The strong move towards nuclear weapons re- duction of the past few years has more recently reached an impasse in Russia, which feels itself menaced by the proposed Nato expansion to- wards the east and by the US push towards re- interpretation of the ABM treaty and the erec- tion of missile defences which might threaten the credibility of the Russian deterrent. These are given as reasons for the delay in the verification of START II, as is the fact that this treaty, since it eliminates multiwarhead missiles, would actu- ally require Russian construction of new single warhead missiles, which would be difficult for the present poor Russian economy.

3. P R E S E N T US N U C L E A R W E A P O N S P O L I C Y

The several nuclear weapons states of course have different rationalisations for their nuclear policies, but also have positions in common. One of the latter is of course that nuclear weapons serve their security interest. I take the US as ex- ample, because it is the most powerful and there- fore more depends on it. No progress is possible without its leadership, and conversely, with the US leading the way, the others may be expected to follow. This was the case, for instance, for the CTBT.

Despite its agreement, in the NPT, to the even- tual abolition of nuclear weapons, this has not been, and is not at present, US policy. The US nuclear position, as restated in the 1994 Pentagon Nuclear Posture Review, is that nuclear deter- rence is essential to US security.

President Clinton, July 1994: "Even with the cold war over, our nation must maintain military forces that are suffi- cient to deter diverse threats. We will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from act- ing against our vital interests and to con- vince it tha t seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. Therefore we will continue to maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability to hold at risk a broad range

of assets valued by such political and mili- tary leaders."

US Secretary of Defence W.J. Perry to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1.3.1995: "The US must maintain a nuclear force of sufficient size and capability to hold at risk a broad range of assets valued by potentially hostile military leaders, as well as the pos- sibility to reconstitute a large force, should the need arise."

Present US policy is the maintenance of a nu- clear posture against all military threats, not only nuclear. The latter is presumably the reason why it has refused to sign any no first use pledge or agreement. It would like to achieve agreement with Russia to reduce strategic warhead levels to about 2-3000, and to reduce tactical weapons to very few, but with the option of increasing the levels substantially and quickly "should the need arise".

4. LOOKING T O W A R D S A N U C L E A R W E A P O N S F R E E W O R L D ( N W F W ) . IS IT DESIRABLE?

Present US policy is not aimed at the elimi- nation of nuclear weapons, but on the contrary, it considers these as a security asset. This, in my view, is a most short-sighted policy, not only from a global, but even from a purely national- istic American point of view. Not only the rest of the world, but especially America would be more secure in a NWFW. Given overwhelming US strength in conventional weapons, the only threat to its security can come from nuclear weapons, even from a much weaker, but nuclear adver- sary. On the other hand, in the three US military confrontations since World War II, North Korea, Vietnam and Iraq, its nuclear weapons were use- less. They were, however, a global threat, since in all three cases some military leaders considered their use, with unpredictable consequences.

a. Even the reduced nuclear weapons levels which are now considered would, if used ei- ther accidentally or by decision of an ill-

512 I Steinberger /Nuclear Physics B (Proc. Suppl.) 64 (1998) 509-513

advised government, cause incredible dam- age. The world is hostage to the nuclear weapons states. So far so good, but tomor- row?

b. The present policy of the nuclear weapons states is based on an asymmetrical posi- tion in international relations of five nu- clear powers, two of which are superpow- ers. For how long will this be accepted? The world has never been stable, the change USSR -~ Russia is a recent example. The huge nuclear arsenal in the hands of an ex- tremely unstable Russian government and social organisation is an interesting threat hanging over the globe. The government is not even able to pay the workers needed to keep the nuclear weapons in safe condi- tion. But there are other equally impor- tant changes, such as the emergence of the East relative to the West. For how long will it make any sense that e.g. France is nuclear, and so also a permanent member of the security council, but not Korea (ei- ther of them), nor Japan, not to speak of India?

C.

d.

Nuclear weapons invite proliferation. If nu- clear weapons serve French interests, why not Cerman? Why not Korean or Iranian?

Conventional weapons are a quite sufficient deterrent to keep the peace among the ma- jor powers.

To sum up, a N W F W is desirable: nuclear weapons are a global threat, the status quo, so dear to the nuclear powers, can not be main- tained, and the global military situation would be no less stable if nuclear weapons were abolished.

5. IS A N W F W F E A S I B L E ?

I assume that the non-nuclear states would feel more secure in a NWFW. Let us assume for this discussion that the nuclear powers were also in favour. Of course the chief concern of each of the latter would be the assurance that as it goes non nuclear, the others do likewise; it is the prob-

lem of verification, and clearly a serious, difficult question.

There are now biological and chemical warfare conventions with difficult verification problems, but which nevertheless have been signed by most of the countries concerned. Verification of com- pliance with respect to the manufacture of nu- clear weapons is a good deal easier than that for chemical or biological weapons, since the produc- tion, for instance, but not only, of the essential fissionable material, requires very visible installa- tions. In any case, an international agency with adequate powers to monitor and control the pro- duction of fissionable material, as well as possible assembly plants or delivery vehicles, such as the IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency, but considerably stronger, would be required.

The most challenging concern is the possibil- ity that present nuclear powers may cheat by hiding existing nuclear warheads and/or nuclear weapons material. It is not obvious how this can be controlled, although it is also not completely easy to do this, since the installations for storage facilities would still need to be substantial, and kept under tight security, and necessarily many persons would be informed, including potential Vanunu's. If the present nuclear powers could convince themselves that they are bet ter off with- out these weapons, they might also be able to con- vince themselves that they are each sufficiently responsible not to cheat on each other and on the rest of the world.

The key to feasibility is the conviction of the nuclear states that they would benefit from this step. If the present world dominant power, the US, would resolutely favour a policy towards a NWFW, it is not hard to imagine that this could succeed.

US policy change towards that of a N W F W is the essential requirement for progress towards a NWFW.

6. T H E I N T E R E S T OF F R A N C E

De Gaulle probably had little choice when he initiated French nuclear weapon development, given the American and British nuclear postures, and his perceptions of the need for French inde-

J. Steinberger/Nuclear Physics B (Proc. SuppL) 64 (1998) 509-513 513

pendence of the US. It is, however, doubtful that the French nuclear arsenals are an advantage to France in its relations with its European neigh- hours, nor with any other nations I can think of, except possibly the US and Great Britain, and it seems clear tha t a N W F W would also serve France's security and other interests best. France would be more secure and no less independent if there were no nuclear weapons in the world as it is now with its nuclear arsenals, but hostage to the other present and possible future arsenals.

The advantages to France of a NWFW seem evident, but there has been, and is now, essen- tially zero public discussion of this important is- sue in France. In America there is some pub- lic discussion, little enough, on nuclear weapons policy. Recently there has been in the US press quite some coverage of the Canberra Com- mission report, as well as of the statement of 50-odd retired generals and admirals of many

countries, and separate appeals by General Good- pastor, former Supreme Allied Commander in Eu- rope (SACEUR), and General Lee Butler, until three years ago the Commander in Chief of the US strategic air forces, all painfully aware of the dan- gers inherent in the nuclear arsenals and pleading for a NWFW. I have been reading Le Monde reg- ularly for quite some years, but do not remember any discussion either questioning French nuclear weapons policy or on the merits or demerits of a NWFW. Also among my colleagues in physics I sense less interest in this question than in the US.

France is an important nation, militarily and culturally, and I think the question of the future of nuclear weapons deserves more serious public scrutiny in France than has been its fortune, and hopefully from a global rather than narrow chau- vinistic perspective. This is the reason for this harangue.