1 TPA will pass – prefer our evidence because it takes into account their non-unique arguments and Obama’s PC is necessary to work out a compromise billSpulak and Byers 2/12 (Thomas Spulak is a partner and Bonnie Byers is a consultant in King and Spalding’s Washington, D.C., office (King and Spaulding is an international law firm). “Expect Trade Promotion Authority Bill To Pass” http://www.law360.com/articles/509435/expect-trade-promotion-authority-bill-to-pass)It is hard to imagine that a TPA bill will not be enacted , but when it does, it will look different from the one now pending. President Obama will have to work with Congress to add provisions that make the bill more palatable to Democrats. There are a number of trade provisions that could attract democratic votes. One is legislation that would clarify that currency manipulation by a country can result in a countervailable subsidy under U.S. trade laws. The provision would help U.S. companies address the serious competitive disadvantage they face from Chinese exports that benefit from China’s undervalued currency. The provision has significant bipartisan support and similar versions have passed by wide margins in separate congresses in both the House and Senate. There is also likely to be a push for full renewal of Trade Adjustment Assistance either as part of the TPA bill or as a separate provision. Portions of TAA, which provides assistance to workers displaced by foreign trade, expired at the end of 2013. Members of the New Democratic Coalition are expected to introduce a TAA bill within the next several weeks. Other trade provisions that could be packaged with TPA include renewal of the Generalized System of Preferences, which expired last year, a Miscellaneous Tariff Bill that would temporarily lower the duties on imported products that are not produced in the United States, and other trade preference programs. Like everything else in Washington, D.C., today, nothing is easy . In fact, the safest bet is to say that TPA will not be enacted. But although there are significant challenges associated with negotiating trade agreements without TPA, it can and is being done. In the end, Congress could gain more by being in the tent than outside trying to look in. Thus, we believe TPA will be enacted.

Democrats will get some concessions from the administration. And in the end, although not favored, side letters could be negotiated to address some issues that may already be concluded in the ongoing negotiations. With rank and file Republicans on his side, Obama will have to work this out with his fellow Democrats. We believe that he will .

Economic engagement with Mexico’s politically divisive Wilson ’13Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International. Center for Scholars (Christopher E., January, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new_ideas_us_mexico_relations.pdf)At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, the U nited S tates and Mexico have an important choice to make : sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context , or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term . Given that job creation and economic growth in both the U nited S tates and Mexico are at stake , t he choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be.

Capital is key—vital to economyBryan Riley, senior analyst and Anthony B. Kim, senior policy analyst, “Advancing Trade Freedom: Key Objective of Trade Promotion Authority Renewal,” ISSUE BRIEF n. 3912, Heritage Foundation, 4—16—13, www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/advancing-trade-freedom-key-objective-of-trade-promotion-authority-renewal

Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) has been a critical tool for advancing free trade and spreading its benefits to a greater number of Americans. TPA, also known as “fast track” authority, is the legislative power Congress grants to the President to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements. Provided the President observes certain statutory obligations under TPA, Congress agrees to consider implementing those trade pacts without amending them.¶ More than a decade has passed since TPAwas last renewed in 2002, and its authority expired in 2007. Reinstituting TPA may well be the most important legislative action on trade for both Congress and the Presidentin 2013 given the urgency of restoring America’s credibility in advancing open markets and securing greater benefits of two-way trade for Americans. As the case for timely reinstallation of an effective and practical TPA is stronger than ever, the quest for renewing TPA should be guided by principles that enhance trade freedom, a vital component of America’s economic freedom.¶ Both House Ways and Means Committee chairman David

Camp (R–MI) and Senate Finance Committee chairman Max Baucus (D–MT) have announced plans to pursue TPA

legislation. However , many lawmakers have correctly pointed out that a proactive push from President Obama is

critical , given that trade bills have been a thorny issue for many Democrats in recent years .¶Historically, it has

been common practice, although not formally required, to have the President request that Congress provide renewed TPA. In fact, except for President Obama, every President since Franklin Roosevelt has either requested or received trade negotiating authority.(1)¶ After four years of informing Congress it would seek TPA at “the appropriate time,” early this year the Obama Administration finally indicated its interest in working with Congress to get TPA done. The President’s 2013 trade agenda offered the Administration’s most forward-leaning language yet, specifying that “to facilitate the conclusion, approval, and implementation of market-opening

negotiating efforts, we will also work with Congress on Trade Promotion Authority.”(2)¶ In the 2002 Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act, Congress—whose role in formulating U.S. trade policy includes defining trade negotiation objectives—made it clear that¶ (t)he expansion of international trade is vital to the national security of the United States. Trade is critical to the

economic growth and strength of the United States andto its leadership in the world . Stable trading relationships

promote security and prosperity.… Leadership by the U nited S tates in international trade fosters open markets, democracy, and peace throughout the world .

Economic decline causes war and miscalculation Royal 10— Jedidiah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, M.Phil. Candidate at the University of New South Wales, 2010 (“Economic Integration, Economic Signalling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Edited by Ben Goldsmith and JurgenBrauer, Published by Emerald Group Publishing, ISBN 0857240048, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political

science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and

the security and defencebehaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. ¶ First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's

(1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As

such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also

Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. ¶ Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000)

theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding

economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult [end page 213] to replace items such as energy resources,

the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could

potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 ¶ Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write,¶

The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg& Hess, 2002. p. 89) ¶ Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, &Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to

external tensions. ¶ Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. “ Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). andBlomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. ¶In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. ¶This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. [end page 214] Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

2

Interpretation—Toward means in the direction ofAmerican Heritage 09 (‘toward’, http://education.yahoo.com/reference/dictionary/entry/toward)to·ward (tôrd, trd, t-wôrd) KEY PREPOSITION: also to·wards (tôrdz, trdz, t-wôrdz) KEY In the direction of: driving toward home.

Violation—The affirmative is economic engagement with Mexico toward Britain, the United States, and the Cayman Islands—at best they’re extra topicalBlickman 13Tom Blickman, specialises in International Drug Control Policy and Organised Crime as a researcher at TNI's Drugs and Democracy Programme, formerly worked for Bureau Jansen and Janssen, a research institute on intelligence and police matters, “Deficiencies in financial oversight enable money laundering”, Transnational Institute, http://www.tni.org/article/deficiencies-financial-oversight-enable-money-laundering)In July 1989, the leaders of the economic powers assembled at the G7 Paris summit decided to establish a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to counter money laundering as an effective strategy against drug trafficking by criminal ‘cartels’. However, since the inception of the international anti-money laundering (AML) regime there is a growing awareness that the regime is not working as well as intended.¶ A case in point is the recent HSBC money laundering scandal : from 2006 to 2010, the Sinaloa cartel in Mexico and the Norte del Valle cartel in Colombia moved more than $881 million in drug proceeds through HSBC’s US and Mexican branches. Most observers suspect that this is only the tip of the iceberg. In total, the bank’s US and Mexican branches failed to effectively monitor the origin of more than $670 billion in wire transfers and more than $9.4 billion in purchases of US dollars from HSBC Mexico.¶ Traf¬fickers would sometimes deposit hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash in a single day into a single account using boxes designed to fit the precise dimension of the tellers’ windows in HSBC’s Mexico branches. In December 2012, US federal and state

authorities negotiated a $1.92 billion fine with the London-based HSBC to settle charges rather than seeking a criminal indictment against the bank. The fine is less than 10 per cent of HSBC’s $20.6 billion worldwide profit

before taxes for 2012 and is about five weeks of income for the bank. HSBC’s US branch offered correspondent banking services to HSBC’s Mexican branch, treating it as a low risk client, despite the obvious money laundering and drug

trafficking chal¬lenges in Mexico. Services included high risk clients like casas de cambio (currency exchange houses), high risk

products like US dollar accounts in the Cayman Islands, a secrecy jurisdiction , with inadequate customer due diligence and weak AML controls.¶ The evidence in the case suggests that customers barely had to submit a real name and address, much less explain the legitimate origins of their deposits. The Mexican branch transported $7 billion in cash US dollars to the US branch from 2007 to 2008, outstripping other Mexican banks, even one twice its size, raising red flags that the volume of dollars included proceeds from illegal drug sales in the United States.

Voting Issue

Limits—regulations toward international banks multiplies the case-list by infinity—even the smallest step outside the 3 topic countries justifies action anywhere geographically in the world—crushing the negative’s ability to compete.

Extra T means reject the entire affirmative – justifies infinite extra planks that are unpredictable and have their own advantages and can spike out of ground – severing just those parts makes the aff a moving target and kills neg strat.

3Text: The National Banking and Securities Commission of Mexico should increase anti-money laundering efforts by adopting the supervisory review in the Basel II recommendation.

CP solves caseViñals and Ezyaguirre 11 Jose and Nicolás, International Monetary Fund, Mexico, "Financial System Stability Assessment", reflects the work undertaken in the context of joint IMF/World Bank FSAP Updates missions to Mexico City in September and October 2011, December 7, 2011, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr1265.pdfThe CNBV’s organization, regulations, and prudential supervision have been ¶ significantly overhauled

since the 2006 FSAP Update. The CNBV’s staff is professional and ¶ has outstanding information systems at its disposal with high quality and

granularity of data that ¶ form the basis for building robust analytical tools and models. Its regulatory framework is ¶ comprehensive and relies on well-developed supervisory methodologies and processes. Homehost cooperation is

well developed.18 A new vice-presidency handles anti-money laundering and ¶ the combating financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) work; new departments have been created, ¶ new risk areas/functions have been added, and work is ongoing to develop analytical and ¶ statistical tools to fully implement Basel II and to deploy more sophisticated approaches to ¶ analyze risks in the banking system. Once in place, this should provide specific risk metrics and ¶ clearer criteria to differentiate each bank according to their risks. ¶ 21. CNBV has been reasonably effective in delivering supervision; however, ¶ implementing Basel II’s supervisory review (Pillar 2) would complement already strong ¶ capital buffers to reach a fully risk-based regulatory system. Currently: (i) the ¶ responsibilities of the Boards of Directors are not explicitly linked to the levels of risk and ¶ capital; (ii) portfolio concentration risk limits are unclear—exemptions are widespread; and ¶ (iii) the overall rating assigned to a supervised institution is not used effectively to require ¶ remediation. Adopting Pillar 2 would introduce a supervisory review process and associated ¶ standards providing the authority, methodologies, and criteria to require banks to increase capital ¶ (including to offset loan concentration, liquidity, interest and operational risks); it would also ¶ explicitly relate the outcomes of the supervisory review process with banks’ mandatory internal ¶ capital adequacy

assessment process (ICAAP), to determine future capital needs and how these ¶ can be met. Additional measures to strengthen

supervision are to: (i) create a quality assurance ¶ function to increase consistency and standardize supervision practices, documented in updated ¶ supervision manuals; (ii) introduce a formal supervisory cycle to cover all significant supervisory ¶ areas—this can also be used for resource planning; and (iii) standardize criteria and procedures, ¶ including metrics used internally for risk assessment and onsite inspections, to provide ¶ benchmarks against which business practices can be judged.

4Mexico energy reform implementation will pass now but Nieto’s PC is keyGarza 12/19(Antonio Garza, writer for The Moniter. "COMMENTARY: Mexico's oil reforms -- a long road ahead". www.themonitor.com/opinion/columnists/article_ed02861a-6836-11e3-acf7-0019bb30f31a.html)Mexico took a giant leap toward a new economic future last week with congressional passage of a remarkably bold energy reform bill . Both euphoria and hand wringing ensued as Mexico observers and the Mexican people began contemplating the significance to the country of opening its long-protected oil and gas industry.¶ These emotional reactions, though deeply felt, will soon subside; giving way to the realization that there’s much hard work ahead and that the road to reform is long and potentially strewn with obstacles.¶ But there’s every reason to believe that President Enrique Peña Nieto’s administration is attuned to the challenges . After all, there’s been quite a lot of discussion — albeit largely of the academic sort — about how to revamp the sector. And Mexico surely stands to benefit from the examples of previous reform efforts in the hemisphere and beyond — namely in Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Norway.¶ The measure that emerged from Congress last week barely resembled the initial, cautious, proposal presented in August by the governing Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI). That middle-of-the-road

effort, which would have introduced profit-sharing agreements, was judged unappealing by the foreign firms whose investment and

expertise Mexico’s energy sector desperately needs to overcome its woes.¶ And so a new, more transformative piece of legislation was produced via the art of political compromise. It’s a craft that has been evident throughou t Peña Nieto’s first year in office , facilitated by the three-party accord known as the Pact for Mexico. But with the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) unwilling to negotiate meaningful change for the energy sector, the pact inevitably dissolved. The PRI and the conservative National Action Party (PAN) remained at the bargaining table and together produced a reform more far-reaching than many analysts had thought possible.¶The approved legislation reforms Mexico’s constitution by ending the 75-year-old oil and electricity monopolies by state-run oil giant Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), and the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE). This will allow private oil companies to explore for and produce oil and gas under a variety of contracts, including services, production or profit-sharing, and licenses; create a sovereign fund to manage oil revenues, and to revise the nature and governance of the Pemex board.¶It took less than a week for the constitutional changes to be ratified by a majority of state legislatures; 17 of Mexico’s 31 states approved the reform within five days of its congressional passage. Senate recognition of the state actions and the president’s signature will soon follow.¶ But the next step will be far more challenging: translating constitutional reforms into workable policies. This secondary legislation, also called implementing laws, will stipulate the policy framework and legal processes required to carry out the reform.¶These measures are highly anticipated and potentially will set the stage for as much as $20 billion per year in new investments in the sector. They must clarify roles (for all actors in the sector, from private companies and regulators to Pemex, CFE and other government entities) and establish the mechanisms and procedures by which the country’s energy resources will be developed and distributed. Among the details to be addressed are which oil and gas blocs will be developed, when and under which terms and how costs will be established and recuperated.¶Adding to this daunting task is an aggressive time frame stipulated in the reform for developing the follow-up laws and regulations, and pressure from continued political opposition from the left can’t be dismissed as a potential complication.¶

Extensive new economic initiatives with the US are unpopularLong 13(Tom Long 4-16-2013 Doctoral research fellow, Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, American University, "Will tensions over security spoil the Obama-Peña Nieto Summit?” American University Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, aulablog.net/2013/04/16/will-tensions-over-security-spoil-the-obama-pena-nieto-summit/)Peña Nieto’s political incentives do not point to the same , high-profile cooperation with the U nited S tates that occurred under President Felipe Calderón, who had already begun shifting priorities last year.

Despite the major turnaround signified by the PRI’s signing NAFTA almost 20 years ago, Peña Nieto’s PRI still contains elements

more skeptical of U.S. “intervention ” than Calderón’s PAN. Materially, moreover, most of the U.S. aid planned under the Mérida Initiative has been disbursed, and Congress exhibits little appetite for major new appropriations. (Even at its height, U.S. spending was a fraction of Mexico’s contribution to the drug war.) That reduction , coupled

with growing awareness that the Calderón strategy actually fueled violence, diminishes the enthusiasm in and outside of

government for continuing his policies. Frustration from the left in both countries regarding persisting human rights violations and the slow pace of judicial reform could also grow more serious .

That solves US oil dependenceHakim 12(Peter 2012, president emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue, “Won’t You Be My Neighbor?”, Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/26/won_t_you_be_my_neighbor?page=0,0)Beyond immigration, Peña Nieto and his advisors consider energy policy one of their highest prioriti es on a far-reaching agenda of economic reform. Their two main challenges are to 1) free Mexico's national oil company, PEMEX, from the suffocating constitutional and regulatory constraints that keep production and revenue low, and 2) allow for the large-scale exploitation of the world's fourth-largest deposits of shale gas. Oil production in Mexico has plummeted by nearly 25 percent from its

peak in 2004 and reserves continue to shrink. Unless officials take action, Mexico could be a net oil importer by the end of the decade. If,

however, the Mexican government succeeds , even modestly, in opening its hydrocarbon sector to private and foreign exploration and investment , it would be a game-changer for both Mexico and the United States. Mexico would gain access to the capital and tech nology -- including deep-sea drilling -- the country requires to remain a major oil exporter and take full advantage of its potential wealth in shale gas. Energy reform in Mexico could also set the stage for a genuine North American energy market , to the

benefit of all three NAFTA partners. And greater energy production in Mexico should mean less U.S. dependence on oil from the Middle East and other distant and/or troubled parts of the world.

Oil Dependence undermines security and causes warGlaser ‘11 [8/11, Charles Glaser is a Professor of Political Science and International Relations Elliot School of International Affairs The George Washington University, “ Reframing Energy Security: How Oil Dependence Influences U.S. National Security,” http://depts.washington.edu/polsadvc/Blog%20Links/Glaser_-_EnergySecurity-AUGUST-2011.docx]Oil dependence could reduce a state’s security if its access to oil is vulnerable to disruption and if oil is necessary for operating the state’s

military forces. Vulnerable energy supplies can leave a state open to coercion —recognizing that it is more likely to lose a war, the state has a weaker bargaining position and is more likely to make concessions. 1 Closely

related, if war occurs the state is more likely to lose. Conflict that is influenced by this mechanism is not fundamentally over the oil;2 rather, when states already have incentives for conflict, the oil vulnerability influences their assessment of military capabilities and in turn the path to war. Recognizing this type of danger during the Cold War, U.S. planning to protect its sea lanes of communication with the Persian Gulf was motivated partly by the importance of insuring the steady flow of oil that was necessary to enable the United States to fight a long war against the Soviet Union in Europe. During the Second World War, Japan’s vulnerability to a U.S. oil embargo played an important role in destroying Japan’s ability to fight.3 This type of threat to the U.S. military capabilities is not a serious danger today because the United States does not face a major power capable of severely interrupting its access to key supplies of oil. In contrast, China does face this type of danger because its oil imports are vulnerable to disruption by the U.S. Navy. Protecting access to oil threatens other states—an access-driven security dilemma The vulnerability of a state’s access to oil supplies could reduce its security via a second, more complicated mechanism—if the state’s efforts to protect its access to oil threaten another state’s security, then this reduced security could in turn reduce the state’s own security. The danger would follow standard security-dilemma logic, but with the defense of oil supply lines replacing

the standard focus on protection of territory. In the most extreme case, a state could try to solve its import vulnerability through territorial expansion . In less extreme cases, the state could deal with its vulnerability by building up 1 For a full analysis of the when and how oil dependence leaves states vulnerable to coercion, see Rosemary A. Kelanic, “Black Gold and Blackmail: The Politics of International Oil Coercion” (PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 2011).2 For important exceptions, see Kelanic, “Black Gold and Blackmail.” 3 Jerome B. Cohen, Japan’s Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1949).

military forces required to protect its access to oil, which has the unintended consequence of decreasing

its adversary’s military capability and signaling that the state’s motives are malign, which decreases the adversary’s security,

which leads the adversary to build up its own military forces. 4 Just as protecting a distant ally can require a state to adopt an offensive capability, protecting access to oil can require offensive power-projection capabilities. Thus, a state’s need to protect its access to oil could create a security dilemma that would not otherwise exist. Conflict fueled by this security dilemma need not be over oil or

access to oil; by damaging political relations the security dilemma could prevent the states from resolving political disputes and avoid ing the escalation of crises . Here again, the United States does not currently face this type of danger; this is largely because the military status quo currently favors the United States, which relieves it from having to take provocative actions. In contrast, China’s efforts to protect its access to oil could be more provocative and generate military competition with the United States. Oil makes territory increasingly valuable In this type of case, a state places greater value on owning territory because the territory contains energy resources that are increasingly valuable. The greater value of territory can increase competition between states, because the benefits of success grow relative to the costs of competition, for example, the

costs of arming. For similar reasons, the greater value of territory increases the probability that crises over territory will lead to war instead of negotiated compromises, as states are more willing to run the risks of fighting.5 This type of conflict is the classic resource war, which is the path by which oil is most commonly envisioned leading to conflict.6 We can also hypothesize that the probability of conflict is greater when territorial boundaries are contested and the political status quo is ambiguous. Because the norm of state sovereignty is now widely held, states are less likely to launch expansionist wars to take other states’ territory. However, when boundaries are not settled, states are more likely to compete to acquire territory they value and will compete harder when they value it more.7 In addition, unsettled boundaries increase the possibilities for boundedly rational bargaining failures that could lead to war. There are two basic paths via which a state could become involved in this type of oil conflict. The more obvious is for the state to be a claimant in the dispute and become directly involved in a territorial conflict. The second is likely more important for the United States—an alliance commitment could draw the state into a resource conflict that initially began between its ally and another state.8 The state would not have energy interests of its own at stake, but intervenes to protect its ally. Along this path, energy plays an important but less direct role in damaging the state’s security, because although energy interests fuel the initial conflict, they do not motivate the state’s intervention.9 A later section explores the possibility of conflict between China and Japan in the East China Sea, with the United States drawn in to protect Japan and consequently involved in a war with China. When a state’s economy depends heavily on oil, severe supply disruptions might do sufficiently large economic damage that the state would use military force to protect its prosperity. A state this suffers this vulnerability risks not only suffering the damage that could be inflicted by a supply disruption, which might be the by-product of unrelated domestic or international events, but also risks being coerced by an adversary. Consequently, states will want to be confident that their ability to import oil will be uninterrupted and will pursue policies to ensure secure access.

4 On the security dilemma see Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; and Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 171-201.5 In terms of bargaining theory, see Robert Powell, Bargaining in the Shadow of Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), Chp. 3.6 For a generally skeptical analysis of the standard resource war arguments see David G. Victor, “What Resource Wars,” The National Interest (November/December 2007). 7 For related points, see Shaffer, Energy Politics, pp. 67-70, who identifies additional examples that I do not address, including the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and the Arctic Circle.8 Still another path is for a state to intervene in an energy-driven conflict to protect its access to oil; this is an example of how various mechanisms could overlap with each other. 9 This can be understood as a form of alliance entrapment; see Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984), pp. 461-495.

5Text: The United States federal government should:-institute and fund a Quadrennial Ecosystems Services Trends Assessment. -end signature strikes which target unidentified militants-limit targeted killings to a limited number of specific terrorists with transnational ambitions-improve congressional oversight of drone strikes-work internationally to establish rules and norms governing the use of drones

QUEST Solves biodiversityPCAST ’11 ( President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT SUSTAINING ENVIRONMENTAL CA PITA L : PROTECTING SOC IETY AND THE ECONOMY , White House, July 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast_sustaining_environmental_capital_report.pdf)In the report we transmit here, PCAST’s Working Group on Biodiversity Preservation and Ecosystem Sustainability addressed the needs and opportunities in relation to both of these dimensions of the capacity of governments—and especially the U.S. Federal government—to fulfill more effectively their responsibility in relation to the protection of environmental capital and ecosystem services. The Working Group’s recommendations, which we endorse, involve a threepronged effort encompassing ways to make better use of existing knowledge, to support the generation of essential new knowledge, and to expand the use of informatic s . We here boil down those recommendations to the following six key points. 1. The U.S. government should institute and fund a Quadrennial Ecosystems Services Trends (QuEST) Assessment. QuEST should provide an integrated, comprehensive assessment of the condition of U.S. ecosystems ; predictions concerning trends in ecosystem change; syntheses of research findings on how ecosystem structure and condition are linked to the ecosystem functions that contribute to societally important ecosystem services; and characterization of challenges to the sustainability of benefit flows from ecosystems, together with ways to make policy responses to these challenges more effective . The QuEST assessment should draw and build upon the wide variety of ongoing monitoring programs, previously conducted and ongo ing assessments of narrower scope, and the expanded monitoring and speciesdiscovery efforts for which we also call in this Report. And, it should be closely coordinated with the quadrennial National Climate Assessment mandated by the Global Change Research Act of 1990.

Drones solve border terror—efficiency and resolving unpopularity is keyRozemberg 12 (Hernan, served as a Bureau Chief and senior correspondent for NPR's "Fronteras: The Changing America Desk," where he covered issues of immigration and border security, "Mixed Feelings On Border Drones: Boon To National Security, Threat To Privacy", July 5 2012, www.fronterasdesk.org/content/mixed-feelings-border-drones-boon-national-security-threat-privacy)¶ The Department of Homeland Security just launched its tenth Predator B Unmanned Aerial System, commonly known as a drone, and now

both northern and southern borders are covered.¶ Even though they cost $18 million apiece, many experts say they ’re worth every penny.¶ "Homeland Security’s behind the times. It should have been doing this a decade ago," said Dan Gouré, a former high-ranking

Defense Department official and current vice president of The Lexington Institute, a military think tank in Virginia.¶ "We’ve done as much as we can do on the surface and so you have to go into the air . And we’re going to have to increasingly have to

go into the air in order to be effective," Gouré said.¶ Doug Davis has been working with drones for over two decades. He’s currently second in charge of the country’s largest drone development and testing center, at New Mexico State University. And he started the drone office at the Federal Aviation Administration.¶ "I don’t think there’s a whole lot of need to do this over Kansas, but for border

surveillance , I believe we absolutely need that as a nation right now ," Davis said. "What you have to balance is the safety of the airspace users and the people on the ground with the national security of the country."¶ Striking that balance is a thorny matter. Opponents of the drone program say the government can now spy into anyone’s backyard without their consent. That’s a scary thought, said Jay Stanley, who specializes in privacy issues at the American Civil Liberties Union.¶ "The government does have the right to protect its borders, but we haven’t sat down and gotten our policies straight about how we want to allow these technologies to be used, what kind of limits need to be placed on them in order to protect our privacy ," Stanley said.¶ And then there’s also the question of the effectiveness of border drones . The Homeland Security Department's Office of Inspector General issued a scathing report in May on this issue. It questioned why drones are being put to use for fewer than 4,000 flight hours per year when they could be up in the air for more than 13,000 hours.¶ They ’re just not being used efficiently , said Tom Barry, who researches drone issues at the Center for International Policy, a foreign policy think tank in Washington, D.C.

Money Laundering Adv

They don’t solve cash transfersRealuyo 12 Celina, former U.S. diplomat, international banker with Goldman Sachs, U.S. State Department Director of Counterterrorism Finance Programs, professor of national security and international relations at Georgetown, George Washington, and the National Defense Univesrity, M.B.A. from Harvard, M.A. from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, International Institute for Strategic Studies, published in the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Instittue, "It's All about the Money: Advancing Anti-Money Laundering Efforts in the U.S. and Mexico to Combat Transnational Organized Crime", www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Realuyo_U.S.-Mexico_Money_Laundering_0.pdfThe Modes of Money Laundering in the U.S. and Mexico¶ The transnational organized crime and the global drug trade generate billions of dollars annually ¶ that traffickers must collect, consolidate, and inject into the international financial system to ¶ profit from their trade. Illicit drug sales in the U.S. are predominantly conducted in cash,¶ presenting the daunting challenge of how to deposit vast amounts of currency into financial¶ institutions while maintaining an appearance of legitimacy. U.S. authorities estimate that drug ¶ trafficking organizations send between $19 and $29 billion annually to Mexico from the United States.¶ 7 Mexico is currently the primary placement area for U.S.-generated drug dollars.8¶ To ¶ move and launder the proceeds of their crime, transnational criminal organizations operating in ¶ the U.S. and Mexico predominantly rely on bulk cash smuggling, traditional bank and wire ¶ transfers, and trade-based money laundering schemes.¶ Bulk Cash Smuggling. Despite more sophisticated means of moving and hiding illegal income, ¶ cash remains the preferred payment method by criminal enterprises cross the globe, including the ¶ Mexican cartels. Cash is king! Bulk cash

smuggling which entails physically transporting large ¶ quantities of cash is designed to bypass financial transparency reporting requirements.9¶ It¶ usually occurs in U.S. Dollars that are widely accepted as international currency and can always ¶ be converted. Many cash movements by this method provide no paper trail or a third party, such ¶ as a bank official to become suspicious of the transaction. According to the U.S. National Drug ¶ Intelligence Center (NDIC), bulk cash seizures in the U.S. alone totaled $798 million from ¶ January 2008 through August 2010. These seizures were mostly related to drug trafficking ¶ cases. Since 2002, Mexico has seized over $457.5 million in bulk currency shipments. In 2010, ¶ bulk-cash seizures amounted to US $32.4 million and 87.3 million Mexican pesos¶ (approximately $7

million) amounting to some US$ 39.4 million which is a pittance in light of ¶ the billions generated by the Mexican-based TCOs.¶ 10 As anti-money laundering expert and ¶ former U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles Duncan Deville notes, bulk cash smuggling does not ¶ actually constitute a money laundering mechanism as the cash remains in its original form and ¶ does not enter the formal financial sector.11

No solvency—decreasing the likelihood of money laundering means drug traffickers will just stop laundering money, NOT stop selling drugs

Mexican drug trafficking is inevitableOlson 9 Eric L., M.A., International Affairs, American University; B.A., History and Secondary Education, Trinity College, Associate Director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, as a Senior Specialist in the Department for Promotion of Good Governance at the Organization of American States, January 2009, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/The%20U.S.%20and

%20Mexico.%20Towards%20a%20Strategic%20Partnership.pdf)

It is time to strengthen the U.S. relationship with Mexico. !ere are few countries—if any—which are as important to the United States as Mexico. We share more than just a two-thousand mile border. Our economies and societies are deeply interwoven and what happens on one side of our shared border inevitably affects the other side. As the United States seeks to redefine its role in the world, it is vital to start at home, with our neighbors. Today is a time of great opportunity in our relationship with Mexico, but also a time of severe challenges. While the two governments have taken important steps to limit the risk that terrorists will use the shared border as a launching pad for attacks, drug trafficking organizations have developed a lucrative and deadly cross-border trade that creates significant vulnerabilities for both countries. Mexican drug trafficking organizations have become increasingly violent in recent years, with over five thousand deaths tied to narcotics trafficking in 2008 alone, and they have gradually penetrated the institutional framework of the Mexican state, especially local law enforcement authorities. These organizations are fueled by persistent demand in the United States:

over twenty million Americans use illegal drugs each month and roughly 15 to 25 billion dollars in profits from U.S. drug sales are pumped back into to the Mexican economy each year in cash and weapons. !e violence and corruption wrought by drug trafficking organizations are felt particularly strongly in border communities, but the effects of the trade run deep throughout cities and towns in both countries. Policymakers in the two countries have a shared interest in working together to develop a comprehensive and bilateral approach that limits the reach of organized crime. Mexico also remains vital for the U.S. economy, although the current economic slowdown presents special challenges that will have to be addressed with great care. Mexico is the second destination for U.S. exports, and the first or second destination of exports for at least twenty two U.S. states. Over six million Americans live in cities and counties on the border and over 60 million in border states, whose economies are particularly tied with Mexico’s. !is degree of integration creates opportunities for more focused economic cooperation, but also generates risks for spillover effects in times of economic crisis. An economic slowdown in either country will inevitably affect the other and a full-scale crisis could send shockwaves across the border. Moreover, the persistent wage gap between the two countries presents a long-term challenge that has been insufficiently addressed in past efforts at deepening cross-border economic ties. !e United States and Mexico have the opportunity to develop a framework for economic integration that helps to contain the effect of economic shocks, takes advantage of complementarities to increase the competitive position of both countries, and, above all, places an emphasis on improving the well-being of average citizens in both countries. Introduction and Overview: A Strategic Approach to U.S.-Mexico Relations The United States and Mexico: Towards a Strategic Partnership 13Introduction and Overview: Towards a Strategic Partnership with Mexico : Finally, immigration from Mexico continues to present challenges to policymakers on both sides of the border. Roughly a third of all immigrants to the United States come from Mexico, including a majority of unauthorized immigrants. Over a tenth of Mexico’s population now lives in the United States, and three percent of the U.S. population was born in Mexico. Although U.S. immigration reform will be part of a domestic policy discussion, it will inevitably require U.S. policymakers to speak with their counterparts in Mexico about how to manage immigration flows and to provide long-term alternatives to migration.

SQ solves the aff—money laundering isn’t a big dealReuters 12 "HSBC an 'isolated' case in Mexico -bank's association", July 27 2012, in.reuters.com/article/2012/07/27/hsbc-mexico-idINL2E8IR59K20120727(Reuters) - The money -laundering scandal that hit HSBC Holdings Plc in Mexico was an isolated case in Latin America's second-biggest economy, the head of the country's banks association (ABM) was quoted as saying on Friday.¶ Mexico's National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV) levied a $27.5 million fine against the British bank after a scathing U.S. Senate report last week slammed HSBC for letting clients shift funds from dangerous and secretive countries.¶ Mexico is particularly exposed to powerful drug traffickers, whose sales are worth billions of dollars annually.¶ In an interview with Mexican newspaper El Financiero, ABM President Jaime Ruiz Sacristan said the HSBC case was not a sign of wider problems in the banking sector in Mexico.¶ "I think we're making this into a really big deal ," Ruiz Sacristan told the paper. "In Mexico there are 42 institutions , plus the brokerage houses and insurers ... this is a specific isolated case."¶ The CNBV censured HSBC for noncompliance with anti-money laundering systems and controls as well as for its late reporting of 1,729 unusual transactions, failing to report 39 unusual transactions, and 21 administrative failures.¶ The U.S. Senate panel alleged that HSBC acted as a financier to clients routing funds from the world's most dangerous places, including Mexico, Iran and Syria, doing regular business in areas tied to drug cartels, terrorist funding and tax cheats.¶ The Senate report slammed a "pervasively polluted" culture at the bank and said between 2007 and 2008, HSBC's Mexican operations moved $7 billion into the bank's U.S. unit.¶ This week HSBC apologized for failing to meet anti-money laundering regulations in Mexico. It did not comment on whether the money had come from drug gangs.

Even if stopping money laundering stops drug trafficking, they don’t solve terrorism because Al-Queda can just launder money outside of Mexico

No Mexican state collapse—they have been through worseViñals and Ezyaguirre 11

Jose and Nicolás, International Monetary Fund, Mexico, "Financial System Stability Assessment", reflects the work undertaken in the context of joint IMF/World Bank FSAP Updates missions to Mexico City in September and October 2011, December 7, 2011, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr1265.pdfSince the 2006 FSAP Update, Mexico has experienced four different episodes of ¶ financial system strain. The first was the post-Lehman turmoil, which led to high volatility in ¶ the Mexican foreign exchange market, forcing BoM to intervene; the closing of the capital ¶ markets for some issuers; the drying up of liquidity in the secondary debt markets; and the major ¶ losses experienced by large nonfinancial corporations in the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives ¶ market. The second was a bursting of the credit card and personal loans bubble—the result of lax ¶ underwriting standards in some banks. The rapid expansion of credit card loans in 2005–06 resulted in a steep increase in nonperforming loans and significant write-offs when ¶ unemployment increased in 2009. The third was the distress experienced by the non-deposittaking, unregulated housing finance institutions (Sofoles/Sofomes), which led to illiquidity and ¶ insolvency. The latest was the rapid increase—from a low base—in bank lending to states and ¶ municipalities. Some smaller banks took on very high exposures previously viewed as virtually ¶ risk-free; these loans suffered major restructuring, impacting liquidity and capital.

They can’t solve—the US and Europe controls Mexico’s financial futureViñals and Ezyaguirre 11 Jose and Nicolás, International Monetary Fund, Mexico, "Financial System Stability Assessment", reflects the work undertaken in the context of joint IMF/World Bank FSAP Updates missions to Mexico City in September and October 2011, December 7, 2011, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr1265.pdfThe main macroeconomic risks for Mexico’s financial system are linked to U.S. and ¶ European developments. The strong real sector linkages with the U.S. economy reflect the high ¶ integration in the manufacturing sector, as well as high remittances and tourism revenue. ¶ Although direct trade and investment

linkages with Europe are modest, further turmoil in Europe ¶ could increase global investor risk aversion and emerging market risk premia. In addition, since ¶ Spanish bank subsidiaries account for about one-third of banking system assets,

liquidity ¶ pressures faced by their parents could lead the subsidiaries to deleverage, impacting overall ¶ credit growth and economic activity in Mexico.

No chance of terror attack---too tough to executeJohn Mueller and Mark G. Stewart 12, Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute AND Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle, "The Terrorism Delusion," Summer, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1, politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller//absisfin.pdfIn 2009, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a lengthy report on protecting the homeland. Key to achieving such an objective should be a careful assessment of the character, capacities, and desires of potential terrorists targeting that homeland. Although the report contains a section dealing with what its authors call “the nature of the terrorist adversary,” the section devotes only two sentences to assessing that nature: “The number and high profile of international and domestic terrorist attacks and disrupted plots during the last two decades underscore the determination and persistence of terrorist organizations. Terrorists have proven to be relentless, patient, opportunistic, and flexible, learning from experience and modifying tactics and targets to exploit perceived vulnerabilities and avoid observed strengths.”8¶ This description may apply to some terrorists

somewhere, including at least a few of those involved in the September 11 attacks. Yet, it scarcely describes the vast majority of those individuals picked up on terrorism charges in the United States since those attacks. The inability of the DHS to consider this fact even parenthetically in its fleeting discussion is not only amazing but perhaps delusional in its single-minded preoccupation with the extreme.¶ In sharp contrast, the authors of the case studies, with remarkably few exceptions, describe their subjects with such words as incompetent, ineffective, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant,

inadequate, unorganized, misguided, muddled, amateurish, dopey, unrealistic, moronic, irrational, and foolish.9 And in nearly all of the cases where an operative from the police or from the Federal Bureau of Investigation was at work (almost half of the total), the most appropriate descriptor would be “gullible.”¶ In all, as Shikha Dalmia has put it, would-be terrorists need to be “radicalized enough to die for their cause; Westernized enough to move around without raising red flags; ingenious enough to exploit loopholes in the security apparatus; meticulous enough to attend to the myriad logistical details that could torpedo the operation; self-sufficient enough to make all the preparations without enlisting outsiders who might give them away; disciplined enough to maintain complete secrecy; and —above all— psychologically tough enough to keep functioning at a high level without cracking in the face of their own impending death.”10 The case studies examined in this article certainly do not abound with people with such characteristics. ¶ In the eleven years since the September 11 attacks, no terrorist has been able to detonate even a primitive bomb in the U nited S tates , and except for the four explosions in the London

transportation system in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the only method by which Islamist terrorists have managed to kill anyone in the United States since September 11 has been with gunfire—inflicting a total of perhaps sixteen deaths over the period (cases 4, 26, 32).11 This limited capacity is impressive because, at one time, small-scale terrorists in the United States were quite successful in setting off bombs. Noting that the scale of the September 11 attacks has “tended to obliterate America’s memory of pre-9/11 terrorism,” Brian Jenkins reminds us (and we clearly do need reminding) that the 1970s witnessed sixty to seventy terrorist incidents, mostly bombings, on U.S. soil every year.12¶ The situation seems scarcely different in Europe and other Western locales. Michael Kenney, who has interviewed dozens of government officials and intelligence agents and analyzed court documents, has found that, in sharp contrast with the boilerplate characterizations favored by the DHS and with the

imperatives listed by Dalmia, Islamist militants in those locations are operationally unsophisticated, short on know-

how, prone to making mistakes, poor at planning, and limited in their capacity to learn .13 Another study documents the difficulties of network coordination that continually threaten the terrorists’ operational unity, trust, cohesion, and ability to act collectively .14¶ In addition, although some of the plotters in the cases targeting the U nited S tates harbored visions of toppling large buildings, destroying airports, setting off dirty bombs, or

bringing down the Brooklyn Bridge (cases 2, 8, 12, 19, 23, 30, 42), all were nothing more than wild fantasies , far beyond the plotters’ capacities however much they may have been encouraged in some instances by FBI operatives. Indeed, in many of the cases, target selection is effectively a random process, lacking guile and careful planning . Often, it seems, targets have been chosen almost capriciously and simply for their convenience. For example, a would-be bomber targeted a mall in Rockford, Illinois, because it was nearby (case 21). Terrorist plotters in Los Angeles in 2005 drew up a list of targets that were all within a 20-mile radius of their shared apartment, some of which did not even exist (case 15). In Norway, a neo-Nazi terrorist on his way to bomb a synagogue took a tram going the wrong way and dynamited a mosque instead.15

Relations AdvTBA solves relations—it’s key—energy leads to broader cooperationPascual 13 – Carlos Pascual is the Vice President and Director of Foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. (“U.S. – Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement and Steps Needed for Implementation”, 4/25/13, http://naturalresources.house.gov/uploadedfiles/pascualtestimony04-25-13.pdf)The Transboundary Agreement is an important step in our national efforts to better secure our energy future and at the same time promote a stronger and long-term cooperative relationship with Mexico in meeting each country’s energy security goals. We believe the agreement would help facilitate the safe and responsible management of offshore petroleum reservoirs that straddle our maritime boundary and strengthen overall our bilateral relations . The Agreement would enable meaningful energy sector collaboration between the U.S. and Mexico (and in particular between U.S. operators and PEMEX). We anticipate that this collaboration under the Agreement would provide U.S. operators with the ability to demonstrate the benefits of their participation in the Mexican energy market , potentially lead ing to deeper and more meaningful collaboration over time.

US-Mexico relations high—diversified cooperation increaseingGrobe 2/18 – [Dr. Stefan, 2/18, Correspondant for erou news, the us and mexico a strong but difficult relationship, Euro News, http://www.euronews.com/2014/02/18/the-us-and-mexico-a-strong-but-difficult-relationship/] When US President Barack Obama travels south of the border for the North American Leaders Summit in Toluca on Wednesday, he visits a country whose relations with the US are important and complex. The two countries share a 2,000-mile border, and bilateral relations between the two have a direct impact on the lives and livelihoods of millions of people, whether the issue is trade and economic reform, homeland security, drug control, migration, or the environment. The scope of US-Mexican relations is broad and goes beyond diplomatic and official contacts , and entails extensive commercial, cultural, and educational ties, with over 1.25 billion dollars of two-way trade and roughly one million legal border crossings each day. In addition, a million American citizens live in Mexico. US tourists to Mexico numbered over 20.3 million in 2012 making Mexico the top destination of US travelers.

Mexican tourists to the northern neighbor were about 13.4 million in 2011, and they spent some $9.2 billion. Cooperation along the

common border Cooperation between the United States and Mexico along the common border includes state and local problem-solving mechanisms; transportation planning; and institutions to address resource, environment and health issues. In 2010, a high level Executive Steering Committee for 21st Century Border Management was created to spur advancements in creating a modern, secure, and efficient border. The multi-agency US-Mexico Binational Group on Bridges and Border Crossings meets twice yearly to improve the efficiency of existing crossings and coordinate planning for new ones. The ten US and Mexican border states are active participants in these meetings. Chaired by consuls from both countries, Border Liaison Mechanisms operate in “sister city” pairs and have proven to be an effective means of dealing with a variety of local issues including border infrastructure, accidental violation of sovereignty by law enforcement officials, charges of mistreatment of foreign nationals, and cooperation in public health matters. Cooperation on environmental and natural resources issues The United States and Mexico have a long history of cooperation on environmental and natural resource issues, particularly in the border area , where there are serious environmental problems caused by rapid population growth, urbanization, and industrialization. Cooperative activities between the US and Mexico take place under a number of arrangements such as the US-Mexico Border 2012/2020 Program; the North American Development Bank and the Border Environment Cooperation Commission; the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation; the Border Health Commission; and a variety of other agreements that address border health, wildlife and migratory birds, national parks, forests, and marine and atmospheric resources. The International Boundary and Water Commission, created by a treaty between the United States and Mexico, is an international organization

responsible for managing a wide variety of water resource and boundary preservation issues. US security cooperation with

Mexico With the so-called “Merida Initiative”, both countries have established an unprecedented

partnership to address violence and crime while strengthening the rule of law and the respect for human rights. Since 2010, this cooperation has been organized under four strategic pillars. The first pillar aims to disrupt the capacity of organized crime to operate and the second pillar focuses on enhancing the capacity of Mexico’s government and institutions to sustain the rule of law. The Merida Initiative’s third pillar aims to improve border management to facilitate legitimate trade and movement of people while thwarting the flow of drugs, arms, and cash. Finally, the fourth pillar seeks to build strong and resilient communities. US cooperation with Mexico under the Merida Initiative directly supports programs to help Mexico train its police forces in modern

investigative techniques, promote a culture of lawfulness, and implement key justice reforms. Bilateral economic relations Mexico is the United States’ second-largest export market (after Canada) and third-largest trading partner (after Canada and China). In 2012, two-way merchandise trade reached nearly $500 billion. Mexico’s exports rely heavily on supplying the US market , but the country has also sought to diversify its export destinations. Nearly 78 percent of Mexico’s exports in 2012 went to the United States. In 2012, Mexico was the third-largest supplier of foreign crude oil to the United States, as well as the largest export market for US refined petroleum products and a growing market for US natural gas. Top US exports to Mexico include electrical machinery, nuclear equipment, motor vehicle parts, mineral fuels and oils, and plastics. US companies have invested $101 billion in Mexico. Mexican investment in the United States has grown by over 11 percent in the past year to $27.9 billion. It has grown by over 35 percent the past five years. Mexico is the seventh fastest growing investor country in the United States.

Mexico isn’t key to global biodiversity – at best they only solve in the Americas

No impact to biodiversity Sagoff ‘97 [March 1997, Mark, Senior Research Scholar, Institute for Philosophy and Public policy in School of Public Affairs – U. Maryland, William and Mary Law Review, “INSTITUTE OF BILL OF RIGHTS LAW SYMPOSIUM DEFINING TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION: MUDDLE OR MUDDLE THROUGH? TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE MEETS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT”, 38 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 825, L/N] Note – Colin Tudge - Research Fellow at the Centre for Philosophy at the London School of Economics. Former Zoological Society of London: Scientific Fellow and tons of other positions. PhD, Zoology at Cambridge. Simon Levin = Moffet Professor of Biology, Princeton. 2007 American Institute of Biological Sciences Distinguished Scientist Award 2008 Istituto Veneto di Scienze Lettere ed Arti 2009 Honorary Doctorate of Science, Michigan State University 2010 Eminent Ecologist Award, Ecological Society of America 2010 Margalef Prize in Ecology, PhD

Although one may agree with ecologists such as Ehrlich and Raven that the earth stands on the brink of an episode

of massive extinction , it may not follow from this grim fact that human being s will suffer as a result. On the

contrary, skeptics such as science writer Colin Tudge have challenged biologists to explain why we need more than a

tenth of the 10 to 100 million species that grace the earth . Noting that "cultivated systems often out- produce wild systems by 100-fold or more," Tudge declared that "the argument that humans need the variety of other species is, when you think about it, a theological one." n343 Tudge observed that "the elimination of

all but a tiny minority of our fellow creatures does not affect the material well-being of humans one

iota." n344 This skeptic challenged ecologists to list more than 10,000 species (other than unthreatened microbes) that are essential to

ecosystem productivity or functioning. n345 " The human specie s could survive just as well if 99.9% of our fellow

creatures went extinct , provided only that we retained the appropriate 0.1% that we need." n346 [*906] The monumental Global Biodiversity Assessment ("the Assessment") identified two positions with respect to redundancy of species. "At one extreme is the idea that each species is unique and important, such that its removal or loss will have demonstrable consequences to the functioning of the community or ecosystem." n347 The authors of the Assessment, a panel of eminent ecologists, endorsed this position, saying it is "unlikely that there is much, if any, ecological redundancy in communities over time scales of decades to centuries, the time period over which environmental policy should operate." n348 These eminent ecologists rejected the opposing view, "the notion that species overlap in function to a sufficient degree

that removal or loss of a species will be compensated by others, with negligible overall consequences to the community or ecosystem." n349 Other biologists believe, however, that species are so fabulously redundant in the ecological functions they perform that the life-support systems and processes of the planet and ecological processes in general will function perfectly well with fewer of them, certainly fewer than the millions and millions we can expect to remain even if every threatened organism becomes extinct . n350 Even the kind of sparse and miserable world depicted in the movie Blade Runner could provide a "sustainable" context for the human economy as long as people forgot their aesthetic and moral commitment to the glory and beauty of the natural world. n351 The Assessment makes this point. "Although any ecosystem contains hundreds to thousands of species interacting among themselves and their physical environment, the emerging consensus is that the system is driven by a small number of . . . biotic variables on whose interactions the balance of species are, in a sense, carried along." n352 [*907] To make up your mind on the question of the functional redundancy of species, consider an endangered species of bird, plant, or insect and ask how the ecosystem would fare in its absence. The fact that the creature is endangered suggests an answer: it is already in limbo as far as ecosystem processes are concerned. What crucial ecological services does the black-capped vireo, for example, serve? Are any of the species threatened with extinction necessary to the provision of any ecosystem service on which humans depend? If so, which ones are they? Ecosystems and the species that compose them have

changed, dramatically, continually, and totally in virtually every part of the United States. There is little ecological similarity, for example, between New England today and the land where the Pilgrims died. n353 In view of the constant reconfiguration of the biota, one may wonder why Americans have not suffered more as a

result of ecological catastrophes . The cast of species in nearly every environment changes constantly-local extinction is

commonplace in nature-but the crops still grow. Somehow, it seems, property values keep going up on Martha's Vineyard in spite of the tragic disappearance of the heath hen. One might argue that the sheer number and variety of creatures available to any ecosystem buffers that system against stress . Accordingly, we should be concerned if the "library" of creatures ready, willing, and able to colonize ecosystems gets too small. (Advances in genetic engineering may well permit us to write a large number of additions to

that "library.") In the United States as in many other parts of the world, however, the number of species

has been increasing dramatically , not decreasing, as a result of human activity. This is because the hordes of exotic species coming into ecosystems in the United States far exceed the number of species that are becoming extinct. Indeed, introductions may outnumber extinctions by more than ten to one, so that the United States is becoming more and more species-rich all the time largely as a result of human action. n354 [*908] Peter Vitousek and colleagues estimate that over 1000 non-native plants grow in California alone; in Hawaii there are 861; in Florida, 1210. n355 In Florida more than 1000 non-native insects, 23 species of mammals, and about 11 exotic birds have established themselves. n356 Anyone who waters a lawn or hoes a garden knows how many weeds desire to grow there, how many birds and bugs visit the yard, and how many fungi, creepy-crawlies, and other odd life forms show forth when it rains. All belong to nature, from wherever they might hail, but not many homeowners would claim that there are too few of them. Now, not all exotic species provide ecosystem services; indeed, some may be disruptive or have no instrumental value. n357 This also may be true, of course, of native species as well, especially because all exotics are native somewhere. Certain exotic species, however, such as Kentucky blue grass, establish an area's sense of identity and place; others, such as the green crabs showing up around Martha's Vineyard, are nuisances. n358 Consider an analogy [*909] with human migration. Everyone knows that after a generation or two, immigrants to this country are hard to distinguish from everyone else. The vast majority of Americans did not evolve here, as it were, from hominids; most of us "came over" at one time or another. This is true of many of our fellow species as well, and they may fit in here just as well as we do. It is possible to distinguish exotic species from native ones for a period of time, just as we can distinguish immigrants from native-born Americans, but as the centuries roll by, species, like people, fit into the landscape or the society, changing and often enriching it. Shall we have a rule that a species had to come over on the Mayflower, as so many did, to count as "truly" American? Plainly not. When, then, is the cutoff date? Insofar as we are concerned with the absolute numbers of "rivets" holding ecosystems together, extinction seems not to pose a general problem because a far greater number of kinds of mammals, insects, fish, plants, and other creatures thrive on land and in water in America today than in prelapsarian times. n359 The Ecological Society of America has urged managers to maintain biological diversity as a critical component in strengthening ecosystems against disturbance. n360 Yet as Simon

Levin observed, "much of the detail about species composition will be irrelevant in terms of influences on ecosystem properties." n361 [*910] He added: "For net primary productivity, as is likely to be the case for any system property,

biodiversity matters only up to a point ; above a certain level , increasing biodiversity is likely to make

little difference ." n362 What about the use of plants and animals in agriculture? There is no scarcity foreseeable. "Of an estimated 80,000 types of plants [we] know to be edible," a U.S. Department of the Interior

document says, "only about 150 are extensively cultivated." n363 About twenty species, not one of which is endangered, provide ninety percent of the food the world takes from plants. n364 Any new food has to take "shelf space" or "market share" from one that is now produced. Corporations also find it difficult to create demand for a new product; for example, people are not inclined to eat paw-paws, even though they are delicious. It is hard enough to get people to eat their broccoli and lima beans. It is harder still to develop consumer

demand for new foods. This may be the reason the Kraft Corporation does not prospect in remote places for rare and unusual plants and animals to add to the world's diet. Of the roughly 235,000 flowering plants and 325,000 nonflowering plants (including mosses, lichens, and seaweeds) available, farmers ignore virtually all of them in favor of a very few that are profitable. n365 To be sure, any of the more than 600,000 species of plants could have an application in agriculture, but would they be preferable to the species that are now dominant? Has anyone found any consumer demand for any of these half-million or more plants to replace rice or wheat in the human diet? There are reasons that farmers cultivate rice, wheat, and corn rather than, say, Furbish's lousewort. There are many kinds of louseworts, so named because these weeds were thought to cause lice in sheep. How many does agriculture really require? [*911] The species on which agriculture relies are domesticated, not naturally occurring; they are developed by artificial not natural selection; they might not be able to survive in the wild. n366 This argument is not intended to deny the religious, aesthetic, cultural, and moral reasons that command us to respect and protect the natural world. These spiritual and ethical values should evoke action, of course, but we should also recognize that they are spiritual and ethical values. We should recognize that ecosystems and all that dwell therein compel our moral respect, our aesthetic appreciation, and our spiritual veneration; we should clearly seek to achieve the goals of the ESA. There is no reason to assume, however, that these goals have anything to do with human well-being or welfare as economists understand that term. These are ethical goals, in other words, not economic ones. Protecting the marsh may be the right thing to do for moral, cultural, and spiritual reasons. We should do it-but someone will have to pay the costs. In the narrow sense of promoting human welfare, protecting nature often represents a net "cost," not a net "benefit." It is largely for moral, not economic, reasons-ethical, not prudential, reasons- that we care about all our fellow creatures. They are valuable as objects of love not as objects of use. What is good for [*912] the marsh may be good in itself

even if it is not, in the economic sense, good for mankind. The most valuable things are quite useless .

Species extinction won't cause human extinction – humans and the environment are adaptable Doremus, 2K(Holly, Professor of Law at UC Davis Washington & Lee Law Review, Winter 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 11, lexis)

In recent years, this discourse frequently has taken the form of the ecological horror story . That too is no mystery. The ecological horror story is unquestionably an attention-getter, especially in the hands of skilled writers (*46) like Carson and the Ehrlichs. The image of the airplane earth, its wings wobbling as rivet after rivet is carelessly popped out, is difficult to ignore. The apocalyptic depiction of an impending crisis of potentially dire proportions is designed to spur the political community to quick action . Furthermore, this story suggests a goal that appeals to many nature lovers: that virtually everything must be protected. To reinforce this suggestion, tellers of the ecological horror story often imply that the relative importance of various rivets to the ecological plane cannot be determined. They offer reams of data and dozens of anecdotes demonstrating the unexpected value of apparently useless parts of nature. The moth that saved Australia from prickly pear invasion, the scrubby Pacific yew, and the downright unattractive leech are among the uncharismatic flora and fauna who star in these anecdotes. n211 The moral is obvious: because we cannot be sure which rivets are holding the plane together, saving them all is the only sensible course. Notwithstanding its attractions, the material discourse in general, and the ecological horror story in particular, are not likely to generate policies that will satisfy nature lovers. The ecological horror story implies that there is no reason to protect nature until catastrophe looms. The Ehrlichs' rivet-popper account, for example, presents species simply as the (fungible) hardware holding together the ecosystem. If we could be reasonably certain that a particular rivet was not needed to prevent a crash, the rivet-popper story suggests that we would lose very little by pulling it out. Many environmentalists, though, would disagree. Reluctant to concede such losses, tellers of the ecological horror story highlight how close a catastrophe might be, and how little we know about what actions might trigger one. But the apocalyptic vision is less credible today than it seemed in the 1970s. Although it is clear that the earth is experiencing a mass wave of extinctions, the complete elimination of life on

earth seems unlikely. Life is remarkably robust. Nor is human extinction probable any time soon. Homo sapiens is adaptable to nearly any environment. Even if the world of the future includes far fewer species, it likely will hold people. One response to this credibility problem tones the story down a bit, arguing not that humans will go extinct but that ecological disruption will bring economies, and consequently civilizations, to their knees. But this too may be overstating the case. Most ecosystem functions are performed by multiple species. This functional redundancy means that a high proportion of species can be lost without precipitating a collapse.

Biodiversity is not key to ecosystems Washington Post, 97(8-29 lexis)

Ecologists have long maintained that diversity is one of nature's greatest strengths, but new research suggests that diversity alone does not guarantee strong ecosystems . In findings that could intensify the national debate over endangered species and habitat conservation, three new studies suggest that a greater abundance of plant and animal varieties does not always translate to better ecological health . At least equally important, the research found, are the types of species and how they function together. "Having a long list of Latin names isn't always better than a shorter list of Latin names," said Stanford University biologist Peter Vitousek, co-author of one of the studies published in the journal Science. Separate experiments in California, Minnesota and Sweden found that diversity often had little bearing on the performance of ecosystems -- at least as measured by the growth and health of native plants. In fact, the communities with the greatest biological richness were often the poorest when it came to productivity and the cycling of nutrients. One study compared plant life on 50 remote islands in northern Sweden that are prone to frequent wildfires from lightning strikes. Scientist David Wardle of Landcare Research in Lincoln, New Zealand, and colleagues at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, found that islands dominated by a few species of plants recovered more quickly than nearby islands with greater biological diversity. Similar findings were reported by University of Minnesota researchers who studied savannah grasses, and by Stanford'sVitousek and colleague David Hooper, who concluded that functional characteristics of plant species were more important than the number of varieties in determining how ecosystems performed. "In aiming to protect natural ecosystems, we cannot just manage for species variety alone," the Stanford researchers wrote. British plant ecologist J.P. Grime, in a commentary summarizing the research, said there is not yet "convincing evidence that species diversity and ecosystem function are consistently and causally related." "It could be argued," he added, "that the tide is turning against the notion of high biodiversity as a controller of ecosystem function and insurance against ecological collapse."