Weick (1995) - What Theory is Not, Theorizing is (OCR)

7/29/2019 Weick (1995) - What Theory is Not, Theorizing is (OCR)

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What Theory Products of the theorizing process seldom emerge as

Theorizing Is blown theories. which means that most of what passes fortheory in organizational studies consists of approximations.Although these approximations vary in their generality, few

Karl Weick of them take the form of strong theory, and most of themUniversity of Michigan can be read as texts created "in lieu of" strong theories.

These substitutes for theory may from lazy theorizingin which people try to graft theory onto stark sets of data.But they may also represent interim struggles in which

people intentionally inch toward stronger theories. Theproducts of laziness and intense struggles may look thesame and may consist of references, data, lists, diagrams,and hypotheses. To label these five as "not theory" makessense if the problem is laziness and incompetence. Butruling out those same five may slow inquiry if the problemtheoretical development still in its early stages. Sutton andStaw know this. But it gets lost in their concern with theoryas a product rather than as a process. To add complicationand nuance to their message, I want to focus on theprocess of theorizing.

Before I do so, I want to confess to considerable unease insaying anything that could dilute their basic point. It'sconceivable that journals are suffering from a rash ofsubmissions with half-baked pretensions to theory, andSutton and Staw are trying to root them out and put futureauthors on notice. Any commentary that complicates thatmessage or adds nuance to it may subvert a straightforwardplea. I'd hate get in the way of the message that weneed better theory. would also hate to dilute the messagethat some authors think they are moving us towardbetter theory actually are doing the opposite. Thus. I endorseSutton and Staw's message that theory is not something

one "adds," nor is it something one transforms from weakerinto stronger by means of graphics or references, nor is itsomething can be feigned by a flashy conceptualperformance. That having been said, I want to complicatetheir essay by a closer look at the theorizing process.

M y main reaction to their argument is that I am less certainthan Sutton and Staw seem to be that the five article partsthey discuss are not theory. I say this because most theoriesapproximate rather than realize the conditions necessary fora strong theory and because these five parts themselveshave gradations of abstractness and generality.

by University,0601

I begin with the issue of approximation. Most products thatare labeled theories actually approximate theory. Merton(1967) has been mast articulate about this point andsuggests that approximations take at least four forms:general orientations in which broad frameworks specifytypes of variables people should take into account, without

specification of relationships among these variables; (2)analysis of concepts in which concepts are specified,clarified, and defined but not interrelated; post-factuminterpretation in which ad hypotheses are derived from a

single observation, with no effort to explore alternative

explanations or new observations; and (4) empiricalgeneralization in which an isolated proposition summarizesthe relationship between two variables, but further

Science Quarterly, 40 (1995):



interrelations are no t attempted. While none of these arefull-blown theories, they can serve as means to furtherdevelopment. If they are serving this function, then it isimperative that the author make this clear. But the merepresence of any one of Merton's four is not proof thatshoddy theorizing is underway. And all four of these mightassume the guise of one or more of the parts of an articletha t trouble Sutton and Staw.

The assertion that theory is approximated mor e often than itis realized can be illustrated by Runkel and Runkel's (1984:30) marvelous effort argue tha t theory is a

continuum rather than a dichotomy:

Many social scientists hesitate to claim they are writing theory. Wesee titles of articles. even books, like An Approach to a Theory of . . . , Notes Toward a Theory o f . . . , and A Prolegomenon to a Theory of. . . . Instead theory, we see words and phrases thatmean about the same thing: Conceptual Framework for, Some Principles Model of . Rarely do we see a title that says straightout: A Theory of. . . .

Perhaps some social scientists yearn for a Theory That Sweeps

Away All Others. Perhaps they avoid being accused of overweeningambition by claiming not to be writing a Theory. but only a

conceptual framework or a model.We think it too bad to reservetheory to mean only Good Theory or Grand Theory orTheory. We would like writers to feel free to use theory wheneverthey theorizing. Modesty is all very well, but leaning over toofar backward removes a good word from currency.

Theory belongs to the family of words that includes guess,speculation, supposition, conjecture, proposition, hypothesis,conception, explanation, model. The dictionaries permit us to usetheory for anything from "guess" to "a system of assumptions,accepted principles, and rules of procedure devised to analyze.predict, or otherwise explain the nature or behavior of a specifiedset of phenomena" Heritage Social scientistswill naturally want to use terms with more care than they are usedby the general populace. They will naturally want to underpin theirtheories with more empirical data than they need for a speculation.They will naturally want a to incorporate more than onehypothesis. We plead only that they not save theory to labeltheir ultimate triumph, but use it as to label their interimstruggles.

If everything from a "guess" to a general falsifiable

explanation has a tinge of theory to it, then it becomes moredifficult to separate what is theory fr om what isn't,especially if theory development starts with guesses and

speculations and ends with explanations and models.

There is a third sense in which theories in organizational

studies are approximations, and this involves in thetheory construction process. Theorists start with a vision fora theory and change it "from entwined ideas at the edge ofwords to a linear order in which the ideas are unraveled andset forth in the form of a propositional argument"

and Kaplan, 1973: 147).A nonlinear vision losesaccuracy when it is converted into propositions. That isnormal, natural trouble in theorizing. But it is also one mor ereason why theories approximate, w h y they are one-sided

accentuations (Bacharach, 1989: and why it can betough t o separate texts that are not theory texts thatare. A text that looks like "not theory

r

' may simply be a

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clumsy attempt to disassemble a gestalt into linearpropositions. Wi th more practice and more nuancedlanguage comes more of the originating insight.

So part of what Sutton and Staw make clearer to m e is howhard it is in a low-paradigm field, in which people are novicetheorists, to spot which of their efforts are theory and whichare not. This difficulty arises because theory work can take a

variety of forms, because theory itself is a continuum, and

because most verbally expressed theory leaves tacit somekey portions of the originating insight. These considerationssuggest that is tough to judge whether is atheory or not when only the product itself is examined. Whatone needs to know, instead, is more about the context inwhich the product lives. This is the process of theorizing. Ifwe take a closer look at Sutton and Staw's five forms of "notheory," some seem closer to theory than others, and allfive can serve as means to theory construction.

Unconnected references, especially those that areceremonial citations, are not theory when they merely pointto theories. I agree with Sutton and Staw that we need

more precise descriptions of wha t is being extracted fromreferences. This prescription needs to be conveyed toreviewers as well as authors, since reviewers make thesame error. They are just as likely as authors to recommendadditional references as substitutes for theory without beingany clearer about why the reference is relevant.Furthermore, if authors do pinpoint and paraphrase key ideasin references, rather than simply point to them, this takesspace. Reviewers and editors may need to be more tolerantof space-consuming exegesis if they want something otherthan cryptic citations.

Data by themselves are not theory, and Bacharach (1989:made the same point in the Academy of Management Review special issue on theory. That having been reaffirmed,theorists also need to be attentive to Starbuck's (1993)argument that, just as the best medical doctors treatsymptoms directly without relying on diagnosis to determinetreatments, the best theorists may make prescriptions basedon data alone introducing theory between data andprescriptions. In both cases. diagnoses and theories comelast and summarize observed relations between

and In both cases,there are more combinations of symptoms than there are

diagnoses or theories, which means that translatingsymptoms into diagnoses discards information. Since thereare also more treatments than diagnoses, basing treatmentson diagnoses injects random errors. The key links arebetween symptoms and treatments, w ith feedback fromtreatments making these links clear. Once these effectsbecome clear, then the theorist knows better what is beingtreated and can attempt a diagnosis or explanation.(1993: 91) summarized his argument this way:

Academic research is trying to follow a model like that taught in

medical schools. Scientists are translating data into theories, andpromising to develop prescriptions from the theories. Data are like

symptoms. theories like diagnoses, and prescriptions liketreatments. Are not organizations as dynamic as human bodies and

similarly complex? Theories do not capture all the information in

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data, and they do not determine prescriptions uniquely. Perhapsscientists could establish stronger links between data andprescriptions if they did not introduce theories between them.Indeed, should not data be results of prescriptions? Should nottheories come from observing relations between prescriptions andsubsequent data?

Sutton and Staw are still right, data are not theories. If dataalone are presented in lieu of theory, and reviewers are

tempted to reject the effort as bad theory, the data may be

tied to prescriptions and treatments as a means to get totheory. If this is the case, then the data have more theoryrelevance. This rationate needs to be spelled out by theauthor, but it is a reason why data may be closer to theorythan they appear to be.

I suspect that tight coupling between treatments andsymptoms, with belated theorizing of the outcomes, is a

fairly common tactic in theory construction. In my own ASQpaper reanalyzing the Mann Gulch disaster (Weick,the argument developed partially by taking the Mann Gulchdata as symptoms and , through a series of thought trialscorresponding to treatments, seeing which concepts made adifference in those symptoms. This exercise in disciplinedimagination resulted eventually in the theory thatsensemaking collapses when role structures collapse and inthe realization, helped through discussions with LanceSandelands, that Freud had said the same thing 70 yearsearlier. Consistent with Sutton and Staw's point, I did notsimply submit the Mann Gulch as theory.But consistent with Starbuck's point, neither did the theorycome early in the process. The differential "responsiveness"of data to changes in a treatment is frequently aninformative precursor to theorizing. Some people who seemto confuse data with theory may simply be midway throughthis process. Their progress may or may not warrantpublication. But their blurring of lines between data andtheory may foreshadow active rather than lazy inquiry.

Lists of variables are farther from a well-developed theorythan are stories, but lists still can approximate a theory. Thetacit message in a list is that items not on this list are lesscrucial determinants than those that are it. Another tacitmessage of a list is that the more items on the list that are

and the stronger the activation of each, the moredeterminate is the relationship. Lists also convey the tacitmessage that causation is assumed to be simultaneous

rather than sequential, that history is less crucial thancontemporary structure, that relations among items areadditive, and that items toward the top of the list are moreimportant than items toward the bottom. I realize theseinformal theoretical messages may be inadvertent andsimply wrong. But as long as there is an implied set ofrelations among items in the list, or one can infer such

there are the beginnings of a theory. I would neveraccept a list as a theory, nor would Sutton and Staw. Imight, however, be more inclined to treat the list as closerto theory than they would, since relatively small amounts oftweaking and articulation could make i t an explanation.

Diagrams are not theory. But if you compare diagrams tolists, it should be clear that diagrams are more explicit than

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ASQ

lists about sequence, more and less determinaterelationships, and about pathways of influence. Theseconnections are clear in many of the diagrams found inStaw's theorizing Figure 2, Staw and Ross, 1987: 720).I personally envy his skill at crafting meaningful boxes andarrows because, having tried over and over without success

to do know how hard it is. When Staw and Rossdiagram the antecedents of escalation, diagram showsthat as commitment escalates so, too, does the number ofpeople involved and the level of analysis necessary tocapture the key dynamics from individual domain toproject domain to structural domain). The implied propositionis that commitment that escalates within a level is lesscostly than commitment tha t escalates between levels. Theyalso imply that the more domains that are activated by thecommitment, the more likely it is to escalate. These patternsare implicit in their diagrams, rather than explicit in theirpropositions. But they are plausible assertions suggested byt he way they represent the phenomenon, and theygeneralize across particulars.

Finally, stand-alone hypotheses ("

empirical generalizations"

in Merton's list) are not themselves theory because authorsremain silent about why these hypotheses and not otherones are being stated. Nevertheless, isolated hypotheses areclose to theories and lack only connections with propositionsand concepts t o make them into such (Bacharach, 1989:

connecting may necessitate little more thanraising the level of abstraction of key terms in thehypotheses.

summarize my point about the five parts, the issueseems to be one of means and ends. And the question is,

you publish just ends, or do you publish what Runkel and

Runkel called "interim struggles?"The process of theorizingconsists of activities like abstracting, generalizing, relating,selecting, ekplaining, synthesizing, and idealizing. Theseongoing activities intermittently spin reference lists, data,lists of variables, diagrams. and lists hypotheses. Thoseemergent products summarize progress, give direction, andserve as They have vestiges of theory but are

not themselves theories. Then again, few things arefull-fledged theories. The key lies in the context-what camebefore, what comes next? And this question of context canbe phrased in terms of Sutton and Staw's five parts. If priorand subsequent steps in theorizing are merely more of thesame

-

diagrams preceded this paper and diagrams will bethe focus of the next paper

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then the theorizing is lessrobust and promising than if people are moving from one ofthe through a second of t h e five, on to a third of thefive. Furthermore, references and data seem to have lessgenerality and seem to be farther from theory than do lists,diagrams. and hypotheses. If that is plausible, then it meansthat it is easier to reject papers that use the first two in lieuof theory than those that use the last three.

So where does this leave us? It says in part that if much ofwha t we do consists of approximations, then, as Sutton and

Staw say, we may expect too much of any one attempt attheorizing. any explanation wi ll always be deficient in oneor more of the qualities of generality, accuracy, and

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simplicity, then the best we can hope for a r e tradeoffs.Actually ASQ already knows this. Sutton and Staw begintheir essay by quoting this sentence from the Notice toContributors: manuscripts contain no theory, theiris suspect." The next t wo sentences, which they left out,speak of tradeoffs: "Ungrounded theory, however, is nomore helpful than are atheoretical data. We are receptive tomultiple forms of grounding, but not to a completeavoidance of nding.

,

Perhaps t h e ultimate is the one between processand product, between theorizing and theory, between doingit and freezing it. If one or more of the five texts are not partof an interim struggle that is clearly articulated anddocumented, then their use in lieu of theory warrantsrejection. If, however, the five are part of an interim strugglethat is moving from one text t o another, a struggle whosepast and future is made clear by the author, then I betempted to give the author another shot at articulating boththe process and the product and to ask for a revise andresubmit.

REFERENCES

Bacharach, Samuel B.989 theories:

Some criteria for evaluation."Academy of Management

14: 496-51

Robert K.967 On Theoretical

New York: Free Press.

Runkel, Phillip J., and Margaret

Runkel984 A Guide to Usage for Writers

and Students in the SocialTotowa, NJand

Starbuck, William .

1993 "Watch where you step! orIndiana amid theperils of academe." In ArthurG. Bedeian led.), ManagerialLaureates, 3 : 63-1 10.Greenwich, CT: Press.

Staw, Barry M., and Jerry Ross1987 "Commitment to a policy

decision: Aperspective." AdministrativeScience Quarterly, 23:

Warren D., andCharles D. Kaplan1973 Science and It s Image.

New York: Harper Row.

Weick, Karl E.1993 "The collapse of sensemaking

in organizations: The Mann

Gulch disaster."Science

Quarterly, 38:

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Weick (1995) - What Theory is Not, Theorizing is (OCR)