Weber Reasonofstate

"What a Good Ruler Should Not Do": Theoretical Limits of Royal Power in European Theoriesof Absolutism, 1500-1700Author(s): Wolfgang WeberSource: The Sixteenth Century Journal, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Winter, 1995), pp. 897-915Published by: The Sixteenth Century JournalStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2543793Accessed: 18/07/2009 12:10

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Sixteenth CenturyJournal XXVI/4 (1995)

"What a Good Ruler Should Not Do":

Theoretical Limits of Royal Power in European

Theories of Absolutism, 1500-1700

Wolfgang Weber University ofAtugsburg

The article provides an overview of political ideas about limiting royal power which were developed by Latin-writing German bourgeois authors of the late sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries: Arnold Clapmar (1574-1604),Justus Lipsius (1547-1606), Henning Arnisaeus (ca. 1575-1636), Adam Contzen (1571-1635), Hermann Con- ring (1606-1681), and others. The core concept of the debate was the idea of the common good. This common good referred to a twofold goal of politics, a beatitudo for the individual citizen, which laid in some sense beyond the state, and the conservation of the state by means of a moderated reason of state.Thus, the authors tried to improve the monarch's ability to rule as well as to bind him by certain ideas of individual freedom, rights, and opportunities to live happily and securely. A most influential maxim was Regnum solurn potest conservari, si reges litnitatam habeantt potestatem (the kingdom can only be preserved if the power of kings is limited).

Two BASIC ASSUMPTIONS underlie contemporary research on absolutism. The first rejects the traditional view that Europe's early modern monarchs were really all- powerful. This view argues that despite their best efforts monarchs never gained absolute freedom of political action. Instead, the royal quest for power was limited by traditions, institutions, and social forces even in the model absolute monarchies of France, Prussia, and Denmark.tThe second assumption, linked to the first, attacks still another traditional view. In its more statist form this traditional view traces the beginnings of absolutism back to the imposition of absolutist formulas from above; in its Marxist variant it claims that absolutism arose inevitably in accor- dance with historical laws. By contrast, contemporary historical research sees the rise of absolutism as the result of specific conditions which vary greatly in the different regions of Europe. Thus, absolutism is now seen as neither monolithic in its effects, nor uniform in character.2

This new view of absolutism is caused in part by shifts in the use of sources. Traditional political studies drew mainly on theoretical literature, which is relatively

'For Denmark as an absolutist model case, see Peter Brandt, "Von der Adelstnonarchie zur k6nig- lichen Eingewalt. Der Umbau der Standesgesellschaft in der Vorbereitungs- und Friihphase des ddnischen Absolutismus," Historischle Zeitschrfft 250 (1990): 33-72.

2See Roland Mousnier, "Quelques remarques pour une comparaison des monarchies absolues en Europe et en Asie," Revue Historiqute 272 (1984): 29-44; Geoffrey Treasuire, The Making of Modern Eutrope 1648-1780 (New York: Methuen, 1985); Ernst Hinrichs, ed.,Absolittismtis (Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, 1986); Heinz Duchhardt, Das Zeitalter des Absoltitismnus (Miinchen-Wien: Oldenbourg, 1989).

897

898 Sixteenth CenturyJournal XXVI / 4 (1995)

easy to locate and use. But because this literature favors a systematic approach to its subject, it encourages historians to see absolutism as a system. More recent historians of absolutism, on the other hand, have begun to draw on public records that document absolutist politics in action. This approach not only brings to light important "structural problems" of absolutism, but also accentuates the "nonabso- lutistic" within absolutism. For example, some recent contributions emphasize the close attachment of absolutism to its social basis, and its dependence on estates, to such an extent that one scholar already purports to see "a nearly total destruction" of absolutism as a historical concept.3

In this state of scholarship a contribution to the history of political ideas limiting royal power seems to be both traditional and revisionist: traditional insofar as it is based on the theoretical literature, and revisionist because these texts are exam- ined for arguments that limit or qualify the traditional concept of absolutism rather than supporting it. Since the work of Quentin Skinner and J. G. A. Pocock we know the decisive importance of the context of a text.Therefore, we have to look first to the conditions in which these sources were written and used.

* * *

Early modern Europe's most influential political ideas originated in its dynamic peripheries to the south (Italy and Spain), to the west (France), and to the north (the Netherlands and England). From our perspective, the most important amal- gamation and elaboration of these ideas nevertheless took place in central Europe. The majority of Europe's universities were located in the Holy Roman Empire, and these universities played a key role in the formation of the German territorial states.They functioned as training institutions for clerical and civil personnel, they contributed to the political socialization of academic elites, and they provided important consultative, administrative, and political services, especially in matters of law. Thus, they often became widely accepted centers of practical political and juridical wisdom, but by no means of a merely proabsolutist and uncritical character.4The professors constituted an essential group of the territorial bourgeoisie, which began definitively to separate from the urban bourgeoisie by the 1550s. Thus, they were socially positioned in a strategic way. On one side stood the prince, from whom they drew orders, money, and a good part of their prestige. On the other side was the aristocracy, with whom they competed for high positions in the prince's council. On a third side were the urban bourgeoisie, with whom they maintained certain relations. Then there was the European res publica litteraria to

3Gerhard Oestreich, Neostoicisnm and the Early Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); idem,Antiker Geist tind Moderner Staat beijulstus Lipsius (1547-1606), Schriftenreihe der Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademnie der Wissenschaften, 38 (Gottingen:Vanden- hoeck & Ruprecht, 1989); for the quote, Ulrich Muhlack, "Absoluter Firstenstaat und Heeresorgani- sation in Frankreich im Zeitalter Ludwigs XIV," in Staatsverfasswizg und Heeresverfassung in der Euiropiischen Geschichte der Fridien Neuzeit, ed.Johannes Kunisch (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1986), 251.

4Notker Hamnxrerstein, "History of German Universities," History of Eturopean Ideas 8 (1987): 139- 146; idem, "Zur Geschichte und Bedeutung der Universitaten im heiligen Roniischen Reich Deut- scher Nation," Historische Zeitschrft.241 (1985): 287-328.

Weber: Absolutist Theories of Royal Powver, 1500-1 700 899

which they belonged, though less so as time went on. Finally, there were their stu- dents, who came from a variety of social classes and brought in distinct political experiences and interests. These experiences and interests also reflected the con- trasts between the old-fashioned structures of the empire and the modern tendencies of the developing territorial states. For this very reason, the professors, inspired by their own social origin and position, consciously took into consideration all these different experiences and interests, so as to respond productively to the chal- lenges that a modern social order presented for political thought.We are indebted to the German professorial elite both for the development of the Ius publicur Romano-Germanicum as a specific discipline of the empire's law, and for the development of the Politica as a practical science of government on the other hand.5

The evolution of the basic forms of discussion relevant here can be described roughly as follows:At the beginning of the sixteenth century humanist literature on the prince made a fundamental contribution. In contrast to works produced in Italy, which were already partly committed to the modern political thought of Machiavelli, this body of writing was still strongly influenced by Christian ideas. The most influential work of this kind was the Institutio Principis Christiani by Erasmus of Rotterdam. In addition, moral and humanist works such as those by the Spaniard LudovicoVives (1492-1540) were influential.The focus of the discussion was the humanistic and moral education of the prince. It concerned instruction about life and behavior, with specific regard to the prince's duties.6With the break- through of the Reformation, the crucial point of the political debate shifted tem- porarily to theological writing. In Lutheranism the doctrine of the two kingdoms and the subjection of the church to state authority (ecclesia est in republica) led to the creation of a new kind of Protestant "mirror of princes" literature. In the second half of the century this literature developed into comprehensive instructions for rulers by Georg Lauterbeck (ca. 1510-1578).These works revolved around the idea of the "well-policed territory." More and more tasks relating to public order were transferred to the prince, already an ambitious holder of authority.These tasks were to be carried out in the interests of "common welfare." Nevertheless, the extension of the prince's competencies by no means diminished the traditional rights of the estates. The prince remained limited to functions requiring political initiative: independently solving new types of problems, admonishing his subjects, serving as an example to them, and if necessary, standing in as a helper in need. The dangers involved in the growth of his power, in the views of these writers, would be neutralized by even more intensive Christian education and admonition.

5Michael Stolleis, Gesclichte des Offenlichen Rechits, vol. 1: Reichlspnblizistik tond Policeywissensclhafi

1600-1800 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1988); Wolfgang Weber, Prudieictia Gitberniatoria: Studien zur Herr-

schafsleblre in der Detitschleni Politischleni Wissenscliaft des 17. jablrlninderts, Studia Augustana, 4 (Tiibingen:

Niemneyer, 1992). 6Bruno Singer, Die Fiirstenspie el ini Dewtschlanid imti Zeitalter des HIInnianiisitnns nnd der Refirniationl:

Bibliographische Grundlagen nnid Antsgenvhlte Ieterpretationien:Jakob Wimlpfeling, 'otfgatng Scidel, Johanln

Stnrttn: Urbani Rieger, Hunmanistische Bibliothek Reihe I, vol. 34 (Munich:W. Fink, 1981); Rainer A. Muller, "Die deutschen Firstenspiegel des 17.Jahrhunderts: Regierungslehren und politische Pdda- gogik," Historische Zeitschrfit 240 (1985): 571-597.


Christianization in this sense implied a strengthening of religious identity, employing the prince's authority in the interests of the Lutheran confession. In contrast, Catholicism had not yet accepted the relative independence of politics from the Church. On the contrary, the principle of autonomia was decisively opposed to respublica est in ecclesia, non est ecclesia in republica?

In the decades around the turn of the century, new historical conditions fun- damentally changed this pattern of political and social thinking.The intensification of religious conflict increasingly paralyzed the institutions of the empire and presented the danger of military confrontation.The catastrophic results which military confrontation could produce were demonstrated by the religious wars in France and by the Dutch Revolt. There was thus greater need for inner stability, strong rearmament, and legal and diplomatic safeguards for the prince's position. This need led to a growing orientation towards the immediate utilitas publica, rather than principles of religious truth and justice. On the intellectual level, these innovations were accompanied by the rehabilitation ofAristotle at Protestant universities and by the reception of the logic of Peter Ramus, at first in Calvinist territories.

In Helmstedt, the stronghold of Lutheran Aristotelianism, Johannes Caselius (1533-1613) framed the basic patterns of the new Politica. In Strasbourg, Georg Obrecht (1547-1612) accomplished the transition from "police instruction" to politics. One of his pupils, the now forgotten Otto Melander (died 1640), produced the first pamphlet in which the establishment of a special discipline of politics in the universities was proposed. The authority of Bodin's Six Livres de la Republique, the first bible of absolutism, was quickly and broadly acknowledged. A second book of fundamentals, also drawn from France, was the De Republica Libri Sexetviginti (1586) by the Catholic lawyer and professor of law, Pierre Gregoire (PetrusTholosanus, 1540-1597).Authors also began to recognize the usefulness of Machiavellianism. In line with Italian authors on reason of state, Arnold Clapmar (1574-1604) developed in Altdorf a systematic, practical Arcana Imperii doctrine. This teaching touches on the difference between a ratio status [reason of state] genuina and a ratio status spuria. It belonged to the tradition that looked to Tacitus, a tradition which began with the neo-Stoicism ofJustus Lipsius' Politicorum Libri Sex (1589), and lasted into the eighteenth century. For Tacitus permitted writers to propagate modern ideas of state power without having to name the actual prophet of such ideas, the outlawed Florentine. Aristotelianism offered a systematic, scien- tific basis for all these influences. By 1700, it is likely that these traditions had produced over 100 opera systematica politica as basic academic instruction books. They remained standard for a long time because of their argumentative power. Doctrina Politica (1606) and De Republica seu Reflectionis Politicae Libri Duo (1615), both by the medical professor and philosopher from Helmstedt, Henning Arnisaeus (ca. 1575-1636), proposed a most impressive theory of absolutism. This theory

7James Tracy, ed., Luther and the Modern State in Germany, Sixteenth Century Essays and Studies, vol. 7 (Kirksville, Mo.: Sixteenth Century Journal Publishers, 1986); Hans Maier, Die Altere Deutsche Staats- und Verwaltungslehre (1966; rptd. Munich, 1986); Franciscus Burgkard (i.e. Andreas Erstenberger), De Autonomia das ist von Freystellung mehrerlay Religion und Glaubens (Munich: Georg Berg, 1586).

Weber: Absolutist Theories of Royal Power, 1500-1 700 901

influenced among others the lex regia of Denmark (1665). Arnisaeus carried to an extreme Jean Bodin's view of the concentration of sovereignty in the hands of the prince. In Germany, Bodin was also considered the most consistent opponent of the theory of popular sovereignty and of contract theory as formulated in another influential opus systematicum by Johannes Althusius (1557-1638).8

After the middle of the century, the way was prepared for a change in the discussion of these problems. An orientation towards the concrete problems of government could still be seen in the works of Catholic theorists like Adam Contzen (1571-1635) and the new head of the Helmstedt school, Hermann Conring (1606-1681). This emphasis was further elaborated in the work of Johann Franz Buddaeus (1667-1729), whose eclectic philosophy of practice was initially meant for the general public and anticipated the Enlightenment. At the same time, however, the accent shifted gradually to the theoretical context of politics. Discussion of the theory of natural law proposed by Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) was intense. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), on the other hand, was accepted only with hesita- tion because of his method and because of his belief in the monarch's right to decide his subjects' religious confession. One of his few followers (though not a consistent one) was the Frankfurt historian Johann Christoph Becmann (1641- 1717). Samuel Pufendorf (1622-1694) put forward a view of public law that was secular, like Hobbes', and also comparable to Hobbes' system in its absolutist conclusions, though the framework remained Aristotelian. Finally, the rise of territorial absolutism was consistently legitimated and promoted by Christian Thomasius.9

8Stolleis, Geschichte des Offentlichen Rechts, vol. 1: 80-125; Otto Melander, Idea sive Exegesis Uni- versi Studii Politici ex Media Jurisprudentia ac Civili Sapientia Desumnta, et ad Praesentem Romanae Politiae Statumn Accomnmodata Pro Politices Professione in Academias Introducenda (Lich, 1599); Luigi Gambino, nl De Republica di Pierre Gregoire (Milan: Giuffre, 1978);Arnold Clapmar, De Arcanis Rerumpublicarum Libri Sex (Bremen, 1605);Johann Friedrich Reinhard, Theatrum Prudentiae Civilis eijusti Lipsii Libris Politicorumn (Berlin, 1702); Michael Stolleis, "Arcana Imperii und Ratio Status: Bemerkungen zur Politischen Theorie des frilhen 17.Jahrhunderts" (reprint of 1980 ed.), in Staat und Staatsrdson in der Frtihen Neuzeit (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1990), 37-92; Horst Dreitzel, Protestantischer Aristotelismus und Absoluter Staat: Die Politica des Henninq Arnisaeus (ca. 1575-1636), vol. 55 of Verdffentlichungen des Institutsfiir Europaische Geschichte Mainz: Abteilung Universalgeschichte (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1970); and "Der Aristo- telismus in der Praktische Philosophie Deutschlands im 17.Jahrhundert," in Aristotelismus uind Renais- sance. In Memoriam Charles B. Schmitt (Wiesbaden: Harassowitz, 1988), 163-192; Michael Behnen,

"Herrscherbild und Herrschaftstechnik in der Politica des Johannes Althusius," in Zeitschrflt fir His- torische Forschnng, 10 (1984): 417-472; Politische Thieorie desJohannes Althusius, ed. Karl-Wilhelm Dahm, et al., vol.7 of Rechtstheorie. Beihefte (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1988).

9Adam Contzen, Libri X Politicorum, in Quibus de Petfectae Reipublicae Forma ... Itemque Seditione et Bello ... Tractatur: Editio Secunda (Cologne: Johannes Kinck,1629); Robert Bireley, Maximilian von Bay- ern, Adam Contzen SJ. und die Gegenreformation in Deutschland 1624-1635 (Gottingen:Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975); Ernst-Albert Seils, Die Staatslehre desJesuiten Addm Contzen Beichtvater Kurfirst Maxi- milians I. von Bayern, Historische Studien, vol. 405 (Luibeck-Hamburg: Matthiesen, 1968); Hermann Conring, Opera, ed. Johann Wilhelm Gobel, 7 vols. (1730; rptd. Aalen: Scientia, 1970); Hermann Con- ring (1606-1681): Beitrage zu Leben und Werk, ed. Michael Stolleis (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1983); Johann Franz Buddaeus, Elementa Philosophiae Practicae (Halle:Johannes Zeitler, 1712), trans. Klugheit zu Leben und zu Herrschen (Leipzig-Cothen Johann Christoph Corner, 1733);Johann Christoph Becmann, Conspectus Doctrinae Politicae (Frankfurt a.O.: Jeremias Schrey, 1691); Wolfgang Weber, "Die Deutsche Prudentia Politica des 17. Jahrhunderts und Thomas Hobbes," in Thomas Hobbes. Le Ragioni del Moderno tra Teologia e Politica, ed. Gianfranco Borelli (Naples: Morano, 1990), 165-191; Horst Denzer, Moral- philosophie und Naturrecht bei Samuel Pufendorf Eine geistes- und wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zur Geburt des Naturrechts aus der Praktischen Philosophie (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1972); Christian Thonmasius (1655-1728), ed. Werner Schneiders (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1988).


Hence, political thought in the empire during the seventeenth century, with regard to its origins, functions, themes, and tendencies, marked out a constel- lation of pragmatic ideas that, on the whole, may be accepted as representing a decisive phase of Europe's theory of absolutism. Because of its representative quality, balancing the pro- and anti-absolutist extremes of the wider European debate, political thought in the empire may provide a basis for comparison with non-Euro- pean traditions, especially if reconstruction of the debate is limited to a level between abstract theory and technical or administrative issues.

* * *

The texts under discussion here assumed the general goal of politics to be the production of the bonum commune (common good) insofar as the given circumstances and the shortcomings of human nature allow. Bonum commune referred to the true happiness (beatitude) of mankind, but happiness has different meanings. First, the beatitudo in a religious sense is happiness in God, to be achieved through a good life pleasing to God.This traditional view found renewed strength in Bodin's designa- tion of the true worship of God as the goal of the state. At the same time, the humanist definition of beatitude in terms of goodness, honesty, and contentment promoted a secular tendency.10 The goal of politics was thus twofold. Beatitudo in its various meanings was a goal that lay in some sense beyond the state, afinis exter- nus; conservation of the state itself was defined as the finis internus.The most important means to achieve conservatio and stabilitas reipublicae was reason of state, moderated by the exercise of mixed prudence (prudentia mixta).The limits of political actions allowable under these concepts were to be determined according to the circumstances. Machiavelli had dismissed all moral and religious restrictions on political action, but since this solution was unacceptable for most European political theorists of the time, they introduced a series of distinctions. First, the differen- tiation between godly law, natural law, and human law was refined carefully in terms of levels of obligation. In this view, God's revealed law bound the prince absolutely, and natural law obliged him in most cases, but mere human law allowed full scope for creative action by the prince. Second, the distinction between a state of emergency and a normal state of affairs was developed in more detail. During the normal state of affairs (gubernatoria ordinaria), strict religious, moral, and legal rules remained valid. But a state of emergency (casus necessitatis) permitted the state to exercise a gubernatoria extraordinaria that was largely free of restrictions. The authors saw little problem in placing the declaration of this state of emergency at the prince's disposal, because they thought that the prince would use this power in consultation with them (as mentioned above, university professors were often the prince's councilors). But, the wisest heads knew very well the fruitlessness of all attempts to restrain reason of state by norms, and theorists concentrated on the positive aim of the prince's actions, namely the salus publica. Furthermore, they

1M Ulrich Engelhardt, "Zum Begriff der Gliickseligkeit in der kameralistischen Staatslehre des 18. Jahrhunderts J.H.G.VJusti)," in Geschichte tnd Gesellschaft 8 (1981): 37-79.

Weber:Absolutist Theories of Royal Power, 1500-1700 903

realized that the theoretical distinction between a normal state of affairs and a state of emergency did not conform to reality. For this reason they allowed the use of certain extraordinary political means (for instance, a secret service) even in normal times, in order to forestall a state of emergency.1 1

It was in this framework that the principal duties and competencies of the monarch were established. The monarch existed for the sake of the state, not the state for his sake. In contrast to France, where at least Louis XIV claimed the state to be his property, the central European debate was more or less explicitly domi- nated by theory of monarchy as an office.An exaggerated theory of the divine right of kings was seldom propagated here. On the other hand, most theorists also shrank from the contractual consequences implicit in their theories of natural law. For every notion of creating a contract inevitably implies the notion of annulling the contract; in other words, the dangerous idea of popular sovereignty was inherent in the idea of a contact between the ruler and his subjects. Concepts of divine or natural order thus corresponded better to the requirements of absolutist theorists in the empire.12

Similar arguments could be found in theories of resistance. If the prince ruined the state, the state could free itself from the prince.This ultimate right to resistance belonged to the state, as it does to a patient who can change his doctor if the latter causes him to fall into an even greater state of illness. It is, however, possible to define in advance who in such cases embodies the state and, therefore, may legiti- mately resist. Moreover, only the prince is able to judge whether the state is going to ruin; and to attribute to someone else a right to resist means to abolish the prince's authority and sovereignty, which after all, must remain undiminished for the preservation of order and security. Thus, the ruination of the state was treated as limiting case, something that could happen, but only as a quasi-apocalyptic event, ultimately provoked by superhuman forces.13

Fundamental structures of the state that are in principle beyond the reach of the prince include the legesfundamentales; these laws embody, according to the doctrine formulated by Innocent Gentillet and Bodin, basic laws which constitute the state insofar as its essential political order is concerned. Insofar as the political order was conceived as a monarchical order, this concept at the same time strengthened absolutism. Critical questions arose upon closer examination of these leges. For example, because the German territorial states often lacked stable traditions of how

tDaniel Clasen, Comiipendidmni Politicae Siiccinictuvin (Helmstedt, 1675), 12-15, 587-751 (Clasen was a prominent member of the Conring school); Gabriel Naude, Bibliograplhia Politica, ed. Hernsann Con- ring ( 1633; rptd. Helmstedt:Johannes Muller, 1673), with the first and most influential distinction between admninistratio ordinaria and extraordiniaria; "Noth-LUige" and "Noth-Recht," in Grosses Vollstdndiges Utniversal-Lexicon Aller W'issenschaften tind Kihlste, vol. 24 (Leipzig and Halle: J. F. Zedler, 1740), cols. 1431-1438; Christian Firbringer, Necessitas mitd Libertas: Staatsbildting iind Landstande iun 17.

Jahrhlundert ini Brandenbuirg (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 1985); Stolleis,Arcaiia Iinperii toid Ratio Statuls. t2Johann Heinrich Boecler, Institutiones Politicae (Strasbourg:Johann Friedrich Spoor, 1688), 76-

81; Dreitzel, ProtestantischerAristotelistius, 177-181. t3Horst Dreitzel, "Hermann Conring und die Politische Wissenschaft seiner Zeit," in Hermllatin

Conring (1606-1681), ed. Stolleis, 161-167, and Protestantischer Aristotelismuitis, 232-239; Wolfgang Heider, Philosophiae Politicae Systetna Jena: Georg Reifenberger, 1628), 1004-1088.

904 Sixteenth Century journal XXVI / 4 (1995)

to choose the prince's successor; their theorists sometimes admitted more freedom of action than Bodin did. But, however extensive the changes may have been, they were still subject to the general goal of politics and state, the guarantee of security, stability, and order. Freedom to introduce the novel principle of primogenitura was thought to be permitted only in cases where the established rules of succession proved to have destabilizing effects.The same applied to the handling of rules in general. Central European thinkers dealt with the question of crown property more strictly than Bodin.The younger brothers of the prince were to be provided with public offices, but not with royal lands.The prince was not to pledge or lease royal domain except in casu necessitatis. Also the basic social structures of the state (structurae civitatis) were removed from his reach. However, because these structures must serve the common welfare, the prince had the right to conserve and improve them.

Moreover, Central European absolutist theory retained the principled restric- tion of politics to the realm of the res publica, excluding the realm of the household: "non domus, sed vicus est prima societas publica" ("the first public society is the village, not the home").This regulative idea was based on Germanic and Roman traditions as well as on Aristotelianism and on Bodin's ideas, and was also supported by practical experience. To intervene in matters pertaining to the private realm always led to social unrest and political resistance. Nevertheless, the theoretical bor- derline between the res publicae and the res privatae was fluid. So long as the terrors of civil war remained vivid, most theorists were inclined to incorporate res privatae more and more into the political sphere. Afterwards, increasing stability permitted a more relaxed view. Finally, theorists declared the principle of contract inviolable, for the rule of the pacta sunt servanda is one of the most elementary. principles for preserving stability. Because of the undesirable consequences of this rule for the prince's freedom of action within the state, theorists qualified the contract principle by saying that subjects are not able to enter into contracts with the prince. What subjects may have seen as contracts with the ruler were instead concessions granted by him, with the intention of strengthening the state. In case of doubt or emergency, the principle of the bonum commune was to be preferred over the sanctity of contracts. 14

On a lesser level, the goal of the state and its first principles were seen as binding the monarch to observe a range of rules of behavior and action.The prince was no longer allowed to consider himself a private father of a family. Instead, he must be convinced of his duty as a paterpatriae and behave accordingly. He must prove himself in his office and translate his abilities into lasting achievements.There was

14Julian H. Franklin,Jean Bodin and the Rise ofAbsolutist Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 70-92; Johannes Kunisch, ed., Der Dynastische Fiirstenstaat. Zur Bedewtung von Sukzession-

sordnungenflir die Entstehung des Fruihmodernen Staates, Historische Forschungen, vol. 21 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1982); Horst Dreitzel, "Grundrechtskonzeptionen in der Protestantische Rechts- und Staatslehre im Zeitalter der Glaubenskampfe," in Giinter Birtsch, ed., Gruind- uind Freiheitsrechte von der Stdndischen zuir Sptbkirgerlichen Gesellschqft (Gottingen:Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987), 180-214; Dreitzel, Politischier Aristotelismus, 353-355; Bartholornaeus Keckermann, Systema Disciplinae Politicae (Hannover: Peter Antonius, 1608), 14 (quote).


no room for indolence, improvisation, reckless action, negligence, or passivity. Rather, the prince must act with calculation, purpose, and awareness of the consequences.The pleasures of life were conceded to the prince only in calculated doses. Consequently, his political functions required transformation of the prince into a disciplined, rational, modern human being.

Above all, he had to abstain from everything which disturbed or damaged the conservatio reipublicae.This primarily involved avoiding innovations that were unnec- essary, or too abrupt or too far-reaching. Secondly, he had to avoid all behavior injurious to his own reputation or that of the state. In this respect he was obliged to combine the distance of majesty with a prudent proximity in order to promote respect and obedience among his subjects. The prince also had to know how to produce concordia et amicitia among his subjects.

All these obligations were reinforced by arguments from dynastic reason, possible temporal fame, and the prince's own personal fulfillment in the life to come. To stabilize the state and to bring it to bloom meant to preserve and fertilize it for himself and his offspring. If he succeeded, the ruling prince might become for pos- terity the most celebrated member of his dynasty. Acting as far as possible within the constraints of morality, the prince would also be sure to gain everlasting salvation. 15

* * *

Adaptation of these general principles to the problems of particular spheres of action transformed them into more concrete rules. Of the areas with which the prince concerned himself, religion proved to be the most troublesome, first because the religious definition of the goals of the post-Reformation was inevitably a confessional issue, and second because the advance of state power made the relation of state and church a permanent problem. Most theorists favored confessional unity, and the subjection of the church to the state. Accordingly, the prince was to avoid not only all actions damaging to Christian faith in general, but also (where confessional unity existed) to the specific confession of his territory.Yet he was also not allowed to neglect his political responsibilities in favor of the church and its officials.These premises inevitably give rise to conflicts, which most theorists of the three confessions tried to resolve by developing various distinctions to describe the relationship of church and state.Thus the state was holder of the ills circa sacra (rights over sacred things), allowing it, indeed obliging it, to solve problems of the church's organization and personnel.Yet the church remained in possession of the ius in sacris (rights in sacred things), a sphere at least potentially free from political interference. Princes ruling confessionally mixed territories were advised either to establish confessional unity, by secretly favoring the majority confession, or in cases of persistent confessional diversity, to carry out their religious duties in a nonconfessional way. This solution, already adumbrated by Bodin, was based on the distinction between

15"'In omni imperio prima virtus est gubernare se ipsurn, secundum fanliliam, tertium rempublicam,"Veit Ludwig von Seckendorif, Teutscher Fiirstenstaat Jena: Meyerische Buchhandlung, 1737), 134; Oestreich,Antiker Geist used Modertier Staat, 106-151.


private fides and public professio. But in any case, the prince was not to tolerate atheists in his realm because, in light of the state's concern with external happiness, and the necessarily religious quality of civil obedience, such people were antisocial and rebellious by definition.Afortiori they were not acceptable as the prince's counselors and officials. At the same time, it was seldom advisable to appoint clergymen to such positions, for the necessary political qualifications differed basically from those for church officials. Nevertheless, it was better to have only officials belong- ing to the majority confession.To lay hands on church property was permitted to the prince only in two cases: first, if he had to administer the property because the church had failed in its duties (for then it was his right to demand compensation for his efforts), and secondly if the bonum commune or an emergency demanded a mobilization of all public resources.16

On the question of the right of an absolute sovereign to seize property of his subjects, Central European theorists once again proposed distinctions. As indicated above, the notion that a prince had a claim to his subjects' property except in case of necessity, or a right of expropriation without obligation to compensate, was decisively rejected. Rather, property was thought of as a right preceding the state, even though the state guarantees it and the actual order of the state can modify its content. Therefore, the levying of taxes required for its legitimacy not only the existence of a financial emergency, as defined by the sovereign, but also the agreement of those affected. The form of consent required by theorists varies from explicit approval by the traditional estates to authorization by a standing commit- tee, or to the tacit consent of the subjects, and it was disputed whether explicit consent was required only for new taxes. In principle, nobles and clergy might also be taxed, and if the prince did not tax them, it was for reasons of political prudence. Thus, in principle the question of claims on the property of subjects ex necessitate was to be dealt with by the state authority according to the model of Hugo Grotius' dominium eminens. For example, the destruction of gardens or homes for purposes of defense entailed for Grotius an obligation to pay compensation quan- tum fieri potest. Pufendorf and Ludwig von Seckendorff transformed these requirements into a legal obligation issuing from natural law. For similar reasons, theorists often refused the prince the right to reduce unilaterally the value of coinage.As for the purposes for which taxes may be collected, Kaspar Klock went so far as to consider the idea of refusing to pay taxes when the proceeds merely served the prince's personal and dynastic purposes; he thus connected princely tax revenue with a duty actively to promote the economy.The reason for such views is best brought to light by Thomasius: the pleasure of possessions is part of the individual's beatitude, which is to be encouraged by the state. Hence, the ruler must not drive his subjects into a state of poverty. In light of this background, it was apparent that the prince had to levy taxes not on the things necessary for existence, but on the luxury goods of the rich; even then, there had to be a rational, sensible organization for raising

16Johannes Heckel, Cura Religionis:Jus in SacraJus circa Sacra (Darmstadt:Wissenschaftliche Buch- gesellschaft, 1962); Martin Heckel, Staat usnd Kirche nach den Lehren der EvangelischenJuristen Deutschlands in der Ersten Hi~fte des 17.Jahlrhunderts (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1968).

Weber:Absolutist Theories of Royal Power, 1500-1 700 907

revenue, and for thrifty, purposeful administration and distribution of the proceeds. But emphatic exhortations about the prince's duty to give a well-founded reason for levying taxes did not mean that the prince was in practice bound to render accounts to anyone. Thus, strict theoretical limitations of the prince's freedom of action in levying taxes was one of the many principles that broke down whenever the necessitas of the moment was taken into account. In case of need, the prince was free to seize private property in order to maintain a standing army for defense, or even to support a growing state apparatus. If a ruler sought agreement from his subjects, or reasoned with them and made himself accountable to them, it was only for reasons of political prudence. Strictly speaking, he was obliged only by his own ratio, and by his duty to listen to the suggestions of his advisors. In order to dispense with the limitations on his powers of taxation, he had only to decide that there was a state of emergency. In such a case, he was also entitled to inflict police punishment, by demanding that recalcitrant taxpayers pay even more, although the seizure of property was otherwise justifiable only following ajudgment of the courts.The situation was similar for imposing tribute. Since conquered opponents in principle were entitled to be treated according to the general principles of natural and inter- national law, a victorious monarch could not interfere with the basic structure of their lives.Yet the concrete determination of what is permissible rested with the victor, whose only criterion was his own political wisdom.17

In the sphere of legislation and justice the mainstream of argumentation was rooted in the ancient Roman concept of the condere leges et interpretari. Only Bodin proposed a more active understanding of the potestas legislatoria. Because jurists feared radical historical change, they sought to endow legislation by the ruler with as much stability as possible. Thus, they maintained that it was contrary to state reason to say that laws were valid only for the lifetime of a ruler (this against Bodin). By implication, therefore, a successor should either adhere to the rules of his pre- decessor, or if necessary, depart from them only very gradually.With continual ref- erence to the state goal of bonun commune, the meaning of which was to be determined by the prince, theorists gave the princely legislator unbridled competence (pro arbitio absque aliorum consensu) over all relevant public spheres.The laws had to be just, of course, to increase their respectability: "Respublica non propter leges, sed leges propter Rempublicam sunt instituitae." Moreover, in order to create circumstances in which his own edicts and laws could be clearly applied, a ruler had to be consistent in the eradication of all laws of local corporations that conflicted with princely law. On the other hand, no one was to be refused the right to a day in court, and there could be no suspension of rules of justice. The prince had to be available as the final court of appeal, and generally to take note of any gravamina

t7Christoph Link, "Naturrechtliche Grundlagen des Grundrechtsdenkens in der Deutschen Staatslehre des 17. und 18.Jahrhunderts," in Grund- und Freiheitsrechte von der stdndischen zur spdtbiirgerli- chen Gesellschaft, 221-227; Fritz Karl Mann, Steuerpolitische Ideale: Vergleichende Studien ztur Geschiclhte der Okonomischen und Politischen Ideen und ihres Wirkens in der Offentlichen Meinuing 1600-1700 Jena: Kotter, 1937); Michael Stolleis, Pecunia Nervus Rerum: Zur Staatsfinanzienmg in der Fruhen Neuzeit (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1983); Manfred Wachenhausen, Staatsausgaben und iffentliches Interesse in den Steuer- redfertigungslehren des naturrechtlichen Rationalismus (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1972).


(grievances) his subjects may have had. If the ruler applied the laws universally, as he should, local or corporate privileges could no longer be taken for granted; rather they became exceptions that required justification. Laws could not be unin- telligible, absurd, ridiculous, or impractical, and the public must also be given notice when laws were changed. New laws had to be compatible with preexisting laws. The prince was obliged to abide by his own laws, but doing so was also recommended by political wisdom. In all respects, the principle nulla poena sine lege

(no penalty without a law) was applicable. Punishments had to correspond to the crime and at the same time aim at reforming those who are culpable. Unequivocal reasons had to be given for each statutory punishment, although the carrying out of punishment was subject to political prudence. Since the time of Bodin, it was

agreed that only in cases of homicide was the ruler duty-bound to punish the cul-

prit, without possibility of reprieve. Special sanctions similar to punishment were

not to be the subject of any arbitrary obligation, and there were also to be no arbi-

trary executions, for subjects have a right to life. This meant, for example, that the monarch could not make all the members of a family liable for the crimes of one member, even though this might sometimes be politically desirable. However, such rules were binding only during a normal state of political affairs; in a state of emergency, they could be suspended at the prince's discretion: necessitas omnes legesfrangit (necessity breaks all laws). The police legislation (Polizeigesetzgebung) that was a peculiar feature of the German states is also relevant. Since the early sixteenth century the German Landesherr sought to shape religious, moral, social, political, and economical behavior through so-called police mandates or police orders. Since

police legislation of this kind did not constitute legislation in the juridical sense,

subjects had no legal recourse against it, even though the prince's police power might significantly intrude into the spheres of res privatae.18

The prince could at his own discretion create and bestow offices. Along with offices which directly provided essential public services, honorific offices were also permitted. Therefore, the payment of pensions and rewards was also allowed, insofar as they served a legitimate interest. However, the sovereign could not abolish necessary offices. This applies to the executive organs (adjutores, officiarii) as well

as his own counselors (consiliarii). Their selection was not to be purely arbitrary; with the passage of time, jurists were increasingly likely to recommend examen &

exploratio.When selecting officials, the prince did not need to take account of their social origin or membership in the estates; only a handful of authors obliged the monarch to recruit preferably from the nobility. A general maxim to guide the sov-

ereign in his actions was the requirement to organize the whole apparatus of government in a rational, functional, and efficient way. Hence, the prince could not allow officials to accumulate offices, or recruit top officials from one single family.

18Michael Stolleis, "Condere Leges et Interpretari: Gesetzgebungsmacht und Staatsbildung in der Friihen Neuzeit" (reprint of 1984 ed.), in Saat und Staawsrdson in der Friihen Neuzeit, 167-197; Dietmar Willoweit, "Gesetzgebung und Recht im Ubergang vom Spatmittelalter zum Fruihneuzeitlichen Obrigkeitsstaat," in Otto Behrends and Christoph Link, eds., Zum Rdmischen und Neuzeitlichen Gesetz-

esbegrf(Gdttingen:Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987), 123-146.


There was also a rule preventing the chaotic overgrowth of offices.The recommen- dations for installing a central, permanent, supreme council of state and a corresponding council of finance were so emphatic that they amount to an obligation. Continuous, efficient work was to be achieved through these bodies. The prince himself was obliged to take part in council meetings, and to conduct himself so as to obtain optimal results from the consultations; this meant granting the libertas con- siliandi.The supreme counselors might in no way be placed under pressure or influenced by reward. On the other hand, the prince was obliged to explore the deepest thoughts and motives of his counselors in order to be able to assess their recom- mendations. However, he retained the prerogative to accept their advice or reject it.

The sale of offices was forbidden, or at the very most, permitted only in an extreme emergency, for it encroached upon the sovereign's freedom to dispose of offices, and contradicted the postulate of public welfare as well as reason of state. Whoever bought his office possessed a claim on the ruler, whose decisions were therefore influenced inappropriately.The circle of possible officeholders decreased, thus limiting further the prince's freedom of decision. There was no consensus regarding the question of how to recruit officeholders. Some theorists asserted that the prince must not name foreigners as public officials, lest he fail in his duty of promoting concordia and amicitia among his subjects, or limit the possibility of bestowing offices as incentives for loyal conduct by his subjects. Others pointed out that the sovereign cannot be dictated to regarding his choice of helpers; a calculated decision to appoint foreigners can also be an indispensable means of exercising authority in times of crisis.The prince's freedom to associate with whichever of his servants he chooses was limited by the necessity of protecting his authority. He was not allowed to be on familiar terms with the consiliarii, and ministri was with any individual among them. Having favorites was an impermissible luxury, and even employing a prime minister was not recommended.The prince had to take over his tasks personally. Finally the prince could not demand anything from his officials that would violate their conscience. This problem was mostly discussed from the perspective of the officials, yet the officials themselves were not deemed competent to judge the moral quality of the service demanded of them by the prince. Thus, after dutifully listening to his advisors, the prince could make on them any demands that seemed reasonable to him within the bounds of his fundamental sphere of competence. Still, he might not require them to undertake anything absurd, or to commit suicide-a rule that led to problems in regard to war and hos- tages. No one could refuse a military order which would apparently lead to certain death on the grounds that it was a call for suicide; on the other hand, the prince was not to deliver one of his subjects against his will as a hostage to the enemy.19

19Michael Stolleis, Grwidzifge der Beamteniethik (1500-1650) (reprint of 1980 ed.), in Staat iald Staatsrisott itn der FrOi/eni Netzeit, 197-231; Rudolph Gottfried Knichen, Optis Politicion (Frankfurt, a.M., 1682), 721-793; Adam Rechenberg," De Ministerio, Quid Crimen Est," in Dissertationtum His- torico-Politicartn. ... Moderante A. Rechentberg ... Volumien (Leipzig: Gottfried Enoch Gross, 1678), pars. 1: 106-133.


The sovereign could and was obligated to use direct force to secure his authority and thereby the stability of the state.To exert this force and wage war he had to sustain a corresponding military apparatus.Yet, legitimate military forces must not be a threat to law and concordia in the state, or to individual subjects. The prince must not be constantly surrounded by bodyguard units composed exclusively of foreigners; that would be a sign of tyranny. Armies exclusively composed of foreign soldiers were likewise not allowed. All burdens of paying for soldiers were to be dis- tributed fairly and justly. Forcefully billeting soldiers in a subject's home or confis- cating a subject's property to provision soldiers was allowed only in case of need, and even then required compensation. In discussions of war the three determining conceptions of the time were linked: the older bellum iustum theory with its moral and theological basis; the modern bellum necessarium concept in the Tacitist, neo- Stoic variant; and finally, Hugo Grotius' approach to public law, which sought to make war into a legal business between states. Since war is generally viewed from the standpoint of the internal needs of the state, the first two concepts were in effect connected: war is just only when the prince wages it for the purpose of the conservatio reipublicae. Self-interest, personal ambition, desire for conquest, vengeful- ness, and craving for power were not considered legitimate reasons for war. On the other hand, war could be justified as defense against serious injustice or some other evil which threatened the essence of the state. Injury to the sovereign's honor could also be included because this also affects the state itself.The sovereign had to decide whether a justa causa existed and did so primarily according to reason of state. In war against a party which has breached the law, the return of territories, the reim- bursement of war costs and reparations could be demanded. Likewise, imposition of punishment and preventive measures were allowed. If worst came worst, these measures could also mean the conquest of the enemy, or even preventive wars. However, wars should not threaten the basic existence of the prince's people or those on the enemy's side. Internal evil could also be a causa licita for war: when the people became so lazy, sluggish, undisciplined, and eventually rebellious that inner decay of the state threatened, they could be educated and disciplined through war. This meant that the virtus militaris was also of central importance in peacetime. The prince also had to be capable of presenting himself as a military hero.To the extent that he could do so without endangering the public order, the prince had to keep his people ready for war, a process in which the mobilization of national feeling (sensus patriae) also played an important part.20

The prince was obliged to improve the mores et virtutes subditorium because the quality and stability of the state depended on these moral qualities. Therefore, he had to be indefatigable in supervising the appropriate educational establishments. If he were to seek to prevent the spread of knowledge and wisdom, he would be marked as a tyrant, that is, one who counted on being able to dominate more easily a stupid, rough people. At the same time, it should not be the prince's aim to

20Michael Behnen, "Der Gerechte und der Notwendige Krieg: Necessitas und Utilitas Reipubli- cae in der Kriegstheorie des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts," in Staatsverfassung und Heeresverfassung in der

Europdischen Geschichte der Friihen Netizeit, 43-127; Heider, Philosophiae Politicae Systema, 626-775.


encourage general, undifferentiated education and knowledge. Upbringing and education must rather satisfy the requirements of the state. Hence, those subjects directly aimed at politicm usum were to be favored at the universities. These included subjects which imparted political, juridical, and technical knowledge useful to the rulers. Still, academic education could not function at all without a certain libertas docendi and disputandi, which the sovereign must, therefore, respect. Public education had the further purpose of encouraging virtue and morality in a general sense, as well as enabling the subjects to develop their own interests and abilities in a better way.This latter goal served the state's need for prosperity: poverty contradicts the goal of beatitude, hinders tax yields, and produces uprisings.21

From the nature of the family, it follows that parents were vested with the rights and duties of educating their children.Taking children away from their parents arbitrarily was not allowed.Yet, public education served not only to supple- ment family upbringing, but also to correct it. Hence, its proper domain was higher education; regarding the institutio privata of small children the state could only admonish and warn. But the prince's general obligation to ward off harmful influences included certain goals regarding upbringing and education. Thus, the monarch could not allow anything which might corrupt the morals of youth, such as conjurers, comedians, or matchmakers. He had to bar the production and sale of confusing or corrupting picturae obscoenae, librifamosi and turbi. These measures also served the needs of a sound population policy, for only a nation that has sufficient population will survive (respublica manet immortalis). Therefore, the monarch had also to set conditions for marriage and inheritance. The monarch's goal was to admit only personae idoneae to marriage, and his competence in the field of marriage policy was very extensive. There was only one absolute limit: the principle, derived from the doctrine of the medieval church, that a valid marriage required the free consent of both parties.

This limit on the prince's power had to do with his obligation to respect and defend the dignity (fama et existirnatio) of his subjects. The subject had the right to be addressed by his proper title and to be treated according to his status or estate. He could not be arbitrarily reduced in status, or insulted; conversely, persons of illegitimate birth or who otherwise lacked the proper status could not be appointed to the highest offices of state.These provisions extended as well to the competence of censors, who had to exercise control throughout the territory in the field of morals and public conduct. Censorship in this sense was a preventive measure to forestall crime and misbehavior. Officials who filled- the role of censors were thought to be servants of the prince as well as representatives of people of good reputation, so that the ruler's control from above was combined with social self-control to make censorship more effective.Yet, the prince could not allow censorship to become so powerful as to restrict his authority, or so harsh as to give cause for discontent and rebelliousness.22

21Contzen, Libri X Politicorum, 199-300; Keckermann, Systemna Disciplinae Politicae, 190-201. 22Keckermann, Systema Disciplinae Politicae, 170-189, 204-308; Boecler, Institutiones Politicae, 15-

42; Christopher N. L. Brooke, The Medieval Idea of Marriage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).


The greatest threat to the conservatio reipublicae arose from civil war, for it not only turned the obedience of the subjects against their ruler, but also destroyed concordia in the state, which was the prerequisite for its ability to function. Moreover, civil war usually involved secret agreements with a foreign adversary. In view of the close relations among various European states, insurgents in one state could always find help from outside. Therefore, the monarch was constantly reminded of his duty to avoid: (a) actions or policies that might lead to civil war or intensify a civil war that is already under way; (b) a government that was too harsh or too lenient, especially with regard to excessive taxation or the censorship of morals; (c) an irri- tating oscillation between harshness and complaisance; (d) general neglect of his duties; any injustice or unreasonableness that might give offense to officials or subjects; (e) inattention to the opinions and conduct of the people; (f) neglect of his obligation to hear and accept good advice; (g) failure to act resolutely against potential insurgents; (h) tolerating too much luxury and prosperity, so that the discipline of the people and their readiness to act for the public interest were under- mined; (i) allowing the potentes in the state to form factions; (j) failing to prevent gatherings or meetings that had been forbidden, and so forth. To an uprising, which was indeed a matter of war, the prince could employ all the arcana imperii. For example, the sovereign was not bound by agreements with rebel leaders, except insofar as appears politically useful to keep such agreements. A problematic situation arose if the sovereign could only assert himself against his subjects by system- atically ravaging his own territory.Theorists maintained that in such a situation the monarch must abdicate in the interest of the conservatio reipublicae. But fortune in war can change very quickly, and the sovereign could be justifiably dismissed from office only if he was shown to be explicitly destructive to the state,3

* * *

In European political theory, systematic discussion of the limits of princely power centered on the topic of tyranny. Here, the argument revolved around four com- ponents. First, the tyrannus absque titulo, the illegal usurper of a throne, was differ- entiated from the tyrannus administrations or exercitione, or legitimate ruler who wields authority in a tyrannical manner. But it was not only the modus aquirendi or modus imperandi (in relation to the professed principles of law) that could make a tyrant, but also the telos or goal of the ruler's action. When the monarch pursued his own interests (bonum privatum) instead of the public good, he was a tyrant. Towards the end of the sixteenth century these traditional themes in the discussion of tyranny were colored by the religious conflicts of the time. Thus, a monarch who did not authorize the religious confession desired by a particular author, but rather persecuted and even sought to eradicate it, was denounced as a tyrant. Such conclusions reflected a confessional interpretation of the purpose of the state. Sub- sequently, however, as the main emphasis in the whole discussion of the monarch's

23Johann Friedrich Reinhard, Theatrum Prndentiae Civilis ex justi Lipsii Libris Politicorum (Berlin, 1702), 1775-1830.

Weber:Absolutist Theories of Royal Pover, 1500-1700 913

effectiveness shifted from religion to the restoration of peace, order, and stability in the state, discussions leading to a definition of tyranny became more scholarly and empirical. One unfortunate result of this development was that theoretical literature on the state increasingly lost its public effectiveness and ended by becoming self-consciously arcane. Standards for making judgment also became more ambig- uous. In particular, the discovery and recognition by theorists of various forms of rule that were intermediate between a legitimate monarchy and an illegitimate tyrannus made it more difficult to judge a monarch's actions as unambiguously good or bad. Many authors hence came to regard despotism (if not tyranny) as a legitimate form of monarchy. In this view, despotic rule could be justified when the subjects were not capable of expressing their political will in a mature way and, therefore, required strict governance, as if they were adolescents; if it aimed primarily at his bonum privatum but still kept in mind the bonum commune, the prince's despotism could also be justified. But the acceptance of despotism does not mean a tacit acceptance of tyranny. Rather, history was thought to show that tyranny will always last only for a short period, always ending in chaos, rebellion, and war-the very evils that are to be avoided at all costs. At the end of the seventeenth century there were further refinements in the discussion of tyranny, as norms for judging the prince's modus imperandi were connected not just to the bonum commune, but to the beatitudo or happiness of his subjects. Beatitudo was now thought to require not only that the prince respect divine and natural law as well as due process of law, but far more that subjects participate in political decision making in whatever form and to whatever extent was appropriate. Meanwhile, the contemporary definition of tyranny forbade the monarch to: (1) oppress and persecute the moral and spiritual elite (not least among them the authors of such treatises!); (2) prohibit all public meetings; (3) prohibit the right to emigrate, or to travel within the territory of the state; (4) oblige subjects to work without a justifiable reason (involuntary servitude for state buildings is not permitted); (5) create mistrust, conflict, and alienation among the subjects with the help of informers, slanderers, and agents provocateurs, according to the principle divide et impera; (6) exploit subjects, so that they are impoverished by taxes and other levies; (7) deploy his armed forces exclusively against his own subjects; (8) "perpetuo bellum gerere, subditis vero pacem and otium non concedere" ("wage war constantly, without permitting peace and leisure for his subjects"); (9) reserve public offices exclusively or even mainly to foreigners; and (10) refuse to listen to his subjects in general, and to his advisors in particular.24

* * *

In summary:

1. Theoretical discussion of absolute monarchy began in Europe as soon as absolute monarchy appeared on the scene, in the last quarter of the sixteenth

24Reinhard, Theatrum Prudentiae Civilis, 1830-1862; Clasen, Compendium Politicum, 656-672; "Tyrann," in Grosses Vollstdnidiges Universal-Lexicon Aller Wissenschafteni und Kiinste, vol. 45 (Leipzig and Halle:J. E Zedler, 1745), cols. 2193-2202.


century, and contained an enormous number and variety of arguments. Absolutism thus presented an acute challenge to conventional ways of thinking about power in early modern Europe.

2. In the Holy Roman Empire, the participants in this debate were above all bourgeois, learned authors possessing or seeking high positions in the prince's service. The chief preoccupation of the leading authors and schools of thought was thus to provide support for the monarch's claim to power and for his ability to rule.The debate was by no means a mere academic dispute, but related directly to the practical needs of the state.

3. These fundamental concerns were, however, tempered by the authors' own social and political interests, their respective concepts of a bonum commune (especially the conservatio reipublicae), and also by the different levels of social opportunity, and by the abilities and the needs of subjects within a given historical setting.

4. Ideas on the limitations of royal power were developed from a selective use of virtually the entire range of arguments which the classical European intellectual tradition provided. Owing to the inclinations of the authors, however, these traditional arguments were integrated into a system of thought that sought to legitimate the existing order and make it more efficacious. "Regnum (solum) potest conservari, si reges limitatam habeant potestatem" ("the kingdom can be preserved [only] if the power of kings is limited").25 This overall goal becomes especially clear if one takes into consideration the broad rights of the princes to discipline, educate, and mobilize their subjects.

5. The thesis ofJ. A. Hall thus found confirmation. In contrast to Asia, Europe always had only a comparatively meager demographic potential at its disposal. It was limited in space and politically fragmented. Therefore, its rulers had to develop two strategies: first, they had to rely on treating their subjects relatively well, and increasing their ability and readiness to act efficiently in business as well as in war; secondly, they had to enforce discipline upon themselves in the interest of their own survival within a dynamic system of rival powers, as well as to modernize their governing apparatus and rational- ize their policy.26

6. It would be inaccurate, however, to suggest that limits on monarchical power in Europe were only a matter of arguments by absolutist theorists. New studies of the reality of absolutism, mentioned earlier, confirm the existence of far more effective limits on royal power.The theoretical debate on absolutism we have tried to reconstruct takes into account only a part of the relevant European legacy.Among those things that it largely ignores were the liberties

25Clasen, Compendium Politicum, 651 (quote). 26John A. Hall, Power and Liberties: 7The Causes and Conssequences of the Rise of the West (Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1985).

Weber:Absoltitist Theories of Royal Power, 1500-1700 915

and rights of the common man, rights that had been secured in a long, com- plicated historical process. These liberties and rights may not have had the sanction of normative theory, but they were strong enough to become historical reality. Our work would perpetuate the arrogance of the older intellectual history if we did not at least point to these political achievements that were a part of Europe's daily life27

27Cf. Grund- uind Freihleitsreclhte im, Wandel von Gesellsclhaft und Geschichte: Beitrdge zur Geschlichte der Grund- und Freilieitsrechlte vom Ausgatlg des Mittelalters bis zur Revolution von 1848, ed. Giinter Birtsch (G6ttingen:Vandetnhoeck & Ruprecht, 1981).

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