Welcome to SGIMUN 2017! My name is Harsh Malu and I will be chairing the

Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC). I am currently a sophomore at the Michigan Technological University. I am pursuing a major in mechanical engineering and minoring in global business. I have been involved with Model United Nations since 2012 like Harvard Model United Nations Conference held at Hyderabad in August 2012 and 2013; the Indian International Model United Nations Conference in August 2014, March 2015 and September 2015 respectively and participated as the delegate of Libya in my first ever MUN in the DISEC. I am very excited for the SGIMUN 2017 since I’ll be chairing this committee in the SGIMUN for the first time. So it is going to be a learning experience for you as well as me and I look forward to having a productive MUN ahead.

The agendas this year address contentious issues that are currently affecting international security. The two agendas we will discuss are controlling the proliferation of modern weapons and prevention of arms race in outer space. These topics are new to DISEC and while other committees have discussed them, the international community has solved neither. Resolutions for these topics should focus on disarmament measures. The first topic is relatively recent and calls for international dialogue among member states, while the second topic is a region-specific issue, implying that resolutions should be created regionally. These two topics are relevant, controversial issues and I look forward to seeing you all address and solve these difficult subjects.

Reading the background guide is pertinent to your understanding of the topic because the history of these issues is crucial to addressing them. When writing your Position Paper, I urge you to move beyond the background guide and conduct additional research in order to gain a deeper understanding of the topics. For any other questions or queries please feel free to contact me or the secretariat.

Best, Harsh Malu Chair, Disarmament and International Security Committee hmmalu@mtu.edu

About the committee:

The United Nations (UN) Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) was created as the first of the Main Committees in the General Assembly when the charter of the

United Nations was signed in 1945. Thus, DISEC is often referred to as the First Committee.1 The birth of DISEC responded to the perceived need for an international forum to discuss issues of peace and security among members of the international community. According to the UN Charter, the purpose of DISEC in the General Assembly is to establish “general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments” and also to give “recommendations

with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council.”2 Although DISEC cannot directly advise the decision- making process of the Security Council, the fourth chapter of the UN Charter explains that DISEC can suggest specific topics for Security Council

consideration.3 Aside from its role in the General Assembly, DISEC is also an institution of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), formally named in January 1998

after the Secretary-General’s second special session on disarmament in 1982.4 The UNODA is concerned with disarmament at all levels—nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction, and conventional weapons—and assists DISEC through its work conducted in the General Assembly

for substantive norm-setting support in order to further its disarmament initiatives.5

Membership in DISEC is extended to all 193 members of the UN, in accordance with its purpose to foster discussion and cooperation between all parties. Each member of DISEC, as with the other committees in the General Assembly, has one vote in decisions made by the committee. Often times, discussions in DISEC focus on making recommendations for peace and security,

and as such, they are deemed “important questions.”6 This then requires that a two-thirds

majority of voters decide in favor of such a decision.7 Once decisions are made in DISEC, they, along with decisions made by the other five main committees, are presented before the General

Assembly as draft resolutions for consideration in a special plenary session.8

The specific mandate of DISEC is different from the other committees of the General Assembly in that it places its focus on the “disarmament and related international security questions” faced

by the international community.9 In this way, many of the United Nations conventions on disarmament and on the use of weapons have originated in DISEC. For example, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ratified in 1968, as well as the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), followed the suggestion of United States President Eisenhower to the General Assembly to facilitate the safe development of nuclear technology. Another such document is the 1972 Biological

Weapons Convention (BWC), which is the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning an entire category of weapons by prohibiting the “development, production, acquisition, transfer, retention,

stockpiling and use of biological and toxin weapons.”10 Also included in this list are the

Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which prohibits ratifying states from conducting nuclear tests or explosions of any kind and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) that shares many functions of the BWC but is aimed at chemical weapons of mass destruction.

Lastly, in addition to discussing issues of international peace and security, DISEC and the General Assembly communicate with other organs of the UN, especially the Security Council, by

receiving and considering their reports.11

Currently, DISEC faces many challenges including the impact of increased technology and weapon development on the security of the international community. In 2005, for example, the

DISEC agenda items of the 60th session of the General Assembly included discussions on reduction of military budgets, telecommunications and information in relation to international security, radiological terrorism, nuclear weapon-free zones in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East, the roles of science and technology in international security, and

the protection of non-nuclear weapon states against nuclear weapons.12 In the past year, DISEC has mainly focused on determining the future of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and of

nuclear proliferation worldwide.13 On 26 October 2010, the General Assembly held its 65th

session and the 19th meeting of DISEC. In this meeting, Chair Milos Koterec of Slovakia introduced the two agenda items at hand: nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass

destruction.14 Draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.1, entitled “Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East,” was adopted without a formal vote or objections. Additionally, draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.3 on “The Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle

East” was adopted by DISEC.15 DISEC has adopted a number of notable treaties, including the Arms Trade Treaty, which recently received signatures from over half of all member states.

An important part of DISEC’s work has also focused on the influence of the Non-Aligned Movement, a group of member states not formally aligned with any major power bloc that takes a firm position on peace and disarmament. Many of these states, as members of DISEC, have been instrumental in the introduction and adoption of the aforementioned treaties and other agreements.

Moving forward, DISEC will continue to face complex issues in which the security of the international community is at stake. DISEC will continue to make recommendations to both the General Assembly and the Security Council as it pursues disarmament, peace, and security initiatives to the fullest extent of its mandate.

Simulation:

As members of the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC), delegates will represent the views of their respective countries throughout the duration of debate on both Concerns of controlling the proliferation of modern weapons and prevention of arms race in outer space. Delegates will be responsible for collaborating to develop resolutions for these two issues while remaining within the mandate of DISEC. While these topics are new to DISEC, all resolutions created will need to bear in mind that the goal of DISEC is to promote international peace and security. The beauty of the SGIMUN conference is its ability to offer delegates a hands- on global education and to allow them to experience a real work environment they would be unable to experience elsewhere.

Upon arriving in committee, delegates will be introduced to the Dais consisting of Chair and the Co-Chair. As experts on UN procedure, the Dais will also ensure that delegates observe parliamentary procedure. Should delegates have any questions on either procedural or substantive matters, they should not hesitate to approach any member of the Dais for assistance.

After delegates have been introduced to the Dais, they will first debate the setting of the agenda and then progress to substantive debate, which will deepen and progress throughout the following sessions. In a committee of this size, collaboration and decorum are essential for each and every session. Formal debate consists of delegates adding themselves to the Speaker’s List to be formally recognized before the rest of the committee for a specified length of time. When delegates appear before the committee, it is their opportunity to give an overview of their country’s position as well as accept questions from other delegates for clarification on policy or solutions. It is imperative that delegates remain respectful of others during this time and observe all procedural rules in order for delegates to be heard and for the Speaker’s List to flow smoothly.

While formal debate is a key portion of our simulation, the majority of debate in DISEC will take place in caucus format. Caucusing can be done in one of two ways: moderated or unmoderated. Moderated caucuses flow similarly to formal debate. Delegates' speaking times are often shorter, and each caucus has a specific topic delegates must discuss in their comments. Unmoderated caucuses suspend formal rules of debate for a designated period of time during which delegates are free to move around the room and informally discuss policy and potential solutions directly with other delegates. The majority of writing for working papers and resolutions will occur during these unmoderated caucuses.

Another feature of DISEC as a committee of the General Assembly is the process by which its working papers and resolutions are created. Solutions start out as a set of ideas, are formatted into a working paper, then voted upon as draft resolutions, and finally presented as resolutions in plenary if passed in committee. Delegates will be given more details about the resolution process as the conference progresses, but they should keep in mind that there is this specific structure they must follow.

The two most important things for delegates to keep in mind throughout debate are decorum and country policy. As a committee of the General Assembly, DISEC includes delegates from each member state of the United Nations; hence, it is one of the largest committees. Each delegate will be given equal opportunity to speak before the committee and granted each member’s undivided attention. Parliamentary procedure and decorum will be respected at all times, without exception.

The alteration or suspension of rules may occur at the discretion of the Dais in order to maintain control of the committee and to preserve decorum and respect for all delegates. Additionally, delegates are to keep in mind that country policy should be the anchor for all proposals both presented and supported by the delegate. Although collaboration is the goal, it is always secondary to the integrity of a delegate’s country policy. The desire to compromise should never supersede one’s ability to uphold his or her country’s stance on the issue. With this in mind, apt preparation for committee on policy, background, and potential solutions is imperative in order for all delegates to maintain quality debate and to remain on task at all times.

Debate in DISEC will culminate in a plenary meeting at the final session during which time DISEC delegates will meet with their counterparts in the other committees of the General Assembly to vote. Only draft resolutions that have passed in each individual committee will be presented as resolutions in plenary and voted upon by the entire body. This plenary session simulates the workings of the real UN in that delegates see how DISEC is able to make recommendations that unite the entire membership of the UN when resolutions are adopted.

Like in the UN, the quality of resolutions presented before the plenary body is a direct reflection of the delegates’ work inside and outside of the committee. These resolutions rely heavily upon the delegates’ ability to work diligently and to collaborate respectfully on proposals for the topics at hand, and will help to make SGIMUN 2017 a great year for DISEC and SGIMUN as a whole.

Agenda A: Controlling the proliferation of modern weapons

Introduction:

Nuclear weapons are currently one of the biggest threats to the international community. The dangerous nature of these Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) poses an immediate threat to long-term international security. WMDs affect millions of people, the environment, not to mention the future generations who could suffer the long-term effects of these disastrous weapons. The detrimental effects of nuclear weapons were first revealed on 6 August 1945 when the United States of America dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, followed later by the attack on Nagasaki. These are the only two times nuclear weapons have been used in warfare to date. After this attack, however, international interest in nuclear weapons grew, peaking in the 1960s. It was at this time that the first five nuclear weapon states were established: the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, and China. After them came an expansion of nuclear technology across the world, with India, Pakistan, and Iran among many countries that began developing nuclear programs. The potential use of these weapons threatened both civilians and militaries alike for decades during the Cold War, proving that even the mere possession of nuclear weapons can have detrimental effects on international security. Decades of uncertainty and fear eventually led to non- proliferation efforts by the United Nations and member states. Yet despite reduction efforts, there are still over 22,000 nuclear weapons in existence.

Since the development of nuclear weapons, the UN has taken steps to halt the production of this weaponry. The UN began creating Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) in the 1960s, as a way of curbing the threat of nuclear technology. NWFZs designate specific regions as free from the weaponization of nuclear technology, meaning that these areas cannot house or create such weapons. Many regions have already expressed support for Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, beginning with the establishment of a NWFZ in the Antarctic Treaty in 1959. This treaty sought to regulate the use and ownership of Antarctica in the Cold War, and declared the zone demilitarized and weapon-free to minimize of any chance of conflict. Since then, the First Committee has been in charge of facilitating the creation of these zones.

The Middle East has seen an escalation of conflict within the past few decades. The region has experienced social unrest like the Arab Spring and political issues such as the conflict between Israel and Gaza. Establishing a NWFZ in this region has become an urgent matter due to the escalation of violence among Middle Eastern countries. However, many countries in the area, like Iran and Israel, have expressed opposition to such a proposal. Other countries also oppose the establishment of a NWFZ, the distrust among countries in the region spurring potential proliferation. Israel’s ambiguous stance on nuclear technology and Iran’s nuclear program are both indications that a NWFZ in the region could curb the threat of nuclear warfare. The establishment of a NWFZ would bring security to this region, as far as nuclear technology is concerned. Member states in the First Committee will examine the damage that nuclear use has had on society and work together to curb this threat through the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East.

History:

Nuclear weapons first emerged in the 1940s when the United States started researching the military applications of nuclear technology for use in World War II. Nuclear technology was appealing to the military because of the mass amounts of damage the weapons could cause with just one explosion. Under the alias of the “Manhattan Project,” the United States government began testing this nuclear technology. The first bomb, “Trinity,” was tested on 16 July 1945 in Alamogordo, Mexico. These tests were intended to simulate the effects that this technology would have in combat. They provided scientists with examples of the actual detonation size and capability that these bombs could contain. The tests gave clear examples of the collateral damage any bomb would have on civilian life. However, they could not predict the effects that nuclear radiation would have on civilians for many generations to come.

On 6 August 1945 the United States dropped their atomic bomb “Little Boy” on Hiroshima, Japan. The bombing resulted in the deaths of over 140,000 civilians, nearly half of the city’s population at the time. These deaths were caused by heat, force, or extreme radiation exposure. Radiation exposure from the bomb proceeded to affect the next several generations and caused an increased rate of leukemia among the exposed population. Radioactive fallout, which is radioactive particles in the atmosphere following a nuclear explosion, has such negative consequences for humans. This unprecedented event highlights the dangerous effects of the recklessness of nuclear technology. Three days later, on 9 August 1945, the United States dropped a second nuclear bomb, known as “Fat Boy”, on Nagasaki, Japan. These bombings combined resulted in over 200,000 Japanese civilian causalities. The two bombings represent the first and only example to date of the damage nuclear weaponry can cause. However, even after the bombings, generations of Japanese citizens continued to suffer from cancer and other diseases caused by radiation exposure. The United States government did not anticipate the long-term effect of radioactive nuclear fallout. These bombings showed the incredibly dangerous potential the threat of nuclear weaponry poses against society.

Nuclear technology continued to advance, eventually leading to the invention of the hydrogen bomb by the United States. The hydrogen bomb was a significant development in the history of nuclear technologies, since it is 1,400 times more powerful than the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined. The United States was the first country to test this type of bomb. In 1954, the United States detonated a hydrogen bomb on the Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands. This was the largest nuclear weapon to ever be detonated and had large detrimental consequences. The bomb affected islands over 300 miles from the site of detonation. This test became the most serious incident of nuclear fallout to date, effecting 88 inhabited islands in the Pacific Ocean. Similar to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the nuclear fallout impacted the long-term health of civilians inhabiting these islands, as evidenced by the many cases of radiation sickness. This incident attracted international concern over the use of nuclear weaponry as many civilians were unintentionally affected. The history of nuclear weapons has shown the disastrous affects upon civilian life, the environment, and international security. It is important to understand the negative repercussions the testing and use of nuclear weapons have on international security, as these are the key reasons for the establishment of a NWFZ.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty

A major landmark created by the United Nations to promote nuclear non-proliferation was the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT was created to help limit the expansion of nuclear weapons. It was opened for signing in 1968 and was meant to promote international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Today, it is considered a long-term treaty used to further the goal of eventual total nuclear disarmament. This treaty is significant because it is the only legally binding commitment to non-proliferation, having been ratified by all five nuclear weapon states. Currently, 190 parties have ratified the NPT, making it the most successful international non-proliferation treaty to date. India, Pakistan, and Israel are the only states that have yet to sign the NPT. Despite their apparent lack of nuclear development since 1998, India and Pakistan’s hostility towards non-proliferation poses a threat to international security because they are not legally bound to limit expansion in nuclear technology.

The treaty works in tandem with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is responsible for safeguarding articles of the NPT. States declare their nuclear capabilities to the IAEA and work cohesively with the agency to verify that their declaration is true. The IAEA inspects countries’ nuclear sites and helps to verify states’ continuing compliance of the NPT. For example, the IAEA monitors uranium levels to ensure that continued nuclear development is only for peaceful purposes. These safeguards were created specifically to help enforce the treaty and are an example of true effectiveness when making sure that countries are actually undergoing non- proliferation efforts.

The NPT is reviewed every five years to ensure that its standards are relevant to the current global environment. In one of the review conferences, the treaty was updated with the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. This resolution encouraged the creation of a NWFZ in the region of the Middle East. It called upon states that have ratified the NPT and states in the Middle East to cooperate together to facilitate the creation of a NWFZ in this region. The specific concern for the creation of a NWFZ in the region is because of unguarded nuclear facilities there. In the 1990s, concern was raised during IAEA safety checks at Iraq’s nuclear facilities. Safety inspections in 1991 found that Iraq was weaponizing nuclear technology. These inspections led to the destruction of facilities manufacturing nuclear weapons. The IAEA safeguards have helped to curb the threat of nuclear weapons, particularly in the Middle East. Currently Israel’s Negev Nuclear Research Center, commonly known as “Dimona”, is not under IAEA safeguards. This raises a major concern among the international community and states in the Middle East. Without IAEA safeguards, there is no way of knowing whether or not Israel is developing nuclear weaponry. Unguarded facilities in Israel have contributed to ongoing hostile relations with regional states like Iran. This committee should consider the security implications of unguarded nuclear facilities in this region and what work can be done to enact change while respecting national sovereignty.

The NPT has become an acclaimed treaty. All states in the Middle East region besides Israel are parties to the NPT, meaning that regional support for the establishment of a NWFZ does exist. Israel remains ambiguous about its nuclear weapon status, and the country continues to refuse to sign and abide by the treaty. To the Middle East region and international community, Israel’s indirectness is certainly a concern. As the most prolific treaty on non-proliferation,

the NPT’s implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East is a testament toward the growing focus on working towards the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

The second major non-proliferation effort was the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). As hostilities were beginning to thaw after the Cold War, the UN founded the Conference on Disarmament (CD), a committee that works closely with DISEC, and began discussing the CTBT in 1992. The CD began addressing nuclear non-proliferation efforts to begin regulating all Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). The international treaty prohibits nuclear explosions on Earth and established a global monitoring system to track any nuclear explosion whether in air, land, water, or underground. Passing the CTBT was a positive sign that the international community could work peacefully towards stemming nuclear- proliferation.

Negotiations on this treaty continued from 1994-1996, and it was finally submitted to the General Assembly and opened for signing on 24 September 1996. Currently the United States, Iran, DPRK, Pakistan, and China are among 34 states that have yet to ratify the treaty. This is significant, as all of these countries have nuclear weapon programs. In particular, Iran has a history of hostility towards non-proliferation measures, and the country’s resistance to ratifying the CTBT is cause for concern for the UN and for this committee. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) was established in November 1996 as a part of the treaty. Its objective is to ensure that the initiatives in the CTBT are achieved. With help from the international community, the CTBTO has conducted on-site inspections and created an International Monitoring System (IMS) to effectively monitor nuclear explosions. Together, these resolutions have helped effectively curb the threat of nuclear technology, working to ensure international peace and security.

Established Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones For this topic, the ultimate goal of this committee is to establish a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. Thus, it is important that delegates understand the nature of these zones and the history of their establishment in other regions. By understanding this, DISEC can effectively consider how an NWFZ could be established in the Middle East. An NWFZ is an area recognized by the General Assembly in which any group of states, in the “free exercises of their sovereignty,” establishes a zone completely absent of nuclear weapons. NWFZs are established to gradually “delegitimize” the use of nuclear weapons, beginning at a regional level. These zones are intended to help complement and reinforce previous resolutions such as the NPT and CTBT. NWFZs are under an international verification system that guarantees that states are complying with the obligations of the established NWFZ. On 30 April 1999, the UN Disarmament Commission created a series of guidelines to help efficiently create NWFZs. These guidelines state that NWFZs should be created regionally by a group of states exercising their national sovereignty, and that NWFZs should be created with distinct regional issues in mind. They also mandate that the nuclear-weapon states be consulted when the NWFZ is being created in order to facilitate the ratification process. Lastly, it states that NWFZs should not prevent the exploration of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

The UN regulates NWFZs by working closely with the IAEA to help monitor a state’s nuclear capabilities. States must declare all nuclear activity to the IAEA and then work cohesively to establish a system of verification through on-site inspections conducted by the IAEA. These inspections help to create trust among states and further aid the UN in keeping nuclear development peaceful. To this day there are five established NWFZs, which include 113 states. These are meant to not only prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in these countries but also prevent the use of nuclear weapons against them, guaranteed by the five nuclear weapon states. The concept of establishing NWFZs has existed since the creation of nuclear technology. In 1956, the Soviet Union attempted to create a NWFZ in Central Europe with the help of the General Assembly. This was the first attempt in history to create a NFWZ. A similar proposal was brought forward by Poland, called the Rapacki Plan. This proposal included a ban on possessing, creating, or stockpiling nuclear weapons and prohibited any nuclear attack against states in the region. While both of these proposals failed, the first successful NWFZ was established in the uninhabited Antarctic on 1 December 1959. The region was established as a peaceful zone under the Antarctic Treaty and was one of the beginning efforts towards curbing nuclear growth. Despite the simultaneous expansion of nuclear technology, this treaty signified an eventual movement toward nuclear non- proliferation.

In 1967, The Treaty of Tlatelolco created a denuclearized region in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Treaty of Tlatelolco was mainly facilitated by Brazil and Argentina. This is significant because both countries were in a position to potentially develop nuclear technology. Despite the allure of nuclear technology, the two worked together to help move towards a more peaceful future. As a regional treaty, it was only signed and ratified by states in the area. However, it was still met with opposition because some were hesitant to ratify the treaty and implement it within their country. For many countries in this region, the appeal of nuclear technology was still strong, and this affected their willingness to ratify the treaty. In order to address some states’ hesitation with the NWFZ, the governments of each country were allowed to decide when they would implement the treaty in their legislature. This means that although the treaty was regional, each country entered it into force individually. This implementation method was an effective way of helping deal with tension within the region and inevitably led to the complete ratification of the treaty within the region, making it the first of its kind toward non-proliferation. Delegates should consider the success of this treaty as a means for establishing a similar one in the Middle East.

The next NWFZ to be established was in the South Pacific region. The South Pacific states have experienced the most nuclear activity with the majority of nuclear testing taking place in this region. The close proximity to nuclear testing and the negative effects of radioactive contamination in the oceans led to New Zealand’s proposal of a NWFZ in the South Pacific in 1975. The proposal was endorsed by the General Assembly that same year. A lack of interest halted serious progression, until Australia’s renewed interest in 1983 led to the creation of a draft treaty for the establishment of this NWFZ. Member states in the region worked with the United Kingdom and the United States to facilitate the creation of the NWFZ. They used past treaties like the Treaty of Tlatelco to create a NWFZ best suited to their region. On 6 August 1985, the Treaty of Rarotonga was signed by 13 states in the South Pacific and established the second NWFZ in the world. Each state ratified this treaty separately within the next two

years. The political situation and

general consensus among states in this region allowed the treaty to be

created efficiently and peacefully. The relationship among states

contributed toward another major step in non-proliferation. The

success these two regions had in establishing a NWFZ led to the

creation of five total regional

NWFZs. The first committee should consider how such success was

achieved, fostering a productive environment for the creation of a

NWFZ, and how this can be applied to the Middle East.

Focus Question: 1. What steps must be taken in order

to control the proliferation of modern weapons keeping in mind the short term and long term impacts of their execution?

2. Should the decision be made on which country will be allowed to possess nuclear weapons?

3. How should the international committee respond to rogue states’ nuclear program that could lead to weapons of mass destruction?

R

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e

a

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c

h

L

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s

: 1. UN Resolution 1696

http://www.globalpo

licy.org/security/sanction/iran/2006/0731resolution.htm

2. IAEA website http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml

3. CNN

www.cnn.com 4

.

B

B

C

http://news.bbc.co.uk/

Research Tips:

I’d highly recommend you to refer to

Reuters and Al-Jazeera for adding any

facts and theories to your research.

Articles from news agencies could be

used as an good example of reference

and please avoid using ‘Wikipedia’ as a

direct source of information. Instead use

the reference links or external links

presented with the articles which will

give you concrete information.

Agenda B: Preventing Arms

Race in Outer Space

« It’s politically sensitive, but it’s going to

happen. Some people don’t want to hear this, and

it sure isn’t in vogue, but—absolutely—we’re

going to fight in space. We’re going to fight from

space and we’re going to fight into space. That’s

why the US has development programs in

directed energy and hit-to-kill mechanisms. We

will engage terrestrial targets someday—ships,

airplanes, land targets—from space. »

The desire to reach the sky and explore new

planets has all the time been in the man’s

conscience. The scientific discoveries of the

XVII century, as the Johann Kepler laws on

movement of planets or the work on gravity by

Newton, enabled the development of

technologies for space activities. Since the

beginning of the conquest of space since the 1950’s, at the midst of the Cold War, the United Nations have worked to prevent militarisation

and weaponisation of space. The first treaty,

signed in 1957, prohibits the use of space for

military purposes. Since then, efforts have

continuously been made to maintain it as a

peaceful zone. However, despite of these calls

for its pacific uses, outer-space has been

subject of military uses since the beginning of

spatial era.

In this guide, we will provides elements on the

main debates related to outer-space, the

different military programs and they concerns,

as well as the legal framework designed by the

international community to guarantee its

pacific use.

Outer-space: As considered in previous treaties,

the outer-space is the space above 100 km to 36

000 km above the level of the sea.

Weaponisation of outer-space: refers to the

placement in orbit of space-based devices that

have a destructive capacity. Ground-based

systems designed or used to attack space-based

assets also constitute space weapons. Weapons

that travel through space in order to reach their

targets, such as hypersonic technology vehicles,

also contribute to the weaponisation of space. Many elements of “missile defence” system also constitute space weapons.

Space is the future theatre of war. It is the main

geo-strategic key to better understand power of

nations. Thus, it affects all countries. More than

80 national or international spatial agencies

represent countries’ interest and programs in

terms of space activities. Around 50 countries

have implemented space programs since 1950,

either civil, military or both. Amongst them, the

USA, the Russian Federation and China are often

seen as a threat.

It is not just the hard-line Russian commentators

or the North Korean press that alleges that US

military forces are already armed for space

warfare: the same assumption often appears in

the mainstream Western press as well. However,

it is your duty to find a way to regulate

aforementioned programs, in order to ensure the

limitation of the militarisation of space.

Military capacities of most of countries rely more

and more on communication and pieces of

information generated by satellites. Space

facilities became central in the capacity of a

country to deploy its ground-based activities.

Thus, satellites will be the main target in the

near-future. Moreover, aftermaths of a space

conflict would be catastrophic for each countries

economics.

To begin with, geolocalisation systems could a

first target. They orbit around the Earth at an

average distance (21 000 km) and have a

determined path. They got semi-synchronous

orbits, which means that they meet each day a

located point in outer space compared to Earth.

All systems are concerned by these

vulnerabilities from the American one (GPS), to

the Russian one (Glonass) and the future

European one (Galileo). These concerns are

crucial because these satellites are used both by

civil and by the Army.

Then, the number of fields which we are

dependent from satellites and outer space is

growing every day: Telecommunications,

Internet, Scientific Research, Meteorologic

previsions, etc. Furthermore, it has become more

and more difficult to distinguish today which

satellites are used for civil purposes from those

who are used for military purposes. Each

country’s armies are becoming more and more

reliant on satellites, even those used for civil

purposes. This questions the duality of the

satellites as a civil satellite could be targeted to

harm directly the army. It is thus important to

reach a consensus upon what should be

considered as a weapon in outer space to avoid

the aiming of civil facilities.

Historic of space militarisation Since the Second World War, researches and

specific development programs have been

implemented by countries in order to acquire new

weapons in space. Germany indeed managed to

make huge progresses in building rockets. The

V-2 rocket is considered as the first viable spatial

rocket. After the WWII, the V-2 technology

enabled both the USA and the USSR to develop

their own space programs. Thus, in the context of

the cold, it appeared clearly that space is the

strategic keystone of military competition. In

1957, by launching the satellite Sputnik, USSR

marked the beginning of the spatial exploration

as well as the opening of the debate around

militarisation of space.

The international community, even before 1957

and the launching of Sputnik, agreed on the fact

that space had to be preserved for pacific use.

That is why four great powers (Canada, the USA,

France & the United Kingdom) made a proposal

to create a system of inspections for every object

launched in outer space to guarantee the pacific

and scientific use of these objects.

Later on, the United Nations adopted the

resolution 1348 (XIII) to ensure the pacific aims

of the use of space for nations, and the nations

concluded several treaties in order to give a

juridical framework to this new element of

international policies.

Nevertheless, the juridical and diplomatic issues

have grown around the use of satellites, since it

can be used for civil purposes as well as

surveillance, tracking and different aspects of

military activities. The satellites have little by

little become essential to the army and destroying

one of them could highly compromise a country's

military capacities. In the context of the Cold

War, the USA as well as the USRR began to use

reconnaissance satellites because of the

ambiguity of the terms used to define the «

pacific use » of space objects – it was

misinterpreted by those countries.

From Sputnik, weapons in space became more

and more specialised in the context of the Cold

War. In the 1960's, both the USSR and the USA

developed first reconnaissance satellites to take

pictures of their rivals' installations and that led to

the creation of anti-satellite weapons to destroy

each other's satellites. Spy satellites were used to

monitor the dismantling of military assets in

accordance with arms control treaties signed

between the two superpowers. Then, the

superpowers developed ballistic missiles to use

nuclear weaponry across great distances, and that

led to the development of intercontinental

ballistic missiles (ICBM), which are very

dangerous since they are able to strike on ay part

of the Earth in a timeframe measured in minutes.

The USA developed programs in order to gain

space supremacy, such as the Nike-Zeus

Program, Project Defender, the Sentinel Program

and the Safeguard Program. The Nike-Zeus

Program, developed in the 50's involved firing

Nike nuclear missiles against incoming ICBMs,

thus exploding nuclear warheads over the North

Pole but it was replaced by the Project Defender

in 1958, which used satellites weapons system

orbiting around the USSR.

But it was not very efficient, that is why the

Sentinel Program was developed with the

creation of anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) to

counterattack coming ICBMs. In the mid 1970's

was deployed the Safeguard Program, based on

the Sentinel Program which means it developed

ABM facilities, that were finally restricted by the

ABM treaty in 1972.

In 1983, Ronald Reagan, President of the USA,

developed the well-known « Strategic Defence

Initiative », a space-based system to protect the

United States from attacks by strategic nuclear

missiles (because of the rise of tensions with the

USSR) but to compete this program all the USSR

had to do was build more missiles.

The USSR made many efforts to gain space

supremacy, such as the programs R-36ORB

Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) – that was later prohibited by the SALT II treaty

- and Polyus orbital weapons system, which was

actually the launch of an Energia rocket in 1987.

After the Cold War and the implosion of the

USSR, Russia's influence in the field of space

weapons was highly questioned. Nevertheless, in

1992 the Russian Space Forces were

implemented, to be incorporated into the

Strategic Rocket Forces in 1997 and finally, in

2001 the Russian Space Forces were reborn as an

independent section of the Russian military.

In response to US weaponisation of space, the

Chinese started a space defence program,

including anti-satellite defence. In 2007 China

conducted a test to destroy the FY-AC polar orbit

satellite at an altitude of 865 km thanks to a

kinetic kill vehicle. As a reply, in February 2008

the US launched its own strike to destroy a

malfunctioning US satellite, which demonstrated

the capability to strike in space.

Today, the worries related to militarisation of

outer-space result from antimissile projects

currently developed in USA. These projects

adopted a broad definition of defence which

includes allies of USA. According to the

American administration, the military spatial

facilities will be the keystone of its military

strategy. The objective is the total control of

space activities.

One of the first difficulty in dealing with

weapons in outer-space is the qualification of

weapons. Indeed, everything in space can be used

and so, considered as a weapons: from debris to

conventional weapons or asteroids. The most

relevant typology of new weapons in outer-space

includes:

Intercontinental ballistic missiles (IBCM) The missiles can be launched from earth or

directly from space or from a space satellite.

They can be directed to targets located in space

or on earth, as well as being launched on earth,

directed to an earth target and passing through

space. The targets can be satellites in case of anti-

satellites missiles, missiles for anti-missile

defence system, or a terrestrial target. They can

be charged with nuclear or conventional material.

The ballistic missiles and anti-missile defence

systems are all designed to send explosive

charges or interceptors, meaning that they all

have the capacity to destroy any satellite. The

present technology already enable ICBM to reach

the moon. Until ballistic missiles are not

prohibited or destroyed, it will not be possible to

forbid states, which owns such weapons to

possess anti-satellites capacities. Thus,

negotiations related to forbidding anti-satellites

missiles have to include ballistic missiles’

questions.

Regarding nuclear missiles, among states who

own long-distance ballistic missiles and nuclear

arsenal, USA is the only one country who

operated nuclear missile test in space.

Directed-energy weapons Terrestrial or high-altitude weapons using

electromagnetic energy may destroy and disrupt

electronic and electrical devices, causing a burst

of electromagnetic radiation (electromagnetic

pulse, or EMP) to produce current and voltage

surges. Directed-energy weapons use lasers, high

powered microwaves, and particle beams.

Projects in development by the US are named

Airborne Laser, the Active Denial System and the

Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL).

Satellites and Nano-satellites Satellites, as much as their uses, can be

considered as "power-enhancers", which means

that their interest regarding military activity is the

expansion of actions directed towards ground-

targets rather than actions themselves. However,

the scientific progress enabled new attack

systems raising the risk of war between satellites.

As for now, this issue is particularly focusing on

non-nuclear missiles and high energy laser

weapons. Anti-missile device have to follow a

strict procedure: detection, acknowledgment and

destruction. However, such electronic systems

are vulnerable. The international law face a

crucial lack of regulation regarding the launching

and use of non-nuclear weapons.

UN resolutions do not provide any rules related

to nano-satellites. The last generation of nano-

satellites weigh less than 10 kilos. These nano-

satellites can be hiding explosive charges and are

able to reach and dock secretly other satellites in

order to inspect or damage them. This technology

is basic and available to most of countries.

Spatial mines Part of anti-satellites defence system, mines have

to change their orbit and reached its targets to

damage it. If spatial mines were easy to detect in

the space, new generation of spatial mines

reaches undetectable micro-sizes of 5 to 10 cm.

No use of spatial mines has been released, but the

technology exists and controls are hardly

possible once launched in space. Even if is

technically complicated, a future negotiation

could include controls of satellites before

launching in space thanks to others satellites.

More easy would be a control of planned

trajectory of all special objects before their

launching. Alert satellite could then notify in

case of change in orbit’s trajectory.

Spatial manoeuvrable device (SMD) Every SMD, inhabited or automatised, can be

considered as a weapon. Indeed, it can shoot,

strike, damage or scramble connections. The US

Air forces developed the reusable robotic X-37B

Orbital Test Vehicle (OTV): a small space

shuttle-like craft. However, approaching a

satellite with a manoeuvrable device is still

complex, especially in case of non-cooperative

targets. A future treaty on ban of weapons in the

space should include convincing control

measures of SMD. Thus, the orbit, the manoeuver

planned and the reserve in fuel could be watched

out.

Air launchers of SMD and warheads SMD and warheads can be launched directly

from aircraft, increasing precision and reducing

time for reaction. Since 1958, USA tested several

air missiles launcher such as Prototype Miniature

Air-Launched System (PMALS): a small space

shuttle-like craft. Nowadays, air forces of USA

have at their disposal the Pegasus and Pegasus

XL launcher. In Russian Federation, several

projects are designed based on AN-124 and AN-

225. Air Launcher of SMD and warheads are not

included in any treaty related to space activities.

However, there are a few points we would like to

draw your attention on. Stationing weapons in

space for use against ground targets has long ago

been recognised as far more expensive and less

flexible than basing them on Earth.

Even planning a space-to-space attack can take

hours or days or longer for the moving attacker

and target to line up in a proper position. This

goes double for nuclear weapons: putting them

into space on a permanent basis was last taken

seriously in the Sunday comics in the late 1950’s. So these accusations seem to confuse proposed

projects (usually already rejected—that is why

the proponents go public with their ideas) or even

Hollywood science fiction for actual hardware.

Furthermore, we have to remind you that

scientific exploration should always be accessible

to any country, according to the article II of the

Treaty on (...). Avoiding space warfare should

not limit access to space for scientific purposes.

Involved in the cold war against USSR, USA

were dependant on their capacity to gather

information thanks to air intelligence services.

The increasing facilities of soviets in terms of

interceptors and air defence increased the risk of

surveillance, which raised the interest of USA in

satellites. Since, the USA planned their political

and diplomatic strategy in order to protect the

legality of satellite surveillance.

Thus, Delegates should be notified that the topic

of military spatial activities is regularly blocked

by US representatives in the Disarmament

conference - an UN organ that take decision on

consensus. Besides, the lack of consensus on the

terms “space”, “spatial weapons” and “pacific

uses” make the law-making process harder.

As the years go by, more and more countries

develop their own space program (more than 50

nations) and 600 satellites are present in outer

space, reshuffling the cards of the balance of

powers. This why we are now going to see how

the traditional space powers are coping with the

rise of new actors in space.

The United States of America In 2002, as a counsellor to G.W. Bush,

Condoleezza Rice decided to review the US

policy regarding spatial activities. The USA have

indeed always been, since the Cold War, the

most modern and effective in this field, but the

gap with other countries tends to diminish. They

indeed possess in 2001 110 military satellites

whereas the Russian Federation owned 40 of

them and the 20 remaining satellites belonged to

other nations. The USA fear the rise of Indian

and Chinese reconnaissance satellites more and

more narrowly-specialised that they could be a

threat to the American supremacy regarding

space devices. In 1999, the budget of the United

States dedicated to militarise space was about

94,8% of the total of military spatial budget of all

the countries. That is why it can easily be said

that in order to find an agreement, all member

states countries really take the initiative to open

the discussion with the USA before they

implement their own program concerning arms in

space without any international talks.

People's Republic of China People's Republic China as much less spatial

engines compared to the USA but this nation has

many ambitious projects when it comes to arms

race in outer space. Since the 80's, China tries to

manage to implement an international treaty

about non-armament in space in order to curb the

USA's influence in this area that is why PRC has

led the negotiations at the UN since many years

with the purpose of implementing concrete rules

quickly. Their engineers in fact claim that spatial

weapons not only threaten China's security but

also the world's one.

Nevertheless, China remains quite secretive about

its true intentions and about its own spatial

development, using the argument of the

American supremacy to develop its programs.

That is why you delegates should focus your

debates on these particular interrogations

regarding China's enrolment and goals in the

weaponisation of space.

The Russian Federation Russia has been during the second half of the

20th Century a leader in spatial armament, but

since the dislocation of the USSR and the end of

the Cold War, Russian equipment grew old and

the government did not invested enough money

to keep it from being outdated because funds

were not sufficient. The authorities tried to

improve this precarious situation by combining

its commercial programs as well as all its

militarised spatial programs but it is not yet

sufficient to counter dilapidated state of the

missiles, which can become rather worrying for

the international community.

Furthermore, the Russian government has

expressed the same interrogations as China

regarding the operations of the USA in space,

that is why Russia highly developed since the

beginning of the 2000's its technical skills, and

the country has now acquired the capacity, on a

long-term approach, to reach the level of the

USA. It then raises many questions concerning

this rise of Russia than is also one of the points

you delegates should focus on.

Europe European countries are less involved in the

weaponisation of space, contrary to the USA.

They would rather develop programs aiming at

favouring sustainable development, the

management of the planet and its economic and

social repercussions.

France and the United Kingdom are rather

focused on civil development in space than

military activities. France practises diverse

activities in space such, from launching to Earth

observation and plays an important part in the

Galileo project. The British are present in space

as well but for civil purposes and its programs

are far from being militarised as the USA's or

China's.

Nevertheless, European countries depend on the

USA and would support them if a collation had

to be made. Europe could not lead a military

operation in space by itself, if the region is

involved, it would follow the American power.

A leitmotiv of pasts PAROS resolution preamble

was to impeach an arm race in outer space.

Nevertheless, even if delegates should

concentrate in how we should face such

phenomenon, they shall keep in mind to what

extent their countries’ interests would be

jeopardized.

A first direct consequence of such race would be

significant chill in International Relations.

Considering the destructive power of weapons in

outer space, a failure to a Mutually Assured

Destruction doctrine should be feared. As one

side would decide to attack, the other side would

have the possibility to replicate against,

annihilating both parties. Equilibrium was set as

no would start an open conflict, especially during the Cold War.

However, as the USA withdrew from the Anti-

Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, numerous

countries denounced this aggressive stance.

Indeed, some strategists from the American Air

Force emitted doubts as it could trigger

incentives for other countries to place weapons in

orbit. Constructing anti-missile system would

infringe upon this equilibrium as one state could

easily prevent from being armed by the other’s

strike.

Alexei Arbatov, Director of the Center on

International Securities Studies in Moscow wrote

after this announcement that “The strategic

balance between the United States and Russia is

becoming less stable, and the objective, technical

possibility of a first strike by the United States is

increasing. At a time of crisis, this instability

could lead to an accidental nuclear war. For

instance, if Russia feared a U.S. first strike,

Moscow might make rash moves (such as putting

its forces on alert) that would provoke a U.S.

attack.”

On the one hand, USA fears a potential pre-

emptive-attack from anti-satellites weapons or

the explosion of a nuclear device in outer space

on their interest and justify their anti-satellite

weapons development policy. On the other hand,

other governments are concerned by their own

vulnerabilities in front of a potential space

weapons hegemony of the USA. It is a security

dilemma; countries that do not threaten USA are

tempted to enhance their own security systems,

which increase in the end the global insecurity of

the situation.

To conclude with, an arms race in outer would

create an auto maintained increase in global

insecurity feeling, leading governments to

enhance their defense systems. A single sparkle

could then trigger a completely global and violent

conflict.

Moreover, the Moon Agreement of 1979 ,

endorsed by the COUPUOS and adopted by the

General Assembly, added new specifications

hammering the ban on weapons AND the

establishment of military bases, installations and

fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons

and the conduct of military maneuvers on the

Moon. Nevertheless, the use of military personnel

for scientific research or for any other peaceful

purposes shall not be prohibited.

To begin with, it is important to notice that

preventing an arm race in outer has been

considered as a proper issue since 1958,

regarding the danger of nuclear weapons, with a

resolution of the General Assembly claiming, “that outer space should be used for peaceful purposes only,” and creating the Committee on Peaceful Use in Outer Space (COPUOS).

In 1963, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon

Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and

Under Water, first announced a ban on nuclear

weapon test in outer space to prevent his

proliferation. Nevertheless, China, France and

North Korea did not sign it.

However, the first real treaty, considering Outer

Space as an issue for the peaceful development

of humankind was the Outer Space Treaty,

engineered by the COPUOS, adopted by the UN

General Assembly and entered into force in

1967. It anchored basic principles into

international relations in outer space between

countries such as which today make a clear

consensus for Spatial States (Except Iran that

signed but not ratified it):

Outer Space shall be free for exploration and

use by all States Outer Space is not subject to national

appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means

of use or occupation, or by any other means States shall not place nuclear weapons of mass

destruction in orbit, or on celestial bodies or

station them in outer space in any other manner States shall be liable for damage caused by their

space objects States shall avoid harmful contamination of

space and celestial bodies

Juridical Issues and Debates Nevertheless, treaties are showing their limits

now as they fail to encircle the reality of

weaponry in Outer Space, introducing a need to

new proposals.

To begin with, there is vagueness on several definitions in the treaties.

For instance, in any treaty, the term “Outer

Space” has been defined. Indeed, the limit

between our atmosphere and Outer Space is

implicitly placed at 100 km above the sea level.

The lack of any legal international definition was considered as useful as he permitted to make flexible Space Law. However, this lack is threatening the effectiveness of the treaties, especially with the development of Space planes for instance.

Nevertheless, a clear consensus has emerged

since the Outer Space Treaty upon the strict

prohibition of nuclear weapons in Outer Space or

Celestial Bodies. This issue has not been

questioned since therefore.

In addition, the term “pacific purposes” has been

debated, especially by the USA and USSR since

the Cold War. According to USA, “pacific” is

assimilated to “non-aggressive” and States should

keep a right of self-defence in outer space, in

accordance with the article 51 of the Charter of

the United Nations. On the other hand, USSR

interpreted that the existence of a right of self-

defence should not permit the use of certain type

of weapons such as bacteriologic weapons.

However, Russia has now recognised how crucial

monitoring satellites are to verify the respect of

the treaties by other States .Moreover, the

scientific development has progressively

outdated some articles of these treaties. Some

States fear the rising of new conventional

weapons able to target and take down outer space

satellites or to reach terrestrial territories through

orbital trajectories. For instance, the 1972 Anti-

Ballistic Missile Treaty should have permit to

restrain Anti-Satellite Technology, but the

withdrawal of the United States of America in

2002 re-accented the need of a new legislation to

curb a potential arms race in Outer Space.

A new departure to strengthened proposals Facing the obsolescence of old legislations, the

last decade has seen new proposals and draft

emerging in order to finally give the international

community the right tools to prevent a race.

First, prevention of an arms race in outer space

(PAROS) has established a legal framework

since a few decades.

For instance, the Conference on Disarmament

(Permanent multi-lateral treaty negotiating body,

independent from the United Nations) has

created ad hoc a committee in 1985 to discuss

especially of a PAROS treaty that would

complement the 1967 Outer Space treaty.

Nevertheless, it is known that the committee

made little progress during the end of the XX

Century because of the blocking of some

Western Countries (especially the United States

of America).

Through the First Committee, the General

Assembly has regularly pointed out the

emergency of the negotiation of a PAROS treaty

through numerous resolutions such as

A/C.1/66/L.14 in 2014.

In 2008, China and Russia initiated the Prevention of the placement of weapons in outer

space Treaty (PPWT) to the Conference on

Disarmament. A working paper of 2002, written

Moreover, these measures were not in

contradiction with the free exploration and free

use of Outer Space principles and the self-

defence right. Nevertheless, USA rejected the

draft considering it as “a diplomatic ploy by the

two nations to gain a military advantage”.

A new draft was presented in 2014 with

specifications as for instance the role of the UN,

but makes disappears the “outer space”

definition.

Concerning TCBMs, after a 2007 report of the

UN Secretary-General, it has to be noticed that a

consensus report was introduced to the General

Assembly in 2013 by a Group of Governmental

Expert, calling for measure including

coordination and consultative mechanisms for

instance. Furthermore, it recommended

establishing increased coordination between the

Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Office for

Outer Space Affairs and other appropriate UN

entities.

Finally yet importantly, the European Union

began in 2008 a procedure to build an

International Code of Conduct for Outer Space

Activities (ICoC). As it is not a proper treaty, it

has to be seen as a voluntary basis of principles amongst states. Thus, it proclaims: All countries’ inheritable right to use

space for peaceful purposes Protection of security and reliability of

space objects in orbit; and Consideration for states’ legitimate

defence interests

If Australia, Canada, Japan and USA endorsed

now the ICoC, some countries such as Brazil,

Russia, India and China were disappointed that

their opinions would have not been asked and

raised concerns about their future possibilities of

outer space activities development.

Law making has been initiated and several

treaties signed in order to limit the

implementation of weapons in outer-space,

however, the success of these measures are more

due to difficulty to launching on orbit than thanks

to the strength of these agreements.

Cost and complexity of means to put on orbit

explains the failure of negative projects.

Nevertheless, in a really close future, less

expensive means will be developed. They will

open the outer-space space to more countries, no

matter their intentions or stability.

If the international community is convicted to

prevent a future war in the outer-space, other

countries who have space activities should

impulse a better control and risk management

over these issues. The international community

should define more precise methods of control to

set up limits over range and technologies.

FURTHER MORE:

On the international legal framework http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/tos/tos.html

§ http://www.un.org/disarmament/special/meetings/firstcommittee/69/

§ Last draft “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” : A/C.1/69/L.3/Rev.1, and “No first placement of weapons in outer space” A/C.1/69/L.14

On spatial programs

The US Space strategy 2020 : http://www.worldacademy.org/files/The_US_Space_Command_Vision_for_2020.pdf

§ On Chinese space program: http://sinodefence.com/ On Japan : http://www.spaceandtech.com/digest/flash2002/flash2002-076.shtml