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International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook October 2012 Resilience in Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Will It Last? Abdul Abiad, John Bluedorn, Jaime Guajardo, and Petia Topalova with support from Angela Espiritu and Katherine Pan

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International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook October 2012

Resilience in Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Will It Last?

Abdul Abiad, John Bluedorn, Jaime Guajardo, and Petia Topalova with support from Angela Espiritu and Katherine Pan

EMDEs have done well over the past decade, and through the global crisis

1

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011

Per

cen

t

Growth of Real GDP per Capita

Emerging Market and Developing Economies

Advanced Economies

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011

Per

cen

t

Emerging Market and Developing Economies

Advanced Economies

World Growth

Contribution to Growth in World Real GDP per Capita

Source: World Economic Outlook database.

EMDE resilience has improved since the 1970s and 1980s.

2 80

90

100

110

120

130

140

Peak t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6 t + 7 t + 8 t + 9 t + 10

Emerging Market and Developing Economies

80

90

100

110

120

130

140

Peak t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6 t + 7 t + 8 t + 9 t + 10

Advanced Economies

Dynamics of Output per Capita Following Peaks

50s and 60s 70s and 80s 1990s Great Recession 2000–06

Years Years

In fact, from the 2000s, EMDEs spent more time in expansion—and had smaller downturns—than AEs

3

0

20

40

60

80

100

Advanced Economies Emerging Market and Developing Economies

Per

cen

t

Time Spent in Expansion

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

Advanced Economies Emerging Market and Developing Economies

Per

cen

t

Median Downturn (Peak-to-Trough Amplitude)

50s and 60s 70s and 80s 1990s 2000s

Source: IMF staff calculations.

While AE growth in expansion has fallen over time, EMDE growth in expansion has been more stable.

4

0

1

2

3

4

5

Advanced Economies Emerging Market and Developing Economies

Emerging Market Economies Low-income Countries

Per

cen

t

Median Growth in Real GDP per Capita during Expansion

Source: IMF staff calculations.

50s and 60s 70s and 80s 1990s 2000s

Unpacking further, what factors are associated with greater resilience?

5

We look at three broad areas:

• External and domestic shocks

• Policy frameworks and policy space

• Structural characteristics

Analytical approach: Look at how these factors affect the length of expansions and the speed of recoveries using standard tools of duration analysis

• Bivariate – consider factors one-by-one

• Multivariate – consider multiple factors simultaneously

Shocks, both external and domestic, tend to bring EMDE expansions to an end…

6

Average Probability of Expansion Coming to an End

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

EXTERNAL SHOCKS

Spike in global uncertainty*

Large rise in U.S. real interest rates*

Recessions in AEs*

Sudden stop in capital flows*

Terms-of-trade bust*

DOMESTIC SHOCKS

Banking crisis*

Credit boom*

Percent

Without shock With shock

Source: IMF staff calculations. Note: Statistically significant differences at the 10 percent level are denoted by starred labels.

…but improved policy frameworks and enhanced policy space help prolong expansions, and hasten recoveries…

7

Effects of Policies on Expansion Duration

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16

POLICY FRAMEWORKS

Inflation targeting*

Countercyclical fiscal policy*

Nonpegged exchange rate*

POLICY SPACE

Low inflation*

Fiscal surplus*

Low public debt

Current account surplus*

Low external debt*

High reserves*

Years

Without characteristic With characteristic

Effects of Policies on Speed of Recovery

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16

POLICY FRAMEWORKS

Inflation targeting*

Countercyclical fiscal policy*

Nonpegged exchange rate

POLICY SPACE

Low inflation*

Fiscal surplus

Low public debt*

Current account surplus*

Low external debt*

High reserves*

Years

Without characteristic With characteristic

Source: IMF staff calculations. Note: Statistically significant differences at the 10 percent level are denoted by starred labels. Recovery is defined as the number of years required to get back to pre-downturn levels of per capita output.

…while structural characteristics are more of a mixed bag, with fewer robust relationships.

8

Effects of Structural Characteristics on Expansion Duration

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16

Trade openness

Trade liberalization

High intra-EMDE exports

High financial integration

High capital account openness

High FDI flows*

Low income inequality*

Without characteristic With characteristic

Effects of Structural Characteristics on Recovery Duration

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16

Trade openness*

Trade liberalization

High intra-EMDE exports*

High financial integration*

High capital account openness*

High FDI flows*

Low income inequality

Without characteristic With characteristic

Source: IMF staff calculations. Note: Statistically significant differences at the 10 percent level are denoted by starred labels. Recovery is defined as the number of years required to get back to pre-downturn levels of per capita output.

Improved performance from the 1980s to the 2000s has been mainly due to policies and policy space

9

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

External shocks

Domestic shocks

Policies Structure Total

Per

cen

t

Contribution to Change in Expected Mean Duration of Expansions from 1980s to 2000–07

Source: IMF staff calculations.

0

3

6

9

12

15

18

1980s 2000–07 2008–09 AE Crisis Scenario

Year

s

Expected Mean Duration of Expansions

1990s 2010–11

Concluding remarks

10

EMDE resilience is not a recent phenomenon; it has been building over many years. Not just in EMs, but low-income countries as well

Better policymaking has a lot to do with it

But resilience cannot be taken for granted:

• These economies remain vulnerable to external and domestic shocks

• Policy space, partly used up in response to the 2008-09 crisis, needs to be rebuilt

• Improvements in policymaking (e.g., greater ER flexibility, more countercyclical policies, inflation targeting) should be maintained

It is not just a commodity story…

12 80

90

100

110

120

130

Peak t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6 t + 7 t + 8 t + 9 t + 10

Noncommodity Exporters

80

90

100

110

120

130

Peak t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6 t + 7 t + 8 t + 9 t + 10

Commodity Exporters

Dynamics of Output per Capita Following Peaks

Years Years

50s and 60s 70s and 80s 1990s Great Recession 2000–06

…nor is it only for the largest EMDEs.

13

80

90

100

110

120

130

Peak t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6 t + 7 t + 8 t + 9 t + 10

Other EMDEs (excluding the largest)

80

90

100

110

120

130

Peak t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6 t + 7 t + 8 t + 9 t + 10

Largest EMDEs1

Dynamics of Output per Capita Following Peaks

1Refers to the 30 largest emerging market and developing economies based on their average real GDP over the sample period.

Years Years

50s and 60s 70s and 80s 1990s Great Recession 2000–06

Among EMDEs, EMs did better from the 1990s, while LICs improved most from the 2000s.

14 80

90

100

110

120

130

140

Peak t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6 t + 7 t + 8 t + 9 t + 10

Low-income Countries

80

90

100

110

120

130

140

Peak t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6 t + 7 t + 8 t + 9 t + 10

Emerging Market Economies

Dynamics of Output per Capita Following Peaks

Years Years

50s and 60s 70s and 80s 1990s Great Recession 2000–06

Among regions, EMD Asia and Latin America have seen the most dramatic improvements.

15 80

90

100

110

120

130

140

Peak t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6 t + 7 t + 8 t + 9 t + 10

Latin America

80

90

100

110

120

130

140

Peak t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6 t + 7 t + 8 t + 9 t + 10

Emerging and Developing Asia

Dynamics of Output per Capita Following Peaks

Years Years

50s and 60s 70s and 80s 1990s Great Recession 2000–06

Sub-Saharan Africa also improved, but mostly in the 2000s. CIS-EM Europe was derailed by the crisis.

16 80

90

100

110

120

130

140

Peak t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6 t + 7 t + 8 t + 9 t + 10

Commonwealth of Independent States and Emerging Europe

80

90

100

110

120

130

140

Peak t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6 t + 7 t + 8 t + 9 t + 10

Sub-Saharan Africa

Dynamics of Output per Capita Following Peaks

Years Years

50s and 60s 70s and 80s 1990s Great Recession 2000–06

What is behind the gains in EMDE resilience? Higher steady-state growth and lower variability

17

0,0

0,5

1,0

1,5

2,0

2,5

3,0

3,5

4,0

Advanced Economies Emerging Market and Developing Economies

Per

cen

t

Median Steady-State Growth

0,0

0,5

1,0

1,5

2,0

2,5

3,0

3,5

4,0

4,5

5,0

Advanced Economies Emerging Market and Developing Economies

Per

cen

t

Median Growth Variability

50s and 60s 70s and 80s 90s and 2000s

Source: IMF staff calculations.

Why has performance improved? Some shocks have become less frequent, others more frequent…

18

Relative frequency of shock in EMDEs (percent)

0

20

40

60

80

100

120 Spikes in Global Uncertainty

0

1

2

3

4

5 Banking Crises

0

3

6

9

12

15 Credit Booms

0

2

4

6

8

10

12 Sudden Stops in Capital Flows

0

20

40

60

80

100

120 Recessions in AEs

…but EMDE policy frameworks have improved, and policy space has increased.

19

Share of EMDEs with characteristic (percent)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60 Pegged Exchange Rate

0

10

20

30

40

50 Countercyclical Fiscal Policy

0

3

6

9

12

15

18 Inflation Targeting

0

20

40

60

80

100 High International Reserves

0

20

40

60

80

100 Low Public Debt

0

30

60

90 Single-Digit Inflation

Structural factors are mixed – some are more supportive, others less so.

20

0

20

40

60

80

100

120 High Financial Integration

0

20

40

60

80

100

120 High Trade Openness

0

20

40

60

80

100

120 High Intra-Emerging Market and Developing Economies Trade

0

30

60

90 High Net Foreign Direct Investment

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70 Low Income Inequality

Share of EMDEs with characteristic (percent)

Mixed patterns in other factors

21

Relative frequency of shock in EMDEs (percent)

0

10

20

30

40

50 Current Account Surplus

0 5

10 15 20 25 30 35 Terms-of-Trade Busts

0

20

40

60

80 Spikes in U.S. Real Short-Term Interest Rate

0

20

40

60

80 Low External Debt

0

5

10

15

20

25

30 Fiscal Surplus

Share of EMDEs with characteristic (percent)

What Ends Expansions?

Explanatory Variable

Expansions All Years Z statistic Pre-1990 Z statistic Post-1989 Z statistic

Implied S&P 100 Volatility (VXO)1 0.951*** [-4.179] 0.981 [-0.985] 0.943*** [-4.565]

U.S. Ex Ante Real Interest Rate 0.956 [-1.461] 0.993 [-0.158] 0.835*** [-3.479]

Terms-of-Trade-Bust Indicator 0.968 [-0.214] 0.802 [-1.034] 1.134 [0.740]

Sudden Stop (capital inflows) Indicator 0.590*** [-2.927] 0.497* [-1.885] 0.841 [-1.254]

Advanced Economy Recession Indicator 0.642*** [-4.074] 0.668** [-2.420] 0.680* [-1.911]

Credit Boom during Past Three Years 0.616*** [-3.913] 0.591*** [-2.621] 0.705*** [-2.610]

Banking Crisis Indicator 0.550*** [-3.376] 0.504*** [-3.302] 0.538*** [-2.830]

Single-Digit Inflation Indicator 1.473*** [3.185] 1.574** [2.474] 1.276** [2.102]

Low Public Debt to GDP Indicator 1.009 [0.0713] 0.998 [-0.0117] 1.019 [0.132]

International Reserves to GDP 1.009*** [2.866] 1.006 [1.289] 1.004 [0.903]

Income Inequality (Gini coefficient) 0.986** [-2.144] 0.976*** [-2.833] 0.997 [-0.459]

Trade Openness (exports plus imports to GDP) 0.999 [-0.451] 1.001 [0.373] 1.000 [-0.170]

Financial Openness (external assets plus liabilities to

GDP) 0.999*** [-3.121] 0.999*** [-4.840] 1.000 [-0.549]

Observations 1,264

Number of Episodes 188

Number of Exits 126

Number of Economies 75

Weibull Shape Parameter 1.516 1.408 2.277

Z statistic of Shape Parameter 6.829 3.258 2.928

Log Likelihood -103.0 -88.1

Model Chi-Squared p Value 0.000 0.000

Source: IMF staff calculations.

Note: Exponentiated coefficients shown are time ratios, which indicate whether the variable tends to shorten (less than 1) or lengthen

(greater than 1) the expected time-in-episode. Z statistics are given in brackets underneath the coefficient estimates. A negative z statistic

indicates that the associated variable tends to shorten an episode; if the z statistic is positive, it tends to lengthen an episode. *, **, and ***

denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 1VXO = Chicago Board of Exchange S&P 100 volatility index.

Across regions and groups, some differences in drivers of improved resilience, but overall similar.

23

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

Exte

rnal

sh

ock

s

Do

me

stic

sh

ock

s

Po

licie

s

Stru

ctu

ral

char

acte

rist

ics

Tota

l

Per

cen

t

Latin America

Source: IMF staff calculations.

Contribution of Shocks, Policies, and Structure to the Length of Expansions

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

Exte

rnal

sh

ock

s

Do

me

stic

sh

ock

s

Po

licie

s

Stru

ctu

ral

char

acte

rist

ics

Tota

l

Per

cen

t

Emerging and Developing Asia

Across regions and groups, some differences in drivers of improved resilience, but overall similar.

24 Source: IMF staff calculations.

Contribution of Shocks, Policies, and Structure to the Length of Expansions

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

Exte

rnal

sh

ock

s

Do

me

stic

sh

ock

s

Po

licie

s

Stru

ctu

ral

char

acte

rist

ics

Tota

l

Per

cen

t

Sub-Saharan Africa

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

Exte

rnal

sh

ock

s

Do

mes

tic

sho

cks

Po

lici

es

Stru

ctu

ral

char

acte

rist

ics

Tota

l

Per

cen

t

Heavily Indebted Poor Countries

And it’s not just commodities…

25 Source: IMF staff calculations.

Contribution of Shocks, Policies, and Structure to the Length of Expansions

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

Exte

rnal

sh

ock

s

Do

me

stic

sh

ock

s

Po

licie

s

Stru

ctu

ral

char

acte

rist

ics

Tota

l

Per

cen

t

Noncommodity Exporters

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

Exte

rnal

sh

ock

s

Do

mes

tic

sho

cks

Po

lici

es

Stru

ctu

ral

char

acte

rist

ics

Tota

l

Per

cen

t

Commodity Exporters