WEST COAST DEBATE - BC Forensic League Web viewWhile Syrian President Bashar Assad has dangled the possibility of renewed peace ... while refusing to take the threat of military action

West Coast Publishing Israel Two State March 2017 Public Forum STARTER File Page 1

West Coast Publishing

Israel Two-State Starter FilePublic Forum March 2017

Prepared by Jim HansonResearch Assistance Kathryn Starkey

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WEST COAST DEBATE

Public Forum March 2017

Israel Two State Starter FileFinding Arguments in this File

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WEST COAST DEBATE.................................................................................................................................2

Intelligence Module ................................................................................................................................. 6

GOOD US-ISRAELI RELATIONS ARE IMPORTANT ................................................................... 7

US-Israeli Relations Good – Military Intelligence ............................................................................... 8

US-Israeli Relations Good – Mid East Stability ................................................................................... 9

US-Israeli Relations Good – UN Cooperation .................................................................................... 10

US-Israeli Relations Good – A2: Jews Cry Anti-Semitism ............................................................... 11

US-Israeli Relations Good – Walt and Mearsheimer Indict ............................................................. 12

Israeli Conflict Bad – Becomes Regional ............................................................................................ 13 Distance from Israel Bad..................................................................................................................................................14AT: Distance from Israel.................................................................................................................................................15AT: Distance from Israel.................................................................................................................................................16

ISREAL CAN DETER ATTACKS ..................................................................................................... 17

Yes – Israeli Deterrence ........................................................................................................................ 18






Yes – Israeli Deterrence – A2: July War ............................................................................................. 24

Yes – Israeli Detterence – Mini Nukes ................................................................................................. 25

ISREAL CANNOT DETER ATTACKS ............................................................................................. 26

No – Israeli Detterence .......................................................................................................................... 27







No – Israeli Detterence – Iron Dome ................................................................................................... 34

ISREALI DETERRENCE BAD .......................................................................................................... 36

Israeli Deterrence Bad .......................................................................................................................... 37

Israeli Deterrence Bad .......................................................................................................................... 38 We’re a small non-profit. Please don’t share this file with those who have not paid including via dropbox, google drive, the web, printed copies, email, etc. Visit us at www.wcdebate.com



Israeli Deterrence Bad .......................................................................................................................... 40

ISREALI DETERRENCE GOOD ...................................................................................................... 41

Deterrence Good .................................................................................................................................... 42 No Israel Iran Strike.........................................................................................................................................................43

ISREAL HAS DISCLOSED NUKES .................................................................................................. 44

Yes – Disclosure ..................................................................................................................................... 45

Yes – Disclosure ..................................................................................................................................... 46

Yes – Disclosure ..................................................................................................................................... 47

ISREAL HAS NOT DISCLOSED NUKES ........................................................................................ 48

No – Disclosure – A2: Olmert ............................................................................................................... 49

No – Disclosure – A2: Vanunu ............................................................................................................. 50

DISCLOSURE OF ISRAELI NUKES BAD ....................................................................................... 51

Disclosure Bad – Proliferation ............................................................................................................. 52

Disclosure Bad – US-Israeli Aid ........................................................................................................... 53

Disclosure Good – Detterence .............................................................................................................. 54

Disclosure Good – CBW Detterence .................................................................................................... 55

Disclosure Good – Miscalc .................................................................................................................... 56

Disclosure Good – Communication ..................................................................................................... 57

Disclosure Good – A2: Everyone Knows ............................................................................................. 58

Disclosure Good – A2: Samson Option ............................................................................................... 59

Disclosure Good – A2: US-Israeli Relations ....................................................................................... 60

ISRAELI NUCLEAR WEAPONS ...................................................................................................... 61

Nuclear Weapons Good – War ............................................................................................................ 62



Nuclear Weapons Good – A2: WMD Checks ..................................................................................... 65

Nuclear Weapons Good – A2: Israeli First Strikes ............................................................................ 66

Nuclear Weapons Bad – Instability ..................................................................................................... 67

Nuclear Weapons Bad – A2: Deterrence ............................................................................................. 68

ISREAL IS NOT APARTHIED ........................................................................................................... 69

A2: Israeli Apartheid ............................................................................................................................ 70







A2: Israeli Apartheid (West Bank Occupation) ................................................................................. 74

A2: Israeli Apartheid (Wall) ................................................................................................................ 75

A2: Israeli Genocide .............................................................................................................................. 76

ISRAEL IS APARTHIED .................................................................................................................... 77

A2: One State – Apartheid ................................................................................................................... 78

A2: One State – Palestinian Rights ...................................................................................................... 79

A2: One State – Realism ....................................................................................................................... 80

A2: One State – Successionism DA Link ............................................................................................. 81

NO TWO STATE SOLUTION ............................................................................................................ 82

No risk of two-state solution ................................................................................................................. 83

No risk of two-state solution – Netanyahu Opposition ...................................................................... 84

No risk of two-state solution – Israel Opposition ............................................................................... 85

No risk of two-state solution – Palestinian Opposition ...................................................................... 86

PRESSURE KEY TO TWO STATE SOLUTION ............................................................................. 87

Pressure Two State Solution ............................................................................................................ 88

PRESSURE ON ISREAL IS BAD ....................................................................................................... 89

Pressure Bad – Relations ...................................................................................................................... 90

Pressure Bad – Settler Rush ................................................................................................................. 91




Intelligence Module

US-Israeli relations are key to intelligenceDore Gold, the eleventh Rep of Israel to the United Nations, An Israeli response to the Walt-Mearsheimer claim, 9/2/2007. http://www.aish.com/jewishissues/middleeast/Understanding_the_U.S.-Israel_Alliance.asp

Much of the U.S.-Israel strategic relationship is classified, particularly in the area of intelligence sharing. There are two direct consequences from this situation. First, most aspects of U.S.-Israel defense ties are decided on the basis of the professional security considerations of those involved. Lobbying efforts in Congress cannot force a U.S. security agency to work with Israel. And the intelligence cooperation between the two countries has been considerable; much of it preceded the solidification of the U.S.-Israel defense relationship in the 1980s. It was Israeli intelligence which obtained the exact text of the secret February 1956 speech by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party, in which he denounced the past policies of his predecessor, Joseph Stalin. The Israelis passed Khrushchev's address on to the CIA. 24 "The ability of the U.S. Air Force... to defend whatever position it has in NATO owes more to the Israeli intelligence input than it does to any single source of intelligence." -- General George F. Keegan In August 1966, the Mossad succeeded in recruiting an Iraqi pilot who defected and flew a Soviet MiG 21 to Israel, which shared its intelligence on the new Soviet aircraft, about which little was previously known, with the U.S. The information obtained about the MiG 21 not only helped the Israeli Air Force less than a year later in the 1967 Six-Day War, but would be extremely valuable to the U.S., as well, since the MiG 21 became the workhorse of the North Vietnamese Air Force in the years ahead. Indeed, it became common practice for Israel to furnish whole Soviet weapons systems - like 122 and 130-mm artillery and a T-72 tank - to the U.S. for evaluation and testing, influencing the development of U.S. weapons systems and battlefield tactics during the Cold War. 25 The value of this intelligence for the U.S has been enormous. General George F. Keegan, a retired U.S. Air Force intelligence chief, told Wolf Blitzer in 1986 that he could not have obtained the same intelligence "with five CIAs." 26 He went further: "The ability of the U.S. Air Force in particular, and the Army in general, to defend whatever position it has in NATO owes more to the Israeli intelligence input than it does to any single source of intelligence, be it satellite reconnaissance, be it technology intercept, or what have you." 27 Because many elements of the U.S.-Israel security relationship are normally kept secret, it is difficult for academics, commentators, and pundits to provide a thorough net assessment of the true value of U.S.-Israel ties. Thus, Israel is left working shoulder-to-shoulder with the U.S., even while finding itself caricatured by outside commentators as a worthless ally whose status is only sustained by a domestic lobby.

Effective intelligence is the critical lynch pin for hegemony and preventing terrorist attacks. Lee H. Hamilton, vice chairman of the 9/11 Commission currently serves on the President's Homeland Security Advisory Council, Challenges for Intelligence in American Democracy, 2004 http://www.wilsoncenter.org/about/director/docs/Hamilton_intelamerdem.doc

Good intelligence is essential to our national security. A superpower like the United States simply cannot survive without it. As a heavy consumer of intelligence and an observer of the intelligence community for decades, I hold the men and women of our intelligence agencies in high regard. They are highly talented people. They are dedicated to their work and their country. They are called upon to do a difficult, and sometimes dangerous, job with the knowledge that good work rarely receives outside recognition. The work of the intelligence community played a key role in our victory in the Cold War. And on September 11, 2001, we all learned that the mission for the intelligence community is as vital and urgent as it has ever been. Intelligence is the most important tool that we have in preventing terrorist attacks – at home and abroad. Better intelligence is everybody’s favorite solution to preventing terrorism. And intelligence is also a crucial component of our work to curb weapons proliferation. The stakes could not be higher. Policymakers simply must be able to trust that they have the best possible intelligence as they deal with these new threats. Good intelligence does not guarantee good policy, but poor intelligence can ensure bad policy. If a policymaker has quality intelligence, issues are framed; decisions are clearer; and consequences can be anticipated.




GOOD US-ISRAELI RELATIONS ARE IMPORTANT




US-Israeli Relations Good – Military Intelligence

US-Israeli relations good – reliable, intelligence, takes politically risky actions, and is a victimMarvin J. Cetron and Owen Davies, president of Forecasting International and a specialist in the future and technology, Worst-case scenario: the Middle East, The Futurist, 9/1/2007

* Israeli security. Israel is the only Western-style democracy in the Middle East and the one ally there that the United States can count on in a crisis. Israel provides the United States with useful intelligence about the region and some other areas of the world at least as often as the United States supplies it to Israel. Israel occasionally takes action that is in the American interest when the United States itself would find that difficult, as in the bombing of the OsirakNuclear Research Facility in Iraq in 1981. And Israel has long been a victim of aggression, for which the United States generally has sympathy. It is significant also that many Americans, and especially many politically influential Americans, feel a deep personal interest inthe fate of the Jewish homeland. In all, it is inevitable that the United States would consistently side with Israel in its efforts to survive the hostility of its neighbors.




US-Israeli Relations Good – Mid East Stability

US-Israeli relations are key to regional and global stabilityGlenn Kessler, Washington Post Staff Writer, Bush Says U.S. Would Defend Israel Militarily The Washington Post, 2/2/2006

President Bush said yesterday the United States would defend Israel militarily if necessary against Iran, a statement that appeared to be his most explicit commitment to Israel's defense. In an interview with Reuters, Bush said he is concerned about Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's "menacing talk" about Israel, such as his comments denying the Holocaust and saying Israel should be wiped off the map. "Israel is a solid ally of the United States. We will rise to Israel's defense, if need be. So this kind of menacing talk is disturbing. It's not only disturbing to the United States, it's disturbing for other countries in the world, as well," Bush said. Asked whether he meant the United States would rise to Israel's defense militarily, Bush said: "You bet, we'll defend Israel." The Jewish state sought some sort of military alliance with the United States shortly after it was founded in 1948, but was rebuffed by several presidents, partly out of fear of offending Arabs. Since then, Israel has established the principle of securing its own defense, including a nuclear deterrent, backed by large weapons sales by the United States. Past presidents have spoken elliptically about helping Israel, a close ally, in a conflict. The United States has no military alliance with Israel, though President Bill Clinton dangled the prospect of a military alliance as part of a final peace deal, said Dennis Ross, a senior Clinton adviser on the region. Ross said he could not recall a president ever saying so clearly the United States would come to Israel's defense. But he said it is a "logical extension" of existing policy, because Israel has never before faced the threat of a foe with a possible nuclear weapon. "This proves once again the United States is the best friend and ally of Israel," said Israeli Ambassador Daniel Ayalon. "We are very proud of this special relationship, which is the cornerstone of stability in the Middle East, for the mutual benefit of Israel, the U.S. and all peace-loving countries in the region and beyond."




US-Israeli Relations Good – UN Cooperation

The Israel is America’s biggest supporter in the United Nations Mitchell Bard- Mitchell Bard is the Executive Director of the nonprofit American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise (AICE) and a foreign policy analyst – 2007- - Online- http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/israel_un.html

In 2006, Mauritania was the Arab nation that voted with the United States most often, and that was on only 13.6 percent of the resolutions. The other Arab countries, including allies Saudia Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt, voted against the United States 80 percent of the time or more. Syria was at the bottom of the list, opposing the U.S. 92 percent of the time, with Jordan just slightly better. As a group, in 2006, the Arab states voted against the United States on more than 92 percent of the resolutions. This continues a downward trend in support for the United States at the UN by Arab nations. In 2000, for example, Arab members voted with the U.S. 26.2 percent of the time. Last year, the figure was 10.6 percent. By contrast, Israel has consistently been America's top UN ally. Israel voted with the U.S. 84.2 percent of the time in 2006, outpacing the support levels of major U.S. allies such as Great Britain, France and Canada, which voted with the United States on less than 55 percent of the resolutions.19




US-Israeli Relations Good – A2: Jews Cry Anti-Semitism

Israel doesn’t just cry anti-semite – their argument is actually based on historically offensive propositionsAlan Dershowitz, prof of law at Harvard, Debunking the Newest – and Oldest – Jewish Conspiracy, April 2006.

As an added precaution, the authors preemptively accuse the Lobby of indiscriminately crying anti-Semitism : “Anyone who criticizes Israeli actions or says that pro-Israel groups have significant influence over U.S. Middle East policy … stands a good chance of getting labeled an anti-Semite.”62 “In other words criticize Israeli policy and you are by definition an anti-Semite.”63 T his is demonstrably false, though it is a charge made frequently in the hate literature.64 Several years ago, I challenged those who made similar accusations to identify a single Jewish leader who equated mere criticism of Israeli policy with anti-Semitism.65 No one accepted my challenge, because no Jewish leader has made such an absurd claim. Among the harshest critics of Israeli policy are Jews and Israelis. Just read the mainstream Israel and Jewish-American press66 - a research task that Mearsheimer and Walt should have but did not undertake before they falsely generalized about its content. Mearsheimer and Walt’s straw- man argument — which, if true, would make me and other critical supporters of Israel anti-Semites — simply does not stand up to scrutiny.




US-Israeli Relations Good – Walt and Mearsheimer Indict

Walt and Mearsheimer are unqualified – radical, no new information, poor scholarly workAlan Dershowitz, prof of law at Harvard, Debunking the Newest – and Oldest – Jewish Conspiracy, April 2006.

If these charges sound familiar, it is because, as I will show, they can be found on the websites of extremists of the hard right, like David Duke, and the hard left, like Alexander Cockburn. They appear daily in the Arab and Muslim press. They are contemporary variations on old themes such as those promulgated in the notorious czarist forgery, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, in the Nazi and America First literature of the 1930s and early ’40s, 20 and in the propaganda pamphlets of the Soviet Union. In essence, the working paper is little more than a compilation of old, false, and authoritatively discredited charges dressed up in academic garb. The only thing new about it is the imprimatur these recycled assertions have now been given by the prominence of its authors and their institutional affiliations. As David Duke observed: “The Harvard report contains little new information. I and a few other American commentators have for years been making the same assertions as this new paper.”21 It “validates every major point I [Duke] have been making.”22 It should have been easily predictable – especially to “realists” – that their “Harvard report” would be featured, as it has been, on neo-Nazi and extremist websites, and even by terrorist organizations, and that it would be used by overt anti-Semites to “validate” their paranoid claims of a worldwide Jewish conspiracy.23 One of the authors of this paper has acknowledged that “none of the evidence [in their paper] represents original documentation or is derived from independent interviews”24 – a surprising admission, considering that professors at great universities are judged by the originality of their research. Moreover, the paper is filled with errors and distortions that should be obvious to any critical reader, all of which are directed against Israel and the Jewish Lobby. As I will show, there are at least three major types of errors: First, quotations are wrenched out of context (for example, the authors distort a Ben-Gurion quote to make him appear to favor evacuation of Arabs by “brutal compulsion,”25 when he actually said that, because an evacuation would require “brutal compulsion,” it should not become “part of our programme”26). Second, facts are misstated (for example, that Israeli citizenship is based on “blood kinship,”27 thus confusing Israel’s law of citizenship with its Law of Return; fully a quarter of Israel’s citizens are not Jewish). And third, embarrassingly poor logic is employed (for example, whenever America and Israel act on a common interest, it must be the result of pressure from “the Lobby,” and that “the mere existence of the Lobby” is proof that “support for Israel is not in the American national interest”28). In light of its many errors and the admission that their paper contains nothing original, it is fair to ask why these distinguished professors would have chosen to publish a paper that does not meet their usual scholarly standards, especially given the obvious risk that recycling these old but explosive charges under the imprimatur of prominent authors and their universities would be seized on by bigots to promote their anti-Semitic agendas. As an advocate of free speech and an opponent of censorship based on political correctness, I welcome a serious, balanced, objective study of the influences of lobbies — including Israeli lobbies — on American foreign policy. I also welcome reasoned, contextual and comparative criticism of Israeli policies and actions. Let the marketplace of ideas remain open to all. But, as I will show, this study is so filled with distortions, so empty of originality or new evidence, so tendentious in its tone, so lacking in nuance and balance, so unscholarly in its approach, so riddled with obvious factual errors that could easily have been checked (but obviously were not), and so dependent on biased, extremist and anti-American sources, as to raise the question of motive: what would motivate two well recognized academics to depart so grossly from their usual standards of academic writing and research in order to produce a “study paper” that contributes so little to the existing scholarship while being so susceptible to misuse? Academics do not generally respond to the kinds of assertions and accusations made on hate sites.29 But because of the academic setting in which the Walt-Mearsheimer paper appears, I feel compelled to respond in detail and to these recycled charges and to demonstrate how the paper fails the most basic tests of scholarship and accuracy.

Walt and Mearsheimer are hacksDore Gold, Former Israeli UN Ambassador, Israel is no Burden, 8/27/2007

5. Former US Secretary of State George Shultz rejected the new book’s argument, saying the work was “a conspiracy theory pure and simple and scholars at great universities should be ashamed to promulgate it." Another noteworthy point is that although Walt and Mearsheimer direct most of their charges at the activity of the pro-Israel lobby, AIPAC, they enjoy the support of the pro-Muslim lobby CAIR (The Council on American-Islamic Relations.) It is also noteworthy that while AIPAC relies financially only on donations from American citizens and is unwilling to accept donations from abroad, CAIR enjoys the financial support of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Walt and Mearsheimer are not objective academicians. They took a stand. Their objective is not only to sell books, but also to attempt to influence Middle East decision-making. The broad campaign the two are planning must not catch our public relations officials off guard.




Israeli Conflict Bad – Becomes Regional

Israeli conflict become regional – linkages and proximityHisham Milhem, Washington Bureau Chief, Al Arabiya, Brookings Institution, A long, hot summer, 6/5/2007

And as far as the countries around the vicinity of Israel -- Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Syria -- the continuation of the conflict in one form or another is still the dominant feature in the lives of the average Egyptians -- Egypt to a lesser extent obviously now -- but Syria, Jordan, Lebanon. I mean, we all live in the same small area, and when you have fire in Israel, or the West Bank, Jordan cannot be immune from it. Or if you have a fire between Lebanon and Syria and Israel, as we’ve seen last summer, the region also will not be immune from it. So in that sense, there is that linkage.




Distance from Israel Bad

Distance from Israel causes middle east conflict – portrays lack of resolve

JTA, 10-9-2012, “Romney decries Obama Middle East policy in foreign policy speech,” http://www.jta.org/news/article/2012/10/09/3108836/romney-decries-obama-middle-east-policy-in-foreign-policy-speech

Romney also discussed the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, and the uncontrolled violence by the Assad regime in Syria, concluding that "it is clear that the risk of conflict in the region is higher now than when the President took office." "We cannot support our friends and defeat our enemies in the Middle East when our words are not backed up by deeds, when our defense spending is being arbitrarily and deeply cut, when we have no trade agenda to speak of, and the perception of our strategy is not one of partnership, but of passivity," Romney said. Romney pledged to impose new sanctions on Iran, and to increase military assistance and coordination with Israel. "I will reaffirm our historic ties to Israel and our abiding commitment to its security—the world must never see any daylight between our two nations," he added.

We don’t have the staff necessary to have an effective foreign policy

Rosa Brooks, staff writer, 1-23-2012, “Obama Needs a Grand Strategy,” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/23/obama_needs_a_grand_strategy

Unfortunately, a grand strategy is a necessary but not sufficient basis for coherent national action. All those petite, itty-bitty strategies? All those more modest operational and tactical-level plans? A nation needs those too, as long as they are supporting the grand strategy. And to succeed, a nation needs people who understand the difference between strategy and tactics, people who know how to plan, and people who know how to execute. Without all those things, "policymaking" is a meaningless enterprise: just a game that makes

senior officials feel important. You can announce "policy" all you want, but if you don't have a plan for implementing it, people capable of implementing it, the necessary resources, and a Plan B (and C, and D) for when things go wrong, you're back in wish-list land. This is an area where the United States does shamefully badly. Most executive-

branch agencies offer staff (junior or senior) little if any meaningful training in management, strategic planning, or policy implementation. I've met senior White House officials who didn't know what an executive order was, didn't understand the process through which intelligence agencies determine collection priorities, and didn't understand, in even the most rudimentary way, why sending significant numbers of troops to a foreign country generally takes a little time. (It has to do with the tedious fact that troops need the right training, equipment, transportation, supplies, food, communications, and so on.) This isn't a problem specific to the Obama administration, or to the White House; other administrations and other executive-branch agencies are just as bad. And it's not because the U.S. government is filled with

dumb people: There are many exceptionally talented and dedicated people in government service. But if talented people are untrained, they can still end up doing a lot of dumb things.




AT: Distance from Israel

Some distance is useful

David Ignatius, assistance editor for business news, 10-9-2012, “Does Romney understand the Middle East revolution?” Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/post/does-romney-truly-understand-the-middle-east-revolution/2012/10/09/ac623cce-1204-11e2-ba83-a7a396e6b2a7_blog.html

The biggest difference between these candidates on the Middle East, when you boil down all the other rhetoric, is probably on Israel. Romney said it pretty clearly: “The world must never see any daylight between our two nations.” Taken at face value, that seems to mean the United States shouldn’t take public positions that are different from Israel’s. That’s a formulation that few Republican foreign policy leaders would agree with. Among those GOP luminaries who very deliberately opened “daylight” were Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Brent Scowcroft, James Baker and Condoleezza Rice. Romney can’t seriously mean that on all major issues affecting Israel, he will defer to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu? No nation hands over policy choices to another, even to its best friend.




AT: Distance from Israel

The US has a lot of credibility now

Doug Bandow, Senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 1-19-2010, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11143,

The U.S. has no great power enemies. Relations with China and Russia are at times uneasy, but not confrontational, let alone warlike. Washington is allied with every other industrialized state. America possesses the most sophisticated nuclear arsenal and the most powerful conventional force. Washington's reach

exceeds that of Rome and Britain at their respective peaks. Other nations, most notably China, are stirring, but it will take years before they match, let alone overtake, the U.S. Even subtracting the costs of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars leaves American military outlay around five times that of China and 10 times that of Russia. Combine a gaggle of adversaries, enemies and rogues — Burma, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria — and the U.S. spends perhaps 25 times as much. The United States is not alone. The European Union has 10 times the GDP and three times the population of Russia. Military outlay by the U.S. plus its NATO allies accounts for about 70 percent of world military spending. Add in America's other allies and friends, such as South Korea, and the total share of global military outlay hits 80 percent.

We have lots of influence

Roger Cohen, columnist for the New York Times and the International Herald Tribune, 1-12-2012, http://www.todayonline.com/World/EDC120112-0000002/US-soft-power-could-defeat-declinists

For a while soft power was undercut because the US reputation was tarnished, but the Arab awakening has demonstrated how powerful American-driven social media are in opening up closed societies. Facebook and Twitter have been conspicuous. But when IBM invests massively in Africa - which it has identified as the next major emerging growth market - it is also investing in an openness that advances US interests. When I was at Harvard recently, Joseph Nye, the professor and former dean of the Kennedy School of Government, made an interesting point. He noted that a rising China has 1.3 billion citizens. But America at its best has 7 billion in that it draws on the

world's talents, as its corporations and colleges demonstrate. Prof Nye in general is sceptical of the "declinists". I agree. That's not because another American century is dawning - it's not; nor because the power shift to Asia is illusory; nor because US problems of paralysed

government, high deficits and inadequate schools are negligible. No, it's because the defeat of American hard power has been overdrawn and the magnetism of American soft power underestimated. And we are going into a world where, as Prof Nye

has written, "War remains possible, but it is much less acceptable now than it was a century or even a half-century ago." The US is adaptable. The mistakes of the past decade are being corrected through more effective counterterrorism, withdrawal from the major wars, and a slimmed down military budget. Some event, or political lurch, could blow these moves off course, but I don't think it's a coincidence that consumer confidence is improving as America overcomes its great post-9/11 disorientation.



http://www.todayonline.com/World/EDC120112-0000002/US-soft-power-could-defeat-declinists


ISREAL CAN DETER ATTACKS




Yes – Israeli Deterrence

Israeli nuclear capability is high – can attack from land, air, or sea, can hit any region, and has bunker busters.Lionel Beehner, Israel’s Nuclear Proram and Middle East Peace, Council on Foreign Relations, 2/10/2006

It's a widely held belief among arms-control experts that Israel began its nuclear program in the mid-1950s. One estimate, by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), puts its arsenal at around 200 nuclear warheads, which would make Israel the sixth-largest nuclear power. These warheads can be launched by air (F-16s and F-15Es), by ground (intermediate-range ballistic missiles like the Jericho II), or by sea (U.S.-made Harpoon missiles based on diesel-powered submarines or ships). Experts say Israeli missiles can reach Libya, Iran, or Russia. It is also believed Israel possesses at least 100 bunker-busting bombs—so-called mini-nukes—which are laser-guided and capable of penetrating underground targets like nuclear labs or storage facilities for weapons of mass destruction (WMD). How do we know about Israel’s nuclear program? American U-2 spy planes in 1958 confirmed the existence of Israel's Dimona nuclear complex, located in the Negev desert. U.S. inspections of Israeli nuclear sites in the 1960s proved largely fruitless because of restrictions placed on the inspectors. Instead, much of what the outside world knows about Israel's nuclear capabilities came from Mordechai Vanunu, a nuclear technician who worked at Dimona and leaked details of the program to the British press in 1986. For his actions, he was sentenced for treason and espionage and spent eighteen years behind bars in Israel, eleven of them in solitary confinement.





Missile system ensures deterrenceYaakov Katz, Jerusalem Post staff writer, Ehud Barak's plan for winning the next war, August 3, 2007

SECURITY AND DEFENSE. The new defense minister may be holding his tongue on the details but he is pushing hard for a bigger budget to counter regional threats Defense Minister Ehud Barak might not like to talk to journalists but he does know how to show them respect. On Monday in his first public appearance since marrying Nili Priel over the weekend Barak spoke at a memorial evening at Tel Aviv University in honor of distinguished Haaretz military commentator Ze'ev Schiff. Since taking up his post a month-and-a-half ago Barak has rarely been seen in public let alone to speak. Unlike past defense ministers Shaul Mofaz and Amir Peretz who visited IDF bases every Tuesday together with a large entourage of reporters and cameramen Barak conducts his tours discreetly and behind the scenes. The time will come however when Barak will need to open his mouth and begin letting the public in on his policies strategies and politics. His staff has already begun to realize that the quiet strategy which brought him back to power in the Labor primaries is not going to work when he makes a bid for prime minister in the next general elections. This week in addition to his public appearance at the TAU event Barak made two additional excursions outside his office on the 14th floor of the Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv. The first was to the Rafael Armament Development Authority in the North where he surveyed some of its latest inventions and received a comprehensive briefing on the development of the Iron Dome missile defense system that is designed to intercept Kassam rockets and Katyusha rockets. Barak's second visit was to the Hatzerim Air Force Base in the Negev where he received briefings from OC Air Force Maj.-Gen. Elazar Shkedy and his senior staff on the IAF's operational needs in face of the growing regional threats primarily Syria and Iran. The three events encapsulate the challenges and predicaments the new defense minister is facing. At the Schiff memorial Barak used his speech as an opportunity to speak out against the growing number of youths who dodge the draft. He warned that if immediate steps are not taken the IDF which has prided itself for close to 60 years in being a "people's army will soon become an army of half the people." A former chief of General Staff and the country's most decorated officer Barak recalled the days when soldiers were national heroes unlike today when role models are the finalists on Kochav Nolad - the local version of American Idol - a large number of whom evaded military service. At Rafael Barak laid out his vision for a complete and multi-layered missile defense program. The IDF already has the Arrow to counter long-range ballistic missiles - like the Iranian Shihab - and is currently investing hundreds of millions of dollars in two additional systems - one to intercept medium-range rockets like the Iranian Fajr and Zelzal and another to intercept the short-range Kassam and Katyusha4 0 of which pounded the North during last summer's war. Alongside a multi-layered missile defense system Barak's strategy for ensuring the country's security also includes the procurement of new and advanced military platforms that will contribute to "long-range capabilities." This is where his visit to Hatzerim enters the picture. Throughout his long military and political career Barak made several key decisions that tremendously upgraded the IDF's capabilities particularly its "long-range capabilities." Most notably was his 1999 decision as prime minister and defense minister to purchase more than 100 F- 16 capable of flying missions deep into Iran and Libya. As chief of General Staff Barak also vehicles pushed ahead a project to develop and manufacture long-range Predator unmanned aerial. "Under the current strategic reality Israel needs to operate far from its borders in a complex environment while ensuring complete accuracy Barak said this week in a closed-door meeting when explaining his policy. If he remains defense minister over the next year, he will need to make a number of key decisions concerning which new military platforms the IDF will procure over the next decade. The US decision this week to increase military aid to Israel from an annual $ 2.4 billion to $ 3 billion is a significant factor in that decision-making process. With the additional funds, new military systems that until now generals could only dream of are turning into a reality. Later this month, Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi will convene the General Staff for a week-long workshop during which the IDF multiyear budget and work plans will be determined. The increase in foreign aid is part of a US package to boost friendly countries in the Middle East in face of Iran's pursuit of nuclear power. Despite the financial boost, the defense establishment is not thrilled with the deal under which Saudi Arabia will be getting JDAM smart bombs. In June, Amos Gilad, head of the Diplomatic-Security Bureau at the Defense Ministry, headed a delegation to Washington to try to convince the Americans to change the proposed deal with the Saudis. During their meetings the Israelis offered to tone down their opposition in exchange for the Bush administration's permission to purchase the embargoed F-22, the world's only operational fifth- generation stealth fighter. The US rejected the request, leaving Gilad, who was accompanied to Washington by OC Planning Maj.-Gen. Ido Nehushtan, to return home frustrated and empty-handed. In closed conversations since then, Gilad has on more than one occasion warned of the Saudi deal, claiming it poses a strategic threat to the country. So while the IAF for now will probably not get the F- 22, the IDF does have the opportunity to use the boost in US military aid to purchase additional advanced systems. The Navy is pushing to buy the Littoral Combat Ship, developed by Lockheed Martin and believed to be the future for countries like Israel that require a fast, agile and rapid-deployment fleet. The IAF has already decided to purchase Lockheed Martin's Joint Strike Fighter, also known as the F-35. But with delivery not expected until 2014 and the US opposed to the sale of the Fransport aircraft - the C-130 J" model - to update the current fleet some of which dates back almost 50 years. Alongside the new platforms which will no doubt grant Israel a strategic edge in the region Barak has additional plans for retaining the IDF's qualitative advantage. He said this week that he believed the IDF needed to formulate a work plan that will provide better deterrence in the face of growing regional threats as well as a better-trained and prepared military that can bring quick resolutions to conflicts with clear and decisive victories. "The war needs to be won on enemy soil and with minimal damage to the home front Barak said. The victory needs to come quickly and it needs to be clear who has won." He was hinting at the many failures of the Second Lebanon War - during which the home front was bombed daily Hizbullah was not defeated and the outcome was not clear.





Israeli deterrence strong now – developing new missile system Louis Rene Beres and Isaac Ben-Israel, professor of international law at Purdue University, professor of security studies at Tel Aviv University, Ballistic-missile defense and WMD;To survive, Israel needs pre-emption, March 19, 2007

To defend against Iranian missiles fitted with nuclear warheads, Israel continues to advance the Arrow. In fact, recent test results of this enduring anti-ballistic missile program have been very strong. It would seem, therefore, that Israel's pertinent military technologies remain up to the growing existential challenge. It also seems that the mutual benefits of continuing strategic cooperation between Washington and Jerusalem remain incontestable. But the multiple security threats facing Israel are enormously complex. Jerusalem must soon decide if it can depend upon some combination of deterrence and active defense, or whether it must now also prepare for certain defensive first strikes against selected hard targets in Iran. On its face, Israel's pre-emption option should now be less critical. "The Arrow's success proves that Israel is prepared to deal with a nuclear missile attack," Col. Moshe Petael, head of the Israeli Defense Ministry's Homa Missile Defense Agency, said on Feb. 12. He made this statement only one day after the Israel Air Force had successfully tested the Arrow for the 15th time in its first nighttime exercise against a missile mocking Iran's Shehab-3. If the Arrow were truly efficient in its expected reliability of intercept, even an irrational Iranian adversary armed with nuclear and/or biological weapons could be controlled. If Israel's nuclear deterrent were ignored by an enemy state willing to risk a massive "counter-city" Israeli retaliation, that country's first-strike aggression could still be stopped by the Arrow. Speaking about the same recent Arrow test as Col. Petael, Likud Knesset member Yuval Steinitz commented on Feb. 12: "The test yesterday was exceptional. It proved that the Arrow can bring down any kind of ballistic missile, a capability no power in the world possesses

Israeli deterrence up nowThe Jerusalem Post, news publication, How to prevent war, July 23, 2007

Accordingly the main determinant in preventing a Syrian attack is an old-fashioned one: deterrence. Syria must understand that the cost of attacking will be much higher than even a regime that cares nothing for its people's interests is willing to pay. The IDF understands this and is therefore ensuring that it is trained and equipped to fight a conventional war after years of focusing on fighting terrorists. Last year's war in Lebanon was a vivid wake-up call alerting to this necessity and that call is being heeded. But deterrence is not just a matter of military capabilities but of clearly conveyed intentions including wider diplomatic repercussions. The Syrian regime should be made to understand the obvious namely that Israel will not only destroy any attacking force but in response to an attack will eliminate the regime's military capabilities and therefore threaten the regime's survival. Further any missile attacks against Israeli civilians will be met with the full and direct targeting of all of the regime's assets. The international community can also play an important role in preventing a possible Syrian miscalculation by clarifying in advance the diplomatic results of such aggression. If the Assad regime for example understands that an attack would be met with a European and American initiative to impose Chapter 7 sanctions on Damascus in the UN Security Council and full backing for Israel's right to self-defense the possibility of such an attack would be greatly reduced. To be credible however the UN must ensure that the resolutions it has already passed are enforced. Syria is flagrantly violating the UN-imposed embargo on support for Hizbullah without consequences. The US and Europe have not imposed sufficient pressure on the Lebanese government to request that UNIFIL deploy along the Lebanese-Syrian border to prevent weapons smuggling. The failure to punish Syria and enforce Resolution 1701 constitutes a direct risk of encouraging either Hizbullah or Syria to attack Israel and should be urgently corrected regardless of any rhetorical dance over peace talks or a proposed regional conference. War is eminently preventable provided that basic steps to reduce its likelihood - by convincing the aggressor that it will be too costly - are taken.





Lack of credibility leads to increased Israeli deterrenceThe Daily Star, Beirut news publication, Lebanese paper says Israel's Winograd report "provokes Arab disdain", May 3, 2007

A combination of vindication, disdain, and renewed concerns about Israeli militarism are the dominant reactions in the Arab world to the preliminary report of the Winograd Commission released Monday in Israel. The commission harshly rebuked three senior Israeli political and military leaders for their conduct during last summer's 34-day war with Lebanon, leaving Premier Ehud Olmert and Defence Minister and Labour Party leader Amir Peretz in dismal political shape. The former military chief of staff, Dan Halutz, had already resigned in disgrace after the war. The Arab sense of vindication stems from the feeling that Israel performed poorly in the war, and failed to achieve its primary strategic objectives: smashing Hezbollah, removing the armed Lebanese resistance movement from the South of Lebanon, returning the two abducted Israeli soldiers in Hezbollah's hands, reaffirming Israel's deterrence posture with respect to the Arab world and Iran, and ensuring that all wars with the Arabs are fought in Arab lands, not in Israel. Arab analysts were quick to recall Monday that Israel was forced to accept a UN-mandated cease-fire in August, after failing to win on the battlefield. Disdain permeates many Arab reactions to the Winograd report, for two reasons. The first is the long history of Israeli commissions of inquiry that create much political noise and dust and censure top officials, without altering Israeli militarization and colonization when dealing with Arabs. Most galling for Arabs are the bitter memories of the deeply flawed and inconsequential inquiry commissions that have examined Israeli behaviour against Palestinian citizens of Israel within the state's 1967 borders. The latest followed demonstrations inside Israel in 2000, after Israeli police killed and wounded dozens of Palestinian citizens of Israel. The message of such inquiries -into Israel's use of arms in Lebanon, the occupied West Bank and Gaza, or in majority Palestinian areas inside Israel itself -seems to be that rule-of-law punctilio will be observed for Israelis, but that Arabs can only expect to remain at the receiving end of the combined Israeli military machine and legacy of political discrimination. The second reason for widespread Arab disdain is that the prospect of the Winograd report bringing down the Israeli government and leading to a change in leadership holds out no particular promise of something positive. While Israelis get themselves deeply entangled in the minutia of Israeli party politics and the entertaining personalities of their leaders, Arabs at the receiving end of Israeli foreign policy tend to see little or no significant difference between the Labour and Likud parties that have dominated Israeli life since the 1960s. The hybrid Kadima Party that Ariel Sharon formed in 2005 to claim a new "centre" of Israeli politics is about to disintegrate. Removing Olmert and replacing him with Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu, former Prime Minister Ehud Baraq, or Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni may spur a satisfying sense of cleansing and renewal in Israeli politics, but this would be seen only as another massive show of smoke and mirrors in the Arab world. Arabs see Kadima as an apt symbol of the combined approaches of Labour and Likud, both of which have pursued virtually identical policies towards the Arabs: colonizing and expropriating Arab lands, using massive military overkill to resolve political differences, jailing or killing thousands of Palestinians, wounding tens of thousands of others, institutionalizing Apartheid-like segregation between Israeli occupiers and Palestinians, strengthening the movement to "Judaize" Jerusalem and diminish its Christian and Muslim character, and refusing to seriously consider any negotiated compromise on the core Palestinian refugee issue which forms the heart of the conflict in Arab eyes. After 60 years of hard experience with the Jewish state, most Arabs have concluded that Israeli national policy is defined by a combination of Zionist zealotry and state mil itary overkill vis-a-vis Palestinians and other Arabs. Political leaders who come and go -Olmert, Baraq, Yitzhak Rabin, Menachem Begin, Sharon and others -tend to be technical managers of a consistent policy rather than strategic managers who can truly change policy for the same of the wellbeing of Israel and its Arab neighbours. Another prevalent Arab attitude to the Winograd report is renewed concern that an admonished Israeli military and political elite will resort to military adventurism or other extremist moves to reassert its deterrent capability in Arab eyes. The bedrock of Israel's national strategic policy has always been a fearsome military that can quickly defeat, and therefore pre-emptively deter, any combination of hostile neighbours -Arab or Iranian. Restoring that shattered image of invincibility is likely to be seen as a priority by any Israeli political and military leadership that takes over from Olmert's discredited and crippled coalition. The Winograd report may make Israelis feel good, but in Arab eyes it portends only more of the same Israeli military overkill policies, or even worse, in the months and years ahead.

Barak rallying support for deterrence nowIsabel Kershner, New York Times staff writer, Ex-Premier of Israel Takes Helm of Labor Party, June 14, 2007

Ehud Barak, a former prime minister of Israel, returned to the political scene on Wednesday as the new leader of the Labor Party, and the deputy prime minister and elder statesman, Shimon Peres of the ruling Kadima Party, was elected by Parliament to the largely ceremonial post of president. Both developments are likely to reinvigorate the leadership of the beleaguered prime minister, Ehud Olmert, and increase his endurance, Israeli officials and analysts said. In a startling comeback after a six-year break from politics, Mr. Barak defeated Ami Ayalon, a legislator of one year and a former director of the internal security agency, in a runoff of party members, by 51.2 percent to 47.8 percent. Mr. Barak is expected to assume the post of defense minister, replacing the ousted Labor leader Amir Peretz. In his victory speech early on Wednesday, Mr. Barak called on Mr. Ayalon and other Labor colleagues to work with him in a party notorious for infighting. ''The internal competition has come to its end,'' Mr. Barak said. ''Now it is up to each of us to work in our own field. I am talking about investing all our knowledge in strengthening the defense establishment and the I.D.F. and restoring Israel's power of deterrence ,'' he said, referring to the Israeli Defense Forces





Iranian hostility ensures strong Israeli deterrenceLouis Rene Beres and Isaac Ben-Israel, professor of international law at Purdue University, professor of security studies at Tel Aviv University, Deterring Iran;Israel seeks to head off nuclear strike, June 11, 2007

The "doomsday clock" continues its advance to "midnight." Existential atomic danger is most immediate to Israel. Iran poses the greatest problem. Israel knows that the Iranian president's exterminatory threat is real. In law, this threat signifies the intent to commit genocide. Israel also recognizes that the pre-emptive destruction of Iran's growing nuclear infrastructures would involve serious operational and international difficulties. For interception, Israel has deployed elements of the tested Arrow system of ballistic missile defense, but even the Arrow would have "leakage." A single incoming nuclear missile that manages to penetrate Arrow could promptly kill 25,000-50,000 civilians, and even more if we include long-term fatalities. Iran could also share its nuclear assets with terror groups that would use cars and ships rather than missiles as delivery vehicles. These enemies might seek nuclear targets in New York or Chicago as well as Israel. Iran now augments its declared intent with a corresponding capacity. Left to violate binding treaty rules with impunity, Tehran might be undeterred by threats of Israeli and/or American retaliation. Such a failure of nuclear deterrence could be the result of a presumed lack of threat credibility or even of willful Iranian indifference. Iran could even become the suicide bomber in macrocosm, a nuclear-armed state willing to "die" as a "martyr." Iran's illegal nuclearization has already started a perilous domino effect in the region. Both Saudi Arabia and Egypt have announced possible plans to develop nuclear capability "for peaceful purposes." Strategic stability in a proliferating Middle East could never resemble earlier U.S.-Soviet deterrence dynamics. Even the key assumption of rationality might be unwarranted. A nuclear Iran could therefore lead to a nuclear war in the Middle East. Israel will need to choose wisely between "assured destruction" and "nuclear war-fighting." These are alternative strategies in which one side primarily targets its strategic weapons on the other side's populations and infrastructures or on that enemy state's weapons systems and supporting military assets. Israel could also opt for a "mixed" strategy, but any targeting policy that might encourage nuclear war- fighting would be more costly than gainful. Israel should opt for nuclear deterrence based upon assured destruction. A counterforce targeting doctrine would be less persuasive as a nuclear deterrent, especially to leaders who might sacrifice their armies as "martyrs." And if Israel were to opt for nuclear deterrence based upon counterforce capabilities, its pertinent enemies could feel especially threatened. This could heighten the prospect of nuclear aggression against Israel and of subsequent nuclear war. Israel's decisions on strategic targeting will depend, in part, on: (1) enemy inclinations to strike first; and (2) enemy inclinations to strike all at once. Should Israel assume that an enemy state in the process of "going nuclear" is apt to strike first and to strike with all of its nuclear weapons right away, Israeli counterforce-targeted warheads - used in retaliation - would hit only empty launchers. In such circumstances, Israel's only application of counterforce doctrine would be to strike first itself - an option that Israel clearly and completely rejects. For intrawar deterrence, a counter-value strategy would prove more appropriate to prompt war termination. Should Israeli planners assume that an enemy country "going nuclear" is apt to strike first and in stages, Israeli counterforce-targeted warheads could have damage-limiting benefits. Here, counterforce operations could appear to serve both an Israeli non-nuclear preemption or an Israeli retaliatory strike. But the assumption about enemy self-limitation is itself implausible. Thoughtful steps are needed to prevent a regional nuclear war. These will require awareness of how a nuclear war might start in the Middle East, and an informed Israeli identification of the best available strategic doctrine. To protect itself against a still-nuclearizing and recalcitrant Iran, Israel's best course may well be a prompt and law-enforcing conventional pre-emption. Without pre-emption, if Iran goes nuclear, Israel could feel compelled to end its policy of nuclear ambiguity. Taking the "bomb out of the basement" could allow Israel to enhance its strategic deterrent, but Jerusalem could still never be quite certain of enemy rationality. Every state has the right to defend against aggression, especially where attacks would involve mass-destruction weapons. Now facing the risk of genocidal war from Iran, Israel would not itself consider the first use of nuclear weapons. But should Iranian nuclear weapons ever be unleashed against Israel's cities, either directly or via terrorist proxies, Tehran should understand fully that Israel would respond with at least proportionate destructiveness.

Barak says Israeli deterrence high nowFlorida Jewish News, news publication, JTA Israel briefs, 08/10/07, http://www.floridajewishnews.com/site/a/JTA_Israel_Briefs/

Last summer’s war in Lebanon boosted Israel’s regional deterrence, Ehud Barak told the Israeli commission investigating the government’s handling of the conflict. On Monday, the Winograd Commission published statements Barak made to the commission last November talking about his decision as prime minister in 2000 to withdraw Israeli troops unilaterally from southern Lebanon—a move widely seen as having boosted local Hezbollah guerrillas. Barak said he believed the fact that Israel was not an occupying force gave it legitimacy when it responded to a deadly Hezbollah border raid on July 12, 2006 with a massive offensive in Lebanon. He also argued that the war had boosted Israel’s regional deterrence. "I think Hezbollah took a severe beating and lost fighters, infrastructure, etc.," Barak told the panel. "The good news is that Israel was and remains the mightiest country within 1,500 kilometers of Jerusalem, and everyone realizes this." Barak, who is now defense minister, later called for Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s resignation over his management of the war.





Israel deterrence up now – Golan Guy Bechor, Ynet news staff writer, Assad got the message deterrence reinstated on the Golan; rules of the game have been reset, 08.02.2007, http://www.ynetnews.com/Ext/Comp/ArticleLayout/CdaArticlePrintPreview/1,2506,L-3432880,00.html

Hizbullah's success in paralyzing the north of Israel for over a month last summer left Bashar Assad with his mouth agape: He, with his lack of experience, saw this as proof that Israel could be defeated. This is why Assad has expedited Syria's rearmament campaign in the past year. Assad thought that in times of need he could reach some kind of victory over Israel by also paralyzing it through rocket fire, and in so doing would bring the issue of the Golan Heights on to the international agenda, getting it back "honorably" as one who did so through an impressive military maneuver. The establishment of the international tribunal into the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, set to commence shortly, is of great concern to Assad, as it poses an existential threat to him personally and to the minority Alawite regime that he heads. As it is the way of the Syrians to extinguish fires by creating even greater ones, Israel justifiably feared that Syria was preparing for war before being blamed for the Hariri murder. The welcome outcome to these warnings was that the IDF significantly boosted its preparedness level on the Golan Heights. We all read about the series of large-scale exercises the army carried out on the Golan. These public exercises were welcome, and they should be continued, because they led to an important development. The Syrians have been deterred. Deterrence has been reinstated. The rules of the game have been reset. Israel made it clear to the Syrians that if Assad thinks that an attack on its sovereignty would be a walk in the park and that Israel would suffice with the hesitant responses that characterized the last war, it is mistaken.

U.S. arms deal ensures Israeli deterrence Matt Duss, analyst for Foreign Policy In Focus, US gambling away security in Middle East, August 08, 2007, http://www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?id=10641

Like a gambling addict who has to keep betting more to cover his previous losses, the Bush administration's recently announced plan to provide some $65 billion worth of advanced weapons to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel over the next 10 years represents a reckless, poorly considered attempt to mitigate the consequences of its ill considered invasion of Iraq. The deal also represents an admission of failure of several of the key elements of U.S. security policy in the Middle East, and, perhaps most significantly, it represents a clear abandonment of President Bush's democratic reform agenda in the region. Bush's plan to increase arms to the region is an admission of failure on several fronts. The first, and most obvious, is the failure of the invasion of Iraq and removal of Saddam Hussein to have any positive effect in the region. No one denies that Saddam was a brutal ruler (he certainly was one when he enjoyed U.S. support) but it's clear now that a military invasion and occupation was not the appropriate way to deal with the potential (at worst) threat that he represented. During Iran's massively destructive eight year war with Iraq, Iran's ruling mullahs could not in their wildest dreams have imagined a victory over Iraq as complete as that which was provided them by the U.S. in 2003, paid in the treasure of U.S. taxpayers, and the blood and limbs of U.S. troops and Iraqi civilians. It was always a fantasy that a democratic, Shia-dominated, Iraq would tilt toward the Sunni Arab world and Israel, rather than Shia Iran. Yet this was the imagined outcome for the neoconservative planners of Bush's Iraq policy. Reality has proved otherwise. The militarization of the region through the proposed sales represents, to some extent, a repudiation of the principle of nuclear deterrence, specifically in regard to Israel. Though it has never officially admitted having nuclear weapons, it is understood that Israel does, in fact, have nuclear capability. This policy of "strategic ambiguity" is justified by Israel on the grounds that it is surrounded by enemies, such as Iran, who want to destroy Israel. It's unclear how providing $30 billion of sophisticated new weaponry would enhance Israel's security in a way that a nuclear arsenal could not. As Zbigniew Brzezinski asked at a security conference this June, "If the Israeli nuclear arsenal — some 200 weapons capable of destroying Iran if Iran were to attack Israel — is not a sufficient and credible deterrent, than what is it for?" Israel already has the most powerful and technologically advanced military in the region. If Iran wouldn't be deterred by Israel's nuclear weapons, why would they be deterred by some new laser-guide bombs? And if new-laser guided bombs do the trick, what then is the justification for having nuclear weapons?




Yes – Israeli Deterrence – A2: July War

July war increased deterrence -- Al-Arabiya, Dubai news publication , Israeli PM discusses interest in Arab initiative, Syria talks on Al-Arabiya TV, July 11, 2007

["Exclusive" interview with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert by Al-Arabiya correspondent Ziyad Halabi; questions and answers are in Hebrew with superimposed Arabic translation, translated from the Arabic - place, date not given] [Halabi] You are welcome, prime minister. To start with, allow me first to ask: You talk much about the desire to achieve a comprehensive regional peace. However, the Arab peoples, and even the states that you describe as moderate, have the feeling that you are weak, that you are incapable of making historical decisions, and that you are solely concerned about normalization and nothing more? [Olmert] I cannot talk on behalf of others, but I only speak in my own name and in the name of the State of Israel. I want to remind you that I am the first and only leader who, in his capacity as a prime minister, told all the Arab states after the Riyadh summit that we do not reject the Arab League's peace initiative, come to talk about it, and we are ready for this. I do not know on what basis one assumes that I only have a desire for normalization. I want a peace agreement with the Palestinians before anything else, as well as with the Arab states with which we so far have no peace treaties. There is no doubt that I am ready for dialogue. Lebanon [Halabi] Let us go back one year before, to the second Lebanon war. Would you have acted in the same way, by launching an overall war against Lebanon and, Hezbollah, of course? [Olmert] First of all, I was not the one who launched the war. I want to remind you that the side that began the war was Hezbollah, which kidnapped Israeli soldiers and shelled Israeli cities. If you ask the question to [Hezbollah Secretary General Hasan] Nasrallah, he will give [the same] answer. Following the war, he said had he known by one per cent that this would happen he would not have begun the war. The question asked to me is valid. I would have done what I did. I am today convinced more than at any time before that I should have acted the way I acted. This war has caused the suffering for many people, the Israelis and the inhabitants of the north, who remained in shelters for 33 days. It has also caused a serious suffering for the Lebanese. Those Lebanese should learn lessons regarding Hezbollah and what it has caused for them. There is no doubt that the war is full of suffering, and we do not want this. Hezbollah is a terrorist organization that seeks to undermine the State of Israel and to kill the Jews. We do not have any problem with Hezbollah. We live in Israel and it is in Lebanon. According to the UN resolution, we have no control of any Lebanese territories. So, why should they attack us, kidnap soldiers, kill Israelis, and shell Israel's cities? It is clear that when they do this, we will reply. We will never accept that someone shells us without us replying. There is nothing like this. [Halabi] This means that you have not made a mistake in this war. This is despite the fact that the Winograd report clearly pinpoints grave mistakes you have made in running this war? [Olmert] I do not want to engage in argument on the Winograd report through Al-Arabiya. Certainly, there were mistakes. The question in Israel was whether a certain force should have been moved in a certain way. Undoubtedly, the army has the right answers. However, this does not answer the main question to the effect that on 12 July, Hezbollah took control of all southern Lebanon. Today, however, it does not control all southern Lebanon. On 12 July, it had control of the border area with Israel, but it has no control now. Until 12 July too, it was capable of doing what it wanted in southern Lebanon. However, today, there is a Lebanese Army in the south, as well as the UNIFIL, which also includes Muslim soldiers from Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, and the EU. [Halabi] You have previously said that Resolution 1701 is the most important achievement of the war. However, it is also said that Hezbollah can redeploy in southern Lebanon within 24 hours, and that it has capabilities south of Al-Litani River? [Olmert] I do not want to engage in a war of slogans with regard to the Lebanon war. This is not my style, and I do not need this. There is a fact, which is that there is an international army in southern Lebanon that goes into the fortifications of Hezbollah and explodes weapons. Currently, we do not see Hasan Nasrallah walking around in the streets of Beirut. Ask him why he doesn't do that. [Halabi] I ask you: if he walks around, will he be hurt? [Olmert] I do not know. Ask him why he does not walk around in the streets of Beirut. [Halabi] He is a target, but will he be a target of liquidation if he makes an open speech? [Olmert] Let me say something: I do not wage one-upmanship wars or personal battles. [Halabi] The army and Defence Minister Barak say that the deterrence capability has been affected and it should be restored, how? Some sides fear that this would take place through a war against Gaza or Syria, for example? [Olmert] I am pleased to talk to Al-Arabiya, and I assume that many Arabs are listening to us. We do not have any intentions to fight the Arabs anywhere, and we do not want war, but we want peace. We do not need to restore the deterrence capability. The war has made us gain much deterrence. Let us look at things as they really are. Before 12 July, we did not have a deterrence capability. Had there been deterrence, Hezbollah would not have begun the offensive. Hezbollah attacked because it felt no deterrence from Israel. However, after the war, Nasrallah felt the deterrence. He said that had he known at the time what he knows today he would not have begun the war. Today, he does not want to start again. There is no problem of deterrence. There is a problem in the Arab world and it should face it; namely, that you have many extremists who carry out terrorism. They do not pose a threat to Israel only, but also to the Arab world. Tell me: Have you ever seen a more barbaric killing of Palestinians than what Hamas did in Gaza? This was not an Israeli act, and we have never done this in our life. Hamas killed Fatah members in a barbaric way. Some 160 persons were killed, patients were thrown out of hospitals, and fire was opened at citizens who did not find anyone to protect them. This is a part of Arab reality. We have nothing to do with the existing extremism and violence in certain Islamic movements. This harms the Arab states and Muslim citizens. The majority of Muslims want peace and they hate this violence.




Yes – Israeli Detterence – Mini Nukes

Mini nukes solve for holes in Israeli detterence posturingLouis Rene Beres, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University, The Bomb in the Basement: Reconsidering a Vital Element of Israeli Nuclear Deterrence, 2003. http://www.acpr.org.il/English-Nativ/issue1/beres-1.htm

For Israel, a micronuke employed as an earth-penetrating warhead (EPW) could destroy all but the hardest command bunkers. Deliverable by a gravity bomb, tactical cruise missile or tactical surface-to-surface missile, a micronuke EPW could also be used effectively to neutralize airfields. As a single micronuke strike could put an airfield out of commission for an extended time, use of these particular subkiloton weapons could reduce exposure of Israeli pilots to enemy defenses. This is because it would not be necessary to expect these pilots to execute follow-on strikes. Should deterrence fail to prevent a launch of enemy missiles carrying nuclear or other mass-destruction warheads at Israeli forces, either as a first-strike attack or as an enemy retaliation for Israeli preemption, Israel would require an adequate defensive capability. To acquire such a capability, Israel could benefit from an anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM)14carrying a mininuke warhead with a yield of approximately 100 tons. Seeking to destroy incoming warheads in flight (simply knocking the missile off-target might not neutralize its capacity to inflict great harm on Israeli forces), a mininuke fired by Israel could provide the needed power. Such power could prove vital because an incoming nuclear, chemical or biological warhead must be destroyed as far from its target as possible. Once an armed conflict had actually broken out between Israel and certain enemy-states, tinynuke warheads with yields of about 1,000 tons could prove effective against tank and troop units. True battlefield weapons rather than agents of indiscriminate mass destruction, these tinynukes – deliverable by tactical air-to-air surface missile, tactical surface-to-surface cruise or ballistic missile, or artillery round – could eliminate any company-sized unit. Intended for very precise operations against known troop formations, these weapons would display lethal radii on the order of 500 meters against tank crews and 600 meters against infantry, artillery and support troops. As for the collateral damage and safe standoff radii of these tinynukes, they would range only to about 1,500 meters. Moreover, utilized as airbursts, they should produce no significant local fallout.




ISREAL CANNOT DETER ATTACKS




No – Israeli Detterence

Barak Kills Israeli deterrence Daniel Charles And Gil Hoffman, Jerusalem Post staff writers, Netanyahu lashes out at Barak. Likud central committee sets August 14 primary date, July 11, 2007

Likud chairman Binyamin Netanyahu unleashed a fierce attack on his main competition in the next general election Defense Minister Ehud Barak on Tuesday blaming the Second Lebanon War on Barak's unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. Netanyahu disposed of his main competition in the Likud MK Silvan Shalom when Shalom announced on Monday that he would not seek the Likud leadership. Just two hours after the Likud central committee set an August 14 date for the Likud primary on Tuesday night Netanyahu already shifted his attention to Barak. "The Barak government's irresponsible withdrawal from Lebanon brought Hizbullah to the fence paved the way for Nasrallah and caused the problems in Lebanon in 2006 Netanyahu said in a half-hour speech to a crowd of 650 people at an event at the Tel Aviv Fairgrounds that was cosponsored by the Likud to mark the first anniversary of the war. Netanyahu targeted Barak's security credentials, calling him a reckless amateur." Attacking Barak's tenure as prime minister Netanyahu said: "The Barak government convinced Iran that it can ensnare us in their spider web that we could be defeated. That's why we need to return to the sane diplomatic policies of the Likud." Other Likud MKs also attacked Barak at the event. Faction chairman Gideon Sa'ar said Barak harmed Israel's deterrence by fleeing Lebanon and laid the groundwork for the kidnappings. MK Limor Livnat also said Barak caused the war. Labor officials close to Barak responded that by attacking the Labor leader Netanyahu was "broadcasting that he is under pressure." Prior to the Lebanon War anniversary event the Likud central committee convened in a building next door at the Tel Aviv Fairgrounds. Shalom's decision to drop out of the race caused the central committee members to lose interest in the meeting. Less than 300 out of some 3 0 members attended the event barely filling half of the smoke-filled hall. Shalom boycotted the event and Netanyahu spoke for only five minutes. The decision to hold the primary on August 14 passed nearly unanimously. Netanyahu had planned on holding the race in September but advanced it after Shalom dropped out. The only remaining candidate against Netanyahu Likud activist Moshe Feiglin gave a 20-minute speech at the event in which he attacked Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and the Supreme Court. "Our decision in the primary will be about who will beat Nasrallah and Ahmadinejad and about who will save the country Feiglin said. Only a leader with faith can beat Nasrallah. He beat Olmert even though he didn't have his army because he had faith and that was enough to beat a leader with no God."

Israel will use deterrence against GazaRobert Berger, Voice of America staff writer, Israel Considers Military Action in Gaza After Palestinian Infiltration, 26 August 2007, http://voanews.com/english/2007-08-26-voa9.cfm

Israeli Cabinet ministers demanded tough military action Sunday after two Palestinian gunmen scaled the heavily fortified Gaza border wall on Saturday and infiltrated Israel. The gunmen, who were on their way to attack an Israeli community, were intercepted and killed by Israeli troops. On Sunday, six unarmed Palestinian youths scaled the wall in the same area and were arrested by Israeli troops. In the wake of the infiltrations, and daily Palestinian rocket attacks on border communities, Israel is running out of patience. Avi Dichter is the government's public security minister. Dichter told Israel Radio that the country must restore deterrence in Gaza. He said there are military measures that Israel has not taken yet that could convince the Islamic militant group Hamas to halt rocket attacks and infiltrations. Dichter said Israel should create a buffer zone or no-man's land along the Gaza border, where any Palestinian entering the area would be considered a terrorist and shot. He said some Palestinian neighborhoods in Gaza which militants use to launch rockets at Israel should be evacuated. So far the measures have not been approved by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who fears they could torpedo peace efforts with the internationally-backed Palestinian government in the West Bank. But many Israeli officials believe that with Hamas in power in Gaza, a major military offensive is just a matter of time.





No deterrence now – incompetent leaders Sarah Honig, Jerusalem Post staff writer, But for Arafat’s grace, June 22, 2007

In his younger days Ezer Weizman was wont to repeat at the slightest provocation the Prophet Samuel's assurance that "the Eternity of Israel shall not deceive but then he always followed it up with: and the Arabs wouldn't let us down." So far time after incredible time they indeed bailed us out. Yasser Arafat bum rap that we gave him notwithstanding certainly rescued us from Ehud Barak's hubris. Envision the ensuing calamity had the PLO chieftain accepted the deal Barak and Bill Clinton dangled before him at the 2000 Camp David summit. Had Arafat taken advantage of Barak's foolhardy generosity - instead of violently rebuffing it and launching his bloody Second Intifada - he'd have taken possession besides Gaza of nearly all of Judea and Samaria settlement blocks included as well as east Jerusalem and the Temple Mount (except for ill-defined subterranean layers thereof according to Barak's cockamamie concoction). After Arafat's departure to the netherworld's great terrorist convocation his PLO cohorts would have inherited his latifundia. From here on the story is familiar except for name- place variations. Everything that happened in the Gaza Strip - which Ariel Sharon ceded unilaterally according to Barak's reckless Lebanese precedent - would have been replayed in Bethlehem Hebron Jericho Ramallah Nablus Jenin etc. Eventually Hamas would have gained domination over all that Arafat's fat Fatah failed to control. The pattern is the one revealed before our eyes in Gaza-turned-Hamastan. The outstanding difference is that the Hamastan which brash Barak thoughtlessly almost created along Israel's entire long convoluted eastern flank directly adjoining this country's densest population centers would have been incalculably deadlier than anything visited from Gaza on poor suffering Sderot. WHAT DEVASTATION Kassams from Kalkilya could inflict beggars the imagination. Suffice it to note that into the space between Kalkilya and the Mediterranean is wedged the entire width of Israel and that this slender strip is filled by a row of three side-by-side towns - Kfar Saba Ra'anana and Herzliya - in that order with no vacant gaps between them. It's a single urban sprawl stretched out before enemy eyes and permanently vulnerable to its predations. And whoever fires into Kfar Saba can reach Tel Aviv easily enough. Those who retroactively doubt the Six Day War was worth winning omit mention that during said war an old Jordanian WWII-vintage Long Tom cannon fired from a lowly hill outside Kalkilya hit an apartment building smack-dab in Kikar Masaryk Tel Aviv's very heart. The only reason such feats and worse aren't replicated today is because of continued Israeli presence in areas Barak would have put beyond Israeli supervision. Luckily Arafat seven years ago churlishly spurned Barak's inconceivably egregious largesse. Barak literally came within a hairbreadth of destroying Israel's self- preservation potential. NOW EHUD Olmert whose flunky prime-ministerial record is only rivaled by Barak's couldn't wait to install the architect of Hizbullah's hegemony in southern Lebanon - and the inspiration for the subsequent Gaza disengagement - as defense minister of the state whose deterrence Barak's irresponsibility damaged so grievously. Arrogant Barak who had done so much harm is now in position to do more harm. Expediently hyped as a man of incomparable military expertise Barak lulls the amnesiac public to overlook his dismal past and believe in futuristic fables he once more cynically peddles. It's not for nothing that Barak was chucked out of office as quickly as he was despite the priceless perks he accrued from starting out as the darling of the leftist establishment and its lapdog media. Even our historically- challenged electorate somehow dimly perceived that something was dreadfully awry when the renascent Jewish state's leader proposed to surrender the cradle of Jewish existence without a fight without crushing coercion without an extreme existential emergency.

Israel fails now to boost deterrence The Jerusalem Post, news publication, Don't junk the road map, August 9, 2007

Today for the purpose of preventing terrorism the security forces lawfully control and surround Palestinian areas ... When a Palestinian state is established the security forces would be required - for the purpose of preventing terrorism - to invade the territory of a neighboring sovereign state... The difference between the two situations speaks for itself." Israelis have had it with policies based on "trust and withdrawal." Many times during the Oslo process Israel negotiated partial handovers of security control. Each time Israel lets its guard down on the promise that the Palestinians will fight terrorism and each time the experiment falls apart often at the expense of Israeli lives. Israel also "experimented" with withdrawals without agreements from Lebanon in 2000 and from Gaza in 2005. In both cases Israel was supposed to make up for its lost security presence with increased deterrence and we were assured that Israel would not be deterred from punishing any attacks that arose from the evacuated territory. All such "trust and withdrawal" experiments whether unilateral or by agreement failed to enhance security and deterrence and produced more attacks weakened deterrence a reduction in Israel's ability to combat terrorism and strengthened and more belligerent enemies.





Winograd report undermines Israeli deterrenceAl-Jazeera, Hezbollah says further Israel war unlikely but preparations continue, May 7, 2007

Doha Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel in Arabic carries at 1905 gmt on 5 May a new episode of its "Open Dialogue" talk show for a discussion on the report issued by the Winograd Commission that investigated Israel's conduct in the second Lebanon war that erupted in July 2006. The show's presenter, Ghassan Bin-Jiddu, says today's episode will address the "Arab interpretation of the Winograd report, its effect on the strategic and military Arab scene, especially with respect to resistance movements," as well as the military confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel, Hezbollah's reading of the Winograd report, and the prospects of future settlements with Israel. The first portion of the show includes a 32-minute interview with Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Shaykh Na'im Qasim -the interview is recorded, its date and location are not provided, and it opens with Qasim answering a question on "how Hezbollah reads the conclusions of the Winograd report." [Qasim] In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. If we are to analyse the conclusions we drew from the Winograd report, then let us start with the [Israeli] army: The report states that the army's plans were not reviewed by Halutz - this means that in the [Israeli] military establishment, the lead individual has the final say in everything and is not concerned with the plans that were examined by others or are currently being examined by his command, at a time when the military establishment is supposed to be a council that relays its conclusions to the government. This is a cover up for a crucial matter, that being that the military establishment did not have effective plans in place -there was confusion within the military establishment. Halutz chose this approach not only because he is selfish and unilateral, but also because what he was presented with by the military establishment was neither enough nor mature. Hence, there is a structural problem within the military establishment in terms of its capabilities and willingness to do battle. The report mentions that they had not even prepared themselves for a war -they were under the impression that the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 had marked the end of wars in a broad sense, and that all that is left is the issue of deterrence, and they always prided themselves on their deterrence power. Hence, there is a problem within the military establishment, a real problem, and there is no motivation. [Bin-Jiddu] Allow me to interrupt your eminence, but it seems that what became apparent in the past [rephrases] even Olmert himself said that the plans were already in place and that the decision too, it seems, had been taken since April 2006. [Qasim] Even the Winograd report said that there were plans but that they were not implemented. What Olmert was trying to do was to talk about the decision - a decision can be taken based on plans and studies on paper, but the question is, was the decision in sync with these plans? Meaning that he looked at the overall... [Bin-Jiddu, interrupting] Meaning there was a political decision, but the military preparations were not in sync with it. [Qasim] They were not at the required level; they were not at the required level. There were definitely plans and ideas, but are these [plans and ideas] that suit a war decision, or does a war decision require different plans and arrangements? I can say from here that one of the conclusions presented to the public opinion -the Winograd report's best quality is that it provides the public with a vision they can use to analyse and reach conclusions -one of the conclusions was that the proclaimed deterrence power of the Israeli Army is not at a high enough level to confront Arab armies and a broad Arab resistance, and that [Israel's] military capability is a limited one that benefits from high-tech capabilities, but lacks brave elements that can push onward and suffers a flaw in the military individual; in the internal structure. They use the phrase "deterrence power has been undermined at a military level," but the way I see it, there was never any real deterrence power for us to say that it was undermined. The reality of Israel's deterrence power was exposed - the reality that the illusion is larger than the reality - and this is what was directly disclosed by the report when it spoke of a poor plan, a failure to summon army reserves in due time, and other similar details. This point has to do with the military aspect. The other point, which I believe is more crucial, is that this war on Lebanon was not the result of an independent Israeli decision and was not waged with US support of an Israeli decision, no, it was fought upon a US decision and through Israeli execution. In other words, the pretext for Israel's existence, according to Israel's literature, is the clustering around Zionism in order to establish the state of Israel -this goal is no longer capable of surviving and theorizing, and it became evident that the more important goal is to plant this state in the region for the sake of US interests first. Israel therefore turned into a hand in the hand of America for [implementing] the policies it wants for the Middle East





Israeli deterrence low now Anshel Pfeffer, Jerusalem Post staff writer, It’s not about an air corridor it’s about whether to attack at all, February 25, 2007

What has to be settled first of all is whether the US and Israel are on the same wavelength. Despite repeated assurances over the last few months from various senior administration figures the answer to this question is still far from final. The Americans have first to agree among themselves on a coherent policy. Beneath the surface there seems to be a widening rift opening among President George W. Bush's advisers between those who want to work together with the Democratic Congress firmly opposed to a US attack on Iran and pursue a diplomacy-only course and those who want the military option to remain in clear sight on the table. This dispute will intensify as two clocks tick away. On the first the alarm is fixed to go off in January 2009 and its hands point to time left to Bush in office. The dial of the second clock is misted over allowing only occasional uncertain glimpse of the time left until Iran achieves a nuclear weapon capability. The decision-makers in Israel are looking anxiously at both clocks. If one of them goes off it might be too late. It's impossible to foresee what the policy of the next American president might be after the Iraqi debacle and the implications of Iran reaching the nuclear threshold even if it doesn't officially cross it for the time being are almost too devastating to contemplate. There are only three options for resolving the issue before the alarms go off. The first seems impossible right now that Iran will step back from the precipice without a recourse to violence. The limp-wristed way that the not- very-severe sanctions have been implemented and the reluctant voices emanating from the capitals of Europe doesn't give much hope that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's government will give up its dreams of nuclear weaponry. Which leaves us with an attack on the main nuclear installations. Most Israeli leaders still believe it would be best for the US to carry out such an operation pulling the world's chestnuts out of the fire and reducing the possible repercussions for Israel though it is inconceivable that even a successful American attack on Iran wouldn't spill over to us. The third possibility that Israel will have to go it alone might carry a larger potential for damage in terms of men and machines lost reprisals by Iran and its proxies and in diplomatic criticism but there is a view minority but growing that not only would Israel have done a favor for its American ally by taking out an international threat at a time when political troubles at home ties the president's hands an Israeli strike on Iran would also be a crucial step toward rebuilding its deterrence which took a rocking last summer from the Iranians' boys Hizbullah. Once a decision to do just that has been taken the question of an air corridor will be little more than a technicality.

Tensions escalate – Israeli deterrence lowJoshua Mitnick, Washington Post staff writer, Israel weighs threat, new talks; Fears buildup for an attack, June 7, 2007

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert huddled with Cabinet ministers yesterday to discuss Syria and Lebanon amid heightened speculation that Israel may be at a crossroads between war and renewed peace talks with Damascus. While Syrian President Bashar Assad has dangled the possibility of renewed peace negotiations in recent months, Israeli intelligence officials have been monitoring what is viewed as disturbing signs of a coming conflict - new Russian-made military hardware in Syria and a bolstering of Syrian forces near the Golan Heights. Worried about a loss of deterrence after last summer's botched war with Hezbollah in Lebanon, some Israeli analysts have suggested that Syria may be preparing an attack to recover the strategic Golan Heights plateau captured by Israel 40 years ago this week. Others fear that Iran, under the threat of a U.S. military strike, may try to provoke a war between Syria and Israel to open a second front. Israeli intelligence officials think Iran is paying for Syria's new military hardware. "It's clear that there's a concrete danger of war up north in the next one to two years," said Ran Cohen, a parliament member from the dovish Meretz party who says Israel should open peace talks to reduce the possibility of war. "The last war in Lebanon opened a big wound between Israel, Syria and Lebanon. And it hasn't healed," Mr. Cohen said. Speculation about war escalated this week as the Israeli army televised a military dress rehearsal for a battle with Syria. Interspersed with footage of helicopters firing missiles into simulated Syrian villages, Israel's military chief of staff, Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi said on Tuesday that the army was preparing for an escalation of tensions along the northern board. "If you're not fighting a war, you prepare for war," he said. The comments by security officials regarding heightened chances for war spurred warnings that the statements could become self-fulfilling prophecies. At the conclusion of yesterday's Cabinet meeting, Mr. Olmert said Israel was trying to defuse the tension by conveying calming messages to Syria through third parties. The prime minister also said that Israel is ready to sit down to peace talks with Syria at any time without preconditions.





Arrow is not enough to bolster Israeli deterrence – Iran will strikeLouis Rene Beres and Thomas McInerney, professor of international law at Purdue and chairman of the Iran Policy Committee Advisory Council, Preemption option: a must for Israel, February 27, 2007

The core of Israel's active defense plan remains the Arrow antiballistic missile program. Test results of the Arrow have been promising. They indicate not only the mutual benefits of close cooperation between Washington and Jerusalem, but also the technical promise of Israel's missile defense system. But serious decisions must still be made. Faced with a steadily nuclearizing Iran, Israel must consider whether it can rely entirely upon a suitable combination of deterrence and active defenses or whether it must also prepare for preemption. The results of this essential consideration will have existential consequences for the Jewish state. Israel's preemption option should now appear less urgent. If the Arrow were truly efficient, even an irrational Iranian adversary armed with nuclear and/or biological weapons could be dealt with effectively. If Israel's nuclear deterrent were immobilized by an enemy state willing to risk a massive "counter-value" Israeli reprisal, that aggressor's ensuing first strike could still be blocked by Arrow. So why even consider preemption against Iran? Missile defense is no guarantee The answer lies in certain crucial assumptions. "Operational reliability of intercept" is a "soft" concept, and any missile defense system will always have "leakage" - it can't stop every incoming missile. Whether such leakage would fall within acceptable levels must ultimately depend, primarily, upon the kinds of warheads fitted upon the enemy's incoming missiles. Shall Israel now bet its very life on a capacity to fully anticipate offensive enemy capabilities? We think not. A tiny number of enemy missiles penetrating Arrow defenses could still be "acceptable" if their warheads contained only conventional high explosive or even chemical high explosive. But if the incoming warheads were nuclear and/or biological, even an extremely low rate of leakage would be intolerable. This means that Israel cannot depend upon its antiballistic missiles to defend against any future attack by Iran using a weapon of mass destruction. Even if Israel could expect a 100 percent reliability of interception for Arrow, this would do nothing to blunt the unconventional threat from terrorist surrogates. Special points of vulnerability for Israel would be Lebanon, with Hizbullah proxies acting for Iran, and Gaza, where Iran-supported Hamas is also developing dangerous ties with Al Qaeda. Preemption and deterrence Israel still faces certain state enemies whose undisguised preparations for attacking the Jewish state are genocidal, and who may not always be rational. Israel has every right to act preemptively when facing an existential assault. Known as "anticipatory self-defense," this general right is affirmed in both codified and customary international law, including the 1996 Advisory Opinion issued by the International Court of Justice. Israel must continue to develop, test, and implement a missile interception capability. It must also prepare for certain possible preemptions, and enhance the credibility of its nuclear deterrent. Israel must operationalize a recognizable second-strike force, sufficiently hardened and dispersed, and ready to inflict a decisive retaliatory salvo against enemy cities. Arrow is necessary for Israeli security, but it is not sufficient. To achieve a maximum level of security, Israel must also take appropriate and coordinated preparations for preemption and deterrence. Ballistic missile defense will do nothing to thwart terrorist surrogates of Iran who could utilize ordinary ships, cars, or trucks as nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles.

Israeli deterrence low now – U.S. expected to come to the tableSusan Taylor Martin, Times Senior Correspondent, Six Days and 40 Years, June 10, 2007

"Israel lost much of its deterrence, and deterrence is something that prevents war," says Diskin of Hebrew University. "It may encourage people to try to initiate all kinds of violent attacks on Israel, and those who pay the price are not only Israelis but poor Arabs and Palestinians and Syrians. The result was very unfortunate and it really shows someone didn't calculate his options correctly." If there's an overriding theme to the missed opportunities of the past 40 years, it's that the Israelis could have done more early on to resolve the Palestinian issue - key to peace with the wider Arab world - when they were dealing with a much smaller and less radicalized population. The Palestinians, meanwhile, could have done a far better job of showing they were capable of good self-governance. And other Arab nations could have done more to help the Palestinians. That they didn't left the United States with much of the burden for pushing the peace process along, with some notable successes like the Israeli-Egyptian treaty. Yet it can and should do more, the experts agree. From the Carter years to now, U.S. administrations have tended to "follow the lead of the parties themselves," Cook says. "If the Egyptians were willing to take this deal, why should the U.S. stand in the way? If Israelis really want to live with some sort of Palestinian corruption that would provide them with security, that was fine. We haven't wanted to get out ahead of them. There's a mantra that you can't want peace more than the parties themselves, but we also need to be more proactive." Or as Wittes put it: "The United States remains indispensable to Arab-Israeli peace because of its close relations to Israel and long involvement. There are things that other international actors can do to help - including the Arab states and the Europeans - but both sides want America at the table."





Israeli deterrence low now Hizballah continues attacksDEBKA, news publication, Olmert Government Indifferent to Palestinian Terrorist Rampage from Gaza, August 26, 2007, http://www.debka.com/article.php?aid=1299

Abbas and Fayyad are otherwise engaged preparing for their next meetings with Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert and a long line of foreign peace brokers due for visits next month, with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice marching at their head. The same paralysis appears to have struck Israel’s prime minister, defense minister Ehud Barak and chief of staff Lt. Gen Gaby Ashkenazi. Until the diplomatic do-gooders have come and gone, they seem willing to keep the national security doctrines of deterrence and counter-terror well hidden in a bottom drawer while the terrorists make hay. On Israel’s third front, the Lebanese border, DEBKAfile’s military sources reveal that Iran has just completed laying a broad strategic highway connecting the Hizballah-controlled Beqaa Valley on the Syrian border with the Shiite group’s new fortified bases, complete with missiles pointing at Israel, at the northern reaches of the Litani River. This road will for the first direct link between northern and central Lebanon and the south, speeding up Hizballah troop and weapons movements between sectors. The new missiles delivered to Hizballah include Iranian anti-air weapons and a plentiful supply of C-802 shore-to-ship missiles. Their purpose is to curtail the freedom of Israeli flights and shipping in Lebanon’s skies and off shore. The Israeli government and high command are allowing the IDF to fall back and retreat in the face of the ongoing Palestinian offensive from Gaza which aims to create a band of fire on the Israeli side of the border and burn up the defensive system of positions, roads and patrols the IDF has created. Local commanders see Palestinian pressure mounting, until the missiles for disrupting the opening of the school year in Sderot and its neighbors are backed by terrorist infiltrators. Short of a massive invasion to stamp out the terrorists rampant in Hamas-ruled Gaza, the only effective counteraction would be a 1.5-2km cordon sanitaire inside Gaza’s border. By preventing this, the Olmert government and his military advisers are letting the Palestinians terrorize civilians up to two kilometers inside Israeli territory. Israel leaders’ conduct one year after the Lebanon War shows that nothing has changed and the Hizballah threat which they failed to ward off then is fated to be replicated – this time on three fronts.





Israel can no longer rely on deterrence first strike key Louis Rene Beres, Strategic and Military Affairs columnist for The Jewish Press, Israel's Security After The Oslo Agreement, August 15, 2007, http://www.jewishpress.com/print.do/23272/Israel%27s_Security_After_The_Oslo_Agreement.html

With respect to the recent Gulf War (1991), Israel may feel, generally, that absorbing 39 scud attacks without direct reprisal – that is, letting the Americans do the job for them – was smart. Yet it seems to me that while recognizing full well the military code constraints of that moment, that this deferral to Washington – a deferral reinforced by the demeaning acceptance of minimally-capable patriot missiles – will have longer term ill effects. I daresay this is the case even though I speak together today with the distinguished commander of the Israel Air Force, Maj. Gen. Avihu Ben-Nun. Israel’s enemies understand Cicero. Israel does not. What, precisely, am I suggesting? The peace process, of course, is misconceived and potentially catastrophic. Associated efforts at so-called “confidence building measures” and “security regimes” are the foolish inventions of academics, of the professors, trapped as usual in their hermetically sealed world of erroneous assumptions and political correctness. In the academic world, Cicero is not in fashion. Clichés are the rage, especially when they are well funded. Euphemisms are proper. Forthrightness is unforgivable. Incrementally, Oslo will fail; Israelis will suffer increasingly numerous and more indiscriminate terror attacks; young Palestinians will be recruited to blow up Jews as a ticket to eternal life amidst 72 virgins. What is only metaphor to the sophisticated Westerner will be altogether literal to a 17-year-old Arab boy from Jenin. There is, of course, one more arena of prospective war, an arena of particularly great importance to Israel. I refer to Iran; especially the development of Iranian unconventional weapons and the threat of Iranian nuclear attack. This threat is becoming very real indeed. Regarding this threat, Israel has essentially two options: (1) do nothing other than rely on strategic deterrence, deliberately ambiguous or disclosed (a problem because of willingness, capability, and rationality components of a credible deterrence posture); or (2) strike preemptively against Iranian hard targets and/or associated infrastructures, a strike that would necessarily reflect the permissible use of force known as “anticipatory self defense” in international law. Here an unfortunate synergy must be noted. Now that the “peace process” is underway, Israel’s effective capacity to preempt has already been diminished. It is true that Iran is not a part of this process, but surely the global community (a community not usually known for its good feelings toward Israel or, for that matter, toward Jews in general) would see a post-Oslo defensive strike against Iranian hard targets as evidence of continuing Israeli “aggression.” But again, what is done is done. The only question that remains is: what is Israel to do now? I have written widely about preemption and anticipatory self-defense by Israel, with special reference to Iran. The tactical/operational requirements of such actions are somewhat beyond my domain and can be handled more adequately elsewhere (especially by my fellow speaker today, IAF Maj. Gen. Ben-Nun). What Israel does need to keep in mind is the essential time factor. Once Iranian unconventional or even nuclear weapons are fashioned and deployed, Jerusalem’s preemption options will be severely reduced. In essence, when Iran has already “gone nuclear”, they will have disappeared. Of course, Israel continues to place substantial hopes in ATBM (Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile) defenses, principally the Hetz or Arrow project, but the limitations of such defenses are significant and well-known, primarily because a largely “leak proof” system is required, and such a requirement is well beyond technical possibility. Moreover, the success of deterrence is entirely contingent upon assumptions of enemy rationality. Should the leadership in Iran prove willing to absorb massive Israeli counterstrikes to achieve the allegedly Islamic benefits of a first strike attack against the “Zionist cancer”, Israeli nuclear deterrence would be immobilized. Is such Iranian willingness likely? Probably not- but are you prepared to bet the country on it? And if you are not so prepared, timely preemption by Israel emerges as the only alternative to waiting patiently for annihilation. This is the case even where preemption would succeed only partially. Israel, like Biedermann in Max Frisch’s ominous play (“The Firebugs”), lives in a bad neighborhood. Like Biedermann, Israel can pretend that everything will be alright, that the “arsonists” will disappear on their own accord, or at least that they will be deterred from doing harm if they are indulged in their every whim and expectation. Like Biedermann, self-delusion for Israel will result in “fire,” in an assortment of harms that threaten survival and that should have been averted. Israel must act unlike Biedermann, choosing not the path of “reasonableness” in an unreasonable region, but of determination, self-reliance and appropriate forms of forceful self-defense. Rejecting the “disassociating” professors for whom Jewish history might just as well have never happened, Jerusalem must now base its policies upon a sober awareness of what has already been and upon a full consideration of what is still possible. Should Israel choose such an awareness, as indeed it must, acknowledging protracted, even permanent conflict, the short-term will be markedly unpleasant (hasn’t it always?), but the long-term will at least remain a foreseeable possibility.




No – Israeli Detterence – Iron Dome

Absent further funding Iron Dome will failBBC, Israeli officials warn budget cuts will "kill" anti-Qassam defence system, 8/1/2007

The cabinet's decision this week to reject the Defence Ministry's request for additional funding puts development of the Iron Dome short range rocket defence system at risk, senior defence officials warned on Tuesday. According to defence sources, the $40 million given to the Rafael Armament Development Authority for initial development is running out and if the Defence Ministry wants to continue work on the system, it will need to allocate at least an additional $80m. within the next few months. In February, then-defence minister Amir Peretz chose Rafael's Iron Dome system as Israel's anti-Katyusha and anti-Kassam rocket defence system. Iron Dome is planned to be capable of intercepting Kassam and Katyusha rockets with a small kinetic missile interceptor and is scheduled to be operational for deployment outside the Gaza Strip and along the northern border within two years. Its development is expected to cost $300 million. On Monday, Defence Minister Ehud Barak visited a Rafael plant in the North and was briefed on Iron Dome's development. Barak said the project was of "national importance" and that he would work to obtain the necessary funding for its continued development. But according to high-ranking defence officials, the cabinet's decision not to add NIS 5 billion to the defence budget, as the IDF requested, would almost definitely have an adverse effect on the continued development of the missile defence system. "We need billions of shekels," a high-ranking IDF officer said. "If we don't get the budget there are project's we won't be able to do or will have to develop at a slower pace." Another project at risk is the Trophy system, developed by Rafael to protect Merkava tanks and other armoured vehicles from antitank missiles. The IDF Ground Forces Command recently decided to purchase hundreds of units but has yet to give Rafael an official order due to a lack of funds. The Trophy system creates a hemispheric protected zone around armoured vehicles and is designed to detect and track a threat and then counter it by firing a projectile that intercepts antitank missiles..

Israel fails now to boost deterrence The Jerusalem Post, news publication, Don't junk the road map, August 9, 2007

Today for the purpose of preventing terrorism the security forces lawfully control and surround Palestinian areas ... When a Palestinian state is established the security forces would be required - for the purpose of preventing terrorism - to invade the territory of a neighboring sovereign state... The difference between the two situations speaks for itself." Israelis have had it with policies based on "trust and withdrawal." Many times during the Oslo process Israel negotiated partial handovers of security control. Each time Israel lets its guard down on the promise that the Palestinians will fight terrorism and each time the experiment falls apart often at the expense of Israeli lives. Israel also "experimented" with withdrawals without agreements from Lebanon in 2000 and from Gaza in 2005. In both cases Israel was supposed to make up for its lost security presence with increased deterrence and we were assured that Israel would not be deterred from punishing any attacks that arose from the evacuated territory. All such "trust and withdrawal" experiments whether unilateral or by agreement failed to enhance security and deterrence and produced more attacks weakened deterrence a reduction in Israel's ability to combat terrorism and strengthened and more belligerent enemies.




Syria challenging Israeli deterrenceAbraham Rabinovich, The Australian staff writer, Israeli gas mask handout on hold, August 15, 2007

Mr Assad's ascribed motives include an attempt to prod negotiations over the Golan Heights, captured by Israel in 1967, and fear that Israel is planning a strike against Syria to regain the deterrence lost in its inconclusive war against Hezbollah in Lebanon last year. Syria has in the past year undertaken a significant build-up of its armed forces that for the first time in decades gives it a military potential Israel must take seriously, including numerous ground-to-ground missiles with large warheads capable of striking anywhere in Israel, including Tel Aviv. Tel Aviv newspaper Yediot Achronot reported that Syria, to offset Israel's air superiority, had the densest array of anti-aircraft missile batteries in the world, including the latest models coming off Russian production lines. The Syrian army has been carrying out intensive manoeuvres not seen in years and has built up its forces opposite the Golan Heights. It has also equipped itself with new Russian anti-tank missiles that can penetrate tank armour. Israel distributed gas masks to its entire population before the Gulf War of 1991 in anticipation of a missile attack, possibly with chemical warheads, by Saddam Hussein. The Iraqis fired several dozen missiles at Israel but only with conventional warheads. After last year's war, during which thousands of Hezbollah rockets hit Israel, the defence establishment decided to collect all masks still in civilian hands for refurbishing and then redistribute them so as to be prepared for the use of chemical weapons in a future conflict. It is this redistribution that Mr Barak has put on hold.

Israel ready to increase deterrence nowJames Riley, editor at The National Interest, Inside Track: The Israel Challenge?, 08.24.2007, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=15278

The Nixon Center hosted a luncheon discussion on the challenges facing Israel. Israeli Ambassador Sallai Meridor offered his perspective on Israel’s current political and economic orientation in the larger Middle East. Geoffrey Kemp, director of Regional Strategic Studies at The Nixon Center, moderated the talk. The ambassador found The Nixon Center a fitting setting to comment on foreign-policy challenges facing Israel, and its "special relationship" with the United States: President Nixon was the first U.S. president to visit the nation of Israel. Meridor outlined six elements of Israel’s approach to confronting challenges, such as external security threats, and their impact on its foreign policy. These elements include: maintaining and strengthening Israel’s ability to defend against and deter adversaries; the well-being of Israel’s economic base (8 percent of GDP comes from Israel’s defense industry); its international position vis-à-vis alliances; its Jewish majority population; its relationship to the Jewish diaspora; and the small nation's sense of purpose. According to Meridor, all contribute to Israel’s "national strength." The ambassador admitted that Israel cannot bear isolation, especially in a region where Israel feels it is on the "frontlines" of liberal democracy. Meridor fears that the current instability emanating from the Middle East in the form of fanaticism, terrorism and nuclear proliferation could amount to what he called a "nightmare scenario." Asymmetric conflict has made deterrence an irrelevant strategy.




ISREALI DETERRENCE BAD




Israeli Deterrence Bad

Israeli deterrence sparks international nuclear exchange

The Economist, Bombs away, July 21, 2007Since Israel does not admit to having nuclear weapons, its detailed thinking on nuclear matters is rarely ventilated in public. But most of those Israeli experts willing to talk rate the chances of an Iranian nuclear attack as low. Despite Mr Ahmadinejad, most consider Iran to be a rational state actor susceptible to deterrence. Knowing that Israel already possesses a very large nuclear arsenal, Iran would have to be ready to sacrifice millions of its own people to destroy the Jewish state, unless it was sure that in a first strike it could destroy Israel's ability to strike back. That would be hard, given that Israel is reported to have put nuclear weapons at sea on submarines, and has built sophisticated anti-missile defences expressly to protect its second-strike power. Furthermore, if Iran did obtain nuclear weapons, America might be willing to offer Israel (and other allies in the region) additional reassurance by saying—for whatever such a promise can be worth—that it would regard a nuclear attack on its ally as an attack on itself. Nonetheless, Ehud Olmert, its prime minister, has said that Israel cannot live with a nuclear-armed Iran.whatever its policymakers think, its people have been spooked by Mr Ahmadinejad. And the sheer disparity in size between the countries (Iran's population is more than ten times Israel's, and its land area 75 times as big) leads some Israelis to question whether stable deterrence is possible between them. Israelis are haunted by a remark of Ayatollah Rafsanjani's in 2001, musing that a single nuclear weapon could obliterate Israel, whereas Israel could "only damage" the world of Islam. Could ordinary life in Israel continue under such a threat? Even if Iran did not use its bomb, might not possession of it embolden it to attack Israel by conventional means, either directly or by using its allies in Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories? A further danger is that once Iran went nuclear, others in the region, such as Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, might feel compelled to follow. Hard as it would be for Israel to establish a deterrent balance with Iran, a cat's cradle of Middle Eastern nuclear face-offs would be an even darker nightmare. Added together, these considerations might still tempt an Israeli government to try to knock out Iran's nuclear facilities before it can finish building a bomb. The Israelis have worked for years to obtain the weapons for such a strike, spending billions to procure long-range variants of the F15 and F16 fighter-bomber, for example. On the other hand, senior Israelis know that this would be fraught with danger. Iran's nuclear targets are much further from Israel than was Iraq's Osiraq reactor, which Israeli aircraft destroyed in 1981. Most are more than 1,200km (750 miles) away, and Israel's aircraft would have to fly even farther to avoid Jordanian or Iraqi airspace. That, according to a study by Ephraim Kam of Israel's Institute for National Security Studies, would require refuelling on both the outward and return flights, adding to the danger of interception. Osiraq, moreover, was a single target. Since there would be many this time, the attacking force would have to be large. And to cause serious damage, the aircraft might have to attack more than once. Even a successful strike would not be the end of the story. For as the IAEA's Mr ElBaradei keeps saying, "you can't bomb knowledge." Iran would be likely not only to retaliate with its long-range rockets but also to begin at once to rebuild its nuclear capability, just as Iraq did with extra urgency after Israel's destruction of Osiraq. That might not take long, says Mr Kam: Iran has its own nuclear raw material and already possesses much of the relevant knowledge and technology. Having spent only three years building Natanz from scratch, it could probably rebuild it much faster with the experience it has gleaned. More worrying still is the possibility that Iran has secret nuclear sites outsiders do not know about: the existence of Arak and Natanz, remember, was not discovered until fairly recently. That could render an attack on the known ones pointless. And Mr Kam is surely right that an Israeli strike might unite Iran's people behind the regime and its nuclear aspirations. Another alternative for Israel might be to attack Iran in order to start a sequence of events in which America eventually joins the fray. The Americans, naturally, would find the military job much easier than Israel. The Americans have a motive, too: not fear of annihilation, but fear that a nuclear-armed Iran would knock a hole in what is left of the non-proliferation regime and challenge American interests in the energy-rich Middle East. After Iraq, however, no American president could doubt that such an attack would deepen Muslim hatred of America. And Iran is not without means of retaliation, even against the superpower. It could strike America's already hard-pressed forces in Iraq, direct terrorism at America's friends or disrupt tanker traffic through the Persian Gulf, so causing mayhem in the energy markets. That is why American and Israeli politicians alike, while refusing to take the threat of military action "off the table", are probably being completely honest when they insist that force is a last resort and that they would prefer to stop Iran by means of diplomacy sharpened by economic sanctions. But can sanctions do the job, and can they do it in time?





Israeli deterrence proliferates Hasan Munayminah, Al-Hayat staff writer, Hezbollah should reassess itself one year after Lebanon war, July 24, 2007

In fact, the excuse made by the party to keep its weapons revolves in a vicious circle and aims to deceive exactly like the Israeli excuse for occupying Lebanon. Following the departure of the Palestinian factions from the Lebanese scene, Israel's excuse for occupying the south of Lebanon was the protection of Israel from the Lebanese resistance, while this resistance is in its turn the result of Israel's occupation of the south. Similarly, today, Hezbollah's excuse for keeping its weapons is the protection of Lebanon from Israeli aggression, while the reason behind this aggression is Hezbollah's holding on to its weapons. There is no doubt that Hezbollah along a big section of the Lebanese and Arab people are not ready to trust that Israel will not launch aggression even without the existence of Hezbollah's weapons. The weapons are not the reason from this point of view, but they are partly for deterrence, and partly a means of retaliation and defence. There is no problem whatsoever, it is even desirable, for people adopting this vision that weapons and achievements should constitute an impetus and a backing to the resistance in Palestine against Israeli occupation.

Syria challenging Israeli deterrenceAbraham Rabinovich, The Australian staff writer, Israeli gas mask handout on hold, August 15, 2007

Mr Assad's ascribed motives include an attempt to prod negotiations over the Golan Heights, captured by Israel in 1967, and fear that Israel is planning a strike against Syria to regain the deterrence lost in its inconclusive war against Hezbollah in Lebanon last year. Syria has in the past year undertaken a significant build-up of its armed forces that for the first time in decades gives it a military potential Israel must take seriously, including numerous ground-to-ground missiles with large warheads capable of striking anywhere in Israel, including Tel Aviv. Tel Aviv newspaper Yediot Achronot reported that Syria, to offset Israel's air superiority, had the densest array of anti-aircraft missile batteries in the world, including the latest models coming off Russian production lines. The Syrian army has been carrying out intensive manoeuvres not seen in years and has built up its forces opposite the Golan Heights. It has also equipped itself with new Russian anti-tank missiles that can penetrate tank armour. Israel distributed gas masks to its entire population before the Gulf War of 1991 in anticipation of a missile attack, possibly with chemical warheads, by Saddam Hussein. The Iraqis fired several dozen missiles at Israel but only with conventional warheads. After last year's war, during which thousands of Hezbollah rockets hit Israel, the defence establishment decided to collect all masks still in civilian hands for refurbishing and then redistribute them so as to be prepared for the use of chemical weapons in a future conflict. It is this redistribution that Mr Barak has put on hold.




Palestine counterbalancing Israeli deterrence now – breeds terrorism The Jerusalem Post, news publication, op officer urges major assault against Hamas in Gaza before it's too late. Islamists have 13 0 armed force seek Katyusha capability. Gov't officials: We hear other options from IDF, July 20, 2007

According to the officer the IDF has the necessary capabilities to stop Hamas and all that is needed is the go-ahead from the government. Hamas the officer revealed has established a full- fledged military force in Gaza consisting of four brigades corresponding to the different sections of the Gaza Strip. The brigades are made up of a number of battalions and platoons and include special forces. In addition Hamas had smuggled in 20 tons of explosives via the Philadelphi Corridor from Sinai over the past two months he said. Furthermore the officer claimed that the group had obtained a large number of advanced antitank missiles as well as an unknown number of antiaircraft missiles. Hamas he said was working to obtain long-range Katyusha rockets and was also investing to improve the range of its cache of Kassam rockets he said. "They have an organized military the officer said, adding that Hamas's infantry now had some 13,000 recruits. They have the manpower they have the training they have the motivation; the principle is creating a balance of deterrence against Israel." The officer also noted that over the past two years since Israel's disengagement from Gaza several hundred Palestinians had traveled from Gaza to Iran to receive training. On average he said each Palestinian who trained in Iran was capable of training 400 Palestinians upon his return. He said that Israel was basically helpless when it came to stopping Palestinian terrorists from entering or leaving Gaza through the Rafah Crossing despite the presence there of European Union monitors.





Iran counterbalances Israeli deterrence with nuclear weaponsIsrael Rafalovich, Universal Press Agency staff writer, Israel and a Nuclear Middle East, August 13, 2007, http://www.universalpressagency.com/Israel-and-a-Nuclear-Middle-East_a13387.html

As changes in the overall political setting of the Middle East have occured it is important to focus on Israel's nuclear strategy as the former possibilities of the superpowers to control and fence in the conflicts in the Middle East have given way to new power structures. A significant asymmetry has developed with respect to motivation and determination of some Middle East countries in comparison with Israel and its patron the United States. Over the years, it has become more difficult for the United States to bring its power of deterrence to bear in the Middle East. Despite close relations with the United States Israel is no longer a "bastion" against Soviet communism in the Middle East. Israel's role in context of American foreign policy in the Middle East regained significance in view of the fact that Russia now as a new patron for Iran, and Syria, is engaged in an effort to re-establish its power in the region. One thing can be said with certainty: The structural transformation on the international scene has led to a clear reduction in Israel's deterrence power. Modern weapons systems are easy to purchase as former limitations on the transfer of weapons and the needed technology. Apart from China and North Korea, the Russians are the chief contact in this field. Motivated by economic and power-based interests, its arms and technology deals with Iran, for example, have contributed towards a renewed rise in the flow of highly sophisticated and strategically important technology to the Middle East. The drawn conclusion in the Middle East after the Gulf War is that the acquisition of nuclear weapons confront the United States with a muchmore awkward situation than in the past. The proliferation of nuclear weapons will - above and beyond the far-reaching missiles already at the disposal of some Middle East countries - lead to new risks. In view of its extensive and single-minded fostered nuclear program Iran is already in a position to attain the status of a nuclear power in the medium term. Iran had long since embarked on a good neighbor policy in the Gulf and Central ASia. There are different points of view on Iran's intentions regarding nuclear weapons. Iran's nuclear program began under Shah in 1974, but was abruptly suspended following the Islamic revolution in 1978-1979. It was not until 1984 that Ayatollah Khomeini revived Iran's nuclear weapons program. Only few experts doubt Iran's intention to develop a covert nuclear program. Iran have sought a nuclear capability as a strategic equalizer. For Iran the nuclear weapons serve an ambition greater than that of a relative deterrence. With it Israel lost its monopoly on nuclear weapons, and it shouldn't be ruled out that Israel will find it self confronted with several nuclear powers in the MIddle East. The threat of an extension of the geographical limitations of future conflicts can hardly be averted through arms control measures. For Israel the risk of a renewed formation of a hostile coalition has declined since the beginning of the Middle East talks. In the meantime, Syria's interest in peaceful arrangement has also grown, although the demanded Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights is a difficult problem and Syria's future behavior in the post-Assad era remains an open question. For Israel the loss of strategic depth would not increase its vulnerability with respect to non-conventional long-range missile attack. The dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Israel's relative military superiority, affects the thinking of all the states in the region.




ISREALI DETERRENCE GOOD




Deterrence Good

Only Israeli MAD policies can prevent a middle east nuclear warLouis Rene Beres, Defening Israel In An Apocalyptic Time, Jewish Press, July 2006

A nuclear war in the Middle East is not out of the question. Indeed, there are a number of different scenarios that could result in an Israeli use of nuclear weapons. Israel will need to choose prudently between what are called “assured destruction” strategies and “nuclear war-fighting” strategies. Assured destruction strategies are also sometimes termed “counter-value” strategies or “mutual assured destruction” (MAD). These are strategies of deterrence/preemption in which a country primarily targets its strategic weapons on the other side’s civilian populations and/or on its supporting civilian infrastructures. Nuclear war-fighting strategies, on the other hand, are called “counterforce” strategies. These are systems of deterrence/preemption wherein a country primarily targets its strategic nuclear weapons on the other side’s major weapon systems and on its supporting military infrastructures. For nuclear-weapons countries in general, and for Israel in particular, there are very serious survival implications for choosing one strategy over the other. It is also possible that a country would opt for some sort of “mixed” (counter-value/counterforce) strategy. In the case of Israel, however, any policy that might actually encourage nuclear war-fighting – any counterforce nuclear doctrines – should be rejected out-of-hand. Human psychology has much to do with current world politics. Whichever deterrence/preemption strategy Israel might choose, what ultimately really matters is what an enemy country perceives. In strategic matters, the only pertinent reality is perceived reality; nothing else matters. In choosing between the two basic strategic alternatives, Israel should opt for nuclear deterrence/preemption based upon assured destruction. This seemingly insensitive recommendation will surely elicit opposition in certain publics, but in fact, it is substantially more humane. Further, a counter-value targeting doctrine would appear to create an enlarged risk of losing any nuclear war that might still arise. This is because counter-value-targeted nuclear weapons would not destroy military targets. Yet, a counterforce targeting doctrine would be less persuasive as a nuclear deterrent, especially to societies where leaders would willingly sacrifice entire armies and military infrastructures as “martyrs.” And if Israel were to opt for nuclear deterrence/preemption based upon identified and projected counterforce capabilities, its Arab/Islamic enemies could feel especially threatened. For many reasons, this condition could then actually heighten the prospect of WMD-aggression against Israel and of a subsequent nuclear exchange.




No Israel Iran Strike

Won’t do it – afraid to risk rupture with Washington

Jeffrey Goldberg, 2-10-2012, “How Likely is an Israeli Strike on Iran This Spring?”, The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/02/how-likely-is-an-israeli-strike-on-iran-this-spring/252907/

I think it's perfectly plausible that Netanyahu could order a strike soon, though I'm less sure of that than either Leon Panetta or Ronen Bergman. In part

this is because I tend to think it is something close to impossible for any Israeli prime minister to launch an attack that could have adverse consequences on the United States without first getting the approval of the U.S.

Netanyahu, who is a keen student of the U.S.-Israel relationship -- and who knows, as all Israeli prime ministers in recent memory have known,

that the U.S. is Israel's indispensable ally and patron -- simply couldn't afford a rupture with Washington , unless he was absolutely confident that his only choice was between a break with Washington or a second Holocaust (a fear I wrote about in this Atlantic story). I write about the myth that Israel is a purely independent player in this drama here, by the way.

No Israeli attack – too isolationist and threat of Hamas

Ma’an News Agancy, 3-20-2012, “Hamas official: Israel unlikely to strike Iran”, http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=469431

Hamas leader Mahmoud Zahhar said on Monday he does not expect an Israeli strike on Iran due to Israel's international isolation. The senior official in Gaza told Ma'an that Iran continues to support the Palestinian cause and the Hamas movement, but denied Israeli media reports that Iranian leaders are training Palestinian factions in the Egyptian Sinai. Zahhar met Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi in Tehran on Thursday, thanking the country for supporting Palestine without expecting anything in return. Zahhar has made conflicting statements about the role Hamas would play if Israel attacked Iran. Speaking to the BBC for a report published March 7, Zahhar said Hamas would respond to Israeli attacks on Gaza but would not get involved "in any other regional conflict." He added: "We are not part of any political axis." Zahhar told the BBC that Hamas lacked the power to respond from a territory that is still under siege, occupied and recovering from previous Israeli offensives. He later disavowed the

comments in an interview with the Iranian Fars news agency and said Hamas would respond to Israel and its allies in the event of an attack on Iran. "Retaliation with utmost power is the position of Hamas with regard to a Zionist war on Iran ," he said.




ISREAL HAS DISCLOSED NUKES




Yes – Disclosure

Israel is giving up its policy of strategic ambiguityLuke Harding and Duncan Campbell, staff writers, The Guardian, Calls for Olmert to ereisng after nuclear gaffe, 12/13/2006

Mr Vanunu, who was released in 2004 after spending 18 years in prison, welcomed the prime minister's admission. "Obviously, I don't welcome the atomic bomb but this openness could lead at last to some realpolitik - and maybe to some real peace." Mr Vanunu said he believed the admission was not accidental. "My idea is that it was said intentionally. For 20 years they tried to deny me and my story but the policy of cheating and lying didn't succeed. There is now a new defence secretary in the United States and there are also changes taking place in the Arab world, so I think that may have led to the change."

Strategic ambiguity is anachronistic – everyone knows Israel has nukesWilliam Choong, Straits Times, Mid-East’s worst-kept secret, 12/14/2006

Opponents of the policy, however, argue that it has outlived its utility since Israel's nuclear arsenal is now the region's worst-kept secret. In 1986, Mr Mordechai Vanunu, a former Israeli nuclear technician, provided information to The Sunday Times in London that led experts to conclude that Israel is an established nuclear power. The respected Federation of American Scientists now estimates that Israel has between 100 and 200 nuclear weapons. Mr Olmert's apparent gaffe on Monday came just three days after a similar lapse by new US Defence Secretary Robert Gates who, during his confirmation hearings in the Senate, alluded to Israel's arsenal while explaining why Iran might want an atomic bomb. Mr Avner Cohen, an Israeli who has written about the country's nuclear programme, believes firmly that Israel's policy of ambiguity has become anachronistic. 'The world has taken Israel as a nuclear weapons state for about 40 years,' Mr Cohen, a senior research fellow at the University of Maryland and the author of Israel And The Bomb, told The New York Times.

Israel has already disclosed it has nuclear weapons – Olmert and PeresLouis Rene Beres and Paul Vallely, academic advisor to the Freeman Center For Strategic Studies and Major General, Israel's Nuclear Strategy, The Washington Times, 12/14/2006

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's explicit reference on Dec. 11 to his country's nuclear weapons was hardly a "slip of the tongue." Rather, it was an intentional attempt to remind Israel's enemies that despite a long-standing policy of "opacity" or "deliberate ambiguity," the Jewish state would make any aggressor pay existentially for launching annihilatory attacks. Nor was Mr. Olmert's lifting of Israel's nuclear veil unprecedented. More than 10 years ago, Shimon Peres had publicly advanced the idea of unilateral denuclearization in exchange for "peace."

Israel has already disclosed it has nuclear weapons – PeresGil Hoffman, Jerusalem Post writer, Peres: Ambiguity has achieved its goal, 12/12/2006

"We didn't build a nuclear option in order to create a nuclear bomb," Peres said. "The very suspicion that we have one is enough. It's intended for deterrence and it has achieved its goal." Peres built Israel's nuclear program in the 1950s when he was Defense Ministry director-general. The policy that "Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East" was first wielded by Peres in April 1963 in a meeting at the White House with US president John F. Kennedy. Peres has been accused of violating the nuclear ambiguity policy in the past, most notably as prime minister in December 1995 when he said, "Give me peace and we will give up the nuclear program," and in September when he said that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad should "bear in mind that his country could be destroyed, too."




Yes – Disclosure

Strategic Ambiguity is gone – Olmert and Gates have publicly disclosed Israeli nuclear capabilitesStraits Times, Israli Bomb’s out of the Basement, 12/16/2006

ISRAEL has been a nuclear state for more than three decades. And yet, its leaders have always adhered to a policy of 'strategic ambiguity', neither denying nor confirming the existence of such weapons. Israel's 'bomb in the basement' - as one historian dubbed it - had remained firmly away from public gaze. But no longer. During a visit to Germany earlier this week, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert gave the game away. Asked if Israel's alleged nuclear capability weakened the case against Iran's nuclear programme, Mr Olmert said: 'Iran, openly, explicitly and publicly threatens to wipe Israel off the map. Can you say that this is the same as America, France, Israel, Russia?' Mr Olmert's aides quickly denied any suggestion that the Prime Minister had abandoned Israel's 'strategic ambiguity'. Nevertheless, the statement created a political storm in Israel, where it was seen as a monumental gaffe. But what if Mr Olmert's words were intentional? As an experienced politician, it is highly unlikely that he was guilty of a mere slip of the tongue. More importantly, Mr Olmert's open reference to his country's nuclear capability mirrors a similar statement recently made by Mr Robert Gates, the newly-appointed US Defence Secretary, who also openly mentioned the Israeli bomb. It beggars belief that these two 'indiscretions' were merely coincidental. So, what is happening? One explanation is that, faced with an Iran which openly calls for Israel's destruction, Prime Minister Olmert has to sound tough. But there is another, more intriguing interpretation. Israel may well have decided that Iran will succeed in becoming a nuclear state. If this is the case, no further ambiguity is required: the Middle East will have two countries, openly confronting each other with nuclear charges, a stalemate very similar to that which existed between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Israel has 200 nuclear warheads according to reliable estimates Peter Beaumont, staff writer, The Observer, Israel deploys nuclear arms in submarines, 10/12/2003

Although Israel has long been known to possess nuclear weapons, in the past it has abided by a deal struck with President Richard Nixon in 1969 that it would maintain 'ambiguity' about its retention of weapons in exchange for the US turning a blind eye. According to reliable estimates, Israel has around 200 nuclear warheads. It acquired the three Dolphin class submarines, which can remain at sea for a month, in the late Nineties. They are equipped with six torpedo tubes suitable for the 21-inch torpedoes that are normally used on most submarines. It had been understood they would carry a version of the 'Popeye Turbo' cruise missiles being developed by Rafael Armament Development Authority of Israel. Israel's seaborne nuclear doctrine is designed to place one submarine in the Persian Gulf, the other in the Mediterranean, with a third on standby. Secret test launches of the cruise missile systems were understood to have been undertaken in May 2000 when Israel carried out tests in the Indian Ocean. 'We tolerate nuclear weapons in Israel for the same reason we tolerate them in Britain and France,' one of the LA Times' sources told the paper. 'We don't regard Israel as a threat.' Despite the anonymity of the source, the sentiment is almost identical to that of the US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control, John Bolton, who told British journalists last week that America was not interested in taking Israel to task for its continuing development of nuclear weapons because it was not a 'threat' to the United States. Even if Bolton was not one of the sources for the story, his comments, coming on top of that of the two other sources, suggest the degree to which senior members of the Bush administration can now not even be bothered to hide America's assistance and encouragement for Israel's nuclear programme.

Israel has already disclosed it has nuclear weapons – Vanunu whistleblowingJim Teeple, VOA, Israel Says Nculear Whistleblower Violated Gag Order, 4/30/2007

An Israeli court has convicted a former nuclear technician of violating a gag order for speaking with foreign journalists. VOA's Jim Teeple reports from Jerusalem the case goes back more than 20 years and exposed Israel's nuclear secrets to the world. Mordechai Vanunu was back in court - convicted of violating a court-imposed gag order by speaking with foreign journalists. Vanunu was also found guilty of attempting to leave Jerusalem through the West Bank city of Bethlehem. In 1986 Vanunu was sentenced to 18 years in prison after he gave an interview to a British newspaper detailing his duties at Israel's Dimona nuclear reactor, where he said Israel produced 40 kilograms of plutonium for use in hydrogen and neutron bombs. Since he was released from prison he has been banned from leaving Israel or speaking with foreigners. His lawyers say he will appeal Monday's verdict. Leaving court a defiant Vanunu called the verdict a blow to democracy, saying information about Israel's nuclear program is widely known, and there is no reason not to let him leave the country. "Everything is published here," he said. "All the bombs that Israel refuses to accept and admit that they have the bomb - they are here." Israel's policy of so-called "strategic ambiguity" means that it neither admits nor denies possessing nuclear weapons. Based on Vanunu's revelations more than 20 years ago, nuclear experts concluded that Israel possessed hundreds of warheads, making it the sixth-largest nuclear power in the world.




Yes – Disclosure

Israel has already disclosed it has nuclear weapons – US-Israeli nuclear submarine cooperationPeter Beaumont, staff writer, The Observer, Israel deploys nuclear arms in submarines, 10/12/2003

Israeli and American officials have admitted collaborating to deploy US-supplied Harpoon cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads in Israel's fleet of Dolphin-class submarines, giving the Middle East's only nuclear power the ability to strike at any of its Arab neighbours. The unprecedented disclosure came as Israel announced that states 'harbouring terrorists' are legitimate targets, responding to Syria's declaration of its right to self-defence should Israel bomb its territory again. According to Israeli and Bush administration officials interviewed by the Los Angeles Times, the sea-launch capability gives Israel the ability to target Iran more easily should the Iranians develop their own nuclear weapons.

Israel will have to disclose – Iranian proliferationPaul Starobin, Editor of Atlantic Monthly, National Journal, "Of Mullahs and MADness", 5.20.2006.

Israel's first leader, David Ben-Gurion, was worried not so much about other Middle East states gaining nuclear weapons as about the need for tiny Israel to have a potent weapon that could effectively counter the huge armies of its hostile Arab neighbors. Once the weapon was gained, Israel, for political reasons, including quiet urging from an anxious Washington, adhered to a policy of "nuclear ambiguity" under which it would neither confirm nor deny its arsenal. But Israel could jettison nuclear ambiguity if the mullahs get the bomb -- and thus break Israel's regional monopoly. In our talk, Shai Feldman, who wrote his dissertation, in the 1980s, on the Israeli nuclear deterrent, said, "If Iran becomes nuclear, Israel would not be able to tolerate the level of uncertainties and ambiguities and room for misperceptions that exist today." Even now, some Israeli leaders are sending loaded messages to Tehran. "They want to wipe out Israel," Vice Premier Shimon Peres said of Iran's leaders in a recent interview with Reuters. "Now, when it comes to destruction, Iran, too, can be destroyed," Peres asserted.




ISREAL HAS NOT DISCLOSED NUKES




No – Disclosure – A2: Olmert

Olmert was talking about democracy not nuclear capabilitiesWilliam Choong, Straits Times, Mid-East’s worst-kept secret, 12/14/2006

Foreign Ministry spokesman Mark Regev said that Mr Olmert has been misinterpreted. The premier wanted to categorise the four nations as democracies to set them apart from Iran, and was not referring to their potential nuclear capabilities, Mr Regev said.

Olmert didn’t break from strategic ambiguityThe Advertiser, Denial on Israeli nuclear weapon slip-up, 12/13/2006

Mr Olmert's spokeswoman, Miri Eisen, who accompanied the prime minister to Germany, said he did not mean to say Israel possessed or aspired to acquire nuclear weapons. ''No, he wasn't saying anything like that,'' she said. Israeli Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Mark Regev, said Mr Olmert had meant to categorise the four nations as democracies to set them apart from Iran, and was not referring to their potential nuclear capabilities or aspirations.

Israel is holding onto its policy of strategic ambiguity – OlmertSharmila Devi and Hugh Williamson, staff writers, Olmert under fire for nuclear gaffe, Financial Times. 12/13/2006

Security experts have long believed that Israel has nuclear weapons, and Robert Gates, incoming US secretary of state, suggested last week that Israel has the bomb. But Israel refuses to confirm or deny having nuclear weapons, as part of a "strategic ambiguity" policy aimed at its Arab enemies. Speaking to journalists in Berlin yesterday after a meeting with Angela Merkel, German chancellor, Mr Olmert dismissed suggestions that the comments represented an acknowledgement of the country's nuclear arsenal. He noted that in the same interview he had repeated Israel's traditional reaction to questions on its alleged weapons programme, namely that "Israel will not be the first country in the Middle East to obtain nuclear weapons". He did not comment directly on the controversial sentence in the television interview.




No – Disclosure – A2: Vanunu

Israel still follows an effective strategy of strategic ambiguity– Vanunu’s disclosure didn’t undermine its effectivenessNTI, staffed by a group of experts on int’l affairs and nonprolif, Israel Profile, November 2006. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Israel/Nuclear/index.html

Israel's nuclear history in the period from 1973 until the first Gulf War in 1990-91 can be recounted along two distinct themes. First, it was the period in which Israel's policy of nuclear opacity was transformed from a short-lived improvisation to a semi-permanent strategic posture. In retrospect, the period from 1974 to 1990 was the golden age of nuclear opacity. By the end of the period, Israelis came to view the policy as a great strategic success because it provided Israel the benefits of existential deterrence at a very low political cost. Nuclear opacity became an indispensable pillar in its national security doctrine. Many Israelis came to believe that the low-profile nuclear deterrent played a constructive role both in making peace (in the case of Egypt) and in deterring regional war (in the case of Iraq). In particular, the policy of nuclear opacity seemed to have removed the nuclear issue from the U.S.-Israeli agenda, without restricting Israel's freedom of action in this field. For Israeli strategists, opacity was the best of all possible worlds. Even Vanunu's public disclosure of Dimona's secrets in 1986 (see footnote 2 and below) was not politically sufficient to shake Israel's posture of opacity.




DISCLOSURE OF ISRAELI NUKES BAD




Disclosure Bad – Proliferation

Israeli disclosure would create an incentive for quick regional proliferationWilliam Choong, Straits Times, Mid-East’s worst-kept secret, 12/14/2006

More importantly, however, would be the regional implications if Israel abandons its longstanding policy. The push to go nuclear will intensify - a trend already set in motion by fears over Iran's nuclear programme. Turkey, Egypt and some Gulf states have already expressed their interest in nuclear power. For now, Israel's default strategy would be to extract whatever remaining benefits they can from the decades-old policy. In short, Tel Aviv would only consider crossing its Rubicon when Iran crosses its own - declaring itself a fully-fledged nuclear power.




Disclosure Bad – US-Israeli Aid

Disclosure is bad – undermines US aid to IsraelLuke Harding and Duncan Campbell, staff writers, The Guardian, Calls for Olmert to ereisng after nuclear gaffe, 12/13/2006

Israel has long declined to confirm or deny having the bomb as part of a "strategic ambiguity" policy that it says fends off numerically superior Arab enemies. But Arabs and Iran see a double standard in US policy in the region. By not declaring itself to be nuclear-armed, Israel gets round a US ban on funding countries that proliferate weapons of mass destruction. It can thus enjoy more than $2bn (£1.02bn) a year in military and other aid from Washington.




Disclosure Good – Detterence

Continued explicit disclosure of nuclear weapons is key to effective detterenceLouis Rene Beres and Paul Vallely, Major General, Israel's Nuclear Strategy, The Washington Times, 12/14/2006

The Arab-Islamic awareness of an Israeli bomb does not automatically imply that Israel has credible nuclear deterrence. If Israel's nuclear arsenal were seen as vulnerable to first-strikes it might not persuade enemy states to resist attacking the Jewish state. Similarly, if Israel's political leadership were seen as unwilling to resort to nuclear weapons in reprisal for anything but unconventional strikes, these enemy states may not be deterred. If Israel's targeting doctrine were judged to be predominantly focused on enemy state weapons and supporting military infrastructures, enemy states could so fear an Israeli first-strike that they would then consider striking first themselves. How shall enemy states be apprised of Israel's targeting doctrine? It is no longer enough that Israel's enemies merely know that the Jewish state has nuclear weapons. They must also be convinced that these arms are secure and that Israel's leadership is actually willing to launch these weapons against high-value city targets in response to certain first strike and retaliatory attacks. Israel's strategic doctrine must aim at strengthening nuclear deterrence. It can meet this objective only by convincing enemy states that a first-strike upon Israel will always be irrational. This means communicating to enemy states that the costs of such a strike will always exceed the benefits. Hence, Israel's strategic doctrine must always convince prospective attackers that their intended victim has both the willingness and the capacity to retaliate with nuclear weapons. If an enemy state considering an attack upon Israel were unconvinced about either or both of these components of nuclear deterrence, it could choose to strike first. This would depend in part upon the particular value it placed upon the expected consequences of such an attack. Regarding capacity: Even if Israel were to maintain a substantial arsenal of nuclear weapons, it is necessary that enemy states believe these weapons to be distinctly usable. This means that if a first-strike attack were believed capable of sufficiently destroying Israel's atomic arsenal and pertinent infrastructures, that country's nuclear deterrent could be immobilized. Even if Israel's nuclear weapons could not be destroyed by an enemy first-strike, enemy misperceptions or misjudgments about Israeli vulnerability could still bring about the catastrophic failure of Israeli nuclear deterrence. To the extent that Israel's doctrine actually identifies nuanced and graduated forms of reprisal, more disclosure could contribute to Israeli nuclear deterrence. Without such disclosure, Israel's enemies will be kept guessing about the Jewish state's probable responses, a condition of protracted uncertainty that could serve Israel's survival for a while longer, but — at one time or another — could come apart. Prime Minister Olmert's public comment on Israel's nuclear capacity was a good first-step to enhanced nuclear deterrence. But it was only a good beginning.

Disclosure would re-establish Israeli deterrenceDEBKAfile Exclusive Military Analysis, "A Deterrence Strategy to Replace Israel's Lost Strategic Ambiguity", Dec. 10, 2006. http://www.debka.com/article.php?aid=1242

Timid diplomatic rhetoric will no longer serve. DEBKAfile’s military sources say the time has come for Israel to talk as though it has arrows in its quiver and is capable of using them. Its vanished deterrence can be retrieved, for instance, by press leaks or even an announcement that a new surface missile has been launched, which foreign media would disclose is capable of delivering a nuclear warhead, or the firing of a new Israeli cruise missile from a Dolphin submarine cruising at the Indian Ocean’s point of convergence with the Arabian Sea. This is the sort of publicity tactic Tehran employs; it works. The effectiveness of its provocative talk depends on Israel shrinking back, instead of marching forward and hitting back in kind. Iran’s radical leaders don’t always bother with new or even true shockers. Saturday, the Iranian president recycled an oft-used claim that Iran has started installing 3,000 centrifuges for uranium enrichment at a plant in central Iran, the first step towards industrial production. Nuclear experts immediately seized on the threat embodied in this statement (as was intended) and predicted that within two years, if the centrifuges spin smoothly, Iran will be able to turn out 3-4 small nuclear bombs a year. Iran, still far from possessing an independent nuclear bomb, has big-mouthed itself into the position of a nuclear power, while Israel, which is the genuine article, is brushed aside as a non-player.




Disclosure Good – CBW Detterence

Disclosure good – stops CBW attacksLouis Rene Beres, Professor at Purdue, Parameters, "Israel's Uncertain Strategic Future",Spring 2007

The rationale for Israeli nuclear disclosure does not lie in expressing the obvious; that Israel has the bomb. Instead, it lies in the informed understanding that nuclear weapons can serve the nation’s security in a number of ways, all of which may be of benefit depending on the extent to which certain aspects of these weapons and the associated strategies are disclosed. The pertinent form and extent of disclosure is vital to Israeli nuclear deterrence. To protect itself against enemy strikes, particularly those carrying existential costs, Israel needs to exploit every component of its nuclear arsenal. The success of Israel’s efforts will depend in largemeasure not only upon its chosen configuration of “ counterforce” (hard-target) and “counter-value” (city-busting) operations, but also upon the extent towhich this configuration is known in advance by enemy states. Before an enemy is deterred from launching first-strikes against Israel or fromlaunching retaliatory attacks following an Israeli preemption, it may not be enough to simply “know” that Israel has the bomb. Potential enemies need to recognize that Israeli nuclear weapons are sufficiently invulnerable to attack and they are aimed at highvalue targets. In this context, the Final Report of Project Daniel recommends that “a recognizable retaliatory force should be fashioned with the capacity to destroy some 15 high-value targets scattered widely over pertinent enemy states in the Middle East.” This counter-value strategy means that Israel’s second-strike response to enemy aggressions involving certain biological or nuclear weapons would be unambiguously directed at enemy populations, not at enemy weapons or infrastructures. Itmay appear, at first glance, that Israeli targeting of enemy military installations and troop concentrations (counterforce targeting) would be both more compelling as a deterrent and also more humane. But it is entirely likely that a nuclear-armed enemy could conceivably regard any Israeli retaliatory destruction of its armed forces as “acceptable” in certain circumstances. Such an enemy may even conclude that the expected benefits of annihilating “the Zionist entity” outweigh any expected retaliatory harms to itsmilitary.Under such circumstances, Israel’s nuclear deterrent would fail, possibly with existential consequences. It is highly unlikely, however, that any enemy state would ever calculate that the expected benefits of annihilating Israel would outweigh the expected costs of its own annihilation. Excluding an irrational actor—a prospect that falls outside the logic of nuclear deterrence—enemies of Israel would assuredly refrain from nuclear or biological attacks that would presumptively elicit massive counter-value reprisals. This reasoning holds only to the extent that these enemies fully believe that Israel will make good on its announced strategy. Israel’s nuclear deterrent, once it were made explicit, would need to state to all prospective nuclear enemies: “Israel’s nuclear weapons, dispersed, multiplied, and hardened, are targeted upon your major cities. These weaponswill never be used against these targets except in retaliation for certainWMD aggressions. Unless our population centers are struck first by nuclear attack, certain levels of biological attack, or by combined nuclear and biological attack, we will not harm your cities.” Some readers may be disturbed by this reasoning, discovering in it perhaps an ominous hint of “Dr. Strangelove.” Yet, the counter-value targeting strategy recommended by Project Daniel represents Israel’s best hope for avoiding nuclear or biological warfare. It is the most humane strategy available. The Israeli alternative, an expressed counterforce targeting doctrine, would produce a higher probability of nuclear or nuclear/biological war. Such a war, even if all weapons remained targeted on the enemy’s military forces and structures (an optimistic assumption) would almost certainly entail higher levels of collateral damage. The very best weapons, Clausewitz wrote, are those that achieve their objectives without ever actually being used. This is certainly the case with nuclear weapons. Israel’s nuclear weapons can only succeed through their non-use. ProjectDanielmade clear in its Final Report to PrimeMinister Sharon that nuclear war-fighting must always be avoided. The Project Daniel Group recommends that Israel take whatever actions are necessary to prevent enemy nuclearization, up to and including certain acts of preemption. Should these measures fail (measures that are permissible under international law as expressions of “anticipatory selfdefense”), the State of Israel should immediately end its posture of nuclear ambiguity with open declarations of counter-value targeting. In fact, Prime Minister Olmert’s commentary on Israel’s nuclear capacity indicates that such declarations may not be far off.




Disclosure Good – Miscalc

Ambiguity causes miscalc – Iranian nuclear capability. Sex modified.Dan Williams, staff, Reuters, Israel Seen Lifting Nuclear Veil in Iran Stand-Off", Sept. 25, 2006

Reuven Pedatzur, defence analyst for the respected Israeli daily Haaretz, proposed that the country, under U.S. guidance, go public with its nuclear capability in the hope of building back-channel ties with Iran and establishing mutual deterrence. "Israel cannot continue to rely on it (ambiguity policy) if Iran has nuclear weapons. This is because ambiguity leaves too many grey areas. The enemy cannot know with certainty what the red lines are and when [s]he is risking an Israeli nuclear response," he wrote. "There must be a deterrent policy that will leave no room for misunderstandings," he added. "Thus, for example, we would make it clear that the identification of any missile launched from Iran in a westerly direction means, as far as we are concerned, the launch of an Iranian nuclear missile at us."




Disclosure Good – Communication

Disclosure good -- communicationLouis Rene Beres, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University, 2003

The Bomb in the Basementhttp://www.acpr.org.il/English-Nativ/issue1/beres-1.htm

With the bomb kept silently in the basement, Israel’s imperative communications could be compromised perilously. Unable to know for certain whether Israel’s retaliatory/ counterretaliatory abilities were aptly formidable, enemy-states could conclude, rightly or wrongly, that a first-strike attack or post-preemption reprisal would be cost-effective. Of course, it is conceivable that continued ambiguity would be adequate for Israeli deterrence, but – then again – it might not be adequate. Were it made more plainly obvious to enemy-states contemplating attack that Israel’s basement bombs meet both payload and delivery system objectives, Israel’s nuclear forces would likely better serve their overriding security functions.




Disclosure Good – A2: Everyone Knows

Even if everyone knows Israel has the bomb disclosure is key to making sure everyone knows the extent of the bombLouis Rene Beres, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University, Israel and the Bomb, 2004.

At first glance, the issue of whether Israel has nuclear weapons may appear contrived or inconsequential. After all, everyone knows that Israel possesses a nuclear deterrent. Why, then, belabor the obvious? Before answering this question, it must be understood that the purpose of Israeli nuclear disclosure would not be to reveal the obvious. Rather, it would be to heighten prospective enemy perceptions that Israel's nuclear forces are fully capable and that Israel would be willing to use these nuclear forces in reprisal for certain first-strike attacks. Although not widely recognized, there are distinct and plausible connections between an openly declared Israeli nuclear weapons capacity and prospective enemy perceptions of Israeli nuclear deterrence.




Disclosure Good – A2: Samson Option

Samson option fails – too reactionaryLouis Rene Beres, Prof, Learning From Ancient Chinese Military Thought, The Jewish Press, 6/8/2007 http://www.jewishpress.com/page.do/21779/Learning_From_Ancient_Chinese_Military_Thought:_Israel_And_Sun-Tzu's_Art_Of_War.html

Everyone, it seems, has heard something about the “Samson Option.” This is generally thought to be a last resort strategy wherein Israel’s nuclear weapons were used not for prevention of war or even for war-waging, but simply as a last spasm of vengeance against a despised enemy state that had launched massive (probably unconventional) counter-city and/or counterforce attacks against Israel. Here, faced with an “End of the Third Temple” scenario, Israel’s leaders would accept that the Jewish state could no longer survive, but that it would only “die” together with certain of its enemies. The view of the “Samson Option” from the Arab/Iranian side is clear. Israel would resort to nuclear weapons only in reprisal, and only in reprisal for overwhelmingly destructive first-strike attacks. Correspondingly, anything less than an overwhelmingly destructive first-strike would elicit a measured and proportionate Israeli military response. Moreover, by striking first, the Arab/Iranian enemy likely knows that it would have an advantage in “escalation dominance,” allowing it to control the “ladder” of escalation. These calculations would follow from the more or less informed enemy view that Israel will never embrace the “unorthodox” on the strategic level, that its actions will probably be reactions, and that these reactions will always be limited.




Disclosure Good – A2: US-Israeli Relations

Disclosure doesn’t hurt US-Israeli relationsSharmila Devi and Hugh Williamson, staff writers, Olmert under fire for nuclear gaffe, Financial Times. 12/13/2006

Much of the Israeli media characterised Mr Olmert's comments as a gaffe and few analysts believed they would damage ties with the US, which is legally prevented from giving aid to countries engaged in nuclear proliferation. Domestic criticism focused on whether the remarks would damage Israel's efforts to stop Iran going nuclear. Experts say Israel has the sixth-largest nuclear arsenal in the world.




ISRAELI NUCLEAR WEAPONS




Nuclear Weapons Good – War

Israeli nuclear weapons are good – checks war through deterrenceLouis Rene Beres, Prof Political Science at Purdue, International Security, 2004

Israeli strategist Zeev Maoz's controversial article, "The Mixed Blessing of Israel's Nuclear Policy," calls for Israel to disband its nuclear weapons program and join with Arab states in the region to create a "nuclear weapons-free zone."1 The article, however, ignores the history of Israeli-Arab relations, especially the unending Arab call for Israel's annihilation and the indisputable record of Arab and Iranian noncompliance with international legal obligations. Most ominously, this record includes Iran's recently revealed pursuit of nuclear weapons while party to the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. How little has been learned in some academic quarters. Should Israeli leaders take seriously Maoz's call to renounce nuclear weapons, they might as well agree to commit national suicide. Deprived of its nuclear deterrent, Israel would be at the mercy of governments that unambiguously profess genocide against a country half the size of Lake Michigan. Admittedly, it is difficult to imagine nuclear weapons as anything other than inherently evil implements of destruction. Yet there are circumstances wherein possession ofsuch weapons will be all that protects a state from catastrophic war. Moreover, because nuclear weapons may deter international aggression, their possession could also protect neighboring states (friends and foes alike) from war-related or even nuclear- inflicted harm. It follows that not all members of the "nuclear club" need be a menace; rather, some may provide a distinct and indispensable benefit to world peace and security. An obvious case is the State of Israel. If deprived of its nuclear forces because of misconceived hopes for regional cooperation, the Jewish state could become vulnerable to overwhelming attacks. Indeed, even if pertinent Arab states were to abide by the expectations of a nuclear weapons-free zone—a presumption unsupported by the region's history—their combined conventional, chemical, and biological capabilities could eventually overwhelm the Israeli state.

Israeli nuclear weapons prevent escalation of regional conflictsLouis Rene Beres, Prof Political Science at Purdue, International Security, 2004

Nuclear weapons are not the problem per se. In the Middle East, the problem is a far-reaching and essentially unreconstructed Arab-Iranian commitment to the destruction of the Jewish state. The Palestinian Authority, for example, has never modified its 1974 "phased plan" to replace all of Israel with a Palestinian state, nor has it ever complied with any of its codified legal obligations to Israel concerning the incitement and extradition of terrorists. Faced with this commitment, the Israeli government must already understand that the so-called peace process has never been more than a temporary strategem designed to weaken Israel to the point where it can no longer defend itself. Significantly, this strategem, whether it is called "the Oslo process" or the "road map," could soon succeed beyond the wildest dreams of Israel's enemies. Should the "peace process" be augmented by Israeli nuclear disarmament, as recommended by Maoz, and at a time when enemy states (i.e., Iran, Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia) are continuing to expand their own conventional and unconventional weapons activities, Israel's survival could be placed in doubt. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, at least one Arab state that has signed a formal peace treaty with Israel remains effectively at war with it. There can be little doubt that Egypt, should tactical opportunities arise, would quickly revert to its traditional stance and participate in joint Arab attacks against Israel. Syria, should it one day sign a comparable peace agreement with Israel, would not hesitate to abrogate that agreement if Damascus perceived an opening for attack. It is important in this regard also to note the growing cooperation between Syria and Iran, which could soon imperil Israel with formidable combinations of conventional and unconventional threats, including nuclear weapons. With nuclear weapons, Israel could deter enemy unconventional attacks and most large conventional forms of aggression. Moreover, with such weapons, it could launch nonnuclear preemptive strikes against enemy-state hard targets that threaten Israel's annihilation. Without these weapons, such strikes would likely represent the onset of a much wider war because there would be no compelling threat of Israeli counterretaliation. Israel's nuclear weapons therefore represent an impediment to their actual use and to the commencement of regional nuclear war.





Nuclear weapons are key to preventing Israeli extinctionLouis Rene Beres, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University, The Bomb in the Basement: Reconsidering a Vital Element of Israeli Nuclear Deterrence, 2003. http://www.acpr.org.il/English-Nativ/issue1/beres-1.htm

No less tragic for Israel would be a decision to accept some form of internationally imposed limitations on its nuclear arsenal. With such a decision, the question of disclosure would become moot. After all, “volitional” denuclearization consistent with expected treaty commitments would leave Israel with nothing to disclose. In consequence, Israel’s deterrence requirements would all have to be met with conventional threats and/or US “extended deterrence”. This would not be possible. Israel requires both conventional and nuclear weapons, complementary forces and doctrines to preserve the Third Temple Commonwealth into the next millennium. Significantly, the “Peace Process” has endangered both interrelated requirements. Already, this Process, spawning shrinking strategic depth, has severely curtailed the capacities of Israel’s conventional arms. For the very immediate future, it also threatens the capacities of Israel’s nuclear weapons, a situation that would not only leave the bomb in the basement, but also bury it there. One last word about essential Israeli nuclear deterrence of enemy unconventional attack, a need that could be served more or less effectively by some apt measure of disclosure. Normally, strategic planners, examining the requirements of nuclear deterrence, distinguish carefully between conventional and unconventional attacks. For Israel today, however, such a sharp distinction could be misleading and dangerous. Why? From now on, it is unlikely that enemy-states would launch large conventional attacks against Israel unless these states had backup unconventional (possibly but not necessarily nuclear) forces. This means that the capacities of Israeli nuclear deterrence will now always have to be assessed vis-à-vis enemy-state unconventional weapons. Hence, the question of disclosure will now always have to be asked ultimately in reference to nuclear deterrence of unconventional weapons. It is conceivable, especially after Israel’s unforgivable surrender of territories, that some combination of enemy-states, still effectively nonnuclear, could conclude that a combined conventional attack against Israel would be gainful. To prevent such a conclusion, thereby maintaining successful nuclear deterrence, Jerusalem would need to convince these enemy-states that their prospective combined conventional assault could elicit a fully nuclear reprisal. This task could be made easier by appropriate communications to enemy-states concerning disclosure, including purposeful communications of Israel’s awareness that the conventional/unconventional threshold might still be breached first by the “conventional” enemy-state attackers. Although it is likely that this task could also be made easier because of Israel’s already-truncated strategic depth, the net effect of such truncation for Israel would surely be negative. Halting the “Peace Process”, if this is indeed still possible, is a clear and overriding strategic imperative.





Nuclear detterence solves bestLouis Rene Beres, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University, Israel and the Bomb, International Security 29.1 2004.

Nuclear weapons are not the problem per se. In the Middle East, the problem is a far-reaching and essentially unreconstructed Arab-Iranian commitment to the destruction of the Jewish state. The Palestinian Authority, for example, has never modified its 1974 "phased plan" to replace all of Israel with a Palestinian state, nor has it ever complied with any of its codified legal obligations to Israel concerning the incitement and extradition of terrorists. Faced with this commitment, the Israeli government must already understand that the so-called peace process has never been more than a temporary strategy designed to weaken Israel to the point where it can no longer defend itself. Significantly, this strategy, whether it is called "the Oslo process" or the "road map," could soon succeed beyond the wildest dreams of Israel's enemies. Should the "peace process" be augmented by Israeli nuclear disarmament, as recommended by Maoz, and at a time when enemy states (i.e., Iran, Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia) are continuing to expand their own conventional and unconventional weapons activities, Israel's survival could be placed in doubt. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, at least one Arab state that has signed a formal peace treaty with Israel remains effectively at war with it. There can be little doubt that Egypt, should tactical opportunities arise, would quickly revert to its traditional stance and participate in joint Arab attacks against Israel. Syria, should it one day sign a comparable peace agreement with Israel, would not hesitate to abrogate that agreement if Damascus perceived an opening for attack. It is important in this regard also to note the growing cooperation between Syria and Iran, which could soon imperil Israel with formidable combinations of conventional and unconventional threats, including nuclear weapons. With nuclear weapons, Israel could deter enemy unconventional attacks and most large conventional forms of aggression. Moreover, with such weapons, it could launch nonnuclear preemptive strikes against enemy-state hard targets that threaten Israel's annihilation. Without these weapons, such strikes would likely represent the onset of a much wider war because there would be no compelling threat of Israeli counterretaliation. Israel's nuclear weapons therefore represent an impediment to their actual use and to the commencement of regional nuclear war.

Nuclear weapons key to prevent CBW attacksLouis Rene Beres, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University, Israel and the Bomb, International Security 29.1 2004.

Admittedly, it is difficult to imagine nuclear weapons as anything other than inherently evil implements of destruction. Yet there are circumstances wherein possession of such weapons will be all that protects a state from catastrophic war. Moreover, because nuclear weapons may deter international aggression, their possession could also protect neighboring states (friends and foes alike) from war-related or even nuclear- inflicted harm. It follows that not all members of the "nuclear club" need be a menace; rather, some may provide a distinct and indispensable benefit to world peace and security. An obvious case is the State of Israel. If deprived of its nuclear forces because of misconceived hopes for regional cooperation, the Jewish state could become vulnerable to overwhelming attacks. Indeed, even if pertinent Arab states were to abide by the expectations of a nuclear weapons-free zone—a presumption unsupported by the region's history—their combined conventional, chemical, and biological capabilities could eventually overwhelm the Israeli state.




Nuclear Weapons Good – A2: WMD Checks

WMD won’t checkLouis Rene Beres, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University, Israel and the Bomb, International Security 29.1 2004.

Although Israeli existential vulnerability might be prevented in principle by instituting parallel forms of conventional/chemical/biological weapons disarmament among enemy Arab states and Iran, such parallel steps would never occur. As history [End Page 175] verification of compliance in these matters is exceedingly difficult and would be especially problematic where several enemy states were involved.




Nuclear Weapons Good – A2: Israeli First Strikes

Israel won’t use nuclear weapons offensivelyLouis Rene Beres, What If It Should Really Happy, Jewish Press, March 4, 2006

Israel’s nuclear forces have never even been formally acknowledged. Hence, they certainly have never been used in a threatening fashion by Israel’s civilian or military leaders. Israel’s nuclear weapons, unacknowledged and unthreatening, exist only to prevent certain forms of aggression. This includes the prevention of genocide. It is absolutely inconceivable that Israel’s nuclear deterrent force would ever be used except in defensive reprisal for certain massive enemy first-strikes, especially for Arab and/or Iranian attacks involving nuclear and/or certain biological weapons. For the time being, at least, Israel’s enemies are not nuclear, but – as we have just noted with Iran – this could change dramatically in the foreseeable future. If it should change, Israel’s nuclear weapons could continue to reduce the risks of unconventional war, but only as long as the pertinent enemy states would (1) remain rational; and (2) remain convinced that Israel would retaliate massively if attacked with nuclear and/or certain biological weapons of mass destruction.




Nuclear Weapons Bad – Instability

Israeli nuclear weapons Zeev Maoz, Professor of Political Science at Tel Aviv University, International Security, "The Mixed Blessing of Israel's Nuclear Policy", 2003

On closer inspection, however, these conclusions require fundamental revision. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I argue that the balance sheet of Israel's nuclear policy is decidedly negative: Not only did the policy fail to deter Arab attacks in 1973 and 1991, but it has been unrelated or only marginally [End Page 44] related to Arab decisions to make peace with the Jewish state. Moreover, the policy has had two major adverse side effects, the magnitude of which is only now becoming clear in light of developments in the Middle East in the last decade. First, the policy has been instrumental in fueling a nonconventional arms race in the region. Second, it has had negative implications for Israel's democracy and political control of national security affairs. Given these findings, I argue that Israel should refocus its nuclear policy to explore ways to leverage its nuclear capability to bring about regional agreement on a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East.




Nuclear Weapons Bad – A2: Deterrence

Conventional deterrence solves just as wellZeev Maoz, Professor of Political Science at Tel Aviv University, International Security, "The Mixed Blessing of Israel's Nuclear Policy", 2003

In sum, it is more likely that Israeli conventional deterrence—or what some observers have called Israel's "cumulative deterrence"—was instrumental in changing Arab attitudes toward reaching a peaceful settlement. Contributing, perhaps decisively, to this shift were the following factors: repeated Arab military defeats in major wars; the cumulative impact of human, material, and territorial losses inflicted by these wars and short-of-war confrontations; and the growing image of Israeli resolve and superior conventional capabilities. 89 Moreover, the willingness of the Israeli leadership to pay a territorial price for peace, much more so than the Arab willingness to negotiate, may have been adecisive factor in contributing to the 1973 postwar peace process. Israel's nuclear policy was, at best, marginally relevant in this respect.

Any US-imposed settlement will break downJonathan Freedland, Guardian Columnist, March 24, 2008, For two-state solution, Israel must make peace with Syria, Khaleej Times

HERE'S a truism of Middle East diplomacy. Everyone knows the outline of the eventual settlement: there will be two states, one Israeli, one Palestinian, alongside each other, their borders roughly in line with the parameters set out by Bill Clinton in late 2000. Everyone knows that. Yet somehow the two sides cannot seem to reach this apparently obvious destination. Even back in 2000, when the Israeli cabinet was packed with doves and the peace process was led by a US president engaged in every last detail, the deal remained elusive. Since then, it has fallen ever further out of reach. The conventional explanation blames the leaders, weak on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides and fatally disengaged in Washington. The result is that the peoples themselves, even if they yearn for peace, have grown cynical about the two-state solution that would make that peace possible. "More than three-quarters believe it's not feasible," veteran Palestinian pollster Khalil Shikaki told me from his office in Ramallah yesterday. Palestinians doubt Israel's intentions: instead of giving up land, Israel continues to settle on it. Witness Monday's announcement of another 750 housing units in the Giv'at Ze'ev neighbourhood, on the wrong side of the Green Line that marks the 1967 border. What's more, the two-state solution now carries some unattractive baggage: its lead advocates are the Bush administration, seeking a legacy; the Israeli government, seeking relief from the demographic prospect of ruling over a population in which Jews and Arabs have numerical parity; and an unpopular Palestinian elite represented by President Mahmoud Abbas. If those are the cheerleaders, it's hardly surprising that few Palestinians are waving the banner for two states. Among Israelis, the idea fares little better. They say they have withdrawn from occupied territory twice recently — from southern Lebanon and Gaza — and their reward has been a hail of rocketfire. Besides, while the Palestinians are divided between Hamas and Fatah, there is no viable Palestinian partner who could rule a neighbouring, peaceful state. If that's the situation, what could change it? The current strategy, trumpeted at Annapolis, is to get Israel and Abbas to come to an agreement. Never mind that Abbas's writ does not run in Gaza, and so such an accord would only be hypothetical — "a shelf agreement" — it would, say its advocates, have great impact. It would restore faith in diplomacy, and Hamas would soon have to fall in line. That's how Tony Blair, part-time international envoy, sees it. He argues that Hamas should be kept out of any peace process until a deal is done. Once it has, and especially if the accord is popular, Hamas will come under pressure from its own people to sign up. Advocates add that the Israeli public would also lose its cynicism once the elected leaders of Israel and the Palestinians had shaken hands on an agreement. It sounds straightforward enough, but there's precious little sign of it. The Israeli prime minister is hardly stretching every sinew to get such a deal. Instead, as the Giv'at Ze'ev decision shows, he's bowing to pressure from hardline elements in his own coalition. Nor, says one Israeli government insider, are rocket attacks and terrorist murders in Jerusalem the ideal "atmospherics" for negotiations. And yet there is all too little countervailing pressure in the pro-peace direction from the one player that could make a difference: Washington. Haaretz editor David Landau despairs at the lack of urgency in the talks, contrasting it with the "frenetic" pace back when Clinton was in charge. Even if there were an agreement, it might not help. If an accord ended up gathering dust, it would discredit the two-state idea even further, confirming its status as inherently impractical.




ISREAL IS NOT APARTHIED




A2: Israeli Apartheid

Parallels between Israeli actions and South African apartheid are incorrect and depoliticizing – it discredits Palestinian initiatives and distract from anti-racist goalsBenjamin Pogrund, Born in South Africa, Leader against apartheid, published on Israel-Palestine Dispute, Apartheid?, 2005. http://www.mideastweb.org/israel_apartheid.htm

Apartheid is dead in South Africa but the word is alive in the world, especially as an epithet of abuse for Israel. Israel is accused by some of being “the new apartheid” state. If true, it would be a grave charge, justifying international condemnation and sanctions. But it isn’t true. Anyone who knows what apartheid was, and who knows Israel today, is aware of that. Use of the apartheid label is at best ignorant and naïve and at worst cynical and manipulative. Either way, its inappropriate use cheapens the meaning of the apartheid that South Africans suffered for so long. Just as overuse of “Nazi” has robbed that once-dreaded word of much of its meaning, as happened during the Gaza Strip evacuation in August 2005: the Jewish settlers who yelled “Nazis” at the Jewish soldiers who were evicting them, betrayed and diminished the Holocaust which had murderously swept over Europe’s Jews 50 years earlier. The word "apartheid" was coined in the 1920s for Calvinist religious purposes but became widely known through the general election in 1948 as the expression of Afrikaner nationalist political, social and economic policy. It can be defined as racial separation and discrimination, institutionalised by law in every aspect of everyday life, imposed by the white minority and derived from belief in white racial superiority. The description of Israel as an “emerging apartheid state” began to roll perhaps around 2000 and gained wider currency during the regional conferences leading up to the UN Anti-racism conference in Durban in August/September 2001. The anti-racism conference of NGOs adopted resolutions condemning Israel as an “apartheid state” and called for an international policy of total isolation “as in the case of South Africa which means the imposition of mandatory and comprehensive sanctions and embargoes (and) the full cessation of all links…”. There were also repeated references to “genocide” in descriptions of Israel’s behaviour towards Palestinians, plus denunciations of Zionism, Israel’s founding philosophy, as “racism” in a transparent attempt to reinstate the now rescinded 1975 UN resolution condemning Zionism as a crime against humanity akin to apartheid. The sponsors of these statements and their supporters were so wild and off the mark in their language and actions that they discredited themselves. In addition, that is, to creating near-total distraction from the anti-racism cause which was the purpose of their being there. The conference of governments that immediately followed the NGO meeting rejected virtually every one of the attacks on Israel. Later, South Africa’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Aziz Pahad, spoke of the “disgraceful events” surrounding the NGO conference and said: “I wish to make it unequivocally clear that the South African government recognises that part of that component was hijacked and used by some with an anti-Israel agenda to turn it into an anti-Semitic event.” So how does Israel stand in regard to the apartheid and racist claims? First, Israel inside the Green Line (the de facto border after the 1967 war) Arabs are a substantial minority, about 20 per cent of the population. In theory they have full citizenship rights. In practice they suffer extensive discrimination, ranging from denial of land use, diminished job opportunities and lesser social benefits, to reports of a family ordered off a beach and children evicted from a park. Only some 5,05 per cent of the 55 500 civil servants are Arabs. Arab villages are often under-funded and suffer from poor services and roads. Schools receive smaller amounts of government revenue, so their facilities are poorer. None of this is acceptable and especially in a state that presents itself as the only democracy in the Middle East. But is it comparable with pre-1994 South Africa? Under apartheid, remember, no detail of life was immune to discrimination by law. Skin colour determined every single person’s life, literally from birth until death: where you were born, where you went to school, what job you had, which bus you used, what park bench you sat on and in which cemetery you were buried. In Israel, discrimination occurs despite equality in law; it is extensive, it is buttressed by custom, but it is not remotely comparable with the South African panoply of discrimination enforced by parliamentary legislation. The difference is fundamental. The Israeli situation can perhaps be better likened to the United States: blacks enjoyed rights under the Constitution but the rights were not enforced for decades; it took the Supreme Court’s historic judgement in Brown vs Board of Education in 1954 to begin the process of applying the law. The difference between the current Israeli situation and apartheid South Africa is emphasised at a very human level: Jewish and Arab babies are born in the same delivery room, with the same facilities, attended by the same doctors and nurses, with the mothers recovering in adjoining beds in a ward. Two years ago I had major surgery in a Jerusalem hospital: the surgeon was Jewish, the anaesthetist was Arab, the doctors and nurses who looked after me were Jews and Arabs. Jews and Arabs share meals in restaurants and travel on the same trains, buses and taxis, and visit each other’s homes. Could any of this possibly have happened under apartheid? Of course not. A crucial, indeed fundamental, indicator of the status of Israel’s minority — and another non-comparison between apartheid South Africa and Israel — is that Arabs have the vote. Blacks did not. The vote means citizenship and power to change. Arab citizens lack full power as a minority community but they have the right and the power to unite as a group and to ally with others.





Israel is not an apartheid neither on a philosophical nor practical level – even if it were the case there is no Mandela to make peace after transitionMichael Kinsley, Washington Post Columnist, It's Not Apartheid, December 12, 2006. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/11/AR2006121101225.html

Comes now former president Jimmy Carter with a new best-selling book, "Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid." It's not clear what he means by using the loaded word "apartheid," since the book makes no attempt to explain it, but the only reasonable interpretation is that Carter is comparing Israel to the former white racist government of South Africa. That is a foolish and unfair comparison, unworthy of the man who won -- and deserved -- the Nobel Peace Prize for bringing Israel and Egypt together in the Camp David Accords, and who has lent such luster to the imaginary office of former president. I mean, what's the parallel? Apartheid had a philosophical component and a practical one, both quite bizarre. Philosophically, it was committed to the notion of racial superiority. No doubt many Israelis have racist attitudes toward Arabs, but the official philosophy of the government is quite the opposite, and sincere efforts are made to, for example, instill humanitarian and egalitarian attitudes in children. That is not true, of course, in Arab countries, where hatred of Jews is a standard part of the curriculum. The practical component of apartheid involved the creation of phony nations called "Bantustans." Black South Africans would be stripped of their citizenship and assigned to far-away Bantustans, where often they had never set foot. The goal was a racially pure white South Africa, though the contradiction with the need for black labor was never resolved. Here might be a parallel with Israel, which needs the labor of the Arabs it is trying to keep out. But in other ways, the implied comparison is backward. To start with, no one has yet thought to accuse Israel of creating a phony country in finally acquiescing to the creation of a Palestinian state. Palestine is no Bantustan. Or if it is, it is the creation of Arabs, not Jews. Furthermore, Israel has always had Arab citizens. They are a bit on display, like black conservatives at a Republican convention. No doubt they suffer discrimination. Nevertheless, they are citizens with the right to vote and so on. There used to be Jews living in Arab nations, but they also fled, in 1948 and subsequent years -- in numbers roughly equivalent to the Arabs who fled Israel. Now there are virtually no Jews in Arab countries -- even in a moderate Arab country such as Jordan. How many Jews do you think there will be in the new state of Palestine when its flag flies over a sovereign nation? And the most tragic difference: Apartheid ended peacefully. This is largely thanks to Nelson Mandela, who turned out to be miraculously forgiving. If Israel is white South Africa and the Palestinians are supposed to be the blacks, where is their Mandela?





Israel is not an apartheid state – full rights for Arab inhabitants proven by Arab parliamentDr. Mitchell Bard, Directs the world’s most comprehensive encyclopedia of Jewish history and culture, Stand With Us, Truth, Lies & Stereotypes, No date. http://www.standwithus.com/pdfs/flyers/english/MythFact.pdf

FACT Apartheid was an official policy, enacted in law and brutally enforced through police violence, of political, legal and economic discrimination against blacks. Apartheid is a political system based upon minority control over a majority population. Israel, a majority-rule democracy like the U.S., gives equal rights and protections to all of its citizens. It grants full rights and protections to all Arab inhabitants inside of Israel, a reality best exemplified by Israel’s Arab members of parliament (see: Facts about Arabs Living in Israel, pg. 5). Israeli citizens struggle with prejudices amongst its many minorities, just as all multi-racial, multi-ethnic democracies do, but Israel’s laws try to eradicate – not endorse – prejudices. The Palestinian Authority, not the Israeli government, governs the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Like many Arab nations, the PA does not offer equal rights and protections to its inhabitants. Branding Israel an apartheid state is inaccurate – and emotional propaganda.

Israel is not an apartheid and creation of a Palestinian state doesn’t solve apartheid – it just changes who is in powerBicom, independent organization providing real-time briefings and high quality in-depth research, Response to the Guardian's G2 supplement, February 7, 2006

Why Chris McGreal’s 10,000 word diatribe against Israel in the Guardian’s G2 supplement is fundamentally wrong: * Did black South Africans have the right to full citizenship in apartheid South Africa? No * Are Israeli Arabs citizens with full rights? Yes * Did black South Africans have full political rights in apartheid South Africa? No * Do Arab citizens of Israel have full political rights, including voting rights and representation in the government? Arab citizens of Israel are full citizens with voting rights and representation in the government. There are currently 11 Israeli Arab and Druze MKs. * Did black South Africans have the right to pursue any type of education or employment they desired in apartheid South Africa? No * Do Arab citizens of Israel have the right to pursue any type of education of employment they choose in Israel? Yes * Did apartheid South Africa have segregated public transport? Yes * Does Israel have segregated public transport? No * Was there severe censorship of the press in apartheid South Africa? Yes * Is there complete freedom of speech and freedom of press in Israel? Yes * Who were the majority in apartheid South Africa? The black community * Who are the majority in Israel? The Jews This extensive piece of work published in the Guardian offends not only British Jews but all friends of democracy as well as friends of Israel. Direct comparisons to apartheid South Africa and insinuations about collusion between Jews and Nazis are simply abhorrent. The content and associated imagery are inflammatory and one-sided. They are conveyed with a degree of emotion and hatred that should have immediately alerted the Guardian’s editors to question the writer’s professional integrity. There is a difference between criticising what Israel does and what Israel is. This article puts Israel’s right to exist in question and therefore crosses a very dangerous red line. When talking about apartheid and the Middle East, here is the question: How many Jews would be allowed to live in a Palestinian state? The answer is none.





Israel isn’t an apartheid – Arab minority are full citizens Mitchell Bard, Directs the world’s most comprehensive encyclopedia of Jewish history and culture, Myth and Fact: Apartheid?, Retrieved on 8 November 2006. http://www.jewishsantabarbara.org/page.html?ArticleID=92349

Even before the State of Israel was established, Jewish leaders consciously sought to avoid the situation that prevailed in South Africa. As David Ben-Gurion told Palestinian nationalist Musa Alami in 1934: We do not want to create a situation like that which exists in South Africa, where the whites are the owners and rulers, and the blacks are the workers. If we do not do all kinds of work, easy and hard, skilled and unskilled, if we become merely landlords, then this will not be our homeland. (Shabtai Teveth, Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs: From Peace to War, London: Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 140; Haaretz, September 23, 2003) Today, within Israel, Jews are a majority, but the Arab minority are full citizens who enjoy equal rights and are represented in all the branches of government. Arabs are represented in the Knesset, and have served in the Cabinet, high-level foreign ministry posts (e.g., Ambassador to Finland ) and on the Supreme Court. Under apartheid, black South Africans could not vote and were not citizens of the country in which they formed the overwhelming majority of the population. Laws dictated where they could live, work and travel. And, in South Africa, the government killed blacks who protested against its policies. By contrast, Israel allows freedom of movement, assembly and speech. Some of the government’s harshest critics are Israeli Arabs who are members of the Knesset.

Palestinians are not equivalent to the blacks of South Africa – they want Israeli destructionMitchell Bard, Directs the world’s most comprehensive encyclopedia of Jewish history and culture, Myth and Fact: Apartheid?, Retrieved on 8 November 2006. http://www.jewishsantabarbara.org/page.html?ArticleID=92349

The situation of Palestinians in the territories is different. The security requirements of the nation, and a violent insurrection in the territories, forced Israel to impose restrictions on Arab residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip that are not necessary inside Israel’s pre-1967 borders. The Palestinians in the territories, typically, dispute Israel’s right to exist whereas blacks did not seek the destruction of South Africa, only the apartheid regime. If Israel were to give Palestinians full citizenship, it would mean the territories had been annexed. No Israeli government has been prepared to take that step. Instead, through negotiations, Israel agreed to give the Palestinians increasing authority over their own affairs. It is likely that a final settlement will allow most Palestinians to become citizens of their own state. The principal impediment to Palestinian independence is not Israeli policy, it is the unwillingness of the Palestinian leadership to give up terrorism and agree to live in peace beside Israel.




A2: Israeli Apartheid (West Bank Occupation)

West bank occupation is not apartheid – competition not race is the factor determining such actionBenjamin Pogrund, Born in South Africa, Leader against apartheid, published on Israel-Palestine Dispute, Apartheid?, 2005. http://www.mideastweb.org/israel_apartheid.htm

Second, the West Bank It is occupied by Israel. No occupation can be benign. Israeli harshness and misdeeds are reported day in and day out by Israeli media. Everyone is suffering, Palestinians as victims and Israelis as perpetrators. Death and maiming haunts everyone in the occupied territories and in Israel itself. Occupation is brutalising and corrupting both Palestinians and Israelis. The damage done to the fabric of both societies, moral and material, is incalculable. But it is not apartheid. Palestinians are not oppressed on racial grounds as Arabs, but, rather, as competitors — until now, at the losing end — in a national/religious conflict for land. The word “Bantustan” is often used to describe Israel’s policy about a future Palestinian state. It might look like that, superficially. But the root causes — and even more, the intentions — are different. White South Africans invented the Bantustans to pen blacks into defined areas that served as reservoirs of labour; blacks were allowed to leave only when needed to work in white South Africa’s factories, farms, offices and homes. The Israeli aim is the exact opposite: it is to keep Palestinians out, having as little to do with them as possible, and letting in as few as possible to work. Instead, workers from other countries are imported to do the jobs that Israelis will not do. If Israel were to annex the West Bank and control voteless Palestinians as a source of cheap labour — or for religious messianic reasons or strategic reasons — that could indeed be analogous to apartheid. But it is not the intention except in the eyes of a minority — settlers and extremists who speak of “transfer” to clear Palestinians out of the West Bank, or who desire a disenfranchised Palestinian population. The majority of Israelis — 60 to 70 per cent, opinion polls consistently show — want to get out of the West Bank, with divergences of opinion only on where the final borders with a Palestinian state should be drawn.




A2: Israeli Apartheid (Wall)

The Wall is not apartheid – such use is only lazy academic work which will be used to destroy Israel Benjamin Pogrund, Born in South Africa, Leader against apartheid, published on Israel-Palestine Dispute, Apartheid?, 2005. http://www.mideastweb.org/israel_apartheid.htm

The barrier/wall/fence, as it now is, is a repugnant aspect of Israeli policy, and all the more so because it is also meant to protect scores of Jewish settlements on the West Bank. But it is not apartheid. Calling it the “Apartheid Wall” is a debasement of the word for the sake of slick propaganda. “Apartheid” is used in this case and elsewhere because it comes easily to hand: it is a lazy label for the complexities of the Middle East conflict. It is also used because, if it can be made to stick, then Israel can be made to appear to be as vile as was apartheid South Africa and seeking its destruction can be presented to the world as an equally moral cause.




A2: Israeli Genocide

Israel targets terrorists specifically not Palestinians broadlyDr. Mitchell Bard, Directs the world’s most comprehensive encyclopedia of Jewish history and culture, Stand With Us, Truth, Lies & Stereotypes, No date. http://www.standwithus.com/pdfs/flyers/english/MythFact.pdf

MYTH Israel uses overwhelming military power against the Palestinians. FACT Israel does have one of the most powerful militaries in the world, but it has not used that great power against Palestinians. Instead, it selectively targets terrorists, practicing far more restraint than America has in Afghanistan or Iraq. Moreover, the Palestinians are not helpless victims. The Palestinian Authority receives millions of dollars – and arms – from Arab and Muslim supporters in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. See page 13.




ISRAEL IS APARTHIED




A2: One State – Apartheid

The exclusion of Palestinians made discrimination against them unnecessary. A one-state solution forces Israel to instigate an apartheid to prevent Palestinians from gaining political powerRaef Zreik is a Ph.D. candidate at Harvard Law School, practiced law in Israel. “Palestine, Apartheid and the Rights Discourse,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Autumn 2004.

In thewar of 1948, some 750,000 Palestinians were driven out of or ?ed from their homes in what was to become Israel. Without this radical demographic upheaval, Israelwould not have had a Jewishmajority. It hardlymatterswhether this deportation was planned or merely “improvised” in the course of the war, what is beyond question is that it was implicit in the Zionist project from the very outset. It could be argued that there was no need for specific “plans” to deport the Palestinians because their deportation was “written” into the program of the Jewish state, albeit between the lines. It was the subtext of the text itself. The physical expulsion, or disappearance, of the Palestinians in 1948— Chaim Weizmann’s “miraculous clearing of the land”—made their expulsion from the legal text unnecessary. Populations that are expelled and therefore absent do not need to be discriminated against; discrimination is a sign of presence. Israel thus spared itself the necessity of imposing a classical apartheid regime within its borders through the mechanism of expulsion, through which it secured a Jewish majority inside the state. Once the Palestinians were only a minority, they could be allowed the vote and some minimal political and civil rights. Israeli democracy—limited as it is—was made possible on the back of the demographic change. In South Africa, there was no comparable demographic upheaval—there, the transfers and “removals, ” however massive, had been internal, and the uprooted population remained inside the borders. As a result, apartheid became inevitable (given the ideology of the country’s rulers) as ameans of keeping the “undesired” communities separate even as they remained within the country. Apartheid in practice, then, was not a one-shot deal but a continuing “event” in the here and now, which is what made it visible. The 1948 expulsion, by contrast, was an intensi?ed moment of violence, the historical facts of which have since been obscured by a forest of opposing claims, aided by the passage of time and the rooting of newrealities. Yet it is the concentrated violence of 1948 which, by securing a Jewish majority, allows the machinery of the legal system to work “smoothly” and “noiselessly, ” the relatively tranquil surface masking the harsh underlying reality.




A2: One State – Palestinian Rights

A One-State solution destroys the context necessary for Palestinian people to obtain redress by obliterating historyRaef Zreik is a Ph.D. candidate at Harvard Law School, practiced law in Israel. “Palestine, Apartheid and the Rights Discourse,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Autumn 2004.

One of the shortcomings of the rights discourse in general is that, being based on law, by de?nition it seeks to remedy a status quo, a situation as it now stands. Law being universal, it is applied to all situations as if they were equal; it operates on a situation as if it were an abstract entity rather than the product of agiven historywith a given context. Indeed, the rights discourse, deriving from the universality of law, almost inevitably dehistoricizes and decontextualizes the subject, cutting it off from its particularity. Thus, while there are indisputable gains in wielding the rights discourse, there are losses as well—the greatest being the loss of context. The Palestinian case, for example, when seen from a historical perspective, looks clear and simple: the story of one people taking the land of another people. But seen from a static point of view (the point of view of most legal theorists), it looks shattered and fragmented. This being the case, to compare the Palestinian situation to that of other racial or ethnic groups in the world—specifically to that of the South African blacks under apartheid—is misleading, because the core of the Palestinian problem lies not in the specific demands of the three categories—the right to return by the refugees in exile, for self-determination and an independent state by the Palestinians in the occupied territories, or for equal rights by the Palestinians in Israel—but in the concept of loss. One might even argue that giving primacy to the rights discourse in the Palestinian quest for justice could represent some dangers, because a rights discourse entails the renunciation of the frame, the historical context. Focusing on legal redress implies renunciation of the historical context and therefore renunciation of the right to address in some fashion the wider losses. Seen from this perspective, the very demands of the three groups represent in each case a historical compromise from the very outset. I am by no means suggesting that use of the rights discourse be discarded in the Palestinian struggle; as the main language currency used by people all over the world, it remains very empowering despite its limitations. But it must be used in a way that reintroduces the totality of the Palestinian experience that was fragmented in 1948. (Yet the very reintroduction of this totality puts it in tension with the generally dehistoricizing rights approach.) My principal argument is that the Palestinians have lost not only their rights and their land, but also the context that enables them to demand these rights in a way that makes sense. Context is the background condition that allows us to speak and imbues our words with meaning, and the reclaiming of context is the reclaiming of language. In this regard, the first and basic right for the Palestinians in seeking a measure of justice is the right to context, the right to seek redress within the framework of their loss. Much effort, I believe, needs to be directed toward reclaiming this right.




A2: One State – Realism

Realism must be the approach taken in relation to the one state solution – any other position ignores the tangible realities in the areaNoam Chomsky, Prof @ MIT, Advocacy and Realism, ZNet, 8/26/2004

Since the late ‘90s, a "one-state settlement" has become a welcome topic of discussion in elite circles, so much so that the New York Times Magazine and the New York Review of Books have run major articles proposing this approach – I won’t say “advocating” it, for reasons to which I will return. Same in similar circles elsewhere. It is worth bearing in mind that when the solution was realistic and would have saved a lot of blood and agony, it was utter anathema. Why the change? The only explanation I have seen is what appears in the interview with Shalom-Podur, which I won’t repeat. But let us put that aside, and turn to the current situation. Right now, there are several possible stands that might be taken by those concerned with the people of the region, justice for Palestinians in particular. Evidently, such stands are of only academic interest unless they are accompanied by programs of action that take into account the real world. If not, they are not advocacy in any serious sense of the term. Perhaps another word of clarification is in order. Attention to feasible programs of action is sometimes dismissed as “realism” or “pragmatism,” and is placed in opposition to “acting on principle.” That is a serious delusion. There is nothing “principled” about refusal to pay attention to the real world and the options that exist within it – including, of course, the option of making changes, if a feasible course of action can be developed, as was clearly and explicitly the case with regard to Vietnam, discussed in the comments that Cohen brings up and completely misunderstands. Those who ignore or deride such “realism” and “pragmatism,” however well-intentioned they may be, are simply choosing to ignore the consequences of their actions. The delusion is not only a serious intellectual error, but also a harmful one, with severe human consequences. That should be clear without further elaboration. One stand is support for a two-state settlement in terms of the overwhelming and long-standing and very broad international consensus (including the Palestinian Authority), barred by the US and Israel though supported by the majority of the US population and acceptable to majorities, possibly large majorities, within Israel (depending on how questions are asked in polls). There are various concrete forms. One version is the Geneva Accords, which, as noted in the interview, “gives a detailed program for a 1-1 land swap and other aspects of a settlement, and is about as good as is likely to be achieved.” The terms and maps are readily available. Since Cohen does not address these matters, apart from citation of an irrelevant source, and does not suggest anything that is more “likely to be achieved,” there is no need to go beyond the interview. These proposals constitute a basis for negotiations that is vastly improved over the Clinton-Barak Camp David proposals as well as the (much less unacceptable) Taba proposals that followed. For the first time, they open the doors to a 1-1 land swap that could be meaningful, and they break from the cantonization programs of earlier proposals. They still have objectionable features, but the operative question is whether they can be taken as a serious basis for negotiations, and whether there is an alternative that is likely to offer more to the Palestinians than proceeding on this basis. If there is such an alternative, let’s by all means hear it. Those who do not want to undertake that responsibility are choosing, in effect, to take part in an academic seminar among disengaged intellectuals on Mars.

Realism outweighs their “ethics” claims – serious changes from step-by-step action will only benefit violent Hawks – this turns caseNoam Chomsky, Prof @ MIT, Advocacy and Realism, ZNet, 8/26/2004

I have been assuming so far that the discussion is among people who care about the people involved and their fate, in particular the Palestinians, the most miserable victims. There is, of course, another possibility. We might shift to the academic seminar among disengaged intellectuals on Mars. We can then join them in deriding “realism” and feasibility – that is, attention to the real world and consideration of the consequences of our actions for the victims. And we can engage in abstract discussion of what might be “right” and “just” in some non-existent universe. But if partipicants in these exercises decide to come down to earth, and to have some concern and compassion for the victims, they have the duty of explaining to us how we proceed from here to there. If they have a suggestion, let’s hear it so we can evaluate it, and if it is reasonable, act on it. Those who are convinced by the proposals if they are ever presented should by all means pursue them, but for the moment the matters is entirely academic, since there are no meaningful proposals for action other than the step-by-step ones already outlined; at least none that I have ever seen. For the reasons I explained, I think that those who take these stands without reaching the level of serious advocacy are serving the cause of the extreme hawks in Israel and the US, and bringing even more harm to suffering Palestinians. Since the comments have not been addressed, I have to leave it at that.




A2: One State – Successionism DA Link

Some sort of succession prevention t/off linkNoam Chomsky, Prof @ MIT, Advocacy and Realism, ZNet, 8/26/2004

The same is true generally, including the other examples mentioned here. The Cherokees have the right of return to the lands from which they were driven, and “should certainly not be willing to renounce” that right. The 10-15 million Kurds of Turkey have the right to self-government in a much broader Kurdistan, and “should certainly not be willing to renounce” that right. Suppose that someone were to dangle in front of the eyes of Cherokees or Turkish Kurds the hope that those rights will be realized if only they reject any arrangements that to some extent mitigate their grim circumstances. Such a person might believe him/herself to be a “defender of the Cherokees” or of the Kurds, and to be acting “on principle,” but would be seriously misled.




NO TWO STATE SOLUTION




No risk of two-state solution

( ) No risk of two-state solutionAluf Benn, Staff writer for Haaretz, 9-25-2009, “what obama needs to do for Mideast peace,” http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1116923.html

Obama has not succeeded in enlisting even one supporter in Israel's public arena or political establishment, who will stand up to Netanyahu and call upon him to accept the president's initiative and gallop toward a "two-state solution." The Israelis don't think establishment of a state headed by Abbas will improve their situation in any way. The hard-core ideological left is fighting the Israel Defense Forces in the name of pacifism, and striving for a binational state in the name of equality and liberalism. The right is striving for a binational state in the name of the Greater Land of Israel, fulfillment of the Bible's promises and the security afforded by dominating the hilltops.

Advertisement The Israeli political center, which stretches from Culture and Sports Minister Limor Livnat and Education Minister Gideon Sa'ar of the Likud party, through MKs Tzipi Livni and Shaul Mofaz of Kadima to President Shimon Peres (most recently of Kadima) and Defense Minister Ehud Barak of Labor, in effect accepts the assessment of Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman that a solution to the problem is not possible, that the Arabs will never recognize a Jewish state and that Israel's only strategic option is deterrence backed by the use of force. On Wednesday at the United Nations General Assembly, Obama spoke of the "girl in Sderot who closes her eyes in fear that a rocket will take her life in the night." His concern is touching, but most Israelis believe that Operation Cast Lead reassured the children of Sderot far more than the peace process Obama proposes. The public opinion polls Netanyahu reads indicate a clear trend: Most Israelis these days are more troubled by domestic issues, like education and violence, than by Jewish settlements in the territories or even the Iranian threat. The public wants the government to improve its quality of life, not to hold more peace conferences. Abbas is perceived as recalcitrant, not as a partner to an agreement. Only one thing does bother the Israelis, according to the polls: fear of a diplomatic embargo and an international boycott. The Goldstone Report and the International Court of Justice in The Hague are arousing concern and interest, far more than Obama's peace speeches. However, as long as relations with the rest of the world are satisfactory, Israelis see no reason to emerge from indifference and listen to the president of the United States. No sense of urgency The left's long-standing argument that education and personal security will improve only if we rid ourselves of the settlements and end the occupation does not convince the Israeli public. The right's argument that things only got worse when Israel pulled out of Gaza is more widely accepted. Nor are the Palestinians thrilled by Obama. A survey published this week by the International Peace Institute, headed by Terje Larsen, the former mediator from the time of the Oslo cords, has found that 70 percent of Palestinians do not support the U.S. president, and 56 percent do not expect Obama to achieve progress in the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. And this in a public opinion poll in which most of the respondents expressed support for Abbas, not Hamas.

( ) Zero chance of two-state solutionReuters, 9-24-2009, “All-round pessimism after dud middle east summit,” http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSLO9805520090924?sp=true

Pessimism is not limited to the Palestinians. Aaron David Miller, Mideast counsel to six U.S. secretaries of state, writes in Politico that "to all but the terminally obtuse," the chances of a deal right now are about zero. Even if Obama could deliver a freeze on Israeli settlement building in the West Bank that Abbas has again demanded and Netanyahu has again refused, Miller says, the fact remains that the Palestinian national movement is divided and Israel "still doesn't know what price it's prepared to pay" for peace.




No risk of two-state solution – Netanyahu Opposition

( ) Netanyahu will never negotiate two-state solutionAsia Times, 9-25-2009, “Netanyahu and Obama: Who’s fooling who?” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KI25Ak01.html

Other analysts disagreed with that analysis, insisting that the administration, even as it has raised the stakes on the urgency of reaching a final peace accord, has not yet made clear how hard it is willing to push Netanyahu, in particular, toward serious negotiations. "It is quite clear from round one that Obama underestimated the tenacity of Netanyahu, and the administration did not seem to have thought through what they would do if they didn't get the cooperation they wanted [on settlements]," said Stephen Walt, an international relations professor at Harvard University and co-author of the "Israel Lobby". "If you can't get Bibi [Netanyahu] to agree to a temporary freeze, how does one possibly imagine getting him to agree to 1) borders that would establish a viable Palestinian state; 2) a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem; 3) some formula for the Temple Mount; 4) an agreement on refugees; and 5) the withdrawal of the settlers outside the wall?" he added.




No risk of two-state solution – Israel Opposition

( ) Elias Harfoush, Staff writer for ,2009-24-9دار الحياة , “What remains of obama’s initiative?” http://www.daralhayat.com/portalarticlendah/59497

George Mitchell is not the one responsible for this failure of course, but his president Barack Obama is. The Middle East envoy was required to achieve a historic breakthrough which all of his predecessors failed to achieve. The president himself promised this breakthrough, as he considered that focusing on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict at the outset of his tenure will provide chances for success that will not be available in light of the pressures that accompany the electoral campaigns at the end of his tenure. However, the first obstacle that faced Obama was represented by Benjamin Netanyahu's advent as a prime minister in Israel, one month after the new American president took office. With the known intransigence of the Likud leader and the right-wing group surrounding him – which provides the chances of survival for his government – it has become clear that achieving any breakthrough in the Middle East conflict will necessitate a miracle or a battle. Since the times of miracles are bygone, there should be a battle with Netanyahu in order for the new American administration to convince the Palestinians and the Arabs that it has serious intentions to reach a just solution to the conflict, one that rests on the bases ratified by the Arab peace initiative, which is based on the international legitimacy resolutions. While presenting his vision for the solution at the end of his tenure, Obama used a different language than that which the Palestinians and Arabs were used to hear from Washington. His "extended hand" to Iran did not help him in his confrontation with Israel, as Iran is concerned with its nuclear program and its president reiterates his free threats for the Hebrew State. Therefore, the leaders of the Jewish organizations in the United States felt that the strategic relationship between the US and Israel – with the latter surviving on this strong relationship – might be threatened under the new president. They hurried to convene a meeting with Obama at the White House last July, which can be described as a "historic" meeting between both sides. During that meeting, the Jewish leaders obtained two commitments from Obama: The solution to the Mideast conflict and the Iranian dossier should not pose a threat to Israel's security, according to the Israeli perspective of security. Also, any "concession" made by the Hebrew Sate towards the Palestinians should be accompanied at the same time by progress on the road of normalizing its relations with the Arab states.




No risk of two-state solution – Palestinian Opposition

( ) No risk of two state solution – Palestine won’t compromiseAri Shavit, Staff writer for Haaretz, 9-25-2009, “On Obama’s block,” http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1116658.html

Obama is right, but he has only himself to blame. To build a community you have to understand it; to this day, Obama hasn't shown that he understands the Middle East. And you need a realistic defining concept, around which to rearrange the community; to this day Obama lacks such a concept. Are Benjamin Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas irritating? For sure they are. Are they small-minded? Of course. But these two are not the cause of the problem; they are its symptoms. Advertisement If the community worker doesn't get what the problem is, he doesn't stand a chance of coping with it. Even if he chews the tough kids out again and again, or even knocks their heads together, Barack Obama is headed for failure in the Middle East. This is the problem: The Israeli-Palestinian status quo is unacceptable. The continued occupation of the West Bank denies the Palestinians of their rights, as individuals and as a people; it endangers the nature of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and it harms the interests of the West. A bid to end the occupation unilaterally is doomed to fail. The lesson of the disengagement from Gaza was that withdrawal without a political agreement only inflames Palestinian extremists, pushes peace further away and maybe even brings war closer. Such a withdrawal could lead to a Palestinian humanitarian disaster, to a strategic weakening of Israel and to undermining the very regional stability that the United States is interested in achieving. But the attempt to end the occupation through achieving peace has failed. The lesson of Oslo, Camp David and Annapolis is clear-cut: Even the most moderate Palestinian leadership is not prepared to accept Israel's most far-reaching peace proposal. In 16 years of a painstaking and exhausting peace process, the Palestinians never agreed to a single concession on a core issue. Their refusal to recognize Israel as a Jewish state, to agree to demilitarize a Palestinian state or to give up their demand for the return of refugees to Israel has blocked peace in the past, is blocking peace in the present and will continue doing so for the foreseeable future. As of now, there is no genuine Palestinian partner for the partition of the country. Obama's Palestinian problem can't be swept under a carpet of words.




PRESSURE KEY TO TWO STATE SOLUTION




Pressure Two State Solution

( ) Pressure on Israel key to two-state solutionPeter Gruskin, part of the Palestine center, 2-12-2009, “From Talk to Change: The Test for President Obama’s Israel-Palestine Policy," http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/ht/display/ContentDetails/i/4578

As a candidate, Barack Obama used some degree of political triangulation to appear balanced yet sufficiently pro-Israel in order to sustain political support from an indispensable constituency and lobby network. Yet, in his first weeks in office, he made interesting and noteworthy moves that rub against his election rhetoric. However, none of them indicate a break from the traditional U.S.-Israel alliance, and we cannot expect such nudging anytime soon while Israel sorts out its ruling government coalition--one likely to be divided by partisanship--and the dust in recent Palestinian politics settles. Ultimately, the only way to prompt change will be if the United States confronts the most untenable of Israeli positions--something former President George W. Bush's administration never did. The challenge lies in the inescapable fact that many of those positions, including Israel's control over certain settlement blocs, use of collective punishment against Palestinians, construction of the Wall and denial of responsibility for the Palestinian refugee crisis, are orthodoxy in the dominant political persuasion of Israel. For those who believe peace between Israel and the Palestinians is attainable, President Obama offers optimism. Even his symbolic acts suggest a marked departure from the Bush administration, which explicitly took the position that conditions are not optimal to negotiate with Palestinians. Still, the degree of change possible is limited by domestic political constraints as well as the abysmal state of affairs on the ground. This optimistic vision is incongruent with the sour pessimism on the ground, as Palestinians mourn the Gaza offensive and remain divided politically and Israel's anti-peace right dominates its politics and public opinion--increasingly pitting it against Obama's stated agenda. Given the rightward trajectory in Israeli politics and the growing gap between the rhetoric of Obama and the Israeli right, the best measure of change will be how much actual tension arises between the American and Israeli positions. Resolving such disputes between traditionally close "allies" in a way that corrects the power imbalance between Israel and the Palestinians will be crucial since that is the only way a just settlement can really be effected. Concretization of Palestinians' losses since 1993, when the peace process began, is simply no basis for peace. Only an insistent and tough approach towards Israel can bring about a solution along the lines Obama outlined.




PRESSURE ON ISREAL IS BAD




Pressure Bad – Relations

Any engagement that doesn’t favor Israel crushes relationsClyde R. Mark is a Congressional Research Analyst, Policy Almanac, 17 October 2002,

www.policyalmanac.org/world/archive/crs_israeli-us_relations.shtml

Israel and the United States share the view that the United States has a predominant role and responsibility in Middle East peace-making, but in the past Israel has disagreed with the U. S. view of its role as an even-handed peace broker among the parties to the Arab-Israeli dispute. Most Israelis and Israeli supporters have wanted the United States to favor only Israeli positions. The United States has provided arms to Middle Eastern countries for individual and collective defense against aggression. Past U. S. arms transfers to Arab countries have been striking examples of friction in Israeli-U. S. relations, not only because they underscore the difference in attitudes toward Arab countries, but because Israel perceived arms transfers to Arabs as threatening its security.

More evidence – Non-capitulation sends a key signal on Israel’s role as a strategic allyRobert Rabil, director of graduate studies and an assistant professor of Middle East studies at Florida Atlantic University, “The Ineffective Role of the US in the US-Israeli-Syrian Relationship.” 6-22-01.

However, this new phase of cooperation gave way to a situation which not only put a damper on US-Israeli relations, but also placed these relations out on a limb. This new condition developed when the Bush administration tried to make good on its promise to the Arab allies in the anti-Iraq coalition to convene a peace conference after the war as part of an American effort to bring about a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This situation unfolded in the form of a standoff between the Bush administration and Israel and its American Jewish supporters over the ten billion dollars in loan guarantees, requested by Israel at a time when the US was shoring up support for the peace process. The standoff underscored (a) Israel's diminished status as a strategic ally for the US in the aftermath of the Cold War, (b) the divergence of America' s and Israel' s policies on resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, (c) a renewed desire on the part of the American administration to end the Middle East conflict on as satisfactory terms to both sides as possible, and (d) a subtle American tilt in the direction of the Arab side of the conflict, including Syria.

US engagement with Palestine upsets IsraelMicah D Halpern, network analyst, “America has betrayed Israel”, Washington Jewish Week. Gaithersburg: Vol. 43, Iss. 14, pg. 15, April 5, 2007.

The entire Arab world plus every memher nation of the United Nations and all of Israel knows that the United States is Israel's strongest supporter. So just why is Israel's big brother making these pledges to the Palestinians and to the rest of the Arab world? Why? The United States is being inconsistent and when that happens, everyone suffers, everyone gets hurt. Israel gets hurt because the U.S. is publicly, diplomatically, openly showing that the two nations no longer stand shoulder to shoulder on the question of Hamas. The Palestinians get hurt because they cannot possibly decipher what the U.S. really expects from them and that plays directly into the hands of the extremists, i.e., Hamas. The Arab world gets hurt because double messages are doubly hard to read and the Arab world cannot possibly figure why the United States could care about the Palestinians when the Arab world could not care less. Even the United States gets hurt. It is now perceived as flip-floppy and wobbly by a world that admires straightforward decisions and decisive action.




Pressure Bad – Settler Rush

Pressure doesn’t solve reforms, but it does cause a settlement rush that exacerbates tensionBusiness Day, 9-25-09, “Freeze the settlement freeze”, Business Day (Nigeria).

The cycle goes something like this: American or international pressure mounts on Israel to stop settlement activities in the occupied territories. Israeli settlers and their supporters then gather even more energy to expand onto more Palestinian land, build more exclusively Jewish settlements, and destroy more Arab homes before the so-called "freeze" comes into effect. The peace process, not surprisingly, becomes a joke while this happens. Eventually, world pressure subsides and the freeze fails to materialise. In the end, more Jewish settlements appear. Indeed, the great paradox of this cycle is that more settlements are built during times of negotiations than during times of conflict. This pattern can be traced to 1967. Israelis understand that the only reality in politics is the reality on the ground. So long as Israeli soldiers control the occupied territories, the idea of a settlement freeze will not take root. In fact, the demand for a settlement freeze is nothing more than a call to arms to a wide group of Israelis and their supporters to go and build on stolen Palestinian land. When Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was preparing for his historic visit to Jerusalem, a group of settlers created the settlement of Elon Moreh near Nablus, the most populated West Bank city. When former United States Secretary of State James Baker began his shuttle diplomacy for peace, his ultimately unsuccessful efforts actually resulted in more settlements, with a new one started just hours before he was due to arrive for talks. Baker postponed his visit and later vented his frustrations to the US Senate Committee on Appropriations. He resented "being greeted" every time he came to the Middle East with yet "another settlement." Baker's efforts eventually led to the Madrid peace conference in 1991, but that, too, failed to resolve the conflict. And, while Palestinians and Israelis did reach a secret agreement a few years later that was publicly declared at a White House ceremony, construction of Jewish settlements didn't stop. In fact, since the 1993 Oslo Accords the number of Jewish settlers in the occupied territories has doubled. The creation of new settlements has often been accompanied by hostile media reporting - even within Israel - as well as international condemnation, yet the settlement train has not stopped. It continued to race ahead even during the days when Israel's government rotated between Likud's Yitzhak Shamir and Labor's Shimon Peres between 1984 and 1990. The Shamir government would be defeated at the polls, and the incoming Labour government would declare a freeze on all settlement construction, even on buildings that had already been started. But, despite the decrees, ways were found to continue building, to absorb new residents, and to increase the settler population. For the US, the settlements have proven to be an equal-opportunity obstacle, obstructing both Republican and Democratic diplomacy. The Clinton administration attempted to put brakes on then-Prime Minister Netanyahu's efforts to construct a new settlement near Bethlehem. After a short hiatus, construction resumed. The Bush-Cheney Administration, the most pro-Israeli in memory, fared no better. Today, Har Homa, built on Jabal Abu Ghnaim with the aim of cutting off Bethlehem from Jerusalem, is home to 19,000 settlers. This cycle has become so bizarre and confusing that Palestinians are not sure whether they should hope for continued tensions with Israel (which usually means no new settlements) or for continued negotiations (which usually provide cover for building settlements). On January 5, 2007, the day Prime Minister Ehud Olmert met with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to discuss a new round of talks, the Israeli Construction and Housing Ministry issued a tender for the construction of more units in Ma'ale Adumim, an exclusively Jewish settlement in the occupied West Bank. Of course, whenever the Israelis defy the world over the settlements, as is now once again happening, US and other officials "denounce" and "regret" the decision. But, at the end of the day, despite these few statements and perhaps even a UN resolution of opposition, the pattern established over the past 40 years is clear: the decision stands.



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