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Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham [email protected]

Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham [email protected]

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Page 1: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Welcome

Strategies of Network Organizations

Jonathan D. [email protected]

Page 2: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

What are Networked Companies?

Supply chains Procurement systems Sales channels Out sourcing Off shoring Inter-Organizational Systems E-Lance and Free-Lance Web Sevices New constructions of transacting entities

that do business in fundamentally new ways.

Page 3: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Where technology affects transactions

Page 4: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Why study them?

New methods of transacting offer new challenges for management

Understand what they are Understand the problems and

conflicts Find and use the right tools to

analyze problems and recommend solutions.

Page 5: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

The basic phenomenon

Advances in Information and Communication Technology have enabled new methods of interacting and transacting.

Buying, selling, contracting, supplier relationships, vendor relationships, price setting, etc…

Page 6: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Where the Tools meet the Technology

EconomicsSociologyManagement

Page 7: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Core Issues

Transacting In-house or out-source? Boundary of the firm Sourcing agreements Contract management Employees & personnel management

in networks Intermediaries Pricing

Page 8: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Economics as a Discipline

Assumes that people have endogenous utility functions and they pursue them

Largely a problem of optimization Must make certain assumptions about people/firms to

solve optimization problems Defines generic roles and structures for agents/firms

– calculates equilibrium point If you can live with the assumptions and logic, it can

be very powerful!!!! Base discipline for Strategy, Finance, Marketing,

Accounting…..

Page 9: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Sociology

“Sociology is a science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects.... Action is social when it takes into account the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course“ (Weber, 1947).

Preferences and actions are exogenously determined….The big sponge view

Page 10: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Road Map

Page 11: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Life Insurance & Suicide

Suicide Frequencies

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29

Months after life insurance policy issued

Fre

qu

en

cy

Page 12: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Information Asymmetry

Differences among individuals in their information, especially when this information is relevant to determining an efficient plan or determining individual performance.

In simple terms: a situation that exists when some people have better information than others.

Example: Insider trading

Page 13: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

2 types of Information Asymmetry

1. Hidden characteristics Things one party to a transaction knows

about itself, but which are unknown by the other party.

2. Hidden actions Actions taken by one party in a

relationship that cannot be observed by the other party.

Page 14: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Scenarios

You rent a car, you’re young, beautiful a free spirited, wind in your hair. Go ahead, trash the car, drive it hard, Why Not????

You’ve been working hard all day. The boss leaves for a few hours. Go ahead, kick back, relax, drink a beer, surf the net….Why Not???

Page 15: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Moral Hazard Originally from the tendency of people with

insurance to reduce the care they take to avoid losses or reduce insured losses. Now the term refers to a form of post-contractual opportunism that arises when actions desired or required under the contract are not freely observable.

Situation where one party to a contract takes a hidden action that benefits him or her at the expense of another party.That is.. you do not directly bear the consequences of your actions.

1. potential divergence of interest2. basis of gainful exchange or transaction3. difficulties in monitoring and enforcing

Page 16: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Solutions I

Signaling Attempt by an informed party to send

an observable indicator of his or her hidden characteristics to an uninformed party.

To work, the signal must not be easily mimicked by other types.

Example: Education… ESADE MBA

Page 17: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Solutions II

Improve monitoring Competing sources of information Monitoring by markets Explicit incentive contracts. Linking pay to

some operational output Achieving goal congruence Sources of social governance eg. reputation,

peer approval, morals, religion, culture, Corporate culture: Workable principles or routines

of shared expectations that guide behavior in the face of uncertainty.

Page 18: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Problem

Characteristics of population have specific mean and distribution, but those buying insurance have different profile. Why?

Examples: Choice of medical plans High-interest loans Auto insurance for drivers with bad records USAA

Page 19: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Adverse Selection

pre-contractual opportunism that arises when one party to a bargain has private information about something that affects the other's net benefit, implying that it would be dis -advantageous for another party to enter the contract

Situation where individuals have hidden characteristics and in which a selection process results in a pool of individuals with undesirable characteristics

Page 20: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Solutions

Screening Attempt by an uninformed party to sort

individuals according to their characteristics.

Often accomplished through a self-selection device A mechanism in which informed parties are

presented with a set of options, and the options they choose reveals their hidden characteristics to an uninformed party.

Example: Price discrimination

Page 21: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Opportunism: degrees

1. Self interested behavior2. Self interested behavior

unconstrained by morality3. Opportunism with guile: you may

actually not mind, or even enjoy - doing something at someone else's expense!

Page 22: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Opportunism: Debate!!!

Is it soooo bad???? Just how prevalent is it? How to we mitigate or protect

ourselves against it? If we consciously choose not to be

opportunistic, is it because we are simply “good” people, or is it because we believe there will be long term benefits?

Page 23: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Buying a Car

You are here!

Price= 11,000Nom. Value= 100Distance= 12mi.Value(dist).=1.89

Price= 15,000Nom. Value= 95Distance= 15mi.Value(dist.)=1.05

Price= 10,000Nom. Value= 140Distance= 18mi.Value(dist.)=1.94

Page 24: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Bounded Rationality

The limitations of human mental abilities that prevent people from foreseeing all possible contingencies and calculating their optimal behavior.

Also includes limitations of human language that prevent people from communicating things that are known.

We assume agents are rational, but only sort of rational

Theoretical garbage can

Page 25: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Fairness - Retaliation

Negative Reciprocity & Envy: You hurt me, I will hurt you back! I will even take pleasure in it making you suffer loose something at my expense.

Explanations: Comes from survival instincts in nature

Only in very simple societies do we find less negative reciprocity (people are happy with relatively small shares of money).

Page 26: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Altruism & Fariness

Economist world view based on self interested behavior.

I help you, even when I get nothing back for it..

How do we explain it? Why don’t companies reduce salaries

in hard times? The fire people instead

Page 27: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

An experiment

Imagine you are stranded on a beach on a sweltering day and that someone offers to go for their favorite brand of beer. How much would they be willing to pay?

Subjects agree to pay more if they are told that the beer is being purchased from an exclusive hotel rather than from a rundown grocery. It strikes them as unfair to pay the same.

But a beer is a beer and should be worth the same???

Social preference: I accept prices that I feel are fair to you…

Page 28: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Buying a house

I am selling my house for 350,000 If you knew I bought it 3 years ago for

320,000, would you think it is a good deal?

If you new I bought it 3 years ago for 150,000, would you think it is a good deal?

Page 29: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

What is the average rainfall of New Zealand?

45cm 55cm 63cm 79cm 114cm 123cm 156cm

Page 30: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

The Law of Small Numbers – Weber’ law (people are petty…)

I. You are buying a glass of orange juice. You can buy it here for 4 Euro, or walk across the street and buy it for 3 Euro. What do you do?

II. You are buying a big screen TV. You can buy it here for 800 Euro, or walk across the street and buy it for 799 Euro. What do you do?

III. the impact of a change in intensity of a stimulus is proportional to the absolute level of the original stimulus. In financial terms, a $500 gain on a $100 investment is greater psychologically than a $500 gain on a $1000 investment.

Page 31: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Investors

Alex invested 100,000 Euro and gained 27,000 for a total of 127,000 Euro.

Anne invested 300,000 Euro and lost 39,000 for a total of 261,000 Euro.

Who is happier? Why?

Page 32: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Prospect Theory

Page 33: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Prospect Theory Says

1 unit of loss hurts about twice as much as 1 unit of gain. So….We are loss averse

What would you rather have; 10 Euro today, or 5 Euro today and 5 Euro next week? Changes are more important than absolute levels

What is better – you crash your car once and it costs you 1000 Euro. You crash your car twice and it costs you 400 and 600 Euro respectively.

Page 34: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Changes..

What is happiness? Are rich people really happier? (Of

course they are) We anchor everything to our current

status. Sooo What: Combine losses, spread

out gains We tend to hold onto loosing stocks..

Page 35: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

...Decisions Are Not Always “Rational”

Tickets; $7.95

$1.00 Discount for Children &

Seniors

Tickets; $7.95

$1.00 Discount for Children &

Seniors

Tickets; $6.95

$1.00 Extrafor Middle Aged

People

Tickets; $6.95

$1.00 Extrafor Middle Aged

People

Page 36: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Price Perception Issues are Complex...

More Acceptable Pricing Product-Based Open Discretionary Discounts and

Promotions Rewards

Less Acceptable Pricing Customer-Based Hidden Imposed Surcharges Penalties

Page 37: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Time

You are going to order a new BMW for 60,000 Euro.

The car dealer A tells you that you can get the car delivered in 7 days.

Car dealer B, who is 4 blocks away, tells you the car can be delivered in 3 days.

Do you walk down the street to the other car dealer – price and other options being equal?

Page 38: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Time

You are going to order a special BMW for 140,000 Euro.

The car dealer A tells you that you can get the car delivered in 94 days

Car dealer B, who is 4 blocks away, tells you the car can be delivered in 90 days.

Do you walk down the street to the other car dealer – price and other options being equal?

Page 39: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Procrastination

Scenario A May 1: Work 7 hours May 2: Relax

Scenario B May 1 Relax May 2 Work 7.7 hours

Today is April 30th - which option would you choose?

Page 40: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Procrastination

Scenario A August 1: Work 7 hours August 2: Relax

Scenario B August 1 Relax August 2 Work 8 hours

Today is April 30th - which option would you choose?

Page 41: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

What is the average rainfall of New Zealand?

63cm 79cm 114cm 123cm 156cm 164cm 178cm

Page 42: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Framing Effects

People base their decisions on the references given

Extremes aversion 2nd cheapest wine most expensive

Page 43: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

Endowment Effects

What would you pay for this chair?

10.00 Euro fine How much will

you sell this chair for?

10.01 Euro???

Page 44: Welcome Strategies of Network Organizations Jonathan D. Wareham wareham@acm.org

What are market transactions?

They are defined by:

Moral hazard Adverse selection Information asymmetry Bounded rationality Opportunism

Uncertainty