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Sam Goldman [email protected]
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics,
Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999. Chapters 6 and 7
We learned in the previous assignment that anarchy is what
states make of it. Now
Wendt separates that argument into a causal and a constitutive
claim. The latter, which is
the subject of Chapter 6, goes more or less as follows:
Rationalist models are incorrect toassume that only the behavior of
states is affected by the structure of the internationalsystem.
Instead, the interests and identities of states are themselves
constructed by the
distribution of ideas within that system.
In any given ideational structure, some ideas will be shared and
others will be private.
Shared ideas, especially about the nature of Self and Other, are
the culture or, more
correctly, the political culture of an international system. The
political culture of asystem is the most important thing we need to
know to understand how it works.
Wendt perceives three distinct cultures of anarchy: Hobbesian,
Lockean, and Kantian.
Each of these is constituted by a particular notion of the basic
relationship between states.A state may consider its Other an
enemy, rival, or friend, respectively. Each culture,
moreover, includes three degrees of internalization the motive
states have for playingby the rules. They are: (1st) coercion;
(2nd) interest; (3rd) legitimacy.
All nine combinations are logically possible. But we do not
observe them with equal
frequency. For example, most of human history has been
characterized by a second-degree Hobbesian anarchy: states
considered it to be in their interest (ie, they reflected
upon their position rather than simply responding to immediate
threats) to eliminate otherstates when they could, and to maintain
a defensive balance when they could not. The
Peace of Westphalia, however, created a Lockean anarchy based on
the principle ofsovereignty. This meant the states might continue
to use violence against each other
perhaps more frequently than before but they would not
exterminate their rivals.According to Wendt, we still live in this
world.
Two additional points: First, the presence of shared ideas is
not identical with high levels
of cooperation. One can imagine a legitimate Hobbesian system in
which war isgenerally regarded as necessary and honorable. Second,
political cultures need not be
global systems. So states might find themselves in a Kantian
culture vis-a-vis theirimmediate neighbors, but continue to
recognize a Lockean anarchy in the wider world.
So much for the constitutive effects of political culture. How
are the structures of
international politicsreproduced and transformed by the
practices of states (and non-state) agents? It is easier to answer
this question in reference to changes in degree than
changes in culture. In general, cultures tend to be increasingly
well internalized overtime, and thus to be regarded eventually as
legitimate. The future may not be better but,
given the fact that we no longer live in a Hobbesian culture, it
probably wont be worse.
Changes in identity or the basic relationship between Self and
Other require a moresophisticated explanation. Chapter 7 offers a
constructivist model of identity that takes
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Sam Goldman [email protected]
agents as constantly in process. This model of cultural
selection is opposed to thematerialist model of natural selection,
in which states that are poorly adapted for
competition are eliminated from the system. Natural selection
occurs only, if ever, in aHobbesian condition that no longer
exists; it is not a helpful concept for understanding
contemporary politics.
There are two mechanisms of cultural selection: (1) imitation;
and (2) social learning.The difference appears to consist in the
fact that (2) is mutually constitutive: both agents
in an interaction learn and change in response to each other
through reflectiveappraisal. Imitation, by contrast, implies change
in only one direction. It is not clear,
however, that these categories are really distinct. For example,
the imitation of a singleagent by many other agents in the system
would presumably entail a change in the nature
of that system, and thus a new collective identity. Systemic
change is nevertheless noteasy. Social learning tends to become
self-reinforcing or homeostatic, as states reproduce
the behaviors dictated by their own understanding of the
world.
Wendt identifies four master variables or causal mechanisms of
social learning.Specifically, these are intended to suggest how
states might come to establish a Kantian
culture of anarchy how they might come to view each other as
friends rather than rivals.The master variables are: (1)
interdependence; (2) common fate; (3) homogeneity; and
(4) self-restraint. The first three are efficient causes of a
friendly collective identity, thelast is a permissive cause. Wendt
gives no account of how states managed to exchange
Hobbesian for Lockean anarchy.
