€¦ · Web viewWord Count: 2,000 . Internal Assessment – History HL . May 2015 [name here] Candidate Number: [here] December 11, 2014 [school name / center number here] S. e

What were the key factors behind the successful internal resettlement of the Karelian refugees in Finland between

1944 and 1950? Word Count: 2,000

Internal Assessment – History HL

May 2015

[name here]

Candidate Number: [here]

December 11, 2014

[school name / center number here]

1

Section A – Plan of the Investigation

This investigation answers the question, “What were the key factors behind the successful

internal resettlement of Karelian refugees in Finland between 1944 and 1950?” The scope of this

investigation is the on the second resettlement,1 and covers the period from the resettlement’s

beginning to its end in 1950, focusing on the policies adopted by Finland and how each contributed to

the successful resettlement.

The method has sought to identify the key challenges facing the Resettlement Office (ASO)

by consulting the book Jälleenrakennuksen Ihme (1988) by Veikko Vennamo, head of ASO. The

policies taken by the Finnish authorities are evaluated in terms of their contribution to the success of

the resettlement. This is done by synthesizing information gathered from a variety of sources (books,

journal articles, and lectures), as well as critically evaluating the existing historical research, most

notably The Solution of the Karelian Refugee Problem in Finland (1952) by Axel de Gadolin. Where

appropriate, the evaluation is supported by comparisons to resettlement efforts abroad.

(164 words)

21

The first one was following the Winter War (1939-‐1940), also fought between the Soviet Union and Finland.

3

Section B – Summary of Evidence

The Re f uge e P r ob l e m

During WWII Finland fought and lost twice against the Soviet Union (SU): the Winter War of

1939- 1940 and the Continuation War of 1941-‐ 1944. Following the ‐

loss in the Continuation War, Finland ceded 12% of its territory and

resettled 430,000 persons - 11% of her population -‐ primarily from ‐

the ceded South- Eastern territory of Karelia‐ .2 The Karelians were

also evacuated after territorial losses of the Winter War, but two-‐

thirds returned following the initial reconquering of those areas

during the Continuation War.3

The post Continuation War economic output was 30% lower than

pre- war, electricity production was down by 15%, key‐

infrastructure was destroyed, and Finland had to pay 300 million

USD in indemnity to the SU.4 The Karelian economy primarily relied

on agriculture and forestry, and

most refugees were farmers.5 Finland’s economy did not need more farmers.6 Vennamo and Gadolin

argue that the highest political leadership was gravely concerned of

communism’s rise, and Gadolin writes: “There was a real possibility that the great mass of workers

and refugees, the latter robbed of all means of existence, would create a revolutionary situation.”7

2 Pertti Ahonen, “Taming the Expellee Threat In Post-‐1945 Europe: Lessons from the Two Germanies and Finland,”

Contemporary European History 14, no. 1 (1999): 10.

43

Matti Sarvimäki, Roope Uusitalo, and Markus Jäntti, “Long- t‐ erm Effects of Forced Migration”, (Discussion paper, Institute for the Study of Labor, 2009): 6. Available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp4003.pdf4

Ibid., 75

Kristiina Tolvanen, “A Nation in Transition: the Resettlement of Karelian Refugees” (Essay, University of Tampere, 2008).Available at https://www15.uta.fi/FAST/FIN/HIST/kt- evac.‐ html6

Axel de Gadolin,The Solution of the Karelian Refugee Problem in Finland, (Hague: Martinus Nijoff, 1952), 39.7

Ibid., 37. Veikko Vennamo, Jälleenrakennuksen Ihme (Helsinki: Gummerus, 1988), 53. (Translated title: The Miracle ofResettlement)

5

Despite minor tensions between the Finns and Karelian

refugees, the Karelians shared the same language, and were

“culturally and ethnically affiliated to the hosts [Finns]”, 8 which

Kacowicz and Lutomski identify as a key reason for the success of

the resettlement.9

By 1950 essentially all of the refugees had been

settled,10 and the resettlement is widely considered as a clear

success.11

Legislativ e Measure s

In January 1945, the Finnish Parliament passed the Land

Acquisition Act.12 The act entitled refugees to receive land in

compensation for their losses,13 and the earlier Compensation Act

(1940) provided compensation for lost property via cash and state-‐

bonds.14 The Land Acquisition Act was largely based on the earlier

Emergency Resettlement Act (1940) for post Winter War

resettlement - de Gadolin called the 1940 Act a “dress rehearsal of ‐

the 1945 Act.”15

The Resettlement Office, ASO, established in 1940, was responsible for the planning and

execution of the resettlement.16 Working together with the Karelian League and landowners’

organizations, it drafted the Resettlement Act of 1945.17 Historian Pertti Ahonen argues, drawing

upon international comparisons from East and West Germany: “the permissive and inclusive

approach […] brought a variety of gains” and was “instrumental in avoiding social problems faced by

8 Arie Kacowicz and Pavel Lutomski, Population Resettlement in International Conflicts: A Comparative Study, (Lanham MD,

6USA: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 71.9

Ibid.10

Tolvanen, “Resettlement of Karelian Refugees.”11

Kacowicz and Lutomski, Resettlement in International Conflicts, 60.12

Vennamo, Jälleenrakennuksen Ihme, 6.13

de Gadolin, Solution of the Refugee Problem, 18.14

Ibid., 20.15

Vennamo, Jälleenrakennuksen Ihme, 50. de Gadolin, Solution of the Refugee Problem, 31.16


Tolvanen, “Resettlement of Karelian Refugees.”

7

East Germany practicing repressive governance.”18 ASO had been

working on the 1945 resettlement plan since 1943.19 The Act

relocated each village community as a whole to a new area, and the

new areas were chosen to match the community’s previous

agricultural conditions.20

By 1950 1,214,000 hectares of arable land had been redistributed under the Land Acquisition

Act.21 This created around 80,000 new farms with an average of only 15 hectares of arable land.22

Othe r Resettlemen t P o li c i e s

KYMRO23 was an agency that coordinated the building of housing for

refugees. In 1945 the parliament banned all housing construction

other than that for resettlement, and KYMRO oversaw and regulated

the supply of building materials.24 KYMRO also controlled the

features of buildings: there were strict limits for the size based on

family size, windows could not be “excessively large”, ceiling heights

were capped at 2.2 meters, and so on.25

KYMRO and ASO worked together with the Finnish Architects’ Association to produce

blueprints for standardized houses for refugees.26 Many of these were designed in collaboration with

woodwork factories, and the factories provided some of the components readymade to ease

18 Ahonen, “Taming the Expellee Threat,” 15ff.19


Silvo Hietanen, ”Oma Tupa, Oma Lupa,” (lecture, Karelian League, Helsinki 10 Nov 2007). (Translated title: Your Home, Your Decision) Available at http://www.karjalanliitto.fi/index.phtml?s=22421

Ibid.22

Pertti and Maarit Alasuutari, ”The Narrative Construction of Karelian Identity,” (lecture, University of Tampere Department of Sociology, 2009). Available at http://wwwedu.oulu.fi/tohtorikoulutus/jarjestettava_opetus/Alasuutari/The

8%20Narrative%20Construction%20of%20Kare lian%20identity.pdf23

Abbreviation for “Kulkulaitosten ja Yleisten Töiden Ministeriön Rakennusosasto”, roughly translating to “TheDepartment of Construction under the Ministry of Transportation and General Affairs”24

Petteri Kummala, Jälleenrakennuskauden pientalosuunnittelu, (Helsinki: Finnish Architectural Museum, 2004), 8. (Translated title: Architecture during the Rebuilding Period)25

Kummala, Jälleenrakennuksen pientalosuunnittelu, 10.26

Ibid., 14.

9

construction – the refugees themselves almost invariably built their

houses.27 KYMRO also developed the RT- card system, which was ‐

designed as a “complete, comprehensive, and authoritative

encyclopedia of all construction techniques, materials, and tools.”28

Finland also established a scheme, named Arava, to financially

support housing construction in the countryside, and rent subsidies

for urban areas.29 Kacowicz and Lutomski argue “the core of a

resettlement plan is a development scheme based on land- and ‐

employment strategies”, as they are “most effective” and “relatively

cost effective.”30

(647 words)

27 Kummala, Jälleenrakennuksen pientalosuunnittelu, 13.

1028

Ibid., 9.29


Kacowicz and Lutomski, Resettlement in International Conflicts, 61.

11

Section C – Evaluation of Sources

Jälleenrakennuksen Ihme (1988, “The Miracle of Resettlement”) is a book written by Veikko

Vennamo, the head of the Resettlement Office. Vennamo published the book shortly after resigning

from his career in the parliament. Its purpose is to explain how he led ASO to solve the “Karelian

problem”, but also to be his personal account of the events of the resettlement and quarrels with his

political rivals.

The value of this source is that it offers an inside- view into the organization and politics of the ‐

resettlement: its author was the most important person in the resettlement process. It highlights the

challenges ASO faced, the policies it undertook, and the policies that were considered most important

by those in power.

The limitation of this source is that seeks to explain the successes of the resettlement as the

result of ASO’s actions, thus downplaying other important factors. For example, Vennamo places the

greatest credit on the Resettlement Act of 1945 that ASO drafted, calling it “the law that solved the

refugee problem”31, without recognizing that it was mostly based on the earlier Emergency

Resettlement Act of 1940. Similarly, he gives little consideration for the work of other organizations,

such as the Architects’ Association and KYMRO that were crucial in the construction of refugees’

homes.

The Solution of the Karelian Refugee Problem in Finland (1952) is an academic publication by

Åbo Akademi Professor of Political Economy Axel de Gadolin, who was part of the Research Group for

1231

Vennamo, Jälleenrakennuksen Ihme, 163.

13

European Migration Problems. Its purpose is to investigate the reasons behind the successful

resettlement; he argues that the foremost reasons were the legislative ones and economic ones.

The source’s value lies in that it provides a detailed account of the resettlement policies, how

they worked in practice, and how Finland was able to finance them. Importantly, it also investigates

how the 1940 resettlement shaped the 1945 resettlement. While perhaps not as exciting as

Vennamo’s “miracles”,32 these are crucial in providing a more nuanced and balanced understanding

of the resettlement effort.

One limitation of this source is that due to the proximity to the events, de Gadolin often had

to rely on estimates instead of accurate statistics for his analysis on resettlement policies’

effectiveness. For example, when assessing refugees’ integration into the workforce, he wrote: “It

seems most probable that the employment rate is comparable to that of the general population.”33

(394 words)

1432 The title of Vennamo’s book translates into “The Miracle of Resettlement.”33

de Gadolin, Solution of the Refugee Problem, 78.

15

Section D – Analysis

How is it that a small nation of 3.9 million that had just suffered a devastating defeat in a war,

lost 11% of its land area,34 and had its industries and economy in shambles could successfully resettle

430,000 refugees in the span of less than five years?35

Despite the difficult circumstance Finland was in, several factors were in its favor. The

Karelians were internal refugees, and the close cultural and national connection eased their

integration into their new homes.36 Kacowicz and Lutomski identify “cultural and ethnic compatibility”

as a key factor contributing to the success of refugee resettlement.37

Furthermore, Finland was in a relatively good position to deal with the refugee resettlement of

1945: most of the essential political structures, organizations, and legislation for handling such

situations had already been established through the Emergency Resettlement Act following the 1940

resettlement.38 Gadolin argues: “The Emergency Resettlement Act of 1940 was a dress rehearsal of

the 1945 Act.”39 Similarly, ASO had already been established for the first resettlement in 1940.40

Indeed, ASO remained at work in between the resettlement efforts, and started preparing for the

1945 resettlement in 1943.41 As mentioned in Section C, Vennamo downplayed the significance of

these existing frameworks, but as the evidence suggests they were instrumental in shaping the 1945

resettlement, it is reasonable to challenge Vennamo’s analysis. The Finnish resettlement organization

1634 Ahonen, “Taming the Expellee Threat”, 15ff.35

Tolvanen, “Resettlement of Karelian Refugees”.36

Kacowicz and Lutomski, Resettlement in International Conflicts, 71.37

Ibid.38



Ibid., 46.41

Vennamo, Jälleenrakennuksen Ihme, 114.

17

was prepared in 1945, and this was primarily due to frameworks established for the 1940

resettlement.

So what exactly did Finland do right beyond being prepared? ? Kacowicz and Lutomski argue:

“The core of a resettlement plan is a development scheme based on land- strategies or around ‐

employment- based strategies” as land-‐ strategies are “most effective” and “relatively less costly.‐ ”42

Finland did exactly that: it adopted a moderate land- reform law that redistributed land to the Karelian‐

refugees.43 The distribution of the refugees across Finland was particularly important. Each Karelian

village community was resettled as a whole into one area,44 thus preserving community structures

and inter- personal relations.‐

Although absorbing the Karelians primarily into the agricultural sector was economically

questionable (added capacity was not needed, larger and more efficient farms were sliced into

smaller ones),45 it was important from the perspective of social stability. Most of the Karelians were

farmers,46 and agriculture was the only sector that could absorb them relatively swiftly. Employment

and economic livelihood are crucial in integration, and both Gadolin and Vennamo agree that the

Finnish political leadership was prompted to act, as they were genuinely afraid of the possibility of a

communist uprising, a “revolutionary station” as Gadolin puts it,47 if the refugees’ problems were not

1842 Kacowicz and Lutomski, Resettlement in International Conflicts, 61.43


Hietanen, ”Oma Tupa, Oma Lupa.”45



de Gadolin, Solution of the Refugee Problem, 37.

19

effectively addressed.48 The Land Acquisition Act provided the refugees with a home and a livelihood

and ensured social stability, arguably making it the most important factor in the resettlement.

Another important aspect was the inclusive governance. Vennamo understood that people

from all sides of the matter needed to be heard. The 1945 Act ASO prepared was drafted together

with representatives from both the landowners associations, as well as refugees’ Karelian League.49

Ahonen argues for the importance of this inclusive governance, highlighting that it helped Finland and

West Germany avoid significant social instability faced by East Germany.50

Finally, Finland made substantial efforts to facilitate the building of homes for Karelians. The

Architect’s Association made available standardized designs, KYMRO used construction bans and

regulations to ensure that all available resources were used for refugees’ housing construction, and

KYMRO developed and distributed the RT- cards, “a building encyclopedia”, to guide the refugees in‐

the building process.51 This was critical as the majority of the houses were built by the refugees

themselves,52 and hence most did not have professional skills in construction. KYMRO also worked

together with factories to have some of the components of the standardized houses pre- made.‐

Together with the Arava scheme providing financial support,53 these policies made it possible for the

refugees to build their new homes.

(644 words)

2048 Vennamo, Jälleenrakennuksen Ihme, 53.49


Ahonen, “Taming the Expellee Threat”, 15ff.51

Kummala, Jälleenrakennuksen Pientalosuunnittelu, 8ff.52

Ibid.53

Tolvanen, “Resettlement of Karelian Refugees.”

21

Section E – Conclusion

The key factors behind the successful resettlement of the Karelian refugees were four- fold. ‐

First, although economically hit, Finland was in relatively favorable circumstances: the Karelians were

Finns themselves, and a shared language and cultural background decreased frictions with the

“hosts”. Critically, Finland also already had the necessary frameworks to effectively address the

refugee issue, mainly because of the resettlement effort following the earlier Winter War. Second,

the Land Acquisition Act of 1945 was instrumental as it provided the refugees with land and a

possibility to continue their professions thus ensuring their economic livelihoods, and it maintained

the social fabric and communities of the refugees. Third, Finland’s inclusive decision- making made ‐

sure the problem was properly understood from all perspectives, and thus legitimized and gave

increased support for the resettlement policies. Fourth, Finland took important steps to ensure that

the refugees had the materials, know- how, and financial resources to build their new homes.‐

(151 words)

22

Bibliography

Ahonen, Pertti. ”Taming the Expellee Threat In Post- 1945 Europe: Lessons from the Two ‐Germanies and Finland.” Contemporary European History 14, no. 1 (1999): 1- 21.‐

Alasuutari, Pertti and Maarit. ”The Narrative Construction of Karelian Identity.” Lecture, University of Tampere Department of Sociology, 2009. Accessed October 13, 2014. Available at http://wwwedu.oulu.fi/tohtorikoulutus/jarjestettava_opetus/Alasuutari/The%20Narrative%20Construction%20of%20Karelian%20identity.pdf

de Gadolin, Axel. The Solution of the Karelian Refugee Problem in Finland. Hague: Martinus Nijoff,1952.

Hietanen, Silvo. ”Oma Tupa, Oma Lupa”. Lecture, Karelian League, Helsinki 10 Nov 2007.Accessed September 28, 2014. Available at http://www.karjalanliitto.fi/index.phtml?s=224

Jäntti, Sarvimäki, and Uusitalo. “Long- term Effects of Forced Migration‐ .” Discussion paper, Institute for the Study of Labor, 2009. Accessed October 5, 2014. Available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp4003.pdf

Kacowicz and Lutomski. Population Resettlement in International Conflicts: A Comparative Study.Lanham MD, USA: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008.

Kummala, Petteri. Jälleenrakennuskauden Pientalosuunnittelu. Helsinki: Finnish ArchitecturalMuseum, 2004.

Tolvanen, Kristiina. “A Nation in Transition: the Resettlement of Karelian Refugees.” Essay, University of Tampere, 2008. Accessed September 28, 2014. Available at https://www15.uta.fi/FAST/FIN/HIST/kt- evac.html‐

Vennamo, Veikko. Jälleenrakennuksen Ihme. Helsinki: Gummerus, 1988.

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€¦ · Web viewWord Count: 2,000 . Internal Assessment – History HL . May 2015 [name here] Candidate Number: [here] December 11, 2014 [school name / center number here] S. e