West Germany and the Politics of Centrality

Gordon Smith

West Germany and the Politics of Centrality

WHEN MANY COUNTRIES IN WESTERN EUROPE ARE EXPERIENCING A flux or even a teeming confusion in their party systems, West Germany stands out as a case of almost aberrant cohesion. The age- old yearning for ‘the German synthesis’ finds its apparent modern fulfilment in the party system. The uncomfortable extremes of left and right have for long hovered around virtual electoral extinction, and the rise of new movements - such as forms of neo- Poujadism in Scandinavia or the rediscovery of the territorial dimension of politics as in Britain - has left the Federal Republic untouched. The two major contenders for power, the SPD and the CDU, dominate the electoral scene, and in so doing seem to be locked in an embrace from which neither is able to escape.

To use the term, ‘the politics of centrality’, for West Germany requires some clarification. How has the situation come about? How is the momentum maintained? What are the chances of a sudden reversal? Indeed, the very word ‘centrality’ can be misleading: there is no necessary implication of a desirable moderation, nor are the politics of centrality always the olitics of

the past few years inevitably shows a difference of perspective between the SPD and the CDU, and their roles in government and opposition respectively have resulted in a sharp polarization over particular issues. Their individual characteristics have to be taken into account before attempting to explain the underlying central drives of the system. This latter task is much more s eculative and involves examining the ‘logic’ of the German

state’, and the peculiarly restricted nature of ‘ideological space’ in the Federal Republic.

sweetness and light. Any account of West German poltics P over

t R ree-party system, the dominance of the parties in the ‘party

A DECADE OF THE SPD

Ten years have passed since the SPD first entered a post-war

GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 388

German government. At that time, in 1966, all kinds of fears and

unleash a doctrinaire radicalism on a country with a surfeit fresh in memory and in the example of the German Democratic Republic.

Judged by the party’s performance in the elections of 1969 and 1972, the ‘new’ SPD was convincing on both counts. In 1972 the SPD became the largest party with 45.9 per cent of the total vote, against 44.8 per cent for the CDU/CSU and 8.4 per cent for the Free Democrats. The party behaved ‘responsibly’ in ofice, and in Willy Brandt the SPD roduced a statesman of European stature. The facility with whict he cut through the knot of inherited problems associated with the Ostpolitik contributed to the European detente at the same time as helping West Germans to resolve the problems of their own ‘national’ identity. Yet substantial as was Brandt’s part in securing ‘acceptance’ for the SPD, his resignation in 1974 was a personal tragedy, not a debacle for the party or the government. The comparative ease with which Helmut Schmidt was subsequently able to make his own mark as chancellor shows the extent to which the SPD had already gravitated to being a natural party of government.

In explaining the present respectability of the SPD and its moderation, at least a ritual nod must be made to the party’s Godesber Programme of 1959. It took the SPD away from both ‘class’ ancf‘ideology’ and made the party instead one of the whole people, a Volkspartei, and dedicated as well to pragmatic reform. But these changes were manifest long before the Godesberg Programme was penned, and in itself the commitment to reform has never been a decisive restriction on parties - in changing circumstances ‘reform’ is capable of elastic extension. There has been no shortage of criticism of the course taken by the SPD since it has been in office, but the continuing failure of the party’s radicals to win any substantial base of ower is the more important

one explanation, but this consideration is subordinate to a deep aversion amongst party members to question the basic ordering of German society: to do so would put too much at risk.

fact. An unwillingness to jeopardize t K e party’s election chances is

WEST GERMANY A N D THE POLITICS OF CENTRALITY 389

Rather than concentratin on the ideals of social democracy, the

the Ostpolitik curiously gas to be seen as a part. The ‘self- recognition’ that resulted from the Eastern treaties and the recognition of the German Democratic Republic led to a new awareness of a specifically West German national interest. The substitution of Schmidt for Brandt adequately sums up the evolutionary path of the SPD, and the slogan ‘Modell Deutschlund’ adopted for the 1976 election presented this national image: the West German success in containing inflation and maintaining living standards should be contrasted with the record of others. The SPD version of the German ‘model’ was a national success story.

Nevertheless at the time of the 1969 election Brandt had argued that it was imperative to aim at securing ‘more democracy’ in Germany, and his later ‘dialogue’ with the party’s Left wing proved his good intentions. Yet the debate had the prime effect of increasing strife within the party, whereas Helmut Schmidt’s more abrasive style has paradoxically succeeded in making the SPD appear more united.’ The government’s pro ress towards securing ‘more democracy’ has been modest, a n f anyway the whole concern with the ‘democratization’ of German society, a product of the .turbulence of the 1960s, has receded. Although the movement had no fixed olitical orientation, it soon became suspect as a Trojan horse f!r use by the extreme Left to disrupt German society. The government has persevered with some reforms, notably the new law on industrial codetermination, but this measure, so long a matter of contention between the parties, has emerged as one more legal formula rather than representing a breakthrough for democratic participation.2

It is only fair to say that a 1 along the SPD has had to operate within the constraints of coalition government. As a minority

However, the continuing Schmidt-Brandt partnership is important: Chancellor Schmidt reassures the FDP whilst Brandt, as party chairman, resents a more flexible image within the party. Both Brandt and Schmi B t won overwhelming votes for party offices at the SPD Mannheim conference in November 1975.

2The new law on codetermination was finally passed in 1976 after years of haggling over the recise composition of the supervisory boards of the 600 lar e companies affectel Trade union and SPD demands were not met since t a e boards will have a marginal but critical weighting in favour of shareholders and executive management - a victory for FDP stubbornness.

SPD has significantly em a asized its ‘national’ record, of which

390 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION

partner from 1966 until 1969 the SPD had to be content with adopting olicies that were acceptable to the CDU, and in the first

narrowness of the government’s majority and the overriding preoccupation with the Ostpolitik led to a {ostponement of domestic reforms. Yet even since 1972 most o f t e measures taken have been of rather marginal value to the reputation of the SPD as a party of reform. Critics argue that the SPD has too readily accepted the constraints of government, especially the need to placate the FDP, whereas it should have issued a determined challenge to the other parties. It is in this sense that the question is raised of whether the SPD really is a party of reform and not rather one in ‘the service of the state’ - regarding its hold on power as a sufficient answer to its critic^.^

period o P the alliance with the Free Democrats until 1972, the

THE CDU IN OPPOSITION

The roblems of the SPD in government have been considerable,

to the role of opposition. After twenty years in power unti K 1969, but tEe CDU has faced an equally difficult task in adjustin

the CDU had come to regard itself as indispensable to government as the Christian Democrats in Italy and to believe that it was the only and rightful ‘constitutional’ party. The shock of being forced into opposition perhaps delayed the CDU’s appreciation of the major problems it had to solve if it were to be successful in ousting the SPD: firstly, to present an effective leader to the electorate; secondly, to establish a realistic set of alternative policies; thirdly, to make the best tactical use of the opportunities which o position

come near to success. affords. It can be argued that only in this third area has t R e CDU

One of Adenauer’s least beneficial legacies to the CDU was to

’The question posed by Left-wing critics - Wolf-Dieter Narr and others, SPD - Statsparlei oder Refrmpurtei?, Piper Verlag, 1976. The core of criticism is represented by the party s Jungsozialisten, but the ]uses have little influence on party policy. All SPD members up to the age of 35 are eligible, but the proportion active is small; at their Dortmund conference in March 1976 there were indications of a waning influence of the extreme Left. Wei ht should also

policy-document, Orientierungsrahmen ’85, adopted at Mannheim in 197s. Reforms that the party has tried to bring about (abortion law, codetermination, vocational training, cor orate and ersonal tax reform, family law) have always

be given to the party’s own concern with hture reform, especia f y the ten-year

been watered down by f“ orces outsi B e the party’s control.


make it difficult for any successor to exercise strong control over the party, and certainly not in the patriarchal fashion he imposed. Moreover, although he was instrumental in creating a unified party, Adenauer was not concerned with securing an organizational unity, and for long the CDU lacked an adequate central direction. As a result, the permanent bases of power in the party have related to the federal structure of the state, within the Lhder. Each Land minister-president or party leader can achieve the status of a powerful baron, and any one of them may regard himself as a potential chancellor.

In the post-Adenauer era - which extends up to the present time - no person of sufficient stature has arisen able to control the party or become a strong chancellor-figure. Ludwig Erhard succumbed to Adenauer’s sniping and his own inability to impress himself on the party, and his successor, Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, was deemed expendable after the break-up of the Grand Coalition. Rainer Barzel, well-entrenched in the parliamentary party then took his turn to fight the 1972 election, only to pay the price of defeat in the CDU - political euthanasia. The process by which a chancellor-candidate emerges in the CDU is a complex one, a long drawn-out tactical stru gle involving the Lander parties, the CDU in the Bundestag, an! finally agreement with the CSU in Ba~ar i a .~ The latest contender to enter the lists, Helmut Kohl, himself minister-president of the Rhineland Palatinate, first consolidated his position by becoming the national chairman of the party in 1973, but his emergence in the past few years has been more a process of elimination; certainly he was not an obvious national figure capable of winnin the 1976 election.

pressing by the need to maintain tolerable relations with the CSU and Franz-Josef Strauss; yet the independent osition of the

with all t K e Lhder. Only success at a federal election can give a leader sufficient standing, although even then, as the fate of Erbard showed, authority is not an automatic gift. The long-term alternative is to concentrate on fashioning a strong and permanent

The selection of a ‘chancellor-candidate’ is necessary for both major parties since a new Bundestag has to elect a chancellor and the prior election campai n polarizes between the two rivals. But the party’s candidate need not be the lea& of the arliamentary party nor its national chairman; hence authority is

The leadership problems of t i e CDU have been made more

Bavarian arty is but a magnification of the dificu P ties which exist

fiequen t r y divided.


central authority for the party to which the Lander may become increasingly ~ubordinate.~

The CDU has not fared much better in its attempt to evolve alternative policies to those of the ruling SPD/FDP coalition. Part of the CDU’s embarrassment here stems from the fact that the SPD in government has adhered to the major tenets of the CDU when it was in power - in particular the commitment to a free market econom and the sanctity of the alliances with the Western

FDP have allowed the government to take a much different course - and the continuing health of the private enterprise system and the strength of the German economy make it difficult to believe that there would be much improvement with the return of the CDU.

One major area of confrontation chosen by the CDU has been the Ostpolitik, but the party’s apparent intransigence, at first over the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties in 1972 and then over the Basic Treaty between the two German states in 1973, proved in the end to be no more than a tactical smokescreen and the opposition could not obscure the considerable disagreements within the ranks of the CDU/CSU. Moreover, once the treaties had been ratified, it would have been a political folly of the first order to try to revoke them. In consequence, the CDU has come to have a marked resemblance to the SPD of the 1930s: o position on a ‘Yes-but’ basis which, once an immediate issue gas been resolved, leaves the party very little on which to build an alternative policy.6

The career of Kurt Biedenkopf may be indicative of a trend in the CDU. He became secretary-general of the party in 1973 (a post only created in 1966) and he is a political figure rather than an administrative one as his book, Fortschritt in Freiheit, Piper Verlag. 1974, amply shows. He also headed the CDU list in North Rhine Westphalia for the 1976 election. With an additional base in the Bundestag, he could secure an ascendancy over provincial contestants. However, the Lander are a vduable source of recruitment for federal ofice - as the careers of Brandt and Schmidt demonstrate.

A good illustration of the dilemma of opposition facing the CDU was the ratification of the treaties with Poland, eventually agreed in March 1976. The treaties involved the repatriation of 125,ooo ethnic Germans of the estimated 280,000 still in Poland in return for large West German credits and pension payments to Poles forced to work in war-time Germany. The CDU/CSU majority in the Bundesrat was on the point of wrecking the treaties (by its veto over certain rovisions), but the opposition would then have had to take

powers. In neit B er respect has the SPD faltered - nor would the

responsibility F or bad relations with Poland and for keeping the Germans there.

WEST GERMANY AND THE POLITICS OF CENTRALITY 393

Despite the inability of the CDU to propound clear alternatives - or at least to maintain them - the party has been able to mount a considerable attack on the government in selected instances. The constitutional structure of the Federal Republic offers a determined op osition a range of opportunities to harass the government - the f e c h system and the constitutional court provide ‘sites’ for opposition which are possibly just as effective as the Bundestag itself.’ As a result, the elected assembly is not the sole arbiter of

sure that it has won a until the CDU has exhausted all the possibilities.

Although squeezed out of federal ofice, the CDU has been resilient enough in the Lkder; there the governing arties have been on the defensive. Since elections to the ten Lanlassemblies, eleven with West Berlin, are scattered randomly throughout the normal four-year term of the Bundestag, the wearing and tense atmos here of a ‘continuous election campaign’ is almost literally repro B uced. This comes about because the composition of Lhder governments almost always follows the line-up of the parties at the federal level; each Land therefore reproduces the national conflict in miniature, and the federal government is continually haunted by the prospect of defeat. At a string of Land elections from 1974 onwards the SPD vote fell disastrously and led to a considerable rise in CDU morale.

If Land elections were no more than glorified polls of public opinion as far as the federal government were concerned, not too much would be at stake. But any transfer of power within a Land has an immediate consequence for the composition of the Bundesrat since it is composed entirely of delegations from the Lhder governments. For most of the time since 1972 the CDU/CSU had a narrow one-vote lead in the upper house, sufficient to create difficulties for the government since the Bundesrat ranks as one of the more powerful second chambers and The CDU/CSU climbed down after a face-saving formula had been found: the word ‘will’ instead of ‘can’ to express a commitment from Poland to allow out the remaining Germans eventually.

’The Bundestag comes into its own when the forces of government and opposition are evenly matched as they were from 1969 to 1972. By 1972 there had been numerous defections to the opposition over the Ostpolitik and in April of that year the CDU/CSU failed by a margin of only two votes to unseat Brandt. The ensuing stalemate in the Bundestag caused the election to be held a year early.

public policy, and the has never been quite


its powers are especially pronounced in matters affecting Land interests or where the administrative cooperation of the Lhder is required. Government roblems were unexpectedly made worse

majority: the Bundesrat then became almost the official voice of the opposition.* As originally conceived, the Bundesrat was intended to represent Lander interests rather than party ones, but this constitutional fiction is no longer tenable.

The valuable sites of opposition afforded by the federal structure are supplemented by the Federal Constitutional Court, and the opposition - on the reference from a Land government - can use the court as the final thrust of its resistance to government legislation. Quite clearly, the court does not enjoy being ‘exploited’ in this way, but rulings it does have to give and its edicts are absolutely binding. Thus the attempt. by the government to introduce liberal ‘abortion on demand in West Germany, although it cleared all the legislative hurdles, was finally re ected

CDU, and the coalition had to be content with passing a much more innocuous law to avoid a further ne ative ruling. To speak

may appear to be too strong an expression, but it has to be remembered that the court is composed of judges who are effectively appointed by the parties, and in consequence - depending on which senate of the court hears a particular complaint - one or other of the party ‘complexions’ will usually be paramount. Political uncertainty is therefore replaced by a

early in 1976 when su B denly the CDU came to control a clear

by the court in I W ~ . That decision was explicitly a victory r or the

of the Constitutional Court as a ‘site’ avai B able for the opposition

* Although the SPD lost ground in ten of the 1974 to 1976, in no case did its reverses lead to of the CDU/CSU majority in the Bundesrat came affair’ in Lower Saxony. Despite the fact that the majority in the Landtag, when the incumbent minister-president resigned, his nominated successor (also SPD) failed to gain election, and eventually the CDU nominee was successful. Because ballots are secret, there was no chance of locating the source of the FDP or SPD defections - or the reason. As a result of the change in government of Lower Saxony in January 1976, the CDU/CSU majority rose from one to eleven, or 26-1s as against 21-20. The opposition then gained a majority on Bundesrat committees as well as on the key conciliation committee with the Bundesta This development made the opposition even less likely to seek compromise wi% the government, itself bent on passing legislation before the election. The e isode in Lower Saxony is a good example of the impact of Land politics on t E e federal balance.


judicial 10ttery.~ Since the CDU has been in opposition the party has shown a

willingness to use all constitutional means to harry the government; in this respect at least it has been an effective opposition, but lacking a clear picture of the policies it wishes to pursue and a leader to mould the party, its successes have never been cumulative in effect. What has characterized West German politics has been the degree of estrangement between government and opposition, and the din -dong party battle over one issue after

parties have been subjected to an overarching embrace, this constraint has hardly been apparent to the actors involved.

another has ensured that PO 7. itical temperatures remain high. If the

THE LOGIC OF THE PARTY SYSTEM

Nonetheless, the dust raised by party warfare does not weaken the case for arguing that there is a centripetal drive in West German politics. One component of this movement is the structure of the party system as it has evolved over the years. Since 1961 only three parties have been represented in the Bundestag, and it is the nature of this three-party s stem which has given ‘centrality’ its

exclusive hold on power, with its coalition parmers treated as mere appendages, then the full implications were hidden. It took first the experience of the Grand Coalition and then the ‘little’ social-liberal alliance for the system to reach its mature stage of alternating government: the course is charted by the halting progress of the SPD in fulfilling its potential of becoming the alternative government.

The German party system differs substantially from a two-party format in its operation, for it is the strategic position of the third party, rather than its size, which is of critical importance for the definition of a genuine three-party system. Neither the SPD nor the CDU has much prospect of obtaining an absolute majority on

The ‘lottery’-effect could have momentous come uences. Thus the Federal

GDR in 1973. The case was referred to the court by the Bavarian government on the grounds that the treaty violated provisions of the Basic Law relating to a unified Germany. With stipulations (which could be of im ortance in the

immediately recogniza b le form. As long as the CDU had an

Constitutional Court had to rule on the validity o f t a e Basic Treaty with the

future) the court did hap en to rule in favour of the treaty, but t g e majority vote could have gone the ot E er way. See D. P. Kommers, Judicial Politics in Wes t Germany: A Study ofthe Federal Constitutional Court, Sage Publications, 1976.

GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 396 its own account, and a minority government, although not constitutionally impossible, is only a remote eventuality.’O The point is that coalition government does help to fashion a consensus and strengthen the legitimacy of government, a factor not to be underestimated in West Germany. There is, too, a tendency for the electorate and the parties to become ‘conditioned’ to a coalition outlook. l

Neither of the larger parties would really welcome a return to the Grand Coalition, for precisely in that period the CDU and the SPD were threatened by outflanking movements on their extremes. As a result, however the calculations are made, the final answer is substantially the same: the Free Democrats have to be brought into coalition with either the SPD or the CDU, and the FDP knows from experience that electoral favour comes to the party when it is safe1 in government rather than in the wilderness.

the basic dilemma facing a small third party: to preserve its own identity requires the party to behave independently, but inconstancy in coalition will quickly give it a reputation for unreliable fickleness - the dreaded jibe of being an ‘Umjullpartei’. The strategy a parently evolved by the Free Democrats is the

option in the longer term. Over the past ten years the FDP has acquired a moderately progressive image, but this evolution - essential as it has been in preserving the coalition with the SPD - does not at all preclude a future alliance with the Christian Democrats, as long as the latter avoid the temptation of taking a Right-wing course.12

‘OHowever it would necessarily ha pen that either the CDU/CSU or the SPD would win a majority of seats i P the FDP fell below the ‘five per cent’ requirement of the electoral law, leaving one party with a relative majority of votes and an absolute majority of seats. With 8.4 per cent of the federal vote in 1972 and a reasonably good vote in subsequent Land elections, the FDP was not considered to be in serious danger in 1976.

l1 A tendency towards coalition-thinking was shown by Helmut Schmidt in an extended interview published in Der Spiegel ( 5 April 1976). Thus whilst Schmidt spoke of the FDP and even the CDU as coalition artners, he made no mention

certainly wish to see the FDP as a coalition partner, strong and self-confident . . . In the 1or.g-term I do not preclude a coalition between the SPD and the CDU - but without the CSU.’ Of course, the ‘threat’ of a coalition with the CDU is useful if the FDP should become too uppish.

l2 There were doubts about the FDP loyalty to the coalition especially after

The other substanti 9 lesson the FDP has learned is how to handle

combination o P medium-term fidelity with a preservation of a free

of the possibility - or even the desirability of t K e SPD governing alone: ‘I


The key to the ‘logic’ of the German system is thus to be found in the relationship of the FDP to government formation. The FDP does not represent a separate ‘pole’ of central attraction; it is more correctly seen as a osition of derived centrality, especially

unable to build up a loyal and consistent core of support, and in effect provides one means of transfer between the other two parties. This ‘exchange function’ of the FDP is supplemented b the possibility of direct transfer between the SPD and CDU, wit the result that both major parties are susceptible to a double source of erosion on their ‘central’ flank. The electoral politics of the CDU and the SPD are dominated by the need to win over or retain the critical votes in this fluid middle round - the problem for the

rhetoric of campaign electioneering, once governments are formed they have to be directed from near the centre of the party spectrum. If that direction is to be iven a s ecific content, then it

has come to power in West Germany. The FDP is allowed to act as the insubstantial weathervane of political change.

Yet there may be a rather too ‘mechanical’ quality in attempting to explain central politics solely in terms of the balance of the party system and the electoral calculations of the parties. The ‘logic’ of the party system is best regarded as a contributory factor in maintaining a particular momentum in being. For this reason it is necessary to probe more deeply into the ‘preconditions’ of contemporary West German politics.

apparent in its relations K ip to voting behaviour. In fact, the FDP is

i

parties is to locate them correct f y.I3 Regardless of the heady

is German liberalism - with all its 8. istorica . P ambivalence - which

the SPD had fared badly in Land elections. But at the party’s pre-election conference (Freiburg, May 1976) the delegates voted almost unanimously to continue the alliance until 1980. Only a severe setback for the SPD in October 1976 would tempt the FDP to think a ain.

l 3 Considerable ‘travelling’ does tafe place between the parties. Thus in 1972 11 .5 per cent of the SPD vote and 12.1 per cent of CDU/CSU vote came from previous supporters of the other party. For the FDP, no less than 38.5 per cent of its vote came from those previously attached to the SPD or CDU. The core vote for both large parties, 65.4 per cent SPD and 69.0 per cent CDU/CSU, was from ‘permanent’ supporters, but they re resented only 40.0 per cent of the FDP total. But behind the actual transfer stanls a much larger potential volatility - an ‘outer ring’ for the SPD and the CDU of up to 40 per cent of their total support. See W. Kaltefleiter, Zwischen Konsens und Krise: Eine Analyse der Bundestagswahl 1972, Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1973.


PARTY DOMINANCE AND THE PARTY STATE

Essential to an understanding of the present era in Germany is an appreciation of the extent to which the existing political parties have achieved a dominant osition in German society - the arrival

competition with other social forces would bring about a sharp social disharmony in the Federal Republic. In portraying West Germany as a complete ‘party state’, two historical perspectives should first be introduced in order to emphasize the extent of the present-day transformation.

Traditional German political theory in the 19th century rested on the postulate of a ‘dualism’ existing between state and society. This duality was reflected on a constitutional ane by the

of the party state. Were t R eir pre-eminence to be less secure, the

combination, in Imperial German , of a develope 8’ party system existing alongside a complete 1 y non-responsible form of

abomination. Alt B ough the creation of the Weimar Republic

resurrected. Just as important was the fact t K at the republic and the

government - a ‘unique’ Getman solution to maintaining a separation of state and society. The idea of a ‘party state’ in terms of German theor would have been an impossible hybrid, an

signified a formal victory for the parties, essentially only a ‘parliamentarized’ system resulted, and in the nature and evolution of the Weimar presidency the old olitical dualism was

parties associated with it failed even to win a passive acceptance from large sections of society; the democratic parties constantly had to contend with the elites and the values of an older inheritance.

That historical contrast gives one measure of the change represented by the present system. The second historical ingredient concerns the origins of the Federal Republic - in the important ‘negative’ legacy of National Socialism and in the substantial effects of the subsequent allied occupation. The former, in its disintegration, bequeathed a temporary ‘social vacuum’ to German society, and almost immediately afterwards the occu ying powers

position in the formative years of German post-war development, they themselves did not have to struggle for ascendancy. The total effect was that the parties exceptionally found themselves in an empty ‘house of power’ - to use Max Weber’s expression. Their lack of association with the Nazi regime, their protected status, the

deliberately raised the democratic parties to a specia P ly privileged


unavailability of alternative values, the absence of rival social forces - these factors all helped to establish the dominance of the post-war parties. Their hegemony was reinforced by the Basic Law of 1949, a constitution which was designed by and for the founding parties.

The legitimacy of the new party system was however only as secure as that of the state which the arties represented. In one sense, the whole history of the Fe B era1 Republic up to and including the ratification of the Basic Treaty with the German Democratic Republic can be regarded as an extended test of legitimacy for the republic and its institutions. During the Adenauer era, the very fact that the republic itself could still be regarded as a ‘provisional’ creation, pending reunification, masked the extent to which an active commitment would later have to be won. It is not until the later 1960s that one can properly speak of a ‘crisis’ of legitimacy - for the established parties and the parliamentary system they operated, and ultimately for the state which they had helped to bring into being.

On one level the crisis of the republic affected the parties and the parliamentary system, reaching a culmination at the time of the Grand Coalition and significantly when the cartel-quality of party rule became manifest. The second level of crisis was that of ‘identity’ and had a rather different political effect: the Ostpolitik advanced by Brandt resulted in a growing self-awareness for West Germans and a greater perception of the Federal Republic and its institutions as the permanent ex ressions of a political community -

national The party state is now securely anchored in the parliamentary

system which - although lacking a respectable pedigree - has acquired all the essential hallmarks: stable governments consistently based on parliamentary majorities, a cohesive opposition, and political leadershi as well as public policy

parliamentarianism are possibly absent, but the present system has developed exclusively in the post-war epoch and has succeeded only because an adequate party system has evolved, which in turn has implied a consistent rapport with the electorate. The smooth functioning of parliamentary government in turn has acted as a

l4 See Gebhard Schweigler, National Consciousness in Divided Germany, Sage Publications, 1975.

a secure state-consciousness 1 .p necessarily short of a genuinely

emanating from the parties. T g e nuances of a ‘classic’


powerful reinforcement of the party state. State power in the Federal Republic has to be equated

unambiguously with party power. There are no alternative sources of legitimacy, and the old state elites have been absorbed into the new party state. Party influence, if not outright politicization, is apparent at all higher levels of the state service. A party card, if not a uarantee of preferment, is a useful form of insurance; a balance

substantially different effect from undisputed control by a single party. Perhaps the most telling illustration of party involvement is to be seen in the attern of organization and control over public

within the federal state obviates the danger of a one-sided control over broadcasting since the various Lhder authorities are independent, but within them the parties reign supreme. At least to their own satisfaction, a fairly strict Proporz-system of executive appointment and supervisory control operates, and the parties watch the manoeuvres of the others fairly closely. But it is urel a

as it may be on other grounds-is there any possibility of an autonomous ‘establishment’ arising to provide an insulation from party pressures.

There is one aspect of the German version of the party state which must substantially qualify any idea that there exists an arbitrary party dominance. This reservation stems from the special si nificance which is vested by German thought in the concept of

residual hangover from an earlier age, but the legacy is still present: the ‘state’ as such looms as a factor in its own right. Especially tenacious has been the conservative view which em- bodies a tradition going back to Hegel: the equation of the state with freedom, and the belief that it should stand above the particular and possibly repressive interests in society. Traditions in other countries are more piecemeal; thus in Britain there hardly exists a conception of the state, only its ‘functionally operating’ parts: the Crown, government, Parliament, the law, the public service. In Germany the state borders on an objective reality, and there results an intense concern of the relationship of state to society- exemplified by the special venom in the diatribes of the extreme

l5 See Arthur Williams, Broadcasting and Democracy in West Germany, Granada Publishing/Bradford University Press, 1976.

o B influence between the parties comes to exist over time with a

br~adcasting.’~ T g e decentralized system which has grown up

‘party pluralism’ which results, not a social one, nor - un J . esira Es le

‘t f e state’. A preoccupation with the ‘Staatsbegrrf may well be a

WEST GERMANY AND THE POLITICS OF CENTRALITY 401 Left against the bourgeois state, theorists of the Right who insist that the state must be ‘rescued’, some who proclaim the dissolution of the state into society, others who have ronounced the state to

As a consequence of the s ecial position accorded to the state,

subordinate component in the ‘party state’, that fundamentally they are ‘stuutserhultend’. It is then a small step to speak of a Stuutspartei and to identify a party with the hnctions of state - with strong normative and legal connotations. Precisely in the idea of a state founded in law, a Rechtsstuut, one can appreciate the significant place which the law has as a part of political activity.I6 in fact, much olitical debate tends to revolve around the

often become matters of legalistic interpretation. Philip Blair has summed up this dis osition: ‘The need for constitutional-legal

authoritative, definitive and hence legally-binding resolution of conflict are still vital features of German political life.’17

This ‘legal’ colouration to politics effectively strengthens the hold of the parties, for ultimately they have the authority of the Rechtsstuut at their disposal.18 But once a party, such as the SPD, has moved into the governing orbit and shares in the ethos of state and law, its own goals may become displaced. The party state in Germany does not signify a situation of unrestricted party

l6 The idea of the Rechtsrtuut is only inexactly rendered by ‘the rule of law’ since the vital connection with the state is missing. Nevi1 Johnson has commented: ‘ “Rule of Law” by itself will not do, with its strong overtones of An lo-American Common Law pragmatism. But even “a state based on the rule

German expression.’ Government in the Federal Republic of Germany, Pergamon Press, 1973, p. 12.

l7 P. Blair, Law and Politics in Germany. A aper given at the Loughborough

Is The ‘public function’ of the parties was written into Artic january e 21 of the 1976* Basic Conference of the Association for the Study OrGerman Politics,

Law, a responsibility in law which cuts two ways: the possibility of banning parties for their unconstitutional or undemocratic behaviour or aims, but also a commitment on the part of the state to aid the parties, especially financial support. On this latter aspect, see K. Sontheimer, ‘The Funding of Political Parties in West Germany’, The Political Quarterly, July-September 1974. The Party Law of 1967 which ‘fills in’ Article 21 also lays stress on their public function in Articles I and 2: ‘Parties are, in constitutional law, a necessary component of the free and democratic basic order . . . Parties shall artici ate in forming the political will of the people in all fields of public life’ ( i tJcs addPed):

be dead. There is no British equivalent for t K is type of debate.

there is a live sense in whic K the parties have to be seen as the

questions of lega f competence, duty, and sanction, and as a result

warrant for politic 9 actions and demands, and the search for

of P aw” fails to convey the fusion of state and law (= Right) implied in the


pluralism but rather a particular type of mould for democratic politics, in the paradoxical form of a ‘corporate pluralism’. The dominance of a particular t pe of party and the nature of the

of the centripetal system. German party state can thus 6 e seen to stand as the basic supports

RESTRICTED IDEOLOGICAL SPACE

A further requirement of political centrality is that the ideological extremes should be absent, In the case of the Federal Republic it is necessary to distinguish between the centrality which has resulted from a natural evolution of German society and another type which represents a more or less explicit barrier to ideological extension. Although the expression ‘a natural social evolution’ begs some questions, it can at least be demonstrated how the rise of the ‘catch-all’ party was associated with a diminution of ideological appeal. The early ability of the CDU to s read itself

assimilation of a large proportion of the electorate within a single umbrella-party, and since Adenauer’s heyday the Christian Democrats have at least been able to consolidate their position. The e ually succesdd response of the SPD in later gaining a parity

arties and was made possible because the politica extremes were Lrgely moribund, a surprising turn of events in a country not previously noted for political moderation, but absolutely conclusive in electoral terms: in 1949 their aggregate share of the vote was only 60 per cent as against almost 92 per cent in 1972.

This development supports the view that there has been a sea- change in the relationship of German people to politics. Of course, changes in the political culture have to be interpreted against the background of alterations in ‘real’ factors: quite new economic conditions prevail and there have been similarly striking chan es in the social structure. But besides the natural evolution which a as lessened the attraction of ideology, there is an important sense in which the expression of ideology has been artijicially restricted as well. This restriction can be called ‘the German trauma’, and it has resulted in an ideological truncation which applies to both ends of the political spectrum, although with rather different implications.

The inhibition which stifles the full expression of Right-wing sentiments is directly associated with the experience of National

across the previously rigid lines of German society P ed to the

with t 9, e CDU has resulted in the apparent conver ence of the two s


Socialism. There are many points of contact between attitudes and values of the extreme Right and a typical ‘fascist syndrome’. The unacceptability of such views presented in an overt political form does not prevent their diffusion in society and they need never cohere sufficiently to become a challenge to the CDU.I9 It is also apparent that the CDU would be capable of making a limited ideological shift if conditions required: the ‘conservative’ sentiments, somewhat restored to favour, are indicative of a possible direction.’’ Thus the centrality of West German politics, to which the CDU contributes, does not imply the presence of a golden mean. The election slogan of ‘Freedom or Socialism’ somehow captures the present amorphous state of CDU ideology. The party would willingly olarize German politics: it does not

For the German Left a trauma with rather different origins applies. The way in which Germany came to be permanently divided after 1945 is one aspect, and it is reinforced by the ever- present challenge presented by the East German state. This combination makes a sharp rejection of the extreme Left almost ine+itable, but in addition there is the outcropping of much older attitudes: ‘the Left’ in general was always regarded as basically anti-national in character, and throughout its long history the SPD has been dogged by this reputation. Brandt had to face the charge that his Ostpolitik was selling Germany short, and in wishing to ‘recognize’ the Democratic Republic the SPD was dubbed the ‘Anerkennungspurtei’. The endemic suspicion and hostility has forced the moderate Left into a permanently defensive outlook: constantly the SPD has had to prove that it really is a ‘national’

lY In this context, it is perhaps best to interpret the brief rise of Neo-Nazism in the late rws as a direct but weak echo of the past rather than as a new political force. It was direct because it appealed in the same terms and to the same groups as National Socialism. It was weak because in seeking support, especially fiom rural voters, it failed to take into account the substantial structural changes that had meanwhile occurred. For a comparative analysis of Schleswig-Holstein, see T. A. Tilton, Nazism, Neo-Nazism, and the Peasantr , Indiana University Press, 1975. A new ‘fourth’ party would have to find a dkerent basis of appeal, one which the CSU with its provincial outlook could hardly provide.

2O The declining salience of the specifically ‘Christian’ image of the CDU may account for a renewed interest in conservatism, but it does tend to be a motley collection of ideas ranging from revamped Deutscknationalen sentiments to a glossed-over technocracy, and an all-purpose twist given by Strauss: ‘marching at the vanguard of progress’. See M. Greifenhagen, Das Dilemma des Kon- servatismus in Deutschland, Piper Verlag, 1971.

quite know how far it can ris E the result.

GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 404

party, that it has nothing to do with the extreme Left. The demarcation must be visible and complete.

The extreme Left is therefore cast in the ermanent role of the bogeyman of German politics, regardless o P whether a particular group looks with favour to East Germany, and possibly the ‘autonomous’ fringe movements attract most hatred. Despite a tiny electoral following, all Leftist activity is regarded with troubled apprehension - an unease which does not extend to the other extreme which merges imperceptibly with more acceptable viewpoints. Even though most Western states have had their share of ‘urban guerrilla’ movements, the West German reaction has been more than hypersensitive, and anarcho-terrorism, associated above all with the saga of the Baader-Meinhof group, has indelibly affected prevailing attitudes. In consequence, the

ossibilit of a general extension to the Left in German politics has gee, male that much more remote.

has its own idiosyncrasies which make accommodation virtual r y impossible.21 In a curious way it is also socially isolated, confined to the educated elite, the universities, and the world of intellectual discourse. Apart from pockets of support for the orthodox Communist DKP in industrial areas, there is little or anic connection with the mass of the working population, an di as was evident during the confrontations which took place in the universities, efforts to link up with wider social strata have failed.

The major tenet of the intellectual Left - the dogmatic assertion of the socially repressive nature of the Federal Republic - fails to strike a wider chord of response. With a foundation in Marxist theory, but by no means restricted to it, the extreme Left has engaged in a bombastic denunciation of the political and social institutions of the Federal Republic which, for all its shortcomings, the overwhelming majority regards with some self-satisfaction and pride of achievement. The absolute divorce between the Left-wing intellectual climate and the popular outlook thus ensures an enduring element of tension in German society. The bigotry of the one is matched by the intolerant Angst of the other.

A topical expression of this conflict is apparent in the thorny ’* Kurt Sontheimer has delivered a broadside polemic against the intellectual

Left from the point of view of the moderates: Das Elend unserer Zntellektuellen, Hoffman und Campe, 1976. In particular, he seeks to ex ose the perils in the modes of thought and argument (Denkstruktur) adopted l y the Left which he regards as a devaluation of intellectual and political activity.

The German extreme Left anywa


question of the employment of ‘radicals’ in the public service. No country can face with equanimity the prospect of harbouring people in the state-service who have the deliberate aim of destroying its political and social fabric. In the West German case there is the additional hazard of the Democratic Republic - too many sympathizers and agents have been active for an easy indifference to be displayed. There is a further complication in the Federal Republic arising from the very wide definition as to what the ‘state service’ constitutes, for the ranks of officialdom stretch to the schools, the universities, and beyond. The situation is made slightly ludicrous by the insistence in some quarters that even the humblest public servant in the most menial capacity is a potential menace - if he is, or ever was, a ‘radical’.22

In fact, there has been a deplorable failure to strike a sensible balance between the exclusion of a possible risk and the need to preserve a reasonable degree of non-conformity in society. The result is that the Left-win critics do have a ustification - even

discrimination against Ri ht-wing radicalism remains only of

have become more than a partial point of agreement between the parties is a sufficient warning of the care that is needed in evaluating the content of political centrality. The whole subject illumines the special facets of German political life: the concern for the state, the quest for certainty, and the rather alarming reliance *’ Membershi of a ‘radical’ organization implies belonging to one of a variety

the so-called ‘ban’ on the em loyment of applicants with a ‘radical’ background,

is suspect and can therefore be dismissed. The original Rudikulenerhs was a decree adopted by the federal government and the Lbder in January I972 which sought to achieve conformity of treatment. But in February 1976 the CDU/CSU majority in the Bundesrat rejected the government’s proposed ‘framework’ law which would have regularized the situation. Even though the Constitutional Court ruled in May 1975 that dismissal from the public service should only be possible for specific acts rather than the holding of opinions alone, there are now considerable differences between employing authorities. In CDU/CSU governed Lfider membership of a radical organization may be sufficient grounds for exclusion, whilst for the federal government and SPD/FDP Lbder an additional burden of proof as to unreliability rests with the authority. Either way, a hapless candidate or serving official who once belonged to a ‘suspect’ organization can expect a long wait, possibly a few hearings, and a lar e dossier before his ‘case’ is

Western Germany’, Government and Opposition, Summer 1975.

though their own postures a ave been a materia i contribution - and

theoretical importance. T t at the question of ‘toleration’ should

listed by the fe B era1 government. There are two aspects to the problem: one is

the Berufsverbot, the other is t i e continued employment of officials whose loyalty

decided. See K. Dyson, ‘Left-Wing Extremism and t a e Problem of Tolerance in


on ‘the law’ to come up with the answers. The German idea of the Rechtsstuut is apparently one substitute for ideological debate.

CONCLUSION: THE PROSPECTS FOR THE SYSTEM

There is obviously no ‘iron law’ of inertia to keep West German politics indefinitely on a set course, but the various determining features do appear to be solidly entrenched. The electoral politics of the three-party system make a sudden switch to centrihgality seem unlikely, just as the dictates of the party state and the constraints on ideology rob the system of dynamic potential; these factors are also mutually reinforcing. Furthermore, the structure has proved to be quite equal to the demands ma e upon it: were there to be signs of creaking disharmony or of a creeping immobilisrne, the story might be substantially different. Never- theless, allowance has to be made for qualitative change.

Quite apart from the possibility of a sudden ideological ‘rejuvenation’ - from whatever unexplained source - which could fragment the existing party system, an indication of three different routes will suffice to show how future development can be viewed, although any one need not preclude the others. The first perspective draws attention to a comparatively minor change in the party system which could have considerable consequences. The second reveals the possible impact of ‘outside’ factors on the Federal Republic. The third treats the politics of centrality as mainly relevant to a particular era - the passing of which simply reduces the significance of that type of politics.

An initially modest chan e could come about through a

primarily affecting the FDP. As has been pointed out, the party’s continued survival depends on its ability to keep above the electoral threshold, and there are no uarantees in this respect. Should it fail to do so, then the possibi H, ‘ty would be present of a definite if still limited polarization between the two major parties. Alternatively, the party could become permanently wedded to a progressive alliance with the SPD, despite the efforts of the party’s strategists. Either way, the emergence of a sharper cleavage between two opposing ‘blocks’ would enable the SPD to renew its tradition as a party of reform, and if only for that reason the CDU would be better placed to define its alternative standpoint.

A second and quite different perspective is contained in the

Pit ical

realignment of the forces t E at make up the visible ‘centre’,


allowance for outside influences - for the present purpose summed up entirely by the existence of the East German state. Some Observers would argue that West German politics have become internally so centripetal only because this ‘external’ polarity has been so great: the future evolution of the Federal Republic is therefore in part still conditioned by this relationship. There are, of course, many ingredients for the variations on the theme - the course of relations between the two states, the wider ones between Eastern and Western Europe, the political development of the Democratic Republic itself, the future relevance of ‘Germany’ for the Germans of both states. It would be rash to underestimate the effect of any one of these, and although there are too many imponderables to make any precise speculation useful, any definite shft would have a direct consequence for domestic politics in West Germany.

A third view that can be taken of the future is quite undramatic. It sees the events and developments of the past few years or so as merely the tailpiece of a period of transition. It was a period during which certain basic issues had to be faced and resolved within the Federal Republic - problems of national and state identity, of governmental institutions, of the relationship between state and society. It is reasonable to maintain that problems of this hi h order are most amenable to solution within a strongly co a esive system. Once the transition is over, then one would expect a greater self-confidence to be evident, and at that point it would become irrelevant whether the politics of centrality were to decay or not.

Documents

West Germany and the Politics of Centrality